

A REPORT ON THE MANZANAR RIOT OF SUNDAY DECEMBER 6, 1942  
by

Togo Tanaka

PERSONALITY SKETCHES--of Principals Involved

Fred Masaru Tayama, who was attacked on Saturday evening, December 5, as the first intended victim of the Manzanar riot, is a native of Hawaii. He is 37 years old, married, and the father of an 11-year old daughter; he is the eldest son in a family of eight children--all American citizens; he acquired his education largely in Central California and his higher education from the Armour Institute (now Illinois Institute) of Technology. He has never been to Japan but reads, writes, and speaks Japanese (learned in a language school, at home and in business contacts) sufficiently well to qualify for a teaching position at the Navy's Japanese language school at the University of Colorado (Boulder).

Tayama's "public" life began comparatively late\*. He first appeared in Los Angeles Japanese American Citizens League activities in 1939 when he was elected first vice-president in a cabinet headed by Eiji Tanabe. Prior to that time, Tayama had devoted his time almost exclusively to operating a chain of Main Street and East Fifth Street restaurants in Los Angeles; his leisure was apparently occupied in his hobby of golf; he mingled rarely with the group identified among Southern California Japanese as "J.A.C.L.-ers". In business, he held a reputation among the Nisei of Los Angeles as one of the more successful entrepreneurs. He drove a late model Buick sedan, large for a family of three, owned his own home, was known to employ anywhere between 35 and 50 employees at his restaurants, played golf with the Japanese Consul (Tomokazu Hori) and was frequently asked by Nisei clubs to serve, with his wife, as patron and patroness at numerous social functions.

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\*Most Los Angeles J.A.C.L. leaders who preceded him were still in their twenties when elected to the presidency.

In the same year he first became prominent in J.A.C.L. activity, he was named Chairman of the Annual Nisei Festival, an event which was then acknowledged as Little Tokyo's greatest "tourist attraction." It was usually a festival lasting throughout one week, opened by a gala ball at an expensive downtown/Hotel (frequently the Biltmore) and winding up with Japanese ondo dancing in Little Tokyo, and occasionally, a street brawl staged by hoodlum elements and juvenile delinquents. The J.A.C.L. annually reaped a fat harvest of denunciation, abuse and criticism from the Nisei Festival: (1) Opportunities for "favoritism", both actual and imagined, by J.A.C.L. officials in running the "Nisei Queen" contest were invariably the target of community-wide discussion, often quite heated; (2) the so-called hoodlum element which liked to add a little excitement to Little Tokyo crowds by staging gang fights early resented the repressive measures instituted by the J.A.C.L., such as issuing newspaper warnings and securing additional squads of police; (3) Charges of "graft" and "fraud" were frequently raised, and almost as frequently unfounded. Tayama's term as chairman and the following year in which he served as League president, were no exceptions. For the preceding eight or nine years, Tayama's predecessors had left office "disillusioned and somewhat bitter" against both the J.A.C.L. and an "ungrateful public"; it was often pointed out, as if in confirmation of this claim, that such preceding League presidents as Kay Sugahara (now in the Personnel and Employment division at Granada Relocation Center) John Maeno, (last reported to be at Poston Relocation Center,) Dr. Michael M. Horii (last reported working as construction gang member in Salt Lake City), Ken Matsumoto (last reported to be in Cincinnati, Ohio, following his profession as jewelry display artist), and Eiji Tanabe (now teaching at the University of Michigan in the new Japanese language school there)--all took comparatively little--or no--part in J.A.C.L. activity following their terms in the presidency. It was almost axiomatic that the

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most criticised and most frequently slandered Nisei in Los Angeles was usually the man who held the J.A.C.L. presidency.

In Tayama's second year of prominence in the League, he was the target of a series of articles in the newspaper "Doho", which held the reputation then of being more or less the stepchild of Japanese vernacular journalism as it then existed. Tayama was accused in the columns of "Doho", both in Japanese and English, of being a "labor-baiter" and a "hypocrite". The newspaper denunciation grew out of asserted labor difficulties in the chain of restaurants operated by Tayama. Tayama was accused of operating under "sweat shop conditions" underpaying his help, and of obstructing the unionization of his employees. The publisher and editor of "Doho", Shuji Fujii (now with the Office of War Information, reportedly as a translator) attacked Tayama in signed editorials. Close associates of Fujii in labor union activities organized picket lines in front of the U. S. Cafes, as the Tayama restaurants were called. Tayama countered with court injunctions restraining the picketing, secured a permit to carry a gun for his protection; he admitted that he was opposed to unionizing his employees but denied they were overworked and underpaid. Regarding the campaign in the newspaper "Doho" against him, he once remarked: "I don't mind being picked on by that sheet. Just the fact that it singles you out for an attack means you're all right." That sentiment, moreover, was more general than exceptional among the Japanese of Southern California at the time. Shuji Fujii was rumored--and the rumor was accepted widely--to be a Communist; and among the Japanese community to be an "Ada" (red), was a complete and utter brush-off of anyone. You must didn't belong and that was that.

While he was acknowledged and hailed among his J.A.C.L. friends as a "regular guy" who played a stiff hand at poker, traded gusty jokes with the best of 'em and won more than his share of golf trophies, he was regarded in a small but very articulate circle (Nisei sympathetic to the Shuji Fujii following) as a greedy would-be Nisei capitalist exploiting his fellow human beings. Tayama was a Republican and smoked big fat cigars, they said.

A key to Tayama's personality make-up was revealed to friends once when at a public speaking class session in which he had enrolled he said: "You know, I have been raised to always do my very best and to rise to the very top. I firmly believe that one should always strive to be at the top. Even if I were to be a bandit, I would expect to <sup>be</sup> the Chief <sup>Bandit</sup>." Eiji Tanabe, his predecessor in the J.A.C.L. presidency, and the office secretaries in Los Angeles generally described him as of "dominating disposition."

In his third year of J.A.C.L. activity, Tayama gained the chairmanship of the Southern District Council, embracing 17 chapters of the League throughout Southern California. At this time, several business reverses, an unfavorable court decision in a suit, compelled his withdrawal from the restaurant business. He organized the Pacific Service Bureau, primarily to sell insurance, but also to render various business services for Los Angeles Japanese. In opening this new venture, he ran into the opposition of established brokers. Spirited--and oft-times unfriendly--rivalry broke out between the Pacific Service Bureau and one firm in particular, the S. Nobe & Company. The latter was accused by Tayama of having deliberately blocked Tayama's securing the agency from one of the larger indemnity companies. S. Nobe & Company had most of the downtown Los Angeles wholesale terminal market business. Tayama moved in, soon claimed that Pacific Service Bureau had been promised a number of bonds by the Wholesale Produce Commission Merchants Association through its executive secretary, Ted Akahoshi, whom Tayama said was a long-time personal friend of his. In the business torpedoing that ensued, it was rumored about Tayama that he had engaged in unethical business practices, that one of the alleged reasons for his having to quit the restaurant business was trouble with the State Board of Equalization. Tayama told close friends that an unfavorable court decision arising out of a damage suit caused by an altercation in which one of his employees had figured was the real cause of his retirement.

The Pacific Service Bureau was a three-man affair. Associated with Tayama were Hayaji Matsuo, of Chicago and a former classmate of Tayama's, and Kiyoshi Higashi (still at Manzanar as Chief of Internal Security) who had been in the insurance business for the preceding three and a half years, centering his activities chiefly in Orange County, Terminal Island, and Long Beach. The Bureau was founded in October, 1941, and folded up a few weeks before evacuation in April 1942.

In both the restaurant business and in his Service Bureau venture, Tayama had faced the fact that he had bitter personal enemies.

Among the community (Japanese) as it was then constituted, however, he carried considerable prestige. He was not only accepted by both the Issei and the Nisei, but because of his bilingual capacities, he was often called upon for advice and consultation by the Kibei. The Issei circle in which he moved was then recognized as the leadership element among the Japanese, both from the standpoint of economic pre-eminence and social position. (It might be added here that most of the leadership element among the older Japanese went into F.B.I. custody immediately upon war's outbreak)

In his J.A.C.L. work, Tayama was conspicuously outspoken and vigorous in the campaign of "Americanization" of the Japanese population. His leadership came at a time when relations between the United States and Japan were becoming increasingly strained, and more than any preceding League president, he stressed the "absolute need for undivided loyalty and allegiance to the United States in the event of a war with Japan, which we hope will never occur." He organized the Equality Committee under the League to fight for "equal rights for all Americans, irrespective of their racial antecedents" and pressed an energetic campaign to secure equality of opportunity "for Nisei to make permanent homes." He referred to the discriminatory state real estate regulation preventing a Nisei from occupying his own home if it were located on "restricted" property. He organized a Speakers Bureau under the Los Angeles to send Nisei representatives

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before service clubs, church groups and similar audiences to "win better understanding of the Nisei's loyalty and allegiance to America" He staged mass rallies, such as one held at the American Legion Hall in Hollywood with the co-sponsorship of the Americanism Educational League in the summer of '41. In the course of these activities, the League made contacts with the United States Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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Several months before the outbreak of war, the Southern District Council J.A.C.L., of which Tayama was chairman, through its contacts with these federal agencies, organized what was known as the Southern California Coordinating Committee for Defense.

Among other duties, this body was charged with gathering information on subversive activities; this information was to be turned over directly to Naval Intelligence. (For further details on this body, refer to attached exhibits A & B). Chairman of this committee was Joe Masaoka, whose name was also on the death list of the Manzanar "Blood Brothers" (See W.R.A. Project Report No. 82 Manzanar)

All of these J.A.C.L. activities were, as various signs showed, not viewed with wholehearted support by the entire Japanese population. In August and September of 1941, several months before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese expression "inu" (nearest equivalent is stoolpigeon, or informer) was being applied to some J.A.C.L. leaders. Conversation in "Little Tokio" (Los Angeles Japanese business district centering on East First and San Pedro Streets) barber shops, cafes, bath houses, and other gathering places offered ample evidence. (It should be noted here that all such conversation was invariably in Japanese.)

There was comparatively little--almost no-- open public criticism against this type of League activity, but there was sufficient undercurrent sentiment against it, particularly among the so-called Kibei element. At that time, however, few Japanese in Southern California believed there would be war between the

United States and Japan before the end of the year.

In an analysis of the Japanese population and its division--if war came with Japan--the staff of the Los Angeles Japanese Daily News once estimated that the J.A.C.L. and the leadership among the nisei which it represented would command roughly 15 to 20 per cent of the adult male populations following.

It should be noted here that the J.A.C.L., of which Tayama was the outstanding symbol at Manzanar, represented a numerical minority of the population even in pre-war times.

It was the most active group, however, and invariably attracted the more "Americanized" English-speaking individuals.

When war came suddenly on December 7, 1941, the Los Angeles chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League organized what became known as the "Anti-Axis Committee". This committee enlarged upon the work of the Coordinating Committee for Southern California Defense. Tayama appointed as chairman of the group Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum, a resident of Van Nuys who had lived quite removed from the Japanese community for several years. Slocum, a veteran of the World War and an American Legionnaire, was generally regarded among the Japanese unfavorably; he had numerous enemies. His appointment by Tayama was not, to put it mildly, well received in the Japanese community. The F.B.I. was making daily arrests. Scores of men whom the community generally considered "innocent" of any suspected charges were rounded up and sent to internment camps. Fear, uncertainty, and panic gripped people. Who's next? was a common question everywhere. Pathetic tales of

pregnant woman gone insane when her husband was taken away soon made the rounds of Los Angeles. One family was said to have been found by the International Institute where both the Mother and Father had been arrested and the small children left parentless in the house. For all this, the J.A.C.L.'s Anti-Axis committee was soon being blamed. A deep resentment was being built up in the minds of the average Japanese.

The only newspaper publicity which the J.A.C.L. received at this time--in the metropolitan press--dealt with the spy-detection activities of the Anti-Axis Committee. This had the effect of confirming in the minds of the Japanese--both Issei and Nisei--that the J.A.C.L. was witch-hunting among its own people.

Tayama, as the man most frequently out in front, as the Chairman of the Southern District Council, overshadowed his successor in the Los Angeles presidency, Shigemi Aratani. Tayama himself had been at odds with Slocum for quite some time, did not personally like the man, but appointed him to the chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee because "Slocum has the confidence of the F.B.I. and the Naval Intelligence" (this statement was made at one of the Anti-Axis Committee meetings in the Japanese Y.M.C.A., 312 East First Street, L.A. in December, '41). Tayama assumed responsibility for Slocum's appointment, took much of the abuse that was later heaped on the League for its Anti-Axis Committee activities.

In the months between Pearl Harbor and April, 1942 when when evacuation was half under way, two stories about Tayama began to make the rounds.

One was that his Pacific Service Bureau was making ex-

orbitant profits from high charges for services which could be obtained free by walking several blocks to the Federal building. These services included the filing of alien travel permits (then being required by the Department of Justice), transfer of business licenses, and the like. Another version of the story was that Tayama, through his connection with the J.A.C.L. and the Anti-Axis Committee, instructed secretaries of these organizations to send individuals who went to these offices to send them upstairs to the Service Bureau office. It was charged that the J.A.C.L. was rendering these services free, that the Service Bureau charged a fee anywhere from three dollars to twenty dollars.

Tayama did not deny that some individuals were referred to the Service Bureau by the J.A.C.L., but these only when the League was unable to help them. He said no exorbitant charges were made, that all his clients were not only satisfied but many very grateful; he denied any unethical practises and said that charges that he was exploiting aliens' distress were outright distortions.

The stories, nevertheless, persisted, and followed Tayama right into Manzanar.

The other damaging rumor about Tayama which grew up in this period centered on his alleged mishandling of funds collected from Terminal Island fishermen. According to Tayama, and his statement is confirmed by Frank Ishii, Frank Ono, and George Inagaki, all fellow officers in the Southern District Council, Tayama himself never touched any of the funds of the Terminal Islanders. This money was entrusted to the care of Kiyoshi Higashi, who had served

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as president of the Terminal Island Chapter of the J.A.C.L. and who is still at Manzanar (as of January 7, 1943). The fact that Higashi and his wife lived with the Tayamas for several weeks prior to evacuation and occupied the same barrack at Manzanar for over seven months (up to the time of the riot) is accounted for by some as being the reason for the confusion on this score.

(For coverage on the Terminal Island fund and rumors about it, refer to later report on Kiyoshi Higashi.)

Note to Morton--This started out as a "personality sketch" as you instructed, but it has turned out to be a chronological account of Los Angeles & Southern California J.A.C.L. pre-evacuation activity as it centered around Fred Tayama. Perhaps it should have had a more appropriate heading. If this is not what you want, send me instructions immediately.

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Another story which attached itself to Tayama and provided fuel for the campaign of villification against the J.A.C.L. in general and Tayama in particular from the day Manzanar greeted the first volunteer evacuees was that the Citizens League conspired with certain government agencies to bring about evacuation. There were many different shadings to this story. They ranged from the extreme tale that the "J.A.C.L. sold out for a consideration" to pressure groups and the federal government (which the League subsequently took pains to prove was a fantastic fabrication) to the more reasonable charges that the J.A.C.L. failed to put up a stiff enough fight against evacuation.

In Los Angeles, demands for total evacuation of all Japanese, both citizens and aliens alike, began to be heard as early as mid-January. Nisei organizations found themselves arrayed

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against each other in a bitter dispute as to whether they should "cooperate" with federal officials who were already hinting that total evacuation would have to come, like it or not. In February, after President Roosevelt had taken the matter out of the hands of the Attorney General's office and placed the Army in full control, nisei organization representatives in Los Angeles were contacted by Colonel F. Magill, Jr., Provost Marshal for General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command.

Colonel Magill summoned a group of five Los Angeles Nisei leaders to the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco to drop the first definite word that total evacuation was on its way. The Southern California J.A.C.L. chapters were represented by Fred Tayama. Tom Clark, then Alien Coordinator of the Western Defense Command in a civilian capacity, told the group that federal agencies had made preparations for total evacuation.

Tayama officially broke the news to Southern Californians. He presided at a mass meeting held shortly after his return at the Maryknoll Catholic Church auditorium on Hewitt Street, just a stone's throw from the heart of Little Tokio. The meeting was sponsored by the Anti-Axis Committee. The news he had to break was bad news.

The majority of Nisei organizations in Los Angeles, through their spokesmen, refused to believe Tayama and the J.A.C.L. (that total evacuation was inevitable).

The dispute and bickering between the various groups had already developed into a fairly large scale organizational feud, and a rival United Citizens Federation composed of over 21 already--established groups had been formed to challenge the J.A.C.L. as a

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representative organ of the Japanese community--or at least of the citizen element.

The accusation that the J.A.C.L. had "sold us down the river" or had been "weak-kneed" in negotiations with the Army in attempting to protect at least the right of citizens to remain in their homes immune from evacuation was general.

Intense rivalry sprang up between the J.A.C.L. and the United Citizens Federation, with considerable personal acrimony. Tayama was in the very thick of it all.

At Manzanar, months after evacuation had been a complete and accomplished fact, the blame for the removal of all Japanese from the west coast still continued to be centered on the Japanese American Citizens League.

It might be mentioned here that in November, 1942, the Documentary Historians for Manzanar, Joe Masaoka and Togo Tanaka, lectured to five high school senior classes of instructor Miss Janet Goldberg on the subject "the Background of Japanese Evacuation." Questions were put to students at the beginning of each class, asking what they believed were the causes of the Japanese evacuation. It was interesting to note that answers from five of the students in different classes were: "The J.A.C.L. caused us to be evacuated." In one case, the name of Fred Tayama was specifically mentioned.

(As Tayama continued in activities of public prominence at Manzanar, these stories grew and spread during the seven months of his stay there).

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Personality Sketch No. 2

Another casualty of the Manzanar disturbance of December 6 who was subsequently removed from the Center to Death Valley was--

J o h n S o n o d a, who was set upon by a "group of about 20 kibeï" (according to his own version) at 8 o'clock Sunday night (at the height of the rioting) in mess hall 7 where Sonoda had gone to see a motion picture which was being screened. Sonoda was knocked unconscious by heavy blows from two-by-four clubs wielded by his assailants and left bleeding and limp on the floor of the kitchen. Within two hours, the rumor had spread through the camp that "John Sonoda was killed tonight." He suffered internal hemorrhoid of the head and eyes and had two stitches taken on his skull. He has recovered from his injuries as of this date (January 7, 1943) and is now waiting for a W.R.A. release so that he can go to Boulder, Colorado, where he has been accepted as an instructor in the Navy Japanese Language School at the University of Colorado.

