

Joseph I. Omachi
Gila

December 14, 1942

TADA CASE

On the night of November 30th, 1942, Takeo Tada, a member of the Temporary Community Council of Canal Community of the Gila Center, was surrounded and attacked by a group of Canal evacuees, and he received injuries and wounds about the head and arm. After treatment at the hospital where several stitches were taken for a wound in the head, Tada began recovering soon and will be well. The combination of factors and causes, most of which were imagined and exaggerated by rumors, which gave rise to the incident was interesting from the point of view of group psychology.

On the day following the attack Chota Hirokane, a chairman of the Block Council of Block 7, was apprehended and he quite readily admitted that he was guilty and that he would take responsibility for the act. He admitted that the ironwood stick used in the attack belonged to him. He denied that there were any others involved in the actual attack. He claimed that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of the people and that he was doing so for the betterment of the community.

It appears that Tada was called over to a meeting of the Engei-bu (Japanese theatrical group) and a number of questions had been asked of him as to the matter of Japanese stage productions, materials and supplies needed, policies as to the matter of Issei-Nisei cooperation in the field of entertainment, and a number of

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other things ordinarily of interest to such a group. However, it appears that a number of the members and persons at the meeting began asking him matters which concerned questions as to his neglect or refusal to pursue various requests and demands made to him as a staff member of the Community Activities Section.

Tada was also criticized and hated for alleged acts and neglect of responsibility at the Turlock Assembly Center three months previously. He was one of the four members of the Center Council there and he was also a supervisor in the Welfare Department which took care of the matter of requisitions for clothing under the WCCA program. The 3600 residents of the assembly center were to be provided with basic clothing under an allowance of about \$2.00 to about \$3.50 per month depending upon sex and age groups. Although this matter had been announced in May as a matter of WCCA policy for all assembly centers, there had been no clothes forthcoming until July. When, after repeated demands, the Center manager finally announced that clothing would be available, it was most disheartening. It was announced by memorandum from the Service Division that a limited \$1,000.00 emergency fund was available to take care of the requirements of the most needy cases among workers only. As the needs of mess hall workers and janitors were most pressing, the Welfare Department requested the mess hall and janitor supervisors to forward recommendations as to the most needy cases. On the basis of these recommendations this department made requisitions to the Service Division head who purchased the clothing at

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the Turlock stores.

These requisitions were started immediately after the announcement of the program on or about July 6th. Several days and in some cases more than a week were required before the requisitions were fulfilled. On/about July 14th the announcement was made that the Turlock group were to be sent to the Gila River Relocation Center and on July 18th the advance group of about 500 left for Arizona. About 167 clothing requisitions estimated at about \$850.00 in value were sent in. On July 24th all requisitions and purchases were stopped because of inability to fulfill them prior to evacuation to the relocation center. Thus only about 64 requisitions amounting to about \$450.00 were fulfilled. The rest of the 3600 residents of the assembly center were scheduled to leave on daily trains commencing July 25th. After three groups of 500 each had left the schedule was changed so that there was an intervening period of two weeks before the remaining residents were transferred. During the intervening period about 3000 persons were evacuated to Gila from the "White Zone" (Parlier, Hanford and Sanger regions). The Turlock group had never received the clothing allowances outlined under the WCCA program.

The Turlock Administration announced by memorandum that the clothing allotments are to be granted upon a cumulative basis and that credit will be given for evacuees under the monthly allowance schedule from the time of their induction into the assembly center; also that this credit will extend and apply after the residents have been moved to Gila, and therefore these persons can make requisitions

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at Gila at any time and be granted credit for the time spent at Turlock. Thus, if a person under the age-group schedule entitled to a clothing allowance of \$3.50 per month had first arrived at Turlock on May 1, 1942, and had been removed to Gila on August 10, 1942, he could make his application for clothing at any time within one year after May 1st and obtain clothing up to the total accumulated monthly allowances. If he should apply on November 1, 1942, he would be entitled to \$21.00 worth of clothes. If he applies on January 1, 1942³ he may have \$28.00 worth, etc.

These matters were explained to the Turlock residents by Mr. Tada while he was working in the Welfare Department. Thus, some who might have been eligible for clothing allowances under the announced emergency fund had decided that they would wait until their credit should accumulate so that they could obtain clothes of better quality or of a type more suitable to the Gila climate.

When the Turlock residents arrived at Gila the matter of clothing allowances was submitted to Mr. E. R. Smith, who was the Project Director until September. Mr. Smith stated that he was not fully informed as to clothing allowances but indicated that no injustice would be done in any case. Repeated requests were made, especially by those who were badly in need of clothing, particularly shoes. No definite program was forthcoming. Finally it was announced by Mr. Smith that the clothes issuance credits under the WRA was to commence beginning September 1, 1942. This was later confirmed by Mr. E. R. Fryer, the Regional Director who had come to Gila in the latter part of September to serve as Acting Project Director upon

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Mr. Smith's resignation. It was definitely announced that no credit can be given by the WRA for time spent in the assembly centers, even though no clothing was issued by the assembly center. This was a stunning blow to the Turlock evacuees. It was far more aggravating to these residents when they learned from the evacuees from the Tulare Assembly Center that all the persons there had received clothing. In fact it appears that at Tulare an initial clothing allotment of \$5,000.00 was granted about the latter part of July, and subsequently additional allotments of approximately \$60,000.00 were granted and clothing of that value were delivered. Where there was delay in effecting delivery at Tulare, the clothing which was requisitioned was forwarded to the proper persons at Gila. It was only natural for the people from Turlock to assume that something was drastically wrong somewhere. They began to seek an explanation of the matter from Mr. Tada.

In addition to the clothing issue many of the Turlock evacuees had another cause for resentment. Under the WCCA program free coupon books were to be given to assembly center residents each month during their stay. The schedule of eligibility was as follows: \$2.50 book - single persons 16 years of age or over; husband and wife - \$4.00 books; children 1 to 16 years of age - \$1.00 books; and maximum allowance per family - \$7.50. The coupons from these books could be used for purchases at the center store. At Turlock these books were first distributed during the first week in July as allowances for the month of June. No coupon books were issued for the month of May. July allowances were commenced on July 15th. Although the advance group which were evacuated on July 18th received their books and were allowed to effect purchases at the store, many of those who remained

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were refused these books. This affected, in particular, the single men living in the single-men barracks. Approximately one-half of these men and some of the others did not obtain their coupons at all. These persons became furious at this injustice to them.

In his earnest effort to assist in this situation, Tada, among others, had sought an explanation from the Turlock administration. The center manager announced that he was sorry but as the books had all run out he could do nothing about it prior to relocation. He explained that the clothing and coupon allowances were gifts and that there is no way of enforcing payment of a gift. Tada translated this to those who could not understand English. The reaction was instantaneous. The groups affected by this became indignant and a large number of the single men started a mob demonstration. They pushed over the small booth that had been used for the issuance of coupon books and threatened the administration building. No one was injured at the time but danger was imminent. They could see no reason why the administration should not have provided for a sufficient number of the coupon books. Ample data was available as to the number of persons in the various group categories and daily roll calls were being taken for more than a month past.

These matters smouldered in the minds of the people even after relocation to Gila and were aggravated by the conditions there. In the Community Activities Section Tada worked conscientiously in striving to further its program in the field of entertainment and various club activities. In spite of his efforts needed equipment and supplies demanded were not available. Sufficient rooms could not be found to fulfill the requests of the many clubs that wanted

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to organize. Because of administrative policy he had to refuse several groups the right to organize as a club. A Kibei group was included among those refused. Charges of favoritism and neglect of duty began to grow. The Turlock grievances were again brought up with renewed vigor. The fact that Tada had applied for a position as an instructor in Japanese at Fort Savage, Minnesota became known and was distorted as an attempt on his part to flee from his responsibilities and as an act of disgrace.

The rising furor of the evacuees gave vent to hate and Tada was the unfortunate victim against whom this feeling grew. The sentiment was fanned to flames with more recent rumors as to mishandling of funds by the Turlock administration. Tada was singled out as being responsible or having had something to do with all of these things. Any explanation of facts by him did not convince the already prejudiced minds of these people. Attempts by others to assist Tada in his predicament were regarded with contempt and such persons were branded as being in conspiracy to the alleged wrong. Rumors were started that Tada and possibly a few others might have profited by the Turlock administration policies. Regardless of the falsity of any of such charges against Tada, he was scorned. They did not like his "attitude" or they thought that he "showed off too much" or he acted as though he was a "big shot". It was claimed that Tada should have taken this step or pursued that policy, that he was negligent in the performance of his obligations as a councilman, that he had wilfully misguided the people, that he had personally guaranteed that the clothing allowances promised at Turlock will

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be granted but had failed to see it through, that he was responsible for the failure on the part of many Turlock evacuees to receive coupon books, etc.

Of significant interest was the fact that this intense feeling of resentment and frustration harbored by the Turlock evacuees was used to advantage by a group which had organized themselves under the apparently harmless name of Gila Kenkiu-Kai (Gila Research Society). Instead of pursuing study and research into matters of community welfare this group began investigating certain individuals among the evacuees who were employed in the more important positions at the center, picking out alleged faults and criticisms based principally upon unfounded rumors rather than upon confirmed facts. By such methods the group had made up a so-called "black-list" citing the names of a number of persons to be "taken care of".

Whether or not this group had actually instigated and planned the assault upon Tada is doubtful. However, immediately after the attack the group began to work together to build up a justification for the crime. Using as their spokesman, a newspaperman having unusual eloquence and ability to sway the feelings of a mob the group rallied a crowd to a mass meeting on the following night. The Tada assault was beautifully portrayed as an act which Hirokane had committed for the benefit of the residents of the community. The numerous grievances of the evauees were described in such a manner that the people, particularly the uneducated Isseis, could not help but become convinced as to the injustices inflicted upon them by Tada. The speaker went on to say that even the wardens in the Internal

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Security Department had resigned from their positions in sympathy with Hirokane and that when he had been informed of this he could not but weep with joy in the realization that Niseis (wardens being mostly Niseis) entrusted by the Administration with the maintenance of law and order had such sound judgment as to see the true perspective of the entire incident.

As a matter of fact the wardens had not resigned at all. What happened was that R. B. Cozzens, the Acting Project Director, had promised the wardens that Hirokane will be released upon his own recognizance and will not be jailed until a fair trial is granted and he is sentenced. However, in order to avoid other incidents, Hirokane was taken away to a safe place at the Butte Camp until the trial on Thursday. The fact that he was not released as promised was resented by the wardens and resignations were contemplated, but when Mr. Cozzens indicated where Hirokane was being kept and that he would be granted his release during the interim between the hearing and the pronouncement of sentence, the wardens had relented and continued to serve with credit.

At the hearing on December 3rd evidence material to the crime itself was submitted by the witnesses during the first 15 minutes of the trial. It was conducted very capably by the Acting Project Director assisted by the Project Attorney, James Hendrick Terry, and several other administrative members. They invited testimony from all who desired to make a statement. Thereafter several hours were devoted to the numerous grievances that the residents had been harboring and which they thought were material points

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in justification for the act of crime. The Turlock clothing and coupon book issues appeared to be the principal subjects of resentment. After clearly pointing out that no evidence was submitted which can legally be considered as a justification for the act, Mr. Cozzens announced that he would impose sentence within a few days. He also explained that he would make an announcement to the Canal residents that evening.

The large milling crowd which stood around the building in which the hearing was being held was quite orderly although their occasional shouts and expressions indicated that they were on Hirokane's side. During and after the hearing a spirit of tenseness and danger could be plainly felt. The wave of fear and subtle threats of violence carefully implanted by the Kenkiu-Kai adherers seemed at its highest peak. When Hirokane was granted his release until the time of sentence some satisfaction was apparent. However, rumors were increasing that others on the "blacklist" were to be beaten up next and that the crowd might get out of hand.

Sensing the situation Mr. Cozzens in his well-timed address that evening spoke to the crowd with firmness and unhesitancy. He made it clear that whatever grievances the residents may have, any resort to violence or threat of harm will not be tolerated. He stated that proper channels are provided through which any grievances may be fairly heard and considered. He pointed out that resort to violence will only hinder rather than aid in effecting any benefits for the community. The proper course to follow in obtaining results through the administration is to voice such grievances

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through a representative committee, after thorough consideration is first had. Cozzens then stated that the machinery for granting cash allowances for clothing to all workers and their dependents and that has been already established/ payments will be made next week for July and August allowances. After the talk an evacuee attorney from Los Angeles interpreted the message in Japanese in a very capable manner.

Two days later Hirokane was called in and sentenced to a term of six months in the Pinal County jail, with all but one month of the term suspended upon his good behaviour. To the group which supported him even one month in jail was considered severe. They called on the services of a group of women supporters to go around from room to room, and using coercive tactics obtained signatures of hundreds of women residents to a petition to reduce Hirokane's sentence on the ground that he had acted for the good of the community.

The following week cash allowances were distributed to the Canal residents as Mr. Cozzens had indicated. Thereafter, sentiment began to shift to a realization that the assault upon Tada was uncalled for and quite foolish. The Kenkiu-Kai group offered to disband and have outwardly manifested their intention to serve the community as individuals in a proper manner. Whether this sportive gesture is purely superficial remains to be seen.

Reviewing the entire picture the questions that come to the forefront are these: Was the Kenkiu-Kai group organized with the purpose of carrying out a pro-Axis demonstration

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such as those attributed to Poston and to Manzanar? Was the fact that all of these events had occurred near the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor of some sinister significance? Was the Tada incident and the various ramifications of the case merely tools which were cleverly used to gain a certain objective quite different from that anticipated?

Factors tending toward an affirmative answer to these questions were present. The Kenkiu-Kai group had submitted to Mr. Cozzens a written notice signed by about 500 Gila residents to the effect that the WRA proposal for limited self-government with a council composed only of United States citizens is doomed to fail because of the inexperience of the eligible members. The group proposed a plan under which they would organize a system of government for the center, with some details as to asserted phases of community government that needed attention. This proposal was made at the height of the Tada case. The nucleus of this group included Hirokane and consisted principally of persons who might be considered "radical". The chief supporters were the Issei men residing in the single-men barracks. Most of them were of a type spurning work and always complaining or criticising. Many of them have openly expressed their belief that the government of Japan is going to reimburse the United States government for the cost involved in maintaining the evacuees in these centers, and therefore, they are entitled to receive necessary allowances for clothes and other personal needs regardless of whether they work or not.

It appears that Hirokane, a family man ^{with} seven young children, had either volunteered or was chosen to be the martyr for the "cause"

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of the group, with the subtle purpose of inviting mass sympathy in order to gain the support of as many as possible. If, as at Poston, an evacuee judicial commission should have been selected by the Temporary Community Council to try the case, a series of assault cases might have followed with serious consequences. The capable manner in which Mr. Cozzens had handled the case was probably the reason why the incident did not assume more serious proportions.

