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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Conference of Community Management

May 13, 1944

Shirley Savoy Hotel
Denver, Colorado

Committee - Joseph B. Hunter
John Powell
R. A. Pomeroy
Harry L. Black

In accordance with your request the designated Conference Committee makes the following report on agenda items which it feels were (1) not subject to complete discussion during the conference, or (2) not included in the agenda.

- A. The committee feels that the item of employment of evacuees for personal services, such as domestic help, received sufficient discussion in the conference, but the record should point out the need for an early determination from Washington on the recommendation made for a change in the language of the Manual Release to specify "reasonable" rates rather than "prevailing" rates; and the designation of a maximum-minimum bracket for the guidance of the Project Director in fixing rates of pay.
- B. A question is raised as to the comparative personnel quotas in section employment such as Community Activities. On what basis does Washington prescribe quotas, and what are the reasons therefor? It is suggested that this may be on the basis of budget estimates submitted annually and quarterly; but it is pointed out that there is a wide variation from project to project, and it may be possible to relate sectional quotas among projects on some formula in terms of population, facilities, variety of activities and similar factors.
- C. The committee feels it may have been profitable to discuss the first quarter (1945) employment quota and employment trends for that quarter. As evacuees are lost from essential positions, is it contemplated to employ appointed personnel to fill positions? To what extent is such practice desirable? Or feasible?
- D. It is felt that further discussion could profitably take place concerning Mrs. Adams' suggestion of the techniques of partnership between appointed staff and evacuees. What are the best and most successful methods of transferring administrative responsibilities and authorities from appointive to evacuee staff? In what fields are best opportunities offered? What primary factors are considered? Can instances and examples

be given as step by step processes in the transfer to evacuee personnel the duties and functions formerly performed by appointed personnel.

- E. With respect to the discontinuance of Superintendents of Co-operative Enterprises at Relocation Centers, the following questions remain:
1. What disposition should be made of the files of the former Superintendent?
 2. In the absence of the visiting Superintendent, for whose signature is official correspondence prepared?
 3. Is there, or will there be, a definite schedule for rotation of visiting Superintendents to the several centers?
- F. Is there a specific plan concerning the relationship between the Supervisor of Adult Education and the Supervisor of Vocational Education? Is it intended that the Superintendent of Schools should correlate these two fields of education?
- G. The committee feels that the conference did not exhaust the consideration of the prerogatives of the Project Director with respect to Manual specifications. Frequently it may be the case that project practices attain a desired result by way of an alternative method. For example, some projects have already established a gate pass procedure for the purpose of checking entries and exits from the Project for other purposes than to supply population data for statistics. In such cases, may the Project Director depart from Manual procedure, provided the Statistics Section is supplied with the same information as would be supplied by gate checkers prescribed by the Manual procedure? In such case is it necessary to refer to Washington for approval of alternative practice?
- H. The Agenda of the Conference provided for discussion of relations between Community Activities and other sections. The Committee feels it would have been helpful to have a similar discussion of relations between Community Management and other divisions: Administrative Management, Operations, Project Attorney, Reports Officer, etc.
- I. Administrative personnel of Community Management habitually come in closer contact with various groups and a greater variety of individual evacuees than the personnel of other Divisions. We are therefore more appreciative of the reaction of evacuees to attitudes of appointed personnel. It would have been helpful to discuss the subject of attitudes between evacuees and staff members, considering not only Community Management appointed personnel, but staff of other divisions as well.

- J. No opportunity has been found to discuss Expatriation, Repatriation, Segregation, Army Induction, although these topics were inserted in the Agenda. Along with these topics, we should like to discuss what disposition may be made of those families and individuals remaining in Relocation Centers who ordinarily would be destined for Tule Lake. What is the status of these unsegregated segregees in terms of employment, chances of leave, chances of transfer, and the effect of their continued presence on the remainder of the population of a Relocation Center?

- K. The committee feels that the conference perhaps did not fully explore the opportunities of group relocation.

