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THE BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS

"FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE  
COMMISSION AFTER THE MARCH"

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## FEPC After the March

There were Jews and many Negroes in this agency. Let's face it. That fact was the subject not only of whispering campaigns but of derisive shouts on the floor of Congress. Until Congress itself comes to believe citizenship is not a class prerogative, there is little hope of settling the problem at the grass roots.

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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH had a large stake in the success of the FEPC. As the agitational leader who pressured its establishment he was chief beneficiary of its glory. As head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters the FEPC provided a governmental weapon in his efforts to expand the union's jurisdiction over new categories of railroad workers. Thus McNutt's peremptory "postponement" of the FEPC's railroad hearings was a double blow at Randolph's prestige and organizational leadership. Indeed Randolph never fully recovered the enormous stature he had attained in 1941 and 1942.

Randolph lost face not only because the FEPC seemed dead. His failure to wield the kind of protest which had boosted him to the pinnacle of leadership, however legitimate the reasons, spelled the end of the March on Washington as a mass movement and reduced Randolph to the level of other major Negro leaders.

Were he purely a radical agitator he might have gone ahead with the bold program of the MOWM. Had he done so, it is quite probable that serious punitive action would have been taken against him. And such martyrdom would have popularized the label, "American Gandhi," which many had pinned on him. From what we have observed of Randolph it seems likely that he was indeed tempted, but he is the old radical turned practical through his very success as an agitator-organizer. His radical style remained, its mode of speech and

action came naturally and sincerely into his continuing activities, but it was controlled and compromised by "the art of the possible."

Thus, it was not through the March that Randolph turned loose the pressure which would force the President to supersede Paul McNutt. Milton Webster did not resign in protest from the FEPC or risk his position as did Earl Dickerson in publicly violating McNutt's authority. Rather, the protest that was unleashed took channels which brought Randolph back into formal alliance with the established organizational leadership—Negro and white.

### *Randolph's "Baby"*

THE IMMEDIATE FORM of renewed co-operation consisted of pressures (delegations and negotiations) brought to bear on the Administration to revitalize the FEPC. Success was apparent in the issuance of a new executive order and the rescheduling of the railroad hearings.<sup>2</sup> The second FEPC was removed from McNutt's control and made an independent agency within the Office of Production Management. Although the language of the new order was somewhat stronger than the original, the weakness of the new FEPC was soon revealed. At the conclusion of the hearings, the operating railroads and unions blatantly refused a directive to cease their discriminatory employment practices. The cases were then certified to President Roosevelt who appointed a special mediating committee, but this functioned as a mere "pigeon hole" and no action resulted. The experience made clear the need of a statutory basis for the enforcement of FEPC decisions.

This was not the only factor leading to a growing conviction that legislative support for FEPC was crucial. A congressional committee's investigation into the authority of executive agencies subjected the FEPC to considerable harassment.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the funds of the reconstituted FEPC were brought under congressional control by a measure forbidding the use of appropriations for agencies created by executive order after one year unless specifically authorized by statute.<sup>4</sup> Thus the hope that Congress could be by-passed, with appropriations drawn from the President's general emergency funds, was shattered. Even if there were no ambitions to establish the FEPC on



a permanent basis, the retention of the wartime President's Committee would require a pressure-group strategy appropriate to influencing the Congress.

Finally, though the Normandy ("D-Day") landings were almost a year away, there was increasing apprehension that postwar problems were not far off, that wartime "boom" would collapse in peacetime "bust." Minority groups were especially vulnerable because they lacked job seniority, and the realization grew that the FEPC was only a temporary, emergency agency. Understandably, this led to a conflict of concerns between the pressures necessary to support the wartime FEPC and the desire to establish a permanent agency. But as long as the wartime FEPC fought for congressional appropriations, the National Council for a Permanent FEPC had to subordinate its efforts for legislation to lobbying for continuance of the temporary presidential agency.

It should not be assumed that Randolph was now without a following or without stature as a leader. Only by contrast with his previous rise did his decline appear so steep. He now shared the leadership but his place as a top spokesman for American Negroes was retained. Moreover, his shift from the glamorous mass action of the March to the more prosaic strategy of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC was astutely timed to save his hold on the issue.

The National Council represented a broadening of the alliance behind the drive for a permanent FEPC. However, the new organization as first constructed enabled Randolph to maintain a tight grip upon it. The Council's Washington office, opened early in 1944, was manned by people of his choosing accustomed to regarding him as "the Chief" (an informal title of respectful adulation by which Randolph is known in the BSCP). Mrs. Anna Arnold Hedgeman, who headed the staff, came directly out of the MOWM.

The official policy-making arrangements in the National Council were also conducive to maintaining Randolph's control. A wide representation of organizations drawn from minority, religious, labor and liberal groups provided a broad facade of unity and shared leadership. Nominally, even the chairmanship of the Council was shared by Randolph with a co-chairman, the Rev. Allen Knight Chalmers. But the device of limiting the size of the Executive Committee facilitated manipulation of the leadership. Though all co-operating organizations had representation on the Executive Council the smaller

Executive Committee made the practical decisions. To be sure, even the Executive Committee was considerably broader than the MOWM top levels had ever been. As an interracial organization this naturally followed, but the particular groups represented were narrowly drawn and it was not until 1946 that the NAACP, AFL, and CIO national bodies were provided membership on the Executive Committee.<sup>5</sup>

The pattern of organization was a distinct carryover from the MOWM. (It should be remembered that the March was still in existence, an affiliate of the National Council, and in process of hopefully preparing its National Non-Partisan Political Conference to be held in Chicago, June, 1944, on the third anniversary of the 8802 Order.) Randolph proceeded to establish local affiliates of the National Council which provided the basis for individual membership. In this way he brought with him the personal following built up over years of national touring. In many communities the MOWM simply transformed its operations into National Council activities. The core, as with the March, was the nation-wide network of BSCP Divisions, and their possessive attitude to the Council was the same as it had been to the MOWM. Randolph continued his trips through the country but, whereas previously he had organized March on Washington units, now he set up local councils for national FEPC legislation.

The organizational activity behind FEPC was now interracial—at least officially. But in the early period of the National Council's work, this was more apparent than real. There were, to be sure, many white groups affiliated with the Council, and Randolph received support and funds from white, socialist, labor leaders like David Dubinsky of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. But the fear of Communist infiltration, and the priority white liberals assigned to maintaining wartime unity, led Randolph to emphasize work in the Negro group.

Subsequent organizational developments would find the Negro community playing a definitely subordinate role in many campaigns for state FEPC laws. Paradoxically, Randolph's National Council was attacked for overemphasis on the Negro interest in FEPC. Thus, Louis Kesselman has written:

Especially vigorous were the charges that the Negro viewpoint was being represented to the exclusion of nearly all other minority groups and that the committee was dominated by individuals hand-picked by Randolph and loyal to his point of view. Part of the criticism came from the



Communists who were bitterly opposed to Randolph's leadership, but much of it came from non-Communist groups and individuals who were concerned lest the movement fail for lack of appeal to all minority groups.<sup>6</sup>

Actually, there was little pressure from non-Negroes for involvement in the National Council until the war drew to a close. The largest white minority group with a substantial interest in FEPC was the Jewish community,<sup>7</sup> but the forces at work in Jewish organizational programing during the war placed other issues in the forefront of their activities. Priority was naturally given to Jewish support of the fight against Hitler—a name which firmly unified Jewish interests behind the “arsenal of democracy” idea.<sup>8</sup>

This concern predated the war when American Jews had developed substantial programs to counteract anti-Semitic activities in the United States and abroad.<sup>9</sup> Huge sums were raised to succor the horde of refugees escaping the Hitler terror, and horror grew as these brought news of what they had fled.<sup>10</sup> The magnitude of the persecution overwhelmed the apathy of even the most disinterested American Jews. Many reacted like Max Lerner: “Before I could get educated as to the relation between myself and Jews elsewhere in the world, six million of my brothers and sisters had to die.”<sup>11</sup> The stench from the gas chambers and human furnaces at Dachau seeped into every corner of American Jewish life.

Consequently, employment discrimination against Jews, which certainly existed,<sup>12</sup> did not assume paramount importance in Jewish organizational work until after Hitler was defeated. Though there were definite steps taken to cope with the problem, its relative role was far less than that assigned fair employment by Negroes.<sup>13</sup>

Kesselman maintains that Jews were slow to act against employment discrimination even prior to the war, ascribing this to the “shasha” (“hush-hush”) tactics pursued by the more conservative agencies.<sup>14</sup> The American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith are generally assigned to the “quiet” category whereas the American Jewish Congress has a history of “mass activities, such as protests against the present [Nazi] German government, a boycott against German-made goods, and mass meetings.”<sup>15</sup> The latter organization early established a Commission on Economic Discrimination (in 1930).

However, these differences, with respect to FEPC, can be over-

drawn. The American Jewish Congress was a part of the Chicago Bureau on Jewish Employment Problems which explicitly restricted itself to “non-militant methods.”<sup>16</sup> This Bureau, founded December, 1937 by the Congress and the B'nai B'rith, was later joined by the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee. All of these played important roles in postwar campaigns for national and state FEPC bills.

Further evidence of a conservative Jewish approach to the employment discrimination problem is found in a memorandum on FEPC issued during the war. The Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations Dealing With Employment Discrimination in War Industries (established in 1941) criticised the FEPC for its primary reliance on the public hearing technique.<sup>17</sup> It attacked “extremist sentiment” and the “forces which clamor loudly for Utopia to arrive tomorrow.” Emphasis was placed upon methods “without fanfare and without publicity,” reserving public hearings for situations where less aggressive tactics fail. The approach of the FEPC, it was claimed, “all too often serves to divide our citizenry—whatever the reasons therefore—rather than unite them in a common cause.” Plainly the war effort was uppermost in Jewish concern at the time, and to a greater extent than in the comparable Negro organizations.

Thus, the Jewish groups were aware of the FEPC from the start (note that the establishment of the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations coincided with the creation of the FEPC). A number of Jews served on the FEPC staff and Jewish organizations supplied it with cases of discrimination. But the secondary role which FEPC was assigned by Jews during the war was resented by Negroes. The *Pittsburgh Courier* caustically attacked the Jewish leadership for seeking to benefit from the FEPC without paying the price of a hard-fought pressure campaign:

The Fair Employment Practice Committee was set up to combat job discrimination against minority groups including JEWS and Negroes. Jews did not help to force the creation of this agency. And, as a matter of fact, they stood off on the sidelines to see how it was going before they began to avail themselves of its power and authority. They didn't want to go off on the deep end.

When they perceived that the FEPC might be of service to them, they swung into line. They not only asked the Committee to add impetus to its fight against discrimination of which Jews were the victims, but they



insisted on bigger and better representation on the staff of the Committee. They began to demand jobs which the Committee had and some it did not have.

That is all right. They deserve the jobs. But what did they do when the Committee was recently knocked on its heels by the President's letter of July 30? [transferring FEPC under McNutt.] Did they make any move to keep the Committee in power and authority? Did they, as Negroes did, rally to the aid of the Committee?

Maybe they did, but there is not much record of it.

There are some foxy Jews. We believe that they should not be so foxy, that they should FIGHT with us if they hope to share the benefits of our fighting.<sup>18</sup>

The emotional pitch of this editorial, captioned "Some Jews Are Like Foxes," had marked anti-Semitic overtones. But, despite repetition of the stereotype "foxy Jews," the *Courier* disclaimed any such intent: "Intelligent, thoughtful Negro leadership deplores any evidence of anti-Semitism among the Negro masses." Moreover, they called for united effort and deplored the fact that "some Jews, as some Negroes, do not realize that we should work together for the common interest."<sup>19</sup> This hoped for co-operation would come about, but not until after the war.

The last official action of the wartime FEPC recommended to President Truman "that you continue to urge upon the Congress the passage of [permanent FEPC] legislation. . . ."<sup>20</sup> When it became clear that the wartime agency was dead, a hard-fought lobbying campaign was launched by the National Council in the Seventy-ninth Congress (1945-1946).

In the House of Representatives, the bills were "bottled-up" in the Rules Committee despite favorable action by the House Labor Committee. To get a bill to the floor for a vote, in the absence of a rule from the Rules Committee, is a most difficult task. Efforts at both a discharge petition and the Calendar Wednesday methods for bypassing the Rules Committee failed.<sup>21</sup>

When the Seventy-ninth Congress reconvened in January, 1946, the Randolph forces succeeded in bringing the Senate bill to the floor. This "Senate-first" strategy was assailed by "left-wing" groups who accused Randolph of inept parliamentary management for not awaiting House action.<sup>22</sup> But the Negro leadership, including Randolph's trade-union rival Willard Townsend, came to his defense, and the National Council kept control of the issue.<sup>23</sup>

Whatever the merits of the competing strategies, and competing organizational efforts to seize command of the issue, the Senate smothered the FEPC bill. Despite the fact that President Truman was on record as favoring FEPC, as was the 1944 national platform of the Republican party, it proved impossible to close debate, and the bill succumbed to a Southern filibuster (January 18-February 7, 1946).<sup>24</sup>

The National Council moved swiftly in a desperate effort to save the day. Technically, there was still time in the session to pass the bill in the House and to obtain cloture in the Senate. A strategy conference met in Washington (February 22-23) and plans were laid to threaten reprisals at the polls in the oncoming 1946 congressional elections.

In rapid order, Save FEPC Rallies were held in New York (Madison Square Garden) and Chicago, echoing the days of the March On Washington Movement.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, Randolph attempted to organize a new march under the aegis of the National Council. Nor was this mere bluster for the February 22 strategy conference:

. . . REPRESENTING 43 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 28 LOCAL COUNCILS RECOMMENDED AS A MAJOR SUGGESTION SINCE POLITICAL STALEMATE SEEMS TO BE AT TOP THAT WE HAVE A MARCH ON WASHINGTON.<sup>26</sup>

Now that the war was over and there were definite signs of recession and fear of unemployment,<sup>27</sup> it would seem that conditions were favorable for renewed militancy. But the situation was quite different from the defense-emergency period. The liberal-labor and other minority groups were now active once again in the civil rights area, and FEPC was an attractive issue to feature in organizational programing. Even Randolph was not willing to conceive of a new march as an all-Negro activity.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, the "left wingers" were pressing hard to capture the issue at a time when they were no longer concerned with preserving national unity. They were vigorous in attacks on the National Council leadership, and would soon fill Madison Square Garden in a threat to march on Washington themselves. The language they now employed in their agitation is revealing of the changed situation in which the "left wing" threatened to take over the militant civil rights fight:



## WHERE WERE OUR LEADERS?

... Were they on the firing line? No ... respectable people don't fight. They adopt resolutions. They gabble, they fulminate, they deplore. Every time the Negro masses get a collective notion that they want to fight fire with fire ... meet mob violence with violence. String up a white man every time a black man is sacrificed on the altar of white supremacy. Our social respectable folks have a collective conniption fit. Well, there is nothing respectable about a rope around your throat. ...

WE WILL MARCH ON WASHINGTON<sup>29</sup>

Ultimately this threat failed, but the renewal of militancy by the "left wing" made it exceedingly difficult for non-Communist reform groups to adopt radical tactics for fear of losing organizational control. The Communists had two major advantages when such methods were used: (1) They were highly disciplined and would prolong meetings until their hard core remained after the less dedicated "masses" departed. (2) The emotional, agitational level necessary for enthusiastic mass support is not easily regulated. All negotiated agreements, however satisfactory as reform accomplishments, are vulnerable to charges of "cowardice" or "unprincipled compromise." Thus, mass-action organizational efforts during the Thirties and Forties were feared by reformers even when they may have provided effective instruments for the attainment of their goals.

When the original March on Washington was endorsed, the same danger had existed—up to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. However, the desperate state of Negro morale then prodded the leadership into what was recognized as a risky course. Now, the morale situation was not nearly so pressing, nor were Negroes without white allies. These allies, however, (particularly the CIO) finally rejected the march strategy, and the plans were dropped in favor of electoral reprisals against anti-FEPC congressmen.<sup>30</sup>

Despite a successful Democratic party primary fight against Missouri Congressman Roger C. Slaughter, who had cast a crucial vote in the Rules Committee blocking floor action on FEPC,<sup>31</sup> the results of the 1946 elections were very disappointing. Randolph regarded the composition of the new Eightieth Congress (1947–1948) as proof that a period of reaction had set in and as a typical characteristic of postwar times. His activities now reflected a loss of confidence in the feasibility of legislative-lobbying methods for achieving substantial civil rights gains.

In 1944, Randolph had resisted great pressure from friends and politicians who sought him as candidate for the new Congressional district which would give Harlem its first Negro congressman.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, he had then refused to endorse any presidential candidate "on account of the fact that I am connected with a movement which is sponsoring Bills in the House and Senate for a Permanent Committee on Fair Employment Practice which has bi-partisan support. . . ."<sup>33</sup>

Now, in 1946, Randolph accepted the chairmanship of the National Educational Committee for a New Party formed by many ex-socialists, socialists and other non-Communist liberals (e.g., Walter Reuther, Norman Thomas, John Dewey and David Dubinsky).<sup>34</sup> This was linked, too, with the pre-"Fair Deal" Truman who, it seemed, had yielded to the prevailing "spirit of reaction." The *New York Times* reported, Randolph "denounces Truman emergency labor legislation proposals; urges formation of new political party."<sup>35</sup> In 1948, Randolph publicly endorsed Norman Thomas for president.<sup>36</sup>

Actually, Truman had successfully placated the general Negro community with a strong speech to the NAACP and the Committee on Civil Rights' forthright report of 1947.<sup>37</sup> He achieved even greater popularity among Negroes as a result of the 1948 Democratic party national convention fight over civil rights which resulted in the Dixiecrat exodus.<sup>38</sup> But Randolph, like many others, was convinced Truman could not possibly win the election; liberals might just as well go down to defeat with principled minor parties.

Plainly, 1948 was a confusing year for reform politics, and for a time it seemed that the traditional confines of the two-party system were breached. Truman, of course, succeeded in a classic upset against seemingly insurmountable odds, which included the opposition of Henry Wallace running on the Progressive party ticket and with the support of the Communists. The Wallace movement helped make the election year an important turning point in liberal-labor politics; a widespread campaign against Communist organizational infiltration was spurred in reaction to this highwater mark of "left-wing" influence.

The NAACP, Urban League, American Jewish Congress, CIO, and many other groups "cleaned house" with increased vigor as the "Spirit of Teheran" froze in the "Cold War."<sup>39</sup>



*Sharing the Top*

MEANWHILE, following the 1946 filibuster and the general malaise which engulfed liberals after the congressional elections of that year, the National Council for a Permanent FEPC appeared bankrupt. This condition was more than a figure of speech as the organization was heavily in debt to individuals who had loaned money for the unsuccessful campaign, to staff for back-pay, and to printers with unpaid bills for propaganda materials.

