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ARMY ENLISTMENT AND REGISTRATION

The disturbances in Poston and Manzanar apparently were not forgotten by either the Army or the Congress. Davis McEntire mentioned when he was here that these disturbances were having somewhat of a beneficial effect, so far as the Japanese communities were concerned, in that thinking people in this country were beginning to take hold of the idea that not all of the Japanese were pro-Axis or pro-Japan. On the contrary, these disturbances showed that there were those Japanese who were intensely loyal and patriotic. The effect of such disturbances was, therefore, that it was generally agreed that segregation should take place and that the loyal Japanese should be offered an opportunity to prove their loyalty by serving in defense work and in the armed forces. It has been agreed that segregation is necessary, and that this segregation should have taken place prior to evacuation. A result of the propoganda which for some time had been disseminated<sup>ed</sup> by the protagonists of the Japanese Americans and, perhaps, as a direct result of these Manzanar and Poston disturbances, was the favorable consideration by the Army of the enlistment and drafting of Nisei.

The JACL, the only organization of and by the Nisei, had in its November convention in 1942 taken a favorable stand with regard to enlistment and the opening of the draft to the Nisei, basing such a stand on the arguments that inasmuch as there were loyal citizen Japanese, the same privileges should be extended to them as to other Americans. Although the JACL had taken this stand, it has also been agreed that they were not instrumental in bringing the move about, but, rather, that they served to substantiate the Army's decision to allow the formation of Nisei battalions and the entrance by volunteer enlistment of the Nisei in the armed forces, a circumstance which points to eventual involuntary drafting of Nisei.

Recently, in Washington, representatives were called from the ten relocation centers in order to discuss with high Army officials the possibility and

advisability of allowing Nisei to enlist. At these meetings it was decided that in addition to the opening up of volunteer enlistment, registration of all individuals between 17 and 38 would take place so that an accurate tab could be kept of not only employment possibilities for the war effort but also so that the business of segregation could be brought under way. Against the advice of the WRA personnel, the Army decided on a two-fold course: it would, at the same time, open up volunteer enlistment and effect the necessary registration. A ten-day course of instructions was given to these WRA officials so that they could aid the Army in facilitating this registration and enlistment. The so-called Leave Officer, that is to say the individual concerned with obtaining leave clearances and arranging for the entrance of Japanese from the relocation centers into private employment in the Middle West and elsewhere, was the usual representative of the WRA from the relocation centers at these Washington meetings. John Landward, Leave Officer of this project, returned from Washington early in February, 1943, after having become acquainted with the program contemplated by the Army.

Simultaneously in all ten relocation centers, identical crews of Army personnel were brought in. They were to accept recruits for the Army and to effect registration of the age group mentioned. Only those who have applied for repatriation are to be excluded from the registration. The purpose of the registration, generally, is to provide a source of man power for defense industries and to clarify the situation of loyalty as a prelude to selective induction of Nisei in this age group. Although the Leave Officers at this meeting in Washington deplored the fact that registration and volunteer enlistment would take place at the same time, ~~the~~ Army refused to reconsider its stand and brought about the policy of "killing two birds with one stone." Thus, these Army men have met with lack of success from the very beginning because of the confusion in the minds of the evacuees, not only here at Gila but reportedly at other projects as well, ~~by~~ of the volunteer enlistment and registration. The idea is, an idea which has not been entirely dispelled, that registration of this compulsory nature is tantamount

to Army enlistment. Most of the Issei are of the opinion that if their sons and daughters register, they will be subject to being impressed into the Army or else subject to a labor draft; and it would take them away from their families, forcing them to work in defense industries. This fear will be discussed later in regard to community sentiments concerning this subject.

This dual issue has thus ~~been~~ clouded the minds of most of the evacuee population. It is not to be forgotten that the Army personnel here are to bring across to everyone in the community two facts. The first of these is that the registration is solely for the purposes of tabulating the available manpower. The second is to promote propaganda for the enlistment of the Nisei into the Nisei combat battalion which is now being formed. It is true that there is already an all-Nisei combat battalion made up largely of Hawaiian Japanese. This is the 100th Infantry, which is stationed in Missouri. The battalion formed, however, will be made up mainly of Japanese from the relocation centers. It is difficult for even the objective observer to dissociate these two ideas and to keep them clearly in mind.

The Army personnel arrived at the centers on the 8th of February and immediately began the process of bringing their idea across to the evacuee population. Each center was assigned a crew of Army men who consisted of the following: a commissioned officer in charge of the general program of registration and recruitment; in the case of Gila, this was Captain Thompson, assigned from the division of Army recruiting. This officer is aided by two sergeants, one Japanese and one Caucasian, and the general mechanics of detail are taken care of by a staff corporal, also a Caucasian. In Gila, Captain Thompson and his crew attempted at first to bring across the idea of the necessity for enlistment, pointing out that a quota had been set for enlistees from the relocation centers. This quota for the ten relocation centers is, although there are conflicting reports on it, 3500. In this case, between 300 and 350 are expected to volunteer for Army service at Gila. The officers at first concerned themselves with effecting Army en-

listment, mentioning only secondarily the fact that compulsory registration would also take place. Of course, the arrival of these officers had been preceded by a good deal of publicity. The initial announcement that the Japanese would be admitted into the armed forces received considerable write-up in the Gila newspaper. It had, furthermore, been stressed in newspapers across the country. The Army believed, apparently, that there would be no difficulty in the matter of registration, being unable to foresee the confusion which has resulted over the two issues. In the initial publicity, following the arrival of the Army personnel, much was made over the matter of enlistment, and it was not until enlistment and compulsory registration were mentioned together that public opinion arose against both issues. Previously, publicity had been given to registration as well, but the evacuees in general were amenable to registration of this kind. They did not particularly oppose to enlistment except that the JACL was held responsible for bringing this situation about. It is true that there was opposition to enlistment, but it was not, prior to the arrival of the Army officers, concerted among the center residents.

An all-Nisei combat unit is believed necessary by the Army but has been severely criticized by the evacuees who say that this is racial discrimination. The Army's answer to this criticism, which has been leveled time and again, is that an all-Nisei combat unit which might distinguish itself in an African campaign could do much for the future of the Japanese in this country, molding American opinion in that it would become favorable to the Japanese people. The Army personnel here correctly believed it essential to bring across to the people the idea of the necessity for enlistment, the fact that if the quota of 3500 for the ten relocation centers was not met, the result might be very catastrophic so far as administrative and public opinion were concerned. Adverse public opinion on the ground that too few of the Nisei volunteered in the Army might seriously effect a relocation program and a post-war settlement of the people of this

minority group. It has been repeatedly mentioned by Captain Thompson that the previous disputes must be forgotten in order to take into consideration the import of the problem at hand. It has been pointed out that the future, not the past, is at stake. Public opinion can control and effect the role which the Japanese are to play in America in the future, and if this public opinion is adverse, the loyal Nisei may find themselves in an unpleasant position. This, generally, was the propaganda which was voiced by the Army officials and Project Director, Mr. Bennett, in order to make the younger Nisei see the advisability of enlisting in the armed forces. Registration was made a secondary issue, and this proved to be a very grave error.

In coming in, the Army personnel did not expect to meet with concerted opposition. The administrative officers themselves were of the opinion that although there might be opposition, in the main, there would be cooperation. No one expected to find the terrific opposition which was raised by a number of groups in the center. Keeping the two separate functions which the Army had to perform, in mind, it will be well to examine in detail the effects of their mention in the Gila Community.

In the recruitment program, they expected to reach only a few people; in the registration program, they expected to take in everyone in the specified age group. This registration became more significant than the actual recruitment. The registration for <sup>males</sup> ~~both sexes~~ takes place on a new division of Selective Service Form 304-A, "Statement of a United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry," a form which was prepared January 23, 1943. In general this questionnaire concerns general information regarding the individual and is fairly analagous to any similar registration form with one or two exceptions. These exceptions are concerned with the registration with any Japanese agency which might make for the dual citizenship of the individual or if dual citizenship has been cancelled. Another question concerns the application for repatriation to Japan, while still another requests a statement as to the individual's knowledge of the Japanese language.

Another, relatives in Japan, and so on. These questions are not considered particularly damaging by those who are obliged to fill out the form, and no particular controversy has arisen over them. The last two questions on the form, however, questions 27 and 28, have been the source of one of the bitterest struggles which has, as I said, taken place in this, and as the writer understands, other relocation centers. Question 27 states, "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty wherever ordered?" and question 28 states, "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor or any other foreign government, power or organization?" The objection to the move on the part of the Army to open up the armed forces to the Nisei centered itself around these two questions, which <sup>innocuous,</sup> ~~also~~ appear ~~innocuous~~ <sup>and</sup> ones which every American citizen must answer, <sup>has</sup> ~~have~~ given rise to tremendous opposition. Captain Thompson and his men met the first group of evacuees with whom they expected to deal in Canal Camp on Monday afternoon, February 8. This was followed by a similar meeting in Butte Camp on Monday night. The same reaction took place in both camps. It was the plan of the officials to present the idea of recruitment and registration across to the leaders in the community. Accordingly, all Block Councilmen, Block Managers, and Block Chairmen, as well as the heads of various groups were urged to attend this first meeting. Thompson approached the issue at hand in as fair a manner as possible; in fact, nothing but good can be said of his approach. He has attempted to be ~~as~~ <sup>emphatically</sup> fair in the whole matter and to take cognizance of the controversial issues that he rightly believed would inevitably arise. He, accordingly, in his meeting asked that questions be written. He presented in a prepared speech the implications of enlistment and brought about also the subject of registration. In this prepared speech, he concluded by reading a statement from President Roosevelt in which the President, recognizing the

loyalty of the Nisei, gives them the opportunity of showing this loyalty by volunteering in the Army. After this speech, which lasted only a short time, Thompson devoted time to answering the questions which had been written by the audience, and in attempting to give as honest an answer as he possibly could.

On the February 8 meeting, the appearance of the Kibei Club as a radical element asserted itself. The idea was to present the arguments for enlistment and to give an explanation for the necessity for registration for a few days until February 11, when the actual registration was to begin. Having given the gist of Captain Thompson's talk, let us turn to an analysis of the questions which have been raised. The concern in the first meeting was raised over issues of principle of the subject at hand. In general, the questions concerned the fact that the Japanese have already shown their patriotism by agreeing to evacuation. Volunteer enlistment, therefore, is not a privilege but is simply demanding of a greater sacrifice than a democracy can expect from a minority group. Accession to the demands of evacuation has been forthcoming, with the result that the evacuees in the relocation centers are not in a democratic position having renounced their claim on democratic treatment. They are, therefore, not obliged to either volunteer or be drafted. It was pointed out that the proposed relocation program which is now in effect will be defeated if the breadwinner of any given family were to either be drafted or volunteers. Captain Thompson put aside those questions which concerned matters of principle until he could answer them all in a final speech relative to his task. He did attempt to answer those questions which were not concerned with principle but which sought to make some issue of everyday matter-of-fact problems. When he pointed out that those families who had a son in the service would be given first preference in the matter of relocation, a hiss of protest went up throughout the audience, not only in the first meetings which are described here, but in later meetings before other groups as well. It was pointed out to him that he did not realize that the average age of the Issei was 56, of the Nisei, 21. The Nisei is the breadwinner for the family.

If he is drafted, the family hope of resettlement is gone. The older Issei parents, most of them unable to speak English, would not be assimilable in a Middle Western community if the son who could take the responsibility for the family were to enter the armed forces. Although the fact that families with sons in the Army were to be given resettlement preferences was brought out, nevertheless, the valid argument arose that families without this son would be incapable of assimilation and resettlement. Arguments raised against the all-Nisei battalion brought about the answer that the all-Nisei battalion could be a worthwhile agent of propaganda for the American Japanese, that by it public opinion could be molded favorably. Many quibbling details were raised, but the most significant questions that have arisen time and time again are those which concern themselves with democratic principles and those which express a fear of the disuniting of families under these conditions of hardship. The latter question, of course, cannot be answered. Arguments can be brought to bear that this family disunification, which has occurred throughout the country at large and, indeed, throughout the world at large, is happening to other American families, but such an answer has not been eminently satisfactory.

Regarding those matters of democratic principle, which were raised in the first meetings in Butte and Canal, Captain Thompson expressed himself in sympathy, but he pointed out that a state of war can never be purely democratic and he made issue of the fact that if the Japanese in America were to survive, they must survive through their own efforts, through the effect that their patriotic behavior would have on the country at large. He pointed out correctly that if these issues were forgotten, he feared for the future of the American Japanese. This point has been clearly expressed on numerous of occasions not only by Captain Thompson himself, but by those Nisei who are able to see what refusal to meet the Army demands might mean. An interesting attitude at this point is to note the apparent inability of the people concerned to view this situation in an objective light and to consider the future of their group at large rather than their own interests.

At these first meetings, the subject of loyalty to the United States and its war effort did not arise with particular significance. Loyalty as such is a subject to which the evacuees themselves have not given much thought. Loyalty is an issue which has come out later and which has been brought out, not by the evacuees, but by the administration. The first meetings did bring up the questions 27 and 28 of the registration form which I mentioned above. The common opinion that if question 27 were to be answered "yes", the individual so answering would subject himself to Army enlistment has been repeatedly clarified by Captain Thompson, but it is still not fully understood. Even in this first meeting when the questionnaire form was read aloud, the people concerned, the ostensible leaders in the community, were at a loss to understand it.

