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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Conference - - April 27, 1942

10:15 A.M.

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| Present: Mr. Eisenhower | Mr. Coverley | Mr. Throckmorton |
| Mr. Fryer | Mr. Ferguson | Mr. Stafford |
| Mr. Barrows | Mr. Webster | Dr. Ade |
| Col. Cress | Mr. Dorman | Mr. Taylor |
| Col. Foy | Mrs. Bruick | Mr. McMenamain |
| Major Maston | Mr. Bates | Mr. Zimmer |
| Mr. Lee | Mr. Weinstock | |
| Mr. Cozzens | | |

Summary of remarks by Mr. Glick outlining the legal and constitutional basis upon which the program of the War Relocation Authority rests.

The Executive Order

At the present time no Act of Congress directs the activities of the War Relocation Authority. It operates under Executive Order No. 9102 under which the President, pursuant to his authority as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, established the War Relocation Authority. Paragraph two of the Executive Order is the heart of the order. It directs the Director of the War Relocation Authority to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal of certain persons designated by the Secretary of War from military areas, and for their relocation, supervision and maintenance after their removal.

The authority to establish military areas and a similar authority to evacuate persons from military areas was given to the Secretary of War in another Executive Order--No. 9066 issued in February, 1942. It is only from those areas that evacuation may be made. The Secretary of War it is to be noted has authority to evacuate persons under Executive Order No. 9066; the War Relocation Authority has similar authority under Order No. 9102. In order to guard against conflicts in the administration of these joint responsibilities, Executive Order 9102 does not affect persons in military areas without the approval of the Secretary of War. As the program has worked out, the evacuation function is primarily the responsibility of the military, while the relocation, maintenance and supervision of evacuees is the exclusive responsibility of the War Relocation Authority.

Executive Order 9102 contains provisions giving the Director of the War Relocation Authority broad authority to provide for the employment of evacuees, to secure the assistance of government agencies, to prescribe necessary regulations, to make delegations of authority, to employ necessary personnel, make loans and grants, purchase real property and establish a War Relocation Work

Corps. The Director is also directed to cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian in the custody and disposal by the Custodian of alien property.

Funds for Operation

The War Relocation Authority is now operating with funds allocated from a special appropriation of 100 million dollars, entitled "Emergency Fund of the President", that is contained in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1942. The President, by various allocation letters, has allocated funds from this appropriation for the program of the War Relocation Authority. The availability of these funds for expenditure for various purposes is dependent upon the language of the Executive Order, the appropriation, and the allocation letters of the President.

It is contemplated that the funds for operation, after the current fiscal year, will be obtained from a special congressional appropriation for the purpose rather than from an appropriation of emergency funds to the President.

Constitutional Bases of the War Relocation Authority Relocation Program

The constitutional question facing the WRA is the extent to which we can restrict the movement of, and otherwise control, the activities of the Japanese being evacuated from the military areas designated by the Secretary of War. Two-thirds of the Japanese are citizens of the United States--citizens who in law have precisely the same constitutional rights as other Americans. A great majority of the citizen Japanese are loyal or at least have given no other indication.

The constitutional issues arise solely with respect to citizen Japanese. Alien enemies--which of course include Japanese aliens in this country--have no constitutional rights whatever in time of war. Under the Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, the President has the power to detain and control in his discretion the movement of enemy aliens. As to one-third of the evacuees in the relocation centers, therefore, there will be no question of our constitutional power to require them to remain there.

With respect to the citizen Japanese, the constitutional doctrine is that they may be detained and restrained to the extent reasonably necessary to the national safety in time of war. The extent of danger from their unrestricted movement and the reasonableness of the means used are entirely factual questions which will be ultimately determined by the courts in event of litigation.

This does not mean that the citizen Japanese have lost their constitutional rights. It is well settled that the constitution remains in effect even in war time and that citizens are entitled to life, liberty, and property under the Bill of Rights, but those rights are nevertheless subject to the paramount right of the President and of Congress to take all necessary measures to protect the Nation in time of war. To the extent that necessary war measures

impinge upon the rights of life, liberty and property, to that extent, those rights must be regarded as restricted.

In the present case, it is obvious that the Western Coast of the United States is a strategic area subject to invasion, and to espionage and sabotage of particularly vicious consequences. The Army has decided that it is necessary to clear from certain areas on the Western Coast people who may prove dangerous if they continue to live in those areas and who may interfere, under certain circumstances, with effective operations within a Theatre of War. The mere definition by the Army of the military areas and the classes of persons who must get out obviously is valid if the facts and circumstances appear necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose of winning the war. The detention of persons in relocation centers by the WRA is likewise valid, if the facts and circumstances further support the reasonableness of that detention as a war measure. The existing facts lead to the conclusion that detention of Japanese at relocation centers would be sustained by the courts. The facts supporting the reasonableness of that detention fall into three categories:

1. Prevention of Violence and maintenance of orderly government.

It is a fact that persons of Japanese extraction all over the country and particularly in the West are in danger of their lives. Violence and threats of violence are of everyday occurrence. Voluntary migration of Japanese from the West Coast to inland communities has created unrest and disorder in those communities. Unrestricted movement of the Japanese may well lead, therefore, to bloodshed and riot which cannot be readily controlled, particularly if there should be war reverses in the Pacific.

The prevention of violence to Japanese is related to the war effort in at least three distinct ways.

- (a) Harsh treatment of Japanese in this country may well result in still harsher retaliatory measures against American prisoners in Japanese hands.
- (b) Violence against Japanese would also provide excellent food for Japanese propaganda in India and other Asiatic countries that this is a racial war; such propaganda would be as effective, literally, as divisions of troops.
- (c) Violence and disorder in any community will tend to degenerate morale and to lessen efficiency in war production.

2. Reducing danger of infiltration by Japanese troops.

A resident Japanese cannot well be distinguished from a disguised Japanese soldier landed by parachute. By mixing with Japanese residents, soldiers could congregate in areas of strategic importance.

In view of the clear possibility of invasion, the removal of all Japanese from all vital defense localities and restrictions on their movements in other areas within range of feasible sea or air attack are undoubtedly justified.

3. Prevention of sabotage and fifth column activity.

The third and most important basis for detaining Japanese as such depends upon the existence of facts showing disloyalty or probability of disloyalty among them to an extent justifying the precaution. It is believed that there are facts to support the reasonableness of detaining Japanese upon this ground.

In the first place, it is well known that the Japanese Government attempts to retain control over Japanese in other countries. It regards Japanese in those countries as still being subjects of the Emperor. It encourages Japanese to educate their children in Japan; its consulates keep close check on all persons of Japanese extraction and attempt to strengthen their ties to Japan. It subsidizes Japanese businesses in foreign countries for the purpose of furthering its economic control in those countries. There are evidences in other countries, particularly in South America and countries now overrun by Japanese, that the Japanese Government maintains an active espionage organization.

It is also clear that the Japanese have not been absorbed into American culture as have other immigrants. We have refused them the right to become citizens by naturalization; we have refused them the privilege of holding land and otherwise discriminated against them. In a sense, we treat them as much as an inferior race as we do the negro. Partly as a result of this and partly as a result of their own culture, Japanese tend to congregate in colonies. Many of them maintain Japanese customs and religion and keep their contacts with the mother country.

We also know that many Japanese in this country are disloyal; many American citizens of Japanese extraction have been found to be Japanese Reserve Officers. There have been a number of instances of subversive propaganda and other activities traceable to Japan. In addition, citizen Japanese have engaged in various types of suspicious activities. The charting of the West Coast by Japanese fishing sloops and their presence in fleet-maneuver areas have been given wide publicity. Japanese cameras have often been found in vital defense areas.

It is impossible to tell the loyal from the disloyal. This in itself probably would be sufficient to justify the detention of all citizen Japanese in view of the increased probability of disloyalty among them as distinguished from other citizens. Furthermore, we cannot be sure even in the case of the loyal that should the occasion present itself, as in the case of actual invasion, they would not, because of ties of race, color and religion, do an "about-face". It would certainly be constitutional to refuse to take so grave a risk. As a matter of fact, the courts, at least during war time, even if they disagreed as to the risk involved, would likely genuflect to the decisions

of the military as to the need for detention.

The constitutional basis for detention would further be strengthened if sufficient flexibility were provided in the relocation centers so that under exceptional circumstances and after due investigation, individual Japanese could be permitted to leave the centers either temporarily or, if conditions warranted, permanently.

Employment of Japanese at Relocation Centers

1. It is probably impossible to compel Japanese to work against their will. While their detention can be shown to relate to the National safety as a war measure, the product of their work would be in no different category from the standpoint of war need than the product of the work of any other American citizen. Furthermore, it would be unwise to attempt to compel them to work in view of present negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese Government, under which the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding treatment of prisoners of war would be extended to civilian internees and under which the compulsory labor of civilian internees would be prohibited. It is not expected that the lack of authority to compel labor will be a practical obstacle in view of the administrative devices of preferential treatment that can be used.

2. An enlistment in the War Relocation Work Corps will probably not bind the enlistee for the duration of the war. The enlistment creates a contractual relationship which would entitle the WRA to damages for breach, but it would probably not create a status which the courts would perpetuate since the enlistment is not under military law, and a court will not ordinarily enforce a contract for personal services.

3. Enlistment in the Army and assignment to the War Relocation Work Corps, as a device for obtaining permanency of enlistments, is subject to a number of difficulties. Army enlistment is limited to males over 18. Enlistees would be entitled to Army compensation. The statutory responsibility for the enlistee would then rest with the War Department.

4. The use of the Selective Service Act as a device to achieve permanency in enlistment would be subject to the same difficulties as voluntary enlistment in the Army, with several additional difficulties. The Selective Service Act requires that it shall be administered without discrimination on account of race. Also, it requires the induction of men on the basis of state quotas. The induction of all eligible Japanese would of course throw out of line the state quotas for the states from which the Japanese come.

5. The possibility of using the device of freezing Japanese assets as a means of keeping them on the project is still being considered. Obviously, if a Japanese has no money, he cannot leave a relocation center.

The Legal Framework of Project Self-Government

It is obviously impracticable to use existing state laws for the creation

of local governmental units in the relocation centers, primarily because if cities were organized under state laws, the elected officers would have complete control over city government and would have powers inconsistent with the administration of the project by the Federal Government. It is nevertheless possible to set up a procedure under which a "mayor", a "city council" and "courts" can be established within the relocation centers with much the same functions as they would have under the regular city form of government. In legal theory the Project Manager would merely delegate certain of his administrative functions to persons designated by election or otherwise by the Japanese. He would retain in that manner such degree of control or veto power as might be necessary for him to discharge his responsibility.

The WRA through the Project Manager could create a form of criminal court within each relocation center which would operate in the same manner as a city police court in trying petty offenses and other actions prohibited by "ordinances" of the city council. This mechanism would be nothing more than an expression of the function of the Project Manager to maintain law and order, delegated to a body operating as a "criminal court". It will probably be advisable in the case of major offenses such as aggravated assault, murder, and rape, to bring the Japanese involved before the appropriate state or federal court.

With respect to civil disputes between the Japanese at the centers, an arbitration court procedure can be set up under which parties may bring their disputes before somebody appointed by the Project Manager or elected by the Japanese. In the event one of the parties refuses to submit to this type of arbitration, the Project Manager could probably require an administrative hearing before him. In other cases, it might be desirable to require the Japanese to go into the state courts to settle their difficulties. In some cases it will be necessary to have recourse to state courts. The WRA cannot create courts with the power, for example, to grant divorces, appoint legal guardians, or probate wills.

CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZATION, September 26, 1942
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Glick: Is in favor of establishment of field office in San Francisco to handle property work. We have regional offices, we have drawn together regional staffs. "I am deeply disturbed by the danger of shattered morals within the organization if we eliminate regional offices." Is inclined to feel we should have two regional offices, that is, consolidation of Little Rock and Dewer offices into single regional office, and then prepare an adequate definition, which we have never had, of what are the respective functions of the three.

Mr. Barrows: Points out that surely status quo has many arguments in its favor, however bad it may be; leaving things as they are does not necessarily help morale. Morale is bad in Denver; Ray Miller has just spent seven weeks working intimately with Mr. Whitaker and people in Little Rock, and they feel that the region will be abolished and are slowing down on filling project jobs, expecting they would take some of them themselves.

