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PERSONAL

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INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT L. ALLEN
AND OTHERS

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REPORT

THE DESTRUCTION OF A CULTURE



BLACKS SPEAK OUT —

"IT'S NOT OUR WAR!"



The University and Secret Research

Beginning a series of reports on military contracts with academe

University involvement in Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) research has recently become a major issue on several campuses. CBW research, usually performed on a contract basis for the chemical warfare branches of the Defense Department, would ordinarily have a restricted security classification. Many scientists and professors have therefore charged that such research violates the university's primary responsibility to preserve the free pursuit and dissemination of knowledge. There is also a growing realization among scientists that, due to the acknowledged use of chemical weapons by the U.S. in Vietnam, participation in such research makes one an accomplice to acts which have been outlawed by international law.

Interest in CBW research was originally sparked by the disclosure last spring that the University of Pennsylvania, through its Institute for Cooperative Research (ICR), was engaged in research on chemical and biological weapons systems, with an emphasis on the utilization of such weapons in Vietnam. The nature of this research, revealed by the Philadelphia Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam, was documented first in the June/July issue of *Viet-Report*. Penn was reported to be receiving several million dollars from the Defense Department for its SPICERACK and SUMMIT projects to conduct research on, among other things, psychochemicals, chemical defoliants, delivery systems for chemical weapons, and rice-destroying chemicals.

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These disclosures were disturbing to many of Penn's faculty members, and last fall the Faculty Senate voted overwhelmingly against the conduct of secret research at the University. Despite this demonstration of faculty sentiment, Penn's President Gaylord Harnwell allowed the SPICERACK and SUMMIT projects to be renewed last spring. Critical publicity and faculty resentment to this move later forced Harnwell to dissolve the controversial Institute for Cooperative Research; he indicated, however, that the chemical warfare projects would be continued until their completion. Moreover, it was quickly revealed that the ICR had only changed hats—now gaining the suffrage of the Provost's Office. As a result, the Faculty Senate at Penn recently voted new measures to effect the implementation of its resolutions against secret research.

38 UNIVERSITIES INVOLVED

It is known, from a *Washington Post* report of September 4, that at least 38 American universities, or university-connected institutions, are now engaged in CBW research. Efforts are currently being made on several of these campuses to force the suspension of such research, and to establish safeguards against future engagement in secret research.

It was revealed last week that the New York University School of Engineering was engaged in CBW research for the U.S. Army's Chemical Research Development Laboratory. One NYU project, with a restricted secur-

ity classification, was for "Statistical and Mathematical Evaluation of Chemical Warfare Systems." *The Washington Square Journal*, NYU student newspaper, revealed that the University had also done work on psychological weapons for the Air Force Weapons Division. In an Editorial in the November 17 issue, the Journal called for the banning of all classified research on the campus. NYU's President, James M. Hester, is expected to review the University's policy on secret research in a forthcoming policy statement.

"WAR CRIMES"

Students and faculty members at Columbia University have also been engaged in an investigation of the secret research conducted there. On November 21 President Grayson Kirk admitted that Columbia was doing some secret research for the Defense Department, but refused to answer questions on the nature of that work. At a meeting one week later on "The University and Secret Research," Professor Seymour Melman charged that the Columbia Medical Center had a "history" of performing nerve gas research. At this meeting, sponsored by the Forum Committee of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, Melman warned that individuals engaged in CBW research could be held responsible to future "war crimes" tribunals, like those which followed World War Two. "The argument that one is just 'taking orders,' or engaged in pure scientific research only, is not a valid defense for one's participation in unlawful acts of war," said Melman.

At this meeting, held at the Medical Center, other speakers charged that a Professor of Microbiology at Rutgers University, Dr. Werner Braun, was organizing a research study on biological warfare. A number of molecular biologists and microbial geneticists from across the country who are currently employed in academic research have been approached by Dr. Braun, who informed them that Defense Department funds were available for research in heterologous recombination. Heterologous recombination refers to a genetic exchange between different species, a phenomena that can be used for breeding entirely

new disease organisms—germs that can withstand extreme climatic conditions and are at the same time resistant to all known drugs and antiseptic devices.

In an interview with the *Rutgers Targum*, Dr. Braun denied that he was recruiting basic-research talent for the purpose of developing germ warfare methods.

He stated that none of the research would be directed toward warfare and emphasized that "all results of such research would be published freely in scientific journals." However, in conversations with the scientists he had mentioned the work in connection with a general "preparedness program." Shortly after speaking with Dr. Braun, the researchers received letters on Rutgers' stationery which, while never mentioning the name of the project or type of research to be done, asked the men to forward to "the Committee" both their research proposals and suggestions on how the government money could most conveniently be granted to them. As a rule, money is granted in the biolog-

ical sciences through a competitive application system and through established agency procedures.

Members of the committee included: Dr. Louis Baron from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Army Representative to the genetics study section of the United States Public Health Service since 1958; Arthur Brown, from the Virus and Rickettsia Division of Fort Detrick; Karl Habel from the *National Institute of Health Educational Journal of Infectious Diseases*; Knut Krieger, director of Projects SPICERACK and SUMMIT in the University of Pennsylvania; James W. Moulder from the University of Chicago, member of the Advisory Committee to Fort Detrick, specialist in infectious diseases; and Werner Braun, Chairman, on the Fort Detrick staff until 1955, member of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Army Biological Labs at Fort Detrick.

Several of the scientists who were approached turned down the offer, fearing that it was the beginning of a campaign to recruit top notch basic-research scientists, who are usually

found in universities, for the purposes of developing highly sophisticated CBW agents. They felt that the "freedom to publish" promise was a ploy to win the confidence of those men whose professional integrity would otherwise prohibit them from participating in such a project.

The Rutgers disclosure is significant in the light of recent information indicating that researchers in one of the Government centers studying germ warfare have discovered a strain of *Pasteurella pestis* which is resistant to common drugs. In the October *Viet-Report*, we noted that this germ is the bacillus for Bubonic Plague, and that Vietnam—which had no record of the Plague before 1961—is today the only country in the world where an epidemic of Bubonic Plague is occurring. This information is likely to spur scientists at the several institutions doing research on Bubonic Plague, most notably the Yale University Epidemiological Laboratories, to investigate the purpose for which that research is being done.

— M. K. and R. S.

For The Record

Big Deal in Manila

by Michael Klare

When the Manila Conference was first proposed in September by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as a "peace conference," it was considered by some Asian nations to be a genuine effort to promote peace talks between North and South Vietnam. At a press conference on September 26, Abdul Razak, Deputy Premier of Malaysia, suggested that invitations to the Conference could be extended to both Vietnams, and that "it would be left to the parties concerned to find a formula to solve their problems and our efforts should be directed solely at bringing them together...."

A week later, however, when President Johnson announced that he would attend the Conference, any intention of inviting Hanoi was forgotten. When the United States became a dominant sponsor of what was to have been an Asian conference, the original intent to open a dialogue on Vietnam was dropped, and with it, the participation of Malaysia. When the Conference convened on October 24,

only military allies of the United States were present: Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and South Vietnam.

As late as October 4, the *N.Y. Times* reported that "the discussions are expected to center on the progress of programs aimed at pacifying the South Vietnamese countryside and on United States diplomatic efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the war." But at the same time that

mats, could be expected to lead to negotiations: the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Johnson told a Washington press conference on October 13, that a bombing halt would leave the GI's in Vietnam "with their hands tied behind their back." The October 24-25 Conference was left, then, with the business of conducting the war.

The conferees heard reports on the progress of the ground war in South

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the Seven-Nation Conference was being promoted as including both a peace-finding as well as a military objective, President Johnson, before he left the United States, had ruled out the only step which according to Hanoi, the Soviet Union, U Thant, and many Western diplo-

Vietnam, and on efforts to stabilize the Saigon government of Premier Ky. "Rural pacification" was a major preoccupation and the allies agreed on a massive effort to root out and destroy the "parallel government" of the National Liberation Front (never mentioned by name).

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Once again, eight months after Honolulu, Premier Ky was obliged to re-dedicate himself to the goals of a "social revolution" in the countryside, in order to overcome opposition to the Saigon government.

It became obvious from the remarks of Premier Ky and General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Commander in Vietnam, that South Vietnamese troops would be increasingly eased out of active combat, and re-assigned to the less strenuous task of "holding down" the countryside in Government-controlled areas (consequently leaving U.S. troops with an even greater burden of the fighting). General Westmoreland made it clear that he would have to request a considerable increase in the number of GI's for Vietnam.

In their final Communique the conferees reaffirmed their commitment to resist North Vietnamese "aggression" in the South. They promised to remove all of their military forces and installations from Vietnam within six months after such time as "the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides."

When U.S. officials were queried about this promise, they explained that the figure "six months" was added to lend "dramatic effect" to the statement (which itself represented a particularly hard line on conditions for a settlement). Moreover, when it was pointed out afterwards that Saigon was incapable of defeating the Vietcong by itself—even with the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces—Washington was forced to expand on what it meant by "the subversive forces of North Vietnam." According to Neil Sheehan, "As understood by Administration officials and other observers, the terms of the Manila Communique would amount to a virtual dismantling of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong military structures in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of (all) these elements to the North" (emphasis added; *N.Y. Times*, 11/13/66). What Washington means by "subversive" or "external" forces, then, is not simply native North Vietnamese troops, but rather all those forces in the South which actively oppose Saigon.

Thus, the Manila Conference served to perpetrate the rationalizations used by each country for its continued

intervention in Vietnam. Basic to all these rationalizations is a belief in the urgent need to paralyze Chinese influence (never strictly defined) beyond her borders. As far as U.S. interests were concerned, Max Frankel observed that:

From all the high jinks of the Presidential procession, all the self-serving propaganda and political bush-beating, there remained a vigorous commitment to contain Communist China's influence as well as territory and to stake that commitment on some societies whose internal stability is far from certain. By constantly invoking the image of a new and emerging Asia, the President was committing U.S. dollars and as he himself said at the end, perhaps even soldiers, in still another place should the challenge arise. It is the policy behind Vietnam, therefore, rather than the war itself, that has now been escalated (*N.Y. Times*, 11/3/66).

Mr. Frankel does not explain what that "other place" might be and public statements from the Conference are unspecific. In Anchorage, the President simply concluded that the U.S. was taking a firm "anti-communist stand" in Asia—"you can put it in your pipe and smoke it."

If one looks at the representation in Manila, it is clear that a great part of non-Communist Asia does not subscribe to America's policy in Vietnam. The three most populous nations in Asia outside of China—Japan, India, and Indonesia—were absent from both the Manila parley and the President's tour. In none of these countries is the American position popular; in two of them, India and Indonesia, government officials have recently called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

The Indian position was contained in a joint communique signed on October 24 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. The communique called on the United States to stop the bombing of North Vietnam "immediately and without any preconditions." The joint statement also called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnam, so that the Vietnamese could "decide their future themselves, free from all external interference." Similar views were expressed by Indonesia's Gen-

eral Suharto, who declared October 28 that the Vietnam problem "should be solved by Asia, in an Asian way and by Asian people."

Other Asia nations missing at Manila were Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and Nationalist China. Taiwan's absence was surprising, considering Chiang Kai-shek's offer to supply troops for the Vietnam conflict (an offer rejected by the United States). The absence of Burma, Cambodia and Pakistan is not so difficult to understand, as all three nations are critical of the American presence in Vietnam.

For each government which did appear at Manila, it is clear that there was some political reason. Both Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia and Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand faced parliamentary elections on November 26, at a time when there is in each country widespread opposition to the Vietnam war. The other four leaders present—Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Chung Hee Park of South Korea, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and Nguyen Cao Ky himself—all face popular discontent in their own countries, and all would like to receive more military and economic aid from the U.S. to bolster their regimes.

Accordingly, Thailand received a \$20 million bonus in U.S. military assistance funds. Both South Korea and the Philippines were promised increased aid and continued U.S. military support. Premier Ky, who had just faced the resignation of seven Ministers in his own Cabinet, was assured that the U.S. and allied troops would continue to protect his rule.

President Johnson also had well-defined political goals in Manila. The first, of course, was a desire to prop up his sagging popularity at home, at a time when national elections were less than two weeks off. This was evident, according to Max Frankel, "in his extraordinary care for each day's headlines and the angles for each major photographic scene."

One of Johnson's primary concerns, it appears, was to stress the concept of an *allied* war in Vietnam, in which many nations were fighting side-by-side with the Americans. Johnson hoped that by fostering this idea, he could counteract the widespread dis-

content in the U.S. over the fact that American G.I.'s are doing most of the fighting—and the dying (now at a rate of around 100 men a week)—in Vietnam. For the very same reason, Johnson sought through his tour to endorse those rulers, like Holt and Holyoake, who were willing to commit even token forces to the Vietnam war. It is no coincidence then, that the Manila Conference preceded not only the American elections, but the Australian and New Zealand elections as well.

And the Troops Go Marching On

For the past three months, the U.S. troop build-up in Vietnam has proceeded at an unprecedented rate. U.S. ground forces passed the 300,000 mark in mid-September, and are expected to reach 375,000 by the end of the year.

According to the *N.Y. Times* of October 15, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam was by that date "larger than the number involved in Korea during the height of the war there."

In addition to the 345,000 troops in Vietnam by November 9, there are also 35,000 U.S. troops in Thailand and another 45,000 men serving in the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea.

The U.S. build-up during the four-month August-November period proceeded at a rate of about 7,000 men a week, or five times the infiltration rate of North Vietnamese into the South, which is alleged to be about 5,000 men a month.

The build-up will continue into next spring, with 425,000 G.I.'s expected in Vietnam by May. On November 20, the U.S. Military Command put the expected 1967 total officially at 475,000 troops. The *N.Y. Times* reported on October 11, however, that the Military Command "hoped to see the troop total reach about 600,000 men next year."

In order to provide the manpower for this massive troop build-up, the Defense Department has requested record-breaking draft calls. For the months August-November, the call-up totaled 160,000 men; the October

draft call of 49,200 men was the highest since the peak of the Korean War.

As the Selective Service depletes its reserve of unmarried 1-A men, other categories will be called up, including college students and married men. In addition, the Defense Department intends to lower the mental qualification for service. The revised qualifications are expected to result in an even greater disproportion of Negroes serving in the Army than at present. The Defense Department will also be faced with the question of whether to use the Reserve call-up powers voted to President Johnson on October 11. The President was authorized to call up reservists without declaring a state of national emergency, as required by previous laws. Although Johnson claimed he did not request this authority, the *N.Y. Times* predicted October 12 that "the President might call up individual reservists... after the November election."

How will fresh U.S. troops be deployed in Vietnam? There are some grounds for speculation that the U.S. Military Command is planning an invasion of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Vietnam, coupled with a limited invasion of North Vietnam itself. Ward Just, reporting from Saigon in the *Washington Post*, October 6, indicated that the post-election escalation most talked about by Army officers is an "attack in the Demilitarized Zone itself, or an amphibious landing near Vinh in North Vietnam to seal access routes both to the Mugia Pass into Laos or into the DMZ itself."

Just's observations would seem to correspond with other public information. For instance, the *N.Y. Times* reported October 15 that most of the 75,000 troops that will be sent to Vietnam in the next few months will be sent to the area below the DMZ, where nearly four U.S. and allied divisions are already deployed.

Another option for escalation of the ground war would be an American "invasion" of the Mekong Delta area south of Saigon. The Delta was, until recently, the only area in Vietnam still under the exclusive military jurisdiction of the South Vietnamese Army, although the area has been a major target for U.S. chemical defoliation raids. However, American officials have become increasingly disturbed at the failure of pacification in this area, and, thus, new American forces next

year will include a contingent of amphibious forces for operations in the Mekong River Delta area, in addition to one new Army division, two new Marine combat regiments and regular supporting and replacement units.

It is known that elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division are already operating in the Delta, and the U.S. Army is building a base large enough to accommodate a brigade (about 5,000 men) at the provincial capital of Mytho. Selwyn Feinstein of the *Wall Street Journal* reported on November 10 that General Westmoreland intends to shift considerable numbers of U.S. troops into the Delta.

While the basic objective of the U.S. Military Command remains to find and destroy organized enemy units, this is accompanied with the U.S.M.C. "judgment that the expected military triumph will not in itself alter the course of the basic conflict for control of South Vietnam and its population" (*N.Y. Times*, 11/21/66). Thus, far more than the 475,000 troops anticipated by 1967 will be required for the occupation and pacification of South Vietnam. This was the service which the South Vietnamese Army was to perform, after it was released from joint combat duty, but as Max Frankel explained in the same *Times* story, "the South Vietnamese army has yet to persuade Americans here that it is willing to assume this unglamorous and difficult job, so different from the frontal war for which it was trained and so dependent upon responsiveness to the local population."