War Relocation Authority
Washington
June 15, 1944

OM-1175



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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

Paper Presented at the Meeting of Assistant Project Directors in Charge
of Community Management and Community Activities Supervisors

Denver, Colorado
May 8 - 13, 1944

LOOKING AHEAD
BY
LUCY W. ADAMS

The basic theme of hundreds of segregation, repatriation and leave clearance hearings in which I have taken part or reviewed was the question - Has a person of Japanese ancestry in the United States a future in this country which makes it worthwhile to stay here? And from the answers to that question spring most of our problems. The doubt created Tule Lake; it underlies resistance to Selective Service; it adds continually to the numbers of those requesting repatriation and expatriation; it checks relocation.

I suppose every person who has ever lived in a center has asked himself the question, "Will my future be better in the United States or Japan?", not once, but dozens of times, and will continue to ask it, and will not be sure which is the right answer. A question like that built the United States. Many millions in the last 175 years asked themselves -- "Will my future be better in my own country--in England, or Ireland or Germany or Italy--or in the United States?" And because they said "yes" we have the kind of America we have today. It is, however, a question which we resent if the person who asks it lives in America; and if he chooses another country it seems to us to imply a doubt of our institutions which borders on treason. It's a question which few people in this country have asked themselves because, badly as they might be faring here, there was no other land of promise to which they could migrate. But one group has had the question forced on it since we entered the war--those of Japanese blood evacuated from the West Coast and temporarily confined in relocation centers--and to a degree shocking to the public and to some of us have answered "My future will be better outside the United States -- in Japan."

The evacuee is not the only one who asks it; we of WRA have asked it since the beginning of our program. It was our key question, and upon our answer has depended all our policies.

The WRA answer to the question is fairly clear, I think. We say "Yes, there is a safe and self-respecting present for you here on which you can confidently build a satisfying future, provided you have satisfied the Government of the United States as to your loyalty; that you resettle in communities where we have ascertained you are welcome, that you don't now congregate in large groups, and that you are self-supporting."

The WRA can point to enough job opportunities and enough willing com-

munities to take care of every employable person and his family in the centers, and to a mobilization of agencies and groups which will protect the evacuee in his new community. That is a notable achievement. But it is beginning to appear that it is not enough for a majority of the evacuees. The futures in the United States which WRA is offering are not attracting enough investors to satisfy us. To our offers evacuees object: Chicago is all right but I want Los Angeles. Farm Labor is all right but I want to own my own land and be my own boss. Hotel employment is all right but I am a fisherman or I am a produce merchant. I am safe today perhaps but what about tomorrow when the war is over, when the soldiers come back, if there's a depression? To some of these objections WRA has a cautious answer. To the objection 'Chicago is all right but I want Los Angeles' I would interpret our answer something like this: "The constitution and the laws of the U.S. do guarantee your freedom of movement but some rights may properly be restricted in war-time. As soon as the war emergency is over we will do our best, as a part of the government, to see that the ban is lifted -- that you will be allowed to move freely anywhere in this country." That's as far as the WRA can go at this time.

We have all wondered what effect a reopening of the West Coast would have on the evacuees and on our problems. It would not completely dispel the doubt in the minds of the Japanese as to their future in this country, although it would be the most important single factor in building additional confidence. It might even for a time deepen the distrust, because no matter how carefully and with what wisdom the return is handled it may result in some tragic incidents -- similar to those some of us saw precede evacuation. Without the reopening of the West Coast, however, there would be little hope of the liquidation of Centers.

That, in the face of all the WRA has been able to offer on behalf of the U.S., is the reason for the continuing doubt on the part of thousands of evacuees as to whether they dare risk relocation. That is the reason for a persistent doubt about a worthwhile future in the United States? That is something that all of us on the projects during leave clearance hearings have asked both the evacuees and ourselves.

I'm not going to be so rash as to indulge in prophecy but I can give some appraisal of the strength of the various factors which will, to a large extent, govern the future of people of Japanese blood in the United States -- factors of racial discrimination, economic rivalry, regional prejudice, the temper of the American mind, of the evacuee mind and the power of the forces of good will.