Matters were made even worse by a rift which developed between Mrs. Hedgeman (the Executive Secretary) and Randolph. Mrs. Hedgeman resigned in a public statement attacking the National Council leadership when almost the entire staff was discharged as an economy move.<sup>40</sup> Recriminatory exchanges produced a minor scandal, and it seemed to mark the end of the National Council. Such was the situation described by Mrs. Hedgeman's successor, Elmer Henderson:

After the bitter filibuster and defeat of the bill in the 79th Congress interest in the measure took a sharp decline and disillusionment and discouragement overcame our supporters. A great amount of confusion was created in the mind of the general public after the sudden resignation of the former executive secretary and the recriminations which followed. This confusion has never been cleared up and both Mr. Manly and I have been confronted with it constantly. For nearly a year there was no activity and no contact at all between our Washington office and the field. During that period many people believed the issue dead and the National Council disbanded.<sup>41</sup>

This was addressed to Roy Wilkins not in his NAACP capacity but as chairman (since 1946) of the Executive Committee of the National Council. Shortly before Mrs. Hedgeman's resignation, the National Council had ceased to be entirely Randolph's "baby." He continued as co-chairman, with the Rev. Allen Knight Chalmers, as before; but the Council's organizational base was now greatly broadened by sharing the top.

Previously, the NAACP (and the Urban League) had a rather nominal affiliation with the Council. Walter White could not move against Randolph in an open maneuver because he personified the issue in the Negro community; also, the "left-wing" problem forced a measure of unity among the staunchly anti-Communist leaders.

They defended Randolph on the Senate-first strategy and rejected a united front with Congressman Marcantonio's followers. But, beneath the surface, there was friction.<sup>42</sup>

A complex of factors were involved: the rupture over the March, lingering resentments from the 1942 NAACP convention where Randolph "stole the show," disagreement over priorities for issues—the NAACP was closely identified with competing issues such as anti-poll tax and anti-lynching bills—and general organizational rivalry for funds and the loyalty of followers.

After the war, the FEPC issue (despite Walter White's reluctance) was given top priority by organizations in the civil rights field.<sup>43</sup> This decision grew out of the need to concentrate pressures in the Congress on one bill. Although Jewish organizations now worked closely with Negro groups,<sup>44</sup> the Jewish defense agencies could collaborate best on programs directly connected with Jewish problems. FEPC as an issue was important to a number of groups: it satisfied the Negro militants' emphasis on the laboring masses and their neo-Marxian economic interpretation of politics; it satisfied the Negro conservatives operating in the puritanical Booker T. Washington tradition which glorified hard work and learning a trade as the path to racial advancement; and it satisfied the programatic needs of the Jewish defense agencies because the importance of employment discrimination against Jews was increased by the relative diminution of anti-Semitic activities of the Coughlin variety in the postwar period.<sup>45</sup>

The Jewish agencies, after the war, made substantial financial contributions to the National Council, testified at legislative hearings, provided propaganda materials and loaned the time of competent personnel. Following the post-filibuster reorganization of the Council, Arnold Aronson, representing the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), became secretary of the executive committee.<sup>46</sup> He played a leading role along with Roy Wilkins from that time on. Randolph remained a key figure, to be sure, but Wilkins and Aronson assumed much of the active administrative direction of the Council and, thereby, influenced policy and strategy greatly. Under the skilled guidance of these experienced staff-men, a very efficient operation was made possible.

Wilkins and Aronson seem quite different from the "up-through-the-ranks" leadership of the BSCP and the similar "idealists" attracted

Support  
one  
bill



to Randolph's various movements, such as the March.<sup>47</sup> The accession of these professionals reflected a change in the kind of organizational leadership which was taking over the fair employment issue.

Agitational types, dominant in the March, had continued with Randolph to control the National Council thus keeping possession of the FEPC "ball." Their failure in the Seventy-ninth Congress, though suffered in collaboration with the staffs of other organizations, could eventuate in either outright seizure of the issue by others or co-optation of competing leaders into commanding roles. Though the NAACP did toy with the former strategy, it was not a real possibility.<sup>48</sup> No single organization could monopolize the issue at that stage, a federative effort was inescapable. Given Randolph's pessimism over what he regarded as the historically ordained postwar reaction, and the deep financial indebtedness of the Council, the latter course was readily accepted by all sides.

FEPC could not become the prime symbol of the civil rights fight (prior to the Supreme Court's school desegregation decrees) without attracting those organizations with long-established interests at stake. Nor could Randolph succeed in a national lobbying operation without engineering clear signs of broad and intense public support. In the absence of direct and spontaneous grass-roots pressures—as in the hey-day of the March movement—the wielding of organizational endorsements and activity must symbolize the community of interests involved. These organizations in turn needed the issue for the programs (and annual reports) which justify their existence; and Randolph needed them for the influence they represented, the talented professionals they possessed and the funds they could supply.

The National Council, following the post-filibuster (1946) reorganization, was widely representative of all non-Communist groups interested in FEPC, at the policy-making top as well as in affiliations and supporting activities. Liberal, labor, church and minority groups rallied to support FEPC bills introduced into Congress over the next several years. Despite a succession of vigorous efforts, however, they were without major political success.

The financial deficit with which the reorganized Council began was never entirely overcome. Elmer Henderson, the Council's replacement for Mrs. Hedgeman, had to go on a *per diem* basis after little more than a year and later, reluctantly, resigned for a better position. But the political situation was a greater factor in this failure

than the shortage of funds which it helped produce. As Henderson wrote, "With the election of a Republican Congress in 1946 and its record in the First Session, many formerly active workers have expressed the belief that there is absolutely no chance for passage."<sup>49</sup> This was regarded as confirmed during the subsequent session of the Eightieth Congress. "Although committed to FEPC by their platform of 1944, Republican leaders evinced little interest in the issue and made no effort to bring it out of committee and before Congress."<sup>50</sup>

The National Council was utterly unsuccessful during the Eightieth Congress; but Randolph, through another bold activity reminiscent of the March, helped pressure two important new executive orders from the President.<sup>51</sup> A *New York Times* front-page headline announced: "TRUMAN ORDERS END OF BIAS IN FORCES AND FEDERAL JOBS."<sup>52</sup> This climaxed the organization by Randolph and Grant Reynolds of a civil disobedience campaign directed primarily at segregation in the military services.<sup>53</sup>

Randolph had informed a Congressional committee, "I personally pledge myself to openly counsel, aid and abet youth, both white and Negro . . . in an organized refusal to register and be drafted."<sup>54</sup> Senator Wayne Morse cautioned him, "It may well lead to indictments for treason and very serious repercussions."<sup>55</sup> Randolph persisted—shortly thereafter he mounted a "soapbox" outside the March Community Bookstore, former headquarters of the MOWM, to specifically urge draft-eligible men in his audience not to register with their draft boards and to refuse induction. "He announced he was prepared to 'oppose a Jim Crow Army until I rot in jail.'"<sup>56</sup>

Efforts to isolate Randolph from the rest of the Negro leadership were largely unsuccessful. Though the NAACP could not officially endorse his activity and declared themselves "dubious about this method," they avoided outright condemnation.<sup>57</sup> Indeed the effort was greatly aided when the NAACP announced the results of its poll of draft-eligible Negro students which "found . . . that 71 percent were sympathetic with the A. Philip Randolph-Grant Reynolds civil disobedience campaign. . . ."<sup>58</sup>

The Urban League executive, Lester Granger, played a similar role. He was spokesman for a group of prominent Negroes who met with the Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, and representatives of the military branches. The Granger statement announced, "The group agreed that no one wanted to continue in an advisory capacity

March in March

See  
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Randolph urges draft resistance



on the basis of continued segregation in the armed services."<sup>59</sup> This point of view—of indirect support of Randolph's campaign—predominated over outright disassociation such as that offered the investigating Senate committee by a Negro member of the Massachusetts FEPC. Even this was hedged by a reference to Negro loyalty "in another war. . . ."<sup>60</sup> No one asked the witness, Mr. Elwood S. McKenney, concerning Negro behavior in peacetime.

President Truman was now in a position much like that of his predecessor when he too confronted Randolph in the White House. The difference was that Truman was in the midst of a difficult presidential election campaign and that civil rights was an important part of his bid to northern urban voters.

As chairman of the newly created League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation, Randolph threatened organized non-compliance with the military draft "unless President Truman issues an executive order against segregation."<sup>61</sup> But FEPC was closely connected with this effort for Randolph argued that military service is a species of Federal employment. He asked a Senate committee at a public hearing:

. . . how could any permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission dare to criticize job discrimination in private industry if the Federal Government itself were simultaneously discriminating against Negro youth in military installations all over the world?<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the two executive orders reflected the dual demands uppermost in Negro protest activities ever since the defense emergency of pre-World War II days. Randolph was again able to demonstrate the power of dramatic mass-action methods, when directed against a President. The Congress, however, was less vulnerable to such strategies. Reformers seeking legislation are necessarily ensnared in lobbying operations, parliamentary log-rollings and procedural mazes which make it difficult to pinpoint responsibility and vitiate threats of electoral reprisal.<sup>63</sup>

### Mobilization and Frustration

THE SURPRISING RESULTS of the 1948 election brought Harry Truman back to the White House and a Democratic majority back to Capitol Hill. With them came the high hopes of the National Council

leaders (including Randolph) who regarded the situation as now ripe for enactment of FEPC. But delaying tactics in both Houses kept the bills from floor action and the 1949 session passed without significant progress. This stalemate was intolerable to the proponents who viewed the election as a mandate for civil rights.

A vigorous show of strength was called for by the NAACP which took the initiative in forming a "National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization." Organizational delegations from all over the country were called upon to descend on Washington (January 15-17, 1950) to greet the reconvening Congress. This *ad hoc* organization was headed by Roy Wilkins, NAACP, as chairman; Arnold Aronson, NCRAC, secretary; and Herbert M. Levy, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), assistant secretary. The effort, theoretically, was broader than FEPC and, thus, broader than the National Council. Actually, all other items were subordinated to the FEPC issue.

The directors of the Council and of the Mobilization overlapped, but the public leadership of Wilkins made the NAACP's role more recognizable and they deservedly received credit for the mobilization's success. It seems plain that the separate effort was also welcomed by the NAACP as a means to move Randolph from his monopolization of the FEPC limelight.

Randolph's reaction to all this was what might be expected; reserved in public and, we may conjecture, rather less reservedly negative in private. The *Black Worker* reported:

The National Council for a Permanent FEPC is to receive the cooperation, in the present session of Congress, of the Civil Rights Mobilization Committee. The Mobilization's steering committee is functioning principally as a lobbying group among the various senators and representatives.

Although, Pres. Randolph, as Co-Chairman of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, sees no need for another co-ordinating organization working principally for a Federal FEPC, he is nevertheless willing to give his wholehearted cooperation to the Mobilization groups if such an effort will hasten the federal anti-discrimination law.<sup>64</sup>

As a mobilization, the effort was a great success. There were 4,218 "regularly accredited delegates . . . from 33 states."<sup>65</sup> The organizers claimed, "All observers, including veteran newspaper correspondents, agreed that the Mobilization was the greatest mass lobby in point of numbers and geographical dispersion that had ever come to Washington on behalf of any legislation."<sup>66</sup> Delegations swarmed



over the Capitol buttonholing congressmen, and the leaders were promised, at a White House conference with the President, "the FEPC would be brought to a vote 'if it takes all summer.'"<sup>67</sup>

But if FEPC was to be put across, the crucial test of the Mobilization would be its ability to break the conservative Republican-Dixiecrat alliance.<sup>68</sup> This required constant pressure on the bloc of liberal Republicans and northern Democrats, many of whom were more ardent before their urban, minority-group constituents than in behind-the-scenes maneuvers. A sign of the failure to crack this coalition appeared in the open hostility of the Republican leadership to the Mobilization.

When delegations visited Congressman Joe Martin . . . Massachusetts (Minority Leader) and Congressman Leslie Arends . . . Illinois (Minority Whip), and sought their aid for FEPC, each of them replied: *'What are you coming to us for? Why don't you go to your friends? You elected the Democrats. Why are you asking us for help?'*<sup>69</sup>

At first, it appeared that this was just bluster and that the huge civil rights lobby of 1950 had succeeded in pressuring enough congressmen to have its way. On January 20, an effort by Congressman Eugene E. Cox (D.-Ga.), to restore the power of the Rules Committee to "bottle up" legislation indefinitely, was defeated. (In 1949, a "twenty-one day rule" had been enacted limiting the period of time the Rules Committee could keep a bill from the floor.) This seemed a crucial test and the civil rights proponents were jubilant.<sup>70</sup>

However, Speaker Sam Rayburn (D.-Tex.) refused to grant the floor to the chairman of the committee ready to report favorably on FEPC, so the same situation prevailed. Discharge petitions failed again, but this time the "Calendar Wednesday" technique succeeded in bringing the measure to a vote (February 22, 1950).

The "House-First" strategy was, at last, given a chance, but whatever feelings lingered that Randolph had erred in 1946 for not following a similar course were soon dispelled. The opposition now carried the day with a flanking assault on the heart of the fair employment bill. A substitute amendment was proposed by Congressman Samuel McConnell (R.-Pa.) stripping the measure of all enforcement powers and was carried by a vote of 222 to 178. This was the crucial test, with opponents voting for the amendment and proponents against.

Though the "amended" bill was now passed, the proponents termed it "a far cry from H.R. 4453 as originally introduced and . . . *unsatisfactory* to all supporters of effective FEPC legislation."<sup>71</sup> They had voted for the weak bill on final passage, however, hoping that it would enable them to keep the issue alive and "force" the Senate to act. But the situation again illustrated the complexity of electoral mandates, as opponents in somewhat vulnerable situations could point to their record vote "for" FEPC. The proponents, of course, sought to make clear that "the friends of FEPC are the 178 Congressmen who opposed adoption of the McConnell amendment."<sup>72</sup>

Shortly thereafter, on March 8, 1950, the independent existence of the NAACP-led Mobilization was ended in a merger with the National Council. A final report explained:

Since the Mobilization was not conceived as a permanent organization, conferences were held with the executive committee of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, the pioneer organization behind this legislation. It was agreed that the National Mobilization would cooperate with it in a united effort to secure enactment of FEPC in this Congress. This involves practically no change, since the organizations sponsoring the Mobilization have been the mainstays of the National Council. A new letterhead has been issued: 'National Council for a Permanent FEPC in cooperation with the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization'. . .<sup>73</sup>

There was no explanation of why the separation had been maintained for two and one-half months following the Washington mobilization. The question arises whether the Mobilization leadership would have returned to the National Council had it been credited with passage of an effective FEPC bill in the House. It is likely that a successful new organization would have found little reason to reunite with the unsuccessful "pioneer organization" if it sought to retain full public credit for its victory.

The Wilkins-Aronson leadership put on a better lobbying show than had the Randolph-Hedgeman group. At the same time, whatever organizational differences there were had far less to do with success or failure than the obstinate political hurdles institutionalized in the American legislative system. The pathway between electoral mandates and public policy is a labyrinth of obfuscating procedures blocked by scattered and dimly identified wielders of great power. To be sure, these can be made to yield eventually to a clear and ac-

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And H.R. 4453  
passed  
1949? (p. 163)  
p. 168



tively organized majority. But few matters are ever the subject of widespread concern, and organizational efforts usually take place in an arena of general apathy. The problem of how to pressure important civil rights legislation through the American Congress continues to plague its advocates.

Of course there was no difficulty in knowing who the *staunchest* opponents in the Senate were, when the joint National Council-Civil Rights Mobilization lobbyists turned to the upper chamber. The big problem there would be how to close off debate after free speech degenerated into all-out filibuster. But the parliamentary situation still provided a murky screen behind which covert opposition to FEPC could operate effectively. "Leaders of the Democratic party, boasting a majority in the Senate, were bold and vigorous in their public affirmations of support for FEPC, but singularly weak, hesitant, and inactive on the Senate floor."<sup>74</sup>

In charge was Senator Scott Lucas (D.-Ill.), the majority leader, nominally a firm advocate of FEPC. At the end of the first session (October 19, 1949), he had promised that it would reach the action stage immediately after Congress reconvened. During the second session, he issued periodic promises that it would be taken up at a succession of later points. At last he declared it would be wise to wait for House action first; but when the House acted, he and the President put it off so that the expected filibuster would not wreck the appropriations for the European Recovery Program.

Lucas assured the proponent lobbyists that the bill would soon be acted on and declared:

It is not a question of just when F.E.P.C. will be taken to a test, but of the enthusiasm and determination with which a filibuster will be fought when it goes to the floor. A determined fight will be waged—and I mean 'determined.'<sup>75</sup>

But the "filibuster" which followed was a sham. The bill was moved on May 8, put to one side for two days while another matter was debated, then was returned to for a leisurely consideration of the technical motion that the bill should be the next order of business before the Senate. The *New York Times* reported:

When Senator Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, Majority Leader, moved ten days ago that the bill be called up, Washington expected one of the toughest, most gruelling filibusters in history to be started by the Southerners.

Developments have not borne this prediction out. Instead of all-night sessions with hoarse and weary Southern Senators drawing crowded galleries, the Senate has quit before dinner time.<sup>76</sup>

Two separate efforts were made to invoke cloture but each fell short of the constitutional two-thirds (sixty-four favorable votes) required by Senate rules.<sup>77</sup> Actually, cloture would have failed even if only two-thirds of those present and voting were the rule for ending a filibuster.

Table 3—Two Senate Votes on Cloture, Eighty-First Congress\*

	Total	May 19, 1950			July 12, 1950		
		Yea	Nay	Not Voting	Yea	Nay	Not Voting
Total	96	52	32	12	55	33	8
Republicans	42	33	6	3	33	6	3
All Democrats	54	19	26	9	22	27	5
"Northern"† Dem's.	32	19	6	7	22	6	4
"Southern"‡ Dem's.	22	..	20	2	..	21	1

\* Source: roll calls in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, Part 6, 7299-7300; and Vol. 96, Part 8, 9981-9982.

† "Northern" includes all non-southern senators.

‡ "The South" includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

"Who killed Cock Robin?" Could either of the major political parties be saddled with the responsibility?

After the first cloture vote (May 19, 1950), *Crisis* declared flatly: "DEMOCRATS FAIL FEPC." And indeed, in the 1950 Senate, Republicans had a better record, from the FEPC proponents' viewpoint, than had the Democrats<sup>79</sup> (see Table 3).