LETTERS

Manila, Philippines

DEAR SIR: I read with great interest Martin Nicolaus' excellent article, "The Professor, the Policeman and the Peasant," in *Viet-Report* (Feb., March/April, June/July, 1966); and I would like to ask permission to reprint it in the next issue of the *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. This journal (of which I am an editor) is a quarterly publication of the University of the Philippines' College of Public Administration.

Nicolaus' article gives us a few disturbing thoughts and it should

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serve as a timely warning for us. The College of Public Administration has a history that resembles the National Institute of Administration in Vietnam. It was created in 1953 under contract with the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and for many years it lived on counterpart funds from USOM. It continues to enjoy the financial blessings of Ford and Rockefeller.

Recently AID offered to construct a fabulous building for the Philippine Executive Academy (a branch of the College) on condition that we offer police administration as one of the major fields of study. This arrangement, it was candidly explained to us by an AID advisor, would generate added attraction for the ongoing "advanced training program for police officers" of AID. Steps are already being taken to institute police administration courses, despite the fact that none of our faculty members is competent to teach them. We were assured, however, that AID and the National Bureau of Investigation will provide "instructors" in police administration at no extra expense to the University.

My colleagues in the College are convinced that this is a good bar-

gain, and I am almost alone in opposing it. A ghastly incident which occurred on October 24 is still fresh in my memory. At that time I witnessed students being beaten by an AID-trained "riot squad" or "crowd control squad" in front of the hotel where President Johnson was lodged during the Manila Conference.

Professors in other colleges of the University have pledged their support for me once the police administration project is brought before the University Council. Martin Nicolaus' article should be of incalculable help to us in this fight....

—Francisco Nemenzo, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Political Science, University of the Philippines.

November 22, 1966
Prague, Czechoslovakia

DEAR SIR: In response to your cable dated 11/15/66, we present our opinion as follows:

The Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam never uses arms against the enemy which could harm the life or the well-being of our fellow countrymen. Moreover, true to national humanitarian

traditions, the South Vietnamese population never makes use of arms capable of inflicting either permanent or hereditary diseases on its adversary, such as the American aggressors have used against the South Vietnamese people.

As for the UPI allegation [11/10/66: VC regiment uses "non-poisonous gas grenades" against U.S. 1st Infantry Division in War Zone C, Tayninh Province], it is a pure lie and a piece of fallacious propaganda by the American aggressors aiming to misinform and disconcert public opinion at a time when peace-loving people throughout the entire world are severely condemning American troops for having made use on a growing scale of chemical agents and toxic gas as a means of cutting off the sources of life and massacring the South Vietnamese population. The American aggressors invent this myth in the hope of erasing their crimes and relying on this lie to justify the use of chemical agents and toxic gas on an even wider scale in South Vietnam in time to come.

Nguyen Duc Van
Secretary of the NLF Representation of South Vietnam in Czechoslovakia

(Draft continued from page 37)

you make something over nice you "whitewash" it.

V.R.: If you join the Army you're taken to Whitehall Street.

OQUENDO: Exactly.

V.R.: Still, whites are going to see it only as defiance. They're not going to see it as a new culture springing up.

ALLEN: That's their problem. Look, that's where you white radicals come in. We can't solve everybody's problems. We're got enough of our own. That myth that the Negro's salvation is the salvation of America? Oh no, we're our own salvation....

V.R.: Okay, but let's get back to you four. It's all right to dismiss the white man's trouble provided he doesn't continue to use the black man to fight his bloody wars. Now if Vietnam is a dry run so far as quelling revolution in the rest of Asia or in Latin America is concerned, as I think it is, then it clearly follows that if Negroes are going to continue to be at the bottom of the heap, when Vietnam is finished they're going to have to go to Venezuela, maybe, or, if necessary, Tanzania. So there is an interrelationship. Let's face it: to the extent that you can persuade Negroes not to join the Army, you're going to shove the issues of this war that much more sharply into focus for the rest of us. Because if white middle class kids are going to have to go to Vietnam instead of to

graduate school, there's going to be a hell of a lot of trouble.

OQUENDO: That shows how this system is built.

MOORE: You know, we're just four guys here who took a stand. You know what we're doing now? We're trying to decide what's going to happen as far as the whole black people in this country is concerned. We four took a stand, knowing full well what might happen to us. We took this stand as men, we made our own decisions. Now let's not justify ourselves. Let's not say any more.

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"IT'S NOT OUR WAR!"

William Johnson • Edward Oquendo • Robert Allen • Steven Moore

*An Explosive Interview with four young Black Men
who have refused Military Service*



I. William Johnson

May 11, 1966
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON:...I have looked over the previous letters received from you, which had been filed awaiting further word indicating that you had voluntarily turned yourself in to the Military authorities. I am sure you realize, Mr. Johnson, that you have not helped your case any by going AWOL, but I am sure you realize also that it would be less severe for you if you turned yourself in rather than remain at large until apprehended by the authorities....Under the present circumstances, I am not certain of what help I can be to you. But if you will get in touch with me again after you have voluntarily surrendered, I will get in touch with the Army authorities in your behalf and present to them your previous letters which state in part what caused you to leave your post.

Very truly yours,
Adam C. Powell
Chairman, Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives

June 4, 1966
Bronx, New York

DEAR MR. POWELL:....By now I know you think that I don't want you to help me, because I have not turned myself in as of yet. I have done a lot of thinking. I don't think that they will let me have your help (anyway).

I had written a letter to the President telling him all about what had happened to me. I even told him where I was. I told him that I would go to Vietnam if he would let me go back to my old unit that is in Vietnam now. I told him that I would not go to the unit that they wanted to send me to. All I wanted to do was to get away from the way they felt about my being a Black man. I didn't care where they sent me as long as I was looked on as a man doing a job like everyone else no matter whether his skin was Black or White.

But I was wrong. I had no right to run from what other Black men are fighting for right here in the United States. If we don't have the same rights in the Armed Services as the White man, then how can we be asked to go die for this country?....If the Government feels that way about us, then how do they expect the People to feel...

Right now we have men being killed at home and in Vietnam. At home by the White men in the South. In Vietnam by the Vietcong from the North. The Black man is being killed on two fronts. Is this the way they mean to get rid of the Black man in this country? All I want now is to get out of the Army. I don't care what kind of discharge I get so long as I get out to fight the White man the only way I can-with my mind.

I have made up my mind that if the President won't help me then no one will. It is not like I am hiding. They know where I am. I told the Secretary of the Army where I would be. I told the President where I would be. If they wanted me they could have come and get me any time, but they didn't and won't. Please don't think me ungrateful for not taking your advice, but maybe you can help me to bring about some change in the way we are treated in the Army and the rest of the armed services.

Yours truly,
William Johnson

Pvt. William Johnson, 21, of the Bronx, went AWOL from Special Service Forces in April 1966. On October 24 he surrendered and is currently confined to the stockade at Fort Dix, New Jersey, awaiting a hearing. His lawyer, Mr. Conrad Lynn of New York, believes he may be granted a medical discharge because of an injury sustained in the service when Pvt. Johnson was kicked in the knee by an N.C.O. Meanwhile, he faces possible court martial.

In late September Viet-Report interviewed Pvt. Johnson along with three other Negroes who have refused induction: Steven Moore, Edward Oquendo and Robert Allen. Of the four young men, Pvt. Johnson is the only one who has actually been in the Army. What follows is his story of what he encountered.

After I had been in the service for a year, I reenlisted to go into Special Forces weapons training. Before I reenlisted I had talked with the Special Forces Reenlistment N.C.O. He told me that I did not need a written guarantee that I could get weapons training. He told me that in Special Forces they did not need written guarantees because they would not force me into anything I did not want, but that if I was still worried about getting the training, I should go to Advance Infantry and take up light weapons. That way I would have a start and would have no trouble. I then made arrangements to reenlist. After reenlisting I was sent to Fort Gordon, Ga., where I underwent my Advance Infantry training. There I spoke to another sergeant from Special Forces. He told me not to worry; that I would get what I asked for.

From there I was sent to Fort Benning, Ga., to go to Jump School. Here another Special Forces sergeant came to speak to all of us trying to get more men to go into Special Forces. He told us the only training that we could not take was Operations and Intelligence which was open only to sergeants E-7 and above.

After I had completed my jump training I was sent back to Fort Bragg, where as soon as I arrived I was told that I could not take weapons training unless I was E-4 or above, or had three years of previous service. I was then told I would have to be tested to see which of the two fields I was going into. (They had told us we had four to pick from before we got there.) Right away I told them that I had reenlisted for weapons training, but they wouldn't hear me.

I was placed in Engineering. I told them then that I did not have the math background for engineering. I was told to take it or get out. At this time I could not see leaving Special Forces after I had reenlisted. I would be throwing away three years of my life for nothing. So I felt that if I could somehow pass engineering I could take weapons later.

That is when I began to notice the real dis-
November-December

crimination. It wasn't anything outlandish. I mean, you knew that they didn't want you around, and whenever promotions would come up, it didn't matter how long the black man had time and rank, if the white man came there he got the promotion. And then I began to notice that there were P.F.C.'s taking weapons training and that some of these men hadn't been in the Army as long as I had, but they were white. When I went to my Commanding Officer and asked him about it, he said he would look into it, but there was nothing more said about it.

That was when I began to notice that the 4th Platoon had nothing but black men in it. This Platoon was where you were sent if you were going to be kicked out. It was like a joke. It seemed as if they were segregated. After awhile I felt it was only a matter of time before I was sent to the 4th Platoon.

They have this board you have to go before before they put you out. When I went before them I explained to them all that had happened, but it was no use. You see, they asked for comments from the N.C.O.'s in the company and they made false statements about me. The first one said I needed constant supervision and that I put little or no effort in the billets. The other said that I was a "ghost": that I was always ducking out on any work to be done. The N.C.O.'s who wrote this had no way of knowing anything about me because they never came in contact with me. My squad leader could not have said it because I was the best worker in his squad. But I was still kicked out.

I did not find out about these statements until I was leaving the company, after which I wrote to the Commanding General of Special Forces, not signing my name or anything, to give away who I was. I was called over to the Inspector General's office. He asked me had I written to the General. I told him yes, then asked him, how did they find out it was me? He did not tell me. All he did was try and make me think I did not have a case. It was then that I made it up in my mind to go AWOL.

That was in December. Around the 21st I received orders to go to Vietnam. I knew that I had made it up in my mind what I was going to do. I was given a leave, almost 40 days. I was to have gone to Vietnam on June 30, 1966, but I did not. I had written letters to the President, to Senator Kennedy, the Secretary of the Army, and anyone else I thought would help. I told them where I was and that I was going AWOL unless they helped me. I never received any answer until I had decided to go back (the first time). A letter came from the Secretary of the Army telling me to return and tell my Commanding Officer the whole story, and to give

them the letter from him.

I turned myself in. I stayed in the stockade for 14 days before I decided to give the letter to my Commanding Officer. As soon as they found out I had a letter from the Secretary of the Army no one wanted anything to do with me. I was put out of the stockade and put on a plane that next day to San Francisco where I again went AWOL, getting off the plane and making arrangements to come home at once. On the way home I again wrote the Secretary of the Army, telling him what happened, what I was doing, and where he could get in touch with me. As of yet there has been no answer from him or anyone else I had written to, except Mr. Powell.

* * * *

V.R.: At what age did you enlist?

JOHNSON: Nineteen.

V.R.: Why did you enlist?

JOHNSON: Well, I enlisted because I'd wanted to complete school, and I knew that I'd be drafted sooner or later anyway, and I had just gotten a good job and I didn't want them to start messing with me later on after I'd gotten settled.

V.R.: What kind of job did you have?

JOHNSON: I was working at a publishing plant.

V.R.: Doing what?

JOHNSON: Well, I had started at the bottom actually. Everyone has to start at the bottom, but you work your way up. I was in the shipping department at the time.

* * * *

ALLEN: I think that Bill's case presents a very good example of what Eddie and I have been saying about black survival. What is a young black man in the ghetto offered--if he gets to high school and through high school--what alternatives does he have? How does he hope to better himself, or escape from the spiritual and economic suffocation of the ghetto? You've got to have money to go to school. You've got to have influence to get a big job. But there's one alternative open to the black man for which you don't need any of these things--that's army service. Become a mercenary for the U.S. government. Join the Army. Fight the white man's fight in foreign countries.

OQUENDO: That's the only way for a black person to make it. For example, when I was in Mississippi last December on the voter registration campaign, there were many black troops in uniform who were home for the holiday. I spoke with quite a few, and the thing is--you have no alternative to offer. They know what's going on. These are people who were involved in Greenwood, in the rights battle there. They were involved, but there is nothing to offer them except a job on the plantation for \$12 a week. Besides, there's an aura about the uniform. You know, prestige. It commands respect. Then there is the other part. Over and over again you hear the threat from parents: if you don't straighten up I'm going to put you in the Army. For a black youth who takes to the

streets and gets in trouble over and over again, the Army can be more or less the redeemer.

V.R.: Does any of this describe how you felt, Bill when you enlisted?

JOHNSON: You mean, as far as going in and looking for a way out? No, that wasn't actually my feeling at the time. I just wanted to get them off my back--I mean, go in and serve my time and then get out and be finished with it, so they wouldn't have anything else to do with me, because I knew that they would make me go in eventually, that I would be drafted.

V.R.: You're actually AWOL now. How do you feel about being in that position?

JOHNSON: There was no other alternative. I couldn't get them to hear me any other way. I wrote to a congressman, senator, and I wrote to the President to tell them of my case--about everything that happened.

V.R.: So you would say that once you're in, it's a lot more trouble to make your point?

JOHNSON: Yes.

V.R.: If you're now making your point, where do you think this is going to lead?


JOHNSON: I'm hoping it leads to my discharge.

V.R.: You think there's any chance of that?

JOHNSON: Eventually, one way or another. You see, the way they've got me feeling now, I don't care what kind of discharge I get. Dishonorable, honorable, it doesn't matter to me anymore.

OQUENDO: But you have no doubt you're going to end up in the slams (jail)?

JOHNSON: Oh yes, I know I'm going in. I don't have any doubts about that.



II. Edward Oquendo

"We find many of the so-called civil rights leaders, like Whitney Young, claim that the war is the greatest thing that ever happened to the American Negro; that fighting side by side with the Southern cracker will make him come back here and change his view about us. Oh yeah, 'We fought together,' 'You're a man,'— 'But you can't live next door to me!'"


"The same myths about black men that went on during World War II are going on in Vietnam now. Look at the "Coon Pipe." The military claim they have no idea how this thing is being sold in the PX's. It's a pipe with the bowl being a caricature of a coon, something like Al Jolson; and on the side of the pipe is a picture of a Vietnamese woman....Then you read in the newspapers of the brawls in the bars, particularly around Danang. Yesterday in the **Times** there was an article describing how black troops are not even allowed in some of these bars or restaurants in Vietnam. Why? I don't think the Vietnamese people would have just thought this thing up. This is imported. This is imported racism."

"I see the Poverty Program as part of this war, too. Whenever you can see black youth, the "cadets," marching up and down the ghetto streets with guns, mock guns and uniforms, which are handed out to Haryou-Act by the government, that's preparation.... The Poverty Program is an attempt to control the minds, it is a form of genocide—not the physical mutilation or killing of bodies, but control of the mind. If you think of genocide in this way, the whole concept of being an 'American Negro' is genocide. These are dead minds, white people walking around in black skins."

Edward Oquendo, 20, of Brooklyn, refused to take his induction physical in September, 1965. Since then he has received two draft notices which he returned with the explanation that as a black man, he can not join an army fighting what he believes is a racist war in Vietnam. He has been indicted for violation of the Universal Military Service Act, and is currently awaiting a trial date.

The first notice I received that the Army was interested in me was when I was still in Newtown High School in Queens. There we had "military assemblies," where the four branches of the armed services would come to school to explain the purpose of each branch—more or less recruiting, selling themselves. Signs saying "The Marines has a place for you," or "The Army makes a man of you," or "Uncle Sam wants You," were everywhere. I didn't want any part of it.

Then last year I first began to receive notices for a physical examination. I never reported
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If you're really good boys maybe you'll be able to go into the Army to finish your education.

for it. I received four or five notices; then one draft notice, and a month later another draft notice. When I had received the first physical notice, I went down to the draft board instead of to Whitehall Street where I had been instructed to go. At the draft board I wrote a letter telling why I refused to take a physical examination. I stated my objection as a black man, opposed to having anything to do with the Army itself, or with an Army involved in a war like the one in Vietnam.