Mr. Myer: "May I comment on that? I think we are going to have to take a chance on morale, and once we make up our minds, what we are going to do, we will have to move into it. I don't think we should concern ourselves too much about shattering morale by even drastic re-organization, if we move into it in a way, and time it in such a manner that we give people interested in it time to adjust themselves. In other words, we don't have too many people, probably don't have as many as we are going to have. There may be certain people who want to leave here, or who want to do something else than we are proposing they do. I think we'll have to gamble on that. So I don't believe we need to worry too much about the morale factor, although it is a consideration. I think furthermore, at the moment the majority of your people will be a lot more interested in getting a clarification of duties, feeling that we have, after study, settled on something. I think that will help morale a great deal more than allowing the

status quo to move forward as a status quo now. I think if we moved into a drastic reorganization change without taking time to go out and explain the reasons for it, you could have a drastic morale situation. Just one more thing I want to say on that, and that is, an organization of this kind is bound to be a flexible, moving organization. We are going to have to talk it on every turn to our folks. In war times, we have a situation as we have in the army--there isn't any one in the army that ~~they/they/~~ knows if they will be in the same position tomorrow as today, they may be moved somewhere else. We will have to get the same attitude among our own folks--this is not a peace-time job. So I am not too much concerned--unless we look at it from the standpoint of what we need--let's forget about the morale point for the moment, and then come back."

Mr. Stabuer: "It seems to me we will make more progress in thinking this things/ through and reaching sensible conclusions if we try to look at the question of what the ideal organization is in view of the job to be done, first. And then, on the morale, if we can work out the timing of the thing, I think the morale can be taken care of. Moving on then I agree with a good deal of what has been said, but I think possibly the weight attached to various points would be a little different. I think we need to have strong projects; that is where the job is to be done. We can't handle the jobs that have to be done on the project at either a regional or Washington office. I think we need to have strong projects. Secondly, I am inclined to think that we need to have the headquarters in Washington--the type of thing that Phil has mentioned, the place of WRA in postwar adjustments, I think also the opportunity of maintaining our contacts with other agencies that we are going to need to maintain contact with in order to really get the type of cooperation we need. I think all of those things dictate the necessity of maintaining a good strong Washington office. It is all

right to say the Director could stay here, or he could commute; I don't think that is a substitute for having a headquarters here, because once your headquarters get out in the field, you are merely an appendix on the rest of the governmental structure. I am inclined to think that the function of the regional offices could be minimized and perhaps eventually served by providing a service staff for particular jobs at various points, possibly in Salt Lake City, although if the outside employment thing develops it might be some other center, possibly Chicago, or St. Louis, or some place more nearly in the Middle West, wherever this outside employment is being stressed will be the place we will need to have sub-offices. So to recapitulate, I think we ought to move in the direction of a strong Washington office, and strong project offices, with necessary service centers at other locations as may be needed to meet the job as it develops."

Mr. Barrows: "Is your idea suggested by any of these proposals?"

Mr. Stauber: "I'm not sure I could go along with them specifically as indicated here."

Mr. Province: "b is the one that comes closest."

Mr. Kimmel: " I think we've only got ten projects, and I can't see how any useful function can be served by regional offices as set up now. The salaries of the project directors are such that we can find about as good men for project directors as we can for regional directors. It seems to me that the personnel we have in San Francisco could a good part of it go to the projects, eliminate a lot of confusion, do the job more directly, and not a bit more travel involved. As an alternative to that, I would ^{go} back to the point that Tom raised. That is the question of distance from the project. Let's have a principal office somewhere in the West with a liaison and policy staff

here, a very small one."

Mr. Barrows: "What is a policy staff?"

Mr. Arnold: "How can you separate it from operations?"

Mr. Province: "I think that is something we should discuss a bit more. In the original conception, as I understood it, the Washington office would be primarily responsible for policy, and the regional offices were set up to assist in administration. Have we determined that the Washington end will also have the responsibility for overseeing the administration as well as formulation of policy?"

Mr. Barrows: "How do you distinguish between those two functions?"

Mr. Province: "I would have to go back to earlier discussions that must have preceded the formulation of this in the beginning, that you and Mr. Eisenhower must have been in on. Mr. Eisenhower explained to me that the Washington office would handle the policy, but the regional office would take care of the actual administration of the projects.

Mr. Myer: "May I comment briefly on that? I know this story pretty well, because I spent several hours with Fryer on that. I was at the other end, and got his interpretation of what Mr. Eisenhower said to him, and feel it is quite correct because Mr. Eisenhower told me the same story. I think it needs to be understood that the first concept of this organization, after it was determined we would move into the relocation center type of program we now have, was that all of these centers would be located perhaps on the West Coast, or within the intermountain states and our major operating office would be at San Francisco or at some point there. One of the major jobs would be contact with the army through this assembly center period, as it has been; the movement and development of that program, and the supervision of the projects,

whatever number it took. That was the concept when the San Francisco office was established."

"The first thing that happened was that they did not find enough satisfactory areas in the far West, so they began to move east with them. They began to change that concept. By the time the middle of June arrived, when I began to come into the picture, the Dever office was already established; the Little Rock office was becoming established, it was just in process; so that we had three regional or operating offices--the charts had been drawn for them. Going back again, the original concept, it seems, when Eisenhower first thought about his field office, was that the Director would be spending part of the time, may be 50 percent of it, in San Francisco on this other basis, and would have only a small staff, let's say ten or fifteen key people, in Washington."

Barrows: ****"Then Milton began to feel, 'We're supposed to set policy, but the region is doing all the policy setting in operating the projects; therefore let's get busy and set policy quickly.' * * Then we started a series of administrative instructions, and finally I thought and thought, and came up and talked to Elmer, and said: 'Look, this can mean only one thing, that office instead of being the operating office is becoming a regional office; if it is, let's say so, and that will clarify things.' We put it up to Milton, and said, 'Yes, that's all it is.' So we drew a boundary around it and established a central region, and southern region, without anybody in charge. That hung fire a couple of weeks, and about all we knew was that the projects not in the western region would have to be supervised by Washington. Well, various things happend, but subsequently we hired a regional director for Denver and then one for Little Rock. * *"

Mr. Myer: ****"So, one other thing I see happening (I think I have said this before, but I want to repeat it), once we get (if we ever do get, we still have problems with it) projects well organized, staff reasonably stabilized, people who have been trained and found can handle the job, for the next year or two, our basic instructions regularized, the project job becomes a going institution in the sense that it is a well-organized, operating institution. We will have problems, big ones, lots of them, but different than the kind of problems we have today; not the formulation of a lot of key policies, but a job that has to do with running a well-ordered housekeeping job, being sure we are doing a good job of internal security, keeping our records in shape, holding courts in the proper manner, keeping the supply running, keeping the coal in, keeping fires out, and so on. We will continue to have a job, but it won't be the most intensive job. If we are successful, even reasonably successful, in this new stage of relocation, of really moving people outside, we have immediately ahead of us a tremendous task of getting public acceptance of that job, getting understanding among government officials as well as officials outside and in the area where we have no regions located at all. That is where most of the people should go, not necessarily-- I'll leave out the intermountain situation, because I think a good many can be accepted in that territory--but let's say the Midwest, the Corn Belt, and the northeastern and north central territory here. There's not only a tremendous task there to get that organized, I think that can function, but once people begin to move out in reasonably large numbers, we have a new project to handle of keeping tab on where those people are, helping service them in their tiebacks with the property

section on the West Coast, in their relationships with the employers, and with the communities, U. S. Employment Service, all kinds of movements that will go on, and I don't think any of us have visualized quite yet what that means."

Mr. Barrows: "A regional office is an office in which the head man is responsible for all functions of the Authority within his territory; that is by definition a region. Now an employment office stationed in Chicago or a purchasing office stationed in Denver, those are not regional offices; they are representatives of functional divisions which might and probably should be administratively under the Division Chief in Washington. We really almost have to settle this question: is this organization going to be divided primarily into administrative lines which are functional in character, or into administrative areas which are geographical? You can't confuse the two."

Mr. Myer: "May I make one other comment now. There have been many, many unforeseen developments that require operations at the Washington level which we did not see last spring--I did not see when I came in--priorities is one of them already mentioned, contacting people who know something about priorities, to help guide us at least during this period when we are getting our basic instruction. There will continue to be some of that, not as much of it perhaps as we have now, certainly a lot of contacts with certain Washington agencies that we had not expected. As Elmer says, after all Washington is the seat of government, and from that standpoint, you can't throw it out the window. We are going to deal with all the FBI records here in Washington, the Army

operates from Washington even yet, and most all the other governmental agencies do; a few of them have moved out, such as the Indian Service, that we deal with. ** I don't care what kind of organization you get, it won't be satisfactory. There isn't any that works one hundred percent and solves all the problems. You have too many complex situations to meet. You might organize on a basis, for example, ~~of~~ of having one general operating office that would be a project operations office, that would not generally have the responsibility for this relocation problem that I see is developing, and you might have that key up here and look to the Denver or San Francisco office as a project operations office. ** That kind of division might be a very logical division. We all know while we try to functionalize between divisions (and I think it operates very well), we always run across lines, and sometimes three or four divisions are involved; and you'll never get away from that. So I think we need to understand that in trying to project our thinking, that what we are trying to do here is to find the best, but not the perfect one."

Mr. Myer: "That is correct. Now of course the immediate need for a regional office was to organize the projects, we could not do it all from here. So one of their big jobs has been to secure personnel, help to get them trained, and set up, and established. Their next big job at the San Francisco level, of course, was the thing I have already mentioned, some of which will go out the window. At the other levels, of course, were involved all kinds of functions: receiving, planning, working with state agencies, school superintendents, and so on. So that thing has moved, Colonel, and we find today we are dealing with the project director directly."

Col. Wilson: "Through necessity."

Mr. Myer: "Through necessity. And they are going to be mad about it, and when I get out there, I'm going to have to sit down with some of the folks and say certain things are going to be done here, and this is the reason for it. Let me ask one question, and see if we can agree upon certain things. Could we agree upon this principle in relation to project operation, that we move everything that we could to the project level--this is in line with Tom Holland's thinking."

Mr. Holland: "I think it is in line with most everybody's here, as a matter of fact."

Mr. Myer: "That we move to the project level everything that feasibly could be moved there."

Col. Wilson: "Make him king."

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....Mr. Myer: "We have a different situation, I think, then you would have in normal times. The travel is not normal, I mean travel procedures we normally think of are not functioning on a normal basis, and they may get worse. Not only is travel not normal, communication is not normal. I think it would be impossible to have a major operating office in Denver, Salt Lake, or any other place, unless we had something similar to tactical line. I am convinced, in answer to what Philip says, that we are going to have to have field headquarters of some type, or more than one major field headquarters. Anybody want to argue that subject?"

Mr. Kimmel: "For different functions, or just in general?"

Mr. Arnold: "Is the field headquarters an intermediate step there?"

Col. Wilson: "That would operate directly under this office?"

Mr. Myer: "Just the same way as you have some one of a general nature here, I think there will have to be a number of field offices that will serve a number of functions**. There will be a director, assistant director, etc., because they are not Roy Kimmel's men, or somebody else's men. I think what you are going to have--of course, attached to the director, the different functional divisions, something like we have now. They may change as we go on. And I think, generally speaking, those people will deal more or less directly with the project director, and, of course, with his staff, as far as details are concerned."

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...Mr. Barrows: "We will have this kind of problem. At the moment, we are handling our medical staff out of San Francisco, and we have correspondence floating back and forth across the continent to hire nurses. At the same time we have moved to set up all the photographic work in Denver. Now suppose Philip should find it convenient to consolidate legal work in Little Rock? We'd never have a staff anywhere. That is why I personally feel that a or b would be my pick. I prefer b because of Elmer's argument that this is the seat of government, but I don't know how much I am influenced by the fact that I personally do not want to leave Washington."

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...Mr. Myer: "Unless there is something very different comes up to change my mind, I have definitely decided that the key office is going to be in Washington, the seat of government. I had not decided that up until this last week, but I have made that decision."

