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Development of Attitudes Prior to the Farm Accident.

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DEVELOPMENT OF ATTITUDES PRIOR TO THE FARM ACCIDENT

The transferees on whose statements the following analysis of pre-farm accident attitudes is based did not, for the most part, take an active part in the activities of the pressure group. About half of them were of neutral convictions, sympathizing with the resentments of the people, supporting some of the statements of the pressure group and criticizing others. Two were active supporters and one an active opponent. Three others, while not "agitators" were definitely sympathetic. More than half came from Gila.

By the generally accepted irrevocability of the act of segregation as forcefully expressed by the WRA Administration, those persons who came to Tule Lake were strongly impressed with the fact that they had made a decision which would be extremely difficult if not impossible to retract. It is impossible to estimate what proportion of the transferees from other centers had definitely made up their minds to return to Japan regardless of the outcome of the war. It is indisputable that some were still undecided, having come to Tule Lake to escape military service or because they were alarmed by the increasing WRA pressure toward relocation. However, the enthusiasm, and the militant attitude of that proportion of the transferees who had fully made up their minds to return to Japan was so overwhelming, that individuals who had other motives were forced either to dissemble and profess similar attitudes or suffer social ostracism. Very few took the latter course.

The overt step of segregation gave sincere individuals a powerful conviction of self-respect and morale. It was perhaps

their first major opportunity to gain self-respect since the initiation of evacuation. They had done with shilly-shallying. They had made their final decision and irrevocably turned from America to Japan. To them, Tule Lake offered an opportunity for a new existence, a place where they might prepare themselves for life in Japan, a place where they might live with individuals of like opinion and be rid of the company of the indecisive fence sitters, the koomori, bats, neither flesh nor fowl, who could not make up their minds to support either the United States or Japan and who made up a large proportion of the individuals who remained in the relocation centers after the first egress of the nisei. No longer, they were sure, would they be angered and annoyed by the presence of the inu, the stool-pigeons who ran tattling to the Administration. Instead, they anticipated a camp where all the people would be of one mind. It is understandable that in the face of this vigorous and idealistic attitude, persons who had reserved their final decision maintained a politic silence.

A gentle kibeï girl said:

"All during the trip all the people coming from Gila - all they talked about was how things were going to be in Tule Lake. There wouldn't be any more inus; no more Yes-Yes. They were so glad when they saw the camp. The people came here with such high hopes and they got so little . . .

"When we saw the camp there was a bunch of boys on a potato truck. They pointed. 'That's Tule,' they said. When I saw it tears came to my eyes. It was the first step towards Japan and George (her husband whom she hoped to join in Tule) would be here and everything. I really thought this camp was going to be much different than Gila."¹

Another kibeï woman of very militant mind wrote:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, July 19, 1944, p. 3.

"We came to Tule Lake with great expectation and high hopes to be able to join our fellow Japanese subjects whose ideas and future thoughts. Desire to return to our mother country at her emergencies and to serve her were the main purpose in seeking repatriation and expatriation."¹

A nisei girl said:

"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind (persons who were all of one mind) would be assembled here."²

It was now possible, and in fact, socially obligatory, to express loyalty to Japan. The expression of such sentiments would no longer be followed by incarceration in Leupp or Santa Fe. Attitudes like the following were no doubt common to many segregees.

From an ex-Santa Fe internee:

"We came here for the purpose of repatriation so that we will be on the priority list to be segregated to Japan. We may change our feeling after the war, but for the time being, we must rely on the Emperor or Japan, not on the United States government.

"Our loyalty is to Japan. Naturally we are very earnest about it. Some Japanese say they are still loyal to the United States, but I don't believe it."³

From an older nisei:

"We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan."⁴

In some individuals this attitude was carried so far that it led to a noticeable abhorrence for all things thought to be American and an idealization of all things thought to be Japanese. On arriving in Tule Lake, many nisei and kibe made a conscious attempt to turn their minds from "American ways of thinking and acting to Japanese ways of thinking and acting."

¹ibid., July 18, p. 2.

²ibid., July 19, p. 4.

³ibid., May 21, p. 1.

⁴From a MS prepared by JYK, p. 7.