After that the draft board sent numerous letters citing my non-cooperation to the brokerage house in downtown Manhattan where I was working as a runner. As a result I was fired.

Some months later, in July, while I was helping a friend push a car across the street, I was approached by two men who asked me was I "Edward Oquendo." I told them I was, and they said they would like to talk to me, and would I get into the car with them? I refused and said that if we have any talking to do we can do it right here. This was in front of my house, and I spoke in a manner which caused the neighbors to gather. The two men identified themselves: FBI agents. After asking me some petty questions, I told them the answers were all in the file, and if they did not know what my name was and my selective service number, they weren't doing their work. They agreed and said they would be back next week, and they left.

They returned the next Monday about 8:30 A.M. I opened the door, expecting a friend who was to take me to a driver's test, and both the agents handcuffed me, took me downstairs where I found two cars with a total of four agents. They took me down to the Federal Building in Brooklyn. I went before the U.S. Attorney—his name was Barnett, an amiable man. He directed me to go down to 37 Whitehall Street then and there. I refused.

Then I went before the Commissioner. He was something entirely different. He gave me some speech about how he was for my "kind," and my "cause." This he actually told me. At one

(turn to page 29)

"The Peace Party always wins," Richard Nixon, regretfully. Did it win in November? Can it stop the war in 1968? This cross-country analysis of the 1966 election returns argues that it might. See for yourself.

REPUBLICAN PEACE SCARE

1966-68

by Leonard P. Liggio

The 1966 elections will not reverse the Johnson Administration's foreign policy. Nor do they reveal radical and overwhelming disaffection among voters over the Vietnam War. Of course, neither development could have been expected. On the record, the Administration is notoriously unsympathetic to public criticism of its continual escalation and its broken 1964 promises. Accordingly, it would have been unlikely to change its policies even had they been roundly repudiated by the electorate. Such a repudiation was itself highly unlikely, for a Harris poll released just before the elections revealed considerable voter confusion on the peace issue; roughly half the electorate was persuaded that a vote for the Democrats was a vote for deescalation and peace, while the other half was equally convinced that a Republican vote, and it alone, would have the same effect.

Yet the electoral picture is not entirely without hopeful signs. On the contrary, certain of the results, read in the light of the 1950 off-year election during the Korean War, suggest that the electorate has begun to register its preference for a more peace-leaning foreign policy. And if the 1966 election is precursor to that of 1968, as 1950 was to 1952, two years hence the Johnson Administration may face the prospect of a pro-peace Republican landslide greater even than that recorded in 1952.

The major overall trend of the voting represented a greater upswing for the Republican Party than expected, especially in the House of Representatives where forty-seven seats were gained. A more precise examination of the Republican gains reveals their significance. In the House contests the major portion of GOP gains (twenty-three) occurred in the midwest, the traditional stronghold of isolationism and anti-imperialism. In the 1964 Presidential election, these seats were won by Democrats when traditional Republican voters switched to President Johnson on the basis of his pledge not to widen the war, and out of fear of Goldwater's threat to extend bombing to the North along

with the Senator's refusal to exclude the possible use of nuclear weapons. Having got exactly what they voted against, these Republicans have returned to the safety of their traditional patterns. The increase of Republican governships by eight, although not as relevant to foreign policy considerations, was an additional indication of this general trend.

Such an analysis of events may be confirmed by turning to the House contests in the east. For example, six freshmen House Democrats in New York were returned to office, as were others in the eastern states, while their midwestern colleagues were being defeated. The difference rests in the fact that the midwesterners, while elected originally in part because of Johnson's nonescalation pledge, reversed themselves when Johnson did so and henceforth gave open support to his new and aggressive Vietnam policies. By contrast in the east, and especially in New York, freshman Democrats tended to commit themselves to the moderate "line" staked out by Robert Kennedy in the early part of this year, viz., deescalate and negotiate with the Vietcong. The six freshmen from New York were all returned in districts outside New York City—Long Island, the Hudson Valley, Upstate—all formerly Republican strongholds. The lesson is obvious. Where voters saw an opportunity to support moderate anti-war policies they stayed with the Democrats, otherwise returning to their traditional preferences.

It may be suggested that the Kennedyite candidates did better in the election than did the Senator himself. They held to the position established by RFK in February and won, while the Senator who backed away from his critical stance and supported candidates committed to the Johnson-Humphrey policies saw little success come of it. Two of these candidates, Edward McCormick of Massachusetts and Frank O'Connor of New York, were personally sponsored by Vice President Humphrey, and their defeat, coupled with the rout of Humphrey's Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party against his best efforts, suggests that the Vice President's

Leonard Liggio, American historian, editor of *Left and Right* magazine.

role as chief cheerleader for LBJ's Asian ventures has cost him very dearly.

In neighboring New Jersey we can discern the same pattern. Even before this year's election there was indication of voter rejection of outright pro-war stands. In the New Jersey gubernatorial election of 1965, Republican candidate Wayne Dumont tried to equate opposition to the war with treason, leveling his main attack at Professor Eugene Genovese of Rutgers University for the latter's well publicized remarks in favor of an NLF victory. In spite of, or perhaps, because of help from that durable, if bedraggled hawk, Richard Nixon, Dumont managed to lose an election many had been ready to concede to him earlier. In the 1966 Senatorial contest, a pro-Johnson Democrat was overwhelmed by Senator Clifford Case whose moderation in foreign affairs was highlighted earlier this year by his participation in Senator Fulbright's televised Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Case's landslide victory contributed to the defeat of all New Jersey's freshman Democratic Congressmen, except Representative Henry Helstocki of Bergen County who had strongly criticized the Vietnam War.

John Sherman Cooper's victory in Kentucky, with the same dire results for pro-Johnson Democratic House freshmen, may be read in the same way. These and other Republican Senatorial victories were especially strong expressions of opposition to the Vietnam War. Not only were the strongest Republican hawk candidates defeated, such as Governor Babcock of Montana who failed to gain the seat of Vietnam critic Lee Metcalf, but in no case was a major party critic of the Vietnam War defeated for reelection.

Other contests which indicated widespread unease about the course of our Asian policies resulted in the Republican victories of Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and Howard Baker of Tennessee, as well as Michigan's Robert Griffen who was elected for the first time after being appointed last spring upon the death of the Democratic incumbent, Pat McNamara. Neither Griffen nor Governor Romney, whose landslide carried in most of the GOP ticket, have taken a consistent stance against the war, but both have made periodic forays into positions critical of Administration policy. More significant was the nature of the candidate who Griffen defeated, G. Mennen Williams, for the past six years Dean Rusk's Assistant Secretary of State. Few political figures were more closely identified with the creation, two decades ago, of the interventionist foreign policy. For Williams is representative of those doctrinaire

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anti-communist liberals, like Hubert Humphrey and Paul Douglas, who swept into office—in this case the Michigan governorship—as a result of the great victory of Harry Truman and the Cold War in 1948.

Paul Douglas of Illinois, like Humphrey until he gained the Vice Presidential nomination, has been a strong supporter of the China Lobby's Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China into the United Nations. Douglas in fact has been a major sponsor of this father or, rather, godfather of American expansionism in the Pacific. This he highlighted on the eve of the election by his sponsorship of a Committee statement critical of several recent proposals to ease Sino-American relations. Similarly, during the campaign Douglas emphasized his complete support of the Vietnam War. As both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* pointed out (November 11) this was a major factor in his defeat. In this campaign, too, the Vice President made a major effort, touring the state and arguing to prospective voters that "they never had it so good." While certain liberals remain convinced, apparently, that lots of prosperity at home is worth a small war abroad, the voters of Illinois were not at all persuaded of this curious view. Charles Percy was able to counter-attack effectively with the demand to be told whether Humphrey's oratory should be accepted by the families of the 400,000 Americans now in the Asian war zone.

Along with Percy, the premier Republican dove was Governor Mark Hatfield of Oregon. The Oregon campaign of pro-Johnson Democrat Robert Duncan was pitched to an attack not only on Hatfield's remarks here and there in criticism of the war, but especially to his lone dissenting vote against the war at the Governor's Conference last July. Among the arguments trundled out in this contest, as well as in other dove-hawk encounters, was the contention that a vote for Hatfield would encourage Hanoi and the Vietcong and thus lengthen the war and contribute to increased American casualties. Hatfield's strong victory in the face of such appeals is powerful testament to the depth of voter rejection of the war. (In one of those editorial omissions, for which the Luce publications are justly famous, *Life* magazine studiously avoided this dangerous implication, in a story on the Republican resurgence, by omitting even to mention Hatfield, or Oregon, or Vietnam. If Hanoi wants a sign that American popular support for the war is falling off, *Life's* behavior has provided it.) The Oregon victory not only reaffirms Hatfield's projection as the coming national Republican personality,

but also vindicates the most vocal and long-lived critic of Johnson's war, Oregon's senior Senator, Wayne Morse. And, with the victory, the whole midwest and northwest bank of Democratic peace senators elected or reelected in 1964, from Stephen Young of Ohio and Vance Hartke of Indiana, across to Frank Church of Idaho, have been joined by Republican peace senators from Illinois and Oregon.

1950 ALL OVER AGAIN?

The Congressional elections of 1966, the first since the escalation of the Vietnam War, have many parallels with the elections of 1950, the first following American intervention in Korea, the last limited war fought by the United States. Then as now the GOP gained a number of state houses and sharply increased its standing in the House of Representatives—twenty-nine in 1950 as compared to this year's forty-seven. As in this just completed election, the most significant Republican gains were made in the Senate. Then, too, Democrats who tried to campaign on a pro-war basis were, almost without exception, heavily defeated. In 1950, four major Senate Democratic leaders—all with long seniority and all strong supporters of President Truman's Korean intervention—were defeated in their bids for reelection. They were the majority leader, Scott Lucas of Illinois, the majority whip, Francis Myers of Pennsylvania, and committee chairmen, Millard Tydings of Maryland, and Elbert Thomas of Utah. The overwhelming defeat of Lucas, like that of Paul Douglas from the same state this year, was especially surprising, for he was beaten by a little known Republican Congressman who had been given small chance to win. It would be surprising if 1950's victor, the mellifluous Everett McKinley Dirksen, was unaware of the parallels between the two elections and more surprising still if he, as a chief GOP strategist, was not planning to draw on this experience to ambush LBJ as he helped ambush HST a decade and a half ago.

Second, leading anti-war senators were returned to office in spite of heavy-handed attacks on their patriotism and integrity. In 1950, in the most noteworthy of these contests, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio smashed an all-out liberal-labor attempt to punish him at the polls in an election largely dominated by Taft's foreign policy stands. Taft, who had led the fight against Truman and Acheson on NATO, was an old hand at trying to check presidential intervention all over the world. Accordingly, on June 28, 1950, immediately following Truman's order which sent U.S. forces to Korea

(as well as aid, advisors and "commitments" to Taiwan and Indochina), Taft demanded on the Senate floor that no action be taken until the proposal for a declaration of war had been publicly debated by Congress. The Senator was particularly angered at the way in which the White House acted alone, for as he pointed out later:

On the same theory, he could send troops to Tibet to resist communist aggression or to Indochina or anywhere else in this world, without the slightest voice of Congress in the matter.... My conclusion, therefore, is that in the case of Korea, where a war was already under way, we had no right to send troops to a nation, with whom we had no treaty, to defend it against attack by another nation, no matter how unprincipled that aggression might be, unless the whole matter was submitted to Congress and a declaration of war or some other direct authority obtained. *A Foreign Policy for Americans*. Doubleday, 1951, pp. 32-33.

Throughout the campaign Taft's opposition to the war had led to genuinely scurrilous attacks against him, attacks which have been matched in the current period by those against Senator Fulbright by LBJ crony, columnist William White, and against Mark Hatfield by some of LBJ's Oregon supporters. In the case of Taft, disloyalty and treason were the normal charges, for no claim was too fantastic provided it was leveled against an opponent of The President's Right to run foreign affairs however his whim would have it. Not only was Taft accused of a lack of patriotism but, amusing in his case, he was also accused of communist leanings. During the Ohio campaign the most violent attacks were made by columnist Joseph Alsop, who, to judge by his current writings, has lost none of his youthful enthusiasm for Asian wars over the intervening 16 years. Alsop's column of July 7, 1950, entitled "The Republican Party-liners" was typical. It began: "The Republican record rather startlingly shows that the most typical Congressional Republicans have been voting the straight Communist party line...." Alsop was all-praising of Republicans "such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts" who supported the war as part of a "bipartisan foreign policy." But, according to Alsop,

Senator Taft, moreover, in his attack on the Atlantic Pact and military aid, almost endorsed the Kremlin's contention that we are being "provocative" by aiding free nations to defend themselves. This publicly delighted *The Daily Worker*.

Taft then, like Fulbright and his associates now, was not at all cowed. Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the official directly responsible for Asian policy, the Assistant Secretary, Dean Rusk, were roundly condemned for

their violations of binding American and international law. As Taft summarized the issue later in words of obvious contemporary relevance:

The brazen disregard of law in the Korean enterprise and in the setting up of an international army in Europe is further evidence that our State Department has long since repudiated any serious respect for law and justice.... My own feeling is that this policy in the field of foreign affairs, unless restrained, can only lead to arbitrary and totalitarian government at home, as foreign affairs come more and more to dominate our domestic activities, and to war in the world. *A Foreign Policy For Americans*, p. 41.

Whether this position also delighted the editors of *The Daily Worker* is not recorded. More to the point it delighted the voters, for Taft's campaign, ably directed by the current GOP National Chairman, Ray Bliss, ran up the largest majority in Ohio's history, and the Senator's words, both during the campaign and over the next two years, contributed to the change of attitude in the national electorate which prepared the way for Eisenhower's smashing victory in 1952. On November 10 of this year, Chairman Bliss unequivocally attributed a large measure of the GOP 1966 success to voter worries over the dangerous course of Johnson's policies in Asia, perhaps recalling as he did so the events of 16 years ago of which he was so much a part.

• THE PROSPECTS FOR 1968

The coming year will be a year of decision. In Vietnam it now appears the Administration will go all out in 1967 to achieve a decisive turn in the war. Too many policymakers served in the Truman Administration. They realize that a stalemated war in 1968 would bring about a rousing defeat for the Democrats at the polls. Accordingly, a major escalation of the war appears in order. The chief possibilities include: invasion of the North, U. S. troops sent for the first time to the Mekong Delta region, bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong industry and their residential areas, bombing of the Red River dikes, limited use of nuclear weapons, a determined effort to coerce the Soviets into ending their assistance to Hanoi, expansion of the war into China.

If the President escalates he will have the support of the bi-partisanite Republicans, who now fear that the GOP's foreign policy moderates will seize control of the Party and lead it in a "peace" campaign in 1968. On October 28, Richard Nixon raised the spectre of such a campaign and three days later proposed a meeting between the Administration and the Republican

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leadership with a view to hammering out a new bi-partisan basis for prosecuting the war and, more important, to make certain that peace would not be given a chance to campaign in 1968. The elections confirmed his fears. Analyzing the results, hawk—and presidential hopeful—Nixon pointed out: "The peace party always wins. I know my own party. If the war is still going on in '68, no power on earth can keep them from trying to outbid the Democrats for the peace vote."

On the rival side of the GOP fence is one of the blander political figures of recent years, Governor George Romney, who managed to harvest considerable anti-war sentiment in his Michigan sweep in spite of the fact that his position on the war is all but unknown. This is a very important fact. The Michigan Governor, like New York's Robert Kennedy, is a political figure of a relatively new type, one who specializes in exploiting the vagueness of contemporary liberal political rhetoric, the political party's thorough disinterest in the policy of the men they put forward, and the systematic mindlessness of the press and of television. In Romney's case this means that he is now the favorite for the GOP nomination in 1968—perhaps our next President—and yet there is no reliable body of knowledge dealing with his views on foreign policy or on the men he believes should staff the upper reaches of State, Defense and CIA. What's worse is that there isn't even any curiosity about these critical matters. The "responsible" media appear to be satisfied with the explanation that he has no developed views on foreign policy and its personnel, that he is a plain and simple fellow who learns as he goes along. And what if he learns the bad lessons that hawklike Nelson Rockefeller is now quietly trying to instill? It's just too bad; presumably the peace-inclined electorate which put him into the White House would just have to wait four more years—as we are waiting from the past presidential election—to make another try at discovering a peace President. Such is the state to which our vaunted political system has fallen.