Sonoda is 25, single, was born in Orange County, California and by usual standards, is a kibeï. He graduated high school in Kumamoto, Japan after studying there seven years, returned to the United States in 1935; he attended Woodbury College in Los Angeles, did sales work for an electrical appliance company shortly after leaving school, was office manager for the Union Chemical Company for several months when he suffered a nervous breakdown. In 1940 he joined the staff of the Japanese division, Occidental Life Insurance Company in Los Angeles, and was engaged in this profession

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until evacuation.

Unlike most kibeis, Sonoda speaks English without a trace of accent. He is described as the scholarly type, his English speech and diction adjudged by fellow workers as quite superior to that of the "average Nisei."

As Tayama was described by those who knew him as "dominating and very often stubborn to the point of bull-headed", Sonoda is described as "somewhat wishy washy and effeminate" from external observation. At Manzanar, Mr. S---, a former Japanese language newspaper editor, discussing the "Kibei mind" one day made the observation that both types (typified by Tayama & Sonoda) "make very good targets for physical assaults by these fanatics." (referring to the Kibei element)

Sonoda is a quiet-spoken young man, about 5 feet six inches in height, invariably well-groomed physically, sports a mustache, an almost dapper appearance. He is mild-mannered and inoffensive, comes from a well-to-do family, admits he never indulges in physical or manual labor, has very small, almost feminine hands.

His record at Manzanar embraced three different jobs. He came to the Center with the first volunteer group, secured a job with the Personnel and Employment Division; he held this position until June when he went over to the Manzanar Free Press Japanese section as a translator. In September, he quit the Free Press to work in the Dental Clinic.

At Manzanar, several rumors had been current about him.

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One was to the effect that he was "stuck up about his position and showed favoritism like nobody's business"; there was some resentment although it was not widespread. In commenting on this rumor, Sonoda quietly points out: "Most of the jobs that I had to assign people to in the first months required a knowledge of the English language; many of the Kibei who came to me couldn't speak English very well. I just had to give the jobs to those who could; that's why the rumor started."

Another rumor was to the effect that he quit the Free Press because he was scared out of his job after a beating which was administered to him by a group of Kibei headed by two persons whom Sonoda named as Ben Kishi and Richard Hashimoto. Sonoda says that he did not quit because he was "scared out," but he quit because he wanted "to learn dental mechanics." He related, however, that he was set upon and beaten in June by half a dozen Kibei headed by the above named persons.

Sonoda was attacked in June, he said, because "I was accused of discriminating against the Kibei in the Personnel and Employment division. Ben Kishi approached me one day and asked me to his barrack on a pretext. I went, and there were half a dozen fellows who jumped on me as I stepped into the door. They beat me, Ben Kishi was very emotional about it all. When he was telling me about my wrong attitude towards a lot of things, tears were streaming down his face. He said we were all Japanese and we all owed our allegiance to the Emperor of Japan, and all that. When that fellow's in that state of mind, it's no use talking to him, so I just said yes,

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and agreed with him. He later apologized, so I didn't press the charges." (This statement was made to me by Sonoda on January 6, 1943, at Death Valley, California, in the presence of Joseph Blamey, and Marie Shimizu).

Since that assault, Sonoda said he never received any warning or threatening note or letter of any kind, and had no reason to believe he was in for another attack when the rioting broke out on December 6. He did recall, however, that occasionally as he passed Block 18 enroute home or to the hospital, he was jeered at in Japanese by "several kibeï" who knew him by sight.

Sonoda's explanation as to why he should have been picked out and beaten by the "20 kibeï, none of whom I knew" is as follows:

"I never could get along with the Kibeï generally, although I am one myself. I never associated with them, even in Los Angeles. I can't think along a single track like most of them do; I don't believe in the same things they do. In Japan I was subjected to the liberal influences of an uncle who was quite forthright and outspoken about his views. He was the type which the military in Japan would not tolerate. The Kibeï are very race-conscious; I am not. They shy away from mixing with people of other races; I do not. I never went around expounding my views, but I guess my actions spoke more loudly than my words. In time, it's bound to get around, and my principles are something on which I refuse to back down upon. When that mob attacked me, I remember several fellows with ugly expressions yelling about my wrong thoughts. I don't know what I said in return, but I remember they rushed me into a corner so fast I didn't know what was happening. I have always been against violence and did not raise

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a hand to defend myself. I thought at first I could talk them out of it, but when I took a good look at their faces, I knew I was in for some kind of a beating. Before I knew it, I was out like a light; it didn't hurt at all; I have no recollection of it except when I woke up in the hospital. Friends told me that there were unofficial bulletins posted on the messhalls that evening announcing my death."

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Personality Sketch No. 3 --

H a r r y Y o s h i o U e n o, whose jailing as a suspect in the attack on Fred Tayama the night of December 5 precipitated the riot of the following day, is described as a "kibei". (For biographical data on Ueno, if necessary, consult W.R.A. at Manzanar, or write Mr. Kiyoshi Higashi, Chief of Internal Police).

Physically, Ueno is slight; he is about five feet three inches in height and weighs around 120 pounds; his features are thin, his complexion is described as "sallow". He is in his mid-thirties, married, and has two boys. (The foregoing should be checked for confirmation). In frequent speeches before groups which he addressed, he made references to "my own family about which I am thinking all the time--my wife and two children."

According to the Manzanar police records, Ueno was a fruit stand clerk in Los Angeles prior to evacuation. He is believed to have been born in Hawaii, then sent to Japan where he graduated Koto-gakko (equivalent to Junior high school) and attended high school on his return to the United States for one year. Not much is known of his record in Los Angeles except that he was employed in half a dozen different stores there as a clerk over a period of three years. His average monthly salary during that period was between \$80 and \$90; prior to evacuation he is reported to have told police (Manzanar) that he was earning \$125 monthly, his all-time high.

Ueno is a fluent and persuasive speaker in Japanese.

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His friends said of him, in the midst of his efforts to organize the Mess Hall Workers Union, "he's pretty smart guy all right." His Japanese speech is simple and understandable. His speaking voice, even when addressing one person, is high pitched; he often becomes excited. He has the habit, however, of dropping his eyes when talking or conversing with another person, seldom looking an individual "in the eyes"; this statement was once made by Joseph Kurihara, probably Ueon's closest bedfellow in the Manzanar disturbance. The occasion was an informal discussion about the wisdom of the Nisei following Ueon's so-called leadership.

Ueon's ability to write in either English or Japanese is rated "average" or "below average". He is not the academic or educated type.

His job at Manzanar was that of junior cook in Mess Hall 22, the block on which he resided, and also the block which was the center of the meetings at which the rioting mobs first assembled. It was at mess hall 22 also that Ueno, early in October, began formal organization of what he termed the "Manzanar Kitchen Workers Union". It was his reasoning, as he told those close to him, that "the person who controls the mess halls of Manzanar controls the whole relocation center." The mess division employed, at that time, a personnel of about 1600 persons, the largest single department of Manzanar. Ueno was not interested in control merely as an end in itself; this he told to all, and his friends were convinced of his sincerity when he said that "everything which I do, I am doing for the sake of the people of Manzanar. I have no selfish motives, and

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this unselfishness on my part will be recognized by the people."

Among his co-workers and friends, it went without saying that "all the Japanese have suffered a deep injustice in being thrown into these camps. No Nisei can lift his head and claim that he is a citizen of the United States. No citizen in these camps owes his allegiance or loyalty to America."

On the subject of the war, Ueno said he held one deep-seated conviction, and it was so deep-seated, he declared, that it was unshakeable. That was his firm belief that Japan would win the war, if she had not already won it and that in the ultimate end, his position and what he did on behalf of the Japanese at Manzanar would be vindicated, and he would emerge as the man who had saved the Japanese people, particularly the younger Nisei who seemed to be "so confused by everything."

Some evaluation of Ueno's personality, can also be obtained from the following verbatim transcript of notes made by Ueno in a blue spiral pocket notebook on the first two days of his arrest; the notebook was taken from him as he was jailed, but it contains his record of the arrest; it is scribbled in his own handwriting in English: \*\*

"Dec. 5, 1942

"9:00 P.M.

"Assistant Chief Police Mr. Williams knock the door Wife answered He was asleep Went to sleep 8:30 Told that come from police station Awake from bed Saw police car Dressed and rode on Police car Came to Police station, Asst. William ques,n.

2nd page--

"'You know why you came down her for'

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I thought FBI Mr. McCormick cald me that why I came

Asked where you was evening About 7:30 I got out my home Went to Block 7 and returned home. I went to bed about 8:30 P.M. Chief of Police asked the same question as Mr. William.

3rd page--

Mr. Campbell told "This is good case to send to state penitentiary."  
One hour waited here at Manzanar police station. Chief of Police came to the room and put hand cuffs on me also Mr. Campbell with him. Then took me to the front of the police station and Ch. of Police and myself rode on

4th page--

Chief of police ask  
"What you told to the FBI last time you saw him." I told him 'You better see Mr. McCormick yourself.

5th page--

"the back of car Mr. Campbell drove the car They told me to take me to the Independence jail. On the way I asked Ch. of Plice "Please tell my family where I am"  
Mr. Campbell said "No body hear where you are going to be for a long time. You should think about family long before.' 'I am thinking about my family always.' I said Then Mr. Campbell said "Too bad you son will going to be jailbird son.' Then I said 'You will be just same some of these day You arrived to Independence jail. They took off the hand-cuffs, then took everythings

7th page--

I had in the pocket. Arrived at 20 minutes to 11:00 P.M. Then they give me blanket and mattress I ever have since I am in Manzanar Mr. Campbell said "you will be here for a long time: I said 'You just don't forget that word.'

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8th page--

"I asked to have belt but they could not allow me. Next morning I asked to Shriff my cigarettes be return. He said you can not have anything that is their order."

9th page--

Dec. 6 1942

"Ch. of Police came to Independence at 4:00 P.M. to get me to come to Manzanar Arrived here at 4:20 P.M."

Apparently, it was shortly after his return to Manzanar that Ueno was again searched and the notebook in which he had kept a diary record of his experiences following his arrest was taken away from him. The misspellings, grammatical errors, notably lack of periods, are all copied in the foregoing.

## Personality Sketch No. 4.

Joseph Y. Kurihara, who was jailed by military order early in the evening of the December 6th riot, had a general reputation throughout Manzanar typified by his oft-repeated statement: "I am 100 per cent Japanese; I am proud of having Japanese blood in my veins and my spirit of yamato damashii; the American government can have my citizenship anytime; I don't want it!"

Kurihara was recognized as one of the two most voluble and dramatic spokesmen for the group which centered its activity first (1) in opposing any and all activity sponsored by the J. A. C. L. group and latterly (2) in initiating such activity as the organizing of the Mess Hall workers union. (This union, incidentally, was never recognized by the W.R.A. administration and its organizers were branded by administrators generally as 'agitators'.)

A veteran who had served overseas under the Stars and Stripes in the last war, Kurihara had been born in Hawaii and said he had never been to Japan. He made a great speaking point about these facts to convince his listeners of what he termed "the futility of trying to prove that American citizenship means anything; we're being treated just like a bunch of enemy aliens." He said on frequent occasions that he had challenged "every W.R.A. official I've ever met" to see if "I'm not justified in my stand and views" and "not a one ever challenged me; they always agreed that I was right." It was quite true that ~~WRA~~ <sup>Kurihara's</sup> administrators familiar with his case were, <sup>in general, sympathetic toward him</sup> ~~were to express sympathy for him.~~ WRA

In August, <sup>1942</sup> after Kurihara had made several public speeches which some listeners considered "subversive" and "anti-American", one project administrative officer said he had a talk with Kurihara. "I find Joe Kurihara very bitter about the entire situation, but he is bitter and sore in quite an American way," was his observation. The Assistant Project Director (~~Ned Campbell~~) in a conversation with a group at which Kurihara was not present, ~~once~~ remarked: "Hell, if I

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were Joe Kurihara, I'd be mad too. He was a veteran of the World War, was discharged from the United States Army honorably, had done his part as a citizen. It's just ~~like~~<sup>as</sup> if I had saved one of you guys from getting stabbed or killed in a street brawl, and you ~~had~~ rewarded me by kicking me into the gutter. Hell, sure I'd be bitter."

Kurihara said he was 48, single, had never married, had traveled extensively, and was an accountant by profession. He said that he had been forced to give up an income in excess of "\$650 a month" in San Diego on account of the evacuation. He did not, however, make any claims to being a man of means or wealth at all, and once said: "I don't have a damned cent or responsibility in the world, personally. I can afford to sacrifice my life for the cause of leading the Japanese people of Manzanar along the right path. If I should die or be killed, I know my followers will carry on for me."

In appearance, Kurihara presented the impression of an overworked and overstrained little fat man. (The writer knew him for several years before evacuation: Under the heading of J.Y. Kurihara, he contributed contributed unmerous articles to the Los Angeles Japanese Daily News which were published in the English Section. There was nothing in those articles which I can recall as having indicated any signs of his Manzanar attitudes.) TT

He stood five feet three or four inches in height, weighed about 150 pounds, was pudgy and rotund, an appearance heightened by the fact he was semi-bald. In pre-evacuation days, his address changed frequently, depending upon his work, but a semi-permanent residence was listed as "Terminal Island".

Kurihara's personality was not unattractive, and he commanded a certain ease in meeting people. At Manzanar, his nerves always seemed to be more taut; his eyes were almost always bloodshot, he went unshaved for days and as a result, inspired friends to jokingly remark that he "looked like a hobo". His reaction to evacuation was without a shadow of doubt, resentful, bitter, non-cooperative. His bitterness carried him beyond passive bitterness,

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however; he told his followers and friends that it was necessary to wreak vengeance. He said he had lost all his sense of humor (in pre-evacuation days, he was not known to have a very keen sense of humor despite the fact he was a fat man) and he was known to go about daily with a grim expression and said "I never joke, I am a serious man." His intelligence (in my estimation) was definitely above average, but there is no doubt that bitterness has clogged his ability to reason objectively in matters concerning the position of the American born Japanese who had been evacuated.

"I wouldn't lift a finger to help the American government, not a bit," he said both to small groups of friends and to large audiences which he addressed. "As far as I'm personally concerned, and I say it as a 100% Japanese, this goddam government can go straight to hell. I'll give my United States citizenship back to them at the snap of a finger. The Army put us in here, let the Army do all the work. They want to work us for \$16 a month, well I'm not," he once said.

From the day he arrived at Manzanar to the day he was arrested in connection with the riot of December 6, Kurihara never worked as a W.R.A. project employee. He was never on the payroll, persisted in his stand with determination.

He said: "I'd work night and day and work my head off--without pay--if it were for the welfare of the 10,000 people of Manzanar. I mean the Japanese people. I would do anything for them, and I only want a chance to prove it, but if it's for the government, I won't do a damned thing."

Kurihara's English speech was not without a slight trace of accent; it was typical of what the Nisei refer to as "Hawaii accent", but it was good, understandable English. He commanded a respectable numerical following among the younger teen-age and early-twenty Nisei at Manzanar outside the administrative ("white collar") office personnel. Truck drivers in the dispatches division, food handlers, warehouse workers, rubbish haulers and young men who did manual

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labor comprised the major bulk of his Nisei following. Most Nisei of this age and vocational grouping at Manzanar were wholly or partially attached to their Issei parents who still were generally recognized as "Head of Family". Kurihara made an important point of this relationship and stressed repeatedly the "virtue of filial piety which is a great source of strength of the Japanese spirit (yamato damashii)".

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the first J.A.C.L. group activity, an open public meeting to organize a "Manzanar Citizens Federation" in August, furnished the occasion for Kurihara's ostensible "public" debut at the Center. In the forum session which was a part of the evening's organization program, Kurihara volunteered to take the floor half a dozen times to "oppose any Citizens group which discriminates against our fathers. I am in favor of a Japanese Welfare Association to work for the good of all the Japanese here, because citizenship doesn't mean a thing here." His statements were repeated with conviction by scores of young men in different work divisions the following weeks, and he was soon regarded as something of a leader and hero among a certain element in the Center. Notably, one "gang" at Manzanar roughly labelled as the "Dunbar gang" (variously estimated as being a loosely-knit group of between 85 and 125 youths in their late teens and early twenties) looked upon Kurihara as "the man who will solve our future and protect our welfare."

Among the Issei Japanese he did not command the same type of personal following, but his point of view was generally commended. It should be pointed out in this regard that there may have been a good number who condemned and opposed his point of view but who, under the circumstances, felt silence was the wiser.

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Kurihara's Japanese speech is average, but he is quite fluent and considered a good speaker. He cannot read and write Japanese very well, however, or at least created that impression.

He was frequently seen together with Harry Yoshio Ueno, engaged in almost daily visits with various individuals throughout the Center.

Because he refused to work on W.R.A. projects, because he openly opposed sugar beet furlough by Nisei volunteer workers, because he opposed the operation of the canteen and dry goods store (because they're really another scheme to impoverish the Japanese people, as he put it,) Kurihara was labelled by the element composed largely of office personnel and Nisei close to the Administration as "a little off" or "a fanatic" or "an agin everything".

Kurihara did not appear to be secretive about his intentions. As early as September, he let it be known--so it could be repeated possibly--that he had drawn up a "death list" of marked individuals in the Center. This "death list" was largely composed of individuals who had been active in the J.A.C.L. or in the effort to form the "Manzanar Citizens Federation". By mid-September, Manzanar's No. 1 public secret among the Japanese-speaking population was this "death list".

On Sunday, December 6, at the afternoon meeting held at block 22 preceding the rioting, the "death list" was read out over the public address system which had been commandeered for the occasion.

Half the intended victims were no longer residents of the Center, and the remainder had been forewarned months in advance that they had been "marked".

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Personality Sketch No. 5

Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum was the second man\*\* whose name was read off on the "death list" over the loudspeaker at block 22 on the afternoon of Sunday, December 6. The Slocums lived at Block 24, approximately 250 yards from the scene of the meeting. The meeting had been called to organize a demand for the release of Harry Yoshio Ueno who had been jailed the night before as a suspect in the attack on Fred Tayama. At 6:35 P.M. a mob of several hundred persons stormed the barrack which had been occupied by the Slocums. No one was home, but the mob gained entry into the room and left considerable damage.