The interesting field of community self-government, particularly after the constitution now being drafted is adopted by the evacuee residents of Gila, will be one of the subjects for future reports.

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Supplementary Notes to the Report on the Tada Case.

At the Turlock Assembly Center the four members of the Center Council were appointed by the Center manager, Ernest G. Pinnella, as new groups had come in from time to time. Dr. George R. Baba, a San Francisco physician and a graduate of the University of California and of the U. C. Medical School, was the first member appointed. He was assigned by the W.C.C.A. to take charge of the hospital at the Turlock Center and had arrived on or about April 28, 1942, with the initial group which had volunteered to assist the administration in preparing for subsequent arrivals. I was the next person appointed, perhaps because I was practicing law at Stockton and was a graduate of the University of California and of Hastings College of Law. I was evacuated to Turlock on May 2nd. On May 17th a group of about 800 evacuees came in from Los Angeles. Takeo Tada was in this group and was selected because he had been the secretary of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce at Los Angeles. He is a graduate of Fresno State College. In the latter part of May Mrs. T. Yamamoto of San Francisco arrived at Turlock with her family to join her husband who was a dentist at the Center Hospital. Mrs. Yamamoto was appointed by reason of her excellent record as^a social worker, particularly with the Parent-Teachers Association of the Raphael Weil Grammar School at San Francisco. She was the only Issei among the four Council members.

The principal work of the Council consisted in acting as

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intermediaries between the administration and the residents of the assembly center. Problems affecting the residents were brought up and discussed at meetings of barrack and block representatives and when administrative matters were concerned the council presented the problems to the proper officials of the Turlock administration. Clothing allowances and coupon book issues were among the matters presented in this manner. Under this system the center residents cooperated and worked together in a most commendable manner during the $2\frac{1}{2}$ month period prior to July 18th, when the advance group left for Gila.

I was working as chairman of the Public Welfare and Sanitation Department under the Service Division Supervisor, Lester M. Flewelling, an understanding and capable man who has had considerable experience in recreation and social service. Dr. William J. Furuta, a bacteriologist who received his A.B. and M. A. degrees at the University of California and his Ph. D. degree at the University of Illinois, was our acting consultant for sanitation work and had spent such time as he could afford after performing his regular duties as head of the hospital laboratory. Nine research assistants, a stenographer and a messenger boy completed our staff. Dr. Furuta and I had worked out the program of activities for our department. Periodic calls were made at all family units each week to note sanitary conditions, family needs, general grievances, complaints, etc. Semi-weekly inspections were also made of all mess halls, latrines, laundries and shower rooms and their conditions noted. A few weeks after our department was organized, Takeo Tada was assigned to our department as a foreman

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to assist in welfare matters, especially when clothing allowance policies were being formulated and carried out. His work was satisfactory and beyond reproach.

In all probability the Turlock residents would have received regular basic clothing allowances had they been able to stay at the assembly center for a longer period, through August and September, as at Tulare. Emergency clothing allotments were apparently granted for most assembly centers in July and regular allowances were given in August and September with monthly accumulated credits allowed for a back period commencing around June 1st. However, as the residents were transferred to Gila between July 18th and August 15th the Turlock center was denied the privilege of obtaining regular clothing allowances by action of the main San Francisco office of the W.C.C.A. Whether or not the Turlock administration could have obtained these allowances for its residents had more vigorous steps been taken is problematical. In my estimation this could probably have been done, particularly for those who stayed in August. At any rate the memorandum issued by the Turlock administration, that clothing allowance credits for the period of residence at the assembly center could be accumulated and counted in determining allowances at the relocation center, proved to be erroneous. Whether this misleading representation was made deliberately and with knowledge of its falsity is a point upon which I have been unable to obtain any information.

Of the Center Council members Mrs. Yamamoto and I had left Turlock on July 18th and arrived at Gila on July 20th with the ad-

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vance group. During the following week the unfortunate incidents surrounding the inequality in the issuance of coupon books had occurred. In the midst of these conditions Dr. Baba and Mr. Tada were transferred to Gila between July 25th and July 27th. The unexpected two week delay in leave schedules took place thereafter and the remaining 1500 residents stayed on into August. News as to clothes issuance at other centers began pouring in and became the source of added discontent and suspicion. Reports were also received from the scattered families and persons, who transferred to other assembly centers on permits just prior to relocation, that they had received clothing a short time after their arrival at these other assembly centers.

When all of the Turlock residents had been relocated to Gila, the unaccustomed Arizona heat and necessary housing adjustments were the subjects uppermost in their minds until they became more or less settled down. Then these grievances were brought up again. Mr. Tada was approached time after time. He explained what he knew about the circumstances. He gave me facts as to what had occurred after I had left Turlock, and I drew up a report covering the clothing and coupon book issues. Mr. Tada and I then submitted this report on October 6th to Acting Project Director, E. R. Fryer, for reference to the proper W.C.C.A. officials in San Francisco to obtain relief or at least an adequate explanation. The only explanation made was that both clothing and coupons were gifts and that the W.C.C.A. could do nothing towards an equitable adjustment of the situation.

At the Hirokane trial I was called in as a witness to testify

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as to these matters. I stated what I knew about them and read the report which had been submitted to Mr. Fryer. Some of the crowd which jammed the courtroom indicated their feelings of suspicion against me. I was pointed out as being the next person on the "blacklist". I was overcome more by pity than by anger or resentment against these thwarted individuals who were inclined to jump to conclusions on the basis of prejudices and rumors. Although no thought of fear entered my mind at any time, the anxiety of my family and friends toward me was, however, a matter of concern which I could not ignore.

After the trial Mr. Cozzens indicated that he would personally follow up on the Turlock matters with the proper officials in San Francisco who were in charge of W.C.C.A. policies, and would obtain a complete explanation of the entire matter, especially in reference to the cumulative clothing credit program. Some of my friends talked to the Kenkiu-Kai leaders in my behalf as well as for others rumored to be on the "blacklist", pointing out the injustice and unfairness of attaching blame upon us. The Kenkiu-Kai group realized their folly and have apologized for what had occurred, reiterating, however, that their primary thought and purpose is "to work towards the common welfare of the community".

During the time that this wave of suspicion and skepticism was rampant, the Turlock Council members were the persons subjected to principal criticism by the Kenkiu-Kai adherers. However, Dr. Baba and Mrs. Yamamoto had resided at Butte Camp and were not conveniently within reach. Dr. Baba had left for Tulalake in

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October and his departure from Gila was pointed out as being "suspicious". Mr. Tada and I have been continuously residing at Canal Camp and we were readily available as targets. In addition, several other persons residing here at Canal were blamed for distorted injustices. Among them were Charles Yonezu, the captain in the Internal Security Department, Teizo Yahanda, the central block manager, and George Kawahara, the supervisor of clothing allowances. Yonezu's ability and inclination to perform his duties in the enforcement of law and order was resented and, in addition, the fact that he was Mr. Tada's friend and roommate was regarded with disfavor. Mr. Yahanda was subjected to criticism because of housing maladjustments. Kawahara was blamed for the delay in the payment of clothing allowances under the W.R.A. program. In my estimation all of these persons have been and now are performing their duties in a most capable manner. I know of no other persons among the evacuees who might be able to do a better job in the respective assignments. Any shortcomings that have occurred can only be attributed to lack of supplies, inadequate transportation facilities and other matters incident to the present war-time economy, or to administrative policies over which these persons have no control or authority whatever and any attempt to place responsibility for such failures upon them is not only unjust but is most unreasonable.

It is probable, however, that the Kenkiu-Kai leaders have resorted to such tactics in order to put the administrative officials on notice that more vigorous and energetic steps should be taken to supply the various needs of the evacuees in a more

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fair and equitable manner, upon the theory that the end justifies the means. The fact that they have been able to obtain the support of a large number of ardent followers can be explained upon this theory. The pervading psychology of the Japanese Isseis, that the sacrifice of a few for the sake of the people at large is justifiable, is quite apt to take such peculiar twists in their process of reasoning. To those of us born and reared in this country under American ideals and customs, it would appear without question that to obtain results in cases such as those here involved, a direct approach to the proper administrative officials would be the proper method to pursue.

It is my opinion that the Kenkiu-Kai group, in their thoughts and conduct in relation to the Tada case, were acting honestly and with good intentions and that they were trying to do what they thought would be good for the community. However, I feel that the methods followed or proposed were quite improper and that the net result of the entire case was harmful to the residents of Gila because of the methods used.

The wide divergence in the concepts of those who adhere to Japanese ideals and thought-processes and the concepts of those who have grown up under or have adopted the American ideals and ways of doing things have also caused a great deal of friction in the operation of community self-government. In fact this disharmony has become so acute that a number of the members of the Temporary Community Council at Canal have resigned because of the feeling of uselessness and frustration in continuing to serve. The adjustments, compromises, shifting or sharing of responsibility and the

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many other things necessary for self-government, even in the very limited form proposed by the W.R.A., will be most interesting to observe, and especially so for me as I shall be ^a participant in this program of activities.

KIBEI GROUP.

Mr. Hikida submitted in his manuscript a brief analysis of the so-called Gila Young People's Association, an organization which had not received official sanction from the administration, and the membership of which was made up principally of Kibei Nisei. Although, as Mr. Hikida pointed out, membership was not restricted to Kibei, nevertheless, the meetings were carried on in Japanese, and the facilities of the Buddhist Church was opened to this group as a clubhouse in Camp 2. At present, the Gila Young People's Association is restricted to Camp 2. Oddly enough, the Issei of the Camp 2 community being representative leaders of the Tulare Assembly Center, are, in the main, opposed to the formation of the Gila Young People's Club. It should be mentioned here that two types of leadership exists among the Issei in Butte camp. The first of these, and the larger, is a group of family men interested in furthering the development of the community, and in seeing Gila as a whole, off to a good start. This group is composed of ex-servicemen, former community leaders of the pre-evacuation days, and Issei who have been educated in American Universities and colleges, many of whom are representative of the so-called Yobi-Yose class. It is this group which urged the enlisting of young people in the Japanese language schools sponsored by the Army. It is this group which has been active in the formation of the Community Council, and of furthering the interest of self-government under the auspices of the Caucasian administration. The second group of Issei directly opposed to this benevolent group, is one which has a number of adherence from among single men, Kibei, and some Nisei. This is the group mentioned by me in a former report as a group of agitators, and by Mr. Hikida in his own compilation of data pertinent to political formation in the community. This group is the one which is under the leadership of Otajiro Yamamoto and S. Ando. These two men as counsellors, or advisors, of a group opposed to cooperation with the administration, have, as already been mentioned by Mr. Hikida, urged and brought propaganda to bear on the control of the community politics by Issei and Kibei; in other words, those who spoke Japa-

nese; some of these were definitely marked. This group too, was one active in opposing the enlisting of young men in the Camp Savage School. Rumors against the school were spread by this group to the effect that Japan would win the war, and that people concerned would find themselves in a rather dangerous position, in short, this group advocated a policy of non-cooperation with the Army and the Administration. This group has, therefore, sponsored leadership by the Kibei organization who might, since they respect Issei leaders, be used as tools or pawns for the Yamamoto group. The more liberal Issei group has urged Nisei leadership in accordance with the rules formulated by the WRA. Because of this, they have been active in preventing the organization of groups which might work against community solidarity. Because the Kibei offers a front which is divided, and against the best interests of unification advocated by the liberal Issei group, they have not met with the support of the Community Council in their efforts to organize. A Kibei group which politically would conform to the ideas of the Yamamoto-Ando group is desirable to these, and they have been active in advocating official recognition from the administration, so that the Kibei group could formally organize. The Kibei's are intimately connected with the Young Men's and Young Women's Buddhist Association, in fact, the President of the Gila Young People's Association is also the President of the Young People's Buddhist Association--George Yamashiro. Yamashiro has used his influence with the Buddhist priests in allowing them to open the Buddhist church for meetings of the Gila Young People's Association. At the present writing, the Gila Young People's Association has roughly 300 members. Their meetings are conducted entirely in the Japanese language, and although they meet with the sanction of the Buddhist dignitaries, they have, as yet, received no official recognition from the Community Activities Division. Kibei group in the Butte camp has already stirred up some feeling against the Community Council and its members. The Community Council, composed of elected Nisei but with an Issei advisory board, is in disfavor with this group and its following. Recently, because of trouble-making

activities, Mr. Ando was transferred from one crew of carpenters to another. He protested to Yamashiro and a delegation appeared before the Nisei in charge of construction. This delegation was composed of these Kibei under the leadership of Yamashiro. They protested the transfer of this man, and threatened the Nisei in charge of the crew with lack of support and social ostracism. They were not successful in their demand, but it is obvious that such demands from them will be on the increase. It is certainly true that their activities are curtailed by the Issei leadership, the bulk of whom are members of the Advisory Board to the Community Council. The Gila Young People's Association promises to bid for official recognition and there seems little doubt that soon a delegation will approach Mr. Hoffman, the Director of Community Services, so that their activities in the community may receive administrative recognition.

The matter of Kibei is so closely tied in with Community government and with the desire on the parts of individuals for prestige in the community, that it is almost impossible to speak of Kibei organization divorced from community government. To summarize the situation, it can be said that in Camp 2 there are two definite Issei sanctions, one of which is opposed to the Kibei group, and the other of which fosters it.