This situation poses the most significant political problem for the anti-war movement. To date the organized movement against the war has been relatively successful. In spite of some bad counsel in its ranks about "not going too far," the movement has rightly insisted on going very far, which is to say, it has succeeded in opening up alternative analyses and recommendations which last year's consensus would—and did—conceive to be irresponsible and heretical. The bearded students and all the other improbable types who led the way have managed to stretch the range of the discussable, thus enab-

ling public figures like Senator Fulbright to speak freely and openly against the war. In saying this I intend no denigration of the congressional critics. Names like Fulbright, Morse, Gruening, Brown, Edwards, to name only a few, may come to rank with those of Norris, LaFollette, Taft, LaGuardia, the real giants in the history of the Congress. But without the initial breakthrough of the so-called vietniks it is somewhat doubtful if men like these would have been willing to risk certain rout by speaking to a wholly hostile electorate.

In the future the problem of the movement will be, if anything, much more difficult. It must try to direct the public's vague and general dissatisfaction about the war into a firm grasp of an alternate peace policy in Vietnam. The GOP will try—no matter who the candidate is in 1968—to appeal to those who want more war as well as less. The traditional Republican

enthusiasm for air power will lead Senator Dirksen and Congressman Ford and their associates to obfuscate Vietnam, to complain about too many American lives being lost while in the same breath clamoring against appeasement. The movement's task will be to force the GOP and the Democratic dissidents to see that events have ruled out all but two ultimate alternatives in Vietnam: the U.S. must arrange to withdraw, or it must accept higher casualties, a mounting draft, inflation, and a growing threat of world war. Every factor in American politics works to prevent such terrifying clarity and, certainly, the movement is not well equipped in either numbers or political skills to force the public to confront the real alternatives. Yet, in a grim way, history is on its side, for the prospect is that the war will drag on bloodier than ever and a year from now "victory" will be no nearer in sight. □

MESSAGE FROM VIETNAM

*November 11, 1966
Hue, South Vietnam*

DEAR BOB:^{*} I hope you will get this letter without difficulties, as I hope you got the last one from _____. As you see, I am back here in Hue, since three days. Everything has changed. The Buddhist organizations have been dismantled, worse than by Diem, but more skillfully. The big leaders as Huan, Quyen, Le Tuyen, etc., have all been released, after three months of prison. But the students and labor union leaders are doing slave labor in state plantations as coolies, have been tortured, or escaped to the liberation front. It is said that Tuong—the philosopher you knew—has been killed by the police, but impossible to know exactly. Ton That Ky—formerly an anti-communist—went to the VC Zone. The political life is completely paralyzed—or gone underground. Prices have risen fantastically—200%-300%. Saigon is a *carneval macabre*, profit, misery, cynicism, glamour, death, everything mixed up.

You always think it can not continue this way any more, but it can, and it gets worse every day. Myself, I am now concentrating.... but difficulties are so big that I do not know whether I will be able to finish or not. Here, despite of American imported drugs worth millions of dollars, the most important are not available—must be sold somewhere else.


The military situation in the villages turned strongly in favor of the VC. Not even the road to Phu Bai (airfield) is safe. Only when you are in the field can you imagine to what point even the American press has become brainwashed.

Dear Bob, do what you can do. I am tired and disgusted.

Sincerely yours,

p.s. do not write me here! _____ also left (in disgust) so I have no address to offer.

*Robert Browne, Contributing Editor to *Viet-Report*.



The Long Arm of Intervention

PLAYING CATCH WITH HAITI

by Ruth Shereff

Political exiles from Haiti, and even intimates of President Francois Duvalier, are waiting for his assassination. If he left the presidential palace in Port Au Prince without his armed militia, just once, he would be a sitting duck. But people have been waiting for that moment for nine years; nobody knows how much longer he can hold out.

Faced with continuous activity from the Haitian underground, Duvalier must regularly conduct military purges. The latest Army shake up, reported November 15, seemed to forbode the end. Nine major officers rushed for asylum in the Brazilian, Equadorian and Guatemalan embassies. The underground notified the Columbia Broadcasting System that a rebellion had begun. Haitian exiles flocked to Miami. Suddenly, Washington was on the alert. Young Haitians under the direction of Father Jean Baptiste Georges, an exile priest, and Cuban shock troops led by Rolando Masferrar, a former high ranking torturer under Batista, prepared to launch a beachhead invasion from Florida to Haiti's north coast.

Sol Linowitz, our man in the OAS, was instructed to keep in touch with developments. Plane-loads of reporters landed in Port Au Prince. *The New York Times* denounced the Haitian dictator and commented on the turmoil saying, "There is nothing to worry about. Whoever follows Francois Duvalier is bound to make a better president, because no one could be worse."

However, that same week, the U.S. State Department announced increased dosages of aid to Duvalier. And once the plan was revealed by CBS, the insurgent forces preparing in Miami were broken up and the exiles had to return to their political bases, arguing among

Ruth Shereff, contributing editor of *Viet-Report*, is a student of Latin American affairs. Author of "Arms and the Man in Santo Domingo," (*Viet-Report*, Aug/Sept, 1966).

themselves. Within two weeks after the army shake up, the exiles were back in New York, Montreal, Paris and Chicago. Duvalier, still entrenched in power proclaimed himself to be the "New Haiti," and attended a ceremony to greet the Papal Nuncio and celebrate resumed relations with the Vatican. His armed guard never left his side.

Only a few of the exiles questioned the participation of Rolando Masferrar, who had his eye on Haiti as a potential base for invading Cuba. Most were thinking of the greater good of eliminating Duvalier. Among the exiles were military associates of General Paul Magloire, the dictator who preceded Duvalier, and Father Georges and the young intellectuals and professionals who often cooperate with him. Their mood had been confident even though similar attempts had failed before. This time each had brought with him the support of some agency of the U.S. government. Such support, tentative as it has been to date, bears watching.

While the exiles who live in New York are rich sources of albeit one-sided information, they are afraid to criticize the U.S. for fear of losing the little support they may have. They can't reveal their own beliefs or political activities, and a few were even hesitant to criticize their enemies. I was in turn accused of being a spy for Duvalier, a CIA agent, and a Russian arms dealer. Only by careful cross-examination, by provoking comments about their political opponents, and through disguised questions could I piece together the bizarre puzzle of why Haiti still stagnates under Duvalier.

Most diplomatic officials would be indifferent to the status of the small Negro republic if it were not located between the two major Caribbean explosion zones—Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Therefore, while the State Department shoves Haiti to the bottom of the priority list,

it keeps the lid on the situation by supporting the present government and several exile groups at once. Only the spectre of the Haitian masses—illiterate, disease ridden, dying of starvation—prevents the situation from being viewed as the intricate cloak and dagger drama it really is.

EXILE OPERATIONS I: BLACK RADIO

Six A.M. Just as dawn hits the Caribbean, Haitians who are rich enough to own radios tune in to "morning mass," a clandestine anti-Duvalier broadcast in Creole, emanating from New York. At the other end of the transmission system, a representative of the Coalition Haitienne, code name Raymond Josef, sips coffee in the Madison Avenue offices of WRUL (Radio World Wide) a Mormon owned, CIA sponsored radio station. The Coalition is led by Luc Fouche, a former aide and ambassador for Duvalier, and the jaunty General Paul Magloire, ex-dictator of Haiti.

WRUL has a well known history in similar operations. During the 1954 Guatemala coup, when Eisenhower and the CIA overthrew the progressive Arbenz government, WRUL was broadcasting bulletins on the coup to Guatemala and throughout Central America. Again, during the Bay of Pigs invasion, WRUL transmitters beamed programs to Cuba that served as a backdrop for exile pilots and amphibious forces.

Patterned after the Voice of America, whose Latin America broadcasts it handled in the fifties, WRUL, because it registers as a privately owned station, enjoys more freedom than does the official government radio. Thus it can accommodate a series of exiles from Europe, Africa and Latin America, who enter and leave the offices on a staggered schedule and broadcast secretly to their native lands to rally support against governments that the U.S. officially recognizes—such as that of Duvalier. It is difficult to assess how many of the radio programs are setting the stages for a coup which the U.S. will actually support, and how many are bluff operations designed to keep exiles happy and their governments in line.

Theoretically the exiles pay for and control the broadcasts themselves. So in 1965 when Duvalier asked the State Department to silence the morning broadcast, WRUL declared that the Haiti Station fees mounting up to \$30,000 a year came out of the personal pocket of General Magloire. Magloire may well be able to afford this. He is reputed to have walked off with half the Haitian treasury when he was kicked out of office by a military coup in 1957. Even though Haiti is by far the poorest country in the hemisphere, the takings were estimated at about \$20 million.

No matter who foots the bills, the question remains of how the information for these news programs leaks through the heavy censorship that Duvalier has imposed on all communications media. Unless there are some rebel ham radios operating in the hills, the only way this material could reach New York is via the unblocked cables of the American Embassy in Port Au Prince, perhaps over the teletype of the U.S. Information Service, the agency responsible for gathering and disseminating news vital to our interests abroad.

It is no coincidence that the Fouche/Magloire broadcast began in June 1965, two months after the Dominican revolution. The Dominican intervention, although considered by Washington to have been a great success, was still too haphazard for most diplomatic tastes. Washington planners cite the "chaotic" situation during the April 1965 Dominican revolution, where theoretically the communists were able to step in and take over, as a tame analogy to the field day communists would have in the chaos that would follow the premature assassination of Duvalier. There is no trained bureaucracy under Duvalier, no government structure, no political parties and no means for peaceful transition of power. Added to the structural disarray is the long suffering population which has been exposed to radical ideas. This has led several foreign policy advisory groups to suggest "preventative intervention" as a solution to the Haitian problem.

"Preventative intervention" calls for the substitution of the Duvalier regime with a more "responsible, stable" administration, and essentially restructuring the political life of the country—before it is too late. If ex-government and military officials were included in this substitution package, they might be able to win the immediate allegiance of the Haitian secret police and army. There would be a bloodless coup and the masses would not end up armed as they did in the Dominican Republic. The landing of the marines would be reserved as an emergency measure in case the exile invasion or palace coup failed.

Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, an advocate of preventative intervention, has been suggesting that the Coalition Haitienne, Fouche and Magloire, be used as the alternative to Duvalier. Heinl spent several years in Haiti as head of the U.S. Military Advisory Group. There as he trained and equipped the Haitian troops, he stood by and watched the Army be used to wipe out opposition. Finally Heinl became disillusioned when Duvalier threw him out of the country, destroyed the U.S. trained army and turned the weapons over to the Tonton Ma-

couste, his secret police. Duvalier had begun to fear the growing strength of the traditionally independent oligarchy-oriented armed forces which had deposed a series of presidents before him. But in eliminating this threat to his government, he pushed Heintz into the camp of State Department people agitating for his overthrow. Heintz claims that the army was the most progressive element in Haitian society.

Young Haitian intellectuals, particularly those who identify themselves with the black upper middle class in Haiti, believe that members of the Coalition Haitienne, especially Fouche and Magloire, had their chance to administer Haiti and proved that they didn't care to do anything for the people. The older men are considered to be associated with the Haitian elite, a social class composed mainly of a mulatto aristocracy that dates back from French colonial times. Together with the Army, which was created during the U.S. Marine occupation (1914-1935), and the Church, which till recently has been dominated by foreign French or Canadian priests, the aristocracy has controlled the government, the small amount of native capital, real estate, and commerce without any concern for the peasant masses, who are estimated at 90% of the population, and with disregard for the needs and opinions of the small black middle class.

Black middle class intellectuals euphemistically refer to the mulatto aristocracy as the "minority" and to themselves as the "majority." Actually, when they were in Haiti, the true majority, the peasant, seemed to be little more than an abstract concept for them. As far as the urban middle class population was concerned, the rural masses were not even useful during the time of elections or a coup, since support from the cities was all that was needed. The peasants continued and still live on their tiny plots, on the eroded mountainous Haitian soil, cut out from society, even outside the system of monetary exchange. At no time did any of these advocates of the people's welfare organize a mass peasant movement designed to fit the needs of the rural population rather than of the urban politicians. This Castro-type solution to Haiti's problems seems to be the one possibility that Duvalier, the United States, and the exile groups are united in preventing. And these young black intellectuals are not as neglected as they like to sound.

EXILE OPERATIONS II: REFUGEE RELIEF

The International Rescue Committee is an American based organization which originated with underground operations dedicated to res-

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cuing victims from Nazi Germany. It continued on through the cold war with much publicized aid to victims of Communism. Since Duvalier is a "grade B" fascist, the Rescue Committee extended some aid to refugees from Haiti as well. Officially, this aid consists of visas for some of the refugees to the United States, job placement, and food and clothing relief for the Haitian refugee settlements in the Dominican Republic. Father Jean Baptiste Georges has served as a liaison between the Rescue Committee and these strategically placed groups. In New York, the Committee often deals with the refugees through men identified with the black upper middle class intellectuals.

From their vantage point, the Rescue Committee can survey the exiles for their political opinions and aspirations—a function which they previously handled with Cubans and Vietnamese. Already their files are listing those students who have studied in France and been exposed to the Communist Party there, and those Haitians who are willing to cooperate with "democratic" Cuban exile groups. Officially, the Rescue Committee denies giving political aid to any exile groups, but its record speaks differently.

The International Rescue Committee's most brilliant find during their North Vietnam rescue operations was the "democratic alternative" to Ho Chi Minh, the late President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. If men like Masferrer are to be the "alternative" to the present Haitian government, Haiti might as well keep Duvalier.

The activities of the Rescue Committee in Haiti suggest the possible involvement of Cardinal Spellman, another former advocate of Diem who worked closely with the Committee in the Vietnam situation. The Catholic Church is an issue in Haiti just as in Vietnam. Duvalier has been persecuting and banishing foreign French priests and replacing them with native Haitians of his own choice. He has viewed the Church, just as he viewed the Army, as a potential rival for power. At the same time, Duvalier has given wider leeway to the practice of voodoo, the popular primitive ritualistic religion, which the Haitian Church had long tried to stamp out. As a result of his escapades, Duvalier had been excommunicated by the Vatican. The circumstance of the Church in Haiti, where the country is nominally Catholic, do not parallel the circumstances in South Vietnam, where a member of a Catholic elite minority was being placed at the head of a Buddhist country. But many of the angles of American power play look familiar.

(turn to page 37)



THE DESTRUCTION OF A CULTURE

by William Pepper

When the most powerful military force in the history of the world wages a brutal war in an underdeveloped country, destruction ensues as a matter of course, corrupting those principles which I have always understood to be an integral part of the promise of our nation: belief in the self-determination of people and respect for the essential dignity of every human being.


But beyond the corruption of principles is the unparalleled destruction of the very elements we

purport to fight for in South Vietnam—the people—and particularly that segment of the population who carry within them the seeds of Vietnam's survival and growth—the children.

William Pepper, faculty member of Mercy College, New York, and director of its Children's Institute for Advanced Study, toured South Vietnam (Spring, 1966). A testimony of his findings was submitted to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees, chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and entered in The Congressional Record, Aug. 22, 1966.



Photo Credits. Page 20: upper left—Catholic Relief Services; upper right—Foster Parents Plan; center left—Wm. Pepper; bottom—JUSPAO; page 21: center—Wm. Pepper; center right—JUSPAO; lower left—Catholic Relief Services; lower right—JUSPAO. Cover: bottom—Voluntary Agency Services; top—Catholic Relief Services.



For countless thousands of children in South Vietnam, breathing is quickened today by terror and pain. Death walks with them by day and the warning of the "War Gong" penetrates their sleep at night. It is present in the napalm that falls from U.S. Skyraiders with the frequency and impartiality of rain in the monsoon season. These solemn children, who seldom smile, have never known what it is to live without violence and desolation.

During my tour of Vietnam late last spring, I was concerned mainly with the effects of the war on the civilian population. Of course, I visited those hospitals from where civilian casualties figures originate; but I also visited orphanages, refugee shelters, stricken hamlets, and streets. And from these visits, I was forced to redefine "casualty" to include civilian destruction far beyond the nature and the number reported by government hospital staffs.

The "Kill Ratio" Nobody Claims

Item. U.S. Medical Corps colonel to British reporter Nicholas Tomalin: civilian to VC wounded—4:1. (*London Sunday Times*, 6/5/66).

Item. Bernard Fall on admission statistics of American and Vietnamese hospitals: 30-40 Vietnamese civilians treated for wounds from U.S. weapons, for 1 wounded by VC fire. (*N.Y. Review of Books*, 3/17/66).