Slocum was born in Japan of Japanese parentage; he came to the United States as boy not yet in his teens, was taken in by the Slocum family of Minot, South Dakota (it might be North Dakota, for confirmation, check other records), and was adopted into the family. He grew up in a community where Japanese were few. He served in the World War overseas in France, and as he endlessly told anyone who would listen: "I was the only Japanese sergeant-major in the American Expeditionary Force; I served in the same battalion as Sergeant York." He suffered shell shock and gas injuries in combat duty, received an honorable discharge, became an active member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion.

Before evacuation, he was a civil service employee of the city of Los Angeles at Van Nuys, California, a job secured, he said, through his connections with the Legion. He is in his middle forties and has been married the past seven or eight years to the former Ayako Sally Yabumoto of Anthony, New Mexico, who, like her husband, grew up in a community where Japanese neighbors were comparatively rare. The Slocums have two children, a boy and a girl. It is Slocum's second marriage, his first having been to a girl of

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First man on the list was Fred Tayama.

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Irish parentage "back in New York"; this marriage lasted, he said, for about ten years; there were no children by it.

Among those who said they were his friends and enemies alike, Slocum has been described as an "unusual character". It is accurate to say that he had more than the average man's share of enemies, both before and after evacuation; and these, it seemed, were largely among the Japanese people. That he also had many friends with whom he maintained contacts, though seldom if ever socially, among "Caucasians" (is the term proper here to denote non-Japanese? TT) was also evident. Slocum had secured his American citizenship through passage by Congress in 1935 of the Oriental Veterans Citizenship Act, for which he was wont to claim single-handed credit. In this endeavor, he had been financed by the Japanese American citizens League partially; his wife before her marriage, and for quite some time after, was also active in J.A.C.L. work.

In the year preceding war, the Slocums had lived almost completely apart from the so-called Japanese community of Los Angeles. They had gained the reputation of being "quarrelsome, undesirable neighbors" during a brief period when they had lived in the "35th Street westside district" (a 'Japanese neighborhood' centering around West 35th Street and Normandie in Los Angeles). Slocum figured in bitter personal disputes with members of the Los Angeles J.A.C.L. and dropped out of its activities completely. He had been serving as a member of the Advisory Editorial Board of the Los Angeles Japanese Daily News, fought with every member of that group, individually and collectively, suddenly resigned.

From Slocum's point of view, he had fought and resigned from these activities because he was anxious to lead the Nisei "in the true paths of Americanism," while "you hyphenated pro-Japs don't seem to understand my way of thinking." From the point of view of his adversaries, "Slocum's been gassed in gassed in the war and doesn't seem to make much sense; besides the guy drinks too much and then gets all excited." Rumors passed about the Japanese community

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reflecting unfavorably upon his moral standards, his habits, his personality. Whether these touched him or not, he soon removed himself completely from the "Japanese community" except occasionally to make inquiries of the handful of contacts (notably one, Ken Matsumoto, in '38 president of the Los Angeles J. A. C. L. and subsequently National vice-president) regarding activities of certain individuals.

He was quite active in the Inglewood Post of the American Legion, participated equally in the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He maintained an attitude of open contempt for the Japanese veterans (U.S.Army) group, the Commodore Perry Post No. 125 of the American Legion which had been formed in the Little Tokio area. (It might be interesting to note here that J. Y. Kurihara at one time was a member in this group).

In the latter part of 1940, a fairly well grounded story made the rounds of Japanese circles in Los Angeles that Slocum was turning in information about his personal enemies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Intelligence. He had gained the reputation of being a "spy" and an "informer" on his "own people", according to these Japanese versions. Those who condoned his activity, among the Nisei, on the ground that he was doing no more than any loyal American citizen should do, expressed doubt as to Slocum's ability to judge others. He was considered the "emotional type" incapable of calm, deliberate, and objective judgment. This evaluation of his capabilities seemed to have been concurred in by American Legionnaires who knew him at close hand. Bob Snyder, former County Commander of the Los Angeles American Legion, once said: "Tokie's a good boy, but he sometimes goes over the deep end. His heart's in the right place, and he means well, but he loses his temper, then blooey!"

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His physical appearance is not impressive; he stands about five feet four inches in height, weight about 130 pounds, has a mannerism about him that indicates he is thoroughly scrutinizing the person with whom he is talking. He strikes one as being "suspicious" of "every damned Jap around here; you've got to be careful", carrying this attitude to extremes. He has a sense of humor, however, and a loud laugh.

Both he and his wife speak little--almost no--Japanese. They evacuated to Manzanar with their two children on April 28, 1942, and from the day they landed to the night they were whisked out of camp under Army escort (at the height of the riot), they said they were unhappy in their situation and couldn't stand the "atmosphere". They were decidedly "misfits" in the Manzanar setting. They were extremely unpopular on their own block, having a very limited number of friends, and these, it appeared, largely out of sufferance.

To go back, when war broke out December 7, 1941, Slocum re-appeared in Little Tokyo; he accompanied the F.B.I. agents who arrested officers and leading supporters of the Central Japanese Association of America, with headquarters in the Miyako Hotel. Slocum had publicly attacked this organization as a "nefarious hotbed of subversive activities"; when the wholesale round-up of its leaders began, condemnation ranging from "inu" (literally "dog", but meaning "stoolpigeon") to "witchhunter" was generally heaped upon his name among the Japanese-speaking element. He was more feared, however, than he was hated, among the Issei generally. Nevertheless, to those who had professed their loyalty and allegiance to the United States in the event of war, his position had been vindicated, and he returned to the J.A.C.L. fold more or less as a hero. He was immediately made chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee.

--More to kum--

The activities which Slocum directed as Chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee, in the four and a half months following war's outbreak to evacuation, served to intensify previous feeling against him. The widespread publicity attached to his renewed entry into "public" life among the Japanese added to the distrust and fear that older Japanese held ~~for~~ of him. This followed him into Manzanar.

A glimpse into his personality, and that part of it which led some of his colleagues to say "he has an utter and complete lack of tact and understanding of the other fellow's point of view in an argument" was afforded at a Southern District J.A.C.L. conference in Santa Ana early in 1942, before evacuation of Japanese was yet under consideration. Many of the assembled delegates to the conference were the sons and daughters of men prominent in Japanese Associations and had been taken into custody by the F.B.I. Privately, virtually all of these J.A.C.L.-ers said they were perfectly willing and prepared to accept the situation, realizing that their fathers owed allegiance, as enemy aliens and subjects of Japan, to the enemy; while it was difficult and tragic to be placed in this situation, they were prepared to do so. Slocum, it was said, was fully cognizant of this situation. Yet he seized the opportunity at this conference to speak to the delegates boasting: "I led the F.B.I. over the top when war started; I took them to the ratholes and had them locked up. The trouble with the Nisei has been they've been under the influence of their parents too long."

This statement, and subsequent ones in which Slocum sought to put over the idea of complete loyalty to the national ties--without completely destroying family ties--were invariably misunderstood.

"Slocum says for us to throw away and abandon our parents." "Slocum wouldn't know what parent love is, he never had it." "Slocum thinks we can make good Americans by persecuting our parents." These statements by intelligent Nisei were quite typical of reaction to Slocum's efforts and activities

as Chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee, and several months later, at Manzanar, when he again spoke at the organization meeting of the proposed Manzanar Citizens Federation.

At Manzanar, rumors that "Slocum is an F.B.I. agent" cropped up as early as May, 1942, immediately following his arrival at the Center. These rumors were frequently traced to Slocum himself who privately let it be known among enough people for such circulation that he was in constant correspondence with agents of the F.B.I. in Los Angeles as well as prominent officials in the veterans groups to which he belonged. He was unemployed at the Center for several months, apparently devoting his time to "watching", as he himself described his activities. He was principal speaker at the first Memorial Day observance held at Manzanar; on that occasion, he made a plea for "complete and unreserved faith in our Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt. We who are loyal American citizens are serving on this new battlefield; and it's a tougher battle than if we were actually on the fighting fronts." The speech was well-received by the listening audience of about 1,000 persons. Slocum had injected enough in it to voice the growing feeling among Nisei that a rank injustice had been perpetrated upon them in the evacuation.

The rumors about Slocu, however, particularly those insisting that he was a "troublemaking snooper and an informer" persisted. He was actually avoided by his former J.A.C.L. colleagues on the Anti-Axis committee, but this largely on personal grounds. When a dozen J.A.C.L. members in May, 1942, began holding weekly meetings to discuss their common problems, Slocum was never invited. Actually, at one meeting into which he accidentally happened to stumble, members quietly withdrew, one by one, to another meeting place to liquidate his presence. There is no doubt but that Slocum felt the snub. He was in the habit of approaching these individuals singly, and in confidential manner, whisper his

suspicious about another individual's "pro-Japanese" attitude. A common charge raised by Slocum was: "So-and-so's straddling the fence; he's trying to play both sides. What do you think?"

In June, shortly after the Wartime Civil Control Administration at Manzanar had been replaced by the War Relocation Authority, Slocum got a job on the Center Police force as a special investigator. This, and the fact that he was reputed to be in constant contact with the F.B.I. in Los Angeles, contributed to the numerous new rumors which were continually popping up. Most Issei feared him. The Slocums moved from Block 14 to Block 24 but found practically no Issei friends, although they made neighborly overtures and attempted to conform to their situation.

By August, when the initial trouble over the camouflage net factory had grown to camp-wide proportions, Slocum privately admitted that he was in fear for his own life. He took unusual precautions. Whenever a truck or car approached him, either from front or rear, on one of Manzanar's narrow streets, he was in the habit of making a dash to the side of the road and into a fire-break. He avoided large groups and gatherings in the open.

When the meetings of the Manzanar Citizens Federation were held, Slocum required police escort for his own safety. In October, when the linoleum laying for barrack floors was under way, Slocum narrowly escaped serious injury when, as he was sitting on the steps of the Block 4 Manager's office (Karl Yoneda--more about him in a subsequent personality sketch--TT) a truck suddenly backed into the doorway and 100 pound roll of linoleum was thrown at him. He ducked in time, the flooring cracked under the weight of the roll. The whole procedure was "accidental"; but when a linoleum crew truck backed into the doorway of his own barrack, unloosening the door from its hinges, Slocum charged that attempts were being made to kill him. "The

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Kibei say they are going to bury me alive some day," he said often.

Among the Japanese-speaking population at Manzanar, Slocum, more than any other single person, was blamed on each occasion that the F.B.I. came into the Center and departed with an evacuee in custody--due probably for internment.

The fact that many of the men first arrested in Dec. 1941 and sent to temporary detention camps had since been released or paroled and returned to be with their families at Manzanar did not help modify the feeling against Slocum. Many Nisei even pointed out that "Slocum said they were spies and helped get them arrested when war started. The government has investigated and found them innocent. He's been a first rate witch hunter, and all in the name of his flag-waving patriotism." (This same was said of others, Tayama, Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaolo, but in lesser degree). TT

As rumors grew and threats abounded, withdrew more and more from public view at Manzanar. He never attended meetings, made no effort to participate in so-called "community activity". By November, there was almost no talk about him; he had been virtually forgotten--except by the small group of organized "We are 100% Japanese" proponents led by Ueno and Kurihara.

When the riot of December 6 broke out, the Slocums were second in following the Tayamas out of Manzanar and into the military barracks for their protection. Five days later, the Slocums were enroute to Anthony, New Mexico, where Mrs. Slocum's parents reside. They had previously applied for and received a permit for relocation. Slocum had already secured a job in Washington with a federal agency through one of his veterans' contacts, he said, and showed (at the military barracks after the riot) a letter which indicated he would receive a salary of \$60 a week. He left January 5, 1943 from El Paso, Texas, for Washington, D.C.

## Personality Sketch No. 6.

G e n j i Y a m a g u c h i, Manager of block 13, for a while temporary chairman of the Block Leaders Council (before the change to Block Managers was instituted), and chairman of the committee to Oppose Self-Government, was reported to have been taken into custody on the day of the Dec. 6 riot as one of the leading agitators. He was arrested along with other members of a committee attempting to negotiate for the release of Harry Yoshio Ueno.

Unlike previous personalities covered in these sketches, Yamaguchi is not a United States citizen; he is an alien.

(I have little biographical data on Yamaguchi; hearsay indicates that he is in his late forties or early fifties, is married, has one or two children; that his wife was expecting another baby at the time of his arrest; that he was a gardener in Los Angeles before evacuation.)

His record in connection with the riot may be of some value to the study here because he symbolized the only articulate Issei influence in Manzanar which seemed to grow without any opposing restraints from among the people themselves. That Yamaguchi furnished ideological stimulants for Ueno and Kurihara was recognized beyond doubt; the latter two were frequent visitors both at the block office (13) and at the former's home. At consumer co-operative meetings, at gatherings to discuss the proposed self-government system, Yamaguchi and Ueno supplemented each other's positions, made it known that they stood together. Yamaguchi's conception of the Manzanar Relocation Center was explained by him as follows: "We here are all in the same boat; it makes no difference whether some of us are citizens of the United States and others are enemy aliens. The true facts are that we are all prisoners of war. Furthermore, we are parents and children, together. We do not have to depend upon the United States government for our well-being. We are dependent only upon the Imperial Government of Japan. If conditions are not as they should be, in our opinion, then it is our duty to contact the Spanish Ambassador and demand an investigation. If we are mistreated, Japan will avenge us after she has won a glorious victory."

Yamaguchi was not highly regarded as a man of any exceptional intelligence or ability by the majority of Issei who knew him, but his willingness to speak out, to assume responsibility, to work for what he said was "the common good of all the Japanese," his grim seriousness about "our future destiny" led many to accept him as their leader. Among many Issei, however, there was a common saying that "Any one who tires to stick his nose out and be a big shot in a place like this is a jackass" or words to that effect. Nevertheless, in all the activities that preceded the Dec. 6 rioting, Yamaguchi stood out among the Issei as the martyr to their cause; reports from Manzanar since the incident seem to point to an increase in his stature in the estimation of the people there. "He did it for our sakes" is heard more often than "Why didn't the old fool keep his trap shut?"

In appearance, Yamaguchi was the "hard-working Japanese gardener type". He stood about five feet four inches in height, weighed around 135 pounds, was fairly solid, dark complexioned. His hands were hard, apparently from gardening work. His voice was unusually high-pitched, a tenor, and on occasions when he orated (in Japanese always) about the need "for all of us to be more serious about our future", he literally shrieked.

He did not, as some Issei did, condemn the Nisei for retaining their loyalty to the United States, although he declared that his own children would grow up as "true Japanese" (honto-no-nihonjin). He held such Nisei as represented by the J.A.C.L. as "foolish and misled because they do not realize that in the long run it will be race that counts. They can never become a part of America, which was meant for the white man, and the white Americans never will let them become a part of this country. Their children will suffer just as ours are because we did not wake up in time to realize this."

However, he accepted the arguments of Nisei leaders such as Fred Tayama, with whom he appeared on fairly good speaking terms and outwardly said he wished them well. He said, however: "You Nisei who are loyal to the United States of

America have no business staying in Manzanar. You had no business coming here in the first place, except maybe to spy on us and to report to the F.B.I. You should get out of here and do so right away. This camp is only for those of us who are prisoners of war. You don't expect to stay in here until the war is over, then go out and expect the American people to accept you? They'll ask, what did you do to help win the war? What can you say? Why, young men your ages are now giving their lives for their country!"

When he was told that most Nisei would gladly relocate and intended doing so, but many, because of their youth and inexperience were being discouraged from doing so mainly because of men like himself and the arguments they presented, he invariably countered with:

"Well, then why don't you so-called Nisei leaders get out first? You've just been misleading the younger Nisei: we'll take care of them so that they will have a place in the sun when Japan wins the war."

Speech: Yamaguchi's speaking English was fair for an Issei, his auditory understanding of the language good. He was not at ease, however, in meeting Caucasians, was more often than not, stiff and courteous. He knew enough, however, to teach an evening class in Spanish--or rather conversational Mexican which he had acquired through personal contacts with Mexicans. He is described by Charles Ferguson, adult school principal at Manzanar who placed Yamaguchi in the teaching work as: "not such a good teacher, really, but a guy who tires very hard and evidently is successful in getting an unusual turnout. Why he had over 60 pupils in his first week; his is one of the biggest adult evening classes."

A rumor went about, however, but it was unconfirmed, that the Spanish classes furnished an opportunity for evening meetings of Yamaguchi's ideological bedfellows. A ban had been instituted against meetings in Japanese language following the Kibei meeting (in August or September, check other records for exact date TT)

and most Issei were reluctant to attend any meeting in violation of Center regulations. It might be pointed out here, though, that the ruling prohibiting meetings in Japanese was never closely followed.

--More to kum--

## Evacuee Attitudes --

toward Camp Conflicts which culminated in the Dec. 6 riot:

Fully a month after the Manzanar disturbance in which Harry Yoshio Ueno, Joseph Kurihara, Genji Yamaguchi, and several others branded as "agitators" were jailed, there was still considerable expression of sentiment within the Center demanding their release and return to Manzanar.

On the day after the riot, three representatives from each block were elected--at the direction of the existing block managers' council--to represent the "people of Manzanar".. The 108 assembled delegates at their initial meeting named a "Koshain" (Negotiating Committee) composed of four of their number; this committee was headed by Thomas Ozamoto, a Nisei of excellent bilingual capacities, formerly of Los Angeles, who had received his Japanese education at Waseda University in Tokyo. This Negotiating Committee undertook as its first job the pressing of urgent demands upon the Project Director's office for the "immediate release of Ueno, Kurihara and all persons jailed" in the December 6 disturbance.

An ultimatum was served upon the Project Director, Mr. Ralph Merritt, declaring that the general strike (almost all of the Center's 4,500 evacuee workers remained at home fearful of reporting to work, for a week after the incident) would continue so long as the arrested men were not released. In the course of the prolonged negotiations, in which Ozamoto served as spokesman for the "people of Manzanar", demands were presented for "an investigation by the Spanish Ambassador". A call to Washington, placed by Director Merritt, brought the Spanish Consul at San Francisco to the Relocation Center. In the meantime, Regional War Relocation Authority Director, E. R. Fryer, had flown into Manzanar. When the Negotiating Committee persisted in its demands for "outright release" of the Ueno-Kurihara group, Fryer interposed, declaring to the Committee: "The disposal of their cases (the jailed men) is completely

out of the jurisdiction of Mr. Merritt; once they are out of Manzanar, the War Relocation Authority in Washington has complete control; if you gentlemen wish something to be done, get in touch with Washington." (This was the version of that meeting given to me by Ned Campbell, former Assistant Project Director who was in charge of the Death Valley Camp during the first two weeks. TT)

As negotiations appeared stalemated,<sup>and</sup> the entire atmosphere of the Center remained tense and drawn, with military police literally at every corner both within and without, the Negotiating Committee is said by Director Merritt to have suddenly announced: "We will permit all the workers to return to their jobs and call off the strike if the Spanish Consul tells us to."