A different picture is presented for Camp 1, Canal Camp, and a different division of authority occurs here as a result of development which took place in the Turlock Assembly Center. Here, there is no friction between Kibei and Issei, on the contrary, the Issei are far less liberal than those of Camp 2--the Tulare Assembly Center. One of the chief reasons for Issei sponsorship of Kibei, is the fact that the Kibei Nisei are willing to listen to the advice of the older people, and in accordance with the Japanese pattern accord them greater respect and attention; while in Butte camp, far-seeing Issei leaders have been opposed to a Kibei organization on the grounds that it tends to be detrimental to community solidarity. In camp 1, the Issei tend to favor the Kibei group as against the Nisei. The Kibei group in Camp 1 is fully as strong as that in Camp 2, boasting about 200

members. There is, however, some division of opinion among the Kibei themselves in Camp 1, as to how organization and influence in the community should be effected. Some of the Kibei there also belong to the recently formed association, are opposed to a group which would attempt to exert certain amount of control in the political life of the community, rather they seek to make the Kibei organization a social club in which the members would be bound together by mutual interests. This is quite in contrast to the Kibei organization in Camp 2, which is definitely unified, and with Issei sponsorship, attempts to assert itself as a dominant group in the community. Those Kibei organizations are not unified. That is to say, the Gila Young People's Association is not active in Camp 1 under that name, and the organizations have been formed separately, and seemingly stem out of formations which occurred in the Assembly Centers. The two groups are thus independent of each other. In Camp 1, the Kibei sent a delegation to Mr. Gaba, the head of Community Services and recreation there. They requested that they be given a recreation hall which they could furnish and use as their own club rooms. At the same time, the University Club of Camp 1, a social club founded to meet the interests of any one of the Community who might concern himself with academic subjects, was granted a social hall. These University Club members meet periodically for Forums, discussion groups and for socials, and the membership is not limited, but rather, open to everyone in the community who has an interest in academic subjects. Gaba granted the use of a recreation hall to the University Club, but denied it to the Kibei group on the ground that the Kibei group was selective and did not operate towards the best interests of the community because of its exclusive nature. Issei leadership in the community at Camp 1 was opposed to Gaba's decision, especially in view of the fact that a recreation hall had been given the University Club and denied the Kibei. It is difficult to tell what went on behind the scenes of the Kibei group. It is thought, not without some reason, that members of the Kibei group used influence or threats against the governing committee of the University Club. Gaba was most surprised when recently, a delegation from

the University Club appeared before him and agreed that the Kibei organization might use the University Club's social halls on nights when it was vacant. For Gaba to accede to this request would mean that the Kibei organization as such, had received official recognition from the administration and that its activities would be recognized by the Division of Community Services. Gaba felt himself rather on a spot. As yet, he has been unable to decide whether he should grant official recognition to the Kibei group in Camp 1. As has been mentioned, the Gila Young People's Association, or the Kibei group in Camp 2, has not as yet applied for official recognition. Gaba decided to wait, took the matter up with his chief assistant, Mr. Takeo Tada, who advised him to grant recognition to the Kibei, but to give the Kibei an executive secretary, who could keep tab of the activities of the group and to urge them to submit program plans and the like to the administration for approval. Gaba suggested this plan to the Kibei, and suggested further that they carry on their meetings in English. They accepted the proposal of an executive secretary, but stated that they did not want to carry on their communications in English because many of the men found using that language difficult and unsuitable as a means of communication. Gaba urged that they carry on a program for study of English since it was essential to a life in this country. As a whole, the Kibei group stated, the members did not wish to attend English classes in the evening, since this required attendance four nights out of the week and curtailed somewhat, the social life. They were willing however, to undertake an English study organization of their own and to practice the speaking of English in their meetings. This became one of the points which they embodied in the program of activities submitted by them to Mr. Gaba. At the present writing, December 1, 1942, the question of recognition for the Kibei had not as yet been fully decided upon. It was agreed at first, that they could meet in the clubhouse designed for the use of the University Club. On the evening of November 30, meetings were held separately by each group

in order to discuss the matter. Tada, Gaba's assistant, himself incidentally a Kibei, but not a member of the proposed Kibei group, told the University Club of the consideration of their proposal that the Kibei be allowed to use the facilities from time to time. He then went to make some official statements at the Kibei meeting. Following this meeting, just as Tada left, he was attacked outside the door of the mess hall where the meeting had taken place in Camp 1, and beaten very severely about the head and arms with clubs by five individuals who have not, as yet, been apprehended. It is known that Tada has been rather unpopular with some of the Kibei as well as with many other individuals because of the pro-administration stand that he has taken, and recently, because of the fact that he submitted himself as a Japanese language instructor to the Army. It would be inadvisable to state that Tada was beaten as the result of his opposition to Kibei activities until the facts of the case are known, however, it may be implied from some of the resulting discussions of today, that this beating was a result of the stand by him. This is the first beating that has taken place at Gila under what is presumably a political issue. The beating is a very serious one, and there is some doubt as to what its results will be. It is to be hoped that this action does not indicate a change in the morale of this community. The disposition of the case is, at present, under the direction of the Internal Security Department, and it is hoped that sufficient example can be made of this instance to prevent such further outbreak in the future. The problem of the attempts of the Kibei organizations in both camps to assert themselves is one which will bear close scrutiny in the future. As yet, the two organizations are still in formative stages. To summarize the situation in Camp 1, it might be said that the Kibei have full support of the Issei and stand in opposition to the Nisei of that community.

The TADA INCIDENT (Dec. 3. 1942)

The beating of Takeo Tada took place on November 30. On the following day it appeared that many Kibei sympathizers were responsible for Tada's assault, especially after the stand he had taken in opposition to Kibei organization. Undoubtedly, this was the factor, and it is known that Tada, although himself a Kibei, has done much to prevent formal recognition of any Kibei activities by the administration. He has continually urged Gaba, his superior, not to condone the actions of the Kibei group. There is no doubt that Tada's motives have been of the best, and that he sincerely desires the creation of the undivided community, and sees in Kibei organization only another factor which prevents the development of an organized community front. On December 1, Tada recovered sufficiently to be able to name his assailants. He recognized only one, an Issei who had lived near him. This man was taken into custody by the Internal Security Department and immediately, considerable furor broke out in the community as a result of this arrest. Williamson, chief of Internal Security, agreed to let the handling of the matter up to his assistant chief, Mr. Fredericks. Fredericks believes that the individual apprehended for the beating should not alone be arraigned for trial for assault and battery charges, but rather that the reasons for the beating should be determined more fully, and the other assailants should be apprehended as well. They questioned out the man arrested. It was found that he was an Issei who had lived in Turlock with his wife and seven children. He was asked why he had engaged in this assault, and stated that it was not so much that the community had a grudge against Tada, but rather, after being frustrated so many times in their demands from this or that individual in the administrative staff, the group which he represented saw no alternative but selecting members of the Japanese staff acting as aides to the administration in order to bring their demands to the attention of the proper authorities. He stated that he was personally willing to undergo trial for his actions in the matter, but he believes that his group, composed of Issei and Kibei from the Turlock Assembly Center, would back him up and that a

general strike would be called if he were arraigned for a hearing. Fredericks checked on this man's statements and found that a black list had been prepared of individuals who were regarded with disfavor by the Turlock Issei and Kibei. As it was mentioned above, these two groups are unified in Camp 1, but show definite lack of unity in Camp 2. Camp 1 presents a divided picture. It must be remembered that it is composed of about 3,000 people who came from the Turlock Assembly Center, and who, prior to evacuation, had lived in the localities of Concord, Tracy, Fairfield, Suisun, Livermore, Vacaville, Manteca, and Turlock, but in addition in the Canal community there are roughly 2,300 people from the white zone representative of the general Fresno area, who are not concerned with assembly center politics as took place in the Turlock Assembly Center. A further Issei division has taken place there as a result of this pre-evacuation location. The white zone people, half of Canal Camp, are not so concerned over such a matter, and have taken a rather neutral stand. Undoubtedly, some of the issues involved stem out of difficulties which arose from the Turlock Assembly Center. Here, Tada was one of the three acting councilmen, and was placed in charge of clothing distribution. One of the big issues presented before the Gila community is that of the distribution of clothing. A situation somewhat similar to that of Tanforan apparently existed and the administration at Turlock was said to discourage the obtaining of clothing by evacuees in any great quantities, the result was that Tada was not able to accede to requests of evacuees in regard to clothing, in every case. It is said that the head of the Turlock Assembly Center is, at present, in the penitentiary as a result of graft activities and bribery. I cannot vouch for the truth of this statement but would like to see it checked upon. This fact, together with the shortage of clothing in the Gila Center, have undoubtedly been the cause for some active feeling against Tada who is a kind of renegade Kibei, at best stands alone.

The statement of Tada's assailant to the Internal Security Department was of the effect that because of the shortages of clothing, because of difficulties which confront people in housing, because of the meat shortage, the lack of coffee,

sugar, and the like, it was hoped by this measure to bring their demands of the organized Issei in Camp 1 to the attention of the administration. Fredericks took this explanation at its face value and issued the statement that he believes the Issei man to be honest in his conviction, that this was a measure designed to call the attention of the administration to the plight of the Issei there. It became obvious that the assailants had been delegated by a group of Issei who were prepared to back up this drastic measure with violence of their own in calling a general strike in Camp 1, similar to that recently settled at Poston; in fact, it seems that the Poston outbreak served as the incentive of the handling of the arraignment proceedings. It was decided for the time being to let the assailant go until his accomplices could be identified and all tried together. There was furthermore, the difficulty of ascertaining what the reaction of the community would be if this man were brought up for trial. It was decided by Fredericks to wait for a week before arraigning the accused. This did not meet with the approval of the Project Director, and after the delay of a day or two, proceedings were started on December 4. The Issei-Kibei organization in Camp 1 promises a general strike if the man is not released. The Nisei have circulated a petition for trial, and have informed the administration of a strike if the man is not put up for a hearing. How the problem will be solved is still a question. Angry groups are meeting in Camp 1 at the present writing demanding disposition of the case favorable to individual groups. Unless some arrangement can be made which will favor all the groups, trouble is bound to break in Camp 1. The attitude of the free zone, Santa Anita, and Tulare groups has been neutral and the issue is one which is recognized as concerning only the Turlock group. It may very well be, however, that with the unfavorable disposition of the case, the administration may lose face and the effects of the disposition of the case may be more far-reaching than is now apparent. The above is a general summary of what has happened up to now in Camp 1. The case, in its settlement, may have drastic effects upon the community.

December 4, 1942

The Tada case begins to assume complicated proportions when an analysis of the factors involved is presented. It had been mentioned already that the individual arrested--an Issei by the name of Hirokani, who had been accused by Tada as one of his assailants. The man was taken for questioning to the Internal Security office and his reply, after admitting his complicity in the affair, had been that Japanese leaders were chosen for beating so as to bring the demands of the Issei to the attention of the administration. This statement was received by some of the Nisei wardens acting in the capacity of investigators, with credence. Fredericks also subscribes to this belief although the Project Director, Mr. Cozzens, Mr. Korn, and Mr. Terry, the latter the newly appointed Project Attorney, did not believe that this was the case. They regarded the action as taken as being too high-handed, and upon investigation none was convinced of the veracity of Hirokani's statements.

The black list prepared in a similar way as the one at Poston included in the first five names Nisei and Kibei leaders who were believed to be currying favor with the administration and working against the Japanese people in the Center. That the reverse is true will be shown presently. The blacklist had the names of about ten individuals who were to be marked for assault. The first was Takeo Tada, head of the recreation in the Canal community, a Kibei and chief assistant to Baba. Second was Charles Yonezu, Captain of the wardens in the Canal camp. The third was Joe Omachi, also from the Turlock Center, who had acted as legal advisor and continued in that position here. Fourth was Goro Yamamoto, a Kibei from Berkeley, who was Tada's chief assistant and who, with Tada, had advocated suppression of the Kibei group. The fifth was George Kawahara, an older Hawaiian Nisei who has been chief assistant to Henderson in the disposition of housing problems in Canal. Yonezu was placed on the list because of the consensus in the community that he sought to aid the administration. Similarly, Omachi, who had been active in the formulation of the constitution for the Community Council in Camp 1, was conceived to be anti-

Issei. Feeling in the community against any denominations of pro-administration tactics became intense. The wardens were boy-cotted and snubbed, with the result that, feeling that they were not getting any support from the community and were losing caste socially, they resigned in a body on Wednesday morning. Their resignation was not accepted by Williamson with the result that they returned to work. They had, however, scored a point in this respect, that they had shown the community that by their willingness to resign they favored the desires of the community, and were not working against them. Hirokani's hearing was held on Tuesday afternoon privately by Mr. Cozzens. Apparently no information could be elicited as to the accomplices in the affair of Tada's beating, and it soon became obvious that community feeling was very strong against any private hearings. Cozzens, in order to prevent further outbreaks of ill-feeling and violence decided to hold a public hearing. Unfortunately, I was not aware of this until after it was held. The meeting was held in the Community Council quarters in Camp 1, a "D" apartment, capable of seating perhaps forty people at the most. Cozzens was present together with Williamson, Fredericks, members of the Community Council, the accused, and witnesses. The discussion lasted from ten in the morning until two in the afternoon. The first half hour of the discussion was concerned with the reasons behind Tada's beating. The most pressing issue that was brought to the attention of the administration was that of clothing distribution. It was pointed out that Tada had, as councilman in the Turlock Assembly Center, been in charge of welfare and the allotment of clothing. Either because of unwillingness on the part of the W.C.C.A. to cooperate with the evacuee staff, or because of some political reason, clothing was not properly distributed in the Turlock Center, and Tada was held to blame. Actually, as I later learned from Mr. Terry, the Project Attorney, Tada, in spite of his new position at Gila as Recreation Director had written a number of letters to the W.C.C.A., to Mr. Fryer, to General DeWitt, and to other officials requesting the fulfillment of the promises to the Turlock evacuees that clothing be allotted. In short, Tada has, in the eyes of the administration, at least, spared no effort in attempting to get

proper clothing for his people at Turlock. The remainder of the meeting, after accepting this reason for the time being as the cause for Tada's assault, was spent in attempting to discover some of the reasons for dissatisfaction in the community. The issues brought up involved primarily clothing, references were made again to crowded housing conditions, emphasis was placed upon the lack of sugar in the mess halls, and the fact that little meat was given in the mess halls. Difficulties of transportation and intercamp travel were mentioned, and demands were again made that Issei be permitted to sit in on the Community Council and to be able to hold elective office in community affairs. All of these reasons were advanced in the hearing by witnesses, by details of dissatisfied Issei group, as being contributing factors in the assault on Tada. I am not prepared to say how valid these conditions are. It is hoped that Omachi will submit further material in regard to this affair, inasmuch as he has taken an active part and again and again eloquently attempting to present a true picture of situations confronting the administration to the Issei-Kibei group in Canal. At the hearing, although only forty-odd individuals could crowd themselves into the apartment in which the meeting was held, some 750 people congregated on the outside. The news of the meeting was passed out to the crowd by speakers who would, from time to time, appear and tell those assembled what was going on. General misunderstandings, of course, arose and it became apparent that the hearing was not the satisfactory way to bring the disposition of the hearing across to the crowd. Cozzens, therefore, decided to hold an open mass meeting and to address any member of the community who cared to be present. The meeting was held at 8 o'clock on December 3 in the open-air auditorium in the center of Canal Camp. A representative, appointed by the Community Council--an Issei, introduced Mr. Cozzens in Japanese and commended Mr. Cozzens on his foresight in calling such a meeting. He stated that he hoped that people would understand the reasons behind the calling of the meeting, and hoped that suitable disposition of the problems on hand would be effected to the best of all those who were concerned. He then introduced Mr. Cozzens, the gist of whose speech was as

follows: (The following summary is from my own notes, taken from the speech during the mass meeting.)