Individuals were affected in varying degrees. Some, while complying outwardly, ^{kept their true opinions to themselves} ~~were little~~ affected; some embraced this attitude with stern earnestness; in some it grew to fanaticism. Outward expression of this attitude manifested itself on many minor occasions. Nisei social dances were broken up by kibeI demonstrations. Attending American movies was frowned upon. If any person were courageous or rash enough to speak favorably of a custom or ideal considered American, he would inevitably invite criticism and perhaps physical violence. Three men made the following interesting revelations of their consciousness of this psychological change in themselves.

A younger Americanized issei said:

"Previous to segregation I felt like an American and acted like an American. After segregation I could not help myself. In everything, I began to think and act like a Japanese. I was working on Internal Security then and had always gotten along with the Caucasians. But my mind was just turned around. The Administration just couldn't understand me and lost confidence in me."¹

A Young kibeI said:

"I was educated in Japan but was in the U. S. Army at the outbreak of the war. I was dismissed and am glad. I know I'm going to have a tough time in Japan because I have so many democratic ideas. But I expect it and am willing to take it. I know that the Japanese government is going to watch me and the other nisei, perhaps for years, but they have to do that. The nisei who return to Japan are still going to hold American ideas and must be watched."²

Another kibeI:

"But if I'm going to be a Japanese I'm going to be pure Japanese and not American at all. I didn't used to be like this. But now I just see this camp from the Japanese point of view only. As a Japanese, I got to do it this way."³

¹R. Hankey, Notes, May 23, p. 6.

²ibid., May 28, p. 5.

³ibid., May 18, p. 3.

Undoubtedly the non-realization of this Utopian dream was the chief motivating factor in the sociological explosion of late October and November of 1943. There were other very important resentments, but the disappointment when the true state of affairs at Tule Lake became known was the most bitter. This point will be encountered again, heading the list of the pressure group's demands to Mr. Best.

It should not be imagined that this sentiment was un-
among the transferees.
 unanimous. It may not even have been a majority opinion. However, it was the most vigorous, most deeply felt and, emotionally, the most significant of the complex of attitudes which contributed to the support of the pressure group.

THE PROCESS OF DISILLUSIONMENT

The first contributory causes to resentment met at Tule Lake by the transferees were not closely connected with the attitude described in the preceding section. The sight of the camp, surrounded by barbed wire fences and watch towers, the finger printing process, the atmosphere of mistrust and the implication that the segregees were potential criminals were resented to some degree. The omnipresent dirt and dust of Tule Lake were depressing. Preparations for housing were incomplete and caused much inconvenience. Some individuals were dismayed by the Administration's policy or necessity of scattering the transferees throughout the camp, since they found themselves far removed from any friends or acquaintances.

The fences

As preparation for a camp of avowedly "disloyal" individuals, Tule Lake camp had been surrounded by "man-proof" fence 7 feet

high and topped with three strands of barbed wire. Watchtowers had been hurriedly constructed at regular intervals around this fence. The presence of this fence was and continued to be regarded as an insult, a nagging reminder of American public opinion, by most of the segregees. Few, however, have expressed themselves as fluently or as bitterly as Mr. K:

"A very repulsive sight greeted us as we approached Tule Lake. It was the sight of numerous watch towers lining the perimeter of the camp. I felt as if we were a bunch of real criminals about to be impounded. . . . I felt sure others must have felt the same since I have heard them cursing and swearing vengeance.

"My feelings were further aggravated as we neared the camp. Though I have read about the high fences being erected, while at Leupp, my imagination seemed to have failed in its proper conception because the fences in reality are much high and more cruel, both in construction and appearance. I did not believe they were built so high and with meshed wires similar to those used at San Diego Zoo. Why even the gorillas with tremendous strength were caged in like a bunch of wild animals made me feel terribly irritated. Unconsciously I too have sworn to avenge this injustice some day.