Item. Vietnamese doctor to French reporter Robert Guillain: "For every one who can reach a town, there are ten who die in the village or the fields.... This is true above all of the badly burned" (*Le Monde*, 3/12/66).

Item. Former Canadian member of ICC Hugh Campbell on total civilians killed in combat 1961-1964: 160,000. (*Buffalo Evening News*, 1/30/65).

Item. Robert Guillain on total civilians killed in 1965 alone: 100,000. (*The Nation*, 6/13/66).

Item. Member of American rural health council project in Vietnam, Wyan Washburn: "People who know estimate that the civilian-vs-soldier casualties [killed and wounded] in the war are running about ten-to-one" (*AMA News*, 5/2/66).

If we multiply by ten official U.S. figures for VC casualties since 1961 (260,000), we arrive at 2.6 million civilian casualties—one-sixth of the population of South Vietnam. This estimate gives some idea of the magnitude of the destruction of the Vietnamese people. — Ed.

As early as October 1965, the Swiss-based medical aid group, Terre des Hommes, reported from its tour of South Vietnam that there were 600,000-800,000 known civilian refugees without shelter; 11,000 known (that is, government-registered) orphans. By January 1966, the International Red Cross had reported that "hundreds of thousands of refugees are piled up in the vicinity of large cities and survive in the greatest misery. Incalculable numbers of families are torn apart. Abandoned children and orphans can no longer be counted" (both Terre des Hommes and Red Cross quoted in *Congressional Record*, 8/22/66, p. 19358). In midsummer 1966, the (Pennsylvania) *York Gazette* carried a London-based report by Jane Armstrong that there were 30,000 known war-burned children in South Vietnam.

According to a UNESCO study in 1964, 53% of the population of South Vietnam is under 21 years of age; 43.4% under 15 years; and 47.5% under 16 years. Because of an annual birth-rate of 50 per 1,000, and a yearly population increase of 2.5 percent, these percentages may be higher today. By 1980, 69% of the Vietnamese people will be under 21 years of age. Taking into consideration that most able-bodied young men above 16 years of age are actively involved in fighting (on one side or the other), it is frighteningly apparent that 60-70% of the civilian residents of rural South Vietnam's 2,600 villages and 15,000 hamlets, are children. Thus, when we speak of the beleaguered Vietnamese civilian population we are referring, for the most part, to the brutalization of the children.

This was quite evident in the provincial hospitals I visited. The war injuries I observed followed the same pattern wherever the hospital: wounds inflicted by mines, grenades, small arms fire, air and artillery bombardment—resulting in burned and torn flesh, crushed and broken bones, severed and mutilated extremities, and eyes and ears rendered blind and deaf. Another correspondent visiting the Cantho hospital reported that the children

come through the gates into the hospital compound in ones, twos, and threes. The serious cases are slung in hammocks or blankets . . . About 300 of the 500 casualties each month require major surgery. The gravely wounded who might be saved by rapid evacuation, apparently never reach the hospital but die along the way . . . (Neil Sheehan, *N.Y. Times*, 6/6/66).

For Vietnamese children, the horror of napalm, and its more fearsome companion, white phosphorous (which will burn as long as the

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surface receives air) is impossible to imagine. Young flesh is seared, liquidized and carved into grotesque forms. After an experience of extreme pain and suffering, the finished products are scarcely human in appearance. One cannot be confronted with the monstrous effects of these weapons without being totally shaken. Perhaps it was due to a previous lack of direct contact with war, but I never left the victims without losing composure. My initial urge to reach out and soothe the hurt was restrained only by the fear that the ash-like skin would crumble in my fingers.

"Last month the United States Technology Center in California got a contract for 100,000 pounds of an 'improved' napalm jelly which includes 50 percent polystyrene... U.S. combat forces in Vietnam are finding that the older formulations leave much to be desired, particularly in adhesion..." *The New Statesman*, 8/8/66; quoted from *U.S. Chemical and Engineering News*, Spring, 1966.

In a September 1966 letter to Senator Robert F. Kennedy from the Congressional Inquiry Division of the Office of Legislative Liason,



Montagnard refugees leaving hillside homes (GUN)

U.S. Air Force, he was told that "napalm" is used against selected targets such as caves and reinforced supply areas. Casualties are predominately persons involved in Communist military operations." The pictures of napalm burned children reproduced here, which I brought back from Vietnam, lead me to ask what military functions were being performed by these victims and the hundreds of others I saw sharing hospital beds.

The sharing of beds, frequently by 2 and 3 victims, is a result of the ever-increasing civilian casualties. From the southern Delta to northern I Corps, there are an estimated 101 hospitals. In addition to extreme overcrowding, the existing medical facilities for treating war-injured civilians are totally inadequate. After a visit to a Qui Nhon hospital, correspondent

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Martha Gellhorn reported:

... In some wards the wounded also lie in stretchers on the floor outside the operating room, and in the recovery room the floor is covered with them. Everything smells of dirt, the mattresses and pillows are old and stained; there are no sheets, of course, no hospital pyjamas or gowns, no towels, no soap, nothing to eat or drink from... (*Manchester Guardian*, 9/16/66).

Dr. Ba Kha, Minister of Health, stated that there are about 9 nurses—practical or otherwise—for every 100,000 inhabitants. The proportion of midwives is even more devastating—5 for every 100,000 persons. Infant mortality is estimated at 50% (higher in the rural areas). Those who survive this conflict may have a maximum life span of only 30 to 35 years because of childhood malnutrition.

Moreover, Dr. Ba Kha claimed that his ministry, charged with administering the entire public health program for South Vietnam, receives only 2% of the national budget. It is overwhelmingly clear that in the most minimal sense there are neither adequate facilities, personnel, or finances available to cope with the crying needs of a people who are being relentlessly brutalized in a conflict from which there is no sanctuary.

BREAKDOWN OF THE FAMILY

In a way more subtle than physical scarring, the war is affecting for a long time to come the structure of Vietnamese society. Its continual escalation is compounding the present difficulties of the country and creating future ones.

Vietnamese history concerns a people rather than a geographic area. A people whose culture began with the founding of the Kingdom of Nam-Viet in 208 BC; a people who were governed as a Chinese province until 939 AD; a people who have been struggling off and on to maintain their independence and cultural integrity from foreign domination since the 10th century; a people whose reverence for the family and ancestral veneration is still manifest in the

present-day beliefs of all—including the majority Buddhists, Confucianists, and minority Catholics. The power of these long-espoused beliefs is epitomized in their desire to remain on the land—against horrible odds—where their ancestors are buried.

But for many, the war, with its rain of bombs, has forcibly driven them from their land. It has smashed the basic cultural unit—the family—and disrupted traditional life to the extent that thousands upon thousands of children from six years of age upward roam the streets of the provincial towns in packs, while still others reside in shelters, or try to survive in the hovel-like appendages to the shelters.

Millions of Vietnamese under 21 have never known what it is to live in peace, and are being raised without the presence of the father, who is dead or fighting the war. This places an enormous nationwide responsibility on the mothers, for not only must they raise the average family of five children, but also try to provide for them. Every week each refugee is supposed to receive 7 piasters (15¢) from the Ministry of Social Welfare (which itself receives only .05% of the total budget); but even with American rice doles, this is insufficient, and it does not reach those families who are not resettled under government shelters. While the cumulative figure of refugees has already passed the one million mark, only a small percentage have been classified as "permanently resettled." For the great majority, families and friends have had to band together to form tribes, or larger nomadic units, which can be seen feeding off garbage stores near military bases and cities.

My own observations indicated that a great number of the known refugees, and many others not counted are children who reside in refugee shelters, institutions, makeshift orphanages and hospitals—but mostly on their own. Children



Quinhon Shelter (Pepper)



Children at Quinhon Shelter (Pepper)

housed in the refugee shelters usually receive no education at all.

The long-range social implications inherent in such conditions deprive rather than provide hope for those who survive this conflict. One need not wait to view the negative effects. They are already discernible in the way these children are learning how to survive.

PUBERTY PATROLS


"Puberty Patrols," so named by our Special Forces, are the alternative to the refugee shelters for some children. In the Central Highlands, the scene of some of the heaviest fighting of the war, many Montagnard families have refused to abandon their hillside hamlets. Special Forces has thus permitted pre-teenage boys to remain as a kind of occupying force. These 12 and 13 year-olds are taught to kill, and become the protectors of their families since the fathers are dead or fighting the war.

When I visited an alternative to these patrols, a refugee shelter in Qui Nhon, I could see why many preferred to remain. In this city alone there were over 23,000 refugees. The squalor was unimaginable. Many had cuts that were festering and infected. With my host, Father So, who was in charge of the refugee shelter, I visited orphans living in the hovel-like appendage to the shelter: no beds, no food, no shoes. I was introduced to a little boy and girl who had lived in the same hamlet which had been bombed out. The father was believed to be a Vietcong, and the mother had been killed by the bombing. The girl's right arm was amputated below the elbow (see picture) and the boy's burn scars were hardening. Father So says Mass three times daily; I saw about 3,000 people at the evening service, 90% of which were under 14 years of age.

The general conditions of the refugee shelters and their appendages followed the same pattern wherever I visited: 10-15% of the children may receive some education; the disease rate is higher and resistance lower than average; plague and cholera are always a problem; and sanitary facilities are absent. Even in shelters with cement floors there are no privies for the 160 families which are generally housed in each. Garbage disposal is a minor problem because there is so little waste. Medical help is usually not available to shelter children. All of the shelters have the distinct atmosphere of P.O.W. camps, with barbed wire setting the external perimeter. There were children everywhere; their deaths were common and simply handled as a matter of course.

THE STREET CHILDREN

Those who never get placed into shelters learn to survive by joining with other street children to form packs. A street child who does not join a pack rarely survives. His clothes are soon gone, and without companionship, his resilience diminishes. I saw such a child. He stood in a street in the Saigon-Cholon area completely nude (see picture) framed by a background of storefronts and nightclub signs. I was travelling with an Air Force officer and I asked him to stop so that I could give the child my shirt. My companion restrained me.



Street child in Saigon-Cholon (Pepper)

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One night on lower Nguyen Hue (St.) in Saigon, I was accosted by a member of a pack, who said in English: "Okay Salem... cigarettes for us... 5 piasters?" He was one of a group of eight to ten-year-old boys, only one with a shirt and none with shoes. All were unwashed, perhaps for months. When I tried to leave, one grabbed my leg and hung on, embarrassingly, for several minutes.

On several other occasions, I wandered the street with a French-speaking Vietnamese interpreter. I met a ten-year-old boy who had been brought in from the country a year before by his mother after an attack on their village. His father had been killed. The interpreter wasn't sure whether his father had been a Vietcong or ARVN. His mother had turned to prostitution and used shared quarters to entertain. The boy, then nine, was forced out into the street with increasing frequency, and finally stayed there. He ran with a group of pre-teens who mostly stole, begged, watched cars, etc. He had been on the streets for about a year when I met him. His struggle to live was admirable.

The children's means of survival vary somewhat: Nguyen shined shoes with a syndicate of six others—and did well because Americans paid him 25 cents to \$1; Trieu sold papers, Do, who had one arm amputated in a provincial hospital, flagged and secured cabs for Americans. Generally, the most unfortunate ones are never off the streets, but roam in their "turf" areas. They sleep in doorways, on steps, or sitting against buildings. They are aggressive in their quest to survive, whether it means selling their sisters or soliciting for their mothers. I saw five- and six-year-old boys trying to sell their sisters to American GI's. In one case, the sister could not have been more than 11 years old. I saw little girls hailing passers-by for their mothers, who usually stand inside an alcove. I saw them in every city and provincial town, by the hundreds.

In Qui Nhon, many of the children bore war injuries. Sometimes GI's establish relationships with them; but, then, when the GI's tour of duty is over, the children find it very painful and it often does more harm than good. An American newsman told me how he and his wife took pity on an eight-year-old boy and kept him with them for a year. When they left, they placed him in a well-reputed school where most of the students were sons of military men and businessmen. The child, who had a peasant background, ran away. Today he is back on the street.

During my interview with Minister of Social Welfare Lieng, he told me that the street child-

ren were creating a tremendous increase in juvenile delinquency all over the country and that there was "only one institution [a childrens jail] to hold them." In my talks with Catholic Relief Services director Lawson Mooney, I was told of the fantastic increase in teenage suicides, particularly group suicides, which he attributed to an expression of their hopelessness, and a result of the breakdown of ordered, traditional life.

The number of street children continues to grow. There are no programs aimed at meeting their problems; no one is concentrating on their needs; they are truly forgotten children—simply casualties of war.

CHILDREN WITHOUT A COUNTRY

One of the results of the ever-growing influx of Americans in Vietnam is the birth of "Amerasian" children.

Phu My hospital-shelter sends its nuns into the streets of Saigon-Cholon to pick up old men, women, and starving children. The Mother Superior illustrated the plight of Eurasian and now Amerasian children in Vietnam with the case of Laurant. This particular boy was Eurasian. After the French father, who had not married the Vietnamese mother, left the country, the child resided with the mother until she decided to marry a Vietnamese in 1962. Her potential husband would not tolerate the 7-year-old boy's presence—usual in such cases. The mother took him to Saigon in 1962 and left him on the street. For awhile he begged and stole and slept in the frames of building entrance ways. One of the more fortunate ones, he was taken to Phu My by the sisters.

There were 150,000 French troops in Vietnam, and before they left the country (1955) they fathered 10,000 Eurasian children. Over the last eight years, the French Government has clothed, fed, and taken to France some 3,800 of these children. Repatriation was interrupted after 1960, but in June, 1965, 70 more left, and 150 are scheduled to go early in 1967. Presently, there are about 360,000 American soldiers serving in Vietnam, a number constantly increasing. A majority of them serve a one year tour of duty and leave. Some Americans send modest payments to their former mistress for support of their children; most do not, and these children are frequently abandoned right away or after several years.

Under French law, citizenship is possible for an illegitimate child even if the parents do not marry. In the United States, however, there is grave doubt of any such possibility unless there is a legal marriage. In any event, history tells us that these Amerasian children will remain

transients. (An interesting footnote to Laurant's case history is that on my return to the states, I arranged for a group of women to sponsor Laurant by sending \$20.00 a month to help provide for him. But, in August 1966, three months after I returned to the U.S., word was received that Laurant had been kidnapped by a person or persons unknown. There is little hope of finding him since this occurs frequently—even the injured and diseased disappear mysteriously.)



Orphans in Saigon hospital (Air Force)

THE NEW FAMILY

In essence, then, the war has brought about a defamilization which in turn, is fostering a new family unit—one of brick and mortar. Institutions are becoming the parent substitute. There are 500,000 to 800,000 half- or fully-orphaned children, a number which increases day by day. American authorities will seize upon the construction of more institutions as a solution to the problem of Vietnam's unattended children—as they did in the Korean conflict. Unfortunately, foster parent care is not and never was a part of the pattern of Vietnamese culture. Even when children with one parent are left in an orphanage, the parent will not consider having the child adopted, even if he is left there indefinitely.

Institutional settings breed dependence, low morale, and rarely provide a minimally adequate educational program. Personal attention and care are absent. This depersonalization is bound to have long-range effects on the future adult population. In addition to juvenile delinquency and teenage suicides, the more subtle effects of the conflict are becoming increasingly apparent. The hundreds of institutionalized children that I met could best be described as solemn, listless, and unable to participate in any form of group play. They already seem to know that their future is long-term institutionalization of the most primitive sort.

The war has replaced their childhood with death, pain, suffering, destruction of the family unit and intense brutalization—all framed within

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barbed wire. Yet, when I spoke with the Minister of Social Welfare, and officials of the U.S. Military Command and USAID, they all viewed the salvation of these children as a matter of constructing more institutions.

These institutionalized children, the "saved" ones, will become evermore dependent on our "Care" packages and will stand in line as we dole out to each child his ration of rice. They will grow up within the confines of an alien structure, removed from everything traditional; subdued by lack of attention; depersonalized by group conformity and uniformity; no longer able to identify with their own heritage, yet prevented from adjusting to any other. Under such restrictive, abnormal conditions, can these "saved" children provide the base for the "Independent South Vietnam" to which U.S. policy is purportedly addressed? Does this institutionalization compensate for the ever-increasing military presence and the escalation of the war? Is this our Western replacement for a two thousand year old culture?

We continue to destroy the physical surroundings of Vietnamese culture: the houses and belongings, the places of worship, and the land.