The WRA is a civilian agency created in order to remove the feeling in the community that stringent military control of Japanese evacuees is necessary. The WRA exists to serve the community and to do its best to solve the problems of evacuees which arise from time to time. One of the democratic principals upon which this organization is founded is that of freedom of speech, and it is hoped that the evacuee population would take advantage of every opportunity to bring to the administration grievances and problems confronting it. All have an opportunity to be heard and to come to the Project Director with the statement of problems which are troubling them. A statement has been made in Canal community that the Project Director has been stationed in the Butte camp and that he exists only to serve the population there, that those in the Canal community are in the position of orphaned children and do not have an opportunity to speak their minds. This is not true. The Project Director has representatives and assistants in Canal Community to whom requests may be addressed and who in turn will bring such requests to the attention of the Project Director wherever he may be. The Project Director is willing to meet with delegations of evacuees, with representatives of various groups in the community, in order to solve problems which might effect community solidarity or the general welfare of any group of individual within the community. Above all, the Project Director wants to be fair and wants to listen to all arguments, but he does not want to listen to arguments advanced in an attempt to justify acts of violence. The beating has taken place, and whatever the motive for it might have been are no longer justified because of the high-handed procedures which were adopted in attempting to bring difficulties to the attention of the Project Director. An end does not justify a means, therefore, however honest the individuals or groups of individuals guilty of this act might have been in their motives, nevertheless, the honesty of this motive could not now be considered. It was first

essential to mete justice. In the first place, a beating of this kind has definite effect so far as the entire population of the United States is concerned. The implications of the beating have been promised to lead to a general strike. This is further violence and leaves the subject of loyalty of the Japanese in this country subject to question by those outside, moreover, it endangers the position of those Japanese who live outside. Recently, Dillon Myer, National Director of the WRA, spoke at Gila and outlined the general plan proposing relocation for those who could obtain outside employment. A short analysis of Myer's plan included the following; in order to live outside, it was necessary that an individual show that he had a job, or that he could be economically sufficient in whatever community, outside of military zones 1 and 2, he chose. Here was an opportunity for any Japanese to rehabilitate himself and his family in non-prohibited zones. It was an opportunity for the Japanese to show their loyalty to this country and to start in with a new life socially and economically. It was not recommended that the Japanese seeking rehabilitation settle in any one community but, rather, should disperse themselves over the urban and rural communities of the nation. Any act of violence committed within the Center, could disturb or disrupt this program and could mean only that the communities of here, conceived now to be of a purely temporary nature, would become more permanent than had it first been planned. Furthermore, to any others who did not like this country, who did not choose to live here, the opportunity for repatriation to Japan is still open. A definite promise was made that attention would be paid to all requests for repatriation and that those seeking repatriation could still make application. A brief mention was made of the hearing that afternoon in which Cozzens stated that he had called the hearing in order to elicit facts regarding the incident of assault on Tada. Cozzens further stated that the hearing had to him at least, opened a number of issues which he believed inapplicable to the hearing. These issues, now that he had heard those facts, he would judge as they came up. One such instance was mentioned. In spite of the fact that the man

beaten had also associated with community activities, Cozzens confessed himself unable to see the connection of the Thanksgiving Day Carnival to the issue of the movement. Cozzens stated that the administration had given sanction to the carnival because it believed that it was the desire of the community to have such an affair. The Community Council had passed it and a number of groups had appeared before Cozzens advocating it. It is true that in Camp 2 a carnival had been vetoed by the Community Council, but in Camp 1 the desire for a Thanksgiving Day festival was expressed by a number of groups in the community, and the administration had been under the impression that it was the desire of the community to have such a celebration. Cozzens stated that if these groups did not represent community consensus, he would make sure that in the future all such proposals would be more seriously considered by the administration, and if it should be that individuals, or groups of individuals, were not in favor of having such celebrations, that it would not be given the sanction of the administration. A celebration of this kind, together with the clothing issue had been two of the factors that had come out most clearly in the hearing of the afternoon. The issue of clothing will be touched upon in a moment. It is necessary that the community should respect the Warden's organization. If it was the desire of everyone to have a peaceful community in which law and order prevailed, then it was essential that a staff of wardens be continually on the job and that a Community Council be active to further the interests of the community in preserving law and order. The Japanese community of the Pacific Coast in the pre-evacuation period have earned for themselves the reputation of being extremely law-abiding and orderly. If, however, under the duress of evacuation, the consensus of evacuees wanted a lawless community subject to outside control, they could have that too. Cozzens made a very serious appeal to the community to decide just what they wanted.....law and order, or chaos. The wardens as they now exist are there to serve the community. They are not there to ^{be}/intimidated or threatened by dissatisfied groups of individuals. Mention was made of the fact that the ward-

ens in all seriousness did not feel free to carry on the duties of the organization as laid down by WRA ruling. Because of this honest opinion, they had on Tuesday night, as a group handed in their resignation to Mr. Williamson and asked to be relieved of further warden duties. Mr. Williamson refused to accept the resignation of his wardens with the result that they have loyally remained active in the capacity for which they were hired. An appeal was made that wardens have a job to do, that they were hired to do this job, and that they are working for the best interests of the community, remaining as best as they can entirely neutral. Not only the wardens who are mainly men of the second generation, but also all other Nisei who are engaged in constructive project work are subject to the same intimidations by dissatisfied members of the first generation. It is these Nisei who bring food to the mess halls, who work in housing, in the hospital, as teachers, as recreational leaders, and as general protectors of the public. They are trying to work for the good of the community, not against it. Those Issei who work against them, who criticize them, and who threaten them, should feel most ashamed of themselves. They are the older men, the wiser people of the community, and they are the ones who should advise, guide, and control the reins of leadership. Some of them have been a dissatisfied element among the community, and should be severely censured.

One of the issues that came up in the hearing was that of clothing. Cozzens said "here and now, I make a definite promise. Next week at this time, all of those who are enrolled in the work corps will receive their clothing allowance for the months of July and August paid in cash to each worker and to his dependents. From then on, quick steps will be made to make payment for other months worked. It is to be understood that only those who are actively working during these months will receive this allowance. This is a definite promise, and I will stake my reputation on its fulfillment." At the end of this statement, there was a loud applause from the audience which, incidentally, was composed of about 1,000 people. A further statement regarding clothing was issued at this time. Cozzens stated that clothing for those in dire need, regardless of affiliations with the work

corps, had in many cases been distributed. He stated that he had signed over 300 clothing orders, and that this clothing had already been issued to those in need. (Kikuchi can vouch for the untruth of this statement). Cozzens went on to say that some of the difficulties in regard to clothing were not the fault of the WRA, but stem back to the WCCA. He pointed out that he wanted the people to understand that the WCCA is an army agency under army control; that the WRA is a civilian agency under control of the Secretary of the Interior. That the WRA is not responsible for mistakes or cases of maladministration by the WCCA. This is an extremely important point which has not as yet been emphasized to the full understanding of the community. The administration can understand the problems which the people have to face. They realize that as the result of evacuation, problems have arisen which otherwise may never have occurred. The administration can understand some of the heartaches, the troubles that have arisen, however, this may be, violence is never justified. No one may take the law in his own hands and go unpunished. However, great the needs, an individual may not set himself up as the law. In order to make a peaceful community which he is sure everyone wants, it is essential that the Issei, Nisei, and other groups work with the administration. Again, the Issei should be the leaders, and there is no justification for violence. No decision has as yet been handed out with regard to the man on trial. When it is, when the facts of the case have been very carefully considered, Cozzens will issue his decision. This decision will be irrevocable and Cozzens will not be high-pressured by any individual or groups of individuals to change that decision. The decision will be final, but it will come with careful consideration of the facts. Under no circumstances is violence to be sanctioned, and this will be kept in mind by the administrative staff in preparing the disposition of this case. The Issei are the leaders and they should lose the respect of the community at large if they stoop to acts of violence.

Issei and Nisei presented different reactions to Cozzens's speech at its close. It is mentioned above that about 1,000 were present at the mass meeting called. Following the speech by Cozzens, notes were taken by a Japanese interpreter, who, some of the Nisei said, was in favor with the agitators and with the group which had advocated the assault on Tada. Cozzens speech was by far, one of the strongest measures as yet brought out in this community. In translating, it was said that the tone of the speech was somewhat softened, and the points were generally toned down to some extent, so that the severe measures which Cozzens mentioned, were not fully brought out in the interpreter's analysis of the talk. Cozzens had been most eloquent, but the translator read from his notes in a monotonous voice, thus losing the effect in many cases, of the import of Cozzens words. Many of the Nisei who remained for the entire meeting were dissatisfied with the translation. After the translation had been rendered, the members of the Community Council, who had spoken first, thanked Mr. Cozzens in Japanese for appearing before the people at this time, and stating the issues at hand so clearly. It was thought that possibly demonstrations might take place as the result of Cozzens' speech. Advised by Fredericks, he prepared himself for any emergency and had already made arrangements with the Military Police in companies surrounding the camp, and other groups in Phoenix to enforce military law in the contingency of a general strike. It was not known what the effects would be, but on the whole, the speech was well received. The majority of those present were Issei, women were almost entirely absent. Following the speech, the translator, and the speech of thanks by the Council member, the group adjourned in an orderly way and returned home. I had an opportunity to speak to several Issei with whom I was slightly acquainted, and whom I saw at the meeting. They stated that they believed that the speech was too wishy-washy, and did not advocate strong enough measures. To quote one, "Mr. Cozzens waved a big stick, but the stick was not big enough. The group of agitators must be sent out of camp." This is a sentence I have heard expressed on a number of occasions by Issei. The Issei believe that their own numbers can best

be controlled by strong action enforced by the administration, by an unswerving policy which will let all members of the community know where they stand in relation to the administration that they fail to appreciate the needs of the community, and that even though they do appreciate them, their hands are tied by red tape from above. Indecisive policy has made for many misunderstandings in the community. The Issei, however, in accordance with what some term as "Japanese psychology" are willing to submit to powers of authority. Many of the Nisei, realizing that the speech was addressed to a group of agitators, and toward some of the Kibei who had participated in the mass action of agitating against the administration, could adopt a more objective attitude towards Cozzens' talk. Many said that it was about time such issues were brought out in the community, but they criticized Cozzens' despotic attitude. Many said that if such remarks were directed at them, their first feelings would be one of rebellion and resentment. A rather significant problem is brought out here, I think, in that the clear line of demarcation between the two generations is shown. The Issei are willing to subscribe to the powers of authority above them, while the Nisei, on the contrary, feeling themselves to be loyal Americans, resent despotic attitudes; thus, it is necessary to adopt a dual application in handling problems of such kind. It is virtually impossible to be high-handed with one and not offend the other. An aspect of community development presents itself here which has not, as yet, been touched upon, and concerns the marked reactions of the two generations towards instituted authority. The speech was apparently successful in that it was successful in dispersing what during the afternoon had been an angry group. The result was apparently that the community was ripe for a settlement of the problem today. The hearing of the afternoon had given rise to series of impassioned speeches and haranguing of the assembled people. The psychological implication of Mr. Cozzens's speech is marked in that it showed that the Project Director was willing to take a hand in the hearing and in appearing before a crowd of people to discuss an issue which was uppermost in the minds of everyone. Mr. Cozzens' appearance and speech had a definite

effect in assuaging angry mob feelings. A new development took place this morning when some of the leaders of the protestant group were brought together with the men whose names they had placed on a blacklist for assault. Tani, one of the leaders of the recalcitrant group, was brought face to face with George Kawahara and Joe Omachi, and they all shook hands. Thus, ostensibly, the matter is settled, but still the issue of the case has not been decided. A good deal will hinge upon the sentence passed on the accused man, Hirokani, whose punishment is still under consideration by Mr. Cozzens. Of course, it should appear obvious that the punishment of the accused should be a matter of formality and that he should be subject to the usual punishment and penalty for assault and battery as prescribed in the laws of Arizona. A number of issues are to be considered, however, before the sentence can be passed. This afternoon, I spoke with Mr. Terry, the Project Attorney, who has been handling the prosecution of the accused man. The point has been to determine aside from the reasons behind the assault, the complicity, not only of Hirokani, but also of those who were ring-leaders in bringing about the attack on Tada. Terry is convinced that Hirokani is absolutely innocent of the beating in spite of his admission to the contrary, and in spite of his claims of the ownership of the broken club with which Tada was beaten. It begins to appear that though the man in question was persuaded to submit himself as the assailant in the case, it may be that he was present at the beating and thus was identified by Tada, but it appears as though five or six assailants are involved. Unless the truth of the matter can be learned, and the others, both ring-leaders and accomplices can be apprehended, there seems little doubt that the community will have some justifications for further mass actions and demonstrations of dissatisfaction. There is a good deal more to the case than appears in the case. Terry believes that it may very well be that the confession in this case is only a means of promoting further dissatisfaction in the community, and that the administration must proceed with extreme care in ascribing a punishment for this individual.

Tada's reticence concerning his assailants is also puzzling. Tada himself has an unimpeachable record, but the odd thing is that Hirokani himself has never been shown to be guilty of any agitation or to be linked with groups of agitators. These aspects of the case are extremely puzzling. It seems that though an effort is made to trap the administration into making a mistake, thus providing for further dissatisfaction. It is hoped that Omachi can supply some of the answers to these puzzling questions raised by Mr. Terry, who has followed the case virtually from the beginning. Obviously, certain pertinent information is being withheld by the parties concerned. The existence of another group was mentioned by several people today. This is a so-called "Study Group", in other words being apparently a translation of the Japanese corresponding term. This study group, composed of Issei and Kibei, in both camps is said to have been organized for the purpose of furthering the welfare of the Issei and Kibei, and it is to this group that the beatings are attributed. In Camp 1, this group is said to have over 500 members, while in Camp 2, a similar number has been reported. Some further questions regarding the reality and functions of this so-called Study Group may elicit some more exact truths about it.

The rumor was circulated today that Francis Fredericks, assistant chief of Internal Security had resigned his position because of the failure of Cozzens and Korn to support him in his stand, demanding postponement of the proceedings against Hirokani until such time after the full consensus of the community opinion could be determined. Cozzens apparently came to an agreement with Fredericks point of view after a time, but Fredericks felt that he was not getting the support of the administration in his stand, and the divided administrative picture might have only furthered disharmony in the community. I have not as yet had an opportunity to confer with Fredericks, who has been to the study, at least, an excellent contact and source of information. I say rumor that Fredericks resigned--if the rumor be true, I should not be surprised inasmuch as Fredericks has repeatedly complained

about the failure of his superiors to offer support to his actions. Rumor in the community, at least in the Butte camp, is now widely circulated.