Col. Wilson: "I don't see how it could be any place also."

Mr. Myer: "I don't either, and especially in view of this spread. If we were just going to run 10 relocation centers for the duration, and we are going to try to do the best job possible at finding work for these people, if they were going to be nothing more than let's say concentration camps where they were not going to move out at all, giving them the best treatment possible, if that is all our job was, I would not decide that at all. I'd put an office at Denver or Salt Lake, a little later on, I'd have my property office out on the Coast, and I'd plan, if I were director, to maybe spend a third of my time in Washington. But that, as I see it, is only about 50 percent of the job, beginning next July 1; by that time we will have improved, not in volume of business in the way of the number of dollars we have spent, but from the standpoint of the improvement of how well we do our job. I think 50 percent of our job will be outside of that area. So I will decide that right now. Now we can move on from there."

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....Mr. Myer: "Let me say again, I do not care what the organization chart looks like if the thing functions. What I am looking for is something that will work, something that is understandable. Once we determine on it, we are going to have to put on a thorough-going training job, and be sure people understand how we are going to function, to give it every trial possible. I am trying today to think through and arrive at certain things. As I see it, we have arrived at two principles; one I have stated, and the other we have agreed on. One is, as far as the projects are concerned, we should push everything possible to the project level. The other is that we are going to have our key office in Washington. Beyond that I am not clear in my own mind. I still lean toward f as far as I am concerned. I think it can be made to function, but since nobody else thinks so --"

Mr. Baker: "What is the difference between b and f? F has $2\frac{1}{2}$ levels and b has 2 levels."

Mr. Barrows: "In b, any field representatives not in projects would be representatives of specific divisions responsible to the administrator. In f, representatives of specific divisions would be pre-

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sumably grouped under a field official. The degree of authority exercised over them is not entirely determined in this discussion."

Mr. Myer: "No, it isn't. If he were the right kind of person and handled it properly, it would increase; and if he were the wrong kind of person, it would decrease."

Col. Wilson: "Would your office in Washington decrease or increase under it?"

Mr. Myer: "I think it would increase, and particularly in certain aspects it is bound to."

...Mr. Stauber: "May I raise a question here. I'm not altogether clear in my own mind as to how satisfactorily this arrangement which you propose here of assistant directors in the field would work. I presume they would have headquarters somewhere, wouldn't they?"

Mr. Myer: "For the time being, there would be three of them--Fryer, Whitaker, and Smart. There might be another one or two as the program evolves in the next months."

...Mr. Baker: "What would be the status of these assistant directors? Would they be in charge to the extent of having the power to hire and fire, moving of project directors from one project to another as would seem to be advisable?"

Mr. Myer: "No. They may be in a position to assist in securing personnel, recommending personnel which the project director would hire with the assistance of the Washington office, the same as I might ask Elmer as Deputy Director where we might find somebody for this particular position, but not in the way Cy is now responsible for filling those staff positions out there."

CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 12, 1942
Washington, D. C.

VERBATIM REPORT

9:30 a.m.

Mr. Myer:

This meeting is called this morning for two reasons; first, to give you the Director's thinking about a little reorientation of program, and secondly to discuss reorientation of organization to properly affect the program. Three reasons, really. After we get through with those things, there are a number of policy questions that are now in the air that I want to discuss today and tomorrow, in light of the earlier discussion. We will try to unfold those for you step by step.

In the policy meeting at San Francisco, one of the staff members made a remark that I want to repeat to this whole group;— two or three of you have gotten tired of hearing it--that I think was very significant. When discussing community government, and we determined the council members would only serve for six months, somebody argued it maybe should be three or four, one of the members of the committee said, "Six months in a relocation center the way things are moving in this program now is a lifetime in normal times on the outside." While I think that was a little bit stretched, in terms of administration and necessity for decisive administrative action, a month nowadays is almost equal to a year in normal times, in normal procedures, and in a normal organization.

I have definitely decided that it is essential that we clarify our objectives in this organization, so there will be no chance for misunderstanding; and as I see it right now, we have two major objectives. One is to go just as far as we can with the relocation of people on the outside of relocation centers on a more or less permanent basis; and having determined that, the second one would be the most effective and decisive administration of the work in the relocation centers, in the simplest manner possible, in order to effectuate the first objective.

I have arrived at that decision after a great deal of almost prayerful thinking and discussion with a number of people. There was a question in my mind back two months ago, and even a month ago, whether we could get public acceptance, whether we could get the acceptance on the part of evacuees if we did get the public acceptance, to get a major job done in that field. I have now determined that we can get public acceptance, and we can get evacuee acceptance on a very large scale. That is dependent, of course, on certain things that we had to have, and I think that the foundation is now being developed to the place that we can do the job, I am convinced of it, providing we put ~~our~~ our energies in that direction, and we do not dare spread our energies too much.

Some of the things that have led me to that conclusion in the last two or three weeks, and to a final conclusion, is, one, the fact that before we had put our leave regulations into effect, the Department of Justice and Manpower Commission were ready to go along with this program, and indicated it was sound. Those were two basic essentials, as I see it. We had to be able to say to J. Edgar Hoover that

Francis Biddle thought this was all right. We had to be able to say to the Manpower Commission that it was such that the people in these centers would be using their manpower in the most effective manner. It has not been publicly announced, but we have that general agreement, as I understand it.

The third keystone, as I see it, is the utilization of Japanese Americans in the army, and while I am not in a position to make the final announcement on that this morning, I am in a position to say this, that we have a very sympathetic audience, and we do not dare say at this stage that this is going to be done, but I hope to be able to announce, before I come back from this trip, that it is an accomplished fact, and I personally think I shall be within a week or ten days. I have good reason to believe so, but I don't want to go off on a limb and I don't want you to go off on a limb, but if I did not think so, I would not move as definitely as I am this morning about this thing, because I feel that action is so essential to the major objective I started with that we must have, and I think we are going to get.

In addition to all of that, there are a few little straws in the wind I'd like to throw together for you. The very fact that this school at Savage, Minnesota, is now looking to the training of 400 men in relation to the Army Intelligence program is one big straw in the wind on this whole program. The fact that Major Whittling came in and told me they would like to have 250 of these people working in the arsenal at Ogden, Utah, to me is a big straw in the wind. The point is, they need men badly; the other point is, he is not afraid to have these kind of people working in an arsenal. Three railroads are now asking for an opportunity to employ a lot of these people. We got one request from a contractor on group labor for 150 people to go outside. We have had a number of requests from government agencies requiring white collar workers. We are getting a lot of requests for household workers.

I don't think I need to go on on that, except to say that day after day, as far as I am concerned, the evidence is piling up that this job can be done if we set our stage to do it. That leads to certain conclusions, which is my second point. If we are going to do it, however, we must simplify our program at the center level. I have definitely decided that we can only operate the program on employment if we have only one wage scale at the centers if we are going to accomplish this other thing, assuming we will meet our present obligations on anything that has been set up, of course, but we will establish no new private industry with prevailing wage scales at the centers. There will be no trust funds in productive enterprise. It is too complicated, it is too confusing. The war is going to be too short to try to work out something of that kind and get this other objective carried forward.

Once that is decided, it brings about a number of decisions and implications. It does not mean we won't have industry at the centers. It does mean if we have industry, it is largely industry for the development of the centers themselves or for government consumption, at the same wage scale we pay for services at the center otherwise, simply to help provide work, and effective work, for those people who cannot go on the outside and do a job. Under such conditions as these, it means

that the relocation centers have become a place to stay until people can go some place else, with reasonably kind treatment, with plenty of food, with good schools, with a secure place to live, with the opportunity to, I hope, remain good citizens, those that are citizens, and those who are good aliens to remain good aliens, with the best government, with the opportunity to keep warm, and with no plans for any permanent development at that level.

All of this simply means that we are going to intensify for the next three or four months on getting our construction completed, and we will have a big job -- getting priority, getting material on the ground, and getting them built. We are going to intensify on getting the best schools set up that is possible under our conditions and getting them right; intensify on getting our food situation straightened out and on a sound basis; and on the best internal security program possible, in order to build the ~~right~~ kind of records that will help in the rest of our program, and give them the best situation possible from the standpoint of internal security. That the employment program in the projects, in order to gear in with the outside, must be put on a sound basis. It must be analyzed from top to bottom, to be sure that we do not have too many people working on jobs, and that we find jobs for every one to do if they want to work; that there is not any difference of opinion as to why we are setting the thing up that way, that there is an understanding about the wage scale, and this, that and the other; that we are not going to complicate our employment program with such things as a little extra pay for this, that and the other, with uniforms, with the sort of thing that would come if we had a four or five-year program and if these people were going to stay in the center we'd need that in the picture. I think they would help now, and it will make our center job harder the next four or five months by not having them, but it all goes back to the principle that our big job now is to get clear-cut, simple, decisive administration that the evacuees can understand and that our own administrators out there can understand.

After I made this last trip, it gradually dawned on me as I read the reports that came over this desk and the telegrams and the telephone calls and everything else that came in, that we were just asking people, even intelligent people, as busy as they were, who did not have time to sit down and think all these things through, to encompass too many things at one time. That the problem of trying to build ten cities in four or five months time, involving all physical construction, setting up of government, establishing services, establishing courts, and all that sort of thing, was a tremendous task in itself, without the complications of trying within the same length of time to establish two levels of wage scale, and complicated provisions of industry--all the administrative problems that come along with deductions for subsistence where somebody's working out here and somebody working inside--were too complicated for our own staff, and too complicated for the evacuees.

It led to the very thing that we did not want, it led to further frustration where we already had frustration; and I make this statement with the distinct knowledge that at certain centers the announcement of this kind of a program for the time being is probably going to lead to

a crisis within the next week, two weeks or a month. Until we get over the hump and get it understood, we've got a terrific task ahead of us to get it understood. I am speaking of such centers as Poston, Tule, and particularly the older centers, where the policy was not established early in the game and where there were all the implications, we are going to move into this, and where we've already established some of these things I think now we're going to gradually have to take out. I simply say this to let you know I realize it's not going to be an easy thing to do for the next three months.

I am quite certain, I don't know who they are, but that we have a number of people who are not adapted to the kind of a job they are trying to do in the centers. The kindest thing we can do for them and our program is to find out who they are as quickly as possible and get them readjusted in their work, and find people who are adapted to doing the job we have to do. I think we should move toward as small a Caucasian staff as possible at each center. I realize that, with the first objective in mind, that we've got the people moving out we expect to move out, as time goes on, we might possibly have to add at certain levels a Caucasian staff to take the place of those bright boys and girls we want to locate on the outside, either with a training program on the part of evacuees, or find other people to do the job. We won't need as many at that stage.

That is general background. I might add that one of the things that led me to that conclusion was spending several hours, at one stage of the game, trying to figure out why certain things seemed to be going smoothly at certain projects and were not going smoothly at other projects; and I was particularly interested in trying to analyze why things were moving in the direction, general direction, that I felt they should at Minidoka. I think there are two essential reasons; one is, first of all, good administration, but second, they had not complicated the program with all these things I talked about, and it helped them to do their administrative job. It was simple, people understood it, they were accepting it, and going ahead. And I realized a little of the way in which we had complicated--I say we, because I am just as much a party to it as any one else. I have no criticism of anything that has been done. It was just too much. O.K.

It boils down to this, then: if we are going to get that job done, we must also simplify our organization so it can be understood, and so that there is no misunderstanding. There are at least three or four people in this room that are going to have to listen to this twice, but I will do it very quickly. I have gone over it with the regional directors in detail, and a few of the rest of you know the background.

We have definitely determined that with a program that spreads clear across the country, that may involve setting up some additional offices to get this job done at certain points--I hope not big offices,--with a job that requires working with the public on a much more intensive scale in every state and hamlet in the nation, with a job that is tied in so closely with all of the key agencies here in Washington--involves priorities, working with the Army, etc.--I have definitely determined that Washington will be the key office; that we are not setting up a major operating office in the field, which was under consideration for a long time, and which I put out of the window reluctantly. The projects, as soon as we can work out the realignments, will report directly to Washington.