I would like to appraise the future in somewhat concrete terms, not for individuals but for the group as a whole. Past history on the West Coast is a pretty good guide to what the future is likely to be. These people have only been in the U. S. in large numbers for about 40 years; and yet in those 40 years they made a wonderful progress in an area which is traditionally hostile to racial minorities. In spite of hostility, of suspicion and discrimination, they succeeded in an astonishing degree in establishing themselves in the economy of the area, in improving their condition and in climbing the economic ladder. In spite of alien land laws

they did succeed in owning and controlling a very large portion of good land. In spite of discrimination which closed some professions they did manage to enter others and in some fields they had almost a monopoly of employment and markets. They sent their children to college; through education they were achieving an economic dispersal which was increasing the degree of social acceptance. And they had done it while maintaining a greater measure of cultural isolation and closer ties with their homeland than any other group in the West, including even the Chinese who very nearly approached it. They have sent a large number of their children back to Japan to be educated; they've done less about learning the English language. As I say, in spite of those factors, and of the strained racial hatreds which seem to spring out of the California soil, for many reasons they made amazing progress. And evidently life in the West Coast to most of them was satisfactory. The rest of the United States was open but very few of them went there. Japan was also open but except to visit or to return, comparatively few of them went back to Japan. They felt they had a future in the United States; they admit themselves they had made progress. I venture to predict that the future for Japanese as a group will be in many ways like the past and in some respects better.

Will there be racial discrimination? We have to say, "Of course, there will. But it need not prevent a fairly satisfactory life and it is probably a diminishing factor." Where formerly people felt that racial discrimination was a local problem they are more and more realizing now that it is a national problem and closely related to our destiny in international affairs and therefore a matter of great public concern.

The factors which will continue to arouse racial discrimination will probably be the same which operated in the past and will appear in the same areas. One of the major ones will be the question of land ownership, particularly farm land. Farmers are notoriously insecure and hostile to newcomers and when Japanese purchase farm land they can expect opposition. In spite of this the Japanese will succeed in owning land. Wherever there are groups of Japanese trying to buy land we're probably going to have attempts to oust them. In spite of that, Japanese will operate and own land because they have the necessary skills and capital for it.

Next there's the feeling against inter-marriage. I believe that in the future the prejudice against that will be less intense than in the past, particularly if there is any widespread distribution of the Japanese. Certainly there is no phobia against it as there is against it as there is against inter-marriage with the Negroes and as they climb the social ladder the feeling will be less intense.

I think racial prejudice in the matter of city residence will operate very much as it has in the past on the West Coast -- as it is in Denver right now -- that residents in suburban areas will want to protect themselves against Japanese coming in. They will suspect that if one come in he will be followed by others; and if restrictive measures aren't already in force they will be taken. I imagine this type of discrimination won't decline very much -- it is something evacuees are going to have to face. In other

fields racial prejudice will rise and fall in relation to a great many factors and will always flare up where there is a big or rapid concentration. That is just a normal community reaction to preserve the existing social equation.

As to the great question the evacuees are asking themselves -- 'Will we be able to return to the West Coast, how soon and in what numbers?' -- I think we can safely answer, 'When the West Coast is opened by the Army, of course, you will be able to return but on conditions which some of you will not find attractive. The return will be slow; the reestablishment of the old economic pattern will be slower and probably in a good many cases impossible. In the cities a good many of you could return right now but housing in the biggest centers of production and former centers of Japanese residence is not easily obtainable -- it's almost impossible to obtain at the present time in Los Angeles, Oakland, Seattle, etc. A very large number of you could return now to various occupations in these cities -- the difficulty lies not in the lack of occupations but of houses. Some of you who have your own homes -- who have been gardeners, truck farmers, etc. -- could return right now. In some other areas you probably cannot go back and I fear would be met at the border by groups determined to repel invasion and there's nothing we could do except to call on the Army or the state guard to protect you.' There are places in the Central Valley in California, in Imperial Valley and in Orange County where that will probably be true.