Since the news came out that Army personnel was in the center for such a purpose, pressures against enlistment, already strong, were supplanted by pressures against registration. These pressures seem to center themselves in the general Issei group which has militantly voiced itself on numerous occasions, but more particularly in the Kibei organizations of both camps because the Kibei, as younger people, were subject to the draft. The draft is greatly feared, but it seems that there would not be the terrific opposition that there is against enlistment. Because the draft is feared, it is thought by some that registration is tantamount to a declaration of willingness to be drafted; hence, pressures rise against registration. The Kibei, particularly, have brought this about.

During the week of February 7, meetings took place in both camps. During the day, the meetings occurred in Camp One, while Captain Thompson attempted to meet the groups at night in Camp Two. The first meeting, as mentioned above, attempted to reach the leadership in the community. The second, on Tuesday night, was in Butte Camp sponsored by the JACL and directed toward the Nisei. Although the JACL arranged this meeting, it ~~did not~~ <sup>hesitated to</sup> publicly announce its affiliation with it. On Wednesday night, the older generation was approached and the attempt was made to make the older people see the necessity for allowing their sons to enter

the service. At this meeting, in Butte Camp on the night of the 10th, the Nisei military aide, Sergeant Aburamen, presided. At the same time, in Canal, Thompson was addressing a mixed Issei-Nisei group. The Wednesday night meetings which were conducted in the Japanese language were most unsuccessful. In Butte, the Nisei Sergeant was greeted with howls of derision and was not allowed to continue his prepared speech. Perhaps the first meetings on Monday the 8th were the most orderly. After this, the community was aware of the issues involved; impossible questions were asked or the audience would clap and boo and stamp its feet at the Captain's words. On Thursday night, February 11, a meeting took place before the Kibei Club in Butte. It has already been pointed out in other reports that the Kibei Club in Canal is not nearly so active as the one in Butte. The Butte Kibei Club, under the leadership of George Yamashiro, has been particularly opposed to the Army measure all along. When the meeting was held before the Kibei Club, the group was recognized as dangerous. Yamashiro, head of the group, had been called in to Bennett's office during the afternoon prior to the meeting and had been told flatly that if his group did not cooperate with Captain Thompson in the meeting, he would be held personally responsible and might be indicted on a Sedition charge. The Sedition Act was read to him. The Kibei meeting was extremely quiet. Some controversial questions were raised, but these were encouraged by the Captain in his attempt to clear up matters. There was no demonstration of any kind, but after the meeting, the Kibei remained seated and held a private meeting of their own. When the Caucasians present had left, Yamashiro addressed his own group, saying that Army volunteer enlistment was entirely a matter of choice for the individual. Of himself, however, he said that he would not join the Army for a number of reasons. He could not, he said, as a Japanese, take a stand against his own race; he had already been classed as "4-C" an enemy alien even though a United States citizen, and he did not wish to leave his aging parents. This, he said, was his own personal stand; in the same way, he said that he could not answer questions 27 and 28 in the affirmative. The Kibei have brought about the controversial

issue arising out of the questionnaire form. Captain Thompson has let it be understood that the two questions which are so significant may justly be answered with some reservation. For example, a person may say in answer to question 27, "not unless drafted." Thus, in other words, conditional answers would be allowed. An individual also has the privilege of saying that he does not know. The Kibei have made a very strong issue of these two questions, being unwilling to serve in the armed forces in the main. There are those who will serve in non-combatant capacity. Many of them, however, particularly Yamashiro's group, refuse to answer in the affirmative and continue to believe that if 27 were to be answered "yes", they will then be subjected to Army induction. Captain Thompson's answer to the contrary is not believed.

Registration had started on Thursday, February 11. While there are no exact statistics on the percentage of those expressing loyalty or disloyalty, it is said, undoubtedly with some degree of rectitude, that 75 per cent of those who filled out the questionnaire forms were answering questions 27 and 28 in the negative. Registration in Camp Two started in those blocks centering around the Kibei Club, and it begins to appear that the Kibei were the first to be asked to fill out the questionnaire forms. For several days, however, the discouraging response of more than half of those registering continued to be negative. As the registering officials moved away from those blocks, a better response was elicited and the percentage of those answering in the negative to drop off a little, early in the second week of registration. The administration began to be exceedingly discouraged. Bennett issued public statements from time to time in which he urged favorable consideration of Army enlistment and answers to the questions concerned. The Kibei seemed to bring about community sentiment against not only registration but Army enlistment as well. wty?

Following the meeting before these various groups, leaders, Nisei, Issei, and Kibei, and seeing that registration was making no headway, a list was prepared of leaders in the community and invitations were sent out to them to attend

another meeting under the direction of Captain Thompson in Butte Camp on Friday night, February 12. The list was compiled with the idea of bringing in every leader or anyone at all who was thought to have some adherence. Trucks were arranged to provide transportation for the individuals from Canal. Everyone was asked to return his invitation at the door and a careful check was made of those who did not attend and attempts were later made to contact them. At this meeting, the Sedition Act was publicly proclaimed by Bennett and a much firmer stand was taken by Captain Thompson. The effect of this meeting was to subdue the outspoken groups. The result was that community spirit dissociated itself from the active groups who were pushing an unfavorable response to the issues involved, and had the effect of bringing these issues out of the groups and into the individual homes; in fact, the last manifestation of concerted community sentiment was the appearance Saturday afternoon, February 13, of leaders in a mass Issei meeting held in the Butte amphitheater and which was designed to swing community sentiment toward an unfavorable reception of the enlistment and registration program. The few facts concerning this meeting should be described here.

This Saturday afternoon meeting was a memorable one. It was conducted in the Butte amphitheater, largely at the behest of the Kibei Club. The principal actor in this meeting was the president of the Sumo Club's executive board and chairman of the Board of Governors of the Kibei Club, an older Kibei by the name of Fukumoto, who is known to be a rabid pro-Axis agent and an orator of some power. Several people spoke at this meeting, but it was generally agreed that Fukumoto was the particular orator who swayed the minds of the people concerned. This mass meeting, which was called without permission on the part of administrative officials, was for Issei and was, apparently, a concerted effort to mold Issei opinion against allowing their children to enlist and to register. We may justly wonder why the agitation of a few, such as the Kibei leaders, could so move the population against the proposed Army measure. It has been pointed out

by some of the Issei leaders that the people in the Gila Relocation Center are predominantly rural, thus, less sophisticated. They, therefore, are inclined to be influenced more easily by those elements who can speak to them in terms of sentiment and emotional appeal. It is said that the speeches made by Fukumoto, Yamashiro, Inouye, and the others who spoke at this meeting, had a definite emotional appeal and that they were designed to move sentiments of the Issei who attended the meeting. It is said that the direction of the speeches made followed a line which would be of particular appeal to the Issei mothers of the community. Fukumoto is quoted as saying, "You mothers have held your sons in your arms when they were babies, and now, when they are a comfort to you in your older age, you see them torn from your arms by a ruthless and power-mad government." Fukumoto is alleged to have had most of his audience in tears as the result of the strong emotional appeal he made. Such a speech was accompanied with appropriate gestures such as the cradling of the speaker's arms to denote the holding of an infant and the clenching of fists and stamping of feet when he spoke of a "power-mad government." At the close of his speech, he wept and had most of his audience in accord with his own expressed views. There were some in the audience who were plainly disgusted by such a sickly, sentimental demonstration and who severely criticized the Kibei for it. Certainly, however, Fukumoto, Yamashiro, and Inouye, as well as some of the Issei of those which spoke that afternoon, spoke along similar lines and were extremely successful in what they started out to do; namely, turning Issei opinion against allowing the young men either to register or to volunteer in the Army. They, furthermore, called up a strong public opinion against the proposed draft measure.

Oddly enough, these Kibei called up the concept of bushido, saying that the chivalric code of Japanese could never condone the slaughter of brother by brother. Yet, there are many Issei who apply the concept of bushido in a different way and call to mind the writings of those samurai on the subject referring to a proverb which says, "You must be as loyal to the adopted mother as to the real mother".

Thus, some Nisei have been urged by their parents to volunteer because it is in accordance with the demand made by the adopted mother, namely, the United States. For the most part, Issei opinion has been successful in molding Nisei opinion. There are those Issei who violently oppose the entrance of their sons into the Army and also who urge that their children do not cooperate with the officers by signing up in the registration even though it be compulsory. The Kibei Club as such withdrew from active campaigning to defeat the Army enlistment and registration program when the Sedition Act was read to them. This did not prevent the Kibei leaders, however, from expressing themselves in the mass meeting of Saturday afternoon. The Kibei were generally successful in bringing the issue of registration to the minds of the Issei and of purposely clouding the subject so that most Issei understand registration to be tantamount to enlistment in the Army.

It is not to be thought that the Issei are particularly disloyal because of their stand in regard to their own children. Many, in fact, are able to see clearly the necessity for having their children join the Army so that all the Nisei may enjoy a future in America. Most of them, however, are perfectly willing for other Nisei to go, but are reluctant to part with their own children. The result is that while they are quick to criticize the children of neighbors for their unpatriotic stand in not enlisting, they do not think to criticize their own children and, indeed, exert pressures at home which prevent their children from enlisting. They do not want the questionnaire to be answered either inasmuch as they believe, in general, that an affirmative answer to the questions 27 and 28 can only mean eventual Army service. The strongest feeling which is manifested by the Issei is the desire to keep the family unit intact. This is the point which the public at large will not and cannot understand. In the pre-evacuation period it was relatively secure. People had their own property, their own homes. They were sure, more or less, of their future and, thus, they were not so unwilling to allow their children to go into the Army. In the relocation center, however, it is a very different situation. The result is that the parents of the

of the families do their utmost to hold the family members together as a unit, fearing the future and being uncertain of what lies in store for them. So many families, too, are dependent on their sons, and the parents fear for their own old age should their sons be taken away from them.

Here is the explanation of another interesting attitude in relation to the bushido concept. Bushido demands that the warrior should not hesitate to sacrifice himself on the battle field and that in leaving his family behind him, he must not, when he goes to war, expect to return. While this attitude is not reflected by the Nisei, the Issei remember such a concept as being taught to them when they were children at school in Japan and one they cannot forget. They expect, when their children are taken away to the war, that they will die. There is also the rumor that a Nisei combat battalion will be sacrificed by the Army, that it will be put into the front line trenches and annihilated.

It is important to note that most of the Issei are not concerned with political issues. To be sure, there seems to be the prevalent feeling among them that they do not like to see Japan and the United States at war. For sentimental reasons, they dislike seeing the mother country clash with the adopted country. Their own interests, however, concern their immediate families. There is a group among them whose attitudes are pro-Japan and who argue on a nationalistic basis. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, that this group is definitely in the minority. The general run of Issei are apathetic to the war and wish only to be left alone. The attitudes which they themselves cannot express are brought out by their children and put into more concrete form.

It is mentioned above that the breadwinner, or the potential breadwinner, of a resettled family may find himself torn from his family; thus, causing the family to suffer and to be unable to resettle. If a man is to give up his life, he does not wish to do so unless he is sure of the security of his family. It is said by many of the Nisei that if the family were allowed to resettle and to establish itself on the outside thus guaranteeing itself some substantial security, many more

single  
men

Nisei would be able to feel secure in volunteering. If it only had been possible to bring about registration and volunteer enlistment at different times instead of together, these issues, perhaps, could have been avoided. Because most Kibei hold dual citizenship, they feel moderately secure and are not particularly concerned over the prospect of losing their United States citizenship. For example, George Yamashiro, himself, is quoted as saying that should he lose his United States citizenship, there is a country which will accept him. Not all the Kibei manifest this attitude, however. Most of the people who are here as Kibei are said to have returned to the United States as soon as their education was completed in order to escape conscription into the Japanese Army. There are some Kibei who are volunteering or who are, at least, expressing affirmative answers to questions 27 and 28. They give the reason for this as being the fact that they came back to this country in order to escape conscription in Japan. They, therefore, cannot feel justified in evading the conscription which this country imposes upon them. The writer knows of several cases of this kind. It has been mentioned elsewhere that the Kibei are a spoiled group since they were usually eldest sons who went to Japan alone and were allowed to live much as they pleased and to have enough money to spend. These Kibei of this particular class are those who have raised the greatest amount of opposition to the Army measure.

Generally, throughout the above comments, mention is made of attitudes of the various groups of people. Roughly, they may be divided as between the generations. It is to be noted that the application of the Japanese family system becomes particularly strong when a significant issue is to be faced. There are reports of a number of Issei who have threatened to commit suicide should their children go into the Army. It is the supposedly true case of a father who told his son that if he volunteered or even if he answered affirmatively to questions 27 and 28, he, the father, would kill him himself. Threats of disinheritance and other actions were made by Issei to their children.