A meeting between the Spanish Consul and the Negotiating Committee was held at the Town Hall. According to Merritt, the Consul returned from the meeting "completely disgusted with the Committee; they're impossible." Nevertheless, Merritt, said, a telephone call was put in to Washington where conversations ensued with the State Department and the Spanish Embassy; the message was relayed to the Negotiating Committee that the Spanish Ambassador ordered the Japanese to "go right back to work and quit raising so much trouble." This information was conveyed to the Negotiating Committee, which in turn reported it to the 108 block representatives. Merritt then relates that Ozamoto returned the next day with the statement: "The Issei are now willing to return to work because they are satisfied that the Spanish Ambassador has ordered them to do so on behalf of the Japanese government, but not the Nisei. They are not represented by the Spanish Ambassador, they are American citizens."

Merritt did not disclose the nature of his reply to that statement, but described it as "the height of something or another, don't you think?"

Throughout these proceedings, it was evident and clear that public opinion--that part of it which was articulate and expressed--was almost completely in sympathy with the men who had been jailed. "They did it for us"

was the popular and commonly accepted view. Ueno and Kurihara had been martyrs for a cause--the welfare of the people of Manzanar. At the same time, there was little--if any--articulate sentiment on behalf of the score of men and women who had been taken out of Manzanar under military protective custody--the individuals whose names graced the "death list" and the "black list". These persons were generally labelled as "inu" (stoolpigeons, informers, dogs) who had persecuted their own people.

Without doubt, predominant conversation within the Center--or at least conversation in which people dared to engage--was openly sympathetic to the arrested men, and blame for the riot, for the deaths of two men shot by the military, for injuries suffered by half a dozen others, for the conditions in general--was placed entirely on the shoulders of "the dogs who have run away", referring to the group taken to Death Valley.

That the latter group, known within the Center via grapevine to be enroute to permanent relocation on the outside, had a minority following within Manzanar, was evident through a number of signs. Within the three weeks following the riot, nearly 1,000 applications for permanent relocation, nearly all of them Nisei, virtually flooded the office of Walter Heath, in charge of relocation. Furthermore, not all of the so-called J.A.C.L. group had been whisked out of the Center by the military. Kiyoshi Higashi, former Chairman of the Southern District of the Japanese American Citizens League, who had served (and continues to serve) as Chief of Internal Security at Manzanar, remains at the Center. On the night of the riot, his barrack room, which he shares with Fred Tayama, was entered by rioters, and most of his belongings were smashed. Higashi had taken his family and entrenched himself in Block 9, exclusively occupied by former Terminal Islanders. (Largely fishermen of San Pedro, California.) The report soon went about the Center that "Higashi has a thousand of those tough Terminal Islanders protecting him." The riot stayed clear of Blocks 9 and 10.

Manzanar -- Tanaka

Higashi soon began appearing everywhere escorted by a score of husky youths. Within the week, the report was circulating that the "Terminal Island gang" was ready to beat up or kill anyone who molested Higashi or any unofficial list of persons Higashi had pledged to protect.

Just where the division of sympathies between the two extremes (Ueno-Kurihara on one hand, Tayama on the other) among the 10,000 people of Manzanar existed on December 6 and the weeks both preceding and following can only be roughly guessed. There is no doubt that the former commanded the majority following; there is also no doubt that this following consisted of the element capable of using violence, whereas the opposite appeared to be true of the Tayama following, if it may be called such.

On December 7, the morning after the riot, block managers throughout the Center distributed 3/4-inch wide black arm bands, instructing residents to wear them constantly "until the funeral" of James Ito, 17, of block 4, first of the two to die in the shooting by military police at the height of the riot. It was reported that block managers at a meeting had unanimously concluded that Ito's death had been "for the welfare of the people of Manzanar", and camp-wide mourning was considered advisable. This was also understood among some block leaders as a "protest" against the "cowardly shooting by the military, furthering the injustices against the Japanese." While check-ups of arm-band wearers showed differing tallies, depending upon the block (It was almost unanimous on blocks 4 and 22), an estimate based on various reports (obtained from 14 persons who were in the Center through the week--Japanese evacuees, not Caucasian administrators), between one-half and two-thirds of the adults throughout the Center wore the arm bands for several days. Of these, approximately half appeared to be complying "out of fear of reprisal or intimidation", only a "small percentage" seemed to make an issue of the arm-band, wearing it "aggressively" as the block managers generally urged their residents. In some blocks, a nightly

reminder was said to have been delivered to persons seen during the day without their arm-bands.

The predominant evacuee attitude, either of "neutrality" or pro-Ueno-Kurihara leanings in the riot may be traced to a statistical basis. A census check-up made by Arthur Miller, head of the Employment and Personnel Division, revealed that "the Kibei and Issei Japanese-speaking element outnumbered the Nisei by over two to one among males over 18 years of age at Manzanar." This meant that the Japanese-indoctrinated and generally "pro-Japanese" male population had not only an age and experience advantage over the English-speaking Nisei group, it had also a decided numerical edge, at Manzanar. This situation itself, long before the December 6 riot, had made it inevitable that control of "community" activities (i.e., the Block managers' council, community cooperatives, etc.) should gravitate into the hands of the Japanese-speaking element, which turned out to be the case.

-- More to Kum--

## AN ANALYSIS of

Contributing Causes of the Manzanar Riot --

The Manzanar riot of December 6, 1942, and probably less serious disturbances yet to come, can safely be traced to beginnings in the governmental decision for total evacuation on a racial--rather than individual--basis.

On this basis, the underlying situation which furnished the setting and ingredients for a riot was unavoidable. Serious thinking individuals within the relocation center have likened the "mass dumping of evacuees from all walks and stations of life, holding diametrically opposing views regarding the war" to the attempted mixing of "oil and water". The two elements are foreign to each other.

Over and above the government agencies' apparent failure to recognize the incompatibility of two conflicting groups within a racial population, the whole evacuation procedure itself inevitably brought hatred, misunderstanding, disillusionment, bitterness. In the final showdown at Manzanar, personalities ostensibly heading the two major groups at conflict in reality counted for little--as far as the majority of the people were concerned. It might just as well have been that Ueno and Tayama's positions had been reversed, so far as their ideologies, and it would have been Ueno who would have been attacked and driven out of Manzanar, the scapegoat of an apparent majority sentiment.

Efforts of pre-evacuation J.A.C.L. leaders to continue their activities within Manzanar were undoubtedly a contributing cause to the situation which eventually culminated in the December 6 riot. That the J.A.C.L., and the individuals who more or less stood impressed in the public mind as representing it (Fred Tayama, Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, Tad Uyeno, Tom Imai) as a group enjoyed little--if any--popularity at Manzanar from the outset of the project is generally conceded. There was prevalent among many individuals, particularly early arrivals at Manzanar who had secured administrative and other key positions, the fear that the "same J.A.C.L. bunch is going to try to get

control of Manzanar and run things to their own liking." This feeling was quickly demonstrated. None of the so-called J.A.C.L. group was welcomed into administrative or other jobs; a proposal by a J.A.C.L.-er that "public speaking and human relations" classes be started to "cement relations between the people and the administrative officers" received a frigid reception. The W.C.C.A. attitude toward the J.A.C.L. during April and May inspired the group to organize informally; Fred Tayama was acknowledged as the chairman, and contacts were regularly maintained with "National" headquarters of the Citizens League at Salt Lake City.

During the initial phase of J.A.C.L. activity (which, incidentally, was officially recognized, as the administration let it be known that there would be 'no organized activity outside the community services'), members directed their energies in two general directions: (1) They griped, grouched, kicked, and complained about the inadequate housing facilities, food, and crude conditions in general at the relocation center; (2) they protested against the already-entrenched Issei control of the Block Leaders' Council, discussing at length the most effective means of removing such leadership and establishing themselves, on the grounds that Issei influence was "detrimental to younger Nisei attitudes."

These activities had two significant results. First, they added administrative discredit to the already existing burden of unpopularity on the J.A.C.L. name within the Center; secondly, they intensified the Issei-Nisei conflict arising out of opposing national ties in a war between the United States and Japan.. This latter conflict was centered in a bitter, personal battle of words and feelings between Fred Tayama and Ted Akahoshi, alien but father of U.S. citizen children. Akahoshi was the first Chairman of the Block Leaders' Council, intended originally as the self-governing body for evacuees.

Tayama accused Akahoshi of harboring "subversive" views, specifically that the latter was sympathetic to Japan in the war. Akahoshi in turn expressed the belief that anyone in the position of an evacuee in a relocation center was entitled to hold any beliefs he wished, that one's views on the war should have no bearing upon one's qualifications to participate in the Block leader's council; that "everyone in here is in the same boat, and we should all pull together." Obviously, in the light of subsequent developments, this "pulling together" never materialized. Tayama and Akahoshi, to all surface observations very good friends in pre-evacuation days, remained bitter Manzanar enemies. This enmity in turn affected individuals whose names had in the past been associated with each of the principals, and the two "groups" crystallized, not only in each other's minds, but in the general impression created by camp rumor.

In June, shortly after the War Relocation Authority supplanted the Wartime Civil Control Administration at Manzanar, the jockeying and maneuvering of the Tayama group as against the Akahoshi group (represented largely by the majority membership of the growing Block Leaders' Council) was climaxed by a rumor that the Administration was preparing to summarily remove Fred Tayama and his family from Manzanar because he was considered more or less as a "trouble-maker". At this time, Akahoshi and his long-time friend, Frederick Ogura, block Leader of Block 1, were said to have paid a "friendly" call upon Tayama, cautioning him to "keep quiet and not get involved in too many activities because the Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell has warned us that the Administration is preparing to oust you from camp." The alleged threat was brought out into the open at a Block Leaders' Council session shortly afterwards by Joe Masacka in behalf of Fred Tayama, and Campbell publicly denied making any such asserted statement; Akahoshi and Ogura declared they had been misunderstood and no such impression was intended. The incident was soon forgotten, but rumors persisted for several weeks that such individuals as Tayama, Masacka,

Tanaka, Tad Uyeno (i.e., those linked with the J.A.C.L. group) faced sudden ouster from Manzanar much in the same manner that Dr. T. G. Ishimaru had been sent from the Santa Anita Assembly Center sometime in May to the Poston Relocation Center on 1-day's notice because he had written (presumably this was the cause, according to the rumors) a letter to the Secretary of War protesting against food and housing conditions at Santa Anita.

There is no doubt but that the J.A.C.L. group was attempting to alleviate hardships and poor conditions at Manzanar, and its individual members were sincere in believing they were working on behalf of the evacuees. There is also no doubt that these motives were misunderstood by the majority of the Issei within the camp, due in some measure to the unfortunate (from the standpoint of center harmony and later developments) conflict symbolized by the Tayama-Akahoshi feud.

The impression early gained among the Japanese-speaking population that the J.A.C.L. was persecuting the Japanese people, spying upon innocent Issei for the F.B.I. (an impression due more to the activities of a single individual than to any group --that individual in the estimation of the J.A.C.L. group being Tokutaro Slocum), that the J.A.C.L. was, to translate a frequently-used Japanese expression, "putting a nose around our necks."

Several months later, when the then Project Director Roy Nash (whose general unpopularity among the people of Manzanar was the subject of scores of vicious rumors) announced that the Block Leaders Council would be supplanted by an Elected Community Council limited to United States citizens, a camp-wide furore arose; it was directed principally against the J.A.C.L.; its chief target was Fred Tayama, its lesser targets the individuals associated with him.

An administrative announcement explaining that the new proposed self-government, limiting elective office in the Council to American citizens, was handed down in an instructive regulation from Washington failed to mollify Issei ruffled feelings. The rumor again was camp-wide that the National J.A.C.L. had been responsible for the "discriminatory" ruling which was aimed against the Issei.

This feeling was all the more intense because the new structure of proposed self-government in the first place was to supplant an already-existing body (the Block Leaders Council, which had been changed to Block Managers' Council, and the nature of the jobs changed), and secondly because it followed the unsuccessful effort by the J.A.C.L. group to organize a "Manzanar Citizens Federation" in July and August. The Citizens Federation organizers discovered rabble-rousing opposition in the person of Joseph Kurihara, who had been in the almost constant company of Frederick Ogura, who in turn had been close to Ted Akahoshi. All three shared a common dislike and antipathy toward the J.A.C.L. in general, Fred Tayama in particular, and took little pains to conceal these feelings.

With this background, into which there had been interspersed literally hundreds of rumors regarding all of the individuals connected with the J.A.C.L., it is only a logical development for Issei sentiment--that part of it which concurred in the views and activities of the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group which more or less assumed active leadership when Ted Akahoshi, apparently "sick of it all" resigned in September--to become further solidified when, in October and November, Fred Tayama suddenly was elected Chairman of the Manzanar Work Corps, and Togo Tanaka was elected chairman of the Commission on Self-Government.

Both these latter efforts by two individuals associated in Manzanar minds as "J.A.C.L.-ers" were, from the standpoint of objectives attained,

unsuccessful. Tayama's attempt to carry out the W.R.A. administrative instructions in the formation of a Work Corps brought him the spirited opposition of Harry Yoshio Ueno who instantly began the organization of the "Japanese Mess Hall Workers Union", fighting the Work Corps at every step. A campaign of slandering ensued with unusual vigor, even for Manzanar. Among other stories, Tayama was represented as having written a letter to General De Witt, outlining in detail that a Japanese required only a bowl of rice and a few pickled radishes to subsist. And many people in Manzanar who had never met or known Tayama, sincerely believed the rumor. (The rumor had no foundation in truth at all.) Tanaka's chairmanship of the Commission on Self-Government was marked by the receipt of an anonymous threatening letter by every one of the 17 Commission Members. The letters were signed, "Blood Brothers Who Worry for the Welfare of the People". Commission members were blocked at every turn; the campaign to "explain" the proposed charter through block meetings boomeranged; Sho Onodera, a Nisei proficient in both English and Japanese (he had received language education in Japan) reported greater difficulty than that encountered during the organization of the consumer co-operatives. Threatening posters soon made their appearance on mess hall bulletins; police tore them down, investigated. Soon there followed new posters calling the police "and any other dogs who tear these down" as informers and stoolpigeons on whom proper punishment would some day be meted.

There were half a dozen Issei on the Commission for self-Government, sincere in their efforts to work for the welfare of the community at large. That each went out of his way to shoulder responsibility in accomplishing the goal of the Commission was recognized by not only the Administrative officers with whom the Commission consulted, but the Nisei on the Commission; there was admirable harmony within the Commission, but not a single Issei willing or

able under the circumstances, to assume leadership in facing the withering attack characterized by the "Blood Brothers" posters and letters. (See Project Report No. 82) A meeting shortly after the receipt of the threatening letters discussed the need for further activity. Nisei sentiment on the Commission favored, more or less, continuance of the Commission, since resignation at such a time would indicate the members had been intimidated by the "Blood Brothers". Issei sentiment minimized and ridiculed the letters and the "Blood Brothers" as the work of cranks, reasoned that "our work is really completed since we were formed only to do the technical job of drawing up a Charter", succeeded in bringing about an "honorable discharge" of the Commission. It might be pointed out here that in addition to Tanaka as chairman, Joe Masaoka served as secretary of the Commission; both were linked in the minds of the Manzanar community with Tayama and the J.A.C.L. The whole experience in a sense built up the situation for things to pop as they did on December 6.

Another event which has a bearing on the timing of the attack on Tayama and the riot which followed was the J.A.C.L. convention held in Salt Lake City, Utah in mid-November. One of the convention's reported resolutions pledged the Nisei as willing to volunteer for the armed forces if given the opportunity to do so from the relocation centers. That this resolution was seized upon by the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group to arouse intense anti-J.A.C.L. sentiment in Manzanar was evident everywhere in the Center, and Kurihara was reported to have gone about various blocks announcing that "We're going to have another Poston riot here, only it will be a hundred times worse; we are going to kill all the dogs."

During the same week that Tayama returned from Salt Lake City, officers of the U.S. Army appeared at Manzanar to recruit volunteers for the Camp Savage, Minnesota, training center where language experts are being prepared

for overseas duty. Among the 14 (I am not sure whether this was the final count or not -- TT) volunteers were: Karl Yoneda (a San Francisco longshoreman and CIO union man in pre-evacuation days, who had once run for the State Assembly on the Communist ticket, had been anti-JACL in pre-evacuation period but shared in Tayama's activities at Manzanar. Koji Ariyoshi, also a marine worker, who hailed from Hawaii, and who had been active in J.A.C.L. work at Manzanar, serving as chairman of the organizing meeting for the Manzanar Citizens Federation, and who had engaged in near-fisticuffs with Ueno, Kurihara, and others of their group) Fred Muto, prominent in Los Angeles J.A.C.L. activities, but who had remained in relative serenity away from the tension and noise at Manzanar, and others.

An indication of mounting tension, and a foreshadowing of the attack on Tayama which was to follow so soon after, was the attempted assault by unknown persons against Karl Yoneda on the night before he left to join the United States Army at Camp Savage. Yoneda's wife disclosed that "Karl had to have police protection all that night." Mrs. Yoneda is of Caucasian parentage; she is the former Elaine Black and was compelled to seek protection when the riot of December 6 broke out. She came to the military barracks with her four-year-old son, Tommy Yoneda, on the morning of December 7, frightened and excited. She said: "My God, I thought they were coming after me and Tommy; we just got out in time, because I saw a large mob gathering on our block. You see, Jimmy Ito, the boy who was killed last night when the military police opened fire, lived just next door to us. I went to express my sincere condolences; the mother was just crying and wept on my shoulders. I felt so terrible because I knew that the neighbors were all more or less blaming Karl and the others for the whole incident and for Jimmy's death. He was really innocent, everyone thinks, and I think so too; he was on his way to work in the dispatchers office when the

crowd attracted him, and he must have gotten in the way of the bullets. I talked with his married sister, and she said that another brother who is in the U.S. Army is coming back for the funeral. She took it in this spirit. She said: 'Well, I guess we'll just have to consider that we've given another son to the Service.' I feel so badly for them. Jimmy was shot in the back too." (This statement was made by Mrs. Yoneda Dec. 7 in the military barracks. The claim that Jimmy Ito was shot in the back was instantly challenged by MP's who were within hearing distance; several declared: 'Anyone who was in the vicinity had no business, and no one was shot in the back.' Conflicting versions continued to be heard; however, the medical officer at the camp during the week after the riot, a Captain by rank, and a man in whom one would have good reason to have confidence, told me that Ito died of "bullets which entered his body from the front and not the back". This has not been confirmed to my knowledge --TT)

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IF WHAT WE HAVE termed 'J.A.C.L. activity' has been a contributing cause of the Manzanar situation culminating in the December 6 riot, then there should also be listed as another contributing cause, "inadequate, ill-prepared or ill-advised Administrators".