We will maintain the three field offices as we now have them at San Francisco, Denver and Little Rock; that they will be staff offices in the sense that they will be assistant directors serving as staff rather than line, who will serve in really helping to get the job done all across the country without setting up the administrative program at those levels to do the administrative job that has been done in the regional offices in the past, in the sense of being responsible for hiring personnel, procurement, and this, that and the other all along the line. The flow will be directly back and forth. Certain details of that we have here to discuss more in detail as we go along.

Those offices will be small, five to ten people at the most. Offices such as the property office on the Coast will report to Washington rather than to that office, just as the project director would; in other words, it is a project. It does not mean that we won't have people working in the field, I am quite sure we will have to have other people working in the field--people in relation to employment I am certain will have to be out there. They will be reporting, however, to the Employment Division and will be in line.

That very briefly is the organization pattern, that is an outline. It will take some time to get all the details in effect. As far as I am concerned, I want to make it clear that there is a place in this organization for every person who has an effective job to do, and there are very few people in the organization that do not have a job to do. About the only place and people we may have a little trouble adjusting under these circumstances are the people affected not by the change in the field office situation, but by the change in general front on the program. Roy Kimmel knows this, so I can look him straight in the eye and say we probably won't need as many people in Industry. For those people who are adaptable, I want to use them. I don't know of very many problem children in our organization. We do not have too many people. It is just a question as to where they work.

I realize it is going to be a hard problem to adapt themselves and move where we want them to move in order to get a job done, and it is always a tough job for anybody to make such a decision. On the other hand, we are in a war. I want to repeat again that this program moves fast. We might have to in six months time go through another reorganization; and I want to say to this group here, if it is necessary, we won't hesitate to do it, if it is necessary to do it, if we are wrong about this one and we didn't look far enough ahead. We all have to be in a position to do that today. The boys that landed on the African coast did not have the opportunity to ask whether they might live here or there. As I look at it, we are in the same category today, getting this job done. I am not going to be tough about it, but I am going to be firm about it.

That is pretty much the story. There are a few other little things I'd like to remark on briefly, then I want to quit talking and let you do the talking for a while. Those people who are going to do that job are keyed into the Washington staff, and I want this definitely to get on the record: it will be necessary, to get the job done, to spend in no case less than one fourth of the time in the field, and in most cases,

half the time should be spent in the field. We cannot do it sitting in Washington. We cannot understand the problems if we don't get out there. It is going to be hard travelling. We may get to the place we have to move some people back out. The reason I want people moved together as far as possible now is that I think we need the cohesion that comes from regular staff meetings and regular understanding of the movement of this program. For those people located in the field, I am going to try to arrange with them to be in here at least once a month for three or four days, and sit in on a staff meeting while here, so they have a chance to have the feeling of what is going on here. That won't always be possible, but it is something we hope to shoot at.

We must immediately plan a more intensive program of getting our policies understood throughout the organization. I am leaving Saturday night to visit about three centers. I am debating whether we should not arrange, before I come back, for a couple of project directors' meetings at a couple different points to go over the same thing we are talking about here in detail with the, so there will be no misunderstanding. If we don't do it then, we've got to do it very soon. We are going to need, I think, rather regular and consistent either visits to the project on the part of the Director and his key staff to keep that keyed up, or else -- and probably both -- project directors meeting once every couple months at some point to discuss problems for a day or two, to have an understanding as to how this thing is moving and to get certain things clarified, until we get the thing clicking. If any of you have any ideas as to just how that can be done best in the light of this situation, I'd like to have them; and as far as I'm concerned, I am ready to give up Thanksgiving, Christmas, and everything else to get it done.

We must, in addition to that, plan the most intensive face to face educational job with the general public, something we have not done a great deal about yet. I mean that we have to organize our program in such a way that we really think through how we are going to reach almost every hamlet in the United States, not with news items and that sort of thing maybe, but through the kind of contacts that will have people everywhere know what this program is, why it is that way, and why we are moving in that direction, and what this program means to the objectives we are fighting for in this war. Let me use an example of what I am trying to talk about--some of you will get tired of hearing me talk about this too.

A little incident happened about two weeks ago that indicates the type of thing we need to get done; it happens to affect the whole organization I spent 18 years in. Mr. Glen Kinghorne is Extension Editor in Colorado, a man I have always considered very conservative, and at times a little cold-blooded. I had a contact with Don Sabin the last week or two on his trip, or three or four, along with Director of Extension Anderson in Colorado, and he was very critical of our program and what we are doing for the ~~Japs~~ Japs, and sounded off at some length about it, but he happened to be on his way to Granada to visit Granada. He went to Granada, and somebody did a good job. He only spent two or three hours there. He came out of Granada and made a radio talk that was put on six stations in Colorado, in which he did about three things. He cleared up all the misunderstandings he had in his mind and told about the fine construction and fine

living conditions these people were presumed to have had, he went off the deep end on that. Secondly, he nearly bled his heart out about what was happening to United States citizens, and he really went to town. I told him in my letter that I wrote that I thought he overdid that phase of it a little, but that was all right, he hadn't been there long enough; he showed he had a heart, and had a big one. The third thing he did, which was more significant to me--I expected these other things to happen to anybody that had a heart -- he had the courage to tell the farmers of Colorado that if they wanted these people to come out and help them with their job, they must be treated as United States citizens and not as slaves, and he did it in no uncertain terms.

That is significant in many respects, but in this one in particular: we ought to set out to do that kind of a job with every Kinghorne in the United States--I don't mean just Extension Editors, but everybody in a position to help us do that job. We don't need to do it, but get them to do it. We need to think through--not too many people doing it an once, but a systematic analysis of the people who ought to be keying into this job, the people interested in man power; in the field I know best, certainly the Triple A and Extension Service ought to be doing the job we should not have to do, and that is the job Kinghorne started out to do, letting the farmers know that if they expect to get labor and keep it, they must give these people the kind of treatment they would expect to give their own sons if they were working on the farm.

I think we should go on across the board with other people who have that kind of public contact. Some won't react like Kinghorne did, but most of them will; they will react in a way to be honest and sound about it if our program is sound. So I just want to say we must intensify that phase of the program, not by shouting to the world through the newspapers, or getting big audiences for us to talk to, or the Director to talk to, but quietly searching out those key people in each community that need to be educated so they will educate other people, and they will do better than we can. We haven't done much about it, but we have made a start, just a good start.

I think maybe that is about enough, excepting I would like to outline briefly, in addition to the job we have set out to do--and which Tom Holland and John Provinse have done an excellent job of to date--with church groups and welfare agencies, the establishment of local committees in larger centers. I might say incidentally I am going to go off the deep end a little bit the next week or two with the JACL. I'm going to see if I can't make real statesmen out of them, give them a couple planks for their platform, and rally the thing around to where they can help do the job some of the other Japs can't do. I will meet with ~~xxxx~~ them at Salt Lake on the 22nd. You will probably hear some criticism, I already saw a little, but I'll take a chance. It may fail. But I think they can help us, and they are organizing to see that too many people don't pile up on the outside as the leave program develops. They can do a better job than we can on that because they are members of this organization.

The other job I want them to tackle is to assist in getting a sound government program in there, because a good many of their members will be on councils in the centers, and I hope they will get them to see that the statesmanlike Issei are brought in on this. That is the basis. ~~I don't know whether it will work, but~~ I don't know whether it will work, but we are going to try it. I think it is a possibility of helping.

I met with Mr. McCloy yesterday and told him briefly what we were going to discuss this morning. I wanted him to know it from us rather than some one else. And one of the significant things of the entire organization was that I would expect, other than military passes from the four western centers, and the additional Hawaiiin evacuation, that our main liaison with the army would be here in the future rather than with General DeWitt's office.

I don't want to close the door on this discussion, but I wanted to outline briefly some of the things I'd like to discuss later today and tomorrow in light of the general policy statement I have just made. One is segregation. I still feel very deeply, if we can do it simply, that we should move toward at least moving those people who have determined that they want repatriation out of the centers. But if we have to move five or six thousand people into five or six centers, out of some one center, in order to provide a place for them, I am not sure that it is worth the effort, because we are going right against the principle of simplification and lack of frustration, in order to get settled down to a job, that I think is very questionable. In other words, we have shaken these people a lot. I don't want to shake too many people any further than to shake them outside. I have some question about it, but I don't want to discuss it now. I simply want to throw it open, and tell you why I am throwing it open.

That same situation affects tuberculosis hospitals, as to whether we want to set up one center or two or three centers, to try to move families in where they can be with tubercular patients. I think if we think that through, we may have t.b. wards in each of the centers. I'm not sure. This is all in the pot here, ever since I was in San Francisco last, and longer than that.

I'd like to talk a little further about our part, that is possibly at least start thinking about what our part is, in connection with the voluntary recruiting for the army, and the reestablishment of selective service at these centers, if it should be reestablished. It is a little different problem than we have in a normal situation, and frankly I have not thought it through myself. I simply want to do a little thinking out loud to you folks about it.

We are going to have to review the work priorities situation in the light of the objectives laid out here, and I think we should get out some policy statement on that very soon, in light of this statement.

I don't want to review this one, but I want to say now, to the other people and to this group, that we had a discussion on firearms at the

centers, and I don't want to write anything about it, but it Briefly boiled down to this: that the Director feels he should discuss it with every project director, and he should discuss it with his staff. This had to do mainly with Caucasians having firearms in their possession at centers. We don't want to eliminate hunters' arms from people wherever they are, but we certainly don't want them flashed around, and in general they should be kept under lock and key and out of the way of the public. If we don't allow them to other, we probably should not have them ourselves, but I don't want to restrain in general. I don't want to even say Japanese Americans should not have them where they are not contraband, but it might lead to trouble if too many had them. But I'd say it was in the same class with liquor. It should be handled on the proper basis, properly handled by the staff, no particular recognition given to it, but let's quietly and thoroughly understand that (1) no firearms will ever be carried on the project by any member of the administrative staff--I understand that has happened in a few cases; (2) if they keep them in their homes, that they use them only for hunting purposes, and that they be kept pretty well under control in the meantime, and I hope under lock and key if that is possible --I'm not sure that is possible at all these administrative quarters--and that there be no display of them as they take them in and out to go hunting; and (3) that even internal security officers in my opinion should not carry firearms. They should have them, if they need them, at their headquarters --even the Caucasians. There's plenty of firearms among the M.P.'s to quell any riots that come up, if they need to be called in.

I'm saying that to this group before I forget it, I don't want to spend a lot of time on it. I think we should tackle it on that basis first, and take the first opportunity at the centers to tell them it was discussed with the Director.

.....Mr. Myer: I'll say for Roy Kimmel he's an awfully good sport. He has seen this coming for the last month, inch by inch. --I would feel a little better if somebody wanted to challenge me on this thing or wanted to argue a little bit.

Mr. Holland: I'd like to argue on one phase of my program I am very much interested in. How are we sure that the outside program won't break down in the middle by requiring FBI clearance? I'm getting worried about it.

Mr. Myer: I've got the answer on that, I was challenged on that yesterday. Tom, if the army comes through, which I think they will, within the next thirty days, if we really have this thing move up and the FBI clearance gets in our way, in view of the fact that they are not saying, "This person shall, or shall not, go", then I'd have to get to the place where I would say that we are going to continue with the clearance but we will let these people go out in the meantime and we will get the clearance as fast as we can, and if we find it is unsafe after we have checked our own analysis we will pick them up and bring them back; that is, if we are really going to run into a bog-down that would affect our whole program, I will have to change our policy. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. Holland: Very satisfactory. Looking toward January when we get into the wholesale business on this thing, if we go the same leisurely pace as now, the whole thing would bust up.

....RE: NOT LETTING PEOPLE WORK ON OUTSIDE, LIVE ON INSIDE

....Mr. Myer: It brings up the whole question, Joe, whether employed near the centers or even going way out, as to whether or not we are going to continue a policy of not charging any subsistence, or whether we are going to try an in-between approach that would not discourage them going out but would encourage them taking their families out with them. And I don't know the answer, because administratively the matter of putting on a charge and getting it collected is almost impossible. On the other hand, I do not want to do something that will give us the urge to get people out, I mean where they really take their families out and stay out, in areas where they can do that. So that is one of the things I think we need to discuss here. If you want to go ahead and discuss it now, let's do it. Cy, what is your reaction on that?