The last statement made in this report on December 4th was the statement to the effect that Fredericks, assistant chief of Internal Security, had resigned. The rumor came about as the result of the hearing of last Thursday afternoon when Fredericks aided by his chief, Williamson, had accused Korn and Cozzens of interfering in the prescribed sphere of the Internal Security Division. There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the Internal Security Department had been, in Cozzens' mind at least, worthless with the result that Cozzens and Korn had sought to handle the affair with the exclusion of representatives from the Internal Security Department. Full details on this matter will be elicited shortly. At any rate, during the hearing, Fredericks had denounced Korn for his interference in demanding an immediate hearing of Hirokani. As it is shown above, if an immediate hearing and sentence had taken place, a general strike had been called for by the recalcitrant group composed, as mentioned, of Issei and Kibei. A number of cases of interference by Korn in matters affecting Internal Security was mentioned by Fredericks, and the Project Director was accused by him of not placing sufficient trust in the abilities of the heads of the Division of Internal Security. Fredericks, in this meeting, offered to resign if his department, and he especially, as handling the Tada-Hirokani case were not given full authority to act. Cozzens apologized to Fredericks and left the disposition of the case entirely up to him reserving only the right to pass sentence on Hirokani. Fredericks, therefore, elected to stay although the rumor as to his resignation was quickly circulated. Fredericks is actually far more popular than Williamson and has built for himself the reputation of one who approaches a problem with an open and unbiased mind, and also as one who has the best interests of the community as heart. Williamson's

reputation in the community, and with the administrative staff as well, is bad because of his penchant for failing to commit himself in any issue and to take a firm stand in the issue.

Cozzens' speech had the effect, now that several days have elapsed and the sentiment of the community is better settled, of preventing to some extent the outbreak of mass violence. In general, the community was surprised to learn that at any time they could have the ear of the Project Director. Such a Project Director as Fryer had kept himself somewhat aloof much to the general dissatisfaction, particularly the first generation. When it was understood that the Project Director was willing to meet with representatives of any groups in the community, provided they had not first undertaken acts of violence, the surprise among the Issei was fairly general. It had been thought that the Project Director was unapproachable. Some said, however, that the effect of Cozzens' speech was ruined because he stated that here in the Relocation Center, people were getting three square meals a day. The complaint in this respect is touched on more fully by the report submitted to the Project Director on the whole Tada case by the Internal Security Department. I have been promised a copy of this report and shall submit it upon receipt.

After due deliberation, sentence was passed on the offender, Hirokani. The fact, as mentioned above, that several days delay had taken place before sentence was passed, was instrumental in preventing the outbreak of a general strike similar to that of Poston. It is mentioned above that Cozzens had arranged for the Military Police to take over in the event of a general strike, and the result may well have been a situation similar to that broadcast over the air today as having occurred at Manzanar. After due deliberation, sentence was passed; Cozzens decided that Hirokani would be sentenced to one month in jail, and be placed on probation for five months thereafter. He was removed to the Florence County Jail on Saturday to begin his sentence. The question arises, not fully elicited here, as to the actual guilt of Hirokani and the reasons for his participation in the act of

violence which had such a marked effect on the community. In my discussion of Friday, I see that I have mentioned what is called the "Study Group". The Study Group, or Investigating Agency, is a literal translation of Kenkyu-Kai, a group formulated by Issei and Kibei in Camp 1. Not a great deal is known by the administration regarding this group. It is an agency with Issei and Kibei membership, and it is said to have 580 members in the Canal Camp. The purpose of the organization is to investigate the conditions of the camp and to recommend ways in which conditions of housing, mess operations, the mess halls, general community welfare, and the like, could be improved. Actually, from an ideal point of view, such a group composed of Issei, and working primarily for the welfare of the Issei, could be considered desirable. The methods chosen by this group to enforce demands are, unfortunately, those of agitation and of intimidating of Nisei charged with the carrying out of tasks. Convinced of their group's solidarity, they have not hesitated to single out unpopular individuals for assault in order to enforce their demands and to bring them to the attention of the administration. To my mind, at least, this is the motive behind the beating of Tada. Not only was Tada unpopular, but he had been mixed in with the distribution of clothing in the Turlock Assembly Center, and the general consensus was that he had been guilty of mal-administration. This explains why, I think, Hirokani was willing to accept the blame of five or six individuals with whom he had been associated in the assault of Tada. He felt that he had the backing of the Kenkyu-Kai group. The administration, still unaware of the activities of the Kenkyu-Kai, is somewhat at a loss to understand Hirokani's willingness to admit complicity in the affair and the organization in the community for calling a general strike. The formation of such a group is perfectly logical because many Issei do not feel that representation by the Nisei is justified, and because many wish a voice of thier own in handling community affairs such as representation in the Community Council and the like. They have organized this group so as to present a communal front designed for the investigation of conditions affecting the Issei, and giving to them a measure of control in community affairs

Hitherto, the Issei have exerted a definite control in the community, but they have done this on the basis of disorganized disapproval of the Nisei factor involved. The cultural differences between the two groups are so marked that Issei do not feel that they can trust their destinies or welfare to the second generation. Because the majority of the first generation must face the linguistic handicap, they have chosen these means of agitation in order to explain their desires and needs. The parts in Camp 2 demanding representation of the Issei by elective office in the Community Council, is another example of this pent-up feeling. It is unfortunate that few of the dissatisfied Issei and Kibei individuals in the community have been successful in gaining control of Issei feeling in the community. In the meetings of the Kenkyu-Kai, which apparently take place not in masses but rather in small groups, these individuals have been able either to distort or color facts in such a way that their own advantages and prestige would be served. This investigating group has, therefore, been one of the agencies in Canal Camp successful in formulating of popular sentiment and opinion. Kenkyu-Kai organization has not taken place in Camp 2, but there is definite agitation for it; for example, representatives of this organized Issei group have appeared from time to time in Camp 2 and have discussed the matter of such an organization with individuals with whom they think would be interested. In Camp 2, it is hoped that the Kenkyu-Kai can become as active an agency as it is in Camp 1. Over the past week, notices written in Japanese, were posted on each mess hall bulletin board stating that a meeting of the Kenkyu-Kai committee was to take place, and that the group was to be organized with the idea of promoting fair play for all in the community. The Community Council in the Butte Camp has an Issei advisory board composed mainly of Issei leaders in Camp 2. They are opposing the formation of a Kenkyu-Kai, on the grounds that Issei, not fully understanding the issues at hand, are inclined to go off on a tangent in suggesting solutions to problems confronting the community. As an alternative, they suggest that the Issei be kept better informed of conditions not

only in camp, but also on the outside, through the medium of a larger Japanese section in the newspaper and by written and translated bulletins and declarations from the Project Director. Feeling against the administration has not been so intense in the Butte Camp because the administrative buildings are here, and the Project Director and his staff are more readily accessible. Canal Camp people feel cheated and somewhat left out of things. There may be some truth in this contention, because certainly most of the administrative attention has been focused on the larger settlement of Butte. With the appointment of LeRoy Bennett as Project Director, Cozzens has suggested that the chief engineer, Firman Brown, may, now that the problems of construction are nearly settled, be appointed Deputy Project Director for Canal Camp, and that with added personnel, the two camps may under one Project Director function autonomously. The general consensus is that Bennett is coming in at a very bad time, and the Issei Kenkyu-Kai group will endeavor to test him as to his strength of character. Kenkyu-Kai membership seems to be pretty much of a passive thing, but its control is invested in a few individuals who, by talking with members of the group whom they know to be loyal to the cause they have in mind will support in their actions, thus Hirokani, Tada's assailant, felt that he had the group behind him when he confessed to the complicity in the affair. The committee, heading the Kenkyu-Kai, is not fully known, but apparently is made up of individuals who are dissatisfied Issei who speak no English. One of the delegates of the group was a man named Mr. Tani who was from Concord. Tani does speak English and for this reason acted as spokesman for the faction defending the accused. Tani is unpopular with some of the Issei who have acted as advisors to the Community Council. Tani is a graduate of Waseda University in Tokyo. Mr. Miura, also a graduate of Waseda, was enlisted by Cozzens as spokesman and interpreter for the administration. Miura, because of his wealth and social position, is very much respected by his fellow alumni of Waseda, and for this reason, there is little doubt that he was able to affect a reconciliation between Tani, spokesman for the Kenkyu-Kai, and such men as Omachi, acting as prosecutor

attorney, and other Nisei who have taken an active part in leadership of the community. Thus a good deal of the trouble, the threat of general strike, and the like, has been for the time alleviated. The spirit of the community is still such, however, that the tension, as a result of the affair, has not decreased, and there seems little doubt that before a short time, it will break out again. Much depends on the character of the new Project Director, Mr. Bennett.

There is one unfortunate aspect to the situation which as yet must remain a secret. The administration is anticipating the selection of a number of individuals whom they regard as agitators and as having pro-Japan sentiments. It is recommended that these individuals be selected by a number of Issei in the community and that they be arrested and be sent to an internment camp. Tani is one. In Camp 2, Yamamoto and Ando, mentioned by me in previous reports, are also to be removed. It is unfortunate that a man like Miura, himself exceedingly anxious for power, is willing to denounce to the administration certain individuals whom he considers as his political enemies. When he is successful in having these men removed from the community, there is no doubt that he will be able to assume more of an autocratic role than he has been prevailed to do so far. It is perhaps my own fault that Miura has been able to ingratiate himself to the administration because of his cooperation with me in the study, I had always recommended him highly to members of the administrative staff....having thus brought him to their attention, they have used him as an interpreter in a number of instances. He controls a political sanction of Issei, which, it is true, brings order into the community. It does not seem likely, however, that by removing his political enemies in this way, namely, persuading the administration that to remove the agitators would bring harmony in Gila, would not effect this because of the already large following of the Kinkyu-Kai. If the people called agitators are interned, it will be through the persuasion of Mr. Miura. On the whole, it seems likely that further groups of this kind would arise no matter how many individuals were thus forcibly removed from the community. It should be rather the policy of the administration to understand and placate the groups involved.

If Miura's policy is followed, it is to be feared that only increased dissatisfaction will result.

Already the Kenkyu-Kai is backing Hirokani's action and are attempting to make something of a public hero of him. Over the week-end, a petition was gotten up by the wives of dissatisfied Issei of this group and circulated around every block. This petition was to be signed by the wives and mothers of the community, and stated that Hirokani had been unjustly dealt with, and that his sentence was too severe. The women brought the petition around all day Sunday, and it is understood that the tactics they employed were those of pure gangsterism. In short, they had simply knocked on a door and would not go away until the person called upon had signed the petition. Many signed in order to be rid of the petitioners, thus any such petition does not represent community consensus. Cozzens, moreover, is adamant in his statement that he refuses to reconsider once he has passed on his decision. He is satisfied, however, in the respect that Hirokani is the leader of the anti-administration faction, but he believes that the extenuating circumstances are such that the sentence should not be too severe. He, therefore, has recommended only one month's imprisonment. He has stated that no community pressure, no threats, or demonstrations will cause him to change his mind, and indeed, it seems likely in view of the arrangement he had made with the Military Police in the event of a strike.

A strike, if it were called, was to have assumed rather serious proportions. The wardens learned that the canteens in Camp 1, the Community Service block, were to have been set afire by a specially picked group in the event of a general strike. The canteens, unpopular with many Issei, have rarely, up until now, been mentioned, but I learned that one of the policies of the Kenkyu-Kai was directed strongly against the canteens for reasons similar to those advanced for the Issei stand against these services at Tulelake. This group has suggested in its informal meetings that scrip be issued as in the Assembly Centers. Scrip was touched upon in Cozzens' speech in the mass meeting, but the increased salary in the Relocation Centers are supposed to compensate to the issuance of such scrip.

The function of the so-called Kenkyu-Kai has already been to some extent described and enough of the aspects of this organization have been shown to point out that this appears to be a group behind the conditions of unrest and dissatisfaction which seems, at the moment, to permeate this Center. Naturally, the analysis of this group is not too well depicted for the reason that not everyone in the community, including the administration, is fully aware of the subsistence or the implication of the group. Certain leaders, or at least certain spokesmen, for the Kenkyu-Kai are known to the administration, and it was mentioned previously that these individuals who are known are to be interned as the result of their pro-Axis sympathies. Coupled with the desire for Issei eminence in the community, is the plan for Issei political control. Much has already been made of the petition which was circulated recently, which was designed to allow the Issei to hold elective office in the community. Now that the Kenkyu-Kai seems to have a fairly large following, there seems little doubt that a repetition of agitating for Issei office-holding will take place. Feeling of unrest at Gila has not died down, in fact, it seems to have been accentuated by the reports of the Manzanar incident which have come in by radio. It is apparent that the leaders of the dissatisfied Issei faction are not at all concerned over the unfortunate Manzanar situation and that they are only waiting for such a time as seems to them suitable to participate in another hectic period such as occurred here during the last week. In accordance with the newly organized policies of the WRA together with the Department of Justice and the military in reporting pro-Axis activities and in doing actual espionage work against Japan which would be of aid in the war effort, certain individuals have been marked for internment, among them are this man Tani mentioned previously as spokesman for the Kenkyu-Kai, S. Ando, whose activities also have been mentioned as being concerned with agitation for Issei office-holding, and Otajiro Yamamoto, whose sentiments against the Nisei have also been described. There seems little doubt that within a short time these men and others of alike status in the community will be apprehended, taken away

from their families, and interned in the regular enemy alien Internment Camp of Fort Lincoln, Lordsburg, Santa Fe, and others. It is odd to note that feeling in the community is pretty well divided as to the justice of this measure. Ostensibly a secret, and known only to the administration and to the wardens of the Internal Security Department, it is unfortunate that the news has already spread through-out the community, at least among the Nisei, many of whom support the deportation of such men. Others have argued that this procedure of ridding the community of these individuals is neither democratic or fair. In their own way, they believe themselves to be working for the best interests of the community however reprehensible their application may be. Naturally, Nisei sentiment is strongly directed against Issei control, and the matter of Issei office-holding is still a sore point with many Nisei, even though the National Offices of the WRA have come out with a stand directed against this measure. Williamson, as head of the Internal Security Department, is at the moment engaged in doing investigative work to obtain a list of individuals who are regarded as dangerous to the community welfare. Thus far, he has elicited only a few names of individuals who are obviously not the leaders of the Kenkyu-Kai movement. Such a man as Hirokani, who participated in Tada's beating, is obviously only a tool in the hands of the Kenkyu-Kai leaders, and confessed to his complicity in the affair because he believed that community sentiments, at least backing of his organization, would condone his act. Who the leaders in the movement are is not known either by me or, apparently, by the members of the administrative staff. Tani, as spokesman for the group in Camp 1, is apparently a leader, but must share leadership with a group of his contemporaries. He has been chosen as mouthpiece simply because he knows both English and Japanese. It seems that to rid the community of the lesser agitators at this time is only to call down more trouble of a similar nature, to bring about dissatisfaction and unrest, and to work harm to community morale. However justified or unjustified, such measures on the part of the administration may be, it seems, nevertheless, that a successful move against what the administration chooses to call agitation, cannot be made unless

the group is fully studied and understood. I do not agree that to rid the community of these individuals will be a measure to affect good feeling here. Yesterday, I had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Korn, assistant Project Director, on the subject of the unrest in the community following the Tada beating. Korn had taken a stand demanding immediate action against the assailant in this case, but Fredericks and Williamson of the Internal Security Department had been opposed to immediate action by the administration feeling that mass violence would result on a scale similar to that at Poston and Manzanar. As mentioned above, the general strike had been planned. Rumor has it that some of the Kenkyu-Kai people had entered into correspondence with strike leaders at Poston on the technique of handling mass action of this sort. At least it is known that groups of men were delegated to enforce the strike when it occurred, and the proposed burning of the canteens had been mentioned. Naturally, the strike spirit had not penetrated into the Butte camp, but there seems little doubt that the feeling is contagious and that already there is cooperation between the more recently organized Kenkyu-Kai in Butte, with the similar organization in Canal where the unrest has been predominant. The resistance by the Internal Security Department that no action be taken immediately was so strong that Korn and Cozzens were prevented in their demand that immediate action be taken against Hirokani. They were dissuaded from this taking of immediate action because of the fact that five or six other assailants of Tada had not as yet been named. When it became clear that Hirokani was willing to take the blame for all, and that the names of the other assailants could not, after much work, be elicited, Korn and Cozzens demanded that the hearing be held and that the offender in the case be sentenced. Williamson and Fredericks were bitterly opposed to this and it was they who were instrumental in bringing about the mass meeting before which Cozzens addressed the dissatisfied group of Issei. Korn believes that each case of this kind is one designed to test the administration. The community in making a demand have enforced it in the way proposed by the Kenkyu-Kai. The beating of Tada is, according to Korn, simply a demand for bargaining power. The