It will be well to mention the role played by the administration in this

registration program. Those principally concerned are the Project Director to whom has been given the responsibility by the Army of administering successfully the registration program. He, of course, has several aides, particularly the Project Leave Officer, John Landward. Terry, the Project Attorney, and Williamson, Chief of Internal Security, have been called in to aid the registration program; Williamson for consultation and Terry to express legal opinion on the matter. It is significant to note the character of the administration here and to mention the fact that under the new director, Mr. Bennett, the administration has taken an attitude of extreme conservatism, adopting a policy which inclines to be paternalistic toward the evacuees and one which draws a distinct line between administration and the evacuee population. Bennett has insisted on a policy which prevents any kind of fraternizing whatsoever. He has discouraged his staff from meeting the evacuees socially, and there are the growing feelings from among the population that Bennett is pushing a policy of Jim Crowism. Certainly, Bennett's conservatism is not helpful to the evacuee population as a whole. A former businessman, Bennett lacks entirely any conception of the people with whom he is dealing. He is hidebound by his preconceived prejudices, and his inability to approach an issue with an open mind. He is, therefore, completely unable to visualize the lives of the evacuee residents under his jurisdiction. He states that the Japanese are intelligent, a somewhat grudging admission on his part; therefore, that they easily see the implications of their action in meeting the demand for registration so apathetically. Because he believes that they see the issues involved, he concludes, therefore, that their refusal to answer questions 27 and 28 in the affirmative amounts to loyalty and disloyalty. He would separate the loyal from the disloyal solely on the basis of answers to these questions. He is aided and given support by Terry and Williamson. These three together have convinced a somewhat reluctant Captain Thompson that this is the only issue. No consideration is made of pressure groups in the community and no attention, whatsoever, is paid to the demands of the Japanese family system, a cultural trait which even the Nisei cannot

discard. Bennett, in his exasperation over the poor reception which registration met during the first few days, resorted to threats. In public meetings, he stated that this was a question of loyalty and of disloyalty. To those who answer the questions in the negative, he, without any specific justifications, promised • disfranchisement and possible deportation. The way in which he worded his threats was sufficient to give rise to considerable animosity. Many who might be said to have straddled the fence in <sup>not</sup> knowing exactly how to answer were so incensed by Bennett's stand that they were caused to answer in the negative. Thus, actually, Bennett has done more harm than good.

Some of the more far-seeing administrators, such as Korn and even Hoffman, have agreed that Bennett has taken an erroneous stand in forcing the issue on the basis of loyalty and disloyalty. Bennett, however, is adamant in his stand and has severely criticized staff and evacuees alike who in any way disagreed with him. Fredericks, the Assistant Chief of Internal Security, had long been a thorn in Williamson's side being in opposition to Williamson's conservatism and had criticized ~~the~~ Bennett <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ this approach. The result was an immediate transfer for Fredericks to the Moab Segregation Project. Reference is made to Mendel H. Leiberman's column in the Gila News-Courier which has been appearing for some weeks. In this column on Thursday, February 11, Leiberman stated a fair summarization of the picture, pointing out that while loyalty was not the only issue, the Japanese in order to survive in America must take a stand now which should be a determining factor in their future. While Bennett had not read Leiberman's column, an editorial appeared a week later written by the acting editor of the paper, James Nakamura, in which Leiberman was quoted as saying that loyalty was not the only issue. Bennett stormed and threatened and demanded Leiberman's resignation. A moment later he reconsidered and urged Leiberman to either resign or accept a transfer. Leiberman and Fredericks are, perhaps, the only Caucasian administrators who have taken a liberal stand and have attempted to see the problem from an evacuee point of view. The rest of the administrative staff falls in

line with Bennett's own bigotry and conservatism with the end result that a far sharper line than heretofore existed is being drawn between the administrative staff and the evacuee population.

Certain other members of the administrative staff are making the statement that because of their hesitation to register, the Japanese have at last shown their true disloyal colors. The Senior Science teacher in the high school, a Mr. Sessions, has been out-spoken even to his classes in his denunciation of this failure to be good American citizens, making such statements as: "The United States does not need to tolerate the Japs." Such statements as this are being made aloud in senior high school classes by one or two of the teachers, of which Sessions is the most out-spoken. With the administration falling in line with the conservative Project Director and with such statements as the above going unchallenged by an administrative official, it is to be wondered that an even worse demonstration has not taken place. Terry, when asked for his legal opinion on the subject, made the statement which appeared in the recent edition of the News-Courier, the February 14th or 17th issue. His legal opinion there stated says that there is no question that the issue is one of loyalty and disloyalty. Of course, the question does arise: "How could this program have been better brought across to the Gila population?" Naturally, it was a mistake to bring up both of these issues at the same time, issues which cloud the minds not only of the evacuees but of the administrators themselves. It seems impossible to divorce the one from the other and, yet, if the two issues had been approached separately, it seems fairly certain that the critical situation which has arisen might have been avoided. The threats which are voiced by the administration have served no purpose but to make people resentful and to make them only the more sure of the fact that they are simply being tolerated. It is true that Captain Thompson attempted to approach the matter on as equal a basis as possible. The writer has little doubt that Bennett's vituperations have not, although he ostensibly is trying to be of help in bringing this program to a successful conclusion, served only to increase the antagonism against the program. We may justly

wonder what is to become of the Japanese in America when the administration is so short-sighted. It does not seem as though this situation could have been alleviated except by approaching the two issues separately.

Turning back to the subject of the attitudes expressed by the evacuees themselves, we find, as mentioned above, that a very poor response was elicited, there being principally negative answers to the two questions during the first few days of registration. All of this feeling culminated in the mass meeting which took place in Butte that Saturday afternoon. Registration began in those blocks which centered around the Kibei hall and which were particularly subject to Kibei influence. This is why, perhaps, the response to registration was so disheartening. Moving away from those blocks, a better response began to be elicited and the percentage of those answering in the negative began to drop off a little bit. In both Canal and Butte, however, there were many who simply were not reporting for registration at the time appointed. Some Kibei refused to do this and some Nisei as the result of pressures from their families. The administration, being very discouraged by this failure to report and also by the large percentage of those answering in the negative, called in everyone by letter who had already filled in their questionnaire form and who had answered negatively to give them the opportunity to reconsider on the assumption that there had been a misunderstanding all around. A few have come in to change their answers, but the percentage is small. Some Kibei that I know of changed their answers not once but several times. Not many are answering the appeal for another interview and it begins to appear that the greater majority is opposed to changing the answers already given and that the two questions will remain answered negatively as they stand. The administration exerted pressures against those who had effected agitation by reading off the Sedition Act and by private talks with a number of the opposition leaders including George Yamashiro. It is mentioned above that even though these threats were made, the open opposition of the Kibei shifted back into the individual homes once the Kibei had scored their point by presenting not only a united front of

their membership but by enlisting the Issei who did not particularly understand the issue. Thus, during the first week of propaganda for enlistment and registration, the Kibei were active. By the end of that week, however, they had instilled the Issei with their own ideas with the result that it was not necessary for them to continue to be so out-spoken. The Sedition Act answer against any kind of coercion which might force people to be in antipathy to the war effort of this kind was publicly proclaimed. It carries with it a large fine and the possibility of a twenty-year term imprisonment. It is shown above, however, that threats do not work. The result of reading off the Sedition Act to the Kibei caused silencing of the group as a whole, but did not prevent the out-spoken expressions of Kibei leaders. Following the Saturday mass meeting, the situation quieted down somewhat throughout Sunday and Monday. It soon became obvious, however, from the continuing large number of negative answers that pressures against registration were still at work.

Unable to cope with the situation, leaders in the administration called a council of war and decided to take drastic steps against the elements of opposition. Accordingly, on Monday afternoon, February 15, the Project Director together with several aides including the Project Attorney, Mr. Terry, held a conference in which it was decided that inasmuch as it rests within the power of the administration to act, by calling in the military or to take other stringent action, against agitating elements, it would be wise to take this step. Accordingly, a list of the names of not only subversive leaders, a list which for some time has been being compiled by Williamson, but also of those who were noted as particularly out-spoken against the registration program was taken to Phoenix. There in a conference with the United States Attorney-General and with the FBI, a legal opinion was obtained to the effect that there was sufficient case against the individuals named and that as trouble-makers, they were deserving of apprehension. Having given a round-up of subversive elements their stamp of approval, the United States Attorney and the FBI agreed to cooperate with the

Army and with project officials and to begin to apprehend the leaders who opposed registration. Thus, on Tuesday, February 16, it was agreed that such a round-up should take place.

FBI officers in six cars met at 2 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon at the MP barracks outside of Canal Camp. By 3 o'clock, the designated time of the round-up, guards armed with tommy-guns had been placed around the entrances in the fences of both camps, jeeps were patrolling the road, and all inter-camp travel was frozen. All of those who were caught on the road, were obliged to remain there during the time this round-up was to take place. No one, either Japanese or Caucasian, was allowed to leave the camp boundaries. The plan was to clear Canal of subversive leaders first, and then to move over to Butte. The six FBI cars acted quickly. They had the addresses and places of business of those who were suspects, and they made the attempt to apprehend the people concerned at the same time. In each FBI car was an agent of the organization, a WRA employee to point out the addresses and location of each suspect, and an armed guard. First they called at the houses of those who were to be arrested. The agent would enter, backed up by the armed guard. People were prevented from entering or leaving the house. In twenty minutes, Canal Camp had been cleared of ten suspects, and the delegation then moved on to Butte. Both Issei and Kibei were apprehended. It is noteworthy that these people were picked up purely on suspicion and that no warrants were held for their arrest by the FBI agents, a fact which has had repercussions in the center inasmuch as many people believe this to be illegal and unjust. In some cases, people barricaded themselves in their houses and would not come out, but it was not long before they were brought in-line and agreed to apprehension. Most of the people were at work or away from their homes at the time. They were asked to leave their work and to go home. They were followed home by the armed guard and the FBI agent. The Issei were given five minutes in which to change their clothes and to say goodbye to their families, while the Kibei, who were to be taken to colder country, namely,

the Moab Segregation Project of the WRA at Moab, Utah, were given time to pack a bag of warm clothing and to make their farewells also. A junction of two roads between the camps was chosen as the place to which these individuals were to be taken. They were driven to this point, placed in trucks which were guarded and left there until all of the others could be rounded up likewise.

In Canal, nine Issei were taken and one Kibei. Some pro-Axis leaders were in this group, but others were individuals who for some time had been suspect of pro-Axis tendencies or who have been known to have agitated against favorable answers to the registration questions. The Issei concerned were as follows: The leader of the so-called Kenkyu-kai, that is to say the man who had been named as leader and who had acted as the front for the organization, Mr. Tani. Tani is a Waseda University graduate who has been the agent for the Rocky Nippon newspaper in the camp. He is the individual who figured so prominently in the defense of a man named Hirokani, who had assaulted one of the individuals who was known to have been favorable to the administration some months ago. At the time of this beating which is described in a report known as the "Tada Case", Tani had apparently emerged as the head of a dissatisfied Issei group whose purpose it was to remedy the unpleasant situation of evacuation by fomenting more amicable relations between evacuees and the administrative staff. Tani has long been recognized as a pro-Axis leader and was, perhaps, the active head of the dissatisfied element. There is some reason to doubt the justification of his being apprehended at this time. It is not definitely known that he argued for or against registration. It is simply that he has been long a thorn in the side of the administration. Tani, Fujimoto who is one of the Issei advisors to the Canal Kibei Club and an active leader of the Sumo Club, together with Hirokani, were all apprehended. Other members of the Sumo Club, certain Judo leaders, who are also members of the Engeibu, were taken and one Issei woman was apprehended. A woman by the name of Mrs. Matsuda, who had been most active during Hirokani's trial for assault, was the only woman apprehended. She had been called upon to testify and had shaken the hand of Hiro-

kani whom she hailed as the saviour of the evacuees. Her two grandsons, moreover, had broken into the elementary school office and had marked up an American flag on the wall and had stolen a small amount of cash which they found in the principal's desk. They had been apprehended and placed on probation. Mrs. Matsuda had been very much embarrassed by their actions to the extent that she went to bed and refused to see any of her relatives or her friends since she was so ashamed of the acts of her grandsons. Why she was apprehended at this time is questionable, possibly because she is thought to have instructed her grandsons to mark up an American flag. Actually, it appears that the boys marked up the flag in order to throw the blame on to someone who might be accused of pro-Axis motives. At any rate, nine Issei altogether were taken. The one Kibei who was taken was Akimoto, the president of the Kibei Club in Canal. A number of the administrative staff were opposed to Akimoto's arrest because of the fact that he has been a conservative Kibei leader and has done much to keep the Kibei more or less favorably disposed toward the administration. He was taken because he had answered questions 27 and 28 in the negative, and it was believed that he had been one of those who had agitated for others to follow his example. Although the case against him was not clear, he was, nevertheless, subjected to arrest.

The round-up was scheduled to begin on Tuesday at 3 o'clock. By 3:20 Canal Camp had been cleared, although one of the people who was to have been taken was later arrested in Butte, allegedly a man named Okamoto, who was known to have had certain gambling affiliations and to have been active in Butte gambling in Block 55. It was said he was arrested in that block. Those apprehended were brought to the appointed meeting place at the junction and left there under guard while the FBI agents went to complete the round-up in Butte.