"Topping everything which tends to rouse the ire of the internees are the search lights beaming throughout the camp, watching us through the wee hours of the night as if we were incorrigible murderers. Have we not been the most law-abiding people in the past? Why must we now be subjected to such humiliation."¹

Resentment over Housing

Additional irritating factors, were the confusion and crowding in the distribution of housing, the omnipresent dirt, caused not only by Tule Lake's frequent dust storms but by the fact that many of the barracks assigned had been inadequately cleaned or had not been cleaned at all. Moreover, housing accommodations were in most cases more crowded than in the centers from which the segregees had come. Many recreation

¹MS, p. 1.

halls were turned into barracks to house young unmarried men. The conviction developed that this ill treatment was being meted out to the people because they were "disloyal". A reliable Caucasian informant who assisted in the Housing Division at this time states that it was a madhouse. Former Tuleans who had left camp had sold their barrack improvements, shelves, built in cupboards and the like to evacuees remaining in Tule. The buyers moved into these apartments without notifying the Housing Department. When segregees arrived, they not infrequently found the barrack room assigned to them already occupied. Some of these stranded families ignored the Housing Department, found suitable unlocked quarters and moved in. This haphazard moving added to the burdens of the already overtaxed Housing Department. Most of the barracks were very dirty; some were filthy. One family found their assigned quarters so uninhabitable that they would not even put down their suitcases but slept the night in the block manager's office. The next morning the father came to the Housing Department and said he must have different quarters. He was told he must take the room assigned to him. This he refused to do and insisted that Mr. Huycke, who was then head of Housing, examine his apartment. After much argument, Mr. Huycke gave in. He found that the apartment in question had been used as distillery and that the fig mesh had spilled over the entire apartment, creating a dreadful stench. A disinfecting and cleaning crew worked three days to render the room fit for habitation.¹

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April, pp. 36, 37.

One nisei from Gila described his first impression of Tule lake as follows:

"When I came from Gila I just stood here like a dumbbell. Everything was dirty; the barracks were dirty; the showers were dirty, the mess halls were dirty. When I first came here, that's the way I felt. I think the old Tuleans were used to this mess. That's the main key point in the cause of the trouble."¹

A nisei girl from Topaz said:

"The thing that struck us was, I think, the first appearance of the camp. The comparison with Topaz was very poor. The latrines, the mess and the apartments were so poor in condition and so different."²

A nisei girl from Gila who later worked against the pressure group, said:

"You know how it was on the train. After being so tired, to come to this dirty camp which was so dark and dusty and windy. The Housing didn't want us to be what they call a homogeneous group. So they scattered us all over. We didn't have a single friend in our whole block. We resented the Housing Department. Then, in the latter part of October they broke the Housing Department's windows. They didn't find the guilty ones at that time. I think that was the spark of the whole incident (breaking the windows).

"Well, housing was the worst. We came into rooms with half the plaster board stolen; there was even nothing to light a stove with. We had to take it or leave it."³

A kibeï man about thirty years old who came from Gila said:

"I felt this was really a sad smokey place."

His wife added, "I said, 'What a dump!'" On another occasion she stated,

"For a few months or so you can be crowded. But when you don't know when you're leaving, it's very hard."⁴

Another young kibeï girl from Gila said:

¹ ibid., p. 20.

² ibid., July 18, p. 1.

³ ibid., July 19, p. 4.

⁴ ibid., Aug. 8, p. 4; March, p. 5.

"One thing, when I came here I almost cried, was that all of our friends were separated from us. We said, 'Let's move! That was important with me. I almost cried when I came here and saw it.

"The few people who came here later (In February and May) were not so bad off. They were put together more or less in one place."¹

A young kibeï woman from Jerome, an active member of a pressure group wrote in a letter to the writer:

"Then also, the poor facilities for housing, poor foods, employments unfair to newcomers, as compared to the previous camps we have come from, were all brought up to our attention and dissatisfaction arouse."²

Mr. K, who came into camp in December wrote:

"While in Leupp, I have heard from various sources that Tule Lake is a very dirty camp. Upon my arrival though I was prepared to see dirt, I was very much shocked to find it dirtier than I had really anticipated. I wondered what sort of people had lived here, or what sort of an Administrator was responsible for the health of the residents. . . .Day in day out, living in filth must have created disgust to such an extent that it finally became one of the contributing factors of the trouble."³

Equally disgusting to the newcomers were the extremely dirty, over-used latrinal facilities. The writer can vouch for this from personal observation. The latrines of Tule Lake are far below the standard of those in Gila in cleanliness. The equipment is worn out and inferior; some of the toilets do not flush; fixtures are dingy or dirty; obscenities are scrawled on the walls.

Almost as irritating as the dirt and the unsatisfactory housing was the quality of the food, which most transferees considered definitely inferior to that of the Relocation Centers.

¹ibid., July 30, p. 5.

²ibid., July 18, p. 2.