Internal Security Department, in granting to the populace this bargaining power, Korn feels, made the administration lose face. He is of the opinion that if a general strike is going to occur, that it would have occurred with the delay on the part of the Internal Security people. Korn believes that the administration should be firm but not necessarily harsh, and conceives that the more bargaining power the dissatisfied Issei are allowed, the more stringent will their demands become. With such a situation in the administration, and this situation being apparent to the people involved in the case, it becomes obvious that the administrative officials must lose a certain amount of their own prestige in the eyes of the community for their indecision. It is far more fitting that the administration, even though divided in its attitude on this affair, should have taken a firm and united stand. The lack of unification in the formulation of administrative policies, the petty jealousies which have arisen among the administrative staff, witness the matter of Korn versus the Internal Security Department, does not enhance peace in the community because it shows the administration to be undecided and wavering, a situation which seems to be the design of group agitation here. I suggested the above to Korn, but he is convinced of the inability of the Internal Security Department to see the matter his way, and he and Cozzens will not yield in favor of the opinions of either Fredericks or Williamson. That further trouble may be expected becomes obvious over the issue at hand, and the lack of regularly formulated administrative policies. Today, Wednesday the 9th, LeRoy Bennett arrived, and has five days in which to meet the staff and to become acquainted with the situation here. On Monday Cozzens will leave, and Bennett will assume control. Bennett has obviously not handled any kind of settlement before, with the result that he may be hard pressed to render adequate decisions regarding the life of evacuees here. Since the evacuees are apparently in the habit of testing each new administrator as to his strength of character and firmness of decision, it seems obvious that Bennett coming in at this time especially, will be placed on a spot before the community.

The new organization will be, as mentioned above, inclusive of a Project Director to head both camps. In Camp 2, the larger camp, there will be an assistant Project Director and division heads, and in Camp 1, a Deputy Project Project Director, Mr. Brown, already having been delegated to this post, with division heads there will make for dual camp autonomously. Analyses of the new administration set up will follow shortly as the policies of the new Director becomes apparent.

The matter of the blacklist which was drawn up by the Kenkyu-Kai against certain Nisei here is subject which requires some emendation. In the initial pages of this report, the blacklist was described, and the list of names was mentioned partially. Five names were given but not in proper order. I received notice of these names as a result of hearsay, but through Mr. Miura was privileged to see a copy of the list which had come to his attention. The names of those to be beaten as the result of their unpopularity with the Issei group are as follows: Takeo Tada, Mr. Y. Yahanda who has acted as head of housing in Camp 1 almost since the inception of that camp. He has been active in the Community Council; as an advisor in pre-evacuation times, he was very much respected because of his contacts with the Japanese community. He has been one of the Issei patrons of the J.A.C.L., a graduate of the University of California, he had been employed as advisor and welfare worker by the Japanese Farmers' Association, and had had numerous agricultural contacts prior to evacuation. Because of his pre-Nisei stand, he had met with disfavor from among his contemporaries. The third name on the list was that of Dr. William Furuta, bacteriologist in charge of sanitation in the camp, who had been elected chairman of the temporary Community Council. The fourth name was that of the police captain Yonezu. The fifth, the attorney Joe Omachi, the sixth Tada's assistant Goro Yamamoto; the seventh Yahanda's assistant, George Kawahara. Then followed the names of other Nisei holding jobs relative to employment, outside leaves, clothing welfare, and the like, but all of these names did not figure importantly in the list, rather the seven individuals listed above were those against whom Issei feelings were directed. It has come to my attention that a

similar list has been prepared by the Kenkyu-Kai in Camp 2. The source of information of such a list is an Issei with pro-Nisei sentiments, and the formation of such a list may be merely rumor. It does not seem unlikely, however, that the patterns followed by the dissatisfied group in Camp 1 should be reflected in Camp 2. Political issues, that is the attempt on the part of the Issei to obtain elective office for themselves, comes out clearly in the recent disruptions of the Community Council in Camp 1. It has already been mentioned that the wardens there, as a group, elected to resign, thereby showing their sentiments to be in accord with those of the community at large. Furuta, president of the Community Council in Camp 1, requested that his councilman there take a definite stand against the action of the group sponsoring Tada's assailant. The majority of the councilmen, not wishing to be identified by the community as hostile to the best interests of the community, chose to resign rather than to carry out Furuta's suggestion. Feeling that they are too much under the domination of their Issei parents, and of the Issei leaders in the community, these Nisei acting as councilmen, like the wardens, do not wish to have the spite of the first generation directed against them. Furuta on learning of his position on the so-called blacklist, publicly denounced the responsible Issei, stating that the procedure was not only wrong but unfair to the community at large, and to the reputation of the Japanese in this country. Yahanda, in this same meeting which was held Friday in the presence of Mr. Cozzens and the membership of Japanese including the dissatisfied Tani faction, stated that he agreed with Furuta, and both stated that no amount of pressure could take them away from directing their efforts toward what they believed the best interests of the community. In spite of their stand, the resignations of the Nisei councilmen continued to mount. Kern, in his statement to me, said that in his frank opinion that he did not believe a community of this kind to be capable of self-government. The factions in the community are too clearly diverse. The Kibei siding with the Issei are also opposed to Nisei leadership. The Nisei, who have thus far been intimidated and

otherwise frightened by Issei ambition for political control, do not wish to serve as councillors. The Community Council has thus far, with the exception of one or two individuals such as Furuta, been unsuccessful in dictating community policies. It is rather the counsels of Issei delegates from each block which make up the individual block councils who are active in bringing about the community demands, and in exercising control over community government. These block councils are the true guiding political factors here, the result is that Nisei councilmen feel themselves to be ineffective. They are intimidated by their elders, and are unwilling to serve as governing agencies. It has been suggested that the Issei citizens, namely the ex-servicemen in the community who were born in Japan (there are about 27 such Issei citizens here), act as councilmen, and it may possibly be that if they are placed on the Community Council they may succeed in holding the reins of leadership destined by the administration for the Nisei governing body. Some suggestion that the ex-servicemen take over community leadership has been made several times, and, indeed, if these men can be persuaded to run for office, there seems little doubt that their election might well follow. They, too, are unpopular with the general run of Issei. In my own discussions thus far, I have attempted to avoid the matter of loyalty of the Issei as a generation here in the community. Unfortunately, it begins to appear that some recognition of the pro-Allied sentiments, and pro-Japan feelings must be given. The ex-servicemen are outspoken in their pro-American sentiments. They have been active in demanding flags and flagpoles for both camps; they have sponsored the organization of a Boy Scout troop, and above all, they are concerned over the matter of enlistment in the Japanese Language School of the United States Army. On the last day of recruiting by Major Gould of the Language School, they gave a farewell banquet to those who had enlisted as students. The Kenkyu-Kai and the Gila Young People's Association, are to some extent, pro-Axis naturally, most Issei want to avoid mention of Japan as an enemy since their sentiments are for their home country. A group of agitators here, possibly the leaders of the Ken-

kyu-Kai, are most anxious that Japan should be victorious in its war effort, and there seems to be attempts on the parts of these individuals, although how marked I cannot say, to discredit those whose sympathies are with this country. There seems to be a marked conception on the part of these men, of returning to Japan in the post-war period, thus they do not seem to be concerned over the welfare of the Japanese who expect to remain in this country. Thus, there is considerable manifestation of ill-feeling towards the ex-servicemen who are obliged to remain apart as a group. If nominated for the Council, it might be however, that a unanimous Nisei vote could see them elected. The matter of patriotic loyalty will be discussed more fully presently. There are one or two aspects of the Tada case, however, which should be mentioned here. Tada was sufficiently discouraged by the beating he received, and by the sudden outburst of unpopularity which greeted his efforts to be of benefit to the community, that he resigned. The other Kibei, Goro Yamamoto, who had acted as his assistant in the CAS in the recreation section, chose to hand in his resignation, too. The CAS finds itself without adequate Japanese representation in Canal Camp. It is interesting to note the accusations which were brought against Tada as the result of Thursday's hearing. First and foremost, of course, was the issuance of clothing, and this matter has already been discussed to some extent. In the Turlock Center, it was said that Tada was working hand in glove with the Project Director, Penella, who is now alleged to be standing trial, or incarcerated, for misappropriation of WCCA funds and supplies. Among other things, it is said that he directed a carload of sugar to be set aside for his own use. Also Tada was charged as councilman with the issuance of clothing in the Turlock Assembly Center. Rumor has it that he was given a sum of money to spend on evacuee clothing, and that \$1,000 of this money is as yet unaccounted for. On good authority, it may be stated that \$1,000 is unaccounted for, but it seems most unlikely that Tada could have appropriated this money for his own use or pocketed it. The accusation, however, persists that this is the case. At the same

time, Tada has been most active in attempting to bring about the distribution of clothing for the Turlock evacuees. One odd aspect of the case is that Tada does not wish, or is unable, to name his assailants with the exception of the one man, Hirokani. It was said of Tada that he attempted to flatter Issei and Nisei alike and to make them conform to the rules laid down by administrative policy. Tada made application to leave as an instructor in the Army Fort Savage Japanese Language School. Although the trainees in this school have been enlisted and have already gone to Minnesota, the instructors are still awaiting the arrival of a Colonel Rassmussen to this camp so that definite word as to their appointment may be forthcoming. Actually, the school does not begin until the 15th of January. It was said that Tada was most anxious to get students to enlist in the Army school pretending that he himself was going there. He is going there, but not as a student, but the community at large does not understand the set-up of the school. Inasmuch as public opinion is directed against service of this kind, no attempt has been made on the part of the Issei to understand fully what the school is, or what it is trying to do. Agitation against it in the community has been strong with the end result that all are conceived to enter as students. Tada, it is felt, has betrayed the young men who did enlist in the school and merely pretended that he was leaving. This was the consensus of the community and this matter was brought up in the hearing. Other instances of this kind were cited to show Tada's unpopularity and his attempts to betray the community at large. The Community Activities Section, CAS, is handled in Camp 1 by Gaba, who is now hard put to find Japanese assistants to replace Tada and Yamamoto. He is confronted with the problem of choosing an Issei to act in this capacity while his superior, Hoffman, has already an Issei in Camp 2 to act in an advisory capacity on recreation. Many Nisei were bitterly opposed to the selection of first generation people for Community Activities, since the Nisei especially regard this sphere of recreation as their own and feel that Issei are incompetent to handle Nisei recreational problems. Issei opposition to dances, to love-making, and the like, by Nisei are cited as examples.

The Kibei group, however, supports the selection of Issei as service chiefs. Throughout the whole problem of the disturbances of Gila, the Kibei group seems to hover in the background and to be behind, in part at least, the activities of anti-Nisei-anti-administration Issei. Throughout the disturbances it became obvious that the Nisei are not so much at variance with the Issei as they are opposed to the Kibei. Issei attempts at domination of the community meet only passive resistance on the part of most Nisei. The Japanese pattern of filial piety is borne out pretty well in the Issei-Nisei relationship. It is when the Kibei stand behind the Issei against the second generation that difficulties break out. As has been mentioned, a Kibei group has already been organized in Camp 2 under the name of the Gila Young People's Association. Because in Camp 1 the Kibei chose to start what they called a Kibei Club, Gaba did not feel free to condone their efforts or to grant their requests for recreational facilities. In camp 2, however, the organization is strong, and because it is presumably open for membership to everyone in the community, Hoffman, the director of Community Services, has felt that some recognition should be given them. Accordingly, he permitted the Gila Young People's Association, which up until now had been meeting in the Buddhist Church, to have a recreation hall, and as its official debut in the community, it was permitted to sponsor a Hobby Show. This Hobby Show was cause for much argument between a committee headed by the president of the Gila Young People's Association, George Yamashiro, and Mr. Hoffman, Community Services' director. Yamashiro said that his group wanted to have the Hobby Show over the week-end ending Monday, December 7th. It was obvious that the date December 7th was chosen in commemoration of Japan's entrance into the war; in fact, Yamashiro admitted this. Hoffman utterly refused this request, asking that the Hobby Show be terminated Sunday, December 6. The Hobby Show had considerable success, the items shown were indicative of various pursuits in the community, particularly of the polishing and arrangement of the so-called ironwood; decorated pieces of ironwood together with various kinds of furniture, crochet, knitting, sewing, artificial flower-making,

and the like, were exhibited. The group of Kibei-Nisei in charge bustled about the mess hall in which the exhibition took place, acted as guides and salesmen, and conducted all transactions in the Japanese language. The hobbies exhibited were tagged with the exhibitors' names written always in Japanese. No English whatsoever was used. Many Issei were very pleased to have their work exhibited this way. The exhibition was such a success in fact that it was found necessary to continue it for two additional days. Yamashiro, on finding that Hoffman did not want December 7th to be commemorated in this way, asked that the exhibition be closed Sunday night and be reopened Tuesday morning, thus also succeeding in calling attention to December 7th. At Hoffman's request, it was decided that December 7th would not come in for any special attention, but that the Hobby Show would remain open Monday and Tuesday and would close on Tuesday night. According to Yamashiro's plan, Monday was to have an off day, and the exhibition was to have remained open Tuesday and Wednesday. A meeting of the Kibei Club was called for the evening of December 7th in the exhibit hall after the doors had been closed to the public. Naturally, what went on at this meeting is debatable, but observers say that Japanese martial songs were sung and there was apparently more attention paid to preservation of the pro-Japan spirit. I do not mean to convey by this that the Kibei Club as such has been founded for the purpose of expressing pro-Axis sentiments. It is singular to note, however, that on the evening of December 7th, the Kibei group chose to have a celebration in the hall granted them for the exhibit which they were sponsoring. It is not to be implied that the general membership of this club has pro-Japanese attitudes; the leaders, however, are known to be pro-Axis, and certainly George Yamashiro, who is the guiding force behind the club, has been outspoken in his praise of Japan and in his own desire to return to Japan in the post-war period. Yamashiro is about 25, his home was in Santa Maria but he has spent most of his life in Japan, also, he attended a university in southern California until recently. He is head, not only of the Cila Young People's Association, but also of the Young Buddhist Social Club. The fact