In Butte, six Issei were taken; they were the leader of the Issei Peace Society and advisor to the Kibei Club, Mr. Dyo. Dyo has long been regarded as a subversive element and for some time has been suspected. Also, no evidence with the exception of his affiliations with the Kyowa-kai has been forthcoming. The

real reason for his apprehension was the fact that he had been heard to bring pressures to bear for a negative answers to questions 27 and 28. Otetaro Yamamoto was also taken. Also, he has been frequently mentioned as an Issei leader often in a rather bad light. It must be understood that of recent months, he had somewhat changed his ways. He had had a falling out with Dyo and had withdrawn from the Kyowa-kai, taking some of his own adherents with him. He is known to have been a backer of the Sumo Club, however, and there have been numerous accusations against him from time to time. Some months ago, he had been warned by several of his friends that the administration had taken an unfavorable stand toward him with the result that his activities had, for the past month or two, ceased altogether. He spoke in block meetings, but his sentiments were not particularly subversive. As nearly as can be determined, there was no particular evidence against him, but because he had once been denounced as an agitator by his own Japanese enemies in the camp, his activities have ever been construed as pro-Axis. There is a very good reason to doubt the justification of his apprehension, but apprehended he was, leaving his wife and several children behind. A man by the name of Ando, who also had been associated with Yamamoto in the past but who had swung over to the side of Dyo and the Kyowa-kai, also was taken. There was some justification for this, inasmuch as he is reputed to be more or less of a professional trouble-maker. Several others were taken because of their activities in dissuading people from answering to the call for registration. While only one Kibei was taken in Canal, twelve were taken from Butte. The first one being the president of the Kibei Club, George Yamashiro. Most of the officers of the Kibei Club were taken, including the vice president, Victor Inouye, and a number of others.

It is the belief of the writer that the real leadership of the Kibei Club was removed in a person of an older Kibei by the name of Fukumoto. He was president of the Executive Board of the Sumo Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the Kibei Club. He is mentioned above as a stirring orator, one who has become almost fanatical in his pro-Japanese expressions of sentiment. Most of these

Kibei were arrested in the Kibei clubroom while many of the Issei, Yamamoto and Ando particularly, were apprehended as they were attending a meeting of the Cooperative Board of Directors, an organization which is just now being set up in Butte. Of course, in both camps, news of the round-up spread quickly. Several individuals who were afraid of being arrested or who believed that they had incurred the wrath of the administration hid in the houses of friends, and it is said that about fifty people remained in hiding for several days. It is also said, and there is no way of checking up on the rumor since the sources of information regarding these round-ups are not easily accessible, that it is contemplated to remove a good many more as soon as sufficient evidence against them can be collected. Two men were taken from Butte on Wednesday the 17th.

Mention has been made from time to time of the segregation camp which is to be run by the WRA in Moab in southwestern Utah. All of the Kibei inasmuch as they still hold United States citizenship although they very well may be disfranchised were taken to Moab by Mr. Fredericks, who was Associate Chief of Internal Security here. Fredericks, as been mentioned above, is being permantly transferred to Moab. The Moab Center is known as a segregation or isolation project, being run under slightly different rules from those which control the usual relocation center. Much more stringent control is to be exercised there. No resettlement is to be allowed for the individuals concentrated at Moab. Thirteen Kibei were taken. Fifteen Issei who were arrested shared a somewhat similar fate; also, they passed out of the jurisdiction of the WRA and into that of the Department of Justice, being non-citizens and subject to internment in the regular internment camp. They have been sent to El Paso for hearing and are, ostensibly, lodged in the El Paso County Jail. Following their hearing, and there seems little doubt that the evidence against them is sufficient, they will either be returned to the relocation center or placed in the Lordsburg Internment Camp in New Mexico. This policy of segregation, now having been determined upon, leaves little doubt that similar practices will occur in the other relocation centers, and that those who in the Gila Center attempt to

emerge as subversive leaders may find themselves in a similar position. Since the round-up on the date designated, several Kibei, remarkably enough, have come in to the Project Director's office asking also to be segregated and transferred to Moab. There is the story, how true is questionable, that one Kibei appeared before the Project Attorney with his birth certificate asking that his citizenship be revoked.

The first effect of the mass arrest of the twenty-eight agitators in both camps was that of stunned surprise. The Moab Segregation Project has never been a secret, and there has been talk of it from time to time among the evacuee population. The general concensus was that those individuals who were known to be particularly out-spoken would first be ~~restrained~~ <sup>restrained</sup> or ~~be~~ warned by the project authorities and then if they persisted in their activities would be singly interned. Like so many issues of this kind, the evacuee population seemed unable to face the matter squarely. At first, there was virtual hysteria; people were shocked that the family could be broken in this way and the tendency was to make martyrs of those who had been arrested. On that rather memorable Tuesday afternoon from 3 o'clock until 6 o'clock, little knots of people began to cluster around houses and street corners and it began to appear as though a situation analagous to the strikes described at Poston and Manzanar was about to begin. The feeling, however, died down and the community at large settled down to a peaceful acceptance of the situation. For a few days, there was the tendency to make martyrs of those individuals, but even this does not seem to be an issue at the present writing. Feeling was particularly strong against the apprehension of Mrs. Matsuda, a harmless old woman, it is said, who had been sick in bed these many weeks. Many of the Caucasian administrators are convinced that the right thing was done and that all trouble regarding registration could now be circumvented. On Wednesday, there was a definite increase in the percentage of the negative answers. The Caucasian staff was divided against itself as to the justification for the apprehension for these individuals. Some have been rather opposed to Bennett's threats of disfranchisement and issues of loyalty which he has made. To be sure, by this round-up agitators

and certain leaders were removed. It begins to appear doubtful that the real core of subversive leadership has been drawn out of the community since only the more out-spoken individuals were taken away. It is the writer's opinion that the actual motivating power behind all such demonstrations still remains in camp. As long as these individuals remain untouched, it appears that community sentiment will remain unchanged. Of the Issei there is no doubt that the real leaders were removed by the arrest of Tani in Canal Camp and Dyo in Butte. Of the Kibei, two, Yamashiro and Fukumoto, would constitute the Butte Kibei leadership, but to take Akimoto from the Canal Kibei Club seems to have been a grave error inasmuch as Akimoto kept the Canal Kibei in line with the administration and away from the Kenkyu-kai policies. It may be possible that the Gila Young People organization in Canal will swing over to the Kenkyu-kai and the Sumo Club thus enhancing the Issei front in that camp. This, however, is a postulated result, the effects of which are not as yet in evidence. The so-called "front men" for these strong Issei organizations have largely been removed with the effect that these Issei groups now have the quality of being more firmly established secret societies. It is believed that other "front men" will be found to supplant those who have gone.

One effect that the mass round-up may have had is the cutting of the ties which bound these organizations together making separate entities out of each one of them, a fact which will delay their growth and possibly turn the trend of the community away from Issei solidarity. The much voiced opinion on the part of some administrators and evacuees that the arrest of the persons mentioned above might precipitate a general strike has been found to be without foundation. Oddly enough, these individuals seem to have been forgotten and the feeling has died down completely. It begins to appear that if some demonstration does take place after due de-liberation, it will not come as the direct result of the segregation.

It will be well to raise the question of what happened to the registration and enlistment program while these mass arrests were taking place. Up until the day of the round-up, not too favorable a response had been elicited although it

was daily getting better. Following the round-up, there was a slump and a large percentage of those answering questions 27 and 28 in the negative. Then suddenly all demonstration died down, the leaders were gone, pressures against registration became an individual family affair, and it has been generally agreed that the end result with the registration of the camouflage workers, the results of whose registration have not as yet been tabulated at this writing, may very well bring up the percentage answering in the affirmative. The registration now approximates about 60 per cent "yes" and 40 per cent "no." Following the round-up groups of Issei and Nisei banded together in order to bring propaganda to bear to let people know about the necessity for registering favorably. To a certain extent, this had administrative sanction inasmuch as the administration was anxious to have the problem explained, but it showed that there were pressures in the community which attempted to bring people around to answering questions 27 and 28 "yes" and "yes," respectively. In other words, while there had been coercion against favorable registration, now there was agitation for it. This, too, was not acceptable. The group most concerned with such proselyting, we might call it, was the Ex-Servicemen's Club. It, together with some of the loyal members of the Block Managers offices and the Housing Department, Nisei, and JACL members, arranged for a house to house canvass so as to bring the message over to people as to how to register. This group, or rather the committees appointed by this group, visited every house in the block which had registered and urged people to reconsider their answers if it had been "no." In many ways, the effect was good since the need for registration was carefully explained and some people were persuaded to reconsider their answers. The administration, however, felt obliged to put a stop to such activities. Naturally, the practice brought under way by these individuals was one which attempted to bring across an idea to the benefit of the Japanese people in America as a whole. Mention was made of duty to the native country, that is America being conceived as the country of birth, and their future in America. This, of course, is the significant issue of the whole registration program, able

as it is to effect favorably or unfavorably public opinion of the Caucasian residents of the United States.

Undoubtedly, Bennett's threats did more harm than good since there was severe criticism of them by those residents contacted by this Ex-Servicemen's Club. In conversation with members of this group, the writer learned that there is grave resentment against the JAAC which is conceived to have brought about this whole unfortunate situation. The committees, however, were partially successful in allaying this suspicion. The JAAC has, since registration, somewhat retired into the background and has not maintained itself as a pressure group.

Since February 24 is the last day for men between ages of 17 and 38 to register, women will soon start to register. Mention is made above of Selective Service Form DSS-304-A, "Statement of the United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry." It should be pointed out here that this form, drawn up by the Selective Service system, is designed for the men, while another form, WRA-126, Revised, must be filled out by women alone. This form is almost an exact replica of the Selective Service form with the exception of question 27. Instead of raising the issue over combat duty, this question reads, "If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corp or the WAAC?" Question 28 is identical to question 28 on the Selective Service form which the men must fill out. There are, thus, separate forms to be filed by men and women. The filing by such forms by women is to begin on Wednesday, February 25. Both of these forms are included with this report. It is understood that these forms must be filled out by all individuals. The men must fill out 304-A; the women, WRA form 126. In addition, however, there are those men who wish to apply for volunteer induction into the armed forces. These individuals must fill out three forms, 304-A and forms DSS-154 and 165, these forms being included with this report also. 154 is an application for transfer of the applicant's Selective Service Board to a local board in the vicinity of residence. This will be a Penal County Board probably located in the County Seat at Florence. The 165 form is an application for volunteer induction

into the armed forces, a form which will be processed by the California local board of the residents here in the Gila Relocation Center. These two forms, it is to be repeated and emphasized, are only for those who wish to enlist in the Nisei combat battalion. 304-A and WRA-126 have an additional purpose. Actually, they are further applications for leave clearance which will be processed. A point then of such compulsory registration is that an actual segregation is now possible. People may be cleared on the basis of their own answer in regard to loyalty. Checks are then made with the FBI and if loyalty is ascertained and clearance given by these agencies, leave clearance will be available for all who fit into this category. Even though there is no specific statement against an individual in the FBI files or in the files of the Army of Naval Intelligence, it seems apparent that questions 27 and 28 if answered "no" by either sex, will bring about some kind of segregation and prevent those who avow themselves to be disloyal from resettlement. The issue to be feared then is that too many Japanese will avow themselves disloyal with the result that public opinion may again be turned against the American Japanese and the process of resettlement thus hindered.

One other point which should be mentioned here regarding this particular aspect of the problem is that of the draft. Captain Thompson, in answer to questions brought before him in the various meetings over which he presided, gave assurance that the draft would be given some time in the near future. The fears of the family break-up are founded in this statement. There is some reason to believe that many Issei are counseling their children to answer the significant questions negatively so that they will not have to leave their family. Thus, Leiberman's editorial is borne out in this statement that "loyalty is not the only issue." Such matters as loyalty, duty, and patriotism, are made secondary to the strong Japanese family tie so prominent in application among the rural people who are residents of this center.

Following the registration of women, the registration of Issei, that is, aliens, is to take place and probably the same difference in the use of the forms

involved will be observed for men and women. This will finish the matter of registration in the Gila Center. At the present writing, registration of women is about to begin. Events will be followed carefully from here on.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the eventual percentage of those answering these questions which are so significant on the conceived basis of loyalty and disloyalty will be in the affirmative majority. It may be that by the time the total registration is completed, about 70 per cent of the population will have answered affirmatively. This is a guess on the part of the writer in view of observation of the trends which are manifesting themselves in the community. Naturally, the result will depend upon the home pressures which can be exerted upon this individual or that by his family. There are those who are less optimistic and predict an equal distribution of "yes" and "no" answers. In view of the fact that community feeling has largely died down, there seems some reason to believe that events are taking a change for the better. At the present writing, the ratio of those answering "yes" has been about 60 per cent. What the result of the registration will be is difficult to foretell; perhaps, it may be segregation; perhaps, it may be that the widely circulated rumor that Canal Camp will be made into a segregation camp may have some foundation. There seems little doubt, however, that those who answer "no" to questions 27 and 28 will be eventually subject to disfranchisement if they are citizens and possibly deportation in the post-war period. At the present writing, too, the community has reached an almost lethargic state, the out-spoken agitators against Army enlistment and registration having been removed. The result is that no one dares to come out against Army enlistment or registration. The situation at present is very, very quiet, and there seems little doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, it will continue to be so.

It is true that Army volunteer enlistments are meeting with a generally poor reception, and although no figures are available, it is said that about 40 persons have thus far volunteered in both camps. It seems unlikely that if this is true, there will be many more. Figures on volunteer enlistment will probably be published

in a short time.