I don't base these predictions solely on my own information. One of the favorite topics of conversation among groups of Japanese is "What will happen to us when we return to the Pacific Coasts -- will I be able to go where I was before?" Part of what I have just said is drawn from listening to them and part from observation in California.

To sum it up: I suspect the post-war acceptance of Japanese won't be very unlike the pre-war picture. I believe that evacuees who relocate are going to be able to meet conditions and in spite of racial and other types of discrimination will be able to achieve the same type of success as in the past. They're skilled workers in many lines; they're good bargainers; they utilize the American ladder to advancement. Their faith in higher education is going to bring about a continued economic dispersal which will make acceptance progressively easier.

Now I come back to the question: "Why does life on the terms which WRA is able to offer on behalf of the United States -- which is very much like the terms on which they lived before -- why doesn't that offer seem more attractive than it does? Why haven't a lot more people gone out? What's the difference between what the WRA seems to offer and what the evacuee wants and are we going to be left with just what we've been trying to avoid -- a great many people left in the centers at the end of the war?"

What the WRA offers is economic opportunity and social acceptance to individuals and families, provided sufficient care is taken and certain hazards avoided; and it is along those lines that our relocation program is directed. What the evacuee wants is something very different, right now at least. He wants security and safety for himself it's true, as an individual and for his family but he wants it not only as an individual but as a member of a racial group and under conditions which he may choose; and most important of all he wants to re-enter society on his former economic level.

The WRA sees the solution in terms of individual, family, and community case work; the evacuee thinks of it in terms of race, and of principles of equality and tolerance, and he believes that only on terms as broad as those can he, as an individual, be secure and happy. So while we think of a wide dispersal which will guarantee him a social tolerance in which he can remain suspended, to the evacuee that too often appears to be a social vacuum in which he will perish. The evacuee believes that he shouldn't leave the center until his conditions are likely to be met; the WRA is perfectly certain that delay will result in a major tragedy at the end of the war. That conviction accounts for our almost frantic haste to push relocation no matter what the cost to the center, or to the individuals or the problems which are concerning them. That is an exaggeration, but I think on the whole describes the horns of our dilemma. As Dr. Provinse mentioned this morning, every one of us in Community Management is faced with the difficulty of balancing the major objectives of our program. How are we going to maintain centers which are socially healthy, which meet the emotional needs of victims of a cruel war-time necessity, and at the same time empty the centers before the end of the war?

The WRA answer is that relocation is the primary objective and that within limits everything else should be sacrificed to that, but still leaves it on a voluntary basis. Well, obviously relocation is not the answer unless the evacuees accept it. At present they believe that they still have an alternative: They can still choose between the United States and Japan, with Tule Lake as a way-station, and between remaining dependent on the Government in a center or going outside. We know from experience that if they're driven, or I should say ridden too much, they will choose Japan or dig in at the projects. That still leaves the problem on our hands, whether it be handled by WRA or some other agency. It leaves at the least number the people at Tule Lake, and if we're realists we know that for a majority of the segregated it leaves the problem on our hands after the war as well as for the present.

If it weren't for WRA's fear of being left with an insoluble problem at the end of the war, I think we would concede that relocation has proceeded at a very healthy pace, and perhaps as rapidly as may have been wise. We wouldn't be concerned over the fact that changing composition of the group left in the projects will probably slow relocation down, nor would we be too greatly concerned over the probability that we will have a large number of people in various categories of dependence who are going to be in the centers at the end of the war or require government support. The character and the number of this residuum will depend largely on the degree to which the WRA is able to sell futures in the United States, and to which the evacuee is ready to accept the United States on the terms which we have to offer, and at the moment the only terms that we can offer. Our fear of having these centers on our hands at the end of the war is not because of the people who will be there--we have had C.C.C. camps, Farm Security camps--but because we're afraid that the gates will suddenly be opened and that the evacuees will be mustered out by Congressional or some other action, and we will be confronted by the same series of crises as resulted in the initial creation of WRA and so continue an unending horrid cycle.