It was understood that another cloture effort would be made later in that session, and the *Crisis* editorial was plainly directed at urging the Democratic leadership on to stronger effort.<sup>80</sup> They were particularly perturbed over the number of absentees (non-voting under the circumstances was equivalent to a negative vote), several being from outside the South. The statistical assessment of blame by *Crisis* was more evenly bipartisan, but with twelve votes providing the margin of defeat, the Democrats showed up poorly:

So neither the Republicans nor the Northern Democrats can blame the Dixiecrats. Cloture on FEPC was blocked by northern and western senators of both parties, nine Republicans and twelve [actually thirteen] Democrats.<sup>81</sup>



*Crisis* did not editorialize on the second cloture vote (July 12) but their earlier pressure did stimulate the Democrats to a somewhat better effort (Table 3). The net Republican vote for cloture remained the same (despite individual changes) while the Democrats accounted for the three additional votes. If we paraphrase the *Crisis* editorial assessing the first cloture vote, there were now sufficient Democratic votes outside the Solid South for cloture to have succeeded had all Republicans joined in the effort. But this is an involved and esoteric argument offering little solace to ardent Democrats seeking the political support of the Negro and other minority-groups. Though there were now twenty-two Democrats for cloture, the simple story told by *Crisis* assigning party responsibility for the first cloture vote still applied:

The Republicans produced 33 votes for cloture on the FEPC bill. They should have—and could have—done better, but they did put the Democrats in the shade. The man on the street cares little about the elaborate excuses that will be offered. As far as he is concerned, the vote on the FEPC proposition was 33 Republicans as against 19 [22 on the second attempt] Democrats. In his book the Republicans are far ahead in proving their friendship for FEPC.<sup>82</sup>

From the minority-group viewpoint, as a party the Republicans showed up better than the Democrats—in the Senate.<sup>83</sup> What of the House? Here the crucial test was the vote on the amendment introduced by Congressman McConnell substituting a “voluntary” FEPC for the original bill introduced by Congressman Powell. Apart from the fact that McConnell was a leading Republican and that the Republican House Minority Leader supported the amendment, the voting record (Table 4) reveals what was commonly

Table 4—House Vote, February 22, 1950, on McConnell Substitute Amendment, Eighty-First Congress\*

	Total	Yea	Nay	Not Voting
Total	431†	222	178	31
Republicans	170	104	49	17
All Democrats	260	118	128	14
“Northern”‡ Dem’s.	159	23	128	8
“Southern” Dem’s.	101	95	...	6
American Labor	1	...	1	..

\* Source: roll call in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, part 2, 2253–2254.

† Vacancies account for this discrepancy from the full membership of the House.

‡ “Northern” includes all non-Southern Democrats.

understood; most Republicans opposed FEPC with enforcement powers and maintained that their proposed “FEPC” satisfied the party’s platform pledging enactment of FEPC legislation.<sup>84</sup> This the minority-group leaders would not accept, and they advised their followers to vote against all congressmen supporting the McConnell substitute.<sup>85</sup>

On the other hand, the Democratic Speaker of the House had hindered the FEPC effort,<sup>86</sup> and the Democrats constituted a majority of the House. Even so, only 49 Republicans voted against the McConnell amendment compared with 128 Democrats. The 118 Democrats voting for the substitute included 23 from outside the South who joined 104 Republicans to emasculate the proponents’ bill.

Where was party responsibility to be placed? President Truman, publicly most ardent for FEPC, had included it in his State of the Union Message convening the second session, and had been elected despite the 1948 crack in the Solid South over the civil rights fight. There were questions raised concerning the vigor of his efforts behind the scenes, but that situation was too obscure to be utilized for effective campaign propaganda.

Arthur Krock has written:

Very seldom do informed observers agree with Representative Marcantonio, yet a good many did when he remarked . . . ‘It is obvious to everyone . . . that everybody wants civil rights as an issue but not as a law, and that goes for Harry Truman, the Democratic party, and the Republican party.’<sup>87</sup>

The charge that our political system makes it extremely difficult to assess party responsibility was amply borne out in the divisions over FEPC in the Eighty-first Congress.<sup>88</sup>

Following the second and final defeat in the Senate, Aronson appraised the situation with respect to National Council hopes for electoral reprisals and a renewed campaign in the next Congress:

In analysing the cloture vote, he [Aronson] pointed out that six Republicans . . . and six non-Southern Democrats . . . had voted against cloture on both tests. Only four of these men . . . are up for reelection this year and all come from the states which are removed from centers of minority group population and pressure. Even assuming that every other member of the Senate could be prevailed upon to be present and to vote favorably, he said, the thirty-three recorded negative votes supplemented by the vote of Senator-elect Smathers, would be more than sufficient to prevent cloture. Accordingly, Mr. Aronson concluded, prospects for civil



rights legislation in the 82nd Congress appeared dim under the existing cloture rule.<sup>89</sup>

The logical deduction from this was that the Senate rules had to be changed, and a campaign was developed around that issue. In 1952, the National Council was again bypassed for a "Leadership Conference On Civil Rights" with the major slogan, "ABOLISH RULE 22 IN '52."<sup>90</sup> This campaign was without success—indeed the anti-civil rights attack on the "twenty-one day rule" in the House, which had been beaten down in the Eighty-first Congress, was now triumphant and the power of the Rules Committee was restored.<sup>91</sup>

Though the issue of FEPC nominally has been kept alive in the Congress, the only bill to leave committee in either House, from the 1950 defeat through 1958, was on July 3, 1952, reported out with no possibility for action, only three days before adjournment. Perhaps the most significant thing about this Senate bill was the deliberate change in its title to avoid the initials "FEPC."<sup>92</sup> By now, other civil rights issues dominated the activities of minority-group leaders; housing and educational discrimination problems had moved to the forefront.<sup>93</sup>

FEPC was not a dead issue but it was superseded by other concerns in a time of full employment and congressional stalemate. Discrimination was (and remains) substantial with respect to the *quality* of jobs open to minority workers. But, to the "man-in-the-street," job discrimination has meant simply a total refusal to hire any minority persons.<sup>94</sup> It was the fear of a postwar depression and mass unemployment of minority workers which had raised the issue to the apex of the civil rights battle. Thus, though Negroes and other minority groups were still victims of job discrimination, the "bread-and-butter" urgency of the issue was greatly diluted.

### *State FEPC and Professional Leadership*

THOUGH THE National Council for a Permanent FEPC and the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization have faded from existence, the issue continues high on the list of favored civil rights demands.

Efforts to enact FEPC legislation have continued on the state level where proponents have scored a series of successes ever since New York led the way in 1945. There are now (January, 1958) thirteen states with enforceable FEPC statutes.<sup>95</sup> Half of these victories were obtained during the period of greatest agitation for a permanent Federal FEPC (1945-1950). By 1949, seven of the states had enacted FEPC with "teeth."

When the National Council effort collapsed in the 1946 filibuster, and the congressional elections which followed made the situation seem hopeless, the proponents registered their strength locally where it still counted. But this belief that the national fight was doomed acted as a kind of "self-confirming hypothesis," and the local activities drained energies away from the national organization. Victorious state groups, by their very successes, found the issue less urgent. Defeated groups became all the more pessimistic. Other local programs crowded the organizational budgets and the man-hours available to the national campaigns.

Thus, Elmer Henderson (National Council Executive Secretary) informed Roy Wilkins in 1948:

In a number of states in the North and West, our local supporters turned their attention to state bills. In states where they were successful, they tended to feel their objectives achieved. In states where they lost they became further disillusioned and discouraged. . . . One significant but in a way important development for us has been the creation of so-called permanent organizations as an outgrowth of the FEPC fights in many areas. These organizations have paid professional leadership and their own budgets and fund-raising problems.<sup>96</sup>

Of course, the 1950 Mobilization could not have been so successful in the number of delegations which descended on Washington had the state groups not returned, for a time, to the national issue. But the consequence of that failure repeated the experience of 1946.

Even during the height of the Mobilization, the state organizations were scarcely appendages of the National Council Mobilization leadership. The character of the local FEPC organizations had changed considerably from the initial period of National Council control. They now co-operated as entirely independent groups rather than as mere branches of the Council.

Randolph, as the pioneer FEPC agitator, dominated the national issue through most of 1946 and shared, rather than lost complete



control thereafter. The necessarily centralized handling of a lobbying campaign at the Washington level made it difficult for rival leaders to capture the issue. As noted, this would have required the public establishment of an obviously competing organization.

But on the local level the bulk of Randolph's grass-roots following evaporated with the demise of the March. At first (1944-1945) many of the state affiliates of the National Council were dominated by the BSCP and remaining MOWM activists, but whatever strength they retained was restricted to the Negro community. Indeed, the heritage of the March was such that they were distrustful of whites and wary of Communist infiltration. The consequent charge that Randolph over emphasized the Negro interest in FEPC will be recalled.<sup>97</sup> When he turned his attention to other matters during the Eightieth Congress, Randolph's local contacts were broken and other groups carried the issue into the State legislatures.

Generalizing about a large number of differently situated and only loosely connected organizations while retaining fidelity to the facts is a difficult business. State FEPC proponent groups varied from place to place over the country. There were important differences in the demographic features of their locales; for example: the importance of a Spanish-speaking population in Colorado and New Mexico contrasted with the Midwest. NAACP branches were more vigorous in Detroit than in Chicago where the Negro community has been extremely difficult to organize effectively. The Jewish population and, therefore, its organizations are not uniformly distributed. These organizations also vary in local strength, so that in Massachusetts the American Jewish Congress was more important than in Illinois, where the Anti-Defamation League and the other Jewish agencies predominated. Furthermore, some of these factors differed at particular periods during the decade of local FEPC activity.<sup>98</sup>

Despite these and other important differences, as a whole the state organizations around the 1946 period took on an increasingly professional character in their operations. That is, the active leadership of many of the state campaigns was increasingly placed in the hands of men who practiced human relations work as a career. This had been noted by Elmer Henderson in his 1948 analysis. The significance of this is not simply that a more efficient management of the state campaigns ensued, though that occurred. This efficiency also took place on the national level with the bringing of professional personnel like

Wilkins, Aronson and Maslow into top National Council posts after 1946.

In the states the pre-existent organizations which took over the FEPC issue had operated for years with large professional staffs. To be sure, these men were "under orders" as employees of the "lay" boards of directors of their organizations. Many of these "lay" leaders were also personally active in the state FEPC campaigns on decision-making levels. Nor is it possible for the professionals to operate contrary to the explicit wishes of their boards. But the day-to-day operations of these campaigns were performed by the professionals who, unavoidably, made much of the actual determination of policy and strategy.<sup>99</sup>

The increasing role of the professionals is not introduced here to criticize the later leadership behind the FEPC issue with labels of "bureaucracy" or undemocratic procedures. On the contrary, they have devoted themselves with great energy to the task of educating and activating the members of their organizations and the general community. Their work is a positive contribution to the future of practical democracy if American ideals are to be more than mere shibboleths. Randolph's leadership of the March on Washington Movement was certainly not more democratic; as has been indicated previously, it was less formalized and, therefore, more unrestricted. But its mass movement orientation was substantially different, and professionalization is an important item in that difference.

Community intergroup-relations programs have followed the history of social welfare and charity work in this respect. The professional today is an accepted and crucial leader in the operations of institutionalized "social work." But this was not always the case; "Social casework . . . has had a long general but a short professional history."<sup>100</sup> It was inevitable that as communities and groups faced up to the problems of intergroup relations—race riots, slum ghettos and unequal economic opportunity—that trained men would be called on to do a full-time job. The FEPC issue picked up some of these men early in its development when "Metropolitan Councils on Fair Employment Practice" were created in a number of cities. These paralleled the work, locally, of the President's national FEPC which also hired such professionals. In 1946, the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials (NAIRO) was formed in explicit recognition of this trend. And, as noted, many of the major groups

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behind the state FEPC campaigns were organizations which operated on a large-scale professional basis long before the FEPC issue.

These organized groups are among the institutionalized channels through which community action on minority-group problems ordinarily flows. They are generally limited in their political activities because of their dependence on funds from sources which demand deductibility under the internal revenue laws. This tax-exemption problem is a serious obstacle to the organization of effective electoral reprisals. The problem has increased with time and complicates the political efforts of civil rights advocates on a number of issues. It shapes the kinds of activities through which the affected organizations may pursue their objectives, tending to make it safer to conduct "educational" rather than forceful political campaigns.<sup>101</sup>

As the established organizations whose lay boards are composed of prominent community leaders they are necessarily conservative in their methods. Their dominant concern is practicality. A test of strategy and goals ordinarily leads to an emphasis upon maintaining rapport with established wielders of power, i.e., "the people who count." But within the margins of activity which such conditions allow, they carry considerable influence and often can be more effective than the more militant leadership.

Consequently, they do not tend to originate new issues through such bold ventures as the March which led to the FEPC, or the later Truman orders following Randolph's civil disobedience campaign of 1948. The FEPC issue was created when Negro morale was in a critical situation. The established Negro leadership followed Randolph with reluctance and with concern for the channels of influence which they had so carefully constructed over the years, i.e., relations with the White House and other high governmental and non-governmental officials and leaders. After President Roosevelt established the first FEPC, the issue gradually passed through the "gateway"<sup>102</sup> of popular acceptance (among the public sympathetic to civil rights goals) and became an increasingly important part of the programming of human relations organizations. Indeed it was a sign that the issue had "arrived" when the "professionals" took over. That leadership continues the campaigns for FEPC in the states yet to be won and spurs existing fair employment practice commissions on to more effective enforcement.

### *Again the White House*

CAMPAIGNS FOR CONGRESSIONAL enactment of FEPC became dormant because of what was described as late as 1956 to be "an informal coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans [which has] continued to be the principal roadblock to any civil rights legislation."<sup>103</sup> However, the national issue continued on the presidential level where it first arose.

The political processes through which the President is selected make him more vulnerable to civil rights balance-of-power pressures than the Congress. The latter body contains representatives of varied constituencies many of which are beyond the reach of FEPC advocates. To win New York or Illinois without the support of organized minority groups is difficult enough to make presidential candidates very sensitive to those interests. This is repeated in a number of northern and western states. Of course, the Senators from those states face similar pressures, but their influence is diluted by Senators otherwise situated—most obviously, but not all, from the South. This dilution is further watered down by the apportionment of constituencies in both Houses in a manner favorable to the less populated states.<sup>104</sup>

State FEPC campaigns suffer a similar handicap. A state legislator from Chicago's Negro Southside is obviously vulnerable to FEPC pressures—even if that community is but little organized on the issue. An Illinois governor is less vulnerable, but regardless of party he can be counted upon for at least public support of Negro demands. He can win only with great difficulty if opposed by the bulk of urban voters. With minor exceptions, it is the southern "downstate" districts which counterbalance the strength of the Cook County representatives in the Illinois state legislature. The disproportionate representation provided these non-metropolitan areas is the problem yet to be overcome in Illinois and several other states with substantial, but concentrated, minority-group populations.<sup>105</sup>

The possibility that the Negro vote might return to the Republican party played a tempting part in the campaign to re-elect President Eisenhower. Similarly, the record of Adlai Stevenson as Governor of Illinois during two state FEPC campaigns was important in his appeals to minority voters.<sup>106</sup> The weight assigned to civil rights by presidential hopefuls is a continuing and increasing process.



But no President ever had more reason to appreciate the power of minority voters than did Harry S. Truman.<sup>107</sup> His executive order establishing a Fair Employment Board in the Civil Service Commission in 1948 reflected the pressure of A. Philip Randolph's civil disobedience campaign. It was issued on July 2, and was more than remotely connected with the 1948 election campaign. The order affected only government employment which was, technically, already covered by a provision of the Ramspeck Act of 1940.<sup>108</sup> But the Truman Board provided something of an enforcement mechanism while the Ramspeck Act amounted to nothing more than a verbal declaration.

The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 raised the issue of a more far reaching executive order once again. The proponents sought to convince the President that the new emergency paralleled that of 1941 during which Roosevelt had established the first FEPC. Arnold Aronson reported:

On July 16, 1950, the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, through its co-chairman, A. Philip Randolph, wired the president urging that he 'issue an Executive Order similar to President Roosevelt's 8802 . . . as an integral factor in mobilization of manpower against North Korean Communist aggression.'<sup>109</sup>

On February 2, 1951, Truman issued Executive Order 10210 authorizing the Secretaries of the Defense and Commerce departments to require and enforce nondiscrimination clauses in government contracts. But the proponents were dissatisfied and continued their pressure. Opponents in Congress argued that specific legislative authorization was necessary to set up any new machinery requiring additional expenditures. The proponents argued that there was sufficient existing authority based on various statutes and that the Russell amendment (which had led to the death of the original FEPC) would not require congressional sanction for at least a year.

A vigorous campaign was carried on to coincide with the simultaneous tenth anniversary of the first FEPC order and the first anniversary of the invasion of South Korea. The governors of seven states proclaimed the date "Fair Employment Practice Day" and similar proclamations were issued by the mayors of eight major cities. A feature of the campaign was a commemorative ceremony at Roosevelt's grave in Hyde Park with Mrs. Roosevelt participating.

Finally, Truman announced a new executive order (No. 10308,

December 3, 1951) creating the President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance. The Committee was composed of eleven members, five drawn from several government agencies and six representing the public. The function was an advisory one with the responsibility for enforcement resting with the heads of contracting agencies. A report was issued by this body which:

found the nondiscrimination clause, required by Executive Orders 8802 (1941) and 9346 (1943) to be in every contract entered into by an agency or department of the Federal Government for materials, supplies, or services, 'almost forgotten, dead and buried under thousands of words of standard legal and technical language in Government procurement contracts.'<sup>110</sup>

The contract compliance agency was reconstituted by President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10479, on August 13, 1953, and placed under the chairmanship of Vice-President Nixon. Finally, on January 18, 1955, Eisenhower issued another order (10590) establishing the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy to replace Truman's Fair Employment Board. The two orders carry on the earlier efforts in the fields of government employment and hiring practices by private contractors to the government.

None of these presidential agencies has duplicated the Roosevelt FEPC in size of staff or scope of operations, nor has the public hearing technique been restored to favor. They have, however, registered definite gains via negotiations with top management. Though the Vice-President was a staunch foe of FEPC when in the Congress, his handling of the Committee on Government Contracts evoked favorable comment from FEPC proponents.<sup>111</sup>

The large problem of employment discrimination remains for a fully empowered and budgeted agency. The approach through the contract clauses cannot reach far enough, and the small staff can scarcely hope to cover the job even within its limited jurisdiction.

There is little likelihood, however, that the Negro will come rapping at the White House door as sharply as he did in 1941 over the issue of fair employment practices. FEPC as a prime symbol of civil rights has given way in the public mind to other issues. But it stands in readiness should the fear of large-scale unemployment and depression reactivate its dramatic significance. Meanwhile, a steady increase in minority-group economic opportunities continues to reflect substantial gains from the years of campaigning for FEPC.



# Epilogue

And it is a significant mark of his [the Negro's] progress that he won most of these rights for himself on the field of legal battle; in earlier campaigns for simple justice he relied upon the leadership of sympathetic Southern whites, but in the series of historic actions in which he regained the franchise and saw the limits of legal segregation progressively narrowed, he fought under his own banner and in his own right.

HARRY ASHMORE  
*An Epitaph for Dixie*

FOLLOWING THE WAR and the frustrating campaigns for a national FEPC law, it seemed that Negro militancy had been exhausted and that the spirit which once sustained the March was completely gone. The NAACP continued its lawyers' work in preparing the endless cases, running down citations, obtaining witnesses and filing briefs with little immediate contact with the mass of Negroes. The liberal white leaders found scanty support for measures vitally affecting Negro interests on the community level, and it was an unexpressed belief in these circles that the bulk of Negroes simply could not be organized effectively. The mood dropped back to the level of apathy which Myrdal had explained as characteristic of lower classes generally and, therefore, of the Negro community more than of the white.

A remarkable change has occurred over the past few years. Negro self-reliance is increasingly a fact in American political life, North and South. There have been times when the Negro's protest may have been fiercer, but never before has he voiced his demands with greater confidence in his own power. What has produced this energetic tone, and where does it lead in the difficult trials to come? What are the consequences for the leadership which must steer the organized Negro protest?