The Japanese section of the newspaper has built up a certain amount of propaganda against registration and enlistment, not by overt ~~statements~~ but by rather subtle statements. The editors of the Japanese language section have long been suspect by the writer of disseminating not pro-Axis propaganda but, rather, anti-administration, anti-American propaganda. For example, when it was announced in the English section of the newspaper that 7425 Hawaiian Nisei had volunteered, attention to this was called by the Japanese language section, the article reading as follows: "7425 Nisei volunteer in Hawaii, but they are not evacuees." All of which is true, but this is something which only serves to enhance the public opinion that the American Japanese have already made their sacrifice and that it is inhuman to expect another one from them. One significant point may be another in regard to this attitude and this is in reference to the marked difference between the Issei and the Nisei. In mentioning Issei, Kibei are understood to be included. The significant point is that Kibei and Issei alike are willing to meet a common goal and as individuals they are willing to cooperate with one another even to the point of sacrificing themselves in protest; witness, for example, the Kibei who have asked to be segregated in Moab. In this relation, they have the full support and understanding of the Issei community. In contrast, the Nisei are divided and present a front of many conflicting emotions. There is family feeling and family resentment. There is loyalty to the degree of volunteer enlistment and there are pro-Axis declarations; there is an anti-JACL faction as opposed to the JACL.

For the first time, the position of the Nisei as a marginal man is noteworthy. He is confronted with an issue which has two sides, that of his family or his past and that of his future in America. In most cases, the Nisei takes the easiest way out by following the line of least resistance. He is, therefore, amenable to the wishes of his family, often against his own wishes and often against his better judgment. By doing so, however, he avoids conflict and retires into himself, concealing his real emotions. There have been two cases, thus far,

of individuals unable to stand the strain, who have become unbalanced as the result of these conflicting pressures. It is easy to see why the Issei and Kibei, with a common purpose and a common culture, are no match for the undisciplined and undecisive Nisei. This application of the theory of the marginal man can, I think, be no better exemplified than in this case. As long as the Nisei are subjected to Japanese cultural influences through their friends and associates, they cannot emerge as strong characters capable of building up their future in this country. What the answer to their future will be is not a point which can be decided here.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

With the dying down of the furor over the registration and proposed enlistment of citizens, no further demonstrations of any kind have taken place, a fact which to the observer seems rather remarkable and yet which is rather well borne out by the apparent absence of any kind of tension or of group dissatisfaction. Mention is made above of the fact that aliens are now permitted to enlist in the armed forces. It is also expressed that the registration was to effect all persons between the ages of 17 and 38, whether alien or citizen, whether male or female. Registration of women began on Thursday, February 25. At this time, a lieutenant from the Women's Army Auxiliary Corp came into the center in order to confer with Captain Thompson and to bring propaganda to bear in order to effect the enlistment of some of the women in the community in the WAAC. Like Captain Thompson's meetings, this woman is beginning to preside over meetings of girls in order to urge them to consider the WAAC as their contribution to the war effort and to stress the training and the activities which are offered by this branch of the service. These meetings took place in Canal Camp on the night of the 25th and are to take place according to the present plan now in effect shortly in Butte Camp.

Not a great deal of information has come to the attention of the writer regarding the status of Japanese women in this organization. In fact, there has been no final decision as to whether Nisei will be allowed to enter this unit. The fact that the WAAC lieutenant is here is sufficiently indicative, however, that a favorable decision will be forthcoming. It is difficult to say whether the reception which was given to the lieutenant in Canal is indicative of the position of women in the Japanese social system. No pressures whatsoever have been put to the girls to dissuade them or to encourage them in this matter of Army affiliation. Very likely, most Issei cannot conceive of the fact of women joining the armed forces so that to many it is simply an opportunity of a job. A list of the female persons between the ages of 17 and 38 has been com-

piled, and it is hoped that by invitation all of these girls will attend meetings sponsored by the WAAC lieutenant. The normal age limit for enlistment in the WAAC is 21 to 44, and whether the privilege of enlistment will be extended to all is not known. There a number of girls who intend to volunteer in this corp? In fact, there is probably a higher percentage of such volunteers than there is among the men. A number of the administrative secretaries and other trained personnel plan to enter this unit. So far, it is to be noted that the possibilities of this branch of service had not had any particular effect upon the people here.

Women, as is mentioned above, are to be registered on the revised form, WRA-126. Registration of aliens has some extremely interesting results. There are 300-odd individuals in camp who fall into the specified age category among the men and, perhaps, an equal number or even a greater number among the women. The men of this class are from the so-called yobi-yose group, men who are much like Nisei. Most of these individuals have attained a rather high degree of education in comparison with the rest of the community and most of them came prior to the alien Exclusion Act of 1924. The result is then that most of them are able to speak English well. Since this group is small, it was easy to effect the registration of them in one day. The women have not, as yet, been called upon to register. In fact, alien women will be the last of the group to register.

Alien men between the ages of 17 and 38 registered on Wednesday and were the last of this particular age group to be taken. Male registration is now complete. Regarding the aliens, the same pattern pattern of registration was followed, the men having to fill out form 304-A of the Selective Service system, while the women will be registered on the WRA form. The Army decided that in view of the fact that the Nisei had given such a poor response to registration, that the aliens would be excepted from answering the questions which caused such a controversy among the citizens. Questions 27 and 28, therefore, were left on

the 304-A form. If an individual chose, he might answer these questions as he saw fit, but he was not obliged to. At the bottom of the form a question was typed in which might be answered by the individual registering in lieu of questions 27 and 28. This question reads: "Do you solemnly swear to obey the laws of the United States and to do nothing which might be of detriment to the war effort of this country?" It was here that a remarkable occurrence took place. About half of the aliens who registered chose to answer the alternative question and to leave out questions 27 and 28. In every case of those who chose the alternative question, the answer was in the affirmative. A very small percentage, less than 1 per cent in fact, according to Mr. Landward chose to answer questions 27 and 28 in the affirmative. Thus, of 300-odd people in both camps that fall into this age group, nearly 100 per cent answered affirmatively either questions 27 and 28 or the alternative question. Captain Thompson has chosen to view this situation as tremendously puzzling. In view of the fact that so many Nisei obliged to answer questions 27 and 28 did so in the negative and, yet, on the other hand, non-citizens chose to commit themselves favorably on these questions or of the question which presumably had the same effect, Captain Thompson is incapable of seeing the social implications which lie behind these answers. He and Project Director, Bennett, are inclined to view the situation as terribly significant, something which is indicative of a sinister and deep plot. The Leave Officer, John Landward, was successful in convincing Captain Thompson that this was not actually the case. Project Director, Bennett, however, is not at all convinced, being only too willing to see an insidious plot in the registration statistics. It seems fairly obvious, however, that the reason for such a situation lies in the consideration of these younger Issei. In the first place, they are largely like Nisei except that they are better adjusted because they have not been obliged to choose between Japan and the United States inasmuch as United States citizenship has been barred to them. Most of them are single, having few family ties,

while many have relatives in Japan. There are some, of course, who have aging parents with them in the center, and others who are married and have small families of younger children. The group as a whole has never been concerned with Nisei problems. For the most part, they are not subject to domination by their parents inasmuch as the background which they brought with them from Japan does not conflict with that of their families.

More so than the Nisei, this group takes pride in the fact that they live in America and is content to accept the advantages and disadvantages which America offers. This group has never been a pressure group except as its single men have allied themselves with other single men in the so-called dormitories. Those who have children are anxious that their children should make their way in America. In the main, these aliens have not been subject to either family or group pressures, with the result that they are more free to make a decision. On a percentage basis, it is said that a large number of them have volunteered for service in the Army thereby, of course, making themselves eligible for naturalization. On the whole, this alien group has presented very clearly its willingness to cooperate with the newly established program. The sketchy reasons outlined above and a consideration of the social background of the group which has never been embroiled in the Nisei conflict show clearly the justification of the stand taken by these individuals.

In Canal Camp, of the Nisei who registered, 44 per cent of those who had given negative answers to questions 27 and 28 reconsidered and changed their answers. The end result is that Canal Camp has given a much better showing than Butte. The end result of the Canal Camp registration of the men is that about 80 per cent are willing to serve in the armed forces and have repudiated allegiance to the Japanese government. The percentage in Butte is probably lower due to the strength of the Kibei element. Very likely, however, the end result, although less, will be preponderantly on the side of an affirmative answer. Whether the same situation will occur for the other relocation

centers is not known, but probably as these various struggles die down, something similar may be shown statistically.

The sheep may, therefore, be separated from the goats. It is pretty clearly indicated that some kind of segregation will begin to take place very shortly. In fact, by the end of this current week (February 20), all of those individuals employed in the camouflage net factory who have answered questions 27 and 28 negatively will be discharged. Similarly, wardens, firemen, teachers, administrative employees, and employees of various other service divisions will be separated from their employment. Preference will now be shown to those who have presented themselves as loyal American citizens. Rumors are already rife regarding the segregation of the loyal from the disloyal. Another round-up of agitators and subversive leaders is scheduled to take place during the first week in March. Since the initial round-up of February 16, three other individuals have been apprehended. There is talk of dividing the two Gila Camps and putting the ostensibly disloyal people into Camp One and retaining the loyal in Camp Two. Relocation, private employment outside, student relocation, and the like, will be prohibited for those who have given negative answers to the questionnaire's statements 27 and 28. Gradually, the Moab Project for Kibei and subversive Nisei will expand. The policy of apprehension and segregation will be continued. There seems little doubt that in view of the large percentage of those answering "yes" at Gila, the draft will be opened to those who have expressed their willingness to enter the service.

The writer had an opportunity to talk over the Moab Segregation Project situation with Mr. D. Johnston, Assistant Chief of Internal Security in Butte Camp. Johnston and Fredericks had taken the apprehended Kibei in a truck to the Moab Segregation Center. Fredericks, transferred from this center to Moab, will be Chief of Internal Security there. The Moab Project is not one which has been recently built. It is, on the contrary, an abandoned CCC Camp. The individuals confined there will have ample opportunity to remodel the settlement.

Mr. Johnston described the situation of this camp as in a most unfavorable part of the Utah desert. It is made up of unattractive barracks which are surrounded by a high barbed wire fence. There is no project area proper. The residents there are forbidden to leave the immediate confine of the camp and a close guard is kept at all times. A man by the name of Best is Acting Project Director. The population, although small, is expected to increase from time to time as subversive elements in other relocation centers are seized and interned there. It does not appear as though the Moab Project will be self-supporting. So far as can be determined, no land reclamation or farming of any kind is contemplated for the Moab settlers. There is little doubt that disfranchisement proceedings as well as deportation in the post-war period are being planned for the Moab evacuees. It has not, as yet, been decided what shall become of the families of the Nisei who have been placed in Moab. In the Gila round-up only those individuals who were suspect were apprehended. The family was not touched.

The aliens were taken to El Paso for eventual internment in Lordsburg, New Mexico. There is, apparently, some kind of rule or else a policy has not as yet been ascertained which will allow aliens to be placed in Moab. Apparently, the camp is to be used exclusively for citizens, and it is not known what disposition will be made of the families of these Nisei. Eventually, perhaps, these families may be permitted also to reside at Moab. This problem will probably be some time in being solved.

It is the writer's opinion that the danger which confronted the American-born Japanese has been circumvented. Sufficient have answered favorably on the question of loyalty to justify the segregation and the possibility of the draft. Of course, an unfavorable response to Army enlistment might as yet jeopardize the program. The officials concerned, however, do not seem to be worried over this possibility and, although a number of Army volunteers is a secret, it appears that the prescribed quota of volunteer enlistments will not be met. Sufficient seemed to be volunteering, however, from all rumors and reports to

justify the Army's program. At Gila, the situation has not changed since the day of the round-up, and the pressure groups continue to remain silent. It seems unlikely that further demonstrations of any massed nature will take place. Additional information will be forthcoming regarding the situation from time to time.

ADDENDA TO MILITARY REGISTRATION AND RECRUITMENT  
PROGRAM

Copy

April 23, 1943 - Spencer

Some discussion of the day to day occurrences in the military registration and enlistment program which took place at the Gila Relocation Center beginning February 8, 1943, has already been forthcoming. The repercussions of this program are still spreading throughout the community, however, with important effects and results. Questions 27 and 28 of the military form questionnaire and of the analagous WRA form for those above the age group of 17 to 38 and for women have proved to be significant and continue to be so. The administrative staff conceived the answers to such questions to be determinative of loyalty to the United States. The registration program, ostensibly, brought about the investigation of the Senatorial Committee investigation headed by Senator Chandler for the purpose of determining the advisability of permitting the WRA to exist as the civil authority charged with the administration of the relocation centers and to determine the justification for the sequestration of the so-called disloyal elements. Disloyalty is now more or less of a forgotten issue as is the military registration, so far as the residents of the community are concerned. The effect of the Chandler hearing was, without doubt, to place a stamp of approval on the WRA and its resettlement program. The difficulties which confronted the individual evacuee prior to the registration and the Chandler investigation are now almost completely wiped away. This has been described in a recent analysis of the Leave Office and resettlement of the Gila Center.

There is a definite relationship, however, between registration and resettlement. The registration forms themselves were understood to be applications for leave clearances. All of those who have answered "no" to

questions 27 and 28 are forbidden from resettling. The privileges of a one or two-day short-term leave to visit adjacent localities is denied those who have answered "no". Negative answers to either question are sufficient at this time to barr an individual from leaving the center limits. There were many who had answered "no" to question 27, which pertained to the combat service and willingness to participate in the armed forces, but on the other hand, affirmative answers to question 28, which concerned repudiation of foreign allegiance, were given. In most such cases, the individuals concerned did not understand the registration. Having families, they were reluctant to leave and, being under an impression that affirmative answers to question 27 were tantamount to enlisting, negative answers were given. They, too, are barrèd from resettlement, although it begins to appear that they will eventually be allowed the privileges and that some consideration will be given to them if they wish to change their answers to question 27. Those who answered both questions in the negative are understood to be disloyal. No questions can be contended for the reasons behind their answers or the misunderstanding of the registration program.