³MS. p. 5.

If every comment made on the bad food at Tule Lake had been written down, it would comprise a separate paper. One informant remarked months later when the food had greatly improved, "If then food had been as it is now, it (the warehouse incident) could never have happened."¹

"We never get fresh vegetables. A week and a half ago they started coming in, but they didn't have any for $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 months. All we had was potatoes or beets. We're getting some lettuce now. Why couldn't we get it when the canteen was selling it?"²

While Mr. K. did not arrive in Tule until December, his reaction to the food at that time, which he expressed most emphatically, was no doubt shared to a large extent, by many of the transferees who arrived two months earlier:

Upon my arrival here I have noticed one thing in particular that justified the Japanese to revolt. That is the food was terribly poor. I positively believe the food per person per day couldn't have gone over 20 cents which is less than half of what the Government really allows.

Much criticism was heard throughout the country that the Japanese are being well fed especially after the investigation conducted by the Dies Committee. What lies the Dies Committee could so boldly print. If they would only come and live with us; eat with us; and sleep with us for just a month instead of two years as we already have and report the truths as they really exist, I'll praise them for their fortitude.

Regardless of what the Dies Committee has said, the food was bad and is bad today. Though it improved a little, the difference is so small, it still must be hovering around 20¢ a day. Why we haven't had an egg for over two weeks now.

Food is one of the greatest contributing factors that determines the harmony of the camp. It affects the stomach of every man, woman, and child. The quality of the food can be judged at times by the mood of the people. Grumbling and cursing, animated criticism of this government is freely voiced.

To my judgment the food lacks the essential elements that gives us strength and energy. Many boys are taking

¹Notes, May 15, p. 4.

²Notes, Mar., p. 14.

vitamins to keep their bodies from going to pieces. My eyes went bad on me since evacuation due to lack of proper food. I am not able today to do one fourth of the work I used to do before the war. Should I choose to do any manual work, my entire body starts to tremble and if I should persist, dizziness and fainting sensations overwhelm me. Though I look strong and vigorous, I could not in reality do the work that is required of me now.

Further enumerating on food as one of the greatest contributing factors of revolt. Is it not obvious when thousands upon thousands of men, women and children, the majority of whom are not working and therefore have no appetite that relishes anything will naturally find fault with food? When the appetite is good after a good day's work, the food may be gobbled down to satisfy the hungry stomach, but when the appetite is bad, the best food is subject to criticism.

Many at time I've looked for meat in the plate and if I am gratified with more than two tiny pieces I consider myself lucky. The plate of stew is just a plate of carrots and potatoes flavored with bits of meat. Be it roast pork, if we get more than two slices of one mouthful each, it looks as if the cook had made a mistake. The rest is dressing and gravy which we use to finish a bowl of rice. Fish is of the poorest quality. Herring which is used for fertilizer is now being supplied to us. With such food with no varieties, I cannot blame the rioters when they demanded better food on November 1, 1943.¹

Along with this resentment over poor food a conviction developed that at least part of this condition was due to graft on the part of Caucasian and Japanese members of the Mess Division. This conviction was shared by the older inhabitants of Tule Lake. Rumors of project meat being shipped into Klamath Falls and sold on the black market were current not only among the evacuees but among members of the Appointed Personnel. It was also rumored that large food bills were run up in nearby towns by members of the mess division and that those merchants who furnished an additional bribe were the first to have their bills met. This condition is supposed to have been investigated by the F. B. I. What was actually

¹MS, pp. 4, 5.

going on will probably never be known. All that is certain is that the food was very bad and that Mr. Peck, the Chief Steward, resigned mysteriously, some time after the supposed investigation took place.

This belief in graft affected the evacuees profoundly. Its force is reflected only mildly in the following statements. "I" a nisei from Gila, referring to the suspicion of graft by the Caucasian said:

"Grafting started the whole works."¹

K., referring to grafting by Japanese, said:

"Undue accusation of persons stealing and of grafts goes on without respect of the person under fire. Thus creating suspicion in the eyes of the people without proofs.

"Recently proofs were uncovered and the suspects were arrested (these were Japanese arrested for stealing rice). I personally hope they will be given the severest punishment if found guilty."²

The accumulation of evidence to prove the existence of graft on the part of the Caucasian personnel soon became one of the most important of the self-imposed tasks of the pressure group which was organized. It was considered one of the most potent weapons against the Administration.