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Self-determination  
= collective self-reliance  
p. 182

The long-run factors are those which have uplifted the Negro from conditions of rural bondage and pulled him along in the general urban transformation. These are the forces reshaping the nation's economic structure and, inevitably, its socio-political patterns. Sectional uniqueness, the Old South with its rigid stratification of caste and class, is mortally wounded—despite the violent thrashing about and the shrieks of defiance. And the surest sign of the nearing demise of old-style white supremacy is the flouting of traditional caste roles by southern Negroes. As the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. put it to the 1956 NAACP convention in San Francisco: "You can never understand the bus protest in Montgomery without understanding that there is a brand-new Negro in the South, with a new sense of dignity and destiny."

Among the short-run factors which have produced this renewal of Negro militancy, echoing sharply the days of the March on Washington Movement, the clearest catalyst has been the decision of the Supreme Court finding that segregation *per se* was a denial of rights guaranteed by the American Constitution (*Brown v. Board of Education*, 1954). Technically this was a ruling purely on legally required school segregation, but that was indeed a technicality to the general populace (and this popular view—that all government-imposed segregation is unconstitutional—is fast becoming legally correct). For the Negro community it was a tremendous stimulant to political organization and cohesiveness. Blamed or praised, the NAACP was properly identified by whites and Negroes as the primary organization behind the litigation. Those who praised hailed the NAACP for its leadership of the Negro to a new plateau in the struggle for human equality. Those who condemned have managed to circulate the widespread misconception that the NAACP is a radical organization headed by irresponsible leaders.

The paradox is that it was *because* the NAACP has been a basically conservative body in its methods that the Supreme Court became the battle ground on which the NAACP has so often fought. For years, the NAACP was attacked by Negro militants for its "legalistic" approach to Negro rights. It is ironical that the most conservative strategy available, directed at what is historically our most conservative political institution, should have brought the NAACP to the forefront of the militant Negro protest today.

In the Forties, during the height of the March on Washington



Movement, the "talented-tenth" methods of lobbying and litigation were repudiated. Militants attacked the traditional leadership as too concerned with politeness and respectability. It was this repudiation which led to the rise of a new organization and the birth of the FEPC issue. At the present time, the success of that epitome of moderate strategy, litigation, has precipitated a situation in which moderates are perceived as radicals. Such are the unanticipated consequences of social tactics that the "conservatives" cannot shake the radical label, at least not short of dropping all efforts to implement the decision in the school cases. But that they surely will not do, for among other reasons it is their organizational victory.

Furthermore, so bitter has the pro-segregationist camp become that even the most moderate actions are immediately castigated as if they were revolutionary in nature. (E.g., the Autherine Lucy case, which was simply an effort to enroll one Negro girl as a graduate student in the University of Alabama. This was not even dependent on the 1954 Supreme Court decision.) This has relieved the moderate Negro leaders of the necessity of defending their "middle way" from the attacks of Negro radicals. The legal principle having been established, any move for implementation in the Deep South has been greeted with such resistance that potential rivals have no choice but to support the present leadership.

Extremist southern reaction to the Supreme Court decision, and particularly to the intervention with federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, has made it virtually impossible for moderate whites to speak out in Deep South communities. Thus it is true that the communication bridges between whites and Negroes have been destroyed resulting in a short-run loss for interracial harmony, as traditionally conceived in the Deep South. This may be a heavy price to pay for the gains obtained elsewhere, particularly for the groups immediately involved who must operate in an oppressive atmosphere intimidated by extremist groups. But it is a necessary price if the goals of moderate Southern action are ever to advance from the level of platitude to the concrete objectives capable of marking off specific increments of progress.

One benefit is already registered—a moderate achievement as a result of the breakdown of moderation in the Deep South. The modest gains represented by the substance of the civil rights bill of 1957 are less important than the symbolic significance attached to the

failure of the Southern senators to filibuster. The moderation which could not be expressed publicly in deepest Dixie (with some heroic exceptions) was strategically successful in the southern caucus of the U.S. Senate. To say that it was merely politically astute to allow the first civil rights bill in over eighty years to pass the Senate is to ignore the real question—why was it politically astute? The answer is to be found in the new political power of the Negro which has resulted from the solidification of his organized protest.

For if it is true that the White Citizen's Council has the NAACP to thank for its growth in numbers, as is pointed out by those who bemoan the resurgence of Negro militancy, it is equally true that the NAACP has benefited organizationally from the immoderate attacks upon it by white supremacist forces. The southern states have helped produce Negro cohesion with their efforts to harass the NAACP under barratry and other statutory interferences with the freedom of organized political action. And this, in turn, has had dynamic consequences for minority group politics.

It is true that a middle way between "now" and "never" has to be found if ideals are to become reality without the price of transition becoming too large. Even highly sympathetic friends of the Negro may balk at paying the social costs should these involve the creation of new and equally dire problems. But is it really fair to ask or reasonable to expect the Negro to take on this responsibility as his primary concern? The finding of the middle way is the task predominantly of the white community, and it is right that the white leadership be "unreasonably" goaded into action by the Negro organizations. Apart from this fitting the proper roles of victims and culprits (the general white community has at a minimum been culpably negligent), the Negro cannot maintain his reborn solidarity, cannot conduct the political education of his people through the calculated rationalism of the more-comfortably situated groups. The big problem for the Negro leadership today is how to resist the easy path of relying once again on white philanthropy for their primary organizational sustenance.

This was the fundamental insight which A. Philip Randolph had provided in his leadership. In a way it is the lesson taught by Booker T. Washington too. The difference is that Washington urged individual self-reliance to demonstrate personal achievement, accepting meekly what the whites might choose to acknowledge as the Negro's



due. For Randolph, and now for Dr. King, collective self-reliance is crucial both for individual self-respect and the strategic strength of the organized protest.

Randolph sought to stimulate that sense of communal potency through the all-Negro policy of the March. To some extent this made a virtue of the need to make do without the support of white allies, and it reflected the lesson suffered in losing control of the National Negro Congress to the Communists. Does the united Negro movement of the present need a similar style of organization? If all that were meant by this is the advisability of maintaining an all-Negro membership there would be no real problem. The bulk of the NAACP's membership has always been Negro, as is the new Martin Luther King organization that grew out of the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott. The real question is whether an organization might not gain substantially from an emotional appeal of white-exclusion as a rallying cry. The dangers are the easy degeneration of the tactic into racial chauvinism, and the fact that such an appeal is bound to seem self-segregationist. Therefore, it is unlikely that white exclusion as an organizational rallying cry makes much sense today. Of course, appeals to self-reliance in terms of funds and leadership is another matter.

The NAACP and the neo-Gandhian movement of Dr. King appear to be in close harmony at present in terms of their objectives and the militancy with which their demands are made. But there is a fundamental source of friction which could erupt in the future. Dr. King's movement will yet have to meet the test of all mass movements. On the one hand, the specific objective which created the Montgomery boycott has been achieved. Can the fervor which sustained the group in its short-term struggle be maintained or will gradual apathy lead to its disintegration? Here the orthodox organizations stand ready to take over as in the past. Dr. King may well be content to let that happen, rationalizing the whole experience as a temporary and local affair with purely limited objectives.

Thus far the movement has been kept alive, and a conference in Montgomery of over five hundred Negroes recently considered the possibilities of further applying the passive resistance strategy. The taste of national prominence, the sense of personal charisma in his great success with the Negro masses may lead King to undertake a large-scale national organization "supplementary" to the existing

groups. Inevitably, that would produce a hidden competition for funds and programmatic priorities. Moreover, should any substantial violence erupt as a result of civil disobedience activities challenging jim-crow ordinances, the pressure on the NAACP leadership from some of its more conservative supporters might lead to an open schism.

There are no signs of this happening yet to any great extent. The activity of the NAACP is bound up in the effort to integrate the Southern public school system. That will be enough to solidify the forces on both sides of the racial dispute. Then too, the limits of the litigation method are fast approaching and the NAACP is likely to look for a new method capable of satisfying militants and conservatives within its supporting base. It seems very likely that a simple non-partisan get-out-the-vote campaign will keep the Negro leadership busy for the next several years. So long as this is resisted by any state governments, the campaign cannot fail to provide a source of cohesion around the established leaders. And in the North, where the main problem will be mass apathy, a substantial increase in Negro voting will surely provide great political strength. At the same time, the extreme reaction likely to be faced in the Southern school situation will contribute much propaganda material for over-coming apathy in the North.

There has been too great an inferiority complex among Negroes with respect to their leadership. A decided feeling persists that there is more schism in the Negro community than elsewhere. This reflects the view that there should be but one Negro organization leading the protest battle to which everyone can give wholehearted support, that anything less is but petty bickering. Presumably, if only *the* leader could be found to bring this about all would be well. Actually, the organized protest today is cast more in this image than at any previous time. But it is necessary to say that there is no more bickering in the Negro community than there is in other comparable groups, e.g., Jews and Catholics. Furthermore, the idea that there would necessarily be a gain from having a single organization is predicated on an assumption which is questionable. The assumption is that there is a single path to racial advancement.

Actually, the multiplicity of leaders and organizations (within limits, of course) provides a number of bases on which various strata of the population can be brought together. A single organization



would be rather hard put to rally all classes of Negroes, not to mention the range of white sympathizers who can render useful support. Thus, a more efficient mobilization of the community can be brought about by a number of approaches around which segments of the total group can rally. True, some of their efforts will duplicate and there will be wasted energy expended in internecine strife. But there is no utopia in organizational life, any more than elsewhere, and the alternative is an organization which can appeal only to a part of the community leaving the rest unorganized. Efficient group organization is likely to be multiple-political rather than single-functional.

There are important differences between the 1941 situation and that prevailing at present. There is no world-wide shooting war against a totalitarian foe to reduce the national importance of the Negro problem. The white press is no longer "lily-white" to the degree it once was, and the country follows the news of Negro politics closely, as do the politicians. Nor is the problem of civil rights organization as complicated by the "left-wing" factionalism which sapped its strength during the Thirties and Forties. Negroes today are not without white allies who bring funds and organizational assistance to bolster their cause. And despite the rivalry which is as much the law of Negro organizational life as that found anywhere else, the Negro leadership seems as united today as at the peak of the March on Washington Movement.

Whether the Negro leadership will take action similar to that once threatened by the March is not a "slide-rule" question. It is true that they have rejected the term "gradualism" and that a Negro using it is likely to have the "handkerchief" knocked off his head. This has led to an unfortunate misunderstanding of the Negro position. What they have rejected is the use of the term "gradualism" to mean *no* motion rather than *slow* motion. Used as it has been, it became a noxious symbol of complete unwillingness to make significant headway.

The NAACP has moved slowly, through many years of litigation in a lengthy series of court tests. The Supreme Court too has moved slowly and broken with precedent, in recognition of the difficult social revolution involved, and ordered that its decree be effected with "deliberate speed." That is a form of gradualism which the Negro community shows itself willing to accept.

Dr. King spoke for all the Negro leaders when he said:

Now if moderation means pressing on for justice with wise restraint and calm reasonableness, then it is a virtue which all must seek to achieve in this tense period of transition. But if moderation means slowing up in the move toward freedom and capitulating to the whims and caprices of the guardians of a deadening *status quo*, then moderation is a tragic vice which all men of good will must condemn.

The pleas for "moderation" cannot be sincere if unaccompanied by measurable progress. The problem is not created by the Negro holding a political gun at the Nation's head and demanding the unjust or the impossible. The problem is "An American Dilemma" created out of our traditional ideals as inscribed in our fundamental law and upheld by a unanimous verdict of our highest tribunal.

Those who argue that politics and law cannot be the pathway to basic social change must descend from the level of moralistic platitudes to work vigorously on levels which produce tangible results. That is the task of opinion leaders from all walks of life and all sections of our Nation. Indeed it is true that salvation is not of Caesar—but political processes are inevitably the recourse of men who seek to balance power with justice. No less a religious voice than *Commonweal* has rebutted the argument that this is not a political problem:

On the whole, the history of the Negro in America makes clear that his lot has been improved by decisions and actions taken on the political and economic levels, rather than on the 'moral and spiritual plane.' . . . The Negro's most effective help has come from the court-house not the church.

The 'basic' element remains what it has always been—legislation aimed at interracial justice, and the vigilance of the courts over the execution of such legislation.

As the father of our Constitution, James Madison, well understood, liberty and faction are inseparable. Those who would discourage the excesses of national disunity latent in organizational politics over civil rights must indeed act morally; but, ineluctably, they will have to act.



# Chronology of Major Events

January 1, 1863	President Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation" declared an end to slavery in rebel territory.
September 18, 1895	Booker T. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" address.
May 18, 1896	The U.S. Supreme Court, in <i>Plessy v. Ferguson</i> , held racial segregation was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment if the facilities were equal.
June, 1905	Niagara conference of Negro leaders organized by Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois.
February 12, 1909	NAACP founded.
October, 1911	National Urban League formed by merger of three social work organizations concentrating on Negro problems.
Spring 1917	A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen began publishing <i>The Messenger</i> , "the only radical Negro magazine in America."
July, 28, 1917	NAACP protest parade on New York's Fifth Avenue.
August 2, 1920	Marcus Garvey's followers packed Madison Square Garden in New York.

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## CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

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August 25, 1925	Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters organized. Shortly thereafter Randolph became general organizer and in 1928 was elected president.
May 29, 1932	Bonus Army marched on Washington, D.C.
July 2, 1932	Franklin D. Roosevelt's acceptance speech as presidential nominee pledged "a new deal" to overcome the depression.
August, 1935	Seventh World Congress of the Communist International ushered in the era of the "Popular Front."
February, 1936	National Negro Congress formed with A. Philip Randolph as president.
April 9, 1939	Seventy-five thousand persons heard Marion Anderson sing at the Lincoln Memorial after the DAR refused to permit her to perform in Constitution Hall.
August 23, 1939	Nazi-Soviet neutrality pact ended the "Popular Front."
September 1, 1939	Nazi invasion of Poland triggered start of World War II.
1940	
April 28	A. Philip Randolph resigned as president of the National Negro Congress charging Communist domination.
May	Committee on Participation of Negroes in the National Defense Program formed under <i>Pittsburgh Courier</i> sponsorship and headed by Dr. Rayford W. Logan.
May 26-June 4	Retreat from Dunkirk by the British Expeditionary Force.
September 27	President Roosevelt met with Negro leaders on military discrimination.
October 8	Anti-lynching bill failed in the U.S. Senate.
October 9	War Department policy in regard to Negroes released by White House declared that "the policy . . . is not to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organizations." It was implied that the Negro leaders endorsed this policy.



- October 25 Negro spokesmen for the Committee on Participation of Negroes in the National Defense Program met with President Roosevelt. Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. appointed the first Negro brigadier general in the Regular Army of the United States.
- November 5 Roosevelt reelected. Henry A. Wallace elected Vice President.
- December 29 President Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" address pledged American industrial aid to Britain.
- 1941**
- January 25 A. Philip Randolph proposed that ten-thousand Negroes march on Washington to demand an end to racial discrimination in defense employment and in the military services.
- January 26 Designated National Defense Day by the NAACP which organized protest meetings in twenty-three states.
- March 1 Randolph's union newspaper, *The Black Worker*, published a call to march on Washington.
- March 28-29 Negro Firemen's Conference organized by the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
- April 11 Sidney Hillman, co-director of the Office of Production Management (OPM), urged defense-contractor employers to eliminate discriminatory hiring practices.
- April 12 Randolph announced that "plans for an all-out march of ten thousand Negroes on Washington are in the making and a call will be issued in the next few weeks. . . ."
- May 1 The March on Washington Committee issued a formal call for Negroes to march on Washington on July 1.
- June 13 Conference in New York's City Hall between Mayor LaGuardia, Mrs. Roosevelt and the leaders of the March.  
Randolph called to Washington to confer "on your project."

- June 15 President Roosevelt issued an official memorandum to the OPM that "I shall expect the Office of Production Management to take immediate steps to facilitate the full utilization of our productive manpower."
- June 18 President Roosevelt and aids conferred with leaders of the March on Washington Committee. The President appointed a committee under Mayor LaGuardia to evolve a suitable plan.
- June 22 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. American Communists shifted from opposition to support of the Allied cause in World War II.
- June 24 Mayor LaGuardia conferred with MOWC leaders in New York City on the text of a proposed Presidential order.
- June 24-29 National NAACP conference in Houston, Texas.
- June 25 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 establishing the Presidents' Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC).
- June 28 Randolph broadcast a radio announcement "postponing" the march.  
The Youth Division of the Negro March Committee protested the decision to call off the July 1 march.
- July 1 The date on which Negroes had been scheduled to march on Washington. A victory celebration replaced the march.
- July 19 President Roosevelt named his appointees to the first FEPC.
- October 20-21 FEPC staged first public hearing on employment discrimination in Los Angeles, California.
- December 7 Pearl Harbor attacked by the Japanese and the United States became a belligerent in World War II.
- 1942**
- January 19-20 FEPC public hearings in Chicago, Illinois.
- February 16-17 FEPC public hearings in New York City.



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## WHEN NEGROES MARCH

- March 5 The Bureau of Employment Security revealed that in the period from September, 1941 to February, 1942 more than half of the available employment opportunities were closed to Negroes.
- March 20 Fifty Negro organizations' delegates informed the Office of Facts and Figures' director, Archibald MacLeish, "that the Negro people were cool to the war effort" because of continuing racial discrimination.
- April The March planned a series of great rallies to demonstrate Negro strength and continuing dissatisfaction.
- June 16 Eighteen-thousand Negroes packed New York's MOWM rally.
- June 18-20 FEPC public hearings on employment discrimination in Birmingham, Alabama.
- June 26 Twelve-thousand Negroes over-flow Chicago rally of the MOWM.
- July 2 Odell Waller, Negro sharecropper, executed.
- July 14-19 National NAACP convention. Randolph awarded the Spingarn medal as the outstanding Negro of 1941.
- July 25 "Silent Parade" protesting the execution of Odell Waller held by the New York MOWM.
- July 30 President Roosevelt placed FEPC under the jurisdiction of the War Manpower Commission.
- August 4 MOWM plans are developed for a culminating mass-protest rally scheduled for September 4 in Washington, D.C.
- August 6 The President's secretary, in a letter to Randolph, pleads "extreme pressure" on President Roosevelt's time precludes his meeting with a committee of Negro leaders.
- August 14 A "giant" MOWM rally is held in St. Louis, Missouri.
- August 31 Randolph advised Washington MOWM to "postpone" their plans for a large-scale rally.
- September 26-27 Detroit Conference of the MOWM. Walter White and Lester Granger withdrew.

## CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

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December 30

MOWM announced it was planning to employ Gandhian civil-obedience tactics to break down racial segregation.

## 1943

January 11

Paul McNutt, head of WMC, ordered FEPC to "postpone" its scheduled public hearings on railroad employment discrimination.

February 15

"Save FEPC Conference" in Washington, D.C.

May 27

President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9346 re-constituted the FEPC.

June 3-6

NAACP Emergency War Conference in Detroit, Michigan.

June 7

"Left-wing" sponsored mass rally in Madison Square Garden.

June 20

Race riot in Detroit, Michigan.

July 4

"We Are Americans Too" convention of the MOWM.

August 1

Harlem race riot.

September 15

FEPC public hearings on railroad discrimination.

## 1944 to date

June 25-26, 1944

National MOWM "Non-Partisan Political Conference."

November 7, 1944

Roosevelt reelected. Harry S. Truman elected Vice President.