The American bulldozer has scarred the terrain and American bombs have disembowelled and ravaged it further. Huge craters sink beneath charred fragments of once fertile hillsides and valleys, where for centuries were housed Vietnamese, Chams, Mons Khmers, and Montagnards. Other correspondents, like Neil Sheehan, have also chronicled this destruction:

Deserted hamlets and barren rice fields, now a common sight, are...evidence of what the war is doing....The American policy of killing crops...by spraying them with chemical defoliants (total acres, to date, 640,000) is hastening the process... (Neil Sheehan, *N.Y. Times*, 10/9/66).

And we continue to look for more efficient means of destruction. The U.S. Army is now testing a tractor that "can clear away trees and foliage.... Weighing more than 4,600 pounds, the blade can clear an acre of ground in an hour" (*N.Y. Times*, 10/2/66).

Side by side with this destruction, the United States continues its timetable of military construction which includes more air bases and whole new "cities" to house the American occupation forces. In the September issue of *Fortune*, airfield construction alone was reported to



BULLDOZERS PUSH SAND FOR AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

exceed 1,200 acres of paving. To date, about one billion dollars has been allocated to the program, and the total is certain to climb higher as the war continues. None of this construction will serve any peaceful purpose to the Vietnamese people. Rather, we are rebuilding their country in our own image—a military image.

sure the inevitability of the destruction with each passing day.

The fate of the future is always the charge of the children, and Vietnamese children have already endured in silence so much pain for so long. We have torn apart their families and cast those allowed to live in many directions. They

ALL IN A DAY'S WORK

"In a delta province there is a woman who has both arms burned off by napalm and her eyelids so badly burned that she cannot close them. When it is time for her to sleep her family puts a blanket over her head. The woman had two of her children killed in the air strike which maimed her last April and she saw five other children die. She was quite dispassionate when she told an American 'more children were killed be-

cause the children do not have so much experience and do not know how to lie down behind the paddy dikes'" (Charles Mohr, **N.Y. Times**, 9/5/65).

"I don't like to hit a village. You know you are hitting women and children, too. But you've got to decide that your work is noble and that the work has to be done" (American pilot to **N.Y. Times** correspondent, 7/6/65).

I returned from Vietnam burdened with this image and with the image of a tormented people tearfully and helplessly looking on as the war was ravaging their country and destroying their culture.

It matters not whether it is intentional. Unconscious perpetuation or even "accidents" do not alter the effects of the atrocity. By eliminating functionally the people necessary for perpetuation of any society—the children—we as-

have no place to go and nowhere to hide. We are defoliating their land and depopulating their country. Let everyone understand that these actions are committed in our name; the cost of their administration is paid for by us. Those who survive will remember us by their scars.




Refugee on road with his pig (JUSPAO)

NAPALM VICTIMS TO BE TREATED IN U.S.

A number of European medical investigators, working independently or as emissaries of Terre des Hommes, have reported that children who survive the initial stages of burn caused by napalm would be suitable candidates for treatment in western or American hospitals, where facilities would permit each his own bed and where the child would not be exposed to parasitic infestation, sepsis, or epidemics, as he now is in Vietnamese hospitals. While the State Department has repeatedly rebuffed Terre des Hommes' request for both permission and minimal cooperation in transporting children to selected European hospitals, a movement is underway in the U.S. to do just that.

A group calling itself the independent American Committed of Responsibility has been formed to raise funds to pave the way for a few Vietnamese children who are now being selected to receive long-term care in hospitals throughout the United States. Coordinated by Helen Frumin, the Committee is composed of doctors, professionals, and interested citizens such as Mr. Pepper, who was a prime mover. The Physicians for Social Responsibility have pledged their assistance to the effort, and to date, over 300 doctors have volunteered their services.

For further information write: Committee of Responsibility; P.O. Box 424; Scarsdale, N.Y.



11 year-old Vietnamese boy with secondary stage napalm burns (Terre des Hommes)

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(Draft continued from page 11)

point it seemed as if I was there for the East New York disturbances, because he kept referring to Molotov cocktails and black people getting their rights and freedom the wrong way. When I asked him about napalm, he got angry and said that he had the right to bomb his enemy. At that point I cut him off and I told him, well, we have no disagreement.

No charge was proffered at that time. He released me on my own recognizance, after I had signed a statement that I would report to court whenever I was called. About two weeks later I received an indictment in the mail. I answered the indictment on August 18, pleading not guilty. I am expecting a trial. Right now I'm not sure what defense I'll take. I am interested in the position which two black men are taking in Los Angeles. They have questioned whether black people can be subjected to the draft. Black people are not citizens, with citizens rights or duties, they maintain, or else the government would not have to pass civil rights bills which are in effect nothing more than citizens rights.

* * * *

V.R.: *Are you interested in getting other Negroes to take the same stand?*

OQUENDO: Yes, I am.

V.R.: *If I were a Negro in Harlem, I'd not join the Army because I would figure that that would be one way of keeping alive. Isn't that the most powerful argument?*

MOORE: Well, that is what we are doing. We're just trying to stay alive.

OQUENDO: I'm not just going to leave it like that. I'm not just for plain survival. For example, "Blacks Against Negative Dying" (BAND: a Harlem-based group, led by black World War II veterans), suggests that there is a positive way to die. It doesn't mean dying at home in bed. It means shooting this cracker who can bomb a church—with four children in it. It means shooting this cracker who can go into the street and shoot black people at random. This is what it means.

ALLEN: But it means shooting him—even though he may shoot you—knowing that *someone's going to take your place*. And the only way you can know that is if you have a lot of other brothers in this world.

* * * *

OQUENDO: You ask about Afro-American unity. ... There are two programs carrying this out: The Nation of Islam, under the leadership of Mr. Mohammed, is one program which is clearly defined and which you can find on the back page of any *Mohammed Speaks*. The other concept is put forth by the priests of the Yoruba Temple in Harlem, most notably the priest Baba Oserjeman. The Yoruba tribe and language comes from southern Nigeria. Baba Oserjeman speaks of the concept of *ujamaa*, that is, Af-

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rican socialism. That calls for a separate state—not in the sense that Mr. Mohammed means, but in the sense that black people must establish a culture of their own.

V.R.: *Do you subscribe to this?*

OQUENDO: The Yoruba Temple? Yes, I definitely do.

V.R.: *What are you going to do about the problems of establishing ujamaa in a highly industrialized society?*

OQUENDO: Well as far as the program of Baba Oserjeman goes, it calls for a massive rent strike in 1967, that is, ownership of Harlem. If black people are forced to live here, why not own it?...

V.R.: *But isn't there a dim future for that? Look at it another way. In the history of the U.S., what has been this country's peculiar ability? One is to produce the most advanced technology that the world has ever known; that's one which I don't think we're concerned with right now. The other is...the assimilation of dissent. In the teens, in the twenties, it was the farmers. The farmers were getting a raw deal. And the first thing that happened when they organized together—when they were even invited to organize, and did organize as a bloc opinion in U.S. politics—they were assimilated. They're doing alright now. The second group was labor. And everything I've heard here discussed about the position of the blacks—what blacks have got to do—labor has done—white labor. And what happened to them? As soon as they became a power lobby in U.S. politics, they were assimilated. And invited to assimilate through the NIRA Act in 1933 under FDR. And we got the Walter Reuthers and the Meanys to speak for that particular assimilation. As we talk about blackness we are inviting ourselves to join together—or blacks to join together—as a powerful lobby in U.S. politics. And the future for that is assimilation. As soon as you have the power you will be assimilated. And you'll be part of the white-dominated corporate structure of the U.S.*

OQUENDO: Never, not as a black man.

ALLEN: No, I agree absolutely. That is the great danger of black power, that it will be co-opted and bought out. We'll all organize, we'll get black power—and we'll get two votes in Congress. So *what*. The only movements that we can identify with are in Africa, Asia and Latin America. They are the majority. If we are identified with them, there's hope.

OQUENDO: That's part of black power....

ALLEN: That's what we have to make clear. A lot of these black power leaders are talking like a third party, which means they can be co-opted.

OQUENDO: But you don't take into consideration the conditions we've been under in this country.

V.R.: *I also take into consideration the conditions of Jews, Irish and Poles.*

OQUENDO: You cannot take them into consideration—

V.R.: *—workers in the mines who were brought over here in shuttle cars, shipped over in steamy little ships.*

OQUENDO: But their cultures were not destroyed. They were still white. They don't call themselves "Negroes" walking around straightening their hair.

V.R.: *They call them spics, they call them polacks.*

QUENDO: The people they call spics own their own stores. I don't think it's the same thing.

ALLEN: It is the same, man. Let's not be romantic about this, like we are really a different thing in this culture—

QUENDO: We are.

ALLEN: We are not, because if we allow ourselves to be bought off how are we different from anybody else.... The great danger is that we'll allow ourselves to be bought off again, as we have been so many times in the past. The only hope is if we identify with all those other people in the world who are oppressed like us and who *are* the majority. And who one day will have the power. The power that counts. 11% of the population in this country does not count —for shit. Let's face it. It will get us a handful of congressmen—So what? We have to identify with the majority, man, that's where the power is.

MOORE: You think we have a white backlash now—

ALLEN: We'll get power insofar as we are with the other people of this world who are out.... This is why I don't think I can fight a war against the Vietnamese. They are my allies for the future....

V.R.: *Are there enough common interests besides color which can make these alliances possible?*

ALLEN: That's what we have to work out. I think so, But I'm serious, Eddie and Steve, black power doesn't say enough about our relationship with the other people of color. Martin Luther King was eminently right when he said recently that we don't have the guns, we're a minority—but we're not the minority in terms of the whole world—

QUENDO: Even without guns. Do you know that many times the southern planter couldn't get his crops insured in the South because slaves were burning it up? This is what I want to point to: guns are not it, it's numerical masses.

ALLEN: Backed up by guns.

III. Robert Allen

August 1, 1966

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: At this moment the U.S. is conducting a genocidal war against an heroic people who have struggled against foreign oppression for more than 25 years. The pretext for this aggression is the claim that the U.S. is protecting "freedom and democracy" in South Vietnam. This "protection" consists in propping up a dictatorial regime which was never elected to office and does not enjoy the support of the Vietnamese people. It consists in bombing the homes and fields of thousands of innocent peasants. It consists in attacking North Vietnam in an undeclared and illegal war of aggression.... It is clear that the U.S. is involved in this war not to benefit the Vietnamese but to provide itself with another secure military base in the encirclement of China.... It is the "yellow hordes" of China who are the target of this war, even though the Chinese have not attacked anyone and have no troops abroad. The Vietnamese, being a poor colored people, are dispensable in the brutal effort to achieve this objective. The racist nature of this war cannot be ignored.

To conduct this war the U.S. is drafting thousands of Black men to fight for "freedom" abroad while their freedoms at home are denied. These Black men are forced to fight for white imperialism in its attempt to destroy colored nations. They are forced to fight for the sole benefit of their former slave-masters. These Black men go to war knowing that their brothers and sisters at home will continue to be subjected to violent attacks by racists which will go unpunished. An army which will not protect Black citizens at home and instead attacks colored people in Vietnam is not an army in which any self-respecting Black man should serve.

It is for these reasons that I refuse to accept induction into the U.S. Armed Forces. I would not allow myself to be drafted into the Ku Klux Klan and I will not allow myself to be drafted into the U. S. Army to fight a racist war.... I believe that the Black man in America—a minority—cannot be free until the colored peoples of the world are free of white oppression and take their rightful place as the democratic majority."

—Robert Allen

(A statement submitted to the Whitehall Street Station Induction Center on the day Allen was ordered to report for induction.)

Robert Allen, 24, originally of Atlanta, Georgia, now living in the Bronx, refused to submit to induction in New York City on August 1, 1966. He is awaiting arrest.

What follows is Allen's account of how his opposition to the war came to a head.

My position on this war began to develop around the end of 1964. I was a graduate student at Columbia University, where some of my friends were becoming concerned about how the war was building up in Vietnam. A number of my friends were pacifists, and partly through their influence I had become interested in finding out just what was going on there. Over a period of a month or so of reading pacifist arguments,

the pros and cons of the war, I decided that on moral and political grounds our participation in this war didn't make much sense to me. I decided that I was against it and that if I was sincere enough in this feeling, then I should make my objections known to the authorities.

I decided to write a letter to President Johnson—you know, to start at the top—making him aware (for all that's worth) of my objections to the war. I showed the letter to a number of my friends. In it I stated in a one-two-three fashion my objections, and then at the end I said that I honestly felt that I could not participate in this war. Well, my friends said that they agreed with everything that I said

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in the letter, sure, but *delete the last paragraph*, because they'll draft you. I thought this was utter nonsense. After all, this is a free country, you know--all those things we'd been taught in school--they don't punish people who dissent, etc. So I sent this letter by registered mail in March 1966 to Lyndon B. Johnson, President.

One week later I got a notice from my draft board to report for physical examination. I couldn't believe it; in fact, I didn't believe it. I thought, well, this is just a coincidence, things like this just don't happen. Because of my feelings about the war I did write to my local board and inform them that I couldn't participate in this war. I wrote to ask for a Conscientious Objector form, because I felt that my moral and pacifist convictions would justify a CO stand. But when they sent me the form, I saw all those religious questions and I thought, you know, I don't have a chance. And when I really looked into my heart I didn't think that I was an absolute pacifist either, so I sent the form back with a letter explaining why I didn't think that I could in good conscience apply for CO status. This occurred in April and what I didn't know at that time was that in March the Supreme Court had in effect expanded the definition of a Conscientious Objection in the Seeger decision.

My physical examination was transferred to New York for May 28, 1965; I took it, passed it, but then I was asked to fill out and sign a security questionnaire. This is a list of about 250 organizations which are on the Attorney General's list as "subversive," although they have never been legally found by the courts to be subversive organizations. In the space of about two or three minutes you are required to go over this entire list and decide if you had any contact at all with any of these organizations, and to indicate the exact degree of that contact on the questionnaire. Well, I decided I wasn't going to have anything to do with this. The organizations I belong to are my business if this is a free country--*if* this is a free country. I just handed in the blank form with a statement enclosed indicating why I refused to sign, namely, that I regarded it as a violation of the first amendment to the Constitution, Freedom of Association.

When I refused to sign the form, I was taken to the Commanding Officer. Their technique is to persuade you to do what they ask you to do, and, of course, eventually to force you to do it. Well, he tried to persuade me that I should sign this form and he gave reasons why, the main one being that if I were some sort of political subversive, then this form was de-

signed to protect me, because after all, they don't want subversives in the army and the best way to avoid this is to spot them before you draft them. I just pointed out to him that whether or not I'm a political subversive, the constitution guarantees me certain rights which he was violating with this form. I spent the whole day there debating this point with him, and I was finally "released" with the understanding that they would have to investigate me to determine if I were indeed a subversive sort of person.

The investigation was very haphazard as far as I can determine. At that time, I was employed by the Welfare Department of New York City as a Social Investigator, which is the bottom of the ladder for professional social workers. Well, they sent a man to the St. Nicholas Welfare Center in Harlem to investigate me. My friends who were questioned by him, told me that he was a black man with Military Intelligence. I recall that one friend he questioned--a white guy by the way--told him that he didn't know too much about my affiliations but that he thought I had something to do with SNCC and CORE. The military agent, black, who was taking notes, paused when my friend said SNCC and CORE, and said--"What, how do you spell those?"....

You'll recall that in the spring of this year there was a big to do about the draft deferment test. At first I didn't know whether I wanted to take that or not, but I sent for the forms anyway and got an admission card. Before the test took place I decided that I really couldn't go along with this. How could I sit down in an examination room with people I knew, taking a test in which I'm competing against them to live--trying to avoid going into the army or being sent to Vietnam, hoping that they will be sent in my place. I sent the forms back to my local board and told them I'm not going to have anything to do with this sort of anti-democratic activity.

Shortly after that, I was notified that I had passed the security examination and was subject to being inducted. This was in early June 1966. I replied, pointing out that I was married, that I had a business which I would lose if I was drafted, that I was in school. The local board wrote that I was classified 1-A in March, 1965, that I did not appeal that in the 10 or 20 day period allotted after classification, that therefore, I had no right to appeal now. The board ignored entirely the fact that my circumstances had changed completely in the past year. Well, it was becoming clear then that I was going to have to fight these people, that they were out to get me. It was at this

point that I contacted a lawyer, Mr. Conrad Lynn, to find out how I could fight the draft. At my first conference with Mr. Lynn, he pointed out to me the significance of the Seeger decision, and what that meant in terms of broadening the definition of a Conscientious Objector. He suggested that I should send for the form again and submit it, because there was always the off chance that under the new rules I might be considered a CO.