From the standpoint of the 10,000 people of Manzanar, the constantly-changing personnel among government administrators was an unsettling factor. "We get used to one man, feel we have some confidence in him, the next day he is gone--and with him all the promises he made. What and who can we believe?" was the question raised by an evacuee at a block meeting early in June.

That Manzanar from the outset had its share of sympathetic, friendly Caucasian staff members who early won the friendship and confidence of evacuees is indicated in the conditions still existent at the Center. But that it also had its share of allegedly unfriendly or "misunderstood" Caucasian administrators,

around whose heads and persons wild rumors continuously flew, was also demonstrated.

The important thing to be remembered in this connection is that the Caucasian administrative staff was tied up in the minds of evacuees as "the United States Government". And in the relationships between evacuees and Administration through the months of April, May, June, July and right up through November, that relationship was characterized, from the evacuee point of view, as "one long series of lies and broken promises."

For example: "We were promised union wages if we volunteered as carpenters to help build the Center; we've received nothing for two months!" was a common cry among over 1000 volunteer evacuees who had been the first to come to Manzanar. "We were told that the hospital would be built before we arrived; we're living under intolerable conditions!" was heard frequently by distraught parents whose children were suddenly taken ill. "We were promised schools; our children are idle and getting bad habits. Our youngsters have been without school for six months, yet each week the Administration tells us we'll have schools pretty soon!" This was from parents of school-age children. As winter's severe cold began to be felt: "When are we going to get plaster boards for insulation? We'll freeze to death this winter, and the hospital (it was built as promised but months late) won't be big enough to accommodate all the cases." Before that, a cry had gone up about food, about the lack of linoleum flooring, making life within the barracks intolerable in a dust storm.

It should be recorded here that scores of other such cases furnished ample fuel for discontent and a growing resentment against the "government" for the crudity of living conditions and the constant lack of facilities and hardships endured by evacuees in the initial months.

It should also be recorded here that physical facilities had been improved by the end of November to the point where most evacuees admitted that "conditions here aren't so bad at all" (referring to housing and food usually),

but the memory of broken promises had been etched deeply enough to have produced a common expression in Japanese to the effect that "The word of the United States government isn't worth a damn."

This condition, in the estimation of the writer, was due largely to the fact that administrative personnel was changed so often at Manzanar; that administrators, torn between a desire to quiet pressing demands for action on one hand by the evacuees, and stumped by wartime priorities and difficulties in obtaining materials and other supplies, frequently gave way to wishful thinking, made promises which were impossible of attainment, raised hopes unduly, let the evacuees in for a terrific letdown; this process repeated several times over, and frequently in cases where the administrator who had made the promise was no longer at the Center, contributed to a general breakdown, particularly among the Japanese-speaking element who had less opportunity to get a creditable explanation, of confidence in the Caucasian Administration as "working for the welfare of the 10,000 evacuees." It goes almost without saying that had the Caucasian Administration at Manzanar enjoyed generally a greater measure of confidence, the opportunity for the Issei-Nisei conflict to widen so rapidly and heatedly would not have been so great. But under the circumstances, it soon became axiomatic around the Center among a section of the Japanese-speaking population that the "Nisei who are close to the Caucasians are working against us." The breach also resolved itself into a dividing line, more or less, of opposing sides in a racial war, in the minds of these older Japanese; the Nisei who chose to cooperate with the Caucasians were traitors to their Japanese race and deserved to be condemned. There were constant reminders that "this is a race war to liberate the colored races from the domination of the white yoke. The Japanese who mingle with Caucasians, who want to help and aid the Administration, are serving as tools to perpetuate the supremacy of the white man." The fact that Manzanar had its own "color line" (i.e. the Caucasian Administrative staff quarters were in cream-colored barracks with good household equipment, as

contrasted with the ugly black tar-papers barracks of evacuees--and these were all within very short distance of each other, visible to everyone; for a while, Caucasian administrators ate in mess hall 1 where they were served steaks at tables at which they were waited upon, while across the aisles, evacuees ate beans. This practise was soon discontinued, however).

Several Caucasian staff members, of deep religious convictions and anxious to sincerely assist the evacuees in their situation, admitted privately that there appeared to "be some confusion as to exactly what administrative policy is in regard to our mingling with you folks." The fear was held on the one hand that by living too closely with the evacuees, the charge that they were "fraternizing with the Japanese" might be raised.

Probably more than Administrative personalities of themselves, the policy--or rather lack of policy--under which the Wartime Civil Control Administration first and the War Relocation Authority afterwards sought to manage the Center contributed to the uncertainties constantly raised in the minds of the people. These all added up into creating a constant fear of this thing or fear of that thing. The mental condition of the collective population of Manzanar had never been given an honest opportunity to recuperate from the shock of evacuation itself. A neurosis had set in, and this condition had been constantly irritated by the factors described in the foregoing. It was a constant source of wonderment to the writer that less than half a dozen individuals had been taken out of Manzanar by the end of November to the psychopathic ward of the Los Angeles General Hospital.

(Morton: Do you want inclusion of Administrative personalities, their history at Manzanar, from the standpoint of evacuees there, included in this assignment? If so, please send instructions; I am omitting it here and going on to the next contributing cause, because this report is getting awfully awfully long; you will have to overlook style, grammar, etc. as not too much attention has been paid in that direction. --TT)

AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTING CAUSE of the Manzanar riot of December 6 was not so much what was done or committed, but rather it was what was neglected and not done. And that, according to a point of view which gained considerably among Administration circles and the Nisei element in camp, was the failure of the W. R.A. to speedily detect and remove those who later engineered the assaults and rioting.

"Mollycoddling" of ex-convicts (and Manzanar's population has these individuals running loose among individuals of exactly the opposite type of character, upbringing, background, and temperament), laxity of regulations, failure to punish offenders involved in acts of violence, failure to penalize obvious and openly defiant "anti-American" agitators run consistently through the chronicle of Manzanar's so-called "hoodlum" activity from the beginning of the Center through the week of the unfortunate riot.

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## AN ANALYSIS of Contributing Causes of the Manzanar Riot (Continued)

It was generally known at Manzanar among Nisei employed in Administration jobs that a conflict of opinion and attitudes divided administrative officials over the handling of the "hoodlum" and "ruffian" elements. One school of thought advocated severe measures. Thefts, burglaries, and assault and battery--usually committed by a small number of "repeaters"--should be punished by trial in courts outside the Center and punishment meted according to county, state and federal law--this group advocated. The Police department (Internal Security), under its first chief, Kenneth Horton, strenuously sought to have this done. The other school of thought, however, advocated less severe measures, invariably stopped short of punishment demanded by those who said "we're treating the roughneck element too easily."

Whatever these differences among administrators may have been, the fact was that until the riot of December 6, evacuee attitudes toward possible punishment for crimes committed within the Center were those of open contempt and ridicule. The few "trials" held before a constantly changing "Judicial Committee" had not materially increased respect for law and order. Being held in the Manzanar "jail", moreover, failed to attach to a culprit the stigma found in normal outside communities. Laxity of administrative officials in maintaining respect for regulations gave impetus to the growth of "gangism", a situation best described by the fact that the resident Chief of Internal Security, heading a force of 100 policemen, once said: "Those Blood Brothers don't dare attack or lay hands on me; they know that the whole Terminal Island gang stands behind me and will back me to the limit." When the December 6 riot broke out, this man did not rely on the police force which he directed; he took refuge and found protection in Manzanar's "Terminal Island". The fact that this protective group itself was a "gang" in the most frequently used sense of the word indicates the general absence of preventive machinery working against an outbreak of disorder such as the December 6 riot. (For more on "gangs" see Project Report No. 82 dated 11/11/42 at Manzanar).

Failure to curb lawlessness--a sin of omission which emboldened agitators such as Ueno, Kurihara and Yamaguchi to organize and incite openly-- was on several occasions due to unfortunate departmental and personality clashes among Caucasian administrative personnel. For instance, when Roy Nash became Project Director in June, he inherited a large number of Wartime Civil Control Administration staff employees. Chief of Police Kenneth Horton was just one of these. From the start, personal relations between the two men were anything but "cordial". Nash was personally inaccessible, both to his administrative colleagues and to evacuees; but the relationship between Nash and Horton was particularly strained, ending in a situation where the latter was actually ignored and barred from administrative staff meetings. This had one significant result: the effectiveness of police work was nullified almost completely; cases which were ordinarily under police jurisdiction were summarily taken out of police hands. The effect of bickering among Caucasian departmental heads had registered on the evacuee population as early as June--and unfavorably. As one administrator would speak disparagingly or critically of another, rumors started. In a sense interdepartmental discord offered opening wedges for the later rumor-mongering so efficiently and systematically carried on by Ueno, Kurihara, Yamaguchi.

Administrative inaction--or rather vacillation--in dealing with early offenders of Center regulations apparently led to the same policy in the handling--or rather failure to handle--the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group whose openly defiant activities grew throughout the months of September, October, November.

To the credit of the W.F.A. administration during these months, it should be stated that the leniency accorded the openly anti-American citizens such as Ueno and Kurihara was due to the apparent belief that a policy of non-repressive measures would, in the long run, win out. It was reasoned that the true spirit of American democracy could best be demonstrated to individuals such as Kurihara and Ueno by the government taking the attitude that these

individuals were not to be persecuted despite their views which were admittedly and openly detrimental to a nation at war. In the opinion of the writer (and these are purely his own personal observations), this was an unfortunate miscalculation on the part of the Manzanar W.R.A. administrators. Both Ueno and Kurihara, despite their American citizenship, despite their professed former U.S. loyalties (in Ueno's case, this is doubtful, but not so in Kurihara's), both had projected their mental processes into the Japanese pattern of thinking. They had lost any objectivity they might have once retained. They understood but one language--force; and failure of the W.R.A. to apply forceful measures was, without a shadow of doubt (I am convinced to this because of lengthy conversations with both men) taken by both as a sign of weakness and inability of the government to do anything. Both men once said: "We will be treated all right, mind you, because we are Japanese, and Japan is winning this war; and if we are not treated right, after Japan wins the war, our mistreatment will be avenged; even now Japan holds many many times more prisoners of war and the American government doesn't dare do anything to us."

The Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group which was finally arrested by the military is being blamed as the No. 1 cause of the riot by the W.R.A. Administration fully as much as the majority of the people of Manzanar appear to blame the Tayama-J.A.C.L. group which had to be removed to Death Valley. As of this date, it is interesting to note two differing answers to the question: "How do you think the Manzanar riot could have been avoided, if you feel that it was not inevitable?" The reply among a good section of people in Manzanar, particularly the Japanese-speaking element, today would be: "The W.R.A. should have removed the Tayama-J.A.C.L. agitators long ago; then we wouldn't have had this trouble." The answer given unanimously by the "refugees" at Death Valley: "The Administration should have taken out those pro-Axis agitators like Ueno, Kurihara, and Yamaguchi." These assertions, of course, are debatable, depending upon the

circumstances and point of view of the debaters, and further discussion here serves no end.

It is a matter of pure speculation, moreover, that removal of the obvious pro-Japan and pro-Axis individuals by the W.R.A. would have corrected the underlying situation which provided the administration at Manzanar with an almost "impossible" job. (It is my own personal opinion that arrest of Ueno, Kurihara and Yamaguchi at an earlier date, say October when they became first active, would not have necessarily prevented an eventual riot. Others would have taken their places, for these individuals and their activities appear to me to be the products of conditions and circumstances within the relocation centers. However, most of the refugees here at Death Valley who have given any thought to this problem do not concur with me in this opinion. --TT)

(My principle reasons for holding the above view spring from feelings I have personally experienced in the Manzanar Relocation Center. I cannot see how it is possible for any human being of normal impulses to be cooped up within the limited confines of barbed wires, watchtowers, and all the atmosphere of internment and not be touched by the bitterness, disillusionment all around him. There appears to be a tragic tendency on the part of a large number of Nisei within the Centers to conform to their surroundings; unconsciously, sympathies are channeled into directions already taken by the leadership elements within the camp--the Japanese-speaking, active pro-Japan individuals.)

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PERHAPS NOT A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE, but at least a factor in creating the atmosphere and setting for the riot at Manzanar was the obvious inadequacy of existing mediums for the dissemination of information. Manzanar had--and perhaps still has--a curious system for conveying information to its residents. On the one hand there are the Manzanar Free Press (in both English and Japanese) and the information service; on the other hand the Block Managers, through their council sessions and their contacts with residents. The Free Press--information service both ostensibly and actually represented the Administration

(W.R.A. Manzanar) point of view, voiced sentiments reflecting that representation. The Block Managers ostensibly did also, but actually were more often at variance in their interpretation of the Center news than not. This created an interesting situation. A Center regulation would be announced, for instance, in the Free Press. In cases where it was not popular, the Block Managers were given the added job of interpreting and emphasizing the announcement at their meetings; these meetings were invariably in Japanese. Cases were frequent where the Block Managers would join in the general denunciation of the regulation. The Free Press would sublimely praise it, explaining at length its merits.

Probably more than these peculiar circumstances the personalities associated with the Center's information division played an important part in the almost-universal lack of respect and confidence--within Manzanar--for the Free Press. It should be recorded here that the publication, as a newspaper, was more popular and well received by the younger Nisei element, in the late teens and early twenties brackets; but even among these, the influence of elders was noteworthy, and in its best days, the camp newspaper enjoyed a numerical minority following of sympathizers.

The first editor of the Manzanar Free Press was Tomomasa Yamazaki, formerly of Los Angeles and San Francisco, an alien Japanese by birth, but raised in the United States and equally proficient in both languages. (Yamazaki is among the Death Valley refugees and is due to leave soon for the University of Colorado at Boulder where he has been accepted for a teaching position.--TT) Yamazaki quit his job to be a Block leader, from which position he later resigned. When the Free Press became a thrice-weekly printed (it had formerly been mimeographed) tabloid edition, its editor was Chiye Mori, formerly a cosmetologist and domestic worker from Los Angeles, who had been a contributing writer for several Japanese vernacular newspapers. The Japanese section of the paper included on its staff; James Oda (a former Los Angeles Kibei who had been a

fruit stand worker and union advocate who, in pre-evacuation days, fairly or unfairly, had enjoyed the reputation among the Japanese as a "Communist". The same had been true of Yamazaki and Miss Mori, although, in my opinion, these charges were exaggerated and typical of the close-knit pro-Tokyo sympathies of the Japanese community in pre-war days.--TT) Satoru Kamikawa, (a former Los Angeles gardener whose journalistic endeavors had ended with writing for a Gardeners' Monthly bulletin); John Sonoda (former Los Angeles insurance agent whose beating in the Dec. 6 riot has been covered in an earlier personality sketch); Choyei Kondo (an educated Issei Japanese, formerly of Los Angeles, who was respected and popular among the Nisei but apparently not so among the Issei).

From the outset, the Free Press, as a camp organ was confronted with a dilemma. To truly represent the people of Manzanar, and to function as a representative spokesman for their views, it almost necessarily had to be anti-Administration in most of its views. The fact that the publication went outside the Center and served as a public relations medium made this impossible even had the administrative officials in charge been willing to permit such a situation, which they apparently were not.

The publication also drew over its head added abuse in the vicious personal attacks in the form of rumors current throughout Manzanar about its editor, Miss Mori, twice a divorcee and admittedly living, without benefit of clergy, in the same barrack room with her alleged third, a George Kurata. Both had been appointed by Roy Nash on the original Commission on Self Government, and in the newspaper announcement of the appointments, listing the names and address of Commissioners, Miss Mori had permitted on several occasions the publication of her own name and Mr. Kurata's with the same address, despite the fact it was known that they were not married. In the confined quarters of Manzanar, where gossip reaps a bumper crop every midafternoon, these news stories furnished wagging tongues with lubricants to last a good week. It was

rumored that Miss Mori had left her last husband, a serious tuberculosis case, penniless in the Hillcrest Hospital while she went galivanting about with her new boy friend. (This and a score of other rumors which went bouncing from latrine to latrine were never checked or repeated by the writer, but for purposes of the study, they are included here because they are a minor part of the whole picture. -- TT) The presence of Miss Mori's first husband in the Center, and the fact that, again married, he was openly scornful of her and rabidly outspoken about her, did not aid the situation.

---More to Kum---

Eye-Witness Accounts of the December 6 Mass Meetings

Mobs which participated in the December 6 riot at Manzanar first assembled at two mass meetings held in the afternoon immediately following lunch, and in the evening after an early dinner, on the west end of block 22.

It is a generally established fact that both the noon and evening meals at all--or nearly all-- 36 blocks' mess halls were advanced 30 to 45 minutes--this without administrative knowledge--for the purpose of making possible greater attendance at the meetings. Word of the mass meetings were conveyed to chefs and foremen of kitchens on the morning of December 6.

Eye-witness accounts of what transpired at the two meetings offer conflicting and even contradictory versions as far as details are concerned.

George Fukasawa, a member of the Center police force, had been assigned to "cover" the block area to report "possible disturbances". Fukasawa is a Nisei, in his mid-thirties, married, the father of two children, formerly resident of Santa Monica. Mild of manner and inclined to avoid trouble if he could, Fukasawa nevertheless succeeded in having his name placed on the black list of the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group because of his police service. Physically, he is slight, standing about five feet four inches in height and weighing about 125 pounds; he wears glasses. When, in his own words, the "damned agitators began getting excited and almost hysterical in their speeches, I began to feel uncomfortable and left the place to report back to the station that things were getting out of hand." This was at the afternoon meeting which began immediately after dishes had been cleared from noon lunch tables in mess hall 22. Fukasawa's recollection of the meeting, given on the day after the riot, was as follows:

"I arrived after it had already started. I should have, but didn't know all the men who spoke; but everything was said in Japanese. The whole keynote of everything that was said boiled down to a demand for the release of Ueno who they said had been unjustly arrested the night before for the attack on Fred

Tayama. Joe Kurihara made a long speech in which he condemned Tayama; he said that Tayama had been persecuting the Japanese people, putting a noose around our necks; he said he had definite proof that Tayama was a stoolpigeon (an inu) of the F.B.I. and that it was about time the people of Manzanar got up in their righteous indignation and did something about it. He announced very dramatically in Japanese that he was prepared to lay down his life for the sake of the people.