March 12, 1945

First state FEPC established in New York.

April 12, 1945

President Roosevelt died and Harry S. Truman inaugurated President.

May 7, 1945

Germany surrendered.

January 18-February 7, 1946

Senate filibuster killed Federal FEPC bill.



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## WHEN NEGROES MARCH

- February 28, 1946 "Save FEPC Rally" in Madison Square Garden, New York.
- August 14, 1946 President Truman announced the surrender of Japan.
- October 19, 1946 Last national conference of the MOWM.
- October 29, 1947 Report of President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights.
- March 22, 1948 A. Philip Randolph and other Negro leaders conferred with President Truman.
- March 31, 1948 Randolph and Grant Reynolds initiated a civil-disobedience campaign against military discrimination.
- July 26, 1948 President Truman issued two executive orders 9980 and 9981 creating a Fair Employment Board to eliminate racial discrimination in Federal employment, and a Presidents' Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.
- November 2, 1948 Truman elected.
- January 15-17, 1950 National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization in Washington, D.C., initiated by the NAACP.
- February 22, 1950 FEPC proponents were defeated in a crucial vote in U.S. House of Representatives.
- March 8, 1950 The National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization merged with the National Council for a Permanent FEPC.
- May 19, 1950 FEPC proponents failed to overcome Senate filibuster. Another vote on cloture defeated on July 12.
- June 25, 1950 Outbreak of Korean War.
- February 2, 1951 President Truman issued Executive Order 10210 forbidding discrimination by government contractors.
- December 3, 1951 President Truman's Executive Order 10308 created the Presidents' Committee on Government Contract Compliance.

## CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

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- August 13, 1953 President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10479 reconstituted the contract compliance agency, placing it under the chairmanship of the Vice President.
- May 17, 1954 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that racially segregated public schools are inherently unequal in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The *Plessy* (1896) "separate but equal" doctrine overruled.
- January 18, 1955 President Eisenhower (Executive Order 10590) established the Presidents' Committee on Government Policy to enforce a non-discriminatory policy in Federal employment.
- December 20, 1956 Year-long boycott of public buses by Negroes of Montgomery, Alabama ends in victory after U.S. Supreme Court orders an end to segregated seating.
- May 17, 1957 Negro Prayer Pilgrimage to Washington, D.C.
- September 9, 1957 First Federal civil rights bill in eighty-two years enacted.
- September 24, 1957 President Eisenhower ordered Federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to restore order after school integration rioting.



# Notes

## Notes to Chapter I

1. See H. L. Moon, *Balance of Power: The Negro Vote* (New York: Doubleday, 1948).
2. November, 1940, p. 343.
3. *State of the Union Message*, January 6, 1941.
4. *PM*, May 7, 1941, p. 18.
5. Lead editorial, *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 28, 1941, p. 6.
6. U.S. Federal Emergency Relief Administration, "Color or Race of Persons in Relief Families," *Unemployment Relief Census: October, 1933, U.S. Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1934), pp. 7-9.
7. *Ibid.*, adapted from Table C, p. 8.
8. U.S. Office of Administration of the Census of Partial Employment, Unemployment and Occupations, "Employment by Race," *Final Report on Total and Partial Unemployment*, Vol. IV (Washington, D.C., 1938), Ch. IV.
9. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *16th Census of the United States, 1940, Population, Characteristics of Persons in the Labor Force* (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. iii.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
11. U.S. Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, *Social Security Yearbook, 1941* (Washington, D.C., 1942), p. 184.
12. The disparity between the rate of placements of whites and non-whites (1941 vs. 1940) is explained by the *Social Security Yearbook* as probably due to "the more rapid turnover of employment in occupations in which most Negroes are placed." (*Ibid.*) An additional factor might be a greater overall use of public employment offices by Negroes, whites finding it as convenient, in times of full employment, to apply directly to factory personnel offices.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Herman Bronson, "The Training of Negroes For War Industries in World War II," *The Journal of Negro Education*, X (January, 1941), 121-132.
15. William H. Hastie, "The Negro in the Army Today," *The Annals*, 223 (September, 1942), 55-59; "The Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces in World Wars I and II," *The Journal of Negro Education*, Part I, XII (Summer, 1943).
16. As quoted by Sterling A. Brown, "Count Us In," in R. W. Logan (ed.), *What the Negro Wants* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 318.

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17. March, 1941, p. 318.
18. "The Preservation of American Independence," address of December 29, 1940, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, VII (January 15, 1941), 196.
19. "The Negro's War," April, 1942, p. 164.
20. Cf. Walter White, "It's Our Country Too," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 11, 1940; Roi Ottley, "Negro Morale," *The New Republic*, November 10, 1941; "Editorial Comment: Negro Morale and World War II," *The Journal of Negro Education*, XI (January, 1942); "The Role of Morale Agencies Among Negroes in World Wars I and II," *The Journal of Negro Education*, XII (Summer, 1943).
21. "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in Logan (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 130.
22. Sterling A. Brown, "Out of Their Mouths," *Survey Graphic*, (November, 1942), p. 482.
23. P. L. Pratts, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Forces of the United States," *The Journal of Negro Education*, XII (Summer, 1943), 355.
24. "The Negro's War," *op. cit.*, p. 78.
25. September, 1941, p. 279.
26. Earl Brown, "American Negroes and the War," April, 1942, p. 546.
27. "What the Negro Thinks of the Army," *Annals*, 223 (September, 1942), p. 67.
28. *Chicago Defender*, January 11, 1941.
29. Roi Ottley, "The Negro Press Today," in Sylvester C. Watkins (ed.), *Anthology of American Negro Literature* (New York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 96.
30. *New York Daily News*, December 12, 1940, p. 1. See the story on the *News'* handling of this affair in *Crisis*, January, 1941, p. 15.
31. *New York Amsterdam News*, November 15, 1941, p. 1.
32. Eleanor Roosevelt, "My Day," *New York World Telegram*, January 6, 1943. Cf. W. H. Brown, "A Negro Looks at the Negro Press," *Saturday Review of Literature*, December 19, 1942; V. V. Oak, "What About the Negro Press?" *Saturday Review of Literature*, March 6, 1943.
33. Walter White, *A Man Called White* (New York: Viking, 1948), Ch. 26. NAACP's *Crisis* was temporarily suspended at the end of World War I on similar grounds; see, Mary White Ovington, *Portraits in Color* (New York: Viking, 1927), p. 88.
34. E.g., Walter White in the *Saturday Evening Post*, *op. cit.*; and Earl Brown in *Harpers*, *op. cit.*
35. Roi Ottley, "Negro Morale" *op. cit.*, p. 614.
36. Lester Granger, as quoted by Kenneth B. Clark, in "Morale of the Negro on the Home Front; World Wars I and II," *Journal of Negro Education*, XII (Summer, 1943), 428.
37. *PM*, October 31, 1943, Magazine Section, p. 13. Cf., e.g., "England's Fight Our Cause, Randolph Says We Must Support Aid to Britain," *Pittsburgh Courier*, February 8, 1941, p. 13.
38. February, 1941, p. 35.
39. March 15, 1941.
40. XII (Summer, 1943), 264.
41. Quoted by Charles H. Wesley, "The Negro Has Always Wanted The Four Freedoms," in Logan, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.
42. Quoted by Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., in *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955), p. 138.
43. Wesley, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
44. *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944), p. 821.
45. Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Negro Problem* (New York: James Pott & Co., 1903), p. 75.
46. Cf. E. D. Cronon, *Black Moses* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955).
47. Cf. Walter White's account of



NAACP involvement in the 1941 Ford Motor Co. strike on the side of the United Automobile Workers union in *Man Called White*, *op. cit.*, ch. XXVII.

48. Cf. S. D. Spero and A. L. Harris, *The Black Worker* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), pp. 388 ff. This was published prior to Randolph's success in organizing the Pullman workers and is critical of his leadership. A more sympathetic and recent study is B. R. Brazee, *The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters* (New York: Harper, 1946).

49. Cf. Wilson Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1951), pp. 153 ff. Communist involvement in the Negro protest is separately considered in the next chapter.

50. Roscoe E. Lewis, "The Role of Pressure Groups in Maintaining Morale Among Negroes," *The Journal of Negro Education*, XII (Summer, 1943), 472-473.

## Notes to Chapter II

1. "A. Philip Randolph," editorial, *Chicago Defender*, February 6, 1941.  
2. *Man Called White*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

3. Conference on the participation of the Negro in National Defense, *Findings and Principal Addresses* (Hampton, Va.: Normal and Agricultural Institute, 1940).

4. *Pittsburgh Courier*, November 10, 1940, p. 6.

5. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1941, p. 3.  
6. February 8, 1941, p. 14.

7. In attendance, besides Randolph: Walter White, Secretary, NAACP; Dr. Channing Tobias, Senior Secretary of the National Council of the MCA; Mary McCleod Bethune,

51. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

52. July, 1918, p. 111.

53. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940), p. 245.

54. January, 1942, p. 7.

55. NAACP press release, December 12, 1941, quoted in Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 850.

56. Wesley, in Logan, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

57. W. E. B. Du Bois, (ed.), *An Appeal to the World!* (New York: NAACP, 1947).

58. Walter White, "Negroes," *The New International Yearbook for 1940* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1941), p. 537.

59. *Crisis*, November 1940, p. 351.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, p. 350.

62. *Ibid.*

63. The poem is by Esther Popel. This seems to be the only time that *Crisis* used a cover in this way. Ordinarily they tended toward popular-interest photography; planes, celebrities, pretty girls, etc.

President of the National Council of Negro Women; Dr. George E. Haynes, Executive Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ; and Lester Granger, Executive Secretary of the National Urban League.

8. "The President, The Negro and Defense," *Opportunity*, XIX (July, 1941), 204.

9. Letter to John Temple Graves, reproduced by Graves in "The Southern Negro and the War Crisis," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 18 (Autumn, 1942), 507-508.

10. Charley Cherokee, "National Grapevine," *Chicago Defender*, May 31, 1941.

11. "Houston Awaits Conference," June 1941, pp. 194-195, plus back cover. See May 1941 issue, p. 167, where arrangements for special trains to the Houston Conference are explained in detail.

12. Negro Congressman Arthur W. Mitchell attacked the March leadership in a commencement address, but White repudiated this counsel in his address to a Fisk University graduating class; "Walter White Urges End of Race Patience," *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 7, 1941, p. 3. Also, see *Chicago Defender*, June 28, 1941, p. 6, for Mitchell's attack on Randolph as the "most dangerous Negro in America."

13. *New York Times*, July 29, 1917, p. 12.

14. Dr. Du Bois, while declaring that "the present movement is more fundamental," comments on this parallel in his "Chronicle of Race Relations," *Phylon*, II (Third Quarter, 1941), 300.

15. A Communist leader declared: "Now the idea of a march on Washington for the rights of the Negro people is in itself a worthy idea. But it is only yesterday that these Negro reformist [sic] opposed such a type of struggle. They called this type of action 'radical,' 'lack of good taste,' and 'unintelligible.'" Henry Winston, "Negro Job March Must Be Made Real Fight For People's Demands," *Daily Worker*, June 16, 1941, p. 3.

16. For general discussion see Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper, 1951); and Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950). For a concrete example of how Communists have used a Negro issue in this way see the discussion of the Scottsboro case in Wilson Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951), pp. 86. ff.

17. Cf. Philip Selznick, *The Or-*

*ganizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952). Communist policy toward the Negro leadership of the March on Washington followed this pattern exactly.

18. "Why This is Our War: An Editorial," July 8, 1941, p. 3.

19. James W. Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front* (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 83.

20. Cf. Record, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 ff. Also, Walter White, "The Negro and the Communists," *Harpers Magazine*, December 1931.

21. Communist Party of the United States, *Draft Resolution Proposed for the 8th Convention of the Communist Party of the United States* (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1934), cited in Record, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

22. Cf. Ford, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

23. *The Communist*, June 1941, p. 488.

24. February 10, 1941, p. 6.

25. March 3, 1941, p. 6.

26. Cf. the *Daily Worker*, March 12, 1941, p. 6, also May 30, 1941, p. 6 for continuing attacks on A. Philip Randolph and Walter White.

27. June 10, 1941, p. 6.

28. *Daily Worker*, June 11, 1941, p. 5.

29. Cf. A. Philip Randolph, "Why I Would Not Stand for Re-election as President of the National Negro Congress," *American Federationist*, July 1940.

30. Illustrations are plentiful. For example, one congressman from a Harlem district during the war was the late Vito Marcantonio.

31. Winston, *op. cit.*

32. *Daily Worker*, June 16, 1941, p. 1.

33. Winston, *op. cit.* For a "big-shot" business view of these same events see *Fortune*, "The Story of An Executive Order," June 1942, p. 80. *Fortune* maintained that the order



- was "clearly the result of pressure" to which the Administration only grudgingly yielded. "It was a compromise between hard boiled pressure groups."
34. June 17, 1941, p. 1.
  35. H. R. 3894.
  36. June 19, 1941, p. 6.
  37. From a leaflet in the Schomburg Collection, New York Public Library.
  38. *Daily Worker*, June 17, 1941, p. 1.
  39. June 26, 1941.
  40. June 27, 1941, p. 6.
  41. Theodore R. Bassett, *The Communist*, XX (September, 1941), p. 807.
  42. *The Communist*, XX (December, 1941), p. 1072.
  43. "Some Problems of the Negro People in the National Front to Destroy Hitler and Hitlerism," *The Communist*, XX (October, 1941), 888.
  44. Record, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
  45. See the *Daily Worker* for each of the following dates for calls to this mobilization: March 10, 11, 13, 24, 27, 29, April 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
  46. *Man Called White. op. cit.*, p. 192. Mr. Randolph told the writer that the President instigated an FBI investigation to determine the extent of Negro preparations to march.
  47. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.
  48. A. Philip Randolph, "March on Washington Movement Presents Program for the Negro," in Logan (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 153.
  49. Virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXI (January, 1943), p. 94.
  50. *New York Amsterdam News*, February 15, 1941, p. 13. Later the Chicago group chartered a train to take them to Washington for the march (interview with Mr. Theodore Brown, who was located in Chicago in 1941 and is now educational director of the BSCP.)
  51. *Chicago Defender*, February 15, 1941, p. 1.
  52. Louis Ruchames, *Race, Jobs and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 15-16.
  53. April 19, 1941, p. 16.
  54. *Chicago Defender*, April 12, 1941, p. 9.
  55. *The Black Worker*, May 1941, p. 4. The "Call" was issued in the name of the Negroes' Committee to March on Washington for Equal Participation in National Defense, composed of Walter White, Rev. William Lloyd Innes, Lester B. Granger, Frank R. Crosswaith, Layle Lane, Richard Parrish, Dr. Rayford Logan, Henry K. Craft and A. Philip Randolph. At some later point, but prior to the "postponement" of the March, Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. must have been added to the Committee as he was one of those whom Randolph polled in deciding to call off the demonstration. Powell and the Youth Division delegates were the only ones opposed to the "postponement." See A. P. Randolph, "Why and How the March Was Postponed" (mimeographed), Schomburg Collection, New York Public Library.
  56. *The Black Worker*, May 1941, p. 4.
  57. *Ibid.*
  58. May 31, 1941.
  59. Charley Cherokee, "National Grapevine," 'Coxey's Army,' May 31, 1941.
  60. XIX (July, 1941), 194.
  61. Cherokee, *op. cit.*
  62. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 28, 1941, p. 1.
  63. *New World A-Coming* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), p. 291.
  64. The cities were: Kansas City, Mo.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Atlanta, Ga.; Savannah, Ga.; Cleveland, Ohio; Memphis, Tenn.; St. Louis, Mo.; Milwaukee, Wisc.; Richmond, Va.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Newark, N.J.; Balti-

- more, Md.; Chicago, Ill.; Washington, D.C.; St. Paul, Minn.; Philadelphia, Pa. *Bulletin* (mimeoed), Vol. 1, No. 1, May 22, 1941, distributed by MOWM, BSCP files.
65. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 14, 1941, p. 10.
  66. Interview, July 22, 1955.
  67. *The Black Worker*, August 1941, p. 2. The previously cited *Bulletin* reported "over 15,000 buttons have been distributed in less than a week in the New York Metropolitan area."
  68. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 7, 1941.
  69. Quoted by Earl Brown, in "American Negroes and the War," *op. cit.*, p. 549.
  70. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 14, 1941, p. 1.
  71. E.g., *New York Times*, June 16, 1941, p. 6.
  72. June 21, 1941.
  73. Murray, *The Negro Handbook 1942, op. cit.*, p. 84.
  74. *New York Times*, June 26, 1941, p. 12. That same day the *New York Herald Tribune* gave the story front-page space.
  75. The script, broadcast on June 28, was printed in *The Black Worker*, July 1941, p. 4.
  76. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- ### Notes to Chapter III
1. *13 Against the Odds* (New York: Viking Press, 1944), p. 225.
  2. Inscription on a huge photograph of Mr. Randolph displayed in the national headquarters of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
  3. Embree, *13 Against the Odds, op. cit.*, title of chapter 12.
  4. July 12, 1941, p. 14.
  5. Roi Ottley, *Black Odyssey* (New York: Scribners, 1948), p. 279.
  6. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 5, 1941, p. 4.
  7. Cf. A. Philip Randolph, "Why And How The March Was Postponed," *Black Worker*, August, 1941, p. 1.
  8. Editorial, May 28, 1941.
  9. "The Negro's War," *Fortune*, April 1942, p. 80.
  10. July 5, 1941, p. 1. For other press comment demonstrating specific emphasis on an executive order see the *New York Amsterdam News* editorials for June 21, 1941, p. 14 and June 28, 1941, p. 14.
  11. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 5, 1941, p. 14.
  12. Lester Granger, "The President, The Negro, and Defense," *op. cit.*, p. 204.
  13. *New York Amsterdam News*, August 2, 1941, p. 14.
  14. *Chicago Defender*, July 5, 1941, p. 1.
  15. *The Black Worker*, May 1941, p. 4 (italics supplied). The point is made in the resolutions of the NAACP Houston Conference; *Crisis*, September 1941, p. 296.
  16. *Crisis*, September 1941, p. 296.
  17. Roi Ottley, "Negro Morale," *New Republic*, November 10, 1941, p. 614.
  18. *Ibid.* This was answered in the *Black Worker*, December 1941, p. 3.
  19. Roi Ottley, *Black Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 285.
  20. BSCP files.
  21. Letter to H.W., E.T. and R.P., July 18, 1941.
  22. Cf. John Temple Graves, "The Southern Negro and the War Crisis," *Virginia Quarterly*, Autumn 1942; Virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," *Atlantic*



*Monthly*, January 1943; David L. Cohn, "How the South Feels," *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1944.

23. The phrase is Pauli Murray's (outstanding Negro writer and attorney). Miss Murray explained that she did not mean to suggest that there could not have been a successful march but to characterize the poker game quality of the negotiations between Randolph and Roosevelt.

24. *Op. cit.*, p. 734.

25. Correspondence between Randolph and Anna Rosenberg (BSCP file).

26. *Ibid.*

27. Murray, *The Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

28. September 1941, p. 291. Note the Association's self-applause with no mention of the MOWC.

29. Dickerson was regional director of the Democratic national campaign in 1928; see *Who's Who in Colored America*, 7th edition (Yonkers, N.Y.: Burckel, 1950), p. 152.