Existence of the centers throughout the war is generally considered a

tragedy which we must avert or minimize at any cost, and we seem to have adopted as our motto the title of Mr. Marquand's best seller "So Little Time", and are acting accordingly. I doubt if the urgency is as grim as all that. Various methods of emptying the centers are put forward -- one of them is the suggestion which comes from some politicians and with various modifications is accepted by some people in WRA and a good many people in outside groups: reduce the centers to an assembly center status again; don't provide employment, don't give any wages, don't provide schools, and relocation will take care of itself. That is the extreme statement of a viewpoint which in a good many variations causes a lot of thinking about relocation centers and how far we should go in maintaining public services and social amenities. And at some date it may be a type of pressure we are entitled to use. Then we have the other extreme: recognize the centers as permanent communities and make them self-supporting by introducing private enterprise and private economy, with the idea that that will restore the incentives, initiative and also the cash for relocation. Some other individuals say: give the evacuees themselves more power and more share in WRA policy making and they'll solve the problem themselves. Our present WRA program is: go on as we are, but improve our method of merchandising American futures.

I think we do not admit to ourselves that the wreckage of evacuation has not all gone to Tule Lake, and that payment for the necessity of evacuation is going to require long term financing; it is going to go on as long as the lives of some of the people who evacuated, and "relocation", as a word, is not the complete answer to it.

The fallacy of our present position -- and I feel that it is a fallacy -- and of some of the remedies proposed, seems to me to be the conviction we're laboring under that we must solve the problem before the end of the war, and that the emptying of the centers will do it. That may be true for the WRA as an agency dependent on Congressional funds. But we should be careful not to identify our bureaucratic problem with the real problem, which is the establishment of satisfactory method of relocation and an enduring basis for the continued living of these people in the United States. Under that definition relocation is not the end, it is to date the most valuable piece of machinery we've discovered to achieve it, but it has to be used with skill and wisdom and it can't be pushed. It can't be overworked because the evacuee has the belief -- and it may be an illusion -- that he still has a freedom of choice. He can, therefore, kill the present voluntary relocation program at any point.

I believe we have time to work together with the evacuees on the total problem of their future in the United States -- and we'd better take the time -- because somehow or other either WRA or some other Government agency, or some combination of local and state agencies, will have to deal with it.

I think we can develop attitudes and techniques which are more satisfactory than any we've arrived at so far, and I'm sure that the way to tackle the problem is to attempt to deal with it as it appears to the evacuee as well as it appears to us, not as the problem of a Government agency or of bureaucratic destiny but as a human problem for which the government must recognize continuing responsibility. I feel this confusion of ends is hampering us to a certain extent at present. I'd say that our big job on the projects, and the most important one in Community Management -- by the way, I

hope we're going to call it Service again -- is first of all to create a realistic awareness among the staff and the evacuees of the problem as one that requires constant joint study and thought and to which we do not at the present time have all the solutions. I think our second job is to create mechanisms, lots of mechanisms, use the ones we already have, and multiply them, for joint study and exploration; and to lend our support so that they can be carried on constructively and lead to mutual enlightenment. Our third job is to create an atmosphere on the part of the staff and the evacuees which will lead to wise action, and I would say essential to that is to banish panic.