For a month after the inception of the registration program, it was possible to change answers. Cases are recorded of some individuals who changed their answers "no" to "yes" and back again, four or five times. Since this privilege of changing answers was at one time allowed, it is conceived that permission should not now be given to permit a change of opinion. Under the present circumstances, however, if a person does "repent" and wishes to change his answer, he may make application in a letter to the Project Director, who will appoint a board to hear his case. In this letter, he must clearly state why he wishes to change his answer. Not much consideration is given to those who had given negative answers and who now are worried because permission to resettle is denied them or

because they fear eventual sequestration. Many Nisei who answered the two questions favorably from the administrative point of view are under the opinion that under no circumstances should opportunity be given to change answers now. There are a number of individuals in the center who do wish to change their answers and who have sent to the Project Director a letter requesting this change. No action has been taken on these as yet, further clarification being awaited from Washington. The question in the minds of the administrative officials at the moment is: "Can such a board appointed by the Project Director to hear these cases and proposed to be composed of evacuee leaders and some of the administrative staff be sufficiently objective to weigh the reasons involved in an individual answering as he did and to pass on permission for him to effect changed answers?" It begins to appear as though such a board could not be sufficiently objective and that some further steps should be taken in order to prevent a potentially disloyal and, therefore, dangerous individual from leaving the center.

Administrative opinion, at the moment, contemplates a probationary period. An individual making application to change his answers should be placed under surveillance for several months before permission is given. Whether this contemplated probationary period will pass the National Headquarters is debatable. It becomes apparent, however, that as the keynote of the community extends itself towards resettlement, many of those who answered "no" to questions 27 and 28 are wishing that they had not done so. In most cases, the misunderstanding which was brought about by the registration program was overcome and most of the individuals registering understood what negative answers entailed. At Gila, there was a large number of individuals who answered "no" to questions 27 and 28 on the basis of a protest against evacuation, against deprivation of citizenship privileges,

and against the conditions of the relocation center. A large group of Nisei answered in this way and steadfastly refused to change their answers, although a number of them are beginning to waver. The administration is puzzled as to what to do with such individuals. Such protests are considered to be by some as valid. The Project Directorship, however, continues to regard negative answers as indicative of disloyalty. Some talk in Washington is going on at the present time to arrange for some consideration of those who have entered protests in this way. No clarification of their status is as yet forthcoming.

The WRA apparently does not desire that all of those who answered "no" should be interned and prevented from resettlement. While it is true that the privilege of changing answers was once given and now is no longer possible, it begins to appear as though eventually this will come about again. Chandler, in the report of his committee, states that he found twenty per cent of the population of the ten relocation centers to be disloyal, those having given negative answers to either one or both of the questions. Chandler does not state, however, whether this is the result of the over-all registration or of the given age group, 17 to 38. For those in the given age group, this number, twenty per cent, seems to be rather small in view of the furore that registration caused in so many of the centers. It appears as though this number is that of the over-all registration of women, aliens, and citizens of the given age group, and all others as well. Among the men in the 17 to 38 age group at Gila, there were thirty per cent negative answers. These negative answers, from all that can be determined, were in the most part on the basis of protest. Such protests, however, might well be related to the other reasons for negative answers such as desire to preserve family unit, etc.

At any rate, at Gila thirty per cent of the eligible male citizens answered "no".

No pressure was exerted on women, with the result that in nearly every case, women professed loyalty. For the most part, the alien population professed loyalty. These aliens had to fill out the WRA counterpart to the Selective Service form. In this case, however, rather than to answer question 28, they were given an alternative. They might answer question 28, but if they wished, they could answer an appended question relative to obeying the laws of the United States and to doing nothing which might be of impediment to the war effort of this country. About seventy-five per cent of the aliens chose to answer the alternative question. No stigma is attached to their choosing this question, and they may resettle at will. A very small percentage of them refused to commit themselves on either question 28 or its alternative. On the whole, the alien registration was far more encouraging than was that of the citizens.

The Leave Office, at that time in charge of registration and now concerned with the compilation of statistics of registration and so on, believes that if this alternative question had not been inserted, the alien response would have been equally as good. It is remarkable that the aliens exhibit a far greater ability to cooperate with the military in the registration program.

Thirty per cent of negative answers at Gila involves 1100 in the given age group. Considering these individuals with their families, about 4,000 people are involved or one-third of the entire community. In the main, these people will be prohibited from resettling. Circumstances will bring this prohibition about. The question arises of what can be done with individuals of this sort. There are 4,000 people, therefore, in addition to those so-called loyal people who are unwilling to resettle, who will re-

main in the center. A question thus arises as to how extensive the resettlement program can be. As the result of the military program, the WRA found itself in a very difficult position. Its existence as a separate agency was definitely threatened and, for a time, it appeared as though it might be relegated to the War Department under the same provision as existed for the WCCA. Myer's program, however, apparently met with Senatorial approval and with Army approval. Chandler's statement that twenty per cent were disloyal is not, indeed, as large a figure as the American public might be led to suspect. As long as this is so, the existence of the WRA is justified and the resettlement program has full administrative approval. It is fortunate for those evacuees desirous of resettlement that this is so.

Excerpt from Robert Spencer's letter of February 12, 1943

"Now, it will be necessary to mention the things that are going on in the community which seem to have such terrific implications. I think it well here to mention some of this to you sort of in the form of a report. I shall try to keep you informed on it as the days go by. As you may have guessed, it concerns the opening up of volunteer enlistments in the Army to the Nisei. Landward, as Leave Officer, recently returned from Washington where he had become acquainted with the relocation program in a ten-day course of instruction given to Leave Officers from all projects and became aware of the fact that the Nisei were to be drafted but that first volunteer enlistments would be opened up to the Nisei, and that this program was to commence immediately. Simultaneously in all ten relocation projects, crews of Army officers and Caucasian and Japanese non-commissioned personnel are bringing under way propaganda for enlistment. This body of Army personnel which functions here and in other centers has a two-fold purpose. In the first place, they are to accept volunteers for enlistment in the Army, and in the second place, they are to register all Nisei including Kibei, except those who have applied for repatriation, between the ages of 17 and 38. The idea being to have a source of man-power for defense industries and to further clarify the situation in regard to the draft through registration. These Army men were to have presided at meetings which are designed to bring across to every group in the community these two facts: (1) the necessity for registration which is compulsory and (2) the desirability of enlisting in their own Nisei combat battalion which is now being formed. Incidentally, the latter will be in addition

to the 100th Infantry which is an all-Nisei battalion made up principally from Hawaiian sources.

Lowie, Charlie, and myself attended the first meeting in which Captain Thompson spoke. Landward was there and Bennett. The meeting took place in Camp two with the heads of all organizations present as well as Block councilmen, Block chairmen, and Block Managers. The idea was to bring across to these leaders the necessity for enlistment, the fact that, if the quota of 3500 for the ten relocation centers is not met, the results may be very catastrophic so far as public opinion, and, more, administrative opinion will mold the future of the Japanese in America. There seems to be little doubt that if public opinion cannot see sufficient of the Nisei volunteering in the Army, the consensus in the country will be unchanged, namely to the effect that the Japanese in America are disloyal to a man.

So many issues are involved in the consideration of this fact, people concerned have resolved to discuss all principles involved; that this is not now a privilege and that this is not democracy, that the Japanese in this country have made their sacrifice by acceding to evacuation. These points, of course, are all well taken. The Nisei do not want to volunteer. It has been pointed out that the relocation program which is now in effect will be diverted if the breadwinner of any given family is either drafted or volunteers. The pressures in the community are simply terrific and seem to center around the Kibei clubs, the membership of which will be most seriously affected by any draft. Every day this week meetings have taken place. The first meeting was that, as I mentioned, for the ostensible leaders in the community. The second was sponsored by the J.A.C.L. for the Nisei.

The third was an all-Issei meeting, while last night, a meeting before the Kibei took place. Similar meetings have taken place in both camps, and it is the aim of Captain Thompson here to try to reach everyone in the community. Charlie covers the first meeting in detail. Caucasians have been discouraged from attending the other meetings because it is said, and rightly, that the community at large will get the impression that the Caucasian administrators are aiding and abetting this "further enslavement". At every meeting so far, the Kibei have stood out as a radical group strongly opposing the move. Thompson has been as fair as I believe a man in his position could be. Realizing that controversial issues would be raised, Captain Thompson has had questions written by the audience. He reads them off and answers, attempting to give as honest an answer as he possibly can, but he is not always permitted to say what he wants to say. The audience will clap and boo or stamp its feet. In the Issei meeting in Butte Camp Wednesday night, handled by the Captain's Nisei aide, Sergeant Aburamen, the message was never brought over inasmuch as howls of derision greeted the Sergeant's words and the meeting ended in a near riot.

Everyone is terrifically concerned over the results of Captain Thompson's visit. There are some administrators here who can honestly see the reasons for hesitation on the part of these Nisei and the reasons for the terrific pressures against enlistment which are raised by ~~others~~ the Kibei and the Kyowa-kai. Question of loyalties has been raised by others, sometimes with disastrous results. There are members of the administrative staff who think like the general public that the Japanese in the relocation centers have now shown their true colors. Bennett himself is at an utter loss to understand

the attitudes which are expressed here. To analyze these attitudes briefly, it might be said that the entire concern is for the family group and the very strong desire to keep the family group together in this, the relocation center. It is said that if a family were allowed to get out and establish itself on the outside, many more Nisei would be able to feel secure in volunteering. An interesting application of Japanese concept of bushido has been raised time and again. It is said that the Nisei should volunteer in accordance with the Japanese law of chivalry and that in volunteering these Nisei who are put into a combat unit are giving up their lives. What then of their families? If a man is to give up his life, he does not wish to do so unless he is sure of his family's security. Coupled with this is the fear of the outside. The conservatism which keeps people back, the same factor that up until now has really been a detriment to relocation. The significant points that are raised by the stolid citizen-type of Issei and Nisei alike center around this consideration. The Kibei bring in the dissatisfied element. They maintain that they have been railroaded into this thing and that the railroading was done by the J.A.C.L. Consequently, the J.A.C.L. is in a very bad spot. Kyowakai leaders went yesterday to the Project Director and asked that the two J.A.C.L. representatives to the Salt Lake convention be removed from the project for a week until the furor can die down; otherwise, they said they could not be responsible for the safety of either of these two, Ken Tashiro, former editor of the paper; and Nobu Kawai, J.A.C.L. organizer here.

To George Yamashiro was read the Sedition Act; he is the president of the Kibei Club. He was told flatly by Bennett that if

his group did not cooperate with Captain Thompson in the meeting, which was held last night, he would be held personally responsible and could be indicted on a charge of sedition. The Kibei meeting was then very, very quiet. It is true that controversial questions were raised, but Captain Thompson encouraged the raising of controversial questions in his attempt to clear up the matter. After the meeting, however, the Kibei remained seated. Bennett, Landward, Thompson, and a few Caucasian administrators, members of the American Legion who had been invited, left. George Yamashiro then got up to address the meeting. He took a very significant stand. He stated that joining the Army, volunteer enlistment, and the like, was entirely an individual matter, but for himself, he said he would not join the Army because of his family, because of the fact that he had already been classed as 4-C, an enemy alien even though a citizen, nor would he do anything which would be detrimental to the cause of his race. He spoke in Japanese to the Kibei at large. This talk has not as yet come to the attention of the administration. Perhaps it should; I do not know. Yamashiro, moreover, said that he would not even demean himself by working in the camouflage factory as many Kibei have done, that he wouldn't even touch money made at the expense of the blood of his brothers. When he had said this, the several hundred people in the Kibei recreation hall, as well as the Issei who had been standing outside, filed out without comment, without demonstration of any kind.

The controversial issue which is one of the sources for discontent arises out of the questionnaire which every person between the ages of 17 and 38 must fill out. This questionnaire has two questions in it, numbers 27 and 28, the gist of which is as follows:

27 states (I paraphrase), "Are you willing to serve in the combat forces of the United States? 28 (likewise paraphrased) states in effect, "Do you renounce allegiance to all foreign powers save the United States alone?" It is understood by Captain Thompson that these questions may justly be answered with reservation. For example, a person may say in answer to 27, "Yes, if I am drafted", in other words, he may answer conditionally. He also has the privilege of saying that he doesn't know. The Kibei have made a very strong issue of these two questions. They are not willing to serve in the combat forces of the United States; some are willing to serve in a non-combat capacity. Some of the more rabid, like George Yamashiro, refuse to answer affirmatively. Many think that if 27 is answered "Yes", they are subjecting themselves to Army enlistment. This point although if clarified once has been clarified 50 times very patiently by Captain Thompson has still not been fully understood. The community at large simply will not understand what the two-fold purpose of the registration is and that volunteer enlistment does not follow because a person has filled out the questionnaire.