30. Executive Order 8823, July 18, 1941; U.S. President's Fair Employment Practice Committee, *First Report* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 9.

31. FEPC as the administration of public policy is dealt with in Louis Ruchames, *Race, Jobs, and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); also Cf. Malcolm Ross, *All Manner of Men* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948). The official story is told in two reports issued by the U.S. President's Fair Employment Practice Committee, *First Report*, *op. cit.*; and *Final Report* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947).

32. October 18, 1941, pp. 2, 8. Note the phrase "under white supervision"; but this is a substantial improvement compared with the earlier statement by the North American Aviation Co. president, *supra*.

33. October 1941, p. 327.

34. *Supra*.

35. "It Must Not Fail," November 2, 1941, p. 8.

36. Interview, July 22, 1955.

37. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 12, 1941, p. 11.

38. *New York Amsterdam News*, December 27, 1941, p. 6.

39. Murray, *The Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

41. This slogan was popularized by the *Pittsburgh Courier*.

42. *New York Amsterdam News*, December 13, 1941, p. 9.

43. February 7, 1942, p. 14.

44. FEPC, *First Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

45. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 12, 1941, p. 1.

46. *Ibid.*

47. BSCP files.

48. *New York Amsterdam News*, April 4, 1942, p. 1.

49. "'Temper of Race Critical,' Says Urban League," *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 11, 1942, p. 4.

50. *New York Amsterdam News*, April 25, 1942, p. 7.

51. BSCP files undated but context indicates April, 1942.

52. *New York Times*, April 10, 1939, p. 19.

53. Letter from A. Philip Randolph to Harold Ickes, April 15, 1942 (BSCP files).

54. The reporter was J. Robert Smith. Cf. Julius L. Adams' column, *New York Amsterdam News*, July 31, 1943, p. 2.

55. Letter dated April 4, 1942 (BSCP files).

56. A. Philip Randolph, "Why Should We March?" *Survey Graphic*, November 1942, p. 489.

57. *New York Amsterdam News*, May 23, 1942, p. 13; *People's Voice*, May 30, 1942, p. 37. A financial report released by the March after the meetings (*People's Voice*, October 10, 1942, p. 10) listed total receipts from February through August as \$12,781.-

86. Total expenditures were \$9,973.63.

58. June 17, 1942.

59. *New York Amsterdam News*, April 4, 1942, p. 5.

60. June 13, 1942, p. 21.

61. *Opportunity*, June 1942, p. 186 did run a brief item which failed to indicate Urban League sponsorship. *Crisis* carried nothing prior to the Madison Square Garden meeting. This may be contrasted with the buildup for later NAACP Madison Square Garden affairs. See *Crisis*, February 1952, p. 118; March 1952, p. 202; February 1953, p. 70; March 1953, p. 134.

62. Letter April 26, 1942.

63. Letter May 22, 1942.

64. May 28, 1942.

65. *New York Times*, August 3, 1920, p. 7.

66. *New York Amsterdam News*, April 18, 1942, p. 1.

67. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1942, p. 5.

68. Leaflet issued by MOWC, N.Y. Division.

69. August 1941, p. 1.

70. *New York Times*, June 13, 1942, p. 21.

71. *New York Amsterdam News*, April 11, 1942, p. 21.

72. June 13, 1942, p. 21.

73. June 13, 1942, p. 1.

74. June 1942, p. 1.

75. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 13, 1942, p. 1.

76. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 20, 1949, p. 24.

77. Frank Crosswaith, "Above and Beyond," *New York Amsterdam News*, June 6, 1942, p. 7.

78. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 20, 1942, p. 1. Also, cartoon captioned "Here Lies Uncle Tom, Died June 16, 1942 at Madison Square Garden," and editorial, "Uncle Tom's Funeral," June 27, 1942, p. 6.

79. Theophilus Lewis, "Plays and a Point of View," *Interracial Review*, XV (July 1942), 111.

80. Estimates of attendance at Madison Square Garden vary between 18,000 (*New York Times*, June 17,

1942, p. 11), 20,000 (Randolph "Why Should We March?" *op. cit.*), and 25,000 (Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 220). J. A. Rogers, in an article which enthused about the Garden rally, mentioned 6,000 empty seats (*Pittsburgh Courier*, June 27, 1942, p. 7). Rogers reported an attendance of 19,000. Randolph, *op. cit.*, claimed 16,000 attended the June 26, Chicago rally but the *New York Amsterdam News*, July 4, 1942, p. 2, claimed only "an overflow crowd of 12,000." Randolph, *op. cit.*, claimed 9,000 attended the St. Louis meeting.

81. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

82. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 702, generalizes: "As Negroes are commonly believed to be loud, ignorant, dirty, boisterous, and lax in sexual and all other morals, good manners and respectability become nearly an obsession in the Negro upper class."

83. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

84. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 4, 1942, p. 2.

85. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 27, 1942, p. 7.

86. *Interracial Review*, July 1942, p. 100.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

88. *New York Times*, June 17, 1942, p. 11. The *Times* based its story almost entirely on Crosswaith's appointment; there was no mention of the March as sponsor of the rally.

89. Ellen Tarry, *The Third Door: The Autobiography of an American Negro Woman* (New York: David McKay Co., 1955), p. 193. Also *The People's Voice*, June 20, 1942, p. 3 for Powell's interpretation of the Madison Square Garden rally (he was its editor). This issue, announcing his candidacy, was prepared in advance and sold outside the Garden.

90. *Interracial Review*, July 1942, p. 108. Channing Tobias, Director, Colored Division YMCA, similarly declared: "After this Niagara of eloquence which has preceded me, the only degree of distinction left for me



is to confine myself to the time limit." *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 27, 1942, p. 24.

91. Actually, the title is "Hold the Fort For We are Coming" but it was reported in the *Interracial Review* as we have recorded it. Perhaps the error reveals the idolization of Randolph so widespread in early 1942.

92. June 27, 1942, p. 4.

### Notes to Chapter IV

1. *New York Amsterdam News*, February 8, 1941.

2. Tarry, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

3. July, 1942, p. 100.

4. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 4, 1942, p. 14.

5. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1942, p. 22. A similar march on another plant was reported in the *Courier*, September 12, 1942, p. 22.

6. See Pauli Murray and Murray Kempton, "All For Mr. Davis, The Story of Sharecropper Odell Waller," (New York: Workers Defense League, undated pamphlet).

7. June 11, 1942, p. 22. Cf. the issue of June 19, 1942, p. 22 for an exchange between the presiding judge and the *Times*.

8. *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 27, 1942, p. 24. The entire back cover of the Madison Square Garden rally "Souvenir Program" had been devoted to the Waller case.

9. July 11, 1942, p. 1.

10. Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Ironically, this coincided with the appearance of a biography of Roland Hayes by McKinley Helm, *Angel Mo and Her Son Roland Hayes* (Boston: Little Brown, 1942). A prominent reviewer declared: "Well the color line is crumbling. Roland Hayes's career in itself is proof of this. The Negroes have

93. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

95. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

96. J. A. Rogers' column declared: "Not since the days of Marcus Garvey have I seen such a crowd." *Ibid.*, p. 7.

97. *Interracial Review*, July 1942, p. 102.

made greater gains in the last ten months of war than in the previous twenty years. . . ." Oswald G. Villard, *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 28, 1942, p. 6.

11. Minutes of Meeting of July 7, 1942 (New York MOWM Division).

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Minutes of July 22, 1942, MOWM Meeting.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. *The People's Voice*, July 25, 1942, p. 2, pictures a "poster walk" advertising the parade.

18. Minutes of July 7, 1942 meeting.

19. Minutes of July 22, 1942 meeting. A humorous sidelight documents the use of street meetings and, incidentally, illustrates the flavor of the March and its secondary leadership. The minutes record, "At this point, Colton Brown spoke very eloquently for approximately thirty minutes on the Negro and his problems. It was probably his street speech which he used to promote the plans for the parade." These minutes state that 300 persons were in attendance at the meeting.

20. *People's Voice*, August 1, 1942, p. 40. The entire back page is given over to a picture-story of the Waller parade.

21. "The demonstration was observed in strict silence and the faces of the marchers were impressive. A policeman who persisted in talking was soon made to realize the nature of the march." *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Mr. Totten [International Secretary-Treasurer of the BSCP] stated that the idea of a silent parade probably started during the World War when a race riot occurred in East St. Louis." Minutes of "Call Meeting of the March on Washington Movement," July 7, 1942.

24. Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

25. *New York Amsterdam News*, September 5, 1942, p. 1 (a 1 column by 1 inch story); *People's Voice*, September 12, 1942, p. 23; *Pittsburgh Courier*, September 5, 1942, p. 4, a tiny item, "F.D.R. Too Busy To See Randolph's Group."

26. This sub-title owes an acknowledgment to John Beecher, "8802 Blues," *New Republic*, February 22, 1943, pp. 248 ff.

27. July 4, 1942, p. 20.

28. October 25, 1941, p. 1. Compare the attitude of aircraft companies prior to the FEPC, *Supra*.

29. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 25, 1942, p. 4.

32. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

33. July 25, 1942, pp. 1, 3.

34. The *New York Amsterdam News* editorial was very mild contrasted with previous stands; July 18, 1942, p. 6.

35. Cf. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Note that Dickerson did not challenge Ethridge at the hearing itself but released his statement after the hearings were concluded.

36. Cf. B. Atkinson's review of Southern reaction to the Birmingham hearings in the *New York Times*, July 2, 1942, p. 44.

37. Beecher, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

38. Title of *New Republic* editorial, February 22, 1943, p. 240.

39. *New York Times*, July 24, 1942, p. 7.

40. September, 1942, p. 279.

41. *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 15, 1942, p. 4.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

43. The *New York Times* reported a wire to the President signed by twenty-two organizations; August 18, 1942, p. 40.

44. August 7, 1942. The "inside" factors to which White refers may have concerned the jurisdictional conflict going on between Dr. Robert Weaver's Negro manpower service in the WMC and the FEPC group. Cf. *Pittsburgh Courier*, November 7, 1942, p. 6, which accused Weaver of trying to "completely sabotage the Committee."

45. A letter to Randolph from his St. Louis organizer stated, "We are reliably informed that the local office of the F.B.I. is trying to make a case against us charging sedition. . . ." August 22, 1942.

46. *New York Times*, August 18, 1942, p. 40.

47. *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 22, 1942, p. 4.

48. *Ibid.*, August 15, 1942, p. 1.

49. August 29, 1942, p. 6.

50. August 22, 1942, p. 1.

51. *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 15, 1942, p. 4.

52. *Ibid.*, August 1, 1942, p. 1.

53. *Ibid.*, August 29, 1942, p. 5.

54. March, 1942, p. 4. Cf., *Pittsburgh Courier*, March 28, 1942, p. 2.

55. August 4, 1942, to Mr. Thurman Dodson.

56. *Ibid.*

57. "Negroes began entering war jobs in large numbers in 1942, and continued through 1945 to make gains, both in the number of industries entered and in the recognition of skills." FEPC *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, pp. x-xii.



58. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 18, 1942, p. 20.
59. Letter of August 31, 1942.
60. Letter to the writer, November 28, 1955.
61. *Interracial Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
62. Letter to Randolph, June 2, 1942. Mrs. Bethune was, at the time, Director, Division of Negro Affairs, Federal Security Agency, National Youth Administration in Washington. The Treasury meetings referred to were war bond sales promotions.
63. Letter to Mrs. Bethune, June 8, 1942.
64. *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 3, 1942, p. 4.
65. "McNutt, MacLean Talk; FEPC Gets More Power," *ibid.*, October 31, 1942, p. 1.
66. *Ibid.*, November 7, 1942.
67. *Ibid.*, November 21, 1942.
68. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 51. McNutt's action was the major news story of the week, and the FEPC situation received great attention for some time thereafter; e.g., *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 16, 1943, p. 1.
70. *An American Dilemma*, *op. cit.*, p. 852.
71. For the official report, see *Crisis*, August, 1942, pp. 264-265.
72. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 25, 1942, p. 24.
73. A common distinction was made between "the intellectuals in the NAACP and the masses in the March on Washington committees." See Marjorie McKenzie's column in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 25, 1942, p. 7.
74. Horace Cayton, "NAACP Clings to Randolph's Coat-Tail," *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 25, 1942, p. 13. Mr. Cayton, a sociologist, is widely known as co-author (with St. Clair Drake) of *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1945).
75. July 25, 1942, p. 1.
76. Cayton could obtain no "ex-

planation from the [NAACP] officers." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*

80. It was reported that Randolph's convention speech was delivered "with vehemence which reached a new high." *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 25, 1942, p. 1.

81. *Crisis*, August, 1942, p. 264.

82. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 18, 1942, p. 13.

83. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1941, p. 13.

84. Letter dated June 15, 1942.

85. *The March*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 17, 1942, 4 (mimeoed); in Schomburg Collection, N.Y. Public Library.

86. August 30, 1942.

87. September 2, 1942.

88. September 9, 1942, letter to fourteen members of Chicago Division, MOWM.

89. Cf. Robert Bierstedt, "The Problem of Authority," *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, ed. by Morroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1954), Ch. 3.

90. June 27, 1942, p. 6. Cf. Embree, *13 Against the Odds*, *op. cit.*, p. 228: "Critics say, 'He [Randolph] is just a dreamer.' They say, 'The March on Washington Movement is a symbol and a force, not a plan and a strategy.'"

91. Cf. "Program of the March on Washington Movement," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942, p. 489.

92. The fifth point stated the "demand that the FEPC be made a permanent administrative agency of the U.S. Government. . . ."

93. Criticism had been directed at Randolph on similar grounds with respect to his early difficulties in organizing the Brotherhood. Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 459, ac-

cused him of a "hunger for publicity." They maintained that "if it were his purpose to win recognition and gain concessions from the Pullman Company too much publicity was likely to strengthen the company's determination not to yield, because yielding in the glare of publicity would be a double defeat." But this is at minimum a dilemma, for "publicity" was surely crucial to creating a sense of cohesion among the unorganized porters. What sort of organizational apparatus could Randolph have wielded which might convince the Pullman executives to deal with him? At the outset there was no organization to wield. The practical situation would have made a mild-mannered organizer a company union man.

94. P. L. Prattis, *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 6, 1942, p. 13. This same article referred to June as "March on Washington Month."

95. George S. Schuyler, *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 1, 1942, p. 13. The subsequent shift to the right is clear in his "FEPC Is a Fraud," *The Freeman*, July 14, 1952, pp. 697 ff. Schuyler was once associated with Randolph on the *Messenger*. Some evidence reflecting on organizational ability may be found in Randolph's management of the MOWM 1942 rallies. The poor

planning which overloaded the Madison Square Garden program was balanced by brilliant management of the propaganda buildup.

96. August 8, 1942, p. 6.

97. *New York Amsterdam News*, September 19, 1942, p. 7. Cf. J. Robert Smith, "It's the Truth," *ibid.*, October 24, 1942, p. 7.

98. *Interview*, July 22, 1955.

99. Letter dated September 25, 1942.

100. *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 10, 1942, p. 13.

101. September 1, 1942.

102. September 9, 1942.

103. The Credentials Committee reported that the delegates were distributed as follows: 12 from Illinois, 6 from Missouri, 4 from Washington, 8 from New York, 1 from Louisiana, 2 from Florida, and 33 from Michigan. "Proceedings of Conference Held in Detroit, September 26-27, 1942," p. 11.

104. "Memorandum on the National Policy Conference of the March on Washington Movement," undated.

105. "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 18.

106. The NAACP at that time did not bind its Board of Directors to its national conference decisions.

## Notes to Chapter V

1. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6.

2. *New York Amsterdam News*, December 12, 1942, p. 4.

3. October 17, 1942.

4. "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 27.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

6. Quoted by Albert Parker, *Negroes March on Washington* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, undated pamphlet), p. 8.

7. *op. cit.*, p. 836.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 853 (italics in original text).

9. Cronon, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 107, and 210.

10. Quoted in Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

11. In Logan, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

12. C. B. Powell, then publisher of the *Amsterdam News*, wrote Randolph (October 15, 1942) that the Detroit conference white exclusion



"resolution is undemocratic and denotes segregation and elimination of whites who would help the course of Negro advancement." But after Randolph explained the reasons for the policy, Powell wrote again (November 3, 1942): "From the arguments put forward in your letter, the wisdom of your decision is apparent."

13. Randolph in Logan, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

14. Cronon, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

15. The *Black Worker*, December, 1948, p. 1.

16. White, *A Man Called White*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

17. Randolph was active in many such organizations. Apart from the NAACP, he was head of the New York Citizens' Committee on Better Race Relations, an interracial committee; see Murray 1944, *op. cit.*, p. 275. Also, his union prided itself on the fact that "the Brotherhood has no color clause. . . . Its membership includes white barbers, Chinese maids, Filipino attendants and Mexican porters." *Black Worker*, June, 1941, p. 4.

18. Randolph, "Why Should We March?" *Op. cit.*, p. 489.

19. A. C. Powell, Jr., *Marching Blacks* (New York: Dial Press, 1945), p. 159.

20. Brazeal, *The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters*, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-43.

21. See Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 695-700. Cf. References to Mulattoes indexed in E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).

22. Southern Negroes were not ignored, but they were more vulnerable. For example, a church in Memphis was condemned for "fire code violations" immediately following an address by Randolph. The BSCP quickly donated \$2,000 for repairs. See BSCP press release, (Schomburg Collection in New York Public Library), July 1, 1944.

23. Randolph told a Congressional

Committee: "No white man here has felt the sting of discrimination and segregation, Jim Crowism. As a matter of fact, I believe anyone of you men would raise hell in America if you felt the indignities and injustices that are suffered in America. Right here in Washington, the Capital of the Nation, a Negro cannot go to a restaurant and get a sandwich, cannot go to a theater. Do you mean to say that a democracy is worth fighting for by black men which will treat them that way?" U.S. Senate, Eightieth Congress, Second Session, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Universal Military Training* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 694.

24. Quoted in Mary White Ovington, *Portraits In Color* (New York: Viking Press, 1927), p. 83.

25. The *Black Worker*, May, 1940, p. 1. Randolph's concern for the sources of funds is also made clear in this article.

26. *New York Times*, July 18, 1943, p. 29.

27. A. Philip Randolph, "Government Sets Pattern of Jim-Crow," *Interracial Review*, July, 1942, p. 101.

28. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 21, 1941, p. 3.

29. "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 5.

30. Some NAACP branches (particularly on the West Coast) were "captured" during the period (Record, *op. cit.*, p. 267) yet the Association could not take direct action against Communist infiltration until after 1949. See the account of relevant conference resolutions in Herbert Hill's, "The Communist Party—Enemy of Negro Equality," *Crisis*, June-July, 1951.

31. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 69. A similar view was held by the editor of the *Chicago Defender*. See A. P. Randolph, "A Reply to Lucius C. Harper of the 'Chicago Defender,'" *The Black Worker*, May 1940, p. 4.

32. Cf. Roy Wilkins' column,

"Watchtower," *New York Amsterdam News*, April 4, 1942, p. 7. The Communists later confessed to this as a Browder fostered error. Cf. Record, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

33. L. D. Reddick, "The Negro in the United States Navy During World War II," *The Journal of Negro History*, April, 1947, p. 208.