This sentiment over inferior living conditions was summarized by a well educated issei, an ex-Santa Fe internee from Manzanar. This is an almost universal camp sentiment:

"The starting of such an action (the rise of the pressure group and the trouble which resulted) is the responsibility of the Administration itself. If the Administration had taken consideration of the comfort of the people as a whole, I don't think they could ever have had any action as that which came from the miserable colony."

¹R. Hankey, Notes, February, p. 14.

²MS., p. 2.

This gentleman, a graduate of Stanford also stated that he was of the opinion that the segregees had been sacrificed to WRA policy by being branded as dangerous and confined within a special camp so that WRA's desire to speed relocation might be facilitated. This opinion has been expressed several times by segregees, but only by those of a high educational level.

"First there was segregation, a mistake. Then military registration which was illogical. Then, to push the relocation program, the answers made at military registration were used to segregate a group which never could have been segregated. This created a problem for WRA which they had not originally anticipated. Those who came into Tule Lake as segregees had been treated with greater severity than in their relocation centers."¹

Of minor though by no means insignificant importance was the insufficiency of work and recreation. The work shortage gave rise to the additional resentment, that all the good jobs, "the key positions" were held by the old residents of Tule. To some extent this criticism was justified.

A young man, a nisei from Gila said:

"When I got here I got a job. I didn't feel bad at all. People who didn't get jobs felt awfully bad."²

K. said:

"No work is created to relieve the loathsome hours; no recreations are sponsored to divert the minds of the residents. . . . So far I have not seen any type of recreation sponsored for the adults, to divert their unpleasant minds. If there is enough work in this camp to keep the adults well occupied, recreation may not be necessary but when work is so scarce as it is here, recreation will play a great part in keeping the people satisfied. But neither work nor recreation are being sponsored to relieve the dissatisfied from concocting mischief. Seven days a week, 30 days a month, day in and day out without a thing to do, topped with lack of funds to keep oneself satisfied with wants really does get a man. This is another source of trouble ³

¹R. Hankey, Notes, May 21, pp. 2, 4.

²R. Hankey, Notes, Mar., p. 13.

³MS., pp. 5-6.

Another resentment which had a long pre-segregation history in Tule Lake sprang from the actions and attitude of the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Pedicord. He had acquired an unprecedented degree of unpopularity with the Japanese before segregation took place. A petition signed by 7,500 evacuees requested his removal in June, 1943. Reasons for his unpopularity were set forth in detail by Marvin Opler, the Community Analyst, in a report dated July 6, 1943. In the petition his attitudes toward evacuees, both staff members and patients, is called unsympathetic and dictatorial. He is accused of addressing the evacuees as "Japs," not obtaining necessary medical equipment, placing economy above service, and forcing evacuee doctors to relocate by his dictatorial attitude. Some of the unconfirmed accusations made by informants in November include: That Pedicord had anti-Japanese views, that he was incompetent and negligent of his duties, that he refused to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients who later died,¹ that he did not order sufficient medicine for hospital equipment, that he hired Caucasian quacks one of whom caused a child to be stillborn by giving the mother too much serum, that he cut the hospital staff so severely that it could not run efficiently, that he made the Caucasian nurses section heads and permitted them to give orders to the evacuee doctors (even though one evacuee doctor had a license to practice in California), that he cut down the allowance of baby food although there was an adequate supply in the warehouse. Because of

¹Report, Dec., 24, p. 21.

hiring "quacks" he is also blamed for the death of a severely burned evacuee child who is said to have been left without treatment from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. when it was finally treated by a Japanese doctor coming on duty.¹ The transferees took over this older resentment with remarkable speed. Dr. Pedicord's removal became one of the planks in the program of the pressure group.

While most of the informants quoted in the preceding analysis belong to that section of the population which sincerely desired to return to Japan, the writer noted that those, who later changed their minds and asked to relocate were just as vociferous in their complaints over ill treatment at Tule Lake. There was one exception, however. Those who had decided to get out of Tule Lake by the middle of 1944, had never been strong advocates of "a camp where we can all act like Japanese and prepare for life in Japan." Instead, they had talked of "bring treated like human beings and having as good a time as we can while we're waiting here." It should be kept in mind, therefore, that those who had found a comparatively safe and permanent place to stay until the end of the war shared many of the resentments of the sincere repatriates. Since the possibility of exchange was exceedingly remote, they realized that they might be forced to live at Tule Lake for an indefinite number of years. From Tule Lake and its living conditions, whether good or bad, there was no escape. There was no possibility of removal by relocation. Conditions had to be endured or changed.