I knew the questions on the form, so I decided I'd better work out my answers in advance, because you only have five days to return the form after it's mailed out. I didn't have time to write for the form. Two days after I talked to my lawyer, I received my induction notice. However, I sent for the form anyway; the law states that one is entitled to apply for CO status even after you're inducted into military service. I wrote to the local board pointing out that I was not aware of the Seeger decision in April, 1965, that I was now, that I claimed CO status. They didn't answer my letter, they didn't send me the form—nothing. My induction was scheduled for August 1, 1966, in New York.

This time I prepared myself. They weren't fooling around. I presented myself a bit early and distributed leaflets to the other inductees, denouncing the draft and the war in Vietnam. Then I went inside, took the physical, passed it, and refused to submit to induction. Before I was finally released that evening, after the Commanding Officer had notified the FBI of my case, I was held at the induction station all day and subjected to harassment. When I was outside distributing leaflets, one soldier stood on the steps the whole time, denouncing and abusing me. He informed me that he had only 78 more days left in the service and when that was up he would come looking for me. The army people who abused me were white soldiers. The majority of the inductees were black, but for the most part they seemed apathetic, like they just lost all hope and didn't see any way out of the situation they were in.

When I finished distributing my leaflets and decided to go inside to present myself for examination, the soldier at the top of the stairs met me and said threateningly: "You're on Government property now." I snapped my induction papers open in his face and just walked past him; I didn't say anything, I was so mad. He was astonished, and didn't even react. It was about ten minutes before I saw him again and when I did he was busily informing everyone that I was a communist.

For the most part, the soldiers there found it incomprehensible that someone could make a stand on the basis of his convictions which

might involve the penalty of imprisonment of up to five years. When I was finally brought before the Commanding Officer, he attempted to persuade me to go into the service as the lesser of two evils, namely, the army or prison. He said that if I objected to Vietnam in all probability I would not be sent to Vietnam, and therefore, why should I worry about that. If I objected to the loyalty oath, they could conveniently arrange things so that I wouldn't have to take it. I pointed out to him that I did very much object to the war in Vietnam on moral grounds and that I believed that I should have no part of it. I said, sure, he could tell me now that I might not be sent over there, but that this did not mean anything, because once I was in the service I would be subject to orders. If I was ordered to go there, that's it, I wouldn't have any choice. I also pointed out to him that as far as the service being the lesser of two evils, that didn't make any sense to me because as a civilian, by refusing induction I would be brought before civilian courts where I can make a stand, have some chance of winning, go to the Supreme Court if necessary, because that's the way I think this thing should be fought. If I submit to induction and then try to fight it, I don't have a chance. . . .

Now that I had actually been called up I started looking into this in a more personal way: What does this mean to me, particularly what does this mean to me as a black man in America? As I studied the war, and as I looked into my own feelings about it, I increasingly came to believe that this war was and is basically a racist war against the yellow people of Vietnam. It is a war directed against them and directed against another yellow race, the Chinese. It is directed against people who in many ways are like the impoverished black people of this country. . . .

* * * *

V.R.: *Has this altered your position to the extent that you would now consider fighting a war with the National Liberation Front of Vietnam?*

ALLEN: Over the course of time, after looking into the situation, I came to feel—and I do feel now—that I support the aims of the NLF. I support what they are trying to achieve in Vietnam.

V.R.: *It sounds like a hypothetical question, but does that mean that you would fight for them?*

ALLEN: Well, let's put it this way, I haven't been called—that's sort of irrelevant. I don't know.

OQUENDO: I think black people here should take a lesson from the Vietnamese people. Homes are being bombed daily in South Vietnam. We see pictures of GI's putting the torch to thatched huts. Right here, black churches are being bombed, homes are fired at, crosses burned—north and south. But no one picks up a water pistol to shoot the man who does it. Black people should learn from Vietnamese people.

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ALLEN: I agree with Eddie. When I said I haven't been called, I would alter that to say I'm not called to fight there, but there's a similar fight going on here, and this is where my life and my services are needed to fight for black liberation in this country.... As somebody pointed out, very much to the point, *the Vietcong never called me a nigger*. There are people in this country who have and that means something very specific. It means my survival is at stake in this country. This is much more immediate—but related to Vietnamese survival....

V.R.: *Are all of you here taking your positions as individuals?*

ALLEN: The four of us and a number of other young Afro-American guys have just recently formed a group, Afro-Americans For Survival, whose primary purpose is our mutual defense. We call ourselves Afro-Americans For Survival, because that makes the point without beating around the bush. We're for our survival, that is, the survival of the black race in America which we think is being threatened by this war—not to mention, of course, the fact that the survival of the Vietnamese is being threatened. The survival of the black race in America is being threatened because black men make up a disproportionate number of the troops in Vietnam.... They will say, it's not racism, it's because you "Negroes" are at the bottom of the economic ladder, and we're drafting people at the bottom of the economic ladder, omitting to mention, of course, that the reason we "Negroes" are at the bottom is because of the racism that has always been rampant in American society.

OQUENDO: Carry that even further. I mean, who are they bombing? It seems to me that only peoples of color have experienced the atom bomb, napalm....

MOORE: This is ridiculous. Why should I give up my life, which is my most valuable possession, for something that doesn't benefit me in any way? None whatsoever.

OQUENDO: When you talk of organizing against the war, and you turn to the black community—there's something different. Black people's sympathies don't have to be brought out against this war. Taking action—that might have to be brought out a bit. But, look, when we have rallies in Bedford-Stuyvesant or Harlem, we don't have eggs or bricks or bottles thrown at us like you would in Flatbush or on 42nd or 5th Avenue in a peace parade.

V.R.: *When you say "we" have rallies, is that Afro-Americans For Survival?*

OQUENDO: No, I was thinking of Blacks Against Negative Dying and Afro-Americans Against The War in Vietnam.

V.R.: *Do they share the same perspective as your group?*

ALLEN: Yes. There's also Black Mothers Enraged, which is a group of women who are enraged at the idea of having their sons drafted to fight in this war, and their position is quite similar to ours.

V.R.: *Is there any discussion about the economics of the Vietnam war? Is it entirely a racist war?*

OQUENDO: Working on Wall Street, I noticed something about some of the stocks. I noticed how when Johnson sent out peace feelers—like almost the bottom would fall out. I look in the columns and find

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that aircraft stocks are at their all-time high. It is economically based; and any war is.

ALLEN: Not entirely. The way I see this war is as part of the general effort to suppress China. This Vietnamese war is used as a coverup for building a huge U.S. military establishment in Vietnam which will complete the U.S. encirclement of China. It's the old containment idea in a new form. The way I see the racism in the war is not so much *that* the war is being fought, but *how* it is being fought. I think that the brutal techniques of the war—napalming villages, women and children indiscriminately, wiping out vast fields of rice, destroying peasant crops—these techniques show the racism. Some people will argue that if there were a white middle class people over there the same things would be going on. I disagree.

V.R.: *Your objection to the war is that it is a racist war, and you talked about the way things have changed for you personally—you're much more conscious now of reality. And yet you call yourselves Afro-Americans. Now I don't want to get hung up on this title, but what I would like to know is—to project into the future—could you tell me, any one of you, what kind of war would you fight in the future for America?*

OQUENDO: For America, realistically, there is no war that I could fight for America.

V.R.: *Is that the way you all feel?*

ALLEN: Definitely. I don't see any war I could fight for America. ... We would have to destroy America and build it up again.

JOHNSON: I'm aiming at something else.

MOORE: Even us. We would have to be completely

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wiped out because we still contain some of the old ideas.

V.R.: *You can't think of any way in the future that you would fight for the U.S. overseas?*

OQUENDO: It's impossible. Maybe if it was against another planet....

V.R.: *What if it was black?* (Laughter)

ALLEN: Look, let's face it—America is the enemy of the mass of the people in this world who are what we call colored. How can we foresee any war in which we are going to fight on the side of America?

V.R.: *What is your feeling about Marshall Ky, a colored man?*

MOORE: He's a colored "Tom." He's a Vietnamese "Tom." Chiang kai Shek, a Chinese Tom—a Vietnamese Tom—they're all the same. That's exactly, you know, what they all are—America's "Allies."

IV. Steven Moore

"It's important to me that I have decided that this is the course I'm going to take (refusing induction). I am doing this according to my conscience, I'm not giving in, I'm not going along with the program, I'm doing what is best for me. I feel that there is no other way for me to go about this. That I make the decision about my fate, that I don't submit to some faceless bureaucracy, that I don't submit to the white structure in this country, that I don't submit to these facts—but that I decide my fate, even if that means that I decide that I will go to jail rather than let you tell me how to live my life—**this** is very important to me. This is very important for all black men—that we decide our fate. This is the important thing.

"Each man thinks, well, I'm alone in this, the whole world's against me. I'm fighting it alone. But what we're doing here, that's unique. By all coming together, we're beginning to find out we're not alone, and we hope that by example we'll show others that they are not alone. That's the big problem—the government's keeping this whole thing quiet. You know—hush, hush, on the draft. You have a few spectacular cases where a white man was willing to go all out and get some sort of support for his case. But an organization of draft resisters—a black organization and, perhaps, a white organization of men who are fighting—this is unique. This is what is needed to show...the change in the concept of being a man. Black people don't have to prove themselves men in Vietnam, they must be men right here.... In terms of survival, yes, it's easier now than before. I would rather spend ten years in the slams than have a bullet put through me in Vietnam!"

Steven Moore, 22, of the Bronx, refused induction on July 6, 1966. He was arrested September 28 and charged with violation of the Universal Military Service Act. Moore was released on bail and is awaiting a hearing.

In the slums, in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn, on the lower east side of the Bronx, places where I grew up, there was resentment and frustration. After I got away from high

school, I did want to go into the service. I was ignorant. At that time it seemed like the only thing to do. But I didn't do it, fortunately. Then after traveling around, getting some kind of education, both formally and informally, I decided I would never go. I've seen policies that the U.S. practices.... Now this isn't the main reason why I object to submitting myself to the draft. It's the principle—I have no reason to fight. Or, for that matter, to serve the country.

After high school it seemed that I had no choice. Most black boys from the same area grow up the same way. They're apt to tell you exactly the same thing. But they went into the service—as volunteers. I guess they did it so they could get it over with, or, like me, because they felt that they had nothing else to do.

I went away to school, Orange County Community College. I was in a small town and I had to live with the subtleties of prejudice—and direct prejudice for about two years. That hardened me. And then I went to Europe and to Africa last year, and I've seen how Americans act there.... In certain parts of Africa the Peace Corps is known as the War Corps.

I worked with Operation Crossroads Africa. It was an educational program like the Peace Corps, only not sponsored by the government. I was an instructor in physical education. The athletic director of my school had asked if I wanted to go. He mentioned that it's run by a Negro and that it would be nice. It would be a good show if a Negro from my particular school went along.

Both the Peace Corps and this particular program I was on—they are ways of confusing foreigners. If the U.S. can get a foot in and more or less make a good play, you know, with the money, this is a big show. This is very impressive for the indigenous groups. At least the authorities go for that, those I was working with. But for the people I was working with, there was discontent.

I came back in August 1965, went back to school, subjected myself to that...crap...again. In June 1966 I left school and since then I've been...around. I worked in a bank at one point. I was an operator. I operated a Burroughs machine.

Then the draft started to make motions. At the end of April I received a notice that I was to report May 2 for a physical. This I did. A few weeks later I received the draft notice. Then I refused. I wrote the board a letter explaining my position. I wrote about my disillusionment. I said that I didn't want to take part in something that I didn't feel was morally right. And then there was my own survival. I felt that

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in some way they were trying to get me off the streets to further a cause that doesn't benefit me in any way.

I received a letter stating that, unfortunately, the law does not cover this, and that by refusing to submit I was breaking the Selective Service law.

I expected to be arrested immediately afterwards, but I wasn't. About two weeks later the FBI notified me and told me that if I didn't come down for induction they would get a warrant for my arrest. Two months passed and I was arrested yesterday. I surrendered. The FBI agent called my home and said I was to come in. And I did and surrendered. I saw the U.S. Attorney. He didn't seem to understand my case. I don't think he really wanted to. So I went before the bail Commissioner and he recommended \$2500 bail, which is unusual in this case. Usually there is no bail or if there is, it's very little. My lawyer, Conrad Lynn, tried to get this lowered, but the judge and the Commissioner, they took this very lightly, and said "come back in twenty four hours and if you can't raise the bail, then I'll consider it."

I was released today. I raised the bail.

* * * *

ALLEN: I think I would have fought in World War II. I would have felt that Hitler was a menace, and that I should do something about this menace, and I probably would have gone into the military to fight against it. But I think I would have seen how black men were treated in the U.S. military at that time, and I might well have deserted.

MOORE: I agree, but let's face it: we're making a stand now because we're involved. Before—years ago—many of us accepted that condition. Like we believed we were 2nd Class Citizens and that by going out and trying to tighten up Hitler we were bolstering ourselves in the eyes of the white man.

OQUENDO: Yeah, and while you were there the white man was carrying on about how you had tails. We hear all about that now.... What we never learned were true stories about the slave rebellions in the South....

MOORE: We never learned anything. We were products of "Charlie." We were his boys, so to speak. We didn't know about any rebellions. It wasn't until I was subjected to "Charles," for what he is, that I began to acquire the knowledge of what he was doing. Only then did I take action.

ALLEN: So you accept the fact that as Eddie says there have always been black fighters for liberation, but that most of us—and it's very true—we just didn't know about them. There was a whitewash. Whatever black resistance there was, was completely whited out. It's only recently that we've started to become aware of our own black heritage in this country, which is not one of docility or subservience—but includes black fighters. And it's only recently that the spirit of resistance has been coming more into the open, particularly since 1960....

* * * *

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V.R.: *What do you think of McNamara's "salvage corps"?*

MOORE: You know that most of those 40,000 new inductees are black volunteers who were refused. Now that the mental standards have been lowered and they can be accepted, they will think it's something great. If they get a chance, they're going to go.

ALLEN: Let's look at this in terms of the interests of the Army. I mean is McNamara doing us a favor by drafting these guys who were classified 1-Y and giving them special training? Is he doing this to help them get a job later? No, not at all. The point is to make them soldiers, killers, and to do that in as efficient a manner possible. The education these guys will get is going to be a military education toward a specific military goal. The rest is a facade.

OQUENDO: Like I said, these are dead minds, white people walking around in black skins.

V.R.: *You mean those who just walk into the Army? What about you, Bill? You enlisted—were you a "dead man"?*

JOHNSON: No, I wasn't. I went in because I knew that I'd be drafted eventually. But, like he's saying, I had no other alternative.

OQUENDO: I didn't say that.

JOHNSON: No, but that's what you implied by saying that we were walking around in a sense being dead.

ALLEN: You saw the Army in part as a way of continuing your education—is that right? Exactly what did you mean by that?

JOHNSON: Well, I hadn't completed high school and I completed high school through the service, and I went on to take a college course.

OQUENDO: Well—not to interrupt you—this is a form of mental genocide in the sense that you were continuing a white education.

MOORE: Everything we know, man, is white.

JOHNSON: I understood this, but I had also looked into black history as well.

OQUENDO: But the fact that you even went into the Army.

JOHNSON: Well, I'm not going to lie, I was brainwashed to a certain extent.... The President can pass all the bills he likes, they're still going to dislike me and make use of me. I don't believe that any legislation or administration is helping any of the black race.... In fact, indirectly, I believe it's benefiting the white man.

V.R.: *Maybe integration was the first step of counter-insurgency?*

* * * *

MOORE: I'm not against being brought into the system, but first I have to recognize myself. I have to develop myself as a black man.

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V.R.: *Do you want to be black cracker?*

OQUENDO: There's no such thing.

V.R.: *Have you been to Ethiopia?*

MOORE: Yeah, I've seen that.... And I've seen black men with those policies—Christian missionaries, Peace Corps, the operators—going in there and giving them your set. Teaching them. Because you're "advanced"—supposedly. This way you more or less control them.

V.R.: *Do you have the same feeling about the social work here or abroad which is included in the proposal for a "National Service"?*

MOORE: Look, I have absolutely nothing to contribute, in view of the way I live.

V.R.: *What do you think of the Yoruba Temple or the Muslims as ways of restoring the integrity of black culture?*

MOORE: I see nothing wrong with them. You see, I'm not part of all that because there's still something "white" about me. You understand? Sometimes I hope for that day when I can be completely black. Even saying that—you might say he has that "white" impression of the Muslims, too. Maybe so. Maybe someday I'll have some other impression, a black man's impression.