The important things to develop and to practice are techniques of partnership on the project. Wisely used they will contribute towards a better understanding of the problem, increase confidence in the ability of the Government -- not necessarily WRA -- and of Government agencies to handle it with wisdom and without undue haste, and with primary regard for the place of the evacuee in the United States. We can't change some of the terms on which relocation and a future in the United States can be offered, but the way in which it is carried out has to be something which the evacuee has a share in planning if our present program of voluntary relocation is successful. Dr. Provinsé said it was primarily an evacuee problem -- I'm not sure of that; I think it is our problem as well. I think it has to be solved together as a matter of partnership, of joint study, of joint decision on every level where we can carry it out, to contribute to a state of mind which makes the evacuee ready to accept and take his chance on his future in the United States. The present silent tug-of-war between evacuees and WRA, evacuee groups and WRA, has to be resolved in something more constructive than power politics, or school-book concepts of democracy and citizen rights. I say I think it is not primarily the problem of the evacuee but is a joint problem for us, not only as members of WRA, but as citizens, because the problem is so much bigger than its setting. There are millions of Americans now and after the war who are faced with problems of adjustment similar to those of evacuees; and for many of those millions the problem is complicated by race with prospects of race discrimination much stronger than there are likely to be in the case of a Japanese. In terms of numbers our problem is relatively insignificant. As it is a part of much larger issues of race and minority groups, and the treatment of minority groups, I think it is going to help create the pattern of our future. And so I think our primary problem when we go back is the exploration of evacuee attitudes, education in the facts, discovery and practice of the techniques which are going to be necessary to adjustment. I think in this way, while we don't put all our money on a direct approach to relocation, we don't make a direct attack either without studying and helping to resolve the doubt the evacuee has, and we'll probably achieve our relocation program better than we would in terms of assault, and in a way that will make an important contribution to our handling of similar problems in the future.

June 8, 1944



THE EVOLUTION OF EVACUEE RESPONSIBILITY IN COMMUNITY LIFE

(A paper delivered before the Community Management Conference at Denver, Colorado, 2:00 p.m., May 14, 1944.)

The topic listed on the agenda and the title of this presentation differ. The viewpoint I favor is the "Evolution of Evacuee Responsibility in the Community" rather than "Community Organization from the Project Level."

When we speak of community organization or community responsibility, we are faced immediately with two opposing points of view; first, that community organization can do nothing that is efficient; and secondly, that community organization can do everything. Neither of these viewpoints are correct. There is a middle road.

The development of community responsibility is based upon several definite convictions. The first is that people in general are vitally interested in all things which affect their lives; and secondly, that people are willing and able to accept responsibility in matters which affect their lives. These convictions are definitely democratic. They make allowances for group weaknesses and for individual training. They mean that people are able to govern themselves and that one person is just as good as the next, whether he be evacuee or a member of the appointed staff. The acceptance of responsibility and the willingness to act intelligently (including seeking advice from technical experts) are the criteria upon which democratic life is based.

But why should we have a community organization in a relocation center? The necessity for the development of community responsibility lies in the fact that American life depends upon the desire of people to govern themselves. Direction is too close to dictatorship. If the evacuees are ever to take their place in American life, they must learn to understand majority government including also the majority government which brought about evacuation and an understanding of its process of reasoning. They must also learn to again believe in Americans as people who believe in the principles expressed in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and they must also experience a definite satisfaction in participating in the democratic way of life.

Before such a general understanding could be developed and the purpose for community organization be stated in such terms, it was necessary to analyze the total situation. We

took for granted that the objective were correct, although some were obscure in the minds of the people. We had to know the attitude and willingness of the evacuees, however, to consider those points, the attitude of the staff toward community organization and shifting responsibilities to community government, the attitude of the Director, and the willingness of the residents to cooperate as well as a willingness to make mistakes in the learning process.

It was most evident that a number of the staff did not believe in community government because they felt that community government was letting the people run everything--that once responsibility was given to the people, they would continue to "ball up" the works and try "to run the place". Another member of the staff characterized community government as a "play toy" with no authority and very little excuse for existence. The evacuees themselves looked upon community government as almost useless. They couldn't do anything, so why try? The temporary community council had failed from their viewpoint. If the administration wanted a community council, it was wanted only to carry out administration policies and ideas. Such was, in general, the situation a year ago.

Certain key men saw that community government could do a great deal for the good of the people if it could be organized. They, however, distrusted both the local and the National WRA. In general, they distrusted the staff as people. They also knew that no matter what they suggested, whether that part be small or great, the administration could over-rule and was still responsible for the operation of the Center.