34. Cf. J. Robert Smith's column, *New York Amsterdam News*, July 18, 1942, p. 7. He had previously defended the all-Negro policy of the March in his column of June 13, 1942, p. 7. For an exposition of the tactics of infiltration, see Philip Selznick's *Organizational Weapon*, *op. cit.*

35. Randolph's vigilance, and the need for it, are revealed in a letter he wrote his Washington MOWM chairman August 25, 1942: "You will note that according to this person, two Communists spoke on the program, and a third . . . was scheduled to speak. . . . I want to suggest that we keep the Communists out of our programs regardless of what the occasion may be."

36. October 23, 1942, p. 6.

37. *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 31, 1942, p. 23. This was a "mass prayer service" at the St. Louis Soldiers Memorial. The meeting had "the full cooperation of the Interdenominational alliance."

38. *People's Voice*, November 14, 1942, p. 8.

39. September 19, 1942.

40. Press release, December 5, 1942.

41. December 5, 1942, p. 8. Cf., e.g., Horace Cayton's column, "Leadership, An Articulate and Unified Mass Remains Leaderless Today," *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 2, 1943, p. 13.

42. *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 19, 1942, p. 24.

43. *Ibid.*, December 26, 1942.

44. *Ibid.*

45. "To March or Not to March," January 2, 1943, p. 6. Similarly, the

executive secretary of the Atlanta, Georgia Urban League, an MOWM adherent, wrote Randolph (January 14, 1943): "I have wondered whether the name of the movement could not be changed . . . to something else which does not suggest that the sole activities . . . are limited to marching on Washington. It seems that many persons have not caught the significance of the movement as a technique of mass action which can be applied in any locality. They, therefore, think that the movement is failing if it does not live up to its name to march on Washington."

46. December 19, 1942.

47. D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma* Vol. I, (Bombay: Times of India Press, 1951), p. 109. Cf., M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Madras: S. Ganesan, 1928).

48. Richard B. Gregg, *The Power of Non-Violence* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1934).

49. *Gandhi's Autobiography* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 536.

50. Randolph was imprisoned for a short time for agitation against World War I. In 1948, he courted jail by publicly urging Negro youths not to register for selective service. This preceded President Truman's executive order of July 26, 1948 setting up a commission to end racial discrimination in the armed forces "as rapidly as possible."

51. Quoted in Spero and Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 387. Randolph often used such fighting poems for dramatic effect in his speeches.

52. BSCP press release, December 30, 1942 (Schomburg Collection in New York Public Library). Similarly, the *People's Voice* reported: "MOWM leaders stressed that it [civil disobedience campaign] was only under consideration and would not be discussed until a planned conference this Spring," January 30, 1943, p. 6.

53. *Chicago Defender*, January 9,



1943, p. 4; *New York Amsterdam News*, January 9, 1943, p. 1.

54. January 23, 1943, p. 6. Later, April 24, 1943, p. 4, the *Courier* reported that a poll of Negroes rejected a "non-violent, civil disobedience campaign" as not likely to "help American Negroes"; 70.6% opposed the campaign, 25.3% were favorable, 4.1% were uncertain.

55. February 6, 1943, p. 6.

56. From the initial press release, "Program of Civil Disobedience and Non-Cooperation," December 30, 1942.

57. A separate press release from the one just cited but also dated December 30, 1942.

58. *Ibid.*

59. "THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT AND THE WAR," Press release, January 29, 1943.

60. Press release, December 30, 1942.

61. Extract from Minutes of the Board of Directors, NAACP, meeting of February 8, 1943.

62. "Proceedings," *op. cit.*, p. 37.

63. January 11, 1943.

64. Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

65. Editorial, January 30, 1943, p. 14. The main story reporting McNutt's action, in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, was captioned, "McNutt Admits He Called Off Probe; No Resignations," January 16, 1943, p. 1.

66. Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

67. For Randolph's position arguing that the Negro FEPC members should "stay on and fight," see the *Black Worker*, February 1943, p. 4.

68. This cropped up regularly. The *Pittsburgh Courier*, September 27, 1941, p. 24, reported friction over colored locomotive firemen resolved by Townsend's withdrawal. However, the *Courier*, May 30, 1942, p. 1, reported, "UTSEA Plans Campaign on Rail Workers. . . . CIO Affiliation

Adds Prestige to Campaign and May Make Inroads on Randolph's Car Porter's Brotherhood." Cf. *Black Worker*, February 1943, p. 2.

69. Miss Pauli Murray (letter of March 21, 1943) sought unsuccessfully to convince Randolph that "it is imperative that you and Townsend work in close unison" and complained that "it is also a matter of common knowledge that you do NOT work closely together." Townsend had written an article in his union paper very critical of the MOWM (*Bags and Baggage*, November 1942, p. 3). Randolph answered Miss Murray (April 16, 1943), "I don't consider a conference with him [Townsend] the key to the solution of any problem. There are other leaders in the labor movement like George E. Brown of the Hotel Workers' who represent a larger following than Mr. Townsend. I don't think that Mr. Townsend's connection with C.I.O. or being on the C.I.O.'s Board gives him any special strategic position so far as mobilizing Negro masses is concerned." However, ". . . we have no objection to his participating in the March On Washington, and he has always been invited. . . ." Later, Randolph and Townsend did co-operate in the National Council for a Permanent FEPC.

70. Cf. *Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and *Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen*, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).

71. The *Black Worker*, September, 1941, p. 4.

72. *Ibid.*, August, 1942, p. 1.

73. McNutt's Deputy "admitted that the 'postponement' resulted from pressure of 'big business,' the railroads, and the southern bloc in Congress. . . ." Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

74. The *Black Worker*, January, 1943, p. 4.

75. Beecher, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

76. "Post Mortem on FEPC," edi-

torial in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 23, 1943, p. 6.

77. See The *Black Worker*, January, 1943, p. 1.

78. Following the MOWM Chicago convention, the *New York Amsterdam News* declared: "As it stands, other organizations have had more influence in determining the course of the FEPC than has the March on Washington Movement, and Randolph is further away from the White House than ever, when he should be closer"; August 4, 1943, p. 2. Actually, on August 2, Bishop Haas, the new chairman of FEPC requested Randolph and four other top Negro leaders to meet with him on August 7 (BSCP files). Behind the scenes, Randolph and Morris Milgram of WDL had conducted important negotiations with Attorney General Francis Biddle who handled the FEPC problem for the President at the time.

79. The publisher of the *New York Amsterdam News*, in an article strongly critical of Randolph's handling of the MOWM (July 31, 1943, p. 2), wrote concerning Randolph's experiences organizing the Pullman porters: "Personally I knew the Pullman set-up in Chicago . . . knew something of the activities of the company union. Moreover, I knew that Randolph could have just about written his own ticket if he had abandoned his fight for an independent organization for the porters. It would have meant selling out his friends and the men, and Randolph held fast. I was there! I know men who deserted him for a price! I knew newspapers that deserted him for a price, and I know Randolph merely wept and kept going forward."

80. The March sought to surround the Capitol with a picket line but Randolph was telegraphed, November 21, 1942, by the Washington MOWM chairman:

"UNABLE TO LAUNCH PICKET LINE FOR MONDAY. LEGAL

BARRIERS PREVENT PICKETING OF SENATE WING OF CAPITOL OR OFFICE BUILDING. LINE WOULD HAVE TO EXTEND BEYOND CAPITOL RESERVATIONS; MAKING A LINE OF ONE MILE IN CIRCUMFERENCE WOULD REQUIRE BETWEEN 500 AND 1000 PERSONS TO BE EFFECTIVE. LOCAL COMMITTEE VOTED TO ESTABLISH LINE. PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS PREVENT ESTABLISHMENT BEFORE WEEK OR TEN DAYS. NAACP AND ANTI POLL TAX LEAGUE OPPOSE PICKET IN TOTO."

81. E. Pauline Myers, *The March on Washington Movement Mobilizes A Gigantic Crusade For Freedom* (New York: MOWM, undated pamphlet), pp. 10 ff. Also, Dwight Macdonald, "The Novel Case of Winfred Lynn," *The Nation*, February 20, 1943.

82. Written by a well known white journalist and his wife, Nancy and Dwight Macdonald (New York: MOWM, undated but probably 1943). The authors were involved in an abortive effort to establish a white "Friends of the MOWM."

83. March 21, 1943. Randolph's reply (April 16, 1943) insisted that the decline was largely a press relations rather than a grass-roots loss. He pointed to Roosevelt's success in the face of a hostile press as well as his own experience in organizing the Brotherhood despite opposition from the Negro press. Furthermore, "it is no reflection upon the movement that there is internal strife and even dissension. We have it in the A. F. of L., the C. I. O., and even in Congress." But Randolph was on the defensive. See "A Reply To My Critics," which appeared in six weekly installments in the *Chicago Defender*, June 12, 19, 26; July 3, 10, 17, 1943; each on p. 13.

84. June 7, 1943; Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.



find examples

85. *Crisis*, July 1943, p. 211.
86. *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 19, 1943, p. 13.
87. *Ibid.*
88. See Ruchames, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.
89. Executive Order 9346, May 27, 1943. The FEPC was removed from McNutt's jurisdiction and established as an independent agency within, but not subordinate to, the OPM.
90. Murray, *Negro Handbook 1944*, *op. cit.*, p. 220. On June 26, 1943, the *Pittsburgh Courier* front-paged the headline, "RACE RIOTS SWEEP NATION, 16 Dead, Over 300 Hurt in Michigan, Texas, Mississippi." This was the issue immediately preceding the MOWM convention. On August 1, 1943, a riot broke out in Harlem, N.Y. See Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-50. For a study of the Detroit riot see Alfred M. Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943).
91. Murray, 1944, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
92. *Ibid.*, Had the MOWM conference not been postponed from May, any civil disobedience action launched by the Detroit MOWM might well have received the blame for setting off the riot.
93. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 10, 1943, p. 12.
94. Later the Committee on Racial Equality (CORE) of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (a Christian pacifist group) and the Howard University chapter of the NAACP waged successful forays into Jim Crow territory. Cf., George M. Hauser, *Erasing The Color Line* (New York: Fellowship Publications, 1947), a pamphlet with a foreword by A. Philip Randolph. Randolph's 1948 civil disobedience campaign against discrimination in the military services has been noted previously. The bus boycotts in Montgomery, Alabama and Tallahassee, Florida provide recent examples of political "non-cooperation" by Negroes.

95. By now, the Negro press regularly carried full page advertisements offering war jobs. Cf., the *New York Age*, July 17, 1943, p. 12; the *People's Voice*, September 25, 1943, p. 7. This unquestionably reduced rank and file militancy.

96. July 4, 1943, p. 12. The *New York Amsterdam News* all but ignored the MOWM convention. The issue of July 3 contained nothing; on July 10, they ran a front page captioned picture of Randolph but no story; on July 17, S. W. I. Garlington wrote what amounted to an obituary of the March in his column "Generally Speaking," p. 11. The *Chicago Defender* ran a small p. 1 story, July 10, 1943.

97. *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 10, 1943, p. 12.

98. July 10, 1943.

99. See the detailed account of these panels in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 10, 1943, p. 12.

100. The attendance can be inferred from the size of the vote to retain the important Negroes-only membership policy (102 to 2); *New York Times*, July 4, 1943, p. 12. Randolph had previously declared that "a conference of five hundred delegates is a good conference." Letter to Pauli Murray, April 16, 1943.

101. The National Executive Secretary was let go a few months after the convention. Some question had been raised of incompetency, but the primary reason (she was not replaced) was financial. The treasurer's report of October 30, 1943 revealed an indebtedness of \$2,091.15 with but \$86.85 on hand. By now the BSCP had poured close to \$50,000 into the March.

102. A. Philip Randolph, "March On Washington Movement Presents Program For the Negro," in Logan (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 145.

103. *The Black Worker*, July 1944, p. 3.

104. A vice-president of the BSCP

answered our question concerning why the name of the MOWM had been retained; it "... was not changed because it kind of dissolved into the Council for a permanent FEPC." Another MOWM leader actually declared: "the name of the organization WAS changed," so strong was his recollection that "the National Council for a Permanent FEPC ... was the successor to the MOWM." He even named a white lawyer, active in the National Council, as the man who "was elected Chairman ... after the name was changed." Of course he was trying to recall happenings of thirteen years ago

and specifically warned, "of this I am not certain," but it is revealing of when the March died as a matter of perception by its active leaders. Randolph, too, now stresses the "temporary and limited purpose" of the March primarily in terms of the FEPC.

105. Report by A. Philip Randolph, National Director; National Conference, March on Washington Movement, (Chicago, Illinois, October 19, 1946).

106. Letter of February 24, 1944; BSCP files.

107. January 23, 1947.

## Notes to Chapter VI

1. *All Manner of Men* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), p. 83.

2. Executive Order 9346, May 27, 1943. The railroad hearings began the following September 15.

3. U.S. Congress, House, *To Investigate Executive Agencies*: Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., on H. Res. 102 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), Part 2.

4. Will Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver," *University of Chicago Law Review*, XIII (June, 1946), pp. 412-414.

5. Kesselman, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

7. The position of Jews during the war is described by H. M. Kallen, "National Solidarity and the Jewish Minority," *Annals* 223 (September, 1942). On "defense" organizations, see R. M. MacIver et al., *Report on the Jewish Community Relations Agencies* (New York: National Community Relations Advisory Council, 1951).

8. Direct intervention was not advocated by organizational leaders. A 1940 statement declared: "The disastrous effects of the war on the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, intensely tragic as it is, is a part of a calamity almost world-wide in scope. Happily, our country is not a party in this conflict. Convinced as we are of the futility of war, knowing as we do its incalculable material and moral costs, we hope and pray it may be possible for our country to remain at peace." Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, "Annual Report," *The American Jewish Year Book 5701*, Vol. 42, (Harry Schneiderman (ed.) [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1940]), p. 643.

9. The rise of "hate groups" in this country during the post-World War I era is well known; e.g., The Coughlin, German-American Bund, Silver Shirt movements, and the campaign of Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent*. See Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism In America* (Washington: American Council on



Public Affairs, 1941). In Britain, the Mosley group was much weaker than its counterparts in the U.S. (*ibid.*, pp. 11-12). Indeed Gunnar Myrdal observed: "It is the present writer's impression that anti-Semitism, as he observed it in America during the last years before the Second World War, probably was somewhat stronger than in Germany before the Nazi regime." (*An American Dilemma*, *op. cit.*, p. 1186.) Public opinion polls showed substantial anti-Jewish prejudice during the period prior to and during World War II. See Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk (eds.), *Public Opinion 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 381-388; a Fortune poll of July, 1939 (*ibid.*, p. 383) found 10.8% of its sample believed Jews "make respected and useful citizens so long as they don't try to mingle socially where they are not wanted"; 31.8% thought "some measures should be taken to prevent Jews from getting too much power in the business world"; 10.1% wanted to "make it a policy to deport Jews from this country to some new homeland as fast as it can be done without inhumanity"; 38.9% felt "Jews have the same standing as any other peoples and they should be treated in all ways exactly as any other Americans"; 9.5% "don't know" or "refused to answer."

10. Joseph C. Hyman, Twenty-Five Years of American Aid to Jews Overseas: A Record of the Joint Distribution Committee, *The American Jewish Year Book 5700*, Vol. 41 (1939-1940), 141.

11. *The Role of the American Jew* (New York: American Jewish Congress, undated pamphlet), p. 9.

12. Cf. "The Mirage of the Economic Jew," in Graeber and Britt, *op. cit.*, Part Six; U.S. President, Fair Employment Practice Committee, *First Report*, *op. cit.*, and *Final Report*, *op. cit.*; Arnold Aronson, *Post-war Employment Discrimination*

*Against Jews* (report of National Community Relations Advisory Council, undated); J. X. Cohen, *Who Discriminates and How?* (American Jewish Congress, undated); and, Albert J. Weiss, "Post-war Employment Discrimination," *Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, XXIII (June, 1947), 396-405.

13. This is readily established by contrasting attention to the issue in Negro and Jewish yearbooks. Frequent references have been made herein to Murray's *Negro Handbook*. Cf. *American Jewish Year Book*, Harry Schneiderman (ed.), succeeded by Morris Fine with Vol. 51, *op. cit.*, during war and post-war years. The first substantial reference is in Geraldine Rosenfield, "Combating Anti-Semitism," *ibid.*, 47 (1945-1946), 280, 281, 284, 285. Two important national conferences of major Jewish organizations during the war failed to mention FEPC in their proceedings; see Alexander S. Kohanski (ed.), *The American Jewish Conference, Its Organization and Proceedings of the First Session, August 29 to September 2, 1943*, New York, N.Y. (New York: American Jewish Conference, 1944); *ibid.*, *Proceedings of the Second Session, December 3-5, 1944*, Pittsburgh, Pa. (New York: American Jewish Conference, 1945).

14. Kesselman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

15. Maurice J. Karpf, *Jewish Community Organization in the United States* (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1938), p. 64.

16. Bureau on Jewish Employment Problems, *What Price Employment Barriers: Report of Activity, 1938-1940* (Chicago: undated pamphlet), p. 2.

17. "Memorandum; Subject: President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice," January 22, 1943 (dittoed copy).

18. August 22, 1942, p. 6.

19. *Ibid.* Cf. "Negroes and Jews," editorial, *New York Amsterdam News*, August 22, 1942, p. 6; and

Kenneth B. Clark, "Candor About Negro-Jewish Relations," *Commentary*, I (February, 1946), 8.

20. FEPC, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

21. Maslow, *op. cit.*, provides a thorough analysis of the parliamentary battle in the Seventy-ninth Congress. See also Ruchames, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-206.

22. *People's Voice*, December 1, 1945, p. 18; February 16, 1946, p. 20; March 2, 1946, p. 16. Cf. *Manuscript*, No. 36 (November 19, 1945), p. 3.

23. Kesselman, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-160.

24. Arthur Krock characterized it as "A Filibuster That Kept Banker's Hours" and claimed: "The advocates of the disputed measure [FEPC] are merely making a show of their advocacy to relieve themselves of immediate political pressure and are quite willing to blame the Senate rules for their failure." *New York Times*, February 14, 1946, p. 24.

25. *The New York Times* (March 1, 1946, p. 23) estimated 15,000 persons attended the Madison Square Garden rally held February 28, 1946. Cf. R. G. Martin, "FEPC Rally," *New Republic*, CIV (March 18, 1946), 379.

26. Telegram from Allen Knight Chalmers and A. Philip Randolph, co-chairmen, to constituent organizations composing the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, March 22, 1946. The NAACP participated in the February 22 conference but it is not clear whether they endorsed the plan for a new march; see *Crisis*, March, 1946, p. 74.

27. The importance of the postwar employment concern is revealed in the enactment of the "Full Employment Bill" a few days after the FEPC filibuster ended. See Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

28. "When the proponents of

FEPC plans its proposed new March on Washington, all segments of the population will be urged to join—not just Negroes as the original movement provided." *Manuscript*, No. 50 (February 26, 1946), p. 5.