"Before I could grasp exactly what the purpose of the meeting was, beyond being another gripe and complaint affair, there was the announcement in Japanese that a Negotiation Committee (Koshu-in) had been formed to go down to the Administration and demand of Mr. Merritt (the Project Director) immediate release of Harry Ueno. In the formation of this committee, I recognized the prominent part taken by Genji Yamaguchi who made a long and eloquent talk. He demanded an immediate investigation of the terrible conditions at Manzanar by the Spanish Ambassador, called upon the people of Manzanar to rise up and get rid of the troublemakers and dogs (inu) among their own number. Tension mounted and a large crowd began gathering at the entrance, windows, rear, front, and all the doors to the mess hall. A loudspeaker system, where they got it I don't know, was set up, and the proceedings within the mess hall were carried into the firebreak where the crowd kept on assembling. Inside the mess hall were representatives from most of the blocks which had been contacted through the block managers; it seems each block manager had been instructed to send three representatives to the afternoon meeting.

"During the meeting, several times, different persons got up and shouted that there might be some stoolpigeons (inu) in the mess hall and that a check-up should be made to get them out. Two other fellows (I don't know who they were) were hustled out of the place before things began getting so uncomfortable that I left."

H----- Y----- is an alien and resident of Manzanar whose identity here is not disclosed, as I feel he would not grant permission to use his name. He is still at Manzanar, intends to repatriate to Japan at the earliest opportunity; he is in his middle forties, a former resident of Glendale, California, where he was employed as a gardener and nurserymen; his wife is a United States citizen, Kibei, speaks primarily in Japanese, understands English; she is in her late twenties; the couple have two children, ages six and 10 months. (It should be recorded here that this individual and the writer remained on excellent terms as fellow evacuees of the Center despite opposing points of view regarding the war. In long and interesting exchanges of opinion, this man revealed his background, his hopes, plans, fears. His case, however, is not necessarily typical of Issei of his age or previous occupation). TT. H----- Y----- said he had attended the afternoon meeting at mess hall 22 "not as an official representative, but as an interested spectator only. It was very exciting and ended rather dangerously, I thought. There is no doubt what the majority sentiment of the people is; they want Mr. Ueno released from jail; they are convinced he was framed and wrongly accused by Mr. Tayama whose accusation is believed to be only another of a list of bad things he has done against the Japanese. The place was crowded with I would say about 400 people inside the mess hall, but the microphone was loud; there must have been over a thousand, maybe two thousand people on the outside. They have organized a committee which is pledged to do one thing--that is to get Ueno out of jail. If this is not done, then the committee is going to raise a lot of trouble. This afternoon some speakers even said they would do a lot of killing tonight unless Ueno was released."

(At this point, it might be added here that the writer, having a personal interest in the forthcoming nocturnal murders, inquired if his own name had been mentioned at the afternoon meeting. All of this conversation, incidentally, was in Japanese. The reply was: "No, they haven't announced your name yet, but they are going to meet again after dinner. Personally, I think they will, because there was a lot of muttering among the crowd today, and lots of names were being discussed; yours was among them. Yours and Joe Masaoka were almost always mentioned together; he's in Salt Lake, but everyone doesn't seem to know that; they say you two together cooked up a lot of things

which were against the Japanese people while you did your reporting here at Manzanar; they said your historical work was just a camouflage for F.B.I. stoolpigeon work. You know, I've tried to warn you in the past, and I still want to help you, although I think you are on the wrong side for a Japanese as far as this war is concerned. But you had better keep your door locked tonight and don't answer, no matter who comes around.)

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E----- M----- is also an alien and resident of Manzanar whose identity is likewise cloaked, not because I feel he would not grant permission to use his name, but because it would be a breach of confidence to reveal his name. He is in his early fifties, a very religious person (of Buddhist faith) formerly a restaurant operator in a Southern California city, the father of five children, all of them American citizens, and the eldest a Nisei with strong convictions that all Nisei should remain steadfastly loyal to the United States. This man was employed in a mess hall and attended both the afternoon and evening meetings on December 6 as a representative of his mess workers. In Japanese, he related:

"The afternoon meeting served to fire up the men with great zeal. Many speakers said that Harry Ueno was being made a goat by the Administration because he had exposed the sugar fraud and had sacrificed himself for the people of Manzanar. They said that Fred Tayama was in on the plot and had not been hurt at all, but his injuries were a part of the frame-up; that is what speakers said, anyway. I don't know what the facts are anyway, but it looks like a terrible lot of trouble. Many people, and some of the speakers said that this frame-up was predicted in advance by Kokkuri-San (for several weeks previous to the riot, residents were reported to be indulging in talbe-lifting seances in the dark, something on the order of Ouija boards, getting answers 'yes' and 'no' to all sorts of questions; that many people placed a good deal of credence and faith in Kokkuri-San "Ouija Board" was recognized by many).

One speaker said that Mr. Sasaki on Block 35 who was suddenly, and without more than one-day's notice, taken out of camp to be sent to Tule Lake, (this had happened several weeks previously) had been a scapegoat of the Administration's sugar fraud and that Ueno was another. I personally don't think the Administration, or Mr. Winchester or Mr. Campbell were stealing money by giving out only seven ounces per person rather than the ration of eight ounces. But at least that's what they were saying at the afternoon meeting. A lot of other things were also brought out at the afternoon meeting. It was decided, more or less, because there wasn't any opposition heard at the meeting, that unless the Administration released Harry Ueno that night, the mess hall workers would all go on a strike the next day, nobody would get anything to eat. I think this is ridiculous myself; why should the women and children be made to suffer on this account, no matter how innocent or great a person this Ueno might be. It's just putting the noose around own own necks. There are some cooks, I know, who will refuse to follow orders for any general strike; the Blocks 9 and 10 chefs (Terminal Island) have said they'd feed the whole camp if all the others closed down; Mr. Harry Tayama who is chef at block 24 didn't even attend the mass meetings, and he probably feels the same way; but there are many workers in every mess hall who are sympathetic to the demand.

"The evening meeting was much worse. They're coming out to get a list of about 10 or 11, I can't remember all their names whose names were read off several times over the microphone. I don't know the man's name who made the speech and began calling off the names, but he was short and bald and fat (a reference fitting of Joseph Kurihara) and terribly excited. The first name called off to be killed was Mr. Tayama. They said that the hospital should be invaded and Mr. Tayama killed because the Administration had refused to release Mr. Ueno, and that the Negotiating Committee had gotten no place at all with Mr. Merritt. The speakers were also excited about the soldiers who had been

drawn up by the police station and said that as true Japanese "we should not be afraid to die in this cause as our brothers are dying for justice and permanent peace and the new order in Asia". Most of the talk, though, was about the "inu" (stoolpigeon) activities of the men on the "death list".. The second name was Mr. Slocum, and after him I heard Karl Yoneda, Koji Ariyoshi, James Oda, then your name (Togo Tanaka). After yours came Joe Masaoka, and several others which I don't remember. I don't think you should stay in your house tonight, it's too dangerous; your wife and baby can come to mine."

(I should note here that an almost verbatim account of this man's conversation was taken down at that time, 6:45 P.M. Sunday; five minutes later I was out of the barrack, disguised, and I should confess, armed; 15 minutes later, a mob of about 100 persons came surging to our barrack door; they did not knock; they ripped the door open, breaking the hinge on which a lock had been placed from the inside; my wife, baby, parents-in-law, and father were inside; I was in the mob, at the rear, taking the situation in, and wondering whether I should live to see the dawn. I had just gone to Block 32, about 150 yards away, to a friend's place where I had borrowed extra clothing and weapons, just in time to join the mob enroute from the Hospital (where it had unsuccessfully sought Tayama). There was much conversation in Japanese as the mob straggled along, picking up newcomers along the way. I judged over two-thirds of those in the mob to be curious spectators, more or less; I recognized several young men involved in earlier hoodlum activities in the gang known as "Dunbar". The mob seemed to have about 10 men who appeared to be ringleaders. (It should be pointed out that this was one section of the mob which had first gone up to the Hospital, then split in two, one heading for the police station, the other to kill others on the death list). When the apparent leaders of the group arrived at my barrack, 36-12-1 and ripped open the door, half a dozen forced their way into the room. The scene that ensued is recorded here to the best of my ability because it may have some value in documenting attitudes and frame of mind of the rioters:

All the conversation was in Japanese, and the milling about and searching within the barrack lasted for 15 minutes. Shouts of "we're going to kill him this time" were heard three or four times by individuals in the mob outside (who were within arm's reach of me at the time). The first to speak was my father-in-law, Kango Takamura, an alien, 48, who remains at Manzanar until such time as relocation is made possible for him. He asked what the intruders wanted. "We want Togo Tanaka; we're going to kill him; turn him over to us," was the reply.

"What for? What is the reason for your coming here and asking for him? "

"He is a spy for the F.B.I. and has been turning in information about the Japanese here. We have definite proof that he is an 'inu'."

"Do you have that proof? Show it then."

"No, we don't have the ~~proof~~; but we can get it."

At this point, my father turned to the spokesman for the group and asked;

"What is your name?"

"Ben."

"Ben what?"

"Ben Kishi."

(I did not know this individual, remember having met him but once in connection with a documentary report on drama activities at Manzanar very briefly. He is in his thirties, a Kibei, married, father of one child, according to hearsay information I later gathered. He was involved in one Manzanar court trial on an assault and battery charge, had been acquitted; he presided as chairman at the first Kibei meeting which had prompted former Project Director Roy Nash to suspend all large meetings in the Japanese language. For a while he had headed the Manzanar Drama group. Beyond that I know little of him, except rumors since picked up at Death Valley but largely unconfirmed.) -- TT

My father-in-law interrupted:

"Do you personally know about these accusations against Togo?"

"No, but we have orders to kill him; we have decided to sacrifice our own lives if necessary to kill the "inuz" in Manzanar who are responsible for all our troubles."

"Is his Documentary historians work the cause of your wanting to kill him? There must be some misunderstanding. See that file there. My son-in-law has always said to me that if there should ever be any question as to what he had done or is doing in his work here, I should refer anyone to those files which contain everything he has done here. Go ahead and look and satisfy yourself. Togo does not believe in some things, and one of them is to betray the principles for which he stands; he is not an "inu" and you yourself say you

have no proof with you. I doubt you will ever find it, because there isn't any, but go ahead and look through the files."

"No, we haven't time, just turn him loose, wherever you have him hidden."

At this moment, one of the men who had entered the room, carrying a wooden club, moved toward the closet in the corner. A man in the mob outside shouted:

"If he's not in, let's kill his wife and baby, or his father will do. Kill the father of the 'inu'".

My mother-in-law, pale and tense, stood and shouted through the door:

"How dare you threaten to kill an old man 67 years old? If you're so brave as to do that, kill me in his place."

One of the men within the room went to the doorway, raised his hand and said slowly:

"The wife and baby, the father, the relatives of Togo Tanaka are not the ones we want. It is regrettable that they should have to bear the misfortune of being related to an 'inu'. They are not to be touched. We want only one person, no one else, do you hear?"

The man who had started for the closet sat down on the edge of the bed, looked under it, then spied a small photograph on the desk in the corner.

He called the others in the room, and said:

"Here's his picture; this is what the dog looks like. (It was a small snapshot of my wife and I taken on our honeymoon). The men scrutinized it carefully for a full minute, passing it about. Our baby, who is 11 months old, had started to cry, and my wife was holding her in her arms.

"Even an 'Inu' has babies," one of the men remarked in Japanese. I observed the tense and drawn expressions on the older folks (my father and parents-in-law) in the room.

Three times during the 15 minutes (I always wear my wrist watch) I was almost certain that developments would compel the disclosure of my identity, but no one seemed to recognize me; I knew almost no one and vice-versa, despite the fact my name was on everyone's lips.

The crowd began to spread out; by 7:15 the ringleaders left the barrack with the warning "we'll be back" and the mob started across the firebreak, apparently headed, according to conversation, "to get Tom Imai; he's over in block 19". I went into my barrack several minutes later, found my family and relatives horrified, so left instantly, taking up a post in the darkness of the laundry room 20 feet away. Six men who had been posted in the vicinity rushed the barrack again, began the previous interrogation all over; they closed half of the door (the end barrack is a double door), and I missed most of the ensuing conversation (and my wife has no recollection of what happened except the shock), but they left a few minutes later, apparently satisfied I had disappeared again; I rejoined the mob at a respectful distance from across the firebreak on the north end of block 19. The Young Women's Association Dormitory where Tom and Michi Imai (Mr. and Mrs. Imai are from San Fernando--for biographical data, see Project Report No. 82) is located at 19-14. The dormitory comprises an entire barrack, and the Imais have a small partitioned room within it. The mob which milled around the barrack on every side, completely surrounding it must have numbered three times as many (or so it at least seemed to me) as that at my barrack. Even from a distance, I noticed the far more numerous weapons (ugly long knives, clubs, iron pipes, two-by-fours, rocks) in the hands of the men. Almost everyone wore a pea-coat, the night was frightfully cold, about 30 degrees Fahrenheit, although this is only a guess on my part. I did not stay there long, but went back to my own block. Tom Tamotsu Imai, police investigator, describes what happened at his

barrack as follows:

"I'd had ample warning all right, about what was going to happen to me. Somehow or other, I'm always a little too late. I'd just put on my pea-coat and was starting to head out of the north end of the Dormitory to make a dash out into the firebreak and then down to the station when we heard this shouting and noise, it came from every direction all at once. We knew it was too late for me to get out; I was trapped, and boy, let me tell you, was I scared. Michi turned pale green, and so did all the girls. I had to hide and hide quick; they hid me in a closet."

His wife, Michi Imai related: "Ten, fifteen, or twenty, I don't remember exactly how many, banged the door and came into the dormitory; you should have seen their pale faces, their tense expressions, their set and glassy eyes; their expressions were horrible. A lot of them had long knives; they would have killed Tom if they had found him. Some of them had meat cleavers, others long clubs. All of them spoke in Japanese. When Joy (Joy Soeda, Manzanar nursery school superintendent and one of the girls who stayed at the Dormitory) began speaking to them in English, trying to reason with them, one fellow snapped back at her in Japanese; 'Speak Japanese, this is Japan!' They looked all over the dormitory, even into the closet where Tom was hidden, and we thought the end had come; but they must have thought it was just another pea-coat hanging in the closet. They kept going back and forth to the door, both on the south side and the north side (there are two entrances to the dormitory). The mob on the outside wasn't satisfied that every place had been searched. 'Look in the attic above the ceiling' someone shouted, and they came back in and looked there. I don't know how long they were in there, it seemed like ages; but finally they left. A neighbor friend volunteered to get the police and after a while the soldiers came and took Tom out. I joined him later. Thank God, things turned out as they did and not otherwise." (The Imais are leaving tomorrow morning 1/15/43 from Death Valley to permanent relocation in Chicago where they have secured employment at the Settlement House) TT.

--More to Kum--

Eye-Witness Accounts of the Dec. 6 Manzanar Rioting--

One man who says he was an eye-witness spectator at both the afternoon and evening meetings at block 22, as well as the night rioting in front of the police station is Satoru Kamikawa who is currently at the Death Valley camp awaiting relocation.

Mr. Kamikawa is an alien, in his forties (Note, I do not know his age and am approximating); he is single; before evacuation, he was a gardener in West Los Angeles, and he says he was a translator for the Japanese Gardeners' Monthly published in Los Angeles and edited by a Mr. Nagumo. At Manzanar, he was on the Japanese section staff of the Manzanar Free Press. He was taken out of the camp on Tuesday, December 8, by military police acting upon a recommendation made by Robert Brown, then head of the information division, now Acting Assistant Project Director. In pre-war days, Kamikawa was said to have mingled with the circle among Los Angeles Japanese generally described among the Japanese as "aka" (Red, meaning Communist). This label more or less continued to be attached to him at Manzanar. The following is a verbatim account of his experiences Dec. 6:

"A Kibei roommate of mine told me there was a big meeting going on at block 22, and I should go along with him. I had remembered seeing several people all that week making little clubs out of wooden sticks and had heard a lot of rumors. This roommate had a club, he gave me one; we both went up to block 22, which is only two blocks from my block. (Kamikawa lived on block 20). We got there a little late, and the meeting was in full force; some people said it had originally been planned for inside the mess hall; but when I arrived, there were about 10 men on the platform for the oil tank. (Every Manzanar block has a wooden-support platform on which sits a large tank for the diesel fuel oil which feeds the mess halls and furnished oil for the barrack heaters). They had a loudspeaker over which they were talking. There must have been about two thousand people gathered around, listening. I could feel the excitement and the

tension all around. Me and my Kibei friend were about 20 people from the front where the speeches were being made. I don't remember who was chairman or presiding; but I remember who some of the speakers were and what they said.

"Genji Yamaguchi made a talk; he was very excited, even more excited than at the meeting where the block managers decided to oppose self government. I don't remember what he said, I was watching the faces around me, and everyone was getting pretty heated up. Mr. Hashimoto of Block 19 spoke, rather he read a resolution by the Mess Hall Workers Union calling for a general strike of all the 36 kitchens on Monday. (He refers here to Mr. Sokichi Hashimoto, block 19, 4-4, one of the men reported as having been arrested by military police; I do not know this man, have never met him, and all my knowledge about him is secondary and hearsay; however, his name was mentioned frequently in connection with the first Kibei meeting at Manzanar in August.--TT)

"Mr. Hashimoto was very forceful, even though he too was excited. I do not know whether he was an officer of the Mess Hall Workers Union, but Ueno, Tsuji, and Hashimoto seemed to be the most active leaders in that movement. Just the week before the incident, the three of them came to the Free Press office, and I talked with them. They wanted us to give more publicity in the Japanese section of the Free Press to their mess hall union; they also wanted us to mimeo the rules and regulations of their group. I knew Hashimoto a little bit before evacuation; we stayed in the same hotel just before we moved to Manzanar. I don't know what he used to do for a living; they said at the hotel that he loafed half the time, and worked the other half. I think he is in his forties; he's an alien Japanese.