In the evolution of community organization, several steps were now taken. More or less accidentally, a few key men were invited to discuss relocation. They were taken into confidence on all matters pertaining to the relocation program as it then existed and offered excellent suggestions. Boys and Girls Week was promoted--It just happened that the theme of 1943 was "Learning the Ways of Democracy". These two developments gave a great deal of information about the administration to the people. The boys and girls, following out the national pattern, took over the project operations for a day. There was an interchange of ideas between the staff and the evacuees. All administrative matters were open for investigation to the boys and girls, and for the first time the evacuees learned what went on behind the scenes in the running of the Center.

Influence and Advice

From that time on information was channeled to the people on almost everything. The employment cut of last July was largely overcome by consultation and information. The committee worked with Mess Operations and succeeded in doing what the administration could not do by fiat order. Thus the staff and the Director came to feel that there might be some good in community government. There still persisted a feeling, however, "You can't give them too much or they will run the Center".

Then came segregation and the hectic problems connected with it. Information was channeled to the people by means of charts and notices. Constant meetings were held. Reports were given to the community councils on every new suggestion. Criticism shifted from the local staff to the Washington staff for the change in policies. This was unavoidable and all to the good as far as the Center was concerned. In October a permanent council was organized. The representatives were elected within each block. Interest ran high. Some were convinced that it would work and some that it would not. The block managers looked with questioning brows at the councils. A chairman was chosen who was dynamic and who had been a previous central block manager in the Butte camp. The councils in both communities (When we speak of councils in Rivers, we speak of two bodies distinct and separate, coordinated through the joint meetings of the Executive Boards.) appointed 19 committees. There was no knowledge of parliamentary procedure or committee reporting. Everyone was anxious to do something but there was apparently nothing to do. The channeling of information was all right and things were carried on, but the council had no prestige.

Training

It was suggested at one of the council meetings that there be an investigation of Internal Security. This, coupled together with the development of the Judicial Commission, created tremendous amount of interest. The committee appointed to investigate Internal Security went wild and found itself in a very difficult situation. It could go no further since the premise upon which its action was based had turned out to be a rumor. How could they get out of it? How could they have avoided getting into such a jam? How should a committee work? This process of training by doing, although exceedingly aggravating at times, had a very desirable effect. They pointed out (1) that committee members should not be members of the administrative staff of the activity which they are investigating; (2) that committees should base their actions on definitely written and proved statements, and in fact that no committee

should begin any action unless it is backed by a verified report. It also highlighted the fact that the community council was not a "play-toy" since it could get itself into an extremely difficult position and that its members were not free from possible suits for libel.

There now followed the report of the atrocities to American prisoners of war. A petition was drawn up denouncing these atrocities. A petition was also drawn up on Selective Service. The method was cumbersome. The block managers criticized the council for not being able to get things done. There now developed a small group composed of the executive committee and several members of the block managers who believed that a new organization combining block managers and the council was necessary.

Criterion of Efficiency

This move was excellent since now results and a speedy way of getting results became a common purpose and in this way influenced the community. There was a discussion of government--what it could do, what it could not do, how it could be revised, how it would operate, how to draw out the best leadership, how to define the jobs of councilmen and block managers, how to create a greater interest among the more able parolees, and what could be done to develop a thoroughly American outlook. After a number of weeks of concentrated discussion, several decisions were reached; first, that under no circumstances could the community afford to give up the elective form of representation and substitute according to the old Japanese custom and that streamlining procedures were essential; second, that an outline of jobs for both the councilmen and the block managers must be carried out; third, that the executive committee should have an office and give full time to its work. All these were taken care of. An executive committee was set up and all committee jobs cleared through it. It was particularly stressed that no member of the community should take up any matter with the members of the staff except through the community council, through the Project Director, and to the particular section involved and vice versa, that no member of the staff should contact any evacuee directly, but should channel through the Director, through the executive committee and the council, and to the people. The executive committee has full authority to act between sessions, should be available at all times, and should receive all communications from the Washington office.

Identification

Of course, there were many stumbling blocks in the development of this process. It was not and is not easy. However, the smooth operation of the Center testifies to

the cooperation which has gradually been developing. This is further highlighted by a discussion which took place with the executive committee in insisting that this Center is an American community. The executive committee placed in its outline of duties for the councilmen a definite statement to that effect. The Servicemen's Relatives Association erected a monument in honor of the men who had gone into the Armed Forces. There is developing a definite working partnership on an American basis between the staff and the council. I am looking forward to the time when there can be a much greater community as identifying itself fairly closely with the purposes of the WRA and with the American picture in general.