29. Full-page ad for the Madison Square Garden "Negro Freedom Rally," *Peoples Voice*, June 14, 1947, p. 20.

30. "A. Philip Randolph's proposed MARCH ON WASHINGTON as a strategy in the FEPC fight has run afoul of the National CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination, which has addressed him a 2-page letter of objections." *Manuscript*, No. 56 (April 9, 1946), p. 5. On electoral reprisal activity, see Henry Lee Moon, "The Negro Vote In 1946," *Crisis*, LIII (October, 1946), 306-308.

31. "FEPC Foe Defeated," *Crisis*, LIII (September, 1946), 265.

32. *New York Times*, April 13, 1944, p. 11; and April 19, 1944, p. 15.

33. Press release, October 25, 1944.

34. A. P. Randolph et al., "Ideas For A New Party: A Symposium," *Antioch Review*, VI (December, 1946), 602-624. James A. Wechsler declared that "some of the ablest figures in labor's top echelons . . ." were involved in the new-party move; "The Liberal's Vote and '48," *Commentary*, IV (September, 1947), 217.

35. "A. Philip Randolph," *New York Times Index*, 1946, p. 1959. This was in reaction to Truman's plan to draft strikers in key industries.

36. A. Philip Randolph, "Why I Voted For Norman Thomas," *Black Worker*, November, 1948, p. 2.

37. *Crisis* declared Truman's speech "the most comprehensive and forthright statement on the rights of minorities in a democracy, and on the duty of the government to secure and safeguard them that has ever been made by a President of the United States" in editorial, LIV (August, 1947), 233. Also, see U.S. President's



Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), and comments thereon in *Crisis*, LIV (December, 1947), 361, and LV (January, 1948), 10-11.

38. See the editorial analyses in *Crisis*, LV (January, 1948), 9; and LV (September, 1948), 361.

39. In the 1946 CIO convention, a "left-right" split was assiduously avoided, though with difficulty. The big break came in 1948 and was completed by 1949. See Robert Bendiner's series of articles in the *Nation*, "CIO Tightrope Act," CLXIII (November 30, 1946), 601; "Murray's Limited Purge," CLXVII (December 15, 1949), 361-363; "Surgery in the CIO," CLXIX (November 12, 1949), 458-459. Cf. Max Kampelman, *The Communist Party vs The CIO* (New York: Praeger, 1955). On the NAACP and the Urban League, see Record, *op. cit.*, and editorials in *Crisis*, "Keep An Eye On The Communists," LIX (April, 1948), 105, "The NAACP and the Communists," LX (March, 1949), 72. American Jewish Congress actions date from 1948; two constituent "left-wing" groups, the American Jewish Labor Council and the Jewish People's Fraternal Order, and the metropolitan Detroit chapter were finally ousted in 1949; *New York Times*, June 8, 1949, p. 12, and November 11, 1949, p. 22. Also at this time, Congressman Powell removed the editor of his newspaper and changed its political orientation; see *The People's Voice*, December 27, 1947, p. 3.

40. Her original resignation, July 15, 1946, cited only the financial crisis. At the August 2 National Council Board of Directors meeting, Mrs. Hedgeman submitted a second statement declaring, "I do not believe that the National Council for a Permanent FEPC as presently constituted is utilizing effectively the established political affiliations necessary to enactment of such legislation." Mrs. Hedge-

man was urged to separate her criticisms from her resignation since it "contained the inference of an indictment of the Council which might impair the future welfare of the FEPC movement." Though she would not accede to this request, the Board accepted her resignation "with gratitude for the significant contribution she has made to the cause of fair employment practice." Minutes of meeting; BSCP files.

41. Letter to Mr. Roy Wilkins, January 7, 1948.

42. A close associate of Randolph confidentially attacked the election of Wilkins as a "Trojan Horse." There was less rivalry with the Urban League (its exclusive social-service function made it less competitive for program than the NAACP), and Randolph had to urge Lester Granger to come on the reorganized Board of Directors.

43. White wrote Randolph and Chalmers asking to "disassociate myself" from a Council wire to Senator Taft which asked priority of FEPC over anti-lynching and anti-poll tax bills. He argued that "despite its record of more than a quarter of a century in support of anti-lynching legislation, the NAACP has abstemiously refrained from asking priority for that legislation." White was a member of the Council's strategy committee. (February 27, 1948; BSCP files.) In 1950 Roy Wilkins, as chairman of the Council's executive committee, wrote to Senators: "Major religious, labor, civic, veterans, racial and ethnic organizations have declared FEPC to be 'the most fundamental' of all pending civil rights bills." (January 4, 1950; BSCP files.) In June, 1949, AFL, CIO, NAACP and NCRAC spokesmen "united in urging that top priority be given to FEP among all civil rights measures." Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American Jewish Year Book 1950*, Vol. 51, *op. cit.*, 101.

44. From 1948 to 1953 the American Jewish Congress and NAACP issued a joint annual report, *Civil Rights in the United States: A Balance Sheet of Group Relations*. Jewish organizations have also submitted briefs to support Negro cases as "friends of the court." This activity was not entirely new; Rabbis Emil G. Hirsch and Stephen S. Wise were among the signers of the 1909 Lincoln birthday call for the conference which established the NAACP.

45. "Organized anti-Semitic activity, which began to decline after the war, continued at a low ebb during the year under review [1949]." George Kellman, "Anti-Jewish Agitation," *American Jewish Year Book 1950*, Vol. 51, *op. cit.*, p. 110. Cf. Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, *Cross-Currents* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1956).

46. NCRAC was established after the war to co-ordinate the work of Jewish agencies engaged in community relations activities. Aronson, who earlier came from the Chicago Bureau on Jewish Employment Problems, was in charge of employment work for NCRAC. See MacIver, *op. cit.*, for an interesting example of the conflict between organizational sovereignty and functional allocation of programs which led to the 1952 withdrawal of the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League from NCRAC. Cf. Selma G. Hirsh, "Jewish Community Relations," *American Jewish Year Book 1953*, Vol. 54, *op. cit.*, 162 ff.

47. See the sketch of BSCP leaders in Murray Kempton, *Part of Our Time: Some Ruins and Monuments of the Thirties* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955), ch. 8.

48. *Manuscript* reported a "rivalry of Negro leadership"; "According to some NAACP officials, the independent efforts of that organization were not too welcome in the FEPC fight. Randolph, it is claimed, wanted to

prove he was big enough to do the job without Walter White. This was discussed in the recent NAACP Board meeting where a resolution was adopted to set up a new FEPC committee to carry on the fight on the ground that Randolph's group had been given its chance without interference."

The report further stressed that Walter White, Roy Wilkins, and other NAACP representatives at the February 22 strategy conference following the filibuster absented themselves when a resolution was adopted "extending a vote of confidence to the leadership of Randolph and Anne Hedgeman . . . and condemning any move on the part of any other organization to set up a competing committee." No. 60 (February 26, 1946), p. 1.

49. Letter to Wilkins, *op. cit.*

50. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 206. Cf. Arnold Aronson and Samuel Spiegler, "Does the Republican Party Want the Negro Vote?" *Crisis*, LVI (December, 1949), 364; editorial, "Democrats Fail on FEPC," *Crisis*, LVII (June, 1950), 374; and Alan Barth, "The Democrats And FEPC," *Reporter*, VII (August 5, 1952), 13.

51. July 26, 1948; Executive Order 9980 established what the *New York Times* referred to as a "little FEPC" (July 27, 1948, p. 1), a Fair Employment Board was charged with enforcing the President's order to eliminate bias in Federal employment. Executive Order 9981, issued simultaneously, established the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Service to implement the order to end military discrimination "as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale." (*New York Times*, *ibid.*) On the significance of Executive Order 9980, see Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American*



*Jewish Year Book 1950, op. cit.*, Vol. 51, pp. 106-108.

52. *New York Times*, July 27, 1948.

53. Grant Reynolds, "A Triumph For Civil Disobedience," *Nation*, CLXVII (August 28, 1948), 228.

54. *New York Times*, April 1, 1948, p. 1.

55. *Ibid.* Cf. U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, Eightieth Congress, Second Session, Vol. 94, Part 4, (April 12, 1948, Senate) 4312-4318.

56. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948, p. 36.

57. "Fighting The Jim Crow Army," *Crisis*, LV (May, 1948), 136. This article referred to Randolph as manifesting "his usual eloquence and sincerity." The same issue reprinted a *PM* editorial by Max Lerner containing the significant statement, "Randolph and Reynolds come closer to the true feelings of the masses of American Negroes . . . than their more cautious and circumspect colleagues." (p. 154.)

58. *New York Times*, June 5, 1948, p. 16.

59. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1948, p. 17.

60. *Ibid.*, April 2, 1948, p. 18.

61. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1948, p. 35. There was some question as to whether the executive order issued by Truman precluded "segregation" —the term used in the order was "discrimination." The Negro leaders regarded segregation as prima-facie evidence of discrimination and welcomed the order as "courageous." Their view was later accepted by the Supreme Court in the school segregation cases which reversed the "separate but equal" doctrine. Cf. *Oliver Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Randolph regarded the executive orders as a victory and called off the civil disobedience campaign. Cf. Grant Reynolds, *op. cit.*

62. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Universal Military Training*, Hearings be-

fore Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 686.

63. To be sure, this is a comparative statement. Given sufficient intensity of a crisis in public morale, Congress could not remain aloof. However, it seems a sound generalization that the pressures would have to be more intense and involve a broader range of interests to move the legislative branch compared with the executive. The sheer number of individuals, with differently based power positions who would have to be made vulnerable, produces an important difference. Also important is the seniority system of selecting powerful heads of committees. Thus, the Congress is a more conservative institution than is the office of President. Cf. Stephen K. Bailey, *op. cit.*, ch. XII.

64. *Black Worker*, February, 1950, p. 1.

65. National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization, "To All Sponsoring Organizations," BSCP files March 8, 1950. This report reveals that "a total of 410 persons was not accredited because credentials were found not to be in order." It is likely that this represented the "left-wing" groups which sought to participate in the Mobilization; see Roy Wilkins' report that Communists had tried to "infiltrate and control the mobilization," *Crisis*, LVII (August-September, 1950), 512-513. The March 8, 1950 report provided the following breakdown of delegates: NAACP, 2891; CIO 383; American Jewish Congress, 185; B'nai B'rith, 350; National Baptist Convention, 53; AFL, 119; AMEZ and other church organizations, 41; National Alliance of Postal Employees, 23; Committee for a Permanent FEPC, 11; Greek Letter Fraternities, 12; Americans for Democratic Action and SDA, 60; Elks, Masons and other fraternal

organizations, 17; Catholic Interracial Council, 5.

66. National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization, *op. cit.*

67. Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American Jewish Year Book 1951*, Vol. 52, *op. cit.*, 29. The delegation to the President included A. Philip Randolph, though Roy Wilkins was spokesman. *Crisis*, LVII (February, 1950), 108.

68. During this period, there was talk of formalizing the Republican-Dixiecrat alliance. Cf. "Should the G.O.P. Merge with the Dixiecrats?" "Yes," by Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-S. Dak.), "No," by Representative Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), *Colliers*, CXVIII (July 28, 1951), 20 ff.

69. From the report of the Illinois delegation to the Mobilization.

70. The FEPC campaign in the Eighty-first Congress is described in Ruchames, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-212; and Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American Jewish Year Book 1951*, Vol. 52, *op. cit.*, 29-31.

71. National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization, *op. cit.*

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. Ruchames, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

75. *New York Times*, April 12, 1950, p. 18.

76. May 16, 1950, p. 3.

77. This rule was adopted March 17, 1949. It changed the previous situation, where two-thirds of those present and voting could impose cloture. Then, it had been theoretically possible to invoke cloture with 33 votes (two-thirds of a quorum). Now it was necessary to have 64 irrespective of how many Senators were voting on the proposition. The rule was jointly offered by Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) and Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb.) as a "compromise" to solve the impasse created by reversal of a ruling by Vice-President Barkley (March 10, 1949) that cloture applied to any business before the Senate, to pro-

cedural as well as substantive matters. The Hayden-Wherry rule was a compromise between no cloture at all on procedural matters (in effect, no cloture) and the majority-rule principle demanded by civil rights proponents. See "SENATE GIVES FILIBUSTERS GREEN LIGHT," *Crisis*, LVI (April, 1949), 105. Cf. George B. Galloway, *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1953), pp. 559-570.

78. *Crisis*, LVII (June, 1950), 374-375.

79. Democrats, however, claimed Vice-President Barkley's ruling as a Truman Administration effort for civil rights (Galloway, *op. cit.*, p. 562). Twenty-five Democrats and sixteen Republicans voted to sustain the Chair, twenty-three Democrats and twenty-three Republicans overruled the Chair. The NAACP used this vote as an important item in appraising the voting records of senators; "The NAACP Legislative Scoreboard," *Crisis*, LVII (October, 1950), 549 ff. (The statistics in *Crisis*, however, are not accurate with respect to the vote on the McConnell substitute. Their table seems to be based on that in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, VI (1950), 550-51 which contains errors.)

80. "There will be a second cloture vote, probably while this editorial is in the press. Additional votes will be picked up from among absentees." *Crisis*, LVII (June, 1950), 375.

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*, p. 374.

83. See the efforts made by each side in Senate debate to pin the onus for defeating FEPC on the other party. Only the Southerners claimed credit for the defeat. U.S. Eighty-first Congress, second session, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, Part 6 (May 19, 1950), 7300-7307; *ibid.*, Vol. 96, Part 8 (July 12, 1950), 9982-9985.



84. The 1948 Republican platform declared: "This right of equal opportunity to work and to advance in life should never be limited in any individual because of race, religion, color, or country of origin. We favor the enactment and just enforcement of such Federal legislation as may be necessary to maintain this right at all times in every part of this Republic."

The 1948 Democratic platform declared: "We call upon the Congress to support our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental rights: . . . the right to equal opportunity of employment. . . ."

Congressman Claire E. Hoffman (R-Mich.) told the House that the Democrats had paid no attention to items in their own platform and thus had no right to point to the Republican FEPC plank. Bluntly, he stated, "Platforms, as many people know, are made to garner votes, not to guide the party after the election." U.S. Eighty-first Congress, second session, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, Part 2 (February 22, 1950), 2184.

85. The NAACP advised its members, "Any Congressman who voted for the McConnell substitute on February 22 was voting against a major part of the Association's program. Remember that." *Crisis*, LVII (October, 1950), 549-550.

86. Cf. Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American Jewish Year Book* 1951, vol. 52, p. 30.

87. Arthur Krock, "Has Mr. Rayburn a Senior (Silent) Partner?" *New York Times*, January 26, 1950, p. 26.

88. Cf. American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

89. National Council for a Permanent FEPC in cooperation with the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, July 20, 1950.

90. Nine hundred delegates met in Washington, February 17-18, 1952. *Crisis*, LIX (March, 1952), 170. "Rule 22" specifies the procedure for invoking cloture.

91. It proved very difficult to separate the problem of Senate rules from the substantive issues. See Clarence Mitchell, "These Are the Issues," *Crisis*, LIX (October, 1952), 485.

92. Arnold Aronson, "Discrimination in Employment," *American Jewish Year Book* 1953, Vol. 54, *op. cit.*, 51.

93. "During the Depression and the war, fair employment practices had been their [race relations organizations] key objective. . . . Then, in the middle forties, there was a change in opinion about race relations. Job discrimination was no longer quite so important when there were jobs for all." Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), p. 21. Actually, FEPC had top priority throughout the forties.

94. This was strikingly illustrated to the writer at a "Workshop Conference on Human Relations" sponsored by District 31, United Steel Workers of America, CIO (April 21, 1951), in Chicago. The participants, many of whom were Negroes, reported "no" employment discrimination in their plants. Close questioning revealed that this was scarcely the case, but employment "discrimination" to them did not refer to upgrading or employment in all departments of a firm. Their perception of "job discrimination" was clearly restricted to whether the plant was "lily-white" or not.

95. The thirteen states are Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. Alaska also

has a mandatory law. Kansas and Indiana have "educational" FEPC programs. Arizona recently established criminal penalties for discrimination in public employment. There are also municipal ordinances, thirty-six of the "enforceable" type and two without penalties for violations. Cf. W. Brooke Graves, *Fair Employment Practice Legislation in the United States, Federal-State-Municipal*, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 93 (Washington: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, 1951); Pauli Murray (ed.), *States' Laws on Race and Color* (Cincinnati: Woman's Division of Christian Service, Board of Missions and Church Extension, Methodist Church, 1950), and *ibid.*, *Supplement* (1955); U.S. Eighty-third Congress, Senate (Document No. 15), *State and Municipal Fair Employment Legislation*, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953); the series of reports on employment and civil rights in the *American Jewish Year Book* 1945-1946, Vol. 47 to date; and the FEPC report of the American Jewish Congress, December, 1957.

96. Letter of January 7, 1948. Cf. Kesselman, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

97. Randolph did try to broaden the base of his operations in preparation for the 1945-46 campaign. He wired Mr. Burton, chairman of the Chicago MOWM: "URGE YOU MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENLIST ALL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, CATHOLIC GROUPS, AND WHITE PROTESTANTS. THEY ARE READY TO COOPERATE AND FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION TO FEPC AS WELL AS PRINCIPLE OF UNITY AMONG ALL MINORITIES MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR US TO UNITE THEM. . . ." November 13, 1945.

98. Cf. Bernard Goldstein, *The*

*Dynamics of State Campaigns for Fair Employment Practices Legislation* (Chicago: Committee on Education, Training and Research in Race Relations of the University of Chicago, 1950), (mimeographed). Not all of the factors noted are attributable to Mr. Goldstein; some are based upon personal observations in Illinois and Michigan.

99. Cf. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949).

100. Herbert H. Stroup, *Community Welfare Organization* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), p. 116. Cf. Herman D. Stein, "Jewish Social Work in the United States, 1654-1954," *American Jewish Year Book* 1956, Vol. 57, section on "the Growth of Professionalism," 51-56.

101. This raises a serious matter for consideration by those who would evaluate the relative resources available to various forces seeking to influence governmental policy. What is the tax-exempt status of so-called institutional advertising by business organizations or the funds raised by the American Medical Association to defeat "socialized" medicine? Are reform-protest groups at a government-fostered disadvantage?

102. Cf. B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 209-212.

103. Theodore Leskes, "Civil Rights," *American Jewish Year Book* 1956, Vol. 57, 156.

104. Cf. Gus Tyler, "The House of Un-Representatives," *New Republic*, CXXX (June 21, 1954), 8; *ibid.*, Part II (June 28, 1954), 14; *ibid.*, Part III, CXXXI (July 5, 1954), 13.

105. Cf. Goldstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.



106. "An Illinois FEPC Law came within one vote of final passage. That victory was so near is a tribute to the courageous leadership of Governor Stevenson and his Administration. . . ." Illinois Fair Employment Practice Committee, "Report to the Illinois Community," June 30, 1949.

107. Cf. Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), chaps. 1, 5, 6.

108. Public Law 1881, Seventy-sixth

Congress, Third Session, Title II, Section 3E.

109. Arnold Aronson, "Employment," *American Jewish Year Book* 1952, Vol. 53, 95.

110. Theodore Leskes, "Discrimination in Employment," *American Jewish Year Book* 1954, Vol. 55, 27.

111. Based on a confidential interview; see the favorable report by Theodore Leskes, "Civil Rights," *American Jewish Year Book* 1956, Vol. 56, 208.

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