Mr. Fryer: The line is very fine, Dillon. We can charge more than we did at Gila, and get them out, but if we had gone much beyond that we would have failed, and so would our public relations have failed-- as they did anyway.

....Mr. Myer: Isn't this true--let's go back to the first point. We say this policy is sound that we just adopted. I never know whether any policy is sound any more until we try it. It looks on the surface very sound. We won't know until we put it in operation. I think we need to check back a little more on that. Secondly, I am not too worried on this outside work about the deduction of subsistence as bearing the cost involved in keeping these people. I think because of the interest of the Congressmen in getting these people out to work, they are not going to kick about keeping the families back there if they get a job done. We are not going to run into much trouble about that. I am interested in the immediate urge to get their families out -- maybe Tom has the answer-- and we are moving in that direction, of course, on indefinite leave for every one that goes out for more than 30 days, and working toward getting them adjusted, where they would find work that would carry them through. I don't want to close the door on people going out. One of the best public relations things we have done in spite of all the troubles we have run into with it with the outside public, has been the beet work job.

....Mr. Glick: I was wondering whether we might do something of this sort: At each project, the project director, the chief of the Division of Community Management, the internal security officer, and perhaps one or two others, the employment officer certainly, would probably know 10,15 or 100 people about whom they have their fingers crossed, ~~or~~ be suspicious of. I wonder, if we decided to cut loose from FBI clearance to speed up the procedure, we might issue instructions that they might submit applications for leave, which we act upon in advance in all cases, but if they have doubt, we might indicate that or they might issue advance applications for those about whom they are in doubt, and then we can give those to the FBI and ask them to concentrate their attention on those about whom we are suspicious, instead of the 120,000?

Mr. Myer: Of course, among the thousands of things to be done is a job

somebody needs to do of going back and working with FBI to see where we can help expedite those we are already working on.

Mr. Holland: I think it is partly a mechanical job over there, and they just reach in and grab a bunch of applications and put them through their machines and send us the results, and maybe we could assist them some place so we can get all this done. I hate to abandon FBI clearance at any point, because in my travels in the Middle West, that has been more of a selling point than anything else; one is that they are American citizens, and the other is that FBI is running them through**.

RE: FBI clearance.

Mr. Smart: How many were cleared all told, do you know?

Mr. Holland: Yes, we started sending the first over about the middle of September, and we've gotten back 175, I think, out of possibly six or seven hundred.

Col. Wilson: With the FBI, is that a matter of just whether or not they have any record against this man, or does that initiate an investigation?

Mr. Holland: All we do, Colonel, is to send a copy of our individual record form over there and they apparently examine that and check on their records to see if they have anything in their records. We're getting back reports now that are not adverse--any kind of statement they may have on the person or the parents. They do not clear them, that is not really the word, they send us over all the information they have on that person, the near relatives, or the parents, and then it is up to us to do the clearing. It is what they call a record check.

Mr. Fryer: Will we accomplish our public relations object if we take up with them only those suspected? * * Certain people are held as suspected, and about others there are no questions.

Mr. Holland: No, I think we have to have them all cleared in the same way, Cy.

Mr. Fryer: Would it be enough to say about those about whom we are sure, to say to the public: "Any person here about whom there is no question has been processed by FBI"? School girls who are going to marry soldiers, mothers of soldiers in the army, there's a whole category of people there. You have in every center numbers of people you swear by, the project director and staff comes to know these people intimately, he surrounds himself with them--it happens automatically, with a group of people--

Mr. Holland: The fact that we are investigating and are going to shut down too on those we suspect, doesn't ring a very loud bell with the public. The FBI though they have tremendous confidence in.

Mr. Myer: Tom's point is very valid there, Cy. I have already relaxed as Tom said, on this point I made, and made the one exception: the soldiers' wives could go out--they're going some place maybe before long anyhow--before we got clearance. We had nine cases come up from Tule Lake. But we are still going ahead and get the clearance, I ~~am~~ mean getting the record checked, Cy. I opposed it when it first came up, after I thought it through I was one of the ~~first that~~ ~~proposed it~~ first that proposed it, because you remember I discussed it in staff conference some weeks ago. We had a case from Camp Carson, * * if he was sure his wife could come, he could get her a job, and so on. I debated at that time whether we would throw the door clear open as you suggested. I think if we begin to throw it open, we will step by step break down the whole procedure. I think we should do the temporary thing, perhaps, but I think we should be able to say to the public that we are going to check on all these cases ultimately. I think Tom is right, that J. Edgar Hoover's name really means something in this country, and Dillon Myer's name doesn't mean very much yet, from the standpoint of investigation of Japanese Americans or any other investigations, and I think it is very important that we maintain that symbol in the picture. It is a symbol, in a way, but there is a reason why. They have confidence in him.

Mr. Glick: But we don't have to discuss this, it seem to me, in a way. What we can do, first of all, is to hasten FBI investigation of those we suspect. At the same time we can hasten FBI investigation of those most anxious to go out, and let the others ride, and then gradually feed them

through the mill; and then in some cases we can let them go out in advance, subject to final check by the FBI, and so on.

Mr. Holland: It is all public relations device anyway. And on the soldiers' wives, we felt that if we kept those wives in, that is pretty bad public relations. I think you can make an exception of soldiers' wives very easily and justify it.

Mr. Myer: We can revise our leave regulations to provide the thirty or sixty day leave pending indefinite leave. Some one has suggested a recess, but before we go: we are setting up a small division here, it is very small. Ed Arnold is head, and he has a secretary. Individual exclusion and property, which that whole thing will tie into. Washington people knew it for some time anyhow. And we are asking the War Relocation Planning Division, Stauber, to set up the statistical and record work that has to do with the type of thing Dedrick has done in WCCA, and he has been authorized to proceed with that. In the meantime, he will also be handling repatriation work. Other than that, I don't think there is any general change in the advisory setup, except that the Executive Officer will probably have expanded functions at this level to take in such things as transport, supply procurement, mess, and all those things. We are tying fire protection under Pop Utz, in addition to public works, in the agricultural setup. Housing will come under Provinse, Community Services, rather than Employment, both at the project level and here. I think that covers the major shifts in the general pattern, and just as soon as we can get the charts functioning, we will get that worked through, but I wanted this group to understand how that was being set up, so you know who is responsible.

Mr. Myer: Well, there were so many of them coming in, first thing you knew, that they just said no more. Period. Well, we had to do something about it. So Tom went up and interviewed them, and found what I have just told you was the situation. And when they found out we were willing to take the responsibility for replacements, not too many people piling up, as Tom said, one of the officers said: "Anything J. Edgar Hoover says goes with me, that's all right." I think that sort of thing indicates--incidentally, they went along with us and took off the ban in

the meantime. But I think that we must know where these people are, and that they do have something to do. And if they have a prospect some place, and they have a family relative or some sponsor to live with, and they have plenty to take care of themselves, I don't want to ban that. But I don't want these people going out and going from house to house or from employer to employer looking for jobs. I think it would be very bad at this stage.

Now we may be able to find the answer to what you are saying as we go along with this problem. We may be able to relax a little more than we have now, I don't think there will be many cases of that kind, but if people will say to me that I have plenty of funds for the time being, I'd like to live in a certain city, I have friends there or somebody who is willing to be my sponsor, and I will let you know if I want to move some place else, according to our policy he has adequate support in the meantime, I'd give consideration to it. But I would not want him just floating hither and thither, traveling all over the country doing as he pleases. Let me give you an example of the type of thing I am fearful of in that respect. You remember the Manzanar report regarding _____ and the plants down there? He didn't realize he should not walk into those plants, and ask why they should be military plants, etc.

Mr. Fryer: In areas with more manpower scarcity, where people have the money to travel, and opportunities are very good--

Mr. Myer: If we can get people in the Manpower Commission to say we would like to have a dozen or fifteen or thirty people come on here and get settled, where we can have these people interviewed for a job, we will be responsible in the meantime to see they are properly established and don't do the things I am worried about, and work through the Manpower Commission, I'd like to consider that possibility. I think it

is important we begin to work out some such procedures as that. Your point is well taken in that respect, but we have not yet worked out all the machinery of getting employer and prospective employees together, but I think that is the reason I am willing to have a reasonable trickle in the meantime, until we can work out that kind of a procedure on a sound basis with these government agencies. We can't do it all over night.

Mr. Provinse: Could I go back to something, perhaps earlier in your comments, and that is we have a double-barreled program, a program with two objectives. I still think there is a danger, due to the personnel hired on the projects and some of the earlier emphases, of developing two programs rather than--

Mr. Myer: Maybe the way I put it was unfortunate.

Mr. Provinse: One working toward doing as good a job as possible on the projects, and other to get the people out. A lot of our people were hired on the basis that they had this job todo. Rather than having two separate groups handling the two phases, each person should be responsible for both sides.

Mr. Myer: Right. I was unfortunate in the way I stated these general objectives. I did it to give mephasis to the tightening up of the administrative job in trying to get these things worked out, but I think a better way to put, John, is that we have one major objective, and that is to get people relocated as quickly as possible on a more permanent basis than relocation centers. In so doing, we have the job of working with the public on the outside, and we have the job of working with the public on the inside, and here is to be the policy for the whole thing geared together. I think we all need to give a little more thought to

how we approach it, because psychologically it may be geared up to something we want to break down. Do you want to go further on that point?

Mr. Provinse: I think that we should have that before us in talking with the project people, and talking with all of the people, whoever one of them at the project has the responsibility also has a certain public relations job of trying to get these people in. I know in the schools and lot of places these people would like to do the best job they can, and they are going to resist unless they understand perfectly the other side of the program, moving out the people they get trained.

Mr. Myer: It is a matter of approach. Let me give a couple of examples of what John's talking about. When I was at Tule Lake the last time, in spite of all that furor and disorder, I visited ~~at~~ the garage and the workshops and so on. They were doing some of the most beautiful work on some fenders, and bodies, and engines, and so on. I'd been there when I was there earlier in July, and they had some crackerjack mechanics. So I got the administrative man in charge (I've forgotten his name) aside, and I said, "You've got some pretty good mechanics, haven't you?" He said, "I have ten of the best mechanics under my supervision I have ever had in my whole life, and I have worked with a lot of mechanics". I said, "How would you like to lose them?" He said, "I'd be tickled to death if they got jobs on the outside. I hope you would leave one or two ~~of~~ to take care of some of this business till others are trained." I said, "Were all trained before they came here?" He said, "Some of them were good mechanics and had been in the business all along, but some of them were just good farmer boys who knew something about tractors and made good mechanics since they came. I said, "In other words, you would be willing to train mechanics here, to train these boys to go outside?"

That is one point of view. I think that is the one that we've got to have accepted as a part of a retraining program. And he was enthusiastic about it. The other instance--I am not going to call any names in this case, because I am not sure enough about them and I don't want to do any injustices--people who were interested in their agricultural programs, who were practically saying to the people, "If you leave the project and go out, you are doing the unpatriotic thing", instead of trying to make the adjustment. It was not only in agriculture, I found it a little bit here and there. I can understand that, because they felt they had laid out a job to be done, and ~~xxx~~ until they got that one done, they couldn't quite meet it. So what John says is very, very fundamental. If we are going to get this big job of relocation done, we are not only going to have to set as our major objective getting people out and getting resettled, but what we've got to have is the ways and means of training and retraining people, both psychologically and physically, to fit themselves into the job, and train new people to do the jobs on projects. John, I'm a hundred percent in agreement.

Mr. Tozier: Don't you feel that supervisor of the garage and motor pool you mentioned is an exception? He represents a minority among our people on the projects, and the majority probably feel the other way.

Mr. Myer: I think about fifty-fifty, Toz. I think it will depend on how we have conditioned the thing. I'd say at Minidoka they are all that way. Every person on the project I was able to find was in that attitude.

Mr. Fryer: I don't think you will find any resistance on the part of project personnel to relocation. Our dilemma is one of planning. He doesn't know whether to plan for one, two or five hundred. It is largely one of planning, because all of our thinking has been in terms of a unit of 10,000 in a place.

Mr. Myer: Right. It is a frustration that comes from trying to switch over from ultimately 20,000 acres in production to ultimately one thousand acres in production, let's say, and it is a tough job to readjust your thinking.