V.R.: *Ed mentioned before that English is a kind of foreign language. Does the search for a black man's language interest you?*

MOORE: Look at it this way. As black men in America we don't have a common language. As black men in America we don't have anything. We don't have a damn thing. *We lost.*

V.R.: *What's it like being a black American in Africa?*

MOORE: Is that really necessary?

OQUENDO: Steve was home—that's what he wants to say.

V.R.: *He was?*

MOORE: Was I?

OQUENDO: You were home.

MOORE: I was home physically, but emotionally—

ALLEN: *What is this romantic bullshit! Read history. They sold us out.*

OQUENDO: Oh come on now—

ALLEN: Sold us out, baby—

OQUENDO: When you start telling us that—No, man—

ALLEN: White men didn't even have to go into Africa to get us. The chieftains—they sat on the coast and they brought us to them. Our brothers—

OQUENDO: Maybe the Catholic priests and missionaries—

ALLEN: They were our chieftains. They cooperated. What's 30 pieces of silver?

MOORE: Hold it. We've got to identify with something—as black people. It wasn't the black man who left us here. It's the white man we're up against.

ALLEN: Oh, I know all about him. But let's not forget the others.

V.R.: *Have you noticed that after the riots last summer, some whites are calling Negroes the "aggressor"? That kind of language suggests that white officials may think of retaliating with the tactics of counter-insurgency.*

MOORE: It is coming to that point, because no one

will accept the riots for what they are. Those men are labeling them for their own purposes. We're the "aggressors"—that's crap—how can we be the aggressors?.... They actually believe that they're treating us too good now, that they're giving us too much now. And we don't have anything.

OQUENDO: Reading the papers, the word "aggressor" has taken on a new meaning for me. The U.S. describes China as an "aggressor"—with U.S. bases and allies all around China—and China's got nothing in Mexico or Canada, or anywhere. And they call Vietnamese aggressors. These are people who don't even have an airforce, people who fought back with bamboo spears—which they are still doing—and these are the "aggressors." We're in *their* country, on *their* land, in *their* house.

V.R.: *What happens if the government begins to follow suit here? Mobilizing the National Guard, occupying Harlem with Riot Control Squads, making arbitrary arrests.*

OQUENDO: That's already happening. Like I said ghetto communities are already armed camps. And these are white cops protecting white interests.

V.R.: *What if the direction shifts from "protecting whites" to crushing blacks?*

MOORE: If it goes on as it has been, eventually we'll all be gone—all the black men, that is. But if we do something—

ALLEN: If things continue to get worse and there is an outright genocidal war against us in this country, there is the proposal that Malcolm X made at the end of his life, namely, to take our case before an international tribunal and ask for help. Not the UN.

V.R.: *What about going to another country and asking for help?*

ALLEN: I think we'd be justified in doing that.

V.R.: *What about fighting instead of asking for help?*

ALLEN: Well that goes in conjunction with self-defense, of course.

MOORE: This should be our first response.

V.R.: *Before negotiating?*

MOORE: That's right—No, we've been negotiating for 300 years. Nothing's happened. Forget negotiations.

* * * * *

V.R.: *Do you see any allies among whites who are prepared to accept movements like Afro-Americans For Survival on your terms, and join in the struggle?*

ALLEN: Yes, there are some people in SDS, for example, who are thinking along these lines, namely, that the white radical should be organizing in white middle class and working communities, with the intention of later joining with the black power movement to create a new structure in this country.... If that is at all possible.

OQUENDO: I'd like to make a point about the "white backlash." Even the liberal is turning against the black power movement; even he is afraid.

V.R.: *You sound surprised.*

OQUENDO: No, I'm not surprised.

V.R.: *It's a liberal war in Vietnam.*

OQUENDO: Excuse me?

MOORE: You know your liberals—"knee-jerk" liberals—in times of peril, watch out.

ALLEN: One of the problems here is the psychology of the white liberal. In the past he has found a convenient way to expiate his guilt about how this society is structured, by contributing funds to the movement any maybe occasionally sending his children to Mississippi for a summer. What we're saying now is that this is no longer acceptable: if you feel this guilt we don't want to be a way of expiating it. You've got to do something about it yourself.

V.R.: *But was that true for all? Many liberals envisioned a society where color meant nothing. They accepted the fact that the society into which people would integrate was white, but since 89% of the society is white to begin with, they saw that as just the way things are. Presumably, the Negro would have made contributions.... You obviously are thinking of a different society. You're saying that you don't want any part of white society. You want recognition of black culture. I don't mean to defend liberals, I'm not so fond of them, but I think that that's something which a liberal cannot legitimately understand or*

accept. The real question is, what kind of society do you want? Do you want the status for blacks that Jews had in Germany before the Nazi period: separate legal status? Or there's the society the Irish have today. They're all part of white America, but they have March 17.

ALLEN: No, I think the Soviet Union is a better model for what we may want. In the Soviet Union there are a number of different nationalities, and the way the nationality problem was solved there was by a form of federalism.

MOORE: We have to establish ourselves as black people culturally and then assimilate. Right now we're doing just the opposite.

ALLEN: If we accept our own culture and build it, we'll have black communities, not black ghettos.

V.R.: *But won't that black culture be defined mainly by defiance to white culture?*

OQUENDO: No. It is defined by white culture's defiance of us. For example, the English Language is against everything black. The whole concept of "black" is bad. You're blacklisted, blackballed. If

(turn to page 7)

(Haiti continued from page 19)

The dilemma of the American groups advocating the overthrow of Duvalier is that he is, after all, anti-communist and powerful enough to keep left-wing activity in check. His Tonton Macoute, which a member of the Rescue Committee characterized as "a somewhat sloppy Gestapo" has practiced torture, murder and terror tactics against the opposition and randomly chosen citizens for so long that recent visitors to Haiti report that overt suppression is no longer necessary. The population has been "pacified." Nobody knows this better than the political exiles who have had followers and relatives murdered into submission.

In contrast, the exiles are divided and harbor deep-rooted social and political antipathies against each other (which are exaggerated by having each faction receive aid from different U.S. agencies). An invasion or palace coup might be setting the stage for a violent power tossup which would unleash unpredictable forces, forces that might spill over into the Dominican Republic and Cuba. It would be a risk, especially since Duvalier himself has weakened the groups in society which the U.S. considers to exercise a stabilizing influence: the aristocracy, Army and Church. As a result, it would be much easier for a progressive government to take over after Duvalier than it would be in any other Latin American country suffering under a similar dictatorship.

DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE

Duvalier came to power opposing, in theory, the stranglehold that the elite had on national life. He was associated with a nationalist school

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of thought, directed at the black upper middle class, and urban masses, which called for a recognition of the Haitian-African cultural roots bordering on glorification. Out of this came the revival of Haitian primitive art, dance and religion, experienced during his administration. In his horrifyingly negative way, Duvalier then used "Haitianization" as a facade for attacking the aristocracy, Church and Army.

After Duvalier won the 1957 election, he went on a rampage, with the help of the Army, persecuting and murdering followers of the opposition. Much of the elite who had supported the mulatto candidate, Louis Dejoie, came within his range. For this reason, Duvalier has been portrayed as a racist. But an even greater number of the followers of Daniel Fignole and Clement Jumelle, black candidates, were murdered. Fearing the power of any organization that might rival his government, Duvalier then turned on the powerful church institution, replacing French and Canadian priests with loyal Haitians, and finally on the elitist U.S. trained army. One of Duvalier's most intelligent moves was to grant positions of authority to people from the poor urban and rural masses—a sector that had formerly been ignored. Thus he enjoys more popularity than most exiles would care to admit.

In spite of his persecution of the elite, Duvalier is hardly a progressive. He has weakened, not destroyed, the urban social structure; the position of the peasant masses remains the same. He grants exploitative contracts to foreign firms and never tampers with these investments so long as tax revenues flow into his private

treasury. Perhaps that is why the U.S. would be reluctant to see him go.

In the words of our military strategists testifying before the Senate, we have been following a policy of "minimum level of mutual accommodation." There has been an embargo on sale of arms to Duvalier during the past several years. However, the "accommodation" included the smuggling of two T-28 jets past the embargo in 1964. The people involved were known to the federal government but were never brought to trial due to insufficient evidence. One of them, a man reported to have connections with the CIA, was not permitted to testify—for national security reasons.

Under Kennedy, aid to Haiti had been suspended and the government lent support to a major exile invasion led by Haitian General Leon Cantave in August 1963. Under Johnson, aid to Haiti was cautiously resumed. It was announced that while remaining faithful to the principles of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. had to understand that once Duvalier was firmly in power, Haiti could not be expected to subscribe to the form of democracy expected of other members of the OAS.

The aid itself was more directed at private industry than at Duvalier. Aside from some money for continuation of the anti-malarial program and \$2.4 million for a potable water project, there was \$4 million for a privately owned oil refinery, \$3 million for public works which are owned by American concessions, and smaller sums for investment guarantees.

Haitian nationalism is not entirely ignored. The wife of U.S. Ambassador Benson L. Timmons, III, takes native dance lessons. In May 1964, the ambassador himself attended a Haitian militia rally celebrating Duvalier's assumption to the presidency for life. After that, the U.S. embassy reportedly made itself inaccessible to Haitians opposing Duvalier within the country.

The AID policy and U.S. support for Duvalier has been partly the result of the activities of the "American Friends of Haiti." Officially headed by Lady Malcolm Douglas Hamilton, who is a veteran supporter of anti-communist causes, the group at first glance seems to be a bunch of ladies from a cake-sale bazaar, dedicated to protecting starving Haitians from Castro's threat. The real leaders of the group are W.L. Rice, director of Haitian Reynolds Mines (Rice first rose to prominence when as a U.S. attorney, he tried the government anti-trust suit against Alcoa), and F.E. Hasler, director of the Haitian American Development Cor-

poration, a firm that owns most of Haiti's sugar fields and also owns Dauphin, the largest sisal plantation in the world. Aid to industry, investment guarantees and long term low credit loans, all of which are regular features of AID, would stand to benefit these companies.

It may just be a matter of time, however, till the "Friends of Haiti" decide that their interests may be better served by a change in government. Several times since Duvalier took office American investors have had to advance tax and duty payments to bail the Haitian government out of bankruptcy. General economic conditions there are so bad that investors have difficulty expanding their operations. But so far Rice and Hasler seem to be opting in favor of stability.

Duvalier's Washington lobbyist, I. Irving Davidson, efficient as he may be, continues to serve only as long as the thousands roll in from Duvalier's coffers. I. Irving Davidson is one of the best. A specialist in difficult to handle cases, he has successfully represented the Somza brothers, dictators of Nicaragua, the former military government of Ecuador, and the State of Israel. He also has a personal interest in the stability of Haiti, where he owns a newly built fats and oils processing plant (AID investment-guaranteed). A close friend of President Joaquin Balaguer in the Dominican Republic, Davidson escorted Balaguer, while he was in exile, on a guided tour of the State Department. Now, Davidson says he is planning to invest in the Dominican Republic.

"Some people make a living plotting invasions," Davidson commented on the recent Haitian crisis. "Had they left the Fontainebleau and landed in Haiti they would have been shot." But there is no one supporting Duvalier who could not just as easily back someone else. This has been the hope of the Haitian exiles for the past nine years, despite repeated invasion fiascos and bitter disappointments. The 1963 "invasion" shows both sides of this coin.

In August 1963, exile forces under the direction of Haitian General Leon Cantave, landed in the Bay of Leberte and proceeded to make their way toward Port Au Prince. (Former head of the armed forces under Magloire, Cantave was also the man who deposed Magloire, and paved the way for the 1957 elections.) For a while it seemed as if the invasion would succeed; the insurgents managed to hold out in the countryside for two months. Finally they were forced to flee back to their bases in the Dominican Republic.

Close observers attribute the defeat of the invasion to the failure of reinforcements to ar-

rive. The reinforcements, reportedly led by the same Rolando Masferrer, never took off from Miami. Nobody could say whether the Cubans simply betrayed the Haitians or were detained by the U.S. Government which was supposedly backing the effort. Another cause of failure was lack of support from the peasant and urban masses who were afraid to risk the displeasure of the Tonton Macoute and government authorities. Somehow, the plans excluded Daniel Fignole, the candidate who had had the greatest following among the black masses from where Duvalier also drew his support. Fignole would have at least provided the people with an alternative to Duvalier whom they felt they could trust. But the leaders who wanted power for themselves were careful to keep possible rivals in the background. The present invasion also excluded Fignole from the plans.

Then, again, in the summer of 1964, thirteen idealistic youths from the groups "Young Haiti" tried by themselves to shake the Duvalier establishment, without adequate preparation and support, and were finally captured and beheaded by the Tonton Macoute. Many exiles sent money and weapons to support the invasion, not knowing how poorly it was planned or who was behind the group. Father Georges seems to have been the director of the group at the time.

While the young men were hiding in the Haitian hills, it was discovered that the arms, which were sold to the group by Cuban exiles, were faulty. Then Father Georges was arrested in Miami with a load of small arms—completely cutting off the guerrillas. I learned from conversations with various exiles that the group had been contacted and encouraged by the CIA; that is why they dared the invasion. Therefore, it came as a shock when the federal government caught Father Georges with his petty weapons. Some exiles say that the youths had merely considered, on their own, asking Fignole for support, and that the U.S. feared the effect that Fignole's popularity would have on the masses, although Fignole, like most other exiles, is anti-communist. Only a few exiles began to suspect that the U.S. might not have had any serious intentions of deposing Duvalier in the first place.

Only one group, at present, receives aid from Havana. Led by the poet Rene Despestre, they seem limited to broadcasting over Radio Havana. U.S. encirclement of Cuba would make any Havana-based invasion impractical anyway. Insurgent forces seem more likely to be headed in the other direction. No Haitian exile group is without their Cuban compatriots. It seems that Cuban-exile shock troops are becoming an institution of international mercenary guerrilla

fighting. Cuban pilots turned up working with the CIA in the Congo. Now they seem far more prevalent in Haitian exile movements where re-entry into their own homeland is at stake. That seems to be Masferrer's main interest in Haitian liberation.

Perhaps it is just as well that the latest invasion attempt failed. To unleash Batista's henchmen on Cuba would have created an international crisis. If it had succeeded, it might have paved the way for the return of Batista himself. Already in the Dominican Republic a man who was once the right hand of the dictator Trujillo occupies the presidential chair. The ban prohibiting the re-entry of the Trujillo family into the Dominican Republic has been lifted. And it seems that if any invasion or change over of power is permitted in Haiti, the new wave will bring back the elite.

Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world. Industry and economic expansion are at a virtual standstill. The country has almost no electric power, poor roads and a skilled labor shortage. It has the highest population density in the hemisphere and the lowest ratio of inhabitants per doctor: 9,800/1, just slightly better if Dr. Duvalier himself is counted. The population of Haiti is about 1 1/2 times that of the Dominican Republic, while it occupies only 1/3 of the island of Hispaniola. The average life expectancy is 29 years. Of the people who manage to live, only 6% ever have the chance to attend school. Those that do not live in despair, live in absolute fear for their lives.

The case history of Haiti, where a dictator, Duvalier, is propped up by a gestapo-like secret police, aided in the U.S. by pork-barrel business interests, and allowed to oppress a nation in the interest of the status quo, while exiles, who promise little basic change, are kept divided and deceived by hopes of a coming invasion, is a familiar one in Latin America and throughout the world. Trujillo sat on the Dominican Republic for thirty years. Batista turned Cuba into a jailhouse for ten years until Castro took to the hills and organized a liberation movement which finally defeated Batista's military machine. Through my limited contacts with exiles and Americans dealing with Haiti, I was not able to learn if such a movement exists in the back country there. Since Castro, the United States and most Latin American governments keep far closer vigilance on peasant movements and international arms dealers than they did before.

But in Haiti, things can not go on like this much longer.

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“One of the major tasks of the next generation if we are to have peace with justice... will be to redefine America’s interests, redefine Communism, redefine our place in the world, going beyond all conceptions inherited from the Cold War, especially beyond the concept of ‘the other side.’”


Lynd and Hayden

Originally, *The Other Side* was to be a detailed report of meetings held last Christmas by Viet-Report Advisory Editor Staughton Lynd and Tom Hayden with Asian revolutionary leaders in Hanoi, Peking and Prague. This it is. As far as we know it is the only first-hand report by Americans which brings the men, ideas and organization behind the today’s revolutionary movements so sharply into focus.

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to be left to the foreign desks of State? Are revolutionary movements the sworn enemy of the American people? Can traditions of nonviolence be reconciled with revolutionary violence? Can private Americans build their own bridges across the apparent gulf—as Lynd and Hayden tried to do one year ago in their celebrated visit to “the other side”?

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