that he has been able to push himself into the leadership of these two groups indicates that he is somewhat of a power in the community. His name in Camp 2 has often been linked with Otajiro Yamamoto and S. Ando. He is quite active in the social life of the community. It may be, and indeed has been suggested by some, that he is one of the powers behind the formation of the Kenkyu-Kai in Butte Camp. Then, too, it has been suggested that he is merely a front for dissatisfied Issei spirits in the community who are suing him because of the control he can exert in his own group. It is difficult to delineate his position. It is obvious that he is seeking and has considerable prestige. On the morning of December 7th, a Japanese flag, homemade, was found on the butte near Camp 2, placed there for all the community to see. It is said--I did not see the flag--that a white cloth was colored with a red circle of mercurochrome to denote the imperial flag of Japan. The administration took the view that the flag was placed there by school boys acting on the instigation of their elders. When the flag was visible, however, school boys took it down very indignant about the whole thing. Williamson has taken the stand that some Issei arranged for the placing of the flag by their youngsters; however, coming as it did on December 7th and the fact that ^{the} Kibei were having their own Hobby Show at this time and were quite excited about it, lends some credence to the belief expressed by a few that the Kibei are behind the erection of this flag. This again is rumor and conflicts with the administrative view. Naturally, it will be impossible to determine who placed the flag upon the hill. That the Kibei are rising as a factor in the community becomes apparent from the success which greeted their Hobby Show. Now that official recognition has been given them, it seems likely that Gila Young People's Association will operate in both camps, and that the Kibei Club of Camp 1 will become part of the association. Closely allied with the Kibei Club of Camp 1 is the Issei Engaibu, the dramatic club founded for the purpose of putting on Japanese productions with Issei talent. Tada had also been opposed to the formation of the Engaibu in Camp 1 and had only reluctantly agreed to the use of the

open-air facilities by this group. The Engaibu had been given recognition by Gaba, and Tada, as CAS representative, felt obliged to attend the meetings. He had addressed a meeting of the University Club and had gone to the Kibei Club for an address there, when the two were discussing joint use of facilities. On the same evening of his assault, he had attended a meeting of this Engaibu Issei dramatic club, and it was on leaving this meeting, that the assault took place. It is noteworthy that the Engaibu receives the direct cooperation of the Kibei, and that Kibei are included in the list of membership; thus, Kibei, Engaibu, and Kenkyu-Kai are close linked in Camp 1 and have a solidarity of spirit which makes them a most powerful group. One of their chief purposes is the promotion of Issei office-holding. Kibei may be behind the beating of Tada and may be the directors of the Kenkyu-Kai in Camp 1; furthermore, in Camp 2 the Kibei group is stronger and better organized and also is linked with the Kenkyu-Kai although an Engaibu group has not as yet been formulated in the Butte Camp. The question might justly be asked as to how an Issei Dramatic Society could obtain any kind of control in the community. The Issei find that the expression of Japanese culture may be well retained by dramatic expression, and many Issei leaders, or at least men of repute in Canal Camp, have joined with the Engaibu. The possibility that the dramatic club may be the front for the Kenkyu-Kai is not to be denied. It is my own belief based on observation of the Kibei and of the Issei groups which I know that the administration might look on the one hand to the Kibei group and on the other to the Engaibu group for the malcontented leaders. But now that the Tada affair is pretty well settled, punishment has been meted out to the offender, on the surface at least, the situation has been settled. In the meantime dissatisfied Issei elements continue to clamor for a general strike and there seems little doubt that the first instance of anti-Issei feeling, demonstrations will bring out a situation here which is similar to that of Manzanar and Poston. The parallel developments of dissatisfaction, culminating in the beating of some individual who is unpopular, the ensuing arrest of the offender, and the general strike, seems to

be one which will have further effect, and which will be followed out more fully not only in this but in other Relocation Centers as well. Military control here would undoubtedly mean tragedy as it meant at Manzanar, but it is so far as I can see, impossible to prevent so long as the WRA continues a hit-and-miss policy of indecision and weakness. It seems obvious that trouble is brewing at Gila, and for the first time since the inception of the Project, a deplorable and ugly situation has come to light which cannot be brought to an end until some understanding of the evacuees' problems can be reached.

This is my analysis and description of the situation. It is not, of course, complete but will be amended and supplemented by me as further developments take place. Coverage from different points of view will be given by Kikuchi and Omachi. The above information is so closely linked with administrative policies that a further analysis of the functions of the administration at this point should be given. It is hoped that such an analysis can be presented shortly. I may be wrong, but it is my own observation that there is something rotten in Gila.

January 1, 1943

Notes by DSW

The Tada Case

[The Tada case at Gila is far more significant than the mere "incident" of the beating of a man against whom certain grudges were held would suggest. Its roots go back, not only to the Assembly Center period, but probably to the days before evacuation. It repeats a pattern found in Poston and Manzanar. In it are reflected the various group conflicts which have been intensified by evacuation and isolation, namely Issei versus Nisei, pro-Japan versus pro-America, evacuees versus administration, rural versus urban, one assembly center versus another, educated versus less educated, etc. The marginal position of the Kibei is brought into strong relief. The roles of individuals in assuming leadership, in inciting mass action, in pacifying and in compromising are sharply focussed. To understand this situation completely and to prepare the ground for studying its aftermath, the following outline of a report is suggested:

1. Chronological account of the "incident" from the beating to the incarceration of one of the assailants.
2. Background of the "incident"
 - a. The groups of evacuees involved in the conflict
 - (1) History of their development at Gila
 - (2) Assembly center antecedents
 - (3) Pre-evacuation antecedents
 - b. WRA policy bearing on the incident
 - c. The roles of individuals connected with the incident
 - (1) The victim
 - (2) Other "blacklisted" persons
 - (3) The apprehended assailant
 - (4) Other possible assailants
 - (5) Agitators
 - (6) Pacifiers
 - (7) The project director
 - (8) Other Caucasians
3. Conflicting interpretations of the incident
 - a. The "Turlock grudge" interpretation
 - b. The "anti-administration demonstration" interpretation
 - c. The "pro-Axis" interpretation
 - d. Other possible interpretations
4. Summary and evaluation and open questions.]

Most of the raw data out of which such a report could be developed are at hand in Omachi's, Spencer's and Kikuchi's reports and notes. These need to be reorganized, coordinated, supplemented and checked for inconsistencies.

Starting with Omachi's report, I would ask the following questions if I had no other notes and reports at hand:

- pl. What sort of persons were Tada and Hirokane? Issei, Kibei, Nisei? What of their pre-evacuation history: occupation, social status, family status, where did they come from, what were their political activities?

Under what circumstances was Hirokane apprehended. Who informed on him? What part did administration play?

Was Tada beaten after the meeting of the Engei-bu? Significance of this meeting? Conflicts at this meeting? Composition of the group at this meeting? (Issei, Turlock crowd, etc.)

p.4 More of Tada's history in Gila is needed. It is noted that he worked in the Welfare Department at Turlock, but apparently went over to Recreation at Gila. Any explanation of this?

p.3 and p. 5. Have you a copy of the Turlock memorandum re cumulative allowances noted on p.3? Of the announcement by WRA noted on p. 5? If not, can you reconstruct them or give more detail?

p.6 Approximate timing of the demonstration at Turlock?

p.7 What was the "administrative policy", exactly, that you refer to in lines 1 and 2?

Can the "charges of favoritism and neglect" be made more specific? By whom were these charges made? Nature of the "more recent rumors"?

What "others" attempted to help Tada?

p. 8 More detail needed about the Gila Kenku-Kai. Composition of group? Political affiliations? Issei, Nisei or Kibei? From what areas? Have you a copy of the black-list? Can you tell something of the background of each of those included on it? Nature of the dissatisfactions with each of those blacklisted on the part of those preparing the blacklist?

Who was the "newspaper man"? Give something about his background.

p.9 Give more details about the hearing of December 3. Who were the witnesses? Nature of the evidence? More detail re grievances that were aired.

p.10. Can you give more about the rumors re others to be beaten up? Who were they? What sorts of charges were brought against them? Etc.

p. 11 Who were these "women supporters", What worts of coercive tactics were used?

p. 12. Can you obtain a copy of the notice sent to Cozzens? Who were the signers? From where? etc. Details of the plan proposed?

Proceeding to Spencer's report, I find answers to some of the questions noted above. There are, however, some discrepancies between ~~the~~ details in the two reports, and some points which should be checked by Omachi and perhaps by others.

~~xxx~~ Is the Kibei group described by Spencer the same as the Engei-bu mentioned by Omachi?

Spencer's interpretation of motives differs from Omachi's. The latter emphasizes the "urlock troubles; the former points to anti-administration gestures. Can this be analyzed more completely? Can other individuals be asked to give their interpretation, e.g. Miura, Hikida, etc. These opinions should all be represented, with careful annotation of the source. Also, from Spencer's report, Caucasian interpretations should be isolated and identified.

Spencer gives details re the first five on the blacklist. What organized group actually prepared the list? How did it get in the hands of the administration? Can the whole list be obtained and a more detailed analysis of the background of the persons given?

Spencer was not present at the open meeting of Dec. 4, but Omachi presumably was. Omachi should check and supplement Spencer's statements re this meeting.

Spencer suggests that Cozzens' speech was mis-translated and "softened". Can this be verified, and can more details be obtained? In the follow-up, were the promises Cozzens made about clothing allowances etc. actually fulfilled?

Omachi should go over the questions raised by Mr. Terry, which Spencer notes, and build up as much of the background as possible.

Spencer should make an immediate effort to get the official report of the case which was submitted by the Internal Security Department to the Project Director.

Proceeding to Kikuchi's journal, Kikuchi is in a particularly favorable position to get the reaction of the JACL crowd to matters of this sort. On Dec. 1, Kikuchi suggests another possible motive for the beating up, i.e. Tada's activities in cleaning up the gambling ~~xxxxxxx~~ Kikuchi also reports that Tada had previously been threatened and had to be rescued from a meeting. This point should be clarified.

On Dec. 2, Kikuchi reports that a Nisei group organized to get the assailant. This should be included in the general analysis. CK also has some good expressions of opinions in regard to the mter. These too should be included in the report.

On Dec. 4, CK gives some of the rumors re the case. And on Dec. 9, the attitude of the administration is brought out very clearly in his interview with Williamson.

In summary, I suggest that Spencer, Omachi and Kikuchi get together and plan a reorganization of the report, make a division of labor, and check up on the points I have brought up and any others that may have come to their attention. The three, working together, have a unique opportunity to produce a highly significant document, Omachi with his Turlock background, and his close connection with the legal staff; Kikuchi with his ability to sound out various elements of the population, and particularly to build up the whole story of the JACL reactions and relationships with the whole situation; and Spencer, who is able to get so much inside information from the Caucasian and administrative standpoint.

Joseph I. Omachi
Gila

February 1, 1943

Notes on Spencer's Report of the Tada Incident

Among the factors thought to be the motives behind the Tada beating considerable weight seems to be given by Spencer to the Kibei in Canal Community, particularly in regard to their presumed connection with the Kenkyu-Kai group. I am of the view that such an analysis of the situation is somewhat far-fetched and tends to brand the Kibei group at Canal somewhat unjustly.

One of the first members of the Temporary Community Council at Canal to resign from his position was Minoru Okamoto, who is now the Chairman of the Gila Young Peoples' Association of Canal which has recently received administrative recognition from Mr. Gaba. This organization is composed principally of Kibei members, both men and women, although membership is open to all young people. Okamoto is well-liked and has a considerable following among the members as well as among a number of Issei and Nisei. He is a Meiji graduate of considerable talent and ability and is working in the C.A.S. as head Judo Instructor. He also makes frequent stage appearances playing the harmonica and is always applauded as a favorite entertainer by reason of his skillful renditions. He is about 30 and is a man who acts and speaks with great firmness upon the basis of his honest convictions.

Okamoto's reasons for resigning from the Council represents a viewpoint which is subscribed by a number of Kibei at Canal. As he lives in the same block I have had many occasions to discuss various matters with him. He is outspoken and sincere in the belief that Tada had been earnestly endeavoring to do good for the community

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and that there was no basis for criticizing him, let alone assaulting him. Although there are many who have expressed the feeling that Tada's beating was wrong or too severe, a number of persons have, as an afterthought, come out with the statement that Tada's mannerisms were reprehensible or that his attitude was too condescending. Okamoto, however, has always maintained an attitude of unreserved defense in behalf of Tada and is broad-minded enough to see that any such criticisms as to personal characteristics are not only untrue but also definitely unfair and out of place. He has often expressed scorn as to the Kenkyu-kai group and their ideas and methods of operation. As to Tada's attitude in reference to the organization of a Kibei club, he feels that there was ample justification for Tada's stand in view of the attempts of Yamashiro's Kibei followers to foster their program of activities upon the Kibei of Canal Community. Okamoto also feels that the political activities of the Kibei group at Butte are wrong and improper.

In view of the fact that Tada, a co-member of the Council, has been singled out for unjust criticisms and a beating, Okamoto has expressed the view that the act should be regarded as a direct blow to the entire council as a body and as a public expression of lack of confidence in that body, whether or not such expression is that of a minority group within the community. On this basis he felt that the only proper course for the Council to follow is to resign as a group with a request that a re-election of members be held. To do otherwise, he opined, would not only be considered as an act of dishonor to Tada himself, but also the Council as a governmental

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instrumentality would suffer loss of prestige in the community and would suffer ridicule and derision. He further pointed out that it would be a shame for the council to continue and to follow a wishy-washy policy of trying to follow a middle course, as the Tada matter is one which cannot be ignored or compromised without a definite and clear-cut decision.

Upon these grounds which he had expressed to the Council, Okamoto had immediately resigned early in December. As few weeks passed and his prophesies began to come true, about four other Councilmen among the 16 members of the Council, followed suit and also resigned. Among them was the Chairman, Karl Iwanaga, an attorney from Los Angeles and a veteran of the last war. There is no question that the Council has lost prestige since the incident. The Issei Block Chairmen Board, although unofficial in nature as to organization, has gradually made inroads into the functions of the Temporary Community Council.