Mr. Fryer: If we can say to the project, instead of planning in terms of 10,000, let's assume half these people in the next two years will leave, therefore develop a plan on the basis of 5,000, recognizing that the cream of your people will have been drained off in the process of relocation,--

Mr. Myer: I think when that is understood, we will get acceptance on the part of 75 to 100 percent of our personnel, Toz. We will have some just not able to readjust themselves to that kind of a program. They are not humanitarians. They want to get a job done, they do not want to do the job of training and retraining, they want to get a job done.

Mr. Myer: (Protect Employment) It simplifies itself very greatly to me. It may not be this simple. It is quite clear to me that indefinite leave is to be provided any one that may be cleared, excepting that we may ask, as we do in selective service occasionally, temporary exemptions for training and retraining in certain key cases. Certain facilities would be an outstanding case of that kind, that we would not want to start releasing right off the bat until we found some way to take care of it, and there might be other key positions where we ask the boys or girls not to move out right now. That certainly stands out as number one.

Then it seems to me that number two would be--it is a shifting sort of thing--necessary project maintenance. Of course, you have to have enough people, but I think you can pretty nearly put that number three, for the reason that if you go on a training and retraining program, you

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will always have enough people for most jobs talked about here. So as to whether that comes in the first category or the second, I am not sure.

Group labor, the opportunity for moving out, if we have this group labor thing--Tom Holland hopes this spring we will get all on indefinite leave. I am a little pessimistic about that, but I hope it can be done and I will work right with him to get that accomplished if we can, but we don't have to bother about ~~that~~ that. I think our position now is going to have to be this, that we not have anybody thinking we are going to set up a lot of positions here that will stop us from releasing people; that both from the standpoint of policy and public relations we've got to be prepared to establish a training and retraining program, and let any one go off the center that wants to go off the center, within the leave policy that we have. We will have to be able somehow or other to meet our commitments on the seed deal and on certain other things, but I think we will just have to find ways and means of doing that job.

Mr. Holland: Some of the evacuees, I think, will have a sense of responsibility. There's a dietician at Manzanar applied for a job, didn't have anything particular in mind, and somebody offered her a job in Chicago. And she said she was sorry, she wouldn't be able to come for about three months, until they trained somebody to take her place. So they will have a certain amount of responsibility themselves.

Mr. Myer: That's right. I think there's another thing. Take the seed thing. I think there will be a few individuals who will be responsible for it if we put this thing up to the evacuees and check before we move into it, and say, "Shall we move in, and will we have enough to carry

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through? Then if you get an opening outside, will you carry through until we get the crop harvested?"

Mr. Rowalt: It is reversing our program.

Mr. Myer: Temporarily, it is. On the basis Leland talked about, there may be certain key places that are needed. It is not reversing our program--it is on a small scale, it may be on a three months' scale at Tule Lake, it will not be more than that. After the seed is planted, we have to go through with it. Shall we put it in, or leave it open? This year we are committed on it and have to go through with it. I did write Cy and attach a letter to be sent to the seed people, saying we'd like to take a look at the acreage of spring-planted seeds again, and if we found conditions were not such we could make good, we would want to revise the figure. So I left a loophole there.

Mr. Myer: Number one, the Director is going to be very reluctant from here on to approve any kind of program that ties people up for a very long period of time in work jobs. Secondly, he is going to be reluctant to approve even that kind of a project until it is discussed with the evacuee population, after we determine that we think we can do it, to be sure they are willing to take some kind of responsibility in pushing the thing through. I say "evacuee population", I mean the representatives of the evacuee population. He is going to move very strongly towards types of operations that can be turned on and turned off, other than the regular service jobs, to keep people happy and busy and a chance to earn some money in the meantime without too much cost. I am worried about this kiln thing now.

Mr. Barrows: It doesn't take many people.

Mr. Kimmel: That kiln can be released to another agency.

Mr. Smart: If you do, we'll have a strike on our hands. That's been oversold to Heart Mountain, and they want that thing.

Mr. Myer: I'm not too worried about it.

Mr. Smart: That's a morale builder, and a dandy.

Mr. Myer: I'll write it off on costs. I am willing to stick my neck out a little on wasting some money if morale and other things involved indicate completion of the kiln.

Mr. Barrows: I am strong on the kiln too.

Mr. Myer: Any other comment on work priorities? I think this is a good place to stop for lunch. Let's meet back here at two o'clock.

2:00 P.M.
Reconvened.

Mr. Myer: To finish off priorities. Those who have been working ^{on} /work

priorities, keep on working on them.

Ralph, can you review what information you have to date regarding this whole construction situation that I asked you to look into? Let me say to the group that I have asked Stauber to sort of get together, in cooperation with Fryer and the West Coast folks and others, certain factual materials regarding the whole problem of taking care of Hawaiian evacuees, tubercular hospitals, possible provision for space for segregation if we did move toward repatriates, which had to be based, first, on an analysis of what we will have once we get school and administrative buildings built, and so on, and where we would expand if we needed to expand. That is the background. How much time we put on certain phases of this worry about construction jobs and whether we've got a place to put people, and so on, depends so much on this that I feel it is essential we talk about it a little bit.

Mr. Stauber: I should say that I haven't had a chance to talk to Cy about these figures yet. I have merely the table he brought in, which brings practically up to date some of the things we asked Capt. Astrup to get. We have not yet received from Capt. Astrup the figures on the utilities at the various centers. I have a tabulation here which I believe was worked up pretty largely by Capt. Astrup. This shows that with a reported capacity in the ten projects of 120,500, there is an actual and theoretical housing capacity for just under 128,000 persons; of that, 109,000, well, 108,563, have actually been transferred from assembly centers, leaving a theoretical available capacity as yet unused of about 19,239. That, however, is a theoretical figure, and is built up on the basis of what you might call an ideal, ~~or~~ or nearly ideal, distribution of the apartment facilities. To what extent that is actually realized on the project, I don't know.

Mr. Rowalt: Mostly on the basis of an ideal family composition, which does not exist.

Mr. Stauber: Based on a family composition of--

Mr. Myer: 1930 census, which doesn't take into consideration a lot of these children married since then and maybe have youngsters.

Mr. Stauber: Capt. Astrup told me over the tactical line that the distribution was the distribution which actually left the assembly centers. That is the way he gave it to me.

Mr. Myer: I think he has probably been told that was the case, but I am sure that is not the factual situation, as I have checked into it.

Mr. Rowalt: In other words, WCCA made a boner. They figured a certain number of people per family. When they actually got them together, they found the number of people in a family instead of being four was actually less than four, it was 3.7.

Mr. Stauber: This was made up on the basis of maybe the census, in which the family was one, two three or four.

Mr. Myer: But the construction was not made up on that basis.

Mr. Stauber: This theoretical assignment of apartments, however, which I mentioned, was built up on the basis of this distribution, whatever the source of distribution was, and assuming that optimum assignment of apartments on the basis of distribution gives this residual of 19,000 persons. There are 1707 apartments used for purposes other than quarters; that includes 1104 used for schools, 98 for office purposes, 296 for administrative quarters, 85 for commercial enterprises, and 453 for a variety of uses, some of which I think, owing to unclarity in definition, overlap some of the other groups, but such things as the block manager's office, community enterprises, nurseries, hospital, contractor, single men's barracks, recreation--there are 56 here for signal ~~corps~~ corps, I don't quite understand what that is.

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Mr. Rowalt: Telephone office, is n't it?

Mr. Stauber: And for churches, and so on. All of that group, assuming an average capacity of apartments at 4.3, which comes by taking the theoretical figure over here and dividing by the number of apartments, would take care of about 16,000 people. It sums up, however, to about this: that the apartments which are apparently vacant just now--and I imagine this means with some squeezing, Cy--will take care of about 2,300 people. As the schools are finished, and if some of these other purposes can be taken care of by other construction, the capacity of the project, the additional number of people that could be taken care of, could be swelled up to quite a substantial figure. Whether it could go quite to that 19,000 or not, I have some--

Mr. Myer: It could never go to 19,000.

Mr. Rowalt: After you take all the schools out,--

Mr. Stauber: It depends ^{on} how much else you take out.

Mr. Myer: I would not be willing to squeeze more than eight or nine thousand into anything we can anticipate now, but I would move to that. Fine. That gives us some background to start from.

Here we have some of these maybe imponderables, I don't know, maybe ponderables. First, we have the Hawaiian situation, which I hope we will know more about in two or three weeks, if they let Ed come back. He is scheduled to leave from the West Coast on the 17th, if he can go by clipper or plane to Hawaii, which is about five days from now. We have a promise, as I understand it, that not more than 5,000 would be shipped between about three weeks ago and the middle of February; in other words, additional notice will be given if more ~~people~~ people than that are shipped so we can make an adjustment. In that case, it looks ~~to~~ to me like we have to consider as to whether we can get our schools and administrative quarters built to take care of another 2,500~~0~~, say, on top of what you have there, simply to take care of Hawaiians; that is, the

contingency of taking care of them needs to be considered. That is number one.

Number two. Let me repeat again, we have to make a decision soon, I think, on how we want to handle the t. b. patient problem, as to whether we want to move toward one project, three projects, or all the projects, taking into consideration the question as to whether we want to make provision for members of the family if they care to, to move wherever the patient is where they could be with them, be close by. That needs to be considered. The problem of providing space some place if we decide to move into the segregation program needs to be considered. I think those are the main factors in the construction situation, as far as additional barrack space, that I know anything about now.

....Mr. Myer: Yes, with additional barrack space. Well, now--oh, there's another factor in the situation, if our hopes come true regarding relocation within four or five or six months, at least, we should have some emptying up on indefinite leave of space, that should be available for additional people. What we are going to have to do is guess and gamble the best we can, but I want to try to clear the thinking of our whole group today as to whether there are certain things that we can determine right now, what additional information we need, and how best to go about getting it to help out in the decision we need to make in some of these things.

I talked about segregation with Mr. McCloy yesterday briefly, and told him, in view of our simplified program, the idea of not cluttering things up too much, that I was now reluctant to move into a segregation policy, even regarding repatriates, if it required a lot of shifting of families who were not repatriates in order to make room for those who were, because it just jostled the whole administrative program again, as well as the attitude of the people, and so on. His reaction was that he did not want me to throw that out the window too soon. He is very strongly sold now on the segregation policy, particularly in regard to repatriates. He would like to add in parollees and maybe some other, I don't know.

Mr. Stauber: Kibei?

Mr. Myer: No, he is not pushing the kibei, but he thinks we should move toward a segregation policy, in which I agree with him, but I told him we had all these other considerations. I said, "Now if you will promise me that you will put the power of the War Department behind a place to put these people without all this shifting, then I won't throw it out the window." You see I did a little trading. No, I didn't put it quite on that basis. I said that we had in the picture the analysis of these figures, and I hoped to get them over to him soon, and I hoped that we could work out something where it would not require shifting of people; that I was not going to throw the whole thing out the window, but we may need their help. That is the way I put it. I said, "If we come to that place, I am coming back to you for help on trying to get that done, because I do not want to shift people in five or six projects back to other projects, and so on, in order to find a place to put them". "Well," he said, "get your figures in, and we'll see what we can do about it; I don't think we should throw it out." So that is that angle of it, and I rather agree, but I wanted to bring the whole question up here. Now, how much can we gamble, what should we look forward to? Should we stand about on our present construction, and assume for the time being we will have enough space for the Hawaiians; not try to shift around for t.b. hospitals, but add some additional space at each of the projects somehow or other for additional wards and take care of them there, or shall we go to three projects or one, or how shall we do it?

Mr. Fryer: With respect to t.b., I think we have adequate hospital space on all of our projects. We have over-constructed, apparently. We have plenty of room in our projects in the western region.