¹ibid., p. 17.

DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE IDEALISTS - GROWTH OF HOSTILITY TOWARD OLD
TULE LAKE POPULATION

Those of the transferees who had hoped to establish and become part of a genuine segregation Center soon were bitterly disappointed. The old population of Tule Lake did not respond at all to the crusading spirit of the new-comers. To begin with, almost one-fifth of the population of old Tule Lake refused to answer the questionnaire at the time of registration. According to a statistical survey made December 3, 1943 there were still 1128 unauthorized residents ^{in camp at that time}. There is evidence that these persons, who had managed to convince the WRA hearing committees that they were "disloyal" to the United States, did not at first attempt to conceal their practical motives for remaining in Tule Lake from the transferees. But when they remarked to the new-comers that they had stayed in Tule to await the end of the war before deciding where they wished to live or to get out of the draft they were met with amazement which quickly developed into hostility. The number of old Tuleans who actually were undecided as to loyalty or were neither No-No, repatriate or expatriate was greatly exaggerated by the transferees. Some transferees conceived and spread the idea that the old Tuleans were spineless, that they were willing to take anything from the Administration, that on the whole, they did not wish to return to Japan. Certain transferees decided that WRA had perpetrated a deceitful trick, putting them down in a center purported to be for segregees only and actually populated by a large number of "Yes-Yes" people, still "loyal to the United States." Gone was the dream that there

would be no more conflict of opinion on "loyalty" no more fence-sitters, no more inu.

Many of the transferees and a still larger part of the old Tulean population were not affected in this manner and kept to the opinion that after all, everybody in Tule Lake should be treated as if they really wished to return to Japan. But certain minorities, particularly among the transferees from Jerome and Topaz, felt that the situation could not be tolerated. How this sentiment affected the development of the pressure group and the demands made to the Administration will be discussed in its proper place.

The following verbatim statements made by transferees from Gila, Jerome, Topaz and Manzanar throw some light on the psychological effect of the discovery that many of the old Tuleans did not think as they did.

From a kibeï woman, an active "agitator" from Jerome:

"When we learned the facts of failure on the part of the WRA to carry out this as a segregation center, that many a loyal ones still remained here in large numbers and many uncertain in status: the No-Yes, the Yes-No, the non-registrants, this, the dump, certainly was no place for us. . . .

"To make this center liveable as possible as we have been privileged in other center, to ascertain a certain status as a repatriate and expatriate not to be dealt alike with the other uncertain element. It was the feeling and the opinion of the segregees to form a central committee to carry out these above-mentioned facts for the benefits of our own and felt it most necessary to ascertain a certain status as we previous had expected. . . .

"What the former Tuleans or the uncertain ones thought at this time I have no idea, but the segregees were all for it."¹

A young nisei girl from Topaz, too young to take any part in political activity gave her reaction as follows. Her

¹R. Hankey, Notes, July 18, 1944, pp. 2-3.

remarks on the Co-op are particularly noteworthy, since they were shared by many transferees.

"Another thing that struck us was the great number of Yes-Yes people and people who hadn't registered who were here. We had expected just one group and had expected to run this camp as we wanted to. We had high hopes of that. . .

"We noticed the people here were so easy going and let everything up to the administration, and didn't bother to put in their viewpoints or anything.

"Especially about the Co-op. It was so different from the other Co-ops. We were shocked to see all the vegetables, potatoes and luxuries like cosmetics and desserts, because at Topaz we just had simple cupcakes and one kind of cooky and things like that. We didn't have varieties there and yet that was adequate for us there.