The old issues against the J.A.C.L. have been revived and even the more intelligent Nisei who are anti-J.A.C.L. cannot see the matter in any other light. The far-reaching effects of the failure to enlist on the part of the Japanese population in America as a whole are not realized and are over-shadowed by the immediate issues at hand. Issues of principle, democracy, and of family disunity as well as of the fear of the unknown. All of these are perfectly understandable, but I would make it clear to you that this suddenly has become a tremendously serious thing, especially in view of proposed Army control of the relocation centers, the senatorial investigation, and

other factors. Unless the Nisei, irrespective of any cause of the injustices which have thus far taken place, can see their way clear to enlist, the bulk of the American public opinion will be aroused in their disfavor. In speeches, Bennett has said, and Thompson has corroborated, that to all those who answer questions 27 and 28 in the negative will come disfranchisement and internment. Not only would those of questionable loyalty be effected by this, but all of the Japanese living in America as well. It is expected to get 350 volunteers from the thirteen-odd-thousand in Gila; 3500 being the quota for all the relocation centers. Gila must supply one-tenth. So far, although no call for enlistment has as yet been forthcoming and the attempt this week is to make this matter clear to the population, I have heard nowhere a favorable report. If 100 volunteer, my own expectations will be exceeded by far. It is also said by Bennett and Captain Thompson that unless the quota is met by volunteer enlistment, it seems very likely that the draft will be pushed through. If this is the case, what will happen to the relocation program and to the post-war resettlement of the Japanese?

I hope that you won't think that I am taking a particularly morbid stand. I wish that you could be here to see what's going on, to feel this terrific agitation in the community, and to talk with Captain Thompson, with Landward, and to have it made clear to you just exactly what this all does mean to the future of the Japanese in America. Thompson says that the Army is taking a favorable stand now, but that it is only a tentative measure. If expectations are not met, George Yamashiro and his cohorts are in a position to destroy their

own minority group in this country.

I don't think I have been successful in making this all very clear to you; it seems, in fact, to be a rather sketchy job. I did want to hit the high points and bring across the importance of this thing that has hit the centers. I hope that we will not have to turn our Study into another channel and term it, "Evacuation and Repatriation Study". Our own worries about our material and the like suddenly appear very insignificant. I might mention that Bennett has taken a very dogmatic stand on this issue and that he is at a loss at the objections raised on the question of loyalty and unloyalty to the United States, refusing thereby to recognize the Japanese family system or the elements of Japanese culture. I hope that, too, I haven't given you too dark a picture, but I'm very much afraid that I can see it in no other light. Of those who understand that situation, Nisei and Caucasian alike, there is the same feeling of despair for an adequate solution to this significant problem. Charlie, Omachi, and I have tried to keep tab on the attitudes which make up this feeling in the community and what the results will be."

Excerpt from Robert Spencer's letter of February 15, 1943

"Charlie will describe in some detail the meeting which took place on Friday which was sponsored by Captain Thompson and Mr. Bennett. Much has been made of the Sedition Act, and it was stated publicly that those who hinder volunteer enlistment would find themselves subject to imprisonment under the terms of the Act of 1917. Your own copies of the newspaper will show that the Act has been publicized and held somewhat as a threat over the heads of those Kibei and Issei who were in strong opposition to enlistment. George Yamashiro has been particularly vociferous, as I pointed out before, in his opposition to the measure of volunteer enlistment. I think now, however, that since actual coercion has been used to suppress the recalcitrant groups, the situation is smoothing out a little bit. In fact, the attitudes have changed to some extent, and it seems as though some volunteers will be enlisted. At least there is greater Issei understanding of the problem, and the more out-spoken Kibei have been silenced. Of course, there is still the individual family problem, the fact that this individual or that is prevented from enlisting by his family because of the desire to keep the family unit intact and to prevent neighborhood criticism which will inevitably result if a member of any given family is conceived to be fighting the mother country. These neighborhood criticisms were brought up before in regard to the subject of enlistment in the language school. Where before, however, the community was up in arms, the result of Friday's meeting has been somewhat to mollify community sentiments and to make for less opposition to Army enlistment. It seems that the next feeling will arise against the

enlistees themselves when their names are made public. It is the desire of the Army and the administration to keep these names secret until the day of departure. Friday's meeting was a rather significant one.

Last Monday, you will recall that Block Managers, Block Councilmen, Block Chairmen, and certain club and organization leaders were present. On Friday, in view of the growing community sentiment, a list was prepared of leaders in the community as well as the officials mentioned above. Invitations were sent out to each of them requesting their attendance at the meeting in Butte, Friday night. Trucks provided transportation for those from Canal, and at this meeting the Sedition Act was publicly proclaimed and a much firmer stand was taken by Captain Thompson. It seems that this sort of procedure rather than a sympathetic handling of the problem was more in order.

In my last letter, I believe I mentioned that Charlie and I thought if one-tenth of the quota of 350 were to volunteer, the situation would be about normal. It now begins to appear that more may be expected, perhaps, as some say, 250. I think that 100 to 150 will be the correct number if community sentiments do not change again. If the whole thing is kept out of the papers and they simply publicize the fact that 150-odd volunteered from Gila and, perhaps, an equal number from the other centers, infinite good can be effected to a favorable public opinion. If this does not work and adverse publicity is given, the whole program might as well fold up."

Excerpt from Robert Spencer's letter of February 18, 1943

"The significant thing which is concerning the community at the moment is the fact, as I mentioned before, of volunteer Army enlistment and registration of all people between the ages of 17 and 38. I have already described the marked Kibei antagonism to this measure, an antagonism which emanated from not only the Kibei Club but which was supported in both camps by the Issei Vigilante Committee, and the rather marked pressure group which has arisen from among the single men in both camps.

I have already mentioned questions 27 and 28 on the general questionnaire, which is being sent out. I shall forward to you soon blank copies of these questionnaire forms. Question 27, as you know, concerns willingness to enlist in an Army combat unit, while 28 asks for repudiation of any other power but that of the United States; and, of course, the Kibei, most of them holding dual citizenship, and many Issei have been very strong in their opposition to answering these questions in the affirmative. In fact, I believe that I have mentioned George Yamashiro's addressing his own Kibei Club on the subject of enlistment. His openly expressed attitude was one which has been found among many other groups and has been seconded by the majority of the Issei. When the Sedition Act was read to the Kibei Club and the threat was made that the act would be enforced if any of the Kibei or Issei are known to be keeping people from either enlisting or filling out the questionnaire form, the feeling settled down somewhat, and the Kibei became less out-spoken. The group pressure exerted by the Kibei, and single Issei particularly, was soon broken up by Bennett's proclamation that all such

forms of agitation would be severely dealt with. This agitation then seemed to take hold of the community sentiment at large and to settle in every household where there were Nisei children who might be subject to eventual draft and who could volunteer and who, at any rate, were obliged to fill out the questionnaire form. A number of cases have come to my attention. It has been said that some Issei have threatened suicide if their off-springs were to enlist in the Army. One Issei man is reported to have said to his son that if he enlisted in the Army, he would be killed not only in battle, but the father said that he would kill the boy himself before allowing him to enlist. Several other Issei have been known to threaten disinheritance should their off-spring enlist. One Kibei, Charlie tells this as a true story, went to the registration office with five dollars and his birth certificate asking that his citizenship be revoked and offering the five dollars in payment for the legal proceedings, and so it has come pretty much throughout the center.

Registration started last Thursday, and in the first days of registration, 75 per cent of those filling out the questionnaire forms were answering questions 27 and 28 "no" and "no." Captain Thompson, the officer in charge, has been exceedingly discouraged by this response. Registration in Camp Two started in those blocks which center around the Kibei hall, and it begins to appear that the Kibei were the first to be asked to fill out the questionnaire forms. Moving away from those blocks, a better response was elicited and the percentage of those answering in the negative began to drop a little bit early this week. In Canal, there are many Kibei who are simply not reporting for registration at the time appointed. The

administration has been so discouraged by this negative answer that they have called in every one who has already filled in their questionnaire form and answered "no" and "no" to the two questions and have given them the opportunity of reconsidering on the assumption that there has been a misunderstanding all around. Not many, however, are answering the appeal for another interview and it begins to appear that the greater majority is opposed to changing their answers and that the two questions remain as they are, in the negative. Realizing the extent of the agitation exerted by the Kibei group, the administration had, as I said, read off the Sedition Act as a kind of threat. This was done last Friday night, but through Saturday and Monday, the negative answers to questions 27 and 28 still continued to pour in.

I've made some mention before of the Moab segregation project, and I think that all of us knew that agitators, pro-Axis enthusiasts, and others of that brand were to be taken there in time. In fact, it is already known that seven have already been taken away from Poston. It was never believed, however, that this would be on a very large scale or that it would come without warning; but that is exactly what happened on Tuesday afternoon when the FBI moved in and the military took control from 3 o'clock until 6 o'clock.

Monday afternoon, Bennett and Thompson and Landward, whose office is aiding the Army in bringing about the registration and enlistment together with Williamson the head of the Internal Security Department, and Terry the Project Attorney had a conference in which they decided that inasmuch as it was in their power to remove the agitators, and since agitation was rampant, they would do so. Accord-

ingly, they took the list of names of subversive leaders which had come into their hands, and the five of them went to Phoenix to confer with the United States Attorney-General and with the FBI to obtain a legal opinion as to whether there was sufficient case against the individuals named. The United States Attorney and the FBI gave this round-up their stamp of approval, and it was agreed that in cooperation with the Army, apprehension of subversive leaders would begin at 3 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon. The FBI officers in six cars met at 2 o'clock Tuesday afternoon at the MP barracks outside of Canal Camp. By 3 o'clock guards armed with tommy-guns had been placed around the entrance in the fences of both camps, jeeps were patrolling the road, and all inter-camp travel was frozen. All of those who were on the road between the two camps were obliged to remain there and no one, either Japanese or Caucasian, was allowed to leave the camps' innermost boundaries. The plan was to clear Canal of subversive leaders first, and from Canal ten individuals were taken. The six FBI cars moved quickly. They had the addresses and places of business of those who were suspects, and they attempted to strike each at the same time. Each FBI car had in it the FBI agent, a military driver, a WRA employee, and an armed guard. They called first at the houses of those who were to be arrested. The FBI agent, having a warrant for the arrest of the individual concerned, would force his way in, backed up with a soldier with a tommy-gun. People were prevented from entering or leaving the house. The Issei were given five minutes in which to change their clothes and say goodbye to their families, and then were taken to a point between the two camps where they were herded into trucks. The Kibei were given time to pack a bag of warm

clothing and time to say goodbye to their families. They were then brought to the junction between the two camps in placed in another truck. The Canal round-up was completed in about twenty minutes. Nine Issei were taken and one Kibei. The Issei were, as nearly as I can tell, as follows: Hirokani, who figured so prominently in the Tada beating; Tani, the apparent head of the Kenkyu-kai and agent for the Rocky Nippon newspaper who had emerged as a leader at the time of the Tada beating; Fujimoto, the Issei advisor to the Kibei Club and head of the Sumo Club; Okamoto and Katagawa, Judo leaders; one woman by the name of Mrs. Matsuda who had been most active at the time of the hearing of Hirokani in that she supported actively the justification for Tada's assault; and three others who are not known to me. The one Kibei who was taken was a man named Akimoto, who is president of the Kibei Club. A number of the administrative staff were opposed to Akimoto's being taken because of the fact that he has been a conservative Kibei leader and has done much to keep the Kibei more or less favorably disposed toward the administration. He was taken because he had answered questions 27 and 28 "no" and "no", and it was believed that he had been one of those who had agitated for others to follow his example. The case against him was not clear, but he was taken any way.

In Butte, six Issei were taken. They were: Dyo, leader of the Kyowa-kai; Ototaro Yamamoto, whom I have mentioned so frequently as a leader of the Issei; his lieutenant, Ando; and three others who were rather out-spoken in their pro-Axis expressions. Twelve Kibei were taken from Butte and, of course, the first one nabbed was George Yamashiro (Poor George, and all my source of information gone); Yama-

shiro's lieutenant, Victor Inouye, the president of the Sumo Club; and vice-president of the Kibei Club, Fukumoto; and nine Kibei officers. The round-up in Butte took place just as quickly as the round-up in Canal. The six cars circled the camp and picked up the individuals concerned in no time at all. Yamashiro and his cohorts were arrested in the Kibei clubroom. Of course in both camps, news of the round-up spread quickly and several individuals who knew that they would be taken or feared that they would hid. About fifty people have remained in hiding for the last two days. Several people were hidden by their friends and have not, as yet, been apprehended. Two more were taken from Butte on Wednesday. On Tuesday, several people barricaded themselves in their apartments and refused to come out. A gun jammed through the window-pane quickly broke the resistance. No one was allowed in or out of houses concerned while the arrests were taking place.

All of the Issei, fifteen of them, are to be interned in the Lordsburg Internment Camp in New Mexico. The thirteen Kibei are to be sent to Moab. The Issei were placed on the train Tuesday night; the Kibei were taken in a truck driven by Mr. Fredericks, associate Chief of Internal Security here who is now being permanently transferred to Moab. Moab Center is known as a segregation or isolation center. It is run by the WRA under slightly different rules than control the usual relocation centers. No resettlement is to be allowed for these Kibei, and it seems likely that they will be disfranchised and deported after the war.

Now that this policy has been determined upon, there seems no doubt that others who attempt to emerge as subversive leaders may

find themselves in a similar position. Since Tuesday afternoon, remarkably enough, several Kibei have come into the Project Director's office and asked to be transferred to Moab, and so the process of segregation is beginning with marked effects in the community. The first effect of this mass arrest in both camps was that of stunned surprise. The residents, including myself, could scarcely believe that this was actually happening. Of course, there has been talk of it from time to time, but it seemed very doubtful that it would actually ever occur. Everyone found his security threatened, and there have been no further demonstrations against Army volunteer enlistment. On Tuesday afternoon from 3 o'clock to 6 o'clock, little knots of people began to cluster around houses and street corners, and it looked as though a situation analogous to that which we witnessed at Poston was about to begin, but the feeling died down and the community settled down to peace and quiet.