- Mr. Myer: We have sufficient bed space apparently.
- Mr. Fryer: Dr. Thompson takes the position that a patient is better off if the family is near him. They are not sick, most of them, except they need rest, I suppose.
- Mr. Myer: Do you think, as I do, while it might be desirable to have them moved to one center, it would be almost an impossible situation to start moving people around?
- Mr. Fryer: Yes.
- Mr. Glick: Are t.b. patients contagious?
- Mr. Fryer: Active cases are contagious. They are setting aside one ward, or two wards, for them.
- Mr. Myer: What is the difference, infectious?
- Mr. Fryer: Active t.b. is supposed to be infectious.
- Mr. Rowalt: The 600 cases we have on the Coast are bedridden cases.
- Mr. Stauber: But there is an additional number, a thousand or more, that have it.
- Mr. Provinse: I think Dr. Thompson has the feeling that he cannot possibly treat them if they are segregated on each project. He has three t.b.--
- Mr. Myer: He is looking at it with a specialist's attitude, I think.
- Mr. Smart: You will have to set up some extra staff in that ward to treat it as a t.b. ward, full time, I think.
- Mr. Myer: If we have to do that in preference to moving families, I think we better try to do it, don't you?
- Mr. Smart: Yes, I do, but I think you better have a separate ward and separate staff for it.
- Mr. Fryer: Earlier Dr. Thompson took the position that the t.b. should be taken care of to prevent moving families. Then he found out that most of them are pneumo thorax cases, must have regular air treatments; some are operative cases; and they should be segregated where special treatment could be given to cases of that kind.
- Mr. Smart: Of course, those cases have been held back, Cy.
- Mr. Fryer: Wouldn't it be cheaper to leave them in the hospitals and pay the bill?
- Mr. Myer: They are forcing them out now, though. They want the room, and they are pushing us to get those people out of there. Is it a possible alternative to take the bedridden cases, and develop additional barrack space, let's say at Tule and Manzanar

they are mostly California cases. One of Thompson's objections to moving them is that he doesn't want to move them out of California for fear they won't accept them back if the war should be over within a reasonable length of time; and there's a good deal to be said for that point.

Mr. Rowalt: The California State Board of Health is helping out. It's just a matter of adding on to our hospitals, isn't it?

Mr. Myer: What about taking care of those cases at Manzanar and Tule, say, by adding on some additional barrack space and making those special hospitals, but providing we take care of those we find in the projects at each of the projects rather than setting up special provision for them? What's the answer on that, John?

Mr. Provinse: I talked with Dr. Thompson this noon about it. His only objection would be that you cannot possibly find a person at each of the projects to look after that. It is fairly technical and requires a certain type of supervision. I suggested he might set up a travelling t.b. man to visit the other projects. Well, he considered that, and I think that might be an answer to the few cases we'd have on the other projects. There are 75 at Tule Lake at the present time. If you add to that the 150 or 125 from the hospitals in California, you would have to have your two trained men we now have at Tule Lake and Manzanar, but I think the others might be taken care of by a travelling person, and not have a special on each project.

Mr. Myer: What would be the problem involved, Cy, would it be too tough to handle if we brought all those 600 cases into Tule and Manzanar, on the travel of friends in and out visiting them, and families, assuming we could not reunite them?

Mr. Fryer: Concentration would be a problem.

Mr. Myer: The problem of travel and getting passes for a large number of people, a place for those people to stay while visiting, etc.

Mr. Fryer: Escorts and clearing with the military in each case, paying their expenses back and forth.* *

Mr. Myer: I think we would have to provide an additional barracks or two for visitors, however, under those conditions. There's so many facts we need to know in connection with this.

Col. Wilson: The doctor at Heart Mountain made the statement when we were up there inspecting the hospital, that that was a fine lay-out for a tubercular hospital, and the climate was just right.

Mr. Myer: Thompson has a real point on this, that he objects to moving all these people out of California where they would run a real problem getting them back in there.

Mr. Smart: I had a letter this morning from Denver that says the contractors are all worried about material. The army is buying practically all the lumber coming out of the Northwest.

Mr. Rowalt: They had a backlog of 70,000 board feet when we put our order in at San Francisco.

Mr. Myer: Some of the projects have some material.

Mr. Smart: We have quite a bit at Heart Mountain, and of course we have a sawmill out there.

Mr. Barrows: Central Utah is in about the best situation. M

Mr. Myer: Yes, they have a backlog of lumber and material there bigger than any place I've seen.

Mr. Whitaker: We have about six million feet of lumber on our projects if we can get the War Department to turn it loose. The War Department has title to some of it and the contractor has title to part of it, but they say they have it there to ship to some airport^{or}/something that they will get a contract to build. It certainly would save the government a lot of money--

Mr. Myer: You have your priorities passed?

Mr. Whitaker: Yes, sir. I thought it was instructions to build it by evacuees?

Mr. Myer: It is, wherever you can do it. We've left it open to the project and regional directors, in case they felt it was essential to do it the other way. There are a lot of factors entering in.

Mr. Myer: Dr. Thompson, we were discussing some of your business before we switched to something else here. Very briefly, we are exploring the questions as to whether we should have t.b. wards on all the projects now, in view of the intricate problem of moving families around, shaking the whole thing up, whether we should have them on one project only, or on three projects, which you later proposed. Or whether we should have a combination. And the combination, I'd say, was something like this:

the possibility of developing, say at Tule Lake and Manzanar in the State of California, a place for all the bedridden people that are in California now, keeping them there in accordance with the suggestion that you made, and getting the help of the Board of Health as well as not moving them out when you couldn't get them back easily, even though we did not move their families, what the problem would be; and if we did that, whether it would be feasible to take care of the rest of the cases, ambulatory and otherwise, as we found them on each of the projects. What do you think? What I am trying to avoid is a big double shift again, shaking people up and shaking them all over the place. It is simple to say we will set it up here and move their families, but it is not very simple to do.

Dr. Thompson: It is very difficult to be sure of figures in our situation, because we have not had an opportunity to make a survey of the actual tuberculosis load. We also have not had an opportunity to determine the exact physical state of all those now hospitalized, as to whether they will all require hospitalization after we get hold of them, or whether they can be made ambulatory is uncertain.

Mr. Myer: If we have the central facilities, I am not concerned over the problem of finding space to take care of these people as we locate them and find them, if they need to be hospitalized, because I think we will empty up enough space that we can add in the space on apartment or hospital space, or whatever you want to call it. I am concerned about the immediate needs, and the approach on getting any additional space we need now for these 600 in California.

Dr. Thompson: Ideally, if we are forgetting the question of priority on building materials and construction problems, I would think we would not

all
want to build three hospitals/at once. Perhaps if we built two at once it would meet our immediate need, facing the possibility we might not have enough in that, and may later have to build an extra facility at another project.

Mr. Myer: Let me say this, if we can provide for two now that will take care of the push cases that the hospitals on the Coast insist you take care of, I still think we can find ways and means to do the others, even at the other projects, because if I don't miss my guess, by the middle of next summer we can provide sufficient space for any we need, from the standpoint of bedroom.

Dr. Thompson: Space is not the only or most important problem. It is a problem of having properly qualified facilities to take care of or supervise tubercular patients. If we have them all in one place, we won't even approach that by 25% of a properly qualified staff. If we spread them out over ten areas, I don't see how we can possibly give supervision of the type that we require; whereas even with three hospitals, I thought we might only have one qualified man at each place, which is the least we could really have. In that regard, we have only one Japanese who is qualified medically in tuberculosis, and that is not enough. We have one surgeon who is qualified in surgery for t.b., and that is adequate providing he does not get furloughed.

Mr. Myer: Gato?

Dr. Thompson: Yes. We have another who would be even better, in the sense he would be more acceptable to other Japanese, and that is _____ at Tule Lake.

Mr. Myer: Why don't we do this now, why don't we proceed on the analysis of what we need to take care of the California bedridden cases at Tule Lake and Manzanar? Not to take care of their families, but taking care of them.

Dr. Thompson: We will have some problem if you exclude the families who are having a problem already in California because the pressure is coming from the patient to get to the family, as well as the hospital to get rid of him. As a matter of fact, some of these patients would not consent to hospitalization in California or staying behind unless we told them we would keep them with their families.

Mr. Myer: Oh, we made a lot of those commitments, eh?

Dr. Thompson: Many of them, there was no choice. The hospitals were not

ready, even Gila River where we could have moved t.b. patients, we couldn't send them because there was no place to put them at Gila.

Mr. Provinse: Normally does a tubercular patient have a choice whether he wants to go with the family, or where the best medical service is? That is, in our normal population. They do get along with the medical service that is available, and choose to do that?

Dr. Thompson: I don't know whether they get along or not. It is hard to say. Of course, from the public health point of view, the effort is made even to get a disagreeable patient into a hospital, not for their own good but for the public good. And that is our angle here, is the relationship of this disease to the general public, which brings in a little different angle than any other disease we have. I don't know how many members of the family would be involved to move those concerned with those now hospitalized, but I wouldn't think it would involve a great deal, 2,500 people probably. I don't think it would involve that many, that would be the maximum number, estimating five to a family even, and many of these people are already at Tule Lake and Manzanar. So the families are already there for many of these t.b. patients.

Mr. Myer: Think of moving 2,500 people again.

Dr. Thompson: I think that would be the maximum number. I don't think we should move more than the immediate family. There is the morale problem, however, which crops in.

Mr. Myer: Both ways.

Dr. Thompson: Yes. Since they can't go back and forth, and we would have a transportation problem, from the point of cost too, because some of these cannot afford to travel the distance that would be involved in some cases.

Mr. Myer: How long would it take to make an analysis of where these people are and where their families are?

Dr. Thompson: I don't think it would take so long, and also it would not take so long to find out the exact medical condition of these people. It would delay it.

Mr. Myer: Who would do it?

Dr. Thompson: We'd have to do it, I suppose. Of course, as soon as we start a survey for tuberculosis at even the California centers, we don't know how many cases we are going to find. We are going to find plenty, because we are already finding them faster than we can take care of them when we're not even looking for them; as a matter of fact, we are trying not to see them, and the number of new active cases that are being found per week would fill a ward in six weeks at the present rate. I don't know how long that ratio will continue, because obviously those obvious cases will be picked up.

Mr. Provinse: How many are in California hospitals?

Dr. Thompson: The last figure the Public Health Service gave me was 395 in California and Oregon and Washington hospitals, and then we have about 125 ourselves in Tule Lake and Gila River.

- Mr. Myer: Doctor, if you were the Director of WRA, and you had decreed no later than two or three hours ago that we were going to simplify our administrative program in every way possible, and would concentrate the next two or three months in getting our people properly housed and fed and secure from the standpoint of internal security, and we would do no more shaking around than we could help, no double wage scales, and this, that and the other, how would you solve the t.b. problem at the moment?
- Dr. Thompson: Let me ask you this. Before I ask the question, I will make an opening sentence. With regard to the release of furloughed Japanese and evacuees, what responsibility is WRA going to assume with regard to the health of these people? And that comes right up to tuberculosis.
- Mr. Myer: You mean people going out on leave?
- Dr. Thompson: Yes.
- Mr. Myer: I am assuming those people will go out, if locating indefinitely, and fit in with the public in the same way any other family would in that community. I don't believe we can take on responsibility of being-- having them tied to our apron strings in any way other than to give them what assistance we can.
- Mr. Holland: We were referring more to the people going out in the sugar beet fields, under group--
- Dr. Thompson: It comes up against the problem of tuberculosis--
- Mr. Myer: Once they have gone out, I think we would assume their medical relationships would be separated.
- Dr. Thompson: If that is true, many will get indefinite leave who have active tuberculosis that we do not know about. That, of course, from a United States public health point of view, is very bad.
- Mr. Myer: Very bad, but don't parrot anything about that right now, will you?
- Dr. Thompson: But from WRA's point of view, it simplifies the picture and will minimize the number of cases we have very considerably. However, we are obligated to detect the tuberculosis that exists in active form in our centers as soon as we can. To survey all our centers will take many months, it will take probably six weeks to do, say, Tule Lake, for example. It will run over a large portion of the year to go through all of them. It takes six months with a good team. How many will be furloughed by that time? Because if we find a case of active t.b. and know that the release them on indefinite leave, we might face some criticism. If you want to take that criticism, all right, we will go ahead with the t.b. survey. If you don't want to take the criticism, we better not move up the t.b. survey and the criticism on that, which probably would be easier to absorb than releasing the known case. In the first place, we may not be able to conduct the survey for other reasons, priority problems and things like that, and the lack of staff, because we have to take care of acute things first.
- Col. Wilson: I don't think the survey you called for embraced as much as the Doctor mentioned.