"At first it was so new to us and so long since we had gone to a store that we were glad. But as time went on we noticed that it wasn't so good. That was one way of wasting our money as well as giving the government an opportunity of not feeding us."¹

A young kibeï girl from Gila said:

"There were some families here - old Tuleans - who said, 'We haven't decided whether we're going back to Japan yet. Our boys just refused to register.' I told my parents, 'Gee, they just stayed here. They didn't want to go out.' I don't have much respect for them."²

A young nisei girl from Gila, definitely not a supporter of the pressure group, said:

"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind would be assembled here. But we found 5,000 Yes-Yes here. They (the transferees) thought they should be kicked out."³

A young nisei man from _____, who became involved in the pressure group after it was established stated:

"That's a very important point. I think about 7,000 people were left here. Among those people there is quite a number who have no intention of going to Japan. Possibly half of them should go out of camp."⁴

¹ibid., July 18, p. 1.

²ibid., July 19, p. 3.

³ibid., p. 4.

⁴ibid., July 30, p. 4.

An older nisei from Manzanar, who, although he did not arrive in camp until February, admitted that he had come to the conclusion that this attitude was very important:

"By gathering the news from the people, I think it amounts to this. I presume the people who came here as segregees from various centers were very much surprised to see the large amount of people of different status remaining in camp. You have to take into consideration the feeling of the segregees."¹

K., an internee from Leupp, who also did not arrive in camp until after the outbreak of trouble, wrote such a detailed, honest account of his first reaction to the presence of the loyal group that it should be included here:

"Let us not forget the political side of the question. We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan. Yet amongst us the WRA has permitted the loyal group to remain. For what purpose we do not know unless their residence is permitted in order to employ them as spies. This is one of the sore spots requiring immediate attention.

"The greater majority of these so-called loyals are not truly patriotic. They've declared themselves loyal because of personal reasons; the greatest of which is to avoid the conscription into the Japanese Military Forces in the event when exchange of prisoners of war is speedily carried out. But should they remain in the U. S. by swearing allegiance, they would escape that fear of being conscripted since this government then was deferring all Japanese nationals to 4C and 4F. So they did and considered themselves wise and safe, laughing at those who hastily renounced their loyalty to the country of their birth. . . .

"This NO-YES-NO group is doubly despised by the true adherents to Japan and to their Emperor. They are neither Americans nor Japanese. They are men without a country.

"Now to further crowd this camp with such opportunists of NO-YES-NO, would create trouble. Therefore their admittance here will be greatly deplored. We do not want them. Those amongst us now ought to be thrown into a camp of their own. . . .

"Is it not palpable the Administration...is making a critical mistake of grouping people of contra-political beliefs

¹ibid., p. 8.

here at Tule Lake? The demand to remove the loyals out of this camp has only been partially met. I hope for the good of all concerned, further augmentation of the loyals with the No-Yes-No group from various camps will not be permitted under any circumstances. We do not care to mingle with the degenerates."¹

A discussion and analysis of the primary attitudes of the old Tuleans and their reaction to the arrival of the transferees will be placed here. Data is now being gathered.

The unelaborated factors listed above, to which many less important attitudes could be added if data were more abundant, laid the foundation for the sociological explosion of late October and November. The rapid mounting of fury engendered when accidental events added profound emotional resentments to this already impressive accumulation, strained self-control past endurance.

For this manifestation, the Administration was unprepared. In fact, the National Director of WRA believed that Tule Lake would be the most peaceful of the centers.² Moreover, the Administration was still endeavoring to settle the most pressing preliminary problems of organization, necessitated by this vast and hurried influx of groups from many centers when it was overwhelmed by the phenomenally rapid rise of a pressure group within the camp. The farm strike occurred less than three weeks after the beginning of the influx of segregees.

¹JYK, MS., pp. 7-9.

²Find and quote, if possible, D; Myer's statement.

An attempt was made by Dr. Opler and a few other members of the Appointed Personnel to set up a body of staff members, the Advisory Council to assist in the initiation of some kind of colony organization.

"Before the accident we were dickering with Best on colony organization."¹

Nothing concrete was accomplished and this contemplated body was swept away by the impact of independent organization from within the colony. It was re-established, however, a month after the proclamation of Martial Law and was later to play an important part in the organization and establishment of a group of Japanese, who attempted to bring the camp back to what was termed "normalcy" and cooperate with the Administration.

THE THREATENED COAL STRIKE

(Sometime, in this period a coal strike was threatened, supposed to have been stimulated chiefly by the Topaz faction. It was resolved successfully. Opler had never given details, but I will get them eventually. Takahashi, later Daihyo Sha Kai member and important Topaz leader, is reputed to have played an important part.)

¹Notes, Mar., p. 59.