Not all difficulties have been overcome, but these difficulties center more around the attitude of the staff than around the attitude of the people in general. In the development at Gila, we have reversed the order of those factors usually considered as necessary for the smooth running of business, particularly problem situations and the influencing of subordinates in reaching decisions. Our business is really one of influencing people just as a business concern tries to influence its employees to carry out the policies of the concern. When we deal with people and the ancient practice of business and the modern practice of authoritarian and dictatorship governments, we reverse the use of authority. They told people what they wanted them to do and expected them to do it. We know from experience in modern business, industry, and government that authority can go only as far as the people concerned acquiesce in the demand. The magnitude of that acquiescence depends upon the sanctions which are available to enforce the demand. Authority created the evacuation, and authority created the relocation centers. Authority, too, could operate these Centers, but there authority reaches the limit of its sanction. No amount of authority can force the development of confidence. No amount of authority and no sanction can force people to believe in a democratic government because that very authority and use of sanctions violated the principles upon which democracy was based. We have therefore reversed the ordinary procedure of influencing people.

The process of identification was also reversed in as far as we were able to do so. Rather than identify the group as Japanese, we have and are attempting to use the term American and to avoid labeling anything as Japanese. There is no common purpose in the Center with the activities of the Japanese Government. There is an old statement which describes the experience of calling a child a bad boy and by that statement forcing him to live up to it. We are trying to avoid that in our operation, realizing that some of the things and ideas may be different from ours but that people are not necessarily bad because they have it. It is our job to give them sufficient information to overcome any false ideas or notions. It is a matter in which

we are to lead and one which cannot be directed. We can have pride in culture, but our thinking must function in an American way.

What we are really trying to do in community organization is to influence people to accept responsibility for themselves. In everything we do, we must therefore so construct our approach that the desired reaction is attained. Our own method of approach is not the criteria upon which to judge the work of a center. The effect of the approach is the criteria. It is not what we do that counts but what we get the other fellow to do in line with the general purposes and objectives under which we operate that counts.

One of the most harmful reactions to the acceptance of responsibility at the project level had been brought about by administrative instructions, manual releases, etc. We grant that standardization is desirable. We grant also that the higher officials may have a wider viewpoint; but when it comes to securing the proper responses from the individuals involved in a relocation center, administrative instructions have left very little leeway for individual thought. Life in a center has too often been looked upon through an organizational chart which designates "lines of authority". But "lines of authority" do not show that there are other and more democratic forms of influencing people. Information, training, and identification are such forms. They may be far more important in securing the coordination and cooperation of people than an instruction. Instructions, manual releases, etc. simply limit the leeway in which responsible people are supposed to act. The behavior of a rational person can be controlled and directed if the premises upon which he is to make a decision are known to him. The tendency of government bureaus to standardize, definitely limits the sphere of responsibility and detracts from democratic ideals and individual responsibility in government.

A functioning community organization depends upon its own ability to make decisions. When a very narrow range of discretion for its operation is permitted, the purpose of the organization is proportionately diminished. Successful community organization demands as wide a range of discretion as possible. This means as few directives as possible. Lest I be misinterpreted, I wish to repeat that directives may be perfectly sound but unless they bring forth constructive responses, they have failed in their purpose. Information, training, and guidance are all helpful but authority may defeat itself.

Community government as it is now established is not an end in itself but is a means of developing a greater acceptance of responsibility. Successful relocation depends.

upon developing confidence. We are not interested in developing a model form of community government. We are not now interested in establishing particular techniques or procedures. We are interested in carrying out the adjustment of a group of people who have been torn from their homes and in creating from that group individuals who are self-respecting citizens of a democracy and of a democratic world. As stated previously, community organization is not an end in itself but one means in the general solution of evacuation and relocation.

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