Many of the Caucasian administrators are convinced that the right thing was done and that trouble can now be alleviated. It is significant to note, however, that the percentage of those answering "no" to questions 27 and 28 has risen from 75 per cent to almost 85 per cent today. A feeling that these individuals who were apprehended are martyrs is already rife. Some of the more clear-headed administrators are beginning to wonder if, perhaps, this was a wise move. To be sure, agitators and certain leaders were removed from the community, but it begins to seem very doubtful, however, that the real core of subversive leadership has been removed. Only the more out-spoken ones have been taken away. There are those who, in

my opinion, remained behind who provided all along the brains for such subversive manifestations and declarations. As long as these men remain untouched, it appears to me that community sentiment will remain unchanged. It is my opinion that among those taken, the only ones who approximated any kind of leadership at all were Dyo, Tani, Yamashiro, and Akimoto. It further appears to have been a very great mistake to have apprehended Akimoto. He kept the Canal Kibei siding with the administration and steering away from the Kenkyu-kai. Now, as he is gone, it seems that the Gila Young People in Canal will swing over to the Kenkyu-kai, lending to that organization greater strength than they have had before. It seems that the effect of such segregation, without apprehending the true leadership, serves to give these strong Issei organizations the quality of being more firmly established Secret Societies. Other front men will be found to supplant those who have gone, and actually, the community sentiments are, if anything, more pro-Japanese than before Tuesday. I was of the opinion that this sense of making the arrested men martyrs might precipitate a general strike. There has not been this effect, however, and it now appears as though this feeling will again die down, or after some deliberation, some demonstration may take place.

We have been wondering what the effect of this will be on the resettlement program. The fact that people continue to answer these so important questions negatively may when publicized jeopardize the chances of Nisei for employment in defense industries, leaving only domestic and farm work open to a limited few. Public opinion, too, can be turned stronger against resettlement. I understand that Dillon Myer is definitely in disfavor with Congress and that his own

brain children, draft for the Nisei and the resettlement program, are seriously threatened by the Congressional investigation. It may be that a change in WRA personnel will see the whole pattern of the relocation centers changed. Myer is very worried according to reports, and there is the threat of Army control over the relocation center beginning July 1st, with the WRA relegated to a position comparable to that of the WCCA. There seems little doubt that the requests for clearance which are now pending for so many will be delayed. It is my own frank opinion that the situation is beginning to appear as critical as I thought it might be in my first letter regarding Army enlistment to you. One good effect this all has had so far as we are concerned is that the attention of the administration is being removed from us.

This, generally, is the report on the situation and I will keep you informed from time to time. No matter what happens, it seems that the draft for the loyal Nisei will still be coming through."

Excerpt from Robert Spencer's letter of February 19, 1943

"From the information that I have been getting from various members of the administrative staff regarding Tule Lake and other projects, I see that, as you say, a definite pattern is at work repeating itself almost exactly not only in two centers but in nearly all of them. Of course you will probably read that Manzanar and Poston are answering "yes" 97 per cent, but I learn that this average is falling down. Our own is on the increase. As the interviewers went from block to block and worked over more to the Nisei blocks and away from the Kibei blocks, our own percentage of those answering yes has increased. On the first day of registration, as I said, 75 per cent were answering the two questions "no."; by yesterday, however, 60 per cent were answering "yes" while in Camp One, about 80 per cent were answering "yes". I believe this difference to be caused by the fact that Kibei are pretty limited in Camp One as compared with Camp Two, and it has been the Kibei who have been the subversive element all along.

Groups of Issei and Nisei have been appointed by the administration to make a house to house canvass to urge those who answered "no" to reconsider. Next Wednesday is the deadline for reconsideration. I shall be able to obtain copies of the questionnaire form from Landward, and I shall forward them to you as soon as I get them."

Robert Spencer

SUPPLEMENT TO INFORMATION ON  
REGISTRATION  
AT TULE LAKE

It is unfortunate that during a short stay at Tule Lake I was unable to go through the files of the internal security department for additional documentation on registration. In a lengthy conversation with Dr. Jacoby a few items relative to registration were mentioned which bear repetition here. At the time of registration an army official, Major Marshall, who, as proved by letters, became very friendly with project director Coverley, was on the project and concerned himself with close scrutiny of the registration program. None of the project officials, excepting those in higher brackets, such as Hayes, Coverley and O'Brien, were aware of Major Marshall's purpose, whom he represented, or the agency which had sent him. The handling of the registration itself was in the hands of a Lieut. Carroll, who was not in any way associated with Major Marshall. Marshall's arrival, coming as it did just prior to registration, and his stay which lasted through the registration period, make it appear that Marshall was on detail to cover in some way the registration program. His function in the community was never explained to many officials, and Jacoby professes himself to be at a loss to understand why Major Marshall was in the community. The fact that he was there, however, necessitated that Coverley take a definite stand as a strong man who had the community under his control. Two factors brought this about, one

of which was Major Marshall's presence. The other was the fact that Cozzens from the Regional office arrived on the project just as registration was about to begin. It was necessary for him (Coverley) to show himself capable of handling the community under Cozzens' scrutiny. Cozzens had been project director at Gila, and in his opinion had handled so well a group of opposing Japanese that he felt capable of meeting any situation which the evacuee colonists might create. In fact, Cozzens stated publicly and often, not only at Tule Lake at the time but elsewhere, that in dealing with an unpleasant situation at Gila he had listened to the demands of the evacuees and then done exactly the opposite. In a sense this is not true (see accounts of Tada incident). At any rate, Cozzens appeared on the project full of a certain amount of inflated ego, and firm in the belief that the evacuees could be forced into any situation which a project director might impose upon them, if that project director exerted the sheer force of his personality. This left Coverley in a rather embarrassing position. He felt it necessary, in order to justify himself as project director, to appear in Cozzens' and Marshall's eyes, as one who had the situation well in hand. In order to do this, it was necessary for him to take high-handed action and to attempt to complete the registration program as soon as possible with the least amount of apparent dissension in the community and among his staff members. One tends to pity Coverley for his complete lack of understanding of the situation, and his futile attempts at self-justification before Marshall and Cozzens. Almost at once the

situation came out of hand, and Coverley was unable to control it. At the advice of O'Brien, the project attorney, it was felt necessary to take recourse to the FBI and to call in FBI agents to make investigations in the center to ascertain the names of those evacuees who were attempting to curb feeling for registration. Reference is made to the lengthy correspondence between the various FBI agents in San Francisco, Red Bluff, with Coverley, and the letters between Dillon Myer and J. Edgar Hoover. In these letters, Coverley openly criticizes the FBI for their failure to succor him in his hour of need. The whole thing began to revolve around the question as to how much jurisdictionary power the FBI had in handling evacuees in the military zone. It is Jacoby's private belief that Bendetsen, aide to General DeWitt, was opposed to the use of the FBI in the relocation centers in the areas under his jurisdiction, and would have preferred to see the matter fall into the hands of G-2. This may be true, inasmuch as project directors in other states have had no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining the help of the FBI, whereas the projects of Manzanar and Tule Lake have secured FBI aid with difficulty. It is certainly true that at Gila Leroy Bennett has had not the slightest difficulty in securing FBI cooperation. Much of the hysteria which demanded FBI aid, Jacoby attributes to O'Brien, who for some time had been concerned with investigations of his own, aimed at ascertaining the names of subversive characters among the evacuee population. Hayes, furthermore, had completely balled up the instructions on registration, apparently learning nothing from his attending the

Washington conferences for instruction in the procedure of registration. Jacoby remarks also that Lieut. Carroll also was not fully prepared to handle the situation. Hayes came out with a statement that all of those who applied for repatriation need not register. Jacoby, however, showed me a memorandum from Rowalt stating that it was necessary for repatriation applicants to register. This memorandum did not come through until several days ~~prize~~ after the beginning of registration. In the meantime, Jacoby had had considerable disagreement with Marshall, who had demanded that all of those who had applied for repatriation be isolated in some section of the community where they could be kept out of contact with those who had not applied. As the repatriation applications piled up, viewed by the evacuees as a substitution for registration, Marshall demanded of Coverley and Jacoby that they prevent further applications for repatriation. Hayes stuck solidly by his misguided interpretation that repatriation applicants need not register. It was not until Rowalt's memo came too late that the procedure had to be begun again, but by this time the harm was done, and the anti-registration feeling had swept the community, a situation which Coverley was completely incapable of handling.

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September 25, 1943

## HIKIDA ON ARMY ENLISTMENT AND REGISTRATION

At the present writing, Mr. Hikida is engaged in working out his own analysis of the Army enlistment situation. Apropos of his contemplated work, it will be well to point out some of his own reactions to the Army program. With other members of his generation, Hikida is in agreement that the dual measure of registration and enlistment coming as they did at the same time was a tactical error. Hikida has been successful in convincing his own block of the role which the Nisei should play in the present war effort and has talked to several Nisei and aided them in overcoming the objections of their parents not only to negative answers to questions 27 and 28 of the 304-A form, but also in going so far as to enlist.

Hikida has taken a firm stand against Bennett's policy of resorting to threats in order to bring across to the Nisei the necessity for answering the two significant questions in the affirmative. He indicates that the Issei should have been informed of the fact that the refusal to answer questions 27 and 28 in the affirmative was tantamount to a crime inasmuch as the negative answers amounted to treason to the country of citizenship. Not only Hikida, but several Issei with whom I have talked, have expressed the opinion that the argument regarding loss of citizenship made no impression upon most Issei minds. The argument has been raised by a majority of Issei who were opposed to their children cooperating with the Federal government that citizenship in itself was valueless inasmuch as both citizens and aliens alike had been forced to agree with evacuation. Therefore, loss of citizenship was not significant, because the feeling generally was that citizenship in itself had been cancelled by evacuation. If, however, negative answers had been described as crimes, a better reception would have been given because of the desire of the Issei to avoid conflicts of this sort.

Hikida has made mention of the bushido concept. His own analysis of bushido is that the code of the warrior is applicable to every person and that, therefore, everyone is obliged to serve the country of his birth. Most of the Kibei

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use the bushido concept as an argument for entering the United States Army and is failing to cooperate with the Federal government and the Army authorities of the United States. Some Kibei pointed out that their fathers and brothers had been killed by members of the armed forces of the Allied nations. They are, therefore, obliged to avenge the deaths of these relatives and could not, on the strength of the bushido concept, cooperate. Hikida states that a true application of the bushido concept would be that all of the Nisei should enter the armed forces if this was the desire of the government and that they should receive the sanction of their relatives and parents. There had been many bitter arguments over this concept and there are many varying views as to its application in the present emergency. The Kibei group is the most anxious to justify its action in this measure on the basis of the bushido concept and yet, not only as Hikida points out but other Issei as well, it is the same Kibei group which returned to America in order to avoid conscription in Japan.

It has been mentioned elsewhere that the Kibei are a spoiled and pampered lot who have been pretty much successful in getting their own way. It is this group which all along has raised opposition to the various defense and Army measures which have been brought up from time to time by the WRA and other governing agencies. Out-spoken statements against such measures as enlistment in the Army Intelligence Division, work in the camouflage net, and the enlistment and registration program precipitated the strong feelings against these measures which manifest themselves in the center. However, these out-spoken Kibei were given the backing of a few Issei in each block. These were not usually Issei family men, that is, the more stolid type of dependable persons, but usually single men whose fortunes could lie in Japan as well as in America. This group of single men, being dissatisfied, has been the focal point of difficulty for a long time. In the various block meetings when the block councilman attempts to make clear to the block residents the various issues confronting the population, agitation has always arisen from the Kibei group of each block by the

single men of the Issai generation. During the course of Captain Thompson's visit to the Gila Relocation Center in order to effect registration and enlistment, a visit was made by an attache of the War Department, Colonel Scobey, who came to make clear to each relocation center the stand of the War Department in regard to Nisei and enlistment. Scobey's message was one of considerable promise for most Nisei, but in many blocks the Kibei and single men were successful in confusing the issue so that the true meaning of Colonel Scobey's words was never really brought across to many blocks. Instead of aiding the purpose, Scobey's visit only served to add to the confusion.

Now that many of the single men and many of the Kibei have been interned, the Gila Young People group is again making a bid for power. At the present writing, it has been unsuccessful in doing this. With the apprehension of the president, George Yamashiro, and of the chairman of the Board of Governors, Fukumoto, five or six young men of the Kibei group are attempting to inaugurate political band-wagons of their own so that they can step into Fukumoto's position as the controlling agent of the Gila Young People. No one wants to assume the presidency, however, inasmuch as the president must take the responsibility for the action of the Board of Governors, and, as has been shown, Yamashiro's career as a leader was rather short-lived. Until adequate leadership for the Kibei Club can be found, it seems likely that the position of the organization as a pressure group will be lacking even though certain members do make a bid for power. The ecclesiastical head of the Kibei group, the Zen Bishop Ochi, is still active in carrying out religious programs for the organization. Mr. Dyo, however, who is said, probably with some truth, to have dictated the policies of the organization, is gone. Mr. Hikida, the third advisor, has always taken a back seat in regard to the organization, meeting it only through his association with Yamashiro on the CAS staff. It will be worthwhile to note Hikida's further comments on the Army situation.