Mr. Myer: No. What the Doctor is talking about is to find out how much t.b. we have in these centers, which ideally is an important thing to do, but just remember it would not have been done anyhow. So I don't know what to say about it.

Dr. Thompson: The problem has always been known to exist, it has just been brought out in the open, because the nature of the Japanese people has been to hide this disease.

Mr. Myer: But we must be realistic about how much of a job we can do in a reasonable length of time, and it looks to me like with all the rest of the things we have to do in connection with our health program, we should not feel we should rush in right away to make a survey and find out whether everybody has t.b. or whether they do not.

Mr. Stauber: May I ask a question here. Dr. Thompson says you are discovering new cases at quite a rapid rate. Are you referring to all the projects in that connection, or is there some concentration?

Dr. Thompson: They are coming up faster at Tule Lake because they are more conscious of it there. They have seven patients there. We have been able to break down the traditional fear against it, even among the doctors, so as they are becoming a little more acceptable or friendly with the idea, they are coming to light a little faster. Manzanar has done pretty well, and Gila. The rest are not coming in so fast. Of course, the rest are not stabilized to the extent those projects are.

Mr. Stauber: There is nothing in the picture, as you see it, however, which would lead one to suspect that by and large there is any particular concentration; in other words, they will be distributed more or less?

Dr. Thompson: Yes.

Mr. Myer: Let me say this, Doctor. Assuming we will not make any shifts at the projects, and assuming the families took care of their own families, and went out on indefinite leave, what would be your answer?

Dr. Thompson: We are obligated to take care of those we now have and find on our centers.

Mr. Myer: But where?

Dr. Thompson: In California. And I am just guessing, off-hand, probably 400 beds.

Mr. Myer: For those now in hospitals, or for those in hospitals and centers?

Dr. Thompson: In nearby centers, in Tule Lake and Manzanar. There are 200 t.b.'s in Los Angeles alone right now, so there's Manzanar filled up with 200 beds. So I would say 400 beds as an estimate. I'd like to check it, but --

Mr. Myer: At those two centers?

Dr. Thompson: Yes.

Mr. Myer: You would recommend we take those two centers and provide for those 400 now?

Dr. Thompson: Yes.

Mr. Myer: Do you insist that we provide for those on other centers to move in there, and we make a shift in families?

Dr. Thompson: I think we should move them in.

Mr. Myer: Can we assume the other thing, and say if it is feasible we will attempt it, but not make any commitments now?

Dr. Thompson: We should not move the families unless they want to be moved, but if they wish to be moved--

Mr. Myer: Let's study the thing first to find out how much is involved. I don't want to make any more commitments that involve any intricate pattern of administration until we think it through.

Dr. Thompson: We also have a number of t.b. patients at Gila River, moved there in the last month. There's another place to send them. I think there must be twenty-five or thirty there.

Mr. Myer: We could assume then we can take care of them at the individual projects until we get things fixed at the other projects, could we?

Dr. Thompson: Oh, we could.

Mr. Myer: All right.....

Re: Hawaiian Japanese

Mr. Provinse: This is probably complicated somewhat by the fact that Japanese Americans, that is the mainland Japanese, do not like to have the Hawaiians come into their projects. Hawaiians, as near as I can gather, would also like to have their own project. If we are not in a position to move, say one of the projects, like at Gila, and move all of them into one of those camps, wouldn't it be advisable to think in terms of building a temporary place for them?

Mr. Myer: There^{you}/are. You are involving the problem again of additional construction, and I don't think we have a chance of getting them. The only thing we run a chance of getting is building where we have power lines, etc. * * If you go to shifting people from a whole community in order to shift people in, you are running into this--

Mr. Sigler: Might it not be easier to empty the 5,000 camp at Gila than to scatter the 5,000 through the western centers?

Mr. Provinse: The feeling is pretty strong between the mainland Japanese and Hawaiians.

Mr. Sigler: I was thinking of more than of the preference where they wanted to live. I understand the Hawaiians will be excluded on an individual basis, is that not right?

Mr. Myer: I already gave the answer to that, that nobody knows until we get an analysis made of it, and we are going to try to hold them out until we find out. The assumption is however, that that is not the case, and we have been so assured that that is not the case, but I still do not believe it.

Mr. Rowalt: The fact that only one in 300 is evacuated indicates to me that they are volunteers.

Mr. Stauber: It could mean that is all the space that is available.

Mr. Myer: That is right.

Mr. Provinse: We will know more in three weeks about who these people are than we do now. Couldn't we tell then whether we are going to put them separate and apart or whether we try to fill up these little holes all around the projects? Because they might be a real problem if we do the latter.

Mr. Stauber: Why should that group be so much more of a problem than the Fresno and Los Angeles Japs, and so on? The main reason they don't get along is that they have not become acquainted.

Mr. Fryer: There is one question I'd like to ask, and that is, how many can we take care of in the next four months?

Mr. Myer: I think we can take care of 5,000 if we have to in the next four months, assuming we have to push like the devil to get the other thing done, and we have to go back to the army to get them to push materials in to us as we did at Delta, before they ship more people. We'd have to put it on that kind of a basis before we do that. I believe we can gamble on it, but I am willing if the group feels we should not gamble, to go out for part of it.

Mr. Fryer: If the Immigration Service keeps _____, why can't we keep repatriates at Stockton?

Mr. Myer: I have raised that question, Cy, when you were at Gila. I don't believe it.

Mr. Smart: Are you actually going to have more than a handful of repatriates?

Mr. Myer: It is question of moving those and their families, who say they want repatriation and who stick to it.

Mr. Stabuer: There are 2,800 in the whole outfit that have said they want to be repatriated.

Mr. Smart: We originally had 50, and 40 backed out, and there are only 10 now. The thing looks kind of academic to me.

Mr. Myer: It may be academic, but we had 2,800 on that basis, with the possibility of another 2,000 that may develop. The question is, shall we try to make some other provision for it, even if we only had ten? If we had 200 families or thereabouts, that would be a thousand.

Mr. Fryer: They certainly ought to be taken out of the projects.

Mr. Stauber: Which ones do you think ought to be taken out?

Mr. Fryer: Those that have requested repatriation.

Mr. Whitaker: I think so too. I think those that have said they want to go back to Japan, they ought to get them out.

Mr. Myer: I say that with some reservation, for this reason, that we have run into a few cases where in a bitter moment an American citizen asked for repatriation. I think some of those cases we ought to reconsider. I don't know. There's a boy I met up at Minidoka just eating his heart out because of the fact that he did just that thing.

Mr. Fryer: I think probably there are exceptions, but generally, speaking, every person who has applied for repatriation.

Mr. Whitaker: Everybody who has applied, after careful consideration.

Mr. Myer: I think I'd give a chance for a recheck before we moved them.

Mr. Tozier: Isn't it possible some people will back out because of the way the war goes?

Mr. Myer: Yes, some of them have backed out. I think we should make a recheck. But in any case,--I have two questions on this segregation thing. Let's assume that we all agree that they should be moved if we can find a place. Are you agreed that we should not start shifting a

lot of families out of centers to make one of our present centers available for them, and we should find some other way to take care of them?

Mr. Glick: I suggest we transfer to the army the responsibility for administering the center where they are put, not only those we are satisfied are Japanese rather than Americans, but also those to whom we deny indefinite leave on application.

Mr. Myer: I talked with McCloy about that, and he says Justice. After all, the internment is taken care of by the army because they had the guarding facilities. He thinks it is the Justice Department's job.

Mr. Glick: I think if we could get rid of the problem of administering the center where the usual liberal policies of WRA are inappropriate,--

Mr. Myer: Might we legally turn over the money for some place, say like this place in Louisiana?

Mr. Glick: I think we can work that out, yes.

Col. Wilson: I think that would be the solution.

Mr. Glick: If we can assume, within the next three or four months, through a special transfer of money to FBI or otherwise, we can have FBI rapidly check through on the basis of applications for advance clearance, which are provided for in the new administrative instruction on leave, all of the evacuees in the centers. Let's assume there are 150, 300, or 500 people, in whose cases we feel if they applied for indefinite leave we'd want to turn them down. Suppose we were to move all those people out of the centers. Then we might actually be free to do this: terminate military areas over the centers, tell the army we no longer need police protection, simplify the leave regulations by announcing, "If you want to leave, you may leave, goodbye", and let it go at that.

Mr. Myer: You are quite an optimist, Phil. You sound like I did six weeks or two months ago. I'm not so sure we want to argue with Justice

to accept that job, and we will help to finance it, if necessary, to provide space for repatriates where they can be detained in the meantime. If we want to go further and pull out additional people that may be ~~at~~ bad actors, and so on, we can see whether they would be willing to accept them.

Mr. Barrows: I think there is a serious objection of putting bad actors with people to whom we do not want to grant leave. * * If we put them into what amounts to prison or special confinement, we are really violating our commitment that they would not be subject to discrimination if they applied for repatriation. I don't think bad actors need to be put anywhere. That is our problem, we've got it, and should live with it.

Mr. Stauber: You should have a jail to put them in.

Mr. Kimmel: They become martyrs if you put them in a jail.

Mr. Myer: I don't think so, if it is properly handled. You don't have to jail them often, because they lose face if put in jail. The reason they became martyrs is because you had a situation there where it is easy to become martyrs at that time, but I don't think in our situation that would be true.

Mr. Stauber: When we say we want to move in the direction of getting separate conveniences for those who asked to be repatriated, that is one group; but we have another bunch, probably equally large, of persons whom the Japanese government has asked for, many of whom have said they do not want to be repatriated. We don't know what is back of the Japanese government's request, whether they are people--nor the reason back of their declination. Maybe they want to stay here to get further information and take it back.

Mr. Myer: Until we have analyzed that, we have no basis for moving them.

Re: Clothing

Mr. Barrows: You recall, Mr. Myer, you sent out a supplementary wire saying wash it all off, anything issued up to October 21, as forgotten. That leaves the fact that some centers were generous and others were not, and it leaves us with the problem of equalization. I had in mind, if we ever got a statement out of some of the centers, we might let the bars down to equalize--

Mr. Myers: I wouldn't let the bars down and complicate things any further, as long as everybody is warm this winter. I'd like to have it at the point that everybody is warm this winter, period. We will have to wash it off even though there were some unequal ~~val~~ things. There wasn't too much clothing issued or a very large value. If we can make this provision you talked about here on those centers that did not have a chance for any issue previous to October 1--these later centers--because they were not workers and that sort of thing, and the chance of making grants for those people who did not get clothing, they can keep warm.

Mr. Rowalt: Even though the WCCA policies were unequally administered, those who left assembly centers got none under their policy; those that left later got none under our policy; so there is a certain amount of equalization there.

Mr. Myer:

One other thing that will be of interest to you, and I don't want it quoted: I saw Harry Hopkins yesterday morning about twenty minutes on the whole question of Japanese American relocation, and leading up particularly, of course, to the matter of use in the army. I will frankly admit I was a little disappointed in what I thought I accomplished in the way of social point of view, but the outcome I thought was all right in

the sense that he is very much interested in the propaganda value, and said he would talk with the President about that angle but not bring up the other angle. He assured us he would try to keep it open, and that is about all there was to that. We did not go into detail on it. Well, that cleans up the day yesterday as far as I am concerned.

I think our main reason for meeting here this morning is to talk about procedures from here on, and getting into effect; one, the understanding of policy as it is now outlined, and two, the procedures in sequence for getting into effect our reorganization ~~plans~~^{plans}. I would like to start the ball rolling very briefly by telling you what the plans of--first, let me say this. Let me introduce to you the new Deputy Director, Mr. Cy Fryer. Cy, being the good soldier he is, has agreed to come into Washington as Deputy Director. We are starting out tonight to go to Gila and Poston first on the trip together as originally planned. We are meeting then at Salt Lake with all regional directors, I mean the project directors, from the present western region and the present Denver region, the eight western project directors, on next Friday and Saturday. I won't be able to meet with them all day Saturday, because I have another meeting Saturday afternoon to discuss the same sort of thing with them as we have discussed here this week, the main objectives, organization, and policy.