"Another speaker was Masaaki Tanaka; he condemned the Manzanar police force and said that there were people in the Manzanar jail unjustly. He mentioned three names; I can't remember all of them; but he said that these three

boys had been jailed for throwing rocks into the window of a policewoman some-time before. Oh yes, the boys names were Kenny Uchida and Sakae Kazunaga; the third one still slips me; anyway he said that they were sentenced to long terms because they had damaged the window of policewoman Yoshiko Tabuchi. Tanaka said that there were many others in camp who had committed greater crimes and had not been punished, so why shouldn't these three be released. (It should be recorded here that both Uchida and Kazunaga were considered by police as juvenile delinquents at the Center with a record of troublemaking; both were youths still in their teens, both seniors in the high school at Manzanar; they were suspects in a number of petty thefts, assaults and batteries and general mischief-making, according to police accounts. -- TT) To continue with Kamikawa's account:

"Just about this time, someone in the audience yelled: 'There's an inu (dog)'. I didn't see the man who was being pointed out, but somebody else yelled right away: 'Kill him, then, kill him' (Japanese--tatakikorose! tatakikorose!). About 30 feet away I saw over a dozen men rush to one point where I guess the so-called 'inu' was standing. Some of the men had clubs. I was watching the men on the oil platform and noticed that one of them yelled: 'It's a mistake; he's all right.' I guess there was too much noise and he couldn't be heard; the 'inu' was being manhandled and probably would have been beat up if the man on the platform didn't grab the loud-speaker and announce over it that a bad mistake was being made. I guess I was getting a little afraid myself, and I thought many eyes were on me, although I had many friends there too.

"Another speaker was Sam Teteishi, and I don't exactly remember what he said." (Sam Teteishi was a block manager on block 23, is reputed to be a Kibei, married and the father of one or two children; before evacuation, he

was a gardener in West Los Angeles; according to J.A.C.L. members who lived on the same block and who, it should be mentioned, had reasons for disliking Tateishi on grounds of differences of views on the war, Tateishi is described as a 'hypocrite who said one thing to your face and stabbed you when your back was turned'; whatever his enemies' opinion of him may have been, he appears to have carried weight among the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group)--TT. To continue with Kamikawa's story:

"I think the afternoon meeting was over at about two thirty; I heard later that Mr. Merritt was at the meeting but I didn't see him anyway. There were many small groups around the firebreak even after the meeting was supposed to be over. I think a committee which was negotiating to get Ueno brought back to Manzanar from the Independence jail was on its way down to the Administration building or the police station. I went down there too.

"The negotiating committee went to the police station; I thought there were half a dozen members of that committee, but George (George Hayakawa, a member of the Manzanar police force whose name was also on one of the 'death lists' and who is with the group at Death Valley) says there were only three; These three were Joe Kurihara, Sokichi Hashimoto and Sam Tateishi; I'm sure Genji Yamaguchi was also in this original group, but George says they weren't, and he was inside the police station.

"At the block 22 meeting, some people in the crowd were yelling 'Let's get Campbell (Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director), and they repeated this at the police station in the meeting there. I think there must have been 800 or 900 persons in the mob that gathered around the police station and the Administration building around three o'clock; Mr. Merritt and a man who some people said was Captain Martyn Hall of the military police met with the committee. I was watching first from the Free Press building's south end (which

faces the Administration building) and later from the side, which is parallel to the police station. There was a car parked right in front of the Administration building on the road. Joe Kurihara got up on this car's running board and made a speech in Japanese; he said that 'We should kill all the gods in Manzanar; that the biggest dog was Fred Tayama and the other dogs were Tokutaro Slocum, Togo Tanaka! He said that Karl Yoneda and James Oda also should be killed but they were already gone; he also mentioned Koji Ariyoshi and several other names I don't remember. He said that he had proof that Tayama was employed by the F.B.I. He said that Tanaka was also. He said that 'we Japanese people have been most patient up to now, and we will continue to be patient if the Administration will listen to reason and return Yoshio Ueno to Manzanar by six o'clock tonight'. If this were not done, Kurihara said that the government must be prepared to assume responsibility for the deaths of the 'inu'.

"The military police arrived not long after and they set up machine guns all along the police station and by the Administration building. When they arrived, a lot of fellows in the crowd began to taunt them. In the meantime I think Kurihara and his committee were discussing the matter with Mr. Merritt and Captain Hall and I think Chief Gilkey (Assistant Chief of Police). Kurihara seemed to have control of the mob pretty well, because it broke up before dinner time, although things were very tense. I hurried home to our block to have dinner and left right after that to go to the evening meeting again at block 22. This time there seemed to be even more people; I don't know how many, but maybe 2,500. They used the same oil platform and they also had the loudspeaker again. There seemed to be more speakers, although Kurihara took what seemed to me a leading part. Ben Kishi also spoke; so did Seigo Murakami, the judo man; and I don't understand why he is considered to be the 'protector' of Manzanar now." (Mr. Kamikawa was referring to a report from Manzanar yesterday 1/14/43 that Mr. Murakami's judo pupils were accompanying

all members of the Internal police force as bodyguards and that the police force was relying heavily upon Mr. Murakami, a leading judo instructor, for maintaining law and order within the Center.) TT

"At this night meeting, Joe Kurihara read off another death list. I'm not sure, but I think it went something like this, in this order: Fred Tayama, Tokie Slocum, Karl Yoneda, Koji Ariyoshi, James Oda, Togo Tanaka, Tom Imai, George Hayakawa, Joe Masaoka, Tad Uyeno. Lots of people were yelling from the crowd, and new names were being added here and there. I didn't catch everything. I left before the meeting was over, because it looked pretty bad and unhealthy. Before I got very far away, I saw the mob splitting up into two different parts, one group was heading for the hospital and the other to the police station. I think this was around 6:15 or 6:30 o'clock. I don't remember for sure."

(I am unable, either to vouch for or challenge the authenticity and accuracy of Mr. Kamikawa's version of the riot's progress; in an evaluation of the foregoing, however, I think it should be borne in mind that Kamikawa's experience on the Free Press gives him some qualifications for good observation and reporting. You can check these different versions with the official reports regarding the times of the various incidents.--TT)

WHAT HAPPENED IN AND AROUND the police station after the mob began gathering after dinner is described in an eye-witness account by George Hayakawa, a detective on the Manzanar police force who was in the station within half an hour of the time the mob first assembled straight through until 2 o'clock the next morning. He says:

"Sunday's my day off, and I was fooling around and resting and doing nothing. I live on block 14, and I didn't notice anything different around

camp; of course, it may be just me. I think it was around six o'clock, my sister came running in to the barrack and told me that a mob was coming to kill me and I better get out. Boy, I sure got out fast and went to the station. My sister later told me that the mob came about ten minutes after I left. (Note: Hayakawa's timing seems to conflict with other versions generally, which place the mob milling around Block 14 nearer 7:15 P.M. --TT). At the station I got hold of Higashi (Kiyoshi Higashi, chief of police) and we drove the sedan to block 9 where I let Higashi off. I then drove up to block 6 to pick up Harry (Harry Okumuro, another member of the Manzanar police force) and together we went over to block 22 where Yo Ishida lives. (Ishida is also a policeman). He was taking a shower, so we waited, then left him with half a dozen other policemen at his barrack. We thought maybe some of the pro-Axis guys would try to rush him, but we were pretty sure that Yo (Ishida is a wrestler of amateur standing, stands six feet tall and weighs around 200) could give a good accounting of himself any time. We were going to pick them up later, but when we returned, we saw half a dozen pro-Axis guys surrounding the house, so we left for the station. When we got near, we could see the mob already had gathered, and the military police were out there again holding them. We cut outside the road and came into the station from the outside way to avoid the mob.

"Captain Hall and Mr. Merritt were talking to each other in the station, and over by the corner were Joe Kurihara, Genji Yamaguchi, Sam Tateishi, this guy Hashimoto, and a couple of others I didn't know and can't remember their names. The crowd was getting bigger and bigger all the time and making a hell of a lot of noise. I looked outside the window from time to time, and boy, was I glad those MP's were around with their rifles and bayonets. Kurihara was trying to argue with Captain Hall that Ueno should be released. Ueno was in the Manzanar jail; they'd brought him back from Independence; he sure looked cocky; they had him locked up in the rear of the building where the cell is.

"The mob was raising hell outside; they first sang 'Kimigayo' (the Japanese National Anthem); they followed it up with 'Aikoku Koshin Kyoku' (A Japanese patriotic march), then with 'Kaigun March' (Navy marching hymn). They even started dancing the ondo. They would get close to the soldiers and taunt them. Some fellows were thumbing their noses at the soldiers. I saw several of them go right up to the M.P. then turn around, point at their own rear ends in derisive fashion and dare the M.P. to shoot. A lot of them were doing the same thing from the front, pointing to their own chests or stomachs. One fellow went up to an M.P. and suddenly jumped him, grabbing the soldier's gun away from him; he gave it back right away though.

"Around 8:15 P.M. things looked like they were getting pretty much out of hand. Captain Hall just ignored Kurihara completely when it came to discussing anything about releasing Ueno. He turned to him and told him it wasn't even any use talking unless Kurihara went outside and dispersed the mob. Joe Kurihara said, 'I can't do anything now, I haven't got any control over that mob now.' Captain Hall didn't say a word, he just ignored Joe completely after that. I think Kurihara and Yamaguchi and the others wanted to go out of the station and join the mob, but they weren't allowed to do so; they weren't under arrest, though, to my knowledge. They were just inside the station and they couldn't go out because the soldiers barred the way. They were placed under arrest at midnight.

"I think it was around 8:30 when the crowd was getting too much out of hand and was even ignoring orders of soldiers to back up. Captain Hall was being cussed up and down by the soldiers because he wouldn't give them the order to shoot. Boy, were the soldiers mad. A few minutes later, I think he gave the order to throw tear gas; the soldiers did and the crowd began running in all directions; there was a pretty strong wind against the direction from which the

gas was thrown. At the same time, I think the guys in the front of the mob got hysterical because it was packed so solidly in the back and they couldn't get going very fast in the backward direction. It looked to me like a lot of them got hysterical and began running in the direction of the soldiers. It was then that the first four shots were fired; I was told at the order of Captain Hall who certainly had been patient up to that time. Although this scattered the mob quite a bit, it didn't disperse them altogether. A few minutes later, someone started Fire Chief Honn's light coupe, put it into high or second gear and jumped out, aiming the car toward a machine gun nest. The lieutenant opened up with machine gun fire; the bullets must have bounced all over the damned place because that's when some more people were injured. One guy died that night of bullet wounds, another died a few days later; four others were injured and treated for bullet wounds; there were three or four others who were treated at the hospital for bruises, bumps, and injuries they got when they fell and fellows stepped on top of them. There sure must have been a lot of them sick, because that tear gas has an awful effect. Right after the crowd was finally put on the run by the soldiers, the ringleaders of the mob began holding another meeting in mess hall 1; they were making all kinds of speeches there when the M.P's went and threw more tear gas bombs into the kitchen, and they went streaming outside again."

On George Hayakawa: He is 26, a Nisei, formerly engaged in the fibrist business in Glendale which had previously been owned and operated by his parents; he is married and the father of a daughter nearly 2 years old; his wife is an invalid, ailing of pleurisy at the Manzanar hospital; she is virtually a tubercular patient, her illness dating back before evacuation. Hayakawa is fluent in English and Japanese, though he speaks neither with polish; he is a good conversationalist and talker, has a slight tendency and flair for exaggeration,

and does not always, in my opinion, meticulously stick to the facts in a description of places, persons, or events. Nevertheless, he does appear to have a good memory for detail and is a fairly good observer. There is no doubt that he was 'marked' on the death list because of his police activities. His parents and parents-in-law are at Manzanar, as are his wife and baby daughter. He is here at Death Valley with his sister; they plan to relocate in the east. Hayakawa hopes to call his family as soon as he re-establishes himself.

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WHAT HAPPENED AT THE HOSPITAL before the mob finally converged on the police station area where the shooting occurred is partially described in an account by Fred Tayama:

"It was late in the afternoon and my head was still throbbing from the injuries of the night before. My whole body ached, and I had been seeing my family and relatives who had been up visiting me in the ward. My brothers told me of the meetings that were going on, and I asked Tom (Tom Tayama, who had been Chief Steward in the mess division and whose custer from that position had been pressed by Harry Ueno in his organizing of the mess hall workers union) to see Mr. Merritt about getting me out of the camp.

"Around six o'clock, maybe it was a little earlier, Dr. Goto (Dr. James Goto, chief surgeon and head of the medical section of the Manzanar Hospital) came to me and told me to hurry up and get dressed, because the military police were being called to take me out of the camp. I got up from the bed, barely able to stand until I could get my bearings and started to dress hurriedly. All of a sudden, Doc Goto came dashing back in full speed across that ward floor. He shouted out of breath: 'We're too late, we're too late, the hospital's surrounded, and they're pouring in.' He acted very coolly, though. He put me under one of those movable beds, you know the kind that turn up at the back if you wind a

handle. There's a little shelf-like place underneath the bed, and he stuck me in there and covered the bed with the sheets; he did this very quickly and stepped toward the door; there was no one else in the section where I was hidden, of course; it's at the end of the ward, near the rear door. Just as he stepped toward the entrance which separates that section from the main part of the ward, the mob came pouring in, from both the rear and the front. Dr. Goto was caught right in the middle. They yelled at him in Japanese: "Turn him over, turn that dog over; we're going to kill him." They were swearing up and down, and I could just feel the hysteria in their throats. There was a pile of cardboard boxes in the other corner, with blankets underneath; I had noticed it as he was hiding me. From my hiding place, I could hear them kicking those boxes loose and turning all the blankets over. They were arguing among themselves. One fellow called down another; "What's the matter with you, don't you realize the serious purpose we're here for? We're here to kill a man, don't you know? Kill him! Wake up!" Another man shouted: "When we kill that dog, we're going to cut his head off and put it on a pole and exhibit it all around camp as an example of what happens to dogs." All through the other wards and on the outside, I could hear the cries: "Tayama! Tayama! Get that dog Tayama!" Boy, I thought several times as I lay there that I was sure to be killed. The mob was making such demands on Doc Goto that I was almost certain he would have to turn me over to save his own life. He didn't though; how he did it I don't know, but I owe my life to him. I noticed at one time that one of the searchers turned over the bedsheet on the bed just across from the one in which I lay; if he had turned over mine, they would have discovered me. After a long time, they went streaming down the corridor and into the next ward. I could hear them pounding through the hospital. Dr. Goto went with them." (Note: According to George Hayakawa's version of this incident and his is a second hand version: Dr. Goto furthered his ruse by joining the mob and yelling with them 'Get that dog Tayama'.

When the mob members later in the evening discovered he had saved Tayama, they sent several men to threaten his life. He is said to have calmly told them: 'If you kill me, nobody is going to take the bullets out of the hides of those men who lie there shot by the soldiers. Now what are you going to do?' They didn't kill him, Hayakawa relates.--TT) To continue with Tayama:

"They came back into the same ward again, not satisfied that I wasn't there. They re-questioned Dr. Goto who was still with them. I was worried too because my mother was in the women's ward; she had been suffering from a stomach illness, and she couldn't help but hear all that shouting and yelling. (Note: Mrs. Tayama, Fred's mother, died at the Manzanar hospital the morning of the day before Christmas. Her funeral services were held here at Death Valley several days later.--TT)

"I remained hidden in the hospital for three hours until the military police finally arrived. Miss Wetzel, the head nurse there, came and took me to another ward just after the mob had left the hospital. They said, however, that there were a lot of the mob still posted as lookouts all around the hospital. Finally, when the military police came at about 9 or 9:30, let me tell you, I'll never experience that again but I was sure glad to see a soldier with a rifle and a bayonet."

Apparently, piecing together the various eye-witness accounts, the mob proceeded from the hospital eastward toward block 24 where the Slocums resided; thence to block 36 (where I resided); enroute it split up into smaller groups, some going to block 18 where the Tayama relatives resided; others to block 19 and 14.

Note to Merton:

Your letter dated Jan. 12 asks three questions; two of them, on the eye-witness records of the pre-riot meetings and the hospital account, I have attempted to partially answer in the foregoing pages. The other question on "any explanation for the fact that most of the trouble seemed to arise in block 22" is answered as follows:

On the following page is a diagram which I scribbled out in an effort to find reasons for Block 22's position as the scene of most of the trouble making. In the first place, the fact that (1) Harry Yoshio Ueno lived at Block 22, building 2, barrack 4 undoubtedly had much to do with the block meetings there on Sunday, Dec. 6. Ueno was considered something of a leader on his block and was apparently respected and had followers. In the second place (2), a glance at the diagram will show that block 22 is centrally located and almost in the middle of the Manzanar area. Ueno's associates, Genji Yamaguchi (block 13), Joe Kurihara (block 28), Sokichi Hashimoto (block 19), Masaaki Tanaka (block 32) Sam Tateishi (block 23), may have agreed that 22 was the most convenient place to meet; furthermore, the fact that Ueno was a junior cook in the mess hall probably facilitated arrangements in securing the hall as a meeting place; also it should be remembered that organization of the mess hall workers union originated in block 22.

To the best of knowledge gained from information about the people of block 22, there are no particular grounds to believe these residents had any more grievances against the administration than residents on any other block, aside from the fact that it was a fellow resident of their block who had been arrested in the Tayama attack. I do not have statistics showing places from which the various blocks in Manzanar received their population; however, this can approximately be traced through the account of the arrivals and their dates; these statistics may exist, but I do not know where. It is known at Manzanar, however, and a check-up should confirm it, that almost all of Block 3 derived its population from Bainbridge Island, Washington; that most of blocks 9 and 10 are people from Terminal Island. On this basis, it has been partially ascertained that most of

the people on block 22 are from the downtown Los Angeles area.

An incident occurring this summer may throw some light on the attitudes of people on block 22, however. The Japanese language "pro-Axis" talk which goes on in the latrines, at the showers, in the mess hall, in conversations all around has been a source of discomfort and irritation to more than one adult Nisei. Mr. and Mrs. Joe Ito were a young Nisei couple (in their late twenties) from Los Angeles; they have one son, age two or three. Ito lived at Block 22, building 1, barrack 4. Before evacuation, he was employed as a clothing goods salesman in Los Angeles; he is a Nisei who has never been to Japan, speaks Japanese very little; he and his wife spoke only English to each other and to their son. Their manners evidently did not conform to the Japanese customs of bowing and greeting in Japanese. They came to Manzanar sometime in May and within two weeks were intensely unhappy. They left the Center some time in August or September (The Manzanar records on relocation have the exact date). Before leaving Joe Ito said: "We're just fed up with this place. The people on this block are intolerant and intolerable. They speak ill of us and spread rumors and lies. They've mentally persecuted us until we both feel we can't stand it a minute longer; we've grabbed the first chance on relocation we can get though we've neither ever done any domestic work. I think of my little son's future, and I'll be hanged if we're going to let him grow up in this godawful environment. There's a bastard a few doors away who's a hell raising agitator. Mind you, nothing good's going to come of staying in this goddamned hellhole." His profanity expressed his feelings quite well, I thought. I do not know to this day if he was referring to Harry Ueno at the time. It would be interesting to receive correspondence from him, which I hope to do if contact can be re-established.

Note to Morton:            Replying to questions in your letter dated January 13:  
                                 Refer to page 28--

(1) I do not have the "complete list" of names read by Kurihara over the loudspeaker as the "death list" on Dec. 6. The different versions already reported indicate several readings and by persons other than Kurihara as well.

Refer to page 32--

(2) Members of the newspaper staff of the L. A. Japanese Daily News, J--- T---, K---- S-----, (whose identities can be ascertained) reported late in December that Tokio Slocum accompanied F.B.I. agents in their arrests of Central Japanese Association officers in Little Tokio on the night of December 7, 1941. In addition to Slocum's own statements to that effect, it was common talk among American Legion officials of the County Council who made reference to "comrade Tokio's courageous loyalty" on several occasions. This is all the evidence I know anything about to substantiate the generally acknowledged belief that Slocum accompanied (literally, not figuratively), the F.B.I. Whether it is true or not possibly cannot be determined from the evidence at hand. It might be added in this connection that Sature Kamikawa (see page 76) said yesterday: "Slocum told me he was an F.B.I. agent when we were all still at the military barracks just after the riot. He came up to me one day and called me aside and said, 'Now it can be told, but I have been working for the F.B.I.'" That is a verbatim statement by Kamikawa. Scrutinize it and see how rumors and impressions about Slocum grow. Kamikawa says that Slocum told him he was "an F.B.I. agent." Yet, in giving a quotation of what Slocum is alleged to have told him, Kamikawa reveals that Slocum said he was "working for the F.B.I." I have no facts to exactly define the nature or status of Slocum's relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There is ample evidence to support the statement Slocum

created the impression at Manzanar that he was "working for the F.B.I." My personal opinion is that Slocum was never employed as a paid agent of the F.B.I. but volunteered information and correspondence regularly.

Refer to page 36--

Label the following as hearsay, second and third hand: Up to the day of the riot, Manzanar was visited by the F.B.I. possibly six or seven times. (A record has probably been kept by the War Relocation Authority at Manzanar). On almost every visit, word that an "F.B.I. man is in camp" seemed to have circulated throughout the Center within an hour of the agents' arrival; at any rate, secrecy, if it was intended, was never maintained. On several of the return trips, possibly not all, the agents took with them arrested suspects, alien evacuee residents of the Center. F.B.I. arrests at Manzanar up to the time of the riot were probably less than a dozen. On one known occasion (because his arrest caused considerable unrest and gossip), a man returned from a Justice Department detention camp to rejoin his family at Manzanar was picked up by agents and taken out of camp a few days following his arrival. The rumor was to the effect that this man, an alien with several citizen children, had been embittered by his experience in detention and had spoken out openly and loudly on his return to Manzanar. The rumor specifically mentioned Tokio Slocum as having overheard this man and blamed him for the second arrest. Community attitudes toward F.B.I. incursions into Manzanar seemed to be divided. There is no doubt that they caused unrest, uncertainty, fear, and defiance among the older Japanese-speaking element. Resentment and a feeling that "do we have to be persecuted and hunted even behind prison walls?" were frequently expressed by the more outspoken of this element. Among the more English-speaking group (definitely in the numerical minority among adults), attitudes varied

from the extreme of "the F.B.I. should come into this camp and clean out the pro-Japan agitators " to one of "I don't give a damn, but I don't think much of informing rats." My own personal opinion has been that F.B.I. investigations and arrests WITHIN a relocation center worked against conditions necessary for successful W.R.A. administration. Invariably, new unrest and turmoil were left in the wake of an F.B.I. visit.

Refer to page 37--

The name is Yamaguchi, in Japanese ( 山 口 ), not Yamagiuchi or Yamaguichi (which are typographical errors). I should be ashamed of the now apparent ambiguities of my statement. There were other articulate Issei influences in Manzanar, of course. The church ministers, both the Christians and Buddhists, represented a definite, articulate influence among the Issei; there were Issei in the community cooperative enterprises whose outlook on the growing group conflict did not coincide with Yamaguchi; there were Issei in the Community Services division whose efforts were directed in line with securing resident cooperation with the Administration; there were Issei on the Manzanar Educational Council; there were Issei individuals in nearly all departments of work who as individuals undoubtedly held certain views and convictions which were at variance with Yamaguchi. But the point is, Yamaguchi's assumption of active leadership in demanding "an investigation of the camp by the Spanish Ambassador because we are prisoners of war", his leadership in launching a campaign of violence against a group refusing to share his views, was neither criticized, opposed, nor challenged openly by any Issei, individually or collectively. Privately there was, and possibly is, condemnation of the man, or his activities. Openly, up to the riot, there was none; whereas there was ample encouragement at various meetings preceding the disturbance. (Note to Morton: Does that straighten that statement? I should kick myself around the block if I ever use that expression 'the people themselves' again in connection with this particular report).

Refer to page 31

Joe Kurihara's membership in the Commodore Perry Post of the American Legion before evacuation is no positive or reliable indication that he was a quite different person at that time. The best index of his attitude (pre-war period) would be, in my opinion, his written by-line articles which appeared in the L.A. Japanese Daily News for several years before war broke. These files are to be returned to me at a later date, at which time something definite can be written. I had no first-hand opportunity to learn of his pre-war attitude; but my recollections of his letters and writings are that he concurred in, or at least did not oppose, the editorial policy of the paper which stressed "American loyalty of native-born Japanese" to the extent that policy frequently drew down the comment, "Flagwaving", from the anti-J.A.C.L. minority group represented by such individuals as Chiye Mori, Tom Yamazaki, Shuji Fujii.

C o n c l u s i o n s :

I. In grouping the participants, one can roughly identify three factions among evacuees in the Manzanar riot:

(1) The J.A.C.L. group, Fred Tayama, Joe Masaoka (who was not at Manzanar at the time), Togo Tanaka, Tad Uyeno, To Imai...

(2) The anti-J.A.C.L. Free Press group, Tom Yamazaki, Chiye Mori, George Kurata, Satoru Kamikawa, Joe Blamey,...

(3) The anti-Administration, anti-J.A.C.L. Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group which carried out the violence. Groups 1 and 2 were evacuated to Death Valley; group 3 landed in jail under military arrest. Group 1 figures found themselves on Group 3's death list; group 2 leaders were on the black list of group 3. Between groups 1 and 2, no love has apparently been lost; there seems to exist mutual distrust and suspicion--and dislike personally. Group 1, whose members arrived at Manzanar several weeks after most of Group 2 had already established themselves, charges the latter with having "laid the mines and torpedoes in advance of our coming; they prepared the Administration--and early evacuees for a hostile reception for us; they kept up the vicious rumors to perpetuate themselves in their petty little jobs, continuing petty jealousies and frictions of pre-evacuation days." Group 2 makes little secret of a similar attitude toward Group 1: "Troublemakers, the whole lot. The J.A.C.L. should have had sense enough to know that the people were fed up and sick of its name; they were so used to grabbing selfish control of everything that when they discovered it couldn't be done at Manzanar, they began agitating; they should have kept their traps shut and minded their own business."

II. The majority of the 10,000 residents of the

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Tanaka  
Manzanar, 1/19/43

Manzanar relocation center were neither active nor passive participants in the incident. Rather, they were interested, curious, somewhat bewildered spectators. I do not believe that any one of the three Groups commanded any substantial, loyal following. Groups 1 and 2 certainly did not; Group 3, in my opinion, represented a spontaneous outburst of pent-up emotion growing out of fears and uncertainties which made for a neurotic state of mind among a large section of the population; the incentive to resist the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi line within Manzanar did not exist.

III. The impression given in newspaper accounts of the Manzanar riot that the instigators were all "pro-Japan" or "pro-Axis" (and the same was applied to their alleged followers) and that the intended victims were "pro-American"--all of them--is not an accurate picture. If it implies that all the outstanding "pro-American" individuals have been driven out of the center and only "pro-Axis" or "pro-Japan" elements are left, it is entirely erroneous and misleading. It is undoubtedly true that differences in ideology and position on the war played an important part; but these were incidental to clashes of personality and organizational friction in leading to the riot itself.

IV. From the standpoint of evacuees anxious to repose confidence in a Caucasian administrative staff, Manzanar's W.R.A. representatives fell short of understanding and solving the complexities of the job. For instance, the assistant project director whose life was threatened by the agitators (Group 3) was privately disliked and condemned by Groups 1 and 2 as well. One administrative official, who told evacuees he was "fired" from his job because "politics" was being played, had commanded probably

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more general respect and support from among evacuees than any official in Manzanar's history.

V. Whether the Manzanar Center will be the scene of another riot like that of Dec. 6 or not will depend more upon successful administration by the W.R.A. staff there than upon the type of evacuee leadership which now asserts itself. This statement is based on the conviction that evacuee leadership in a relocation center at best is temporary and never enjoys much more than minority confidence and support. One of the most difficult problems of administration is that of getting evacuees sympathetic, or at least cooperative, in their attitude toward the W.R.A. administration; if even partial success were attained, the vicious circle of rumors which make for so much unrest and fear would be cut down considerably. Manzanar is like a lady with a shady past, in this respect; she can't seem to live down her record in the eyes of a disbelieving, distrustful, suspicious populace. The underlying situation in which setting it is not difficult to create a riot remains. Manzanar is not unlike a powder barrel. Groups 1, 2, and 3 constituted short fuses, as of December 6, 1942. It took a single incident to ignite the barrel. Elimination of the most apparent and active members of those groups has reduced the hazard of another blow-off in any predictable immediate future; but that does not by any manner or means indicate the underlying situation has been corrected. That pre-riot surface appearances have returned to Manzanar is the impression conveyed through a number of channels: for instance, there were 82 members of the Internal Security police force on the night of the riot; today there are 78, with few changes

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in the personnel; the schools are open, and classes have been resumed; the community enterprises are operating; likewise the shoyu and bean sprout plants; mess halls continue to serve the average of 31,000 meals daily; block residents are beginning to speak cordially to one another after a period of suspicious silence and frigid snubbing; even the intensity of feeling against Death Valley evacuee refugees appears to have diminished slightly. In this connection, the food dispatchers at Manzanar who loaded the corrugated cartons of canned goods for the Death Valley camps on December 11, marked the cartons in English and Japanese: "For the Dogs and Cats". One box containing pepper and spices was labelled: "Flea Powder". On January 17, the shipment included boxes with markings in Japanese & English: "Chu-Sei Gun" (Loyalty Group) and "Anti-Axis." Possibly, it would be more accurate to observe that the food dispatchers at Manzanar had found their wrath transformed to sarcasm.

The foregoing conclusions and observations, particularly those referring to the "groups", are generalizations. General statements at best are only approximately true.--TT

Addenda.

Following is a copy of the report prepared by Kiyoshi Higashi, resident Chief of Internal Security at Manzanar, with the assistance of Chief Commissioner Willard Schmidt, for the National Emergency Conference of the Japanese American Citizens League at Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24. The report was submitted over three weeks before the Manzanar riot. It contains evidence that the Manzanar police department was fully aware of the situation which reached its head in the riot. The report follows: (Mr. Higashi remains at Manzanar in his capacity as resident Chief of Internal Security)

"BACKGROUND: Everywhere in America, and particularly on the West Coast where large numbers of Japanese have lived, there has been a marked absence of crime among our people. Police blotters seldom carried Japanese names. The criminal incidents rate among Japanese was negligible.

"Pride, family training, neighbor and public opinion were strong preventives to irregular conduct. It is these same forces that have been deterrents to law-breaking in the centers. During the period when evacuees have been busily engaged in making furniture, cupboards and closets for their physical comfort, internal security statistics have been remarkably low.

"Now, with more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. What has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life, in reality, covered a cauldron in which differing ideologies, unmiscible as oil and water, seethed and boiled. Surface indications of this internal strife have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency.

"The real threat to peace and order within the centers will not come from individual lawlessness. The bombshell that will shatter these communities will be the blow-off of (1) accumulated resentments, (2) harbored injustices, (3) racial discriminations, (4) pro-Japan convictions, and (5) real and fancied grievances. As time goes on, rather than a settling process, mob outbreaks, mass demonstrations, gang atrocities and acts of terrorism will recure frequently.

WRA administrators must realize the dynamite they are dealing with; they must be realistic; they must not encourage the mushrooming of small incidents by condoning with official laxity; individuals advocating constructive attitudes and activities must be shielded from vengeful harm; deleterious elements in each camp must be recognized and intelligent yet stern methods must be instituted to curb them.

W A R N I N G: The handwriting on the wall is the insurgence of "Nippon Banzai" groups. These elements will use every dissatisfaction to fan the flames of trouble. Unless measures are taken to cope with them, the entire WRA program is jeopardized. The control of any center by intimidation or the outbreak of violence by this group will bring down the due and cry of the press that the WRA is coddling pro-Axis sentiment; that the Army should run the centers.

"Despite circumspection in drawing up any plan of self-government, there is an inevitable perversity among some of the residents. These 'agin-ers' will attack provisions in the constitution, or the people elected, or their method of election. It is very likely that these snipers are the spearhead of an organized opposition that operates sub rosa feeding the fires of discontent.

"It is also likely that this underground movement is allied or idnetiaal to the pro-Japan elements in the center. Fpr this reason, the forces of law

and order must absolutely predominate in the center. The judiciary code of the center Constitution must be rigidly enforced; at no time must the sinister groups of intimidation, of coercion, or of blackmail gain the upper hand, as they have in some communities.

"If those who believe in America are to continue to live side by side with those who have lost their faith in America, then the forward-looking, wholesome people in the centers must be protected from those who jeer and taunt and threaten them.

"COURTS: Under present rulings, felonies are taken outside the center and tried in the county. Destruction of center property constitutes a felony and becomes liable to the same procedure. Shifting of trial outside the center means a prejudiced court in the eyes of many residents.

"The Judiciary code drawn up by representatives of the center is the law. Infractions are tried and sentences, subject to Project Director approval, meted out to offenders. While the panel of the Judiciary Committee includes both Caucasians and residents, the Japanese serving thereon have frequently become the target of intimidation and coercion. Already, conditions have become such that in some centers, law-abiding elements have been driven to cover, thus rendering themselves ineffective and non-assertive.

"Fair Practise and Grievance Committees function in the various centers as conciliatory and arbitration boards to adjust work conditions and worker's controversies. Here, too unsatisfactory decisions often become personal grudges, and members of such boards are sometimes waylaid and beaten.

"FIRE AND POLICE PROTECTION: Cognizance of the fire hazards inherent in the all-wood type of center construction has led to the placing of fire extinguishers in all dwellings. However, telephones or some fire alarm system should be made available in every block. Most imperative, however, is the need for frequent fire drills in the schools, which are

barracks converted to classroom use. Should flames start in these fire traps, panic and casualties are probable.

"Police organization in the light of recent events should be a four-phase program:

"1. Jailing of sentenced offenders should be strict isolation except for definite visiting hours. No visiting should be permitted at windows of jailhouses nor should refreshments be brought in to prisoners and a general partying be tolerated during the visiting period.

"2. Segregation of known troublemakers to a separate center must be accomplished in the interests of peace and order. The WRA policy of lenience has resulted in cowering the decent center population to submission to terroristic rule. Unless this is done, agitators will continue to foment trouble and eventually call down upon evacuees and WRA administration a strict military surveillance and perhaps even congressional investigation.

"2. Policing and records are a matter of intelligent mechanics. Naturally, men of known integrity should be engaged in patrol work; otherwise unscrupulous policemen may attempt to curry special privileges for themselves and families or their groups.

"3. Investigative Police, like their undercover counterparts in the cities, should have their fingers and ears on the "dangerous areas" and "sore spots" of each community. Advance warnings of outbreaks should be forecasted and serious demonstrations averted. Violations of the Judiciary Code should be duly investigated with full utilization of modern police procedures.

"4. Classroom instruction in fundamentals of police work should be started in all centers as a special inducement to attract and hold high caliber men. How to write a report, how to investigate, fingerprint classification, handwriting and typewriting identification, police photography, how to identify

by pictures, plaster casting of footprints, first aid, and the evaluation of evidence should be among lecture subjects.

"G A N G S T E R I S M: Gangs which have run afoul of the law have usually been infused with resentments and injustices fanned alive by pro-Japan persons. These gangs have directed their assaults against individuals who have been prominent in community activities whom they label "administration stooges" or "JACL guys." Generally, their attitude has been one of braggadocio because of seeming immunity against legal punishments.

"R A C K E T E E R I N G A N D G A M B L I N G: To date no racketeering has been uncovered in the center. LIQUOR has been smuggled in by Caucasian workers. Dismissal of such bootleggers has stopped illicit liquor trafficking. Police are often challenged with:

"Is liquor contraband?

"What WRA ruling prohibits liquor purchases?

"Does possession and drinking constitute a legal violation?

"Is the act of bringing in liquor to the centers or mail orders of liquor a punishable crime?

"Gambling in a vice sense does not apparently exist. Reported cases have seldom passed the friendly stage.

"P R O - J A P A N E L E M E N T S: Wholesale experiences of the racial evacuation and living within centers surrounded by barbed wires and watchtowers are in the eyes of many prima facie evidence that a future in this country is hopeless for us. These, too, they believe are indisputable arguments that Japan's is the righteous cause.

"So those who espouse Americanism, participation in the armed forces of this country, work on defense projects, and relocation are particular objects of enmity and persecution.

2 "Numerically, this pro-Japan element is small, but the damage their insidious propaganda can do to the peace and order of the community should not be too lightly regarded."

"CONCLUSION: Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those be-speaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, malefactors have been so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated, but with increasing frequency.

"A warning note must here be again emphasized. As community leaders leave on individual relocation, the centers are drained of the spark plugs which give momentum to WRA policies. The elements which maintained hopeful attitudes of personal re-establishment may disintegrate. The centers may become hotbeds of unrest and indolence. Truly, a great many of the evacuees may become persuaded to remain as wards for the duration. With such a spirit rampant within the centers, WRA administration may of necessity become transformed into a prison administration to maintain peace and order."