Okamoto's views as to the Council is typically Japanese, although the English governmental system is somewhat analogous. The Premier of Japan and the Prime Minister of England, together with their respective cabinet members, are subjected to resignation and re-shuffling as a result of incidents arising out of possible lack of confidence in their policies. The American system, however, is quite different and resignations are generally not contemplated during the term of office. The Temporary Council, being elected by residents who are over 16 years of age to serve until the permanent Council is elected under the provisions of the Constitution now being considered

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presumably follows the American pattern. However, due to the general lack of experience in governmental affairs among the Japanese; and particularly among the Issei, there is a wide divergence in the views of the people as to the propriety of different courses of action. Niseis being reared under the American system and concepts of government, are more inclined to adhere to American views and practices. As a consequence, most of the Council members were not too impressed with Okamoto's reasoning and have continued to act as members. This basic division in concepts has, however, resulted in a material weakening of the Council as a body and its importance as a community organ has diminished.

Although Okamoto's ideas as to the Council are in sharp contrast to those of the general run of Niseis, I have no doubt as to his sincerity of purpose and I am of the opinion that as chairman of the Kibei group at Canal, he will have considerable control over the group in guiding their activities along a more harmonious course than that followed by the Kibei group at Butte. Okamoto is better educated and has^a much saner attitude than Yamashiro. He also has cabinet officers who are more in conformity with the Nisei outlook than is ordinarily attributed to Kibei groups. Their views often conflict more with those of the Issei group at Canal than with those of the Niseis and it appears that they will be of mediating influence for good in the community under their present leadership.

As to whether the Kenkyu-Kai group has had Kibei membership and support seems questionable. I have not personally heard of any but if there were I do not think that they can be considered representative of the Kibei group at Canal. It appears that the Kenkyu-Kai

Omachi
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leaders and members were principally disgruntled Issei organized to give vent to their feeling of frustration and dissatisfaction arising out of the fact that practically all of the key positions at the project under the administration were being manned by the Nisei and Kibei. Rumor was rampant that all of those who were holding \$19.00 jobs at the time of the incident were going to be forced to resign and if they refused they would be "properly taken care of". All of those assertedly on the so-called blacklist were either Nisei or Kibei, with the exception of Mr. Yahanda an Issei who was considered pro-American. It seems that the principal contention of the Kenkyu-Kai was that the younger element in the community were being given positions of responsibility out of proportion to their ability and experience and that these positions should be filled by more capable Issei workers.

It is plausible that this contention of Nisei and Kibei incompetence had its origin and took shape on the basis of accusations against Tada in regard to the Turlock clothing matter. The principal charge against Tada appeared to be that he had not been sufficiently persistent enough in demanding the basic clothing allowances for the Turlock evacuees. The feeling was prevalent that as Japanese were forcibly ousted from their homes by the government, they should be unscrupulous about getting all they can and that in this regard the Issei would be more capable of doing so.

This struggle for power on the part of the Kenkyu-Kai group has also manifested itself in a different form, less drastic than resorting to threats and violence but more subtle in nature. This was their persistent efforts towards obtaining administrative approval

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for a separate newspaper for Canal Camp with the intent of placing Tani in charge as editor. Such a move, if successful, would be a powerful factor in moulding public opinion, especially among the Issei as a whole, and would be of considerable value in their bid for power.

Prior to evacuation to Turlock Tani was the editor and publisher of the Rafu-Shimpo, a Los Angeles Japanese-American daily newspaper of wide circulation and has had considerable newspaper experience. Since coming to Gila he has been connected with the Rocky Nippon, a semi-weekly Japanese-American newspaper published in Denver, Colorado. His capacity is that of local reporter and distributor and is receiving good commissions from the sale of the paper at both camps of this project. Sales are made by about two or three newsboys working from block to block shouting their ware.

Assistant Project Director Korn and Assistant Community Service Director Gaba, both of Canal, have been approached on numerous occasions for a separate newspaper, but they have so far rejected the proposal. The various Block Councils and the Block Chairmen Board, all composed of Issei membership, have approved the plan. However, the Temporary Community Council, the only officially recognized representative body, has not as yet sanctioned the matter. It appears very unlikely that it will ever^{be} approved by the administration especially in view of their knowledge that Tani and the Kenkyu-Kai are involved.

All of these activities, however, have tended to place Tani into the limelight and it is likely that as a consequence of such activities the sales of the Rocky Nippon have gained considerably during

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the past two months. Tani appears to be maneuvering his forces in a very clever and subtle manner in order to gain recognition and fatten his own purse.

What might be termed as the crowning achievement in this regard was the dinner given by Tani on January 5, 1943, at Mess Hall 7. Personal invitations from him were extended to selected members of the administrative staff and evacuee residents. Messrs. Korn, Gaba, Williamson and Fredericks were present, the latter two being the Director and Assistant Director, respectively, of the Internal Security Department. Among the evacuees who were assertedly on the blacklist indicated in Spencer's Report (p.40), Charles Yonezu, Goro Yamamoto, George Kawahara, and I were present at the dinner. Dr. Furuta and Mr. Yahanda were invited but declined to attend. Yonezu and I were ushered to the head table to sit with the administrative personnel and with Black Chairman Omai and Japanese editor Ogasawara of the local paper. There were approximately 150 guests from both camps, including about 20 women and everyone came quite well dressed.

Tani gave a short welcome address in Japanese. He merely stated that he was very glad that so many of the guests were able to attend, that he hoped they would all enjoy the dinner and program and that we might all become better acquainted with each other. He announced that he was pleased to welcome everyone in behalf of the Rocky Nippon and asked that they eat heartily and enjoy themselves. Mr. Korn was asked to say a few words. Korn stated that Project Director Bennett had asked him to express his regrets that he was unable to be present, and announced that the new administration office building for Canal

Omachi
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8.

will be ready in a short time. He indicated that responsible officials in every department will always be available to assist and discuss all individual or group problems. He expressed the hope that Canal Camp residents will thus be given adequate service and attention.

An amusing and paradoxical incident of the dinner itself was that several bottles of whiskey were placed on each table. The bottle labels all indicated well-known American brands but Tani smilingly came to the head table and poured the drinks saying, "Have some Japan tea". This project being on an Indian reservation, the liquor had of course been smuggled in by various means and sold to residents at exhorbitant prices. There appears to be considerable uncertainty as to whether the fact that the W.R.A. is in charge of the project could be construed to nullify the federal law against transportation and sale of liquor within Indian reservations. In order to get into the project area, however, it is first necessary to travel through the grounds of the Pima Reservation and there would be a definite violation of law in carrying any liquor into the project.

The main course of the dinner itself was fried chicken, a delicacy which had never been served at any time either at the assembly center or at this project. Mock turtle soup, pineapple and cottage cheese salad, vegetables, fruits, apple pie, jello, soda water and coffee supplied the trimmings. A long and drawn-out program of entertainment followed, interesting at first but rather exasperating towards the end when many excused themselves and walked out. The entire affair lasted from about 7:30 to about 11:00 o'clock at night and ended without any more speeches.

J. Omachi
Gila

Hirokane, Tada's assailant, who had served his 30 days at the county jail and had just been released the day before, was present at the dinner. He was being greeted by Tani and his friends but not a word was said in his welcome address about Hirokane or the Tada incident. The dinner was apparently meant to be a good-will gesture to forget the past and to cement better relationships with the administrative and evacuee leaders. It appears to me, however, that the dinner was a clever publicity stunt for Tani's paper and a move for general community recognition.

Recent weeks at Canal have been very quiet. Nothing has apparently taken place that might indicate that Tani or the Kenkyu-Kai has been attempting an organized activity of any kind. Although the matter of the cooperative enterprise has been a subject of general community interest lately, the Tani group has not attempted to take a stand or to exert its views on the matter. In fact it appears that the Kenkyu-Kai group have actually disbanded as they had previously promised to do. I have not heard of any discussions or group activity on their part in reference to any political or community problems. It seems also that general community sentiment has turned against anything that portends of mob rule. It is hoped that this situation will continue.

It is my opinion of the Kenkyu-Kai group that their activities in connection with the Tada incident were motivated by dissatisfaction engendered by the Turlock treatment and spreading to an organized mob resentment against Nisei and Kibei leadership in the community. I do not feel that it is quite fair to brand their activities and motives

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as being pro-Axis in nature, although their sentiments might be so directed. The fact that alleged pro-Axis trouble-makers at Manzanar and at Poston have been apprehended and interned for a hearing before the Enemy Alien Hearing Board appears to indicate that this project might be also affected. However, if Tani and others who might be considered as leaders of the Kenkyu-Kai were to be similarly apprehended and interned, the results might be unfortunate as far as this community is concerned. It is probable that considerable ill-feeling would follow and the lives of many persons in the camp would be made miserable as a result of such action.

November 30, 1942

EXTRA
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Memorandum for the File

Subject: Takeo Tada, age 34, Assaulted by Chota B. Hirokane, age about 45, 7-11-D

At about 9:30 P.M. this date, Takeo Tada, 8-1-C, was struck on the head and left arm by a heavy ironwood cane, about three feet long and about one and quarter inches in diameter, wielded by Chota Hirokane, 7-11-D, near the entrance of Mess Hall #5 in Canal Community. Both men had attended a meeting of the Engai-bu Dramatic Society in this mess hall and were in the act of leaving this meeting when the assault occurred.

Leo Fukuzawa and Takagi, officers of Canal Community Wardens' Office, were patrolling this area at the time and upon observing the disturbance in front of the Mess Hall #5, ran to the scene of the assault. They observed about five or six persons around Tada, who was lying on the ground, and these persons ran in the general direction of Block #7 and #8. The officers pursued them but were unable to apprehend these persons or to identify them.

Tada was taken to the hospital by Fujikuni, 4-9-C; Asanoma, 4-1-BC; Otani, 3-2-B; and was attended by Dr. Iki. Three stitches were required to close the wound on Tada's head and X-rays were taken of the head and left arm.

Officer Takagi found the cane mentioned above in front of 6-14 by the firebreak between Block #8 and #7 and turned it in to this office.

Information was received that Chota Hirokane, 7-11-D, was one of the assailants; and Captain Yonesu and Officers Shoji Hiraga and Bob Miyamoto went to Hirokane's home and brought him to the Wardens' Office for questioning.

D. C. Johnston, Associate Director of Internal Security, and myself were summoned and questioned Hirokane. He readily admitted having assaulted Tada with the cane described above. He stated to us that he had heard that Tada was to attend the Engai-bu Dramatic Society in Mess Hall #5 and that he went there with the premeditated plan to assault him. He identified the cane as being his property and said that he brought it to the meeting from his home. He stated that he was solely responsible for this act and was ready to go to jail. He claimed that he did not like Tada because an incident regarding clothing allotment while at the Turlock Assembly Center. He stated that he fully realized the gravity of his act and that he had carefully considered his position before committing the assault. He further stated that he felt that he was doing the

FSFrederick:mm
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

EXTRA COPY

-2-

November 30, 1942

Subject: Takeo Tada, age 34, Assaulted by Chota B. Hirokane, age
about 45, 7-11-D

community a service by sacrificing himself in this manner for the
purpose of gaining recognition of the people's grievances by the
administration.

After this interview with Hirokane, it was decided to release
him upon his own recognizance pending further investigation.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

F. S. Frederick:mm
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

December 1, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane (Additional Information)

Reference is made to the report regarding the assault of Takeo Tada by Chota B. Hirokane on the night of November 30, 1942.

Preliminary investigation indicates that this incident is most complicated, involved and serious. The administration, community government and the Internal Security are in a most delicate position and this matter should be investigated very thoroughly before any definite action is taken.

It is believed that this matter is much more serious than it appears on the surface. This assault was not committed impulsively, but rather is the result of a carefully worked out design. Just what is hoped to be gained by this action is not too clear at this writing. It does appear, however, that it is not merely a case of one person assaulting another but that it is a strategic plan to further some cause common to the majority of the people. Hirokane's eagerness to play the role of martyr and his extreme confidence in the wholehearted support of the population should be carefully investigated. His attitude and demeanor is regarded as a clue to the real issue or issues at hand.

Therefore, it is recommended that Hirokane be arraigned before the Project Director today and that the case be adjourned for a few days or a week until proper and complete investigation can be made. The defendant can be released upon his own recognizance. It is further recommended that publicity be given this matter briefly stating that Hirokane was arrested for assaulting Tada; arraigned before the Project Director; and that the case has been adjourned for one week pending further investigation. The purpose of such publicity is to:

- (1) Keep the people informed as to what happened and what is being done.
- (2) Nip in the bud all rumors that might arise out of this incident.

In conclusion, emphasis is placed on careful investigation of this matter to ward off or prevent the occurrence of any general disorder such as recently took place at the Poston Relocation Center.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

EXTRA COPY

December 1, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Takeo Tada, age 34, Assaulted by Chota B. Hirokane, age
about 45, 7-11-D (Additional Information)

Reference is made to the investigation reports regarding the assault of Takeo Tada by Chota B. Hirokane on November 30, 1942.

A conference was held with Director of Internal Security, W. E. Williamson, late this afternoon and D. C. Johnston, Associate Director of Internal Security; Ben Fukuzawa, Probation-Parole Officer of Canal Community Wardens' Office and myself were present.

The findings of the investigation of the assault of Takeo Tada were discussed and the information and recommendations as described in my report written earlier today were verbally submitted to Mr. W. E. Williamson.

By order of the Director of Internal Security, we informed Chota Hirokane, the defendant, at his residence at 7-11-D to be ready at 8:30 A.M. tomorrow at which time he would be taken to Butte Community for a hearing before the Project Director. The plan was to confer with the Project Director before the defendant was arraigned and to advise the Project Director as to the results of our investigation up to this point.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

F. S. Frederick:mm
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

EXTRA COPY

December 1, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane (Additional Information)

Reference is made to investigation reports regarding Takeo Tada being assaulted by Chota Hirokane.

It came to our attention this evening that petitions were being circulated among the people protesting against the conviction of Chota Hirokane, defendant, and also for the removal of Takeo Tada, victim, from the office he now holds.

Investigation revealed that house to house canvassing was being conducted and that about 90% of the adult population had signed these petitions. It was further discovered that the Block Managers were being visited by large groups of persons and that a general meeting of block representatives were to be held at 10:00 P.M. in Mess Hall #5. A proposal for a general strike was to be discussed and to be effective tomorrow morning. Plans were being laid for a large group to be gathered about the residence of the defendant to prevent or protest against his removal from his home to the office of the Project Director for arraignment. Another large group was to march in a body from Canal Community to Butte Community at 7:00 A.M. tomorrow to congregate around the office of the Project Director for the purpose of preventing the defendant's being taken to jail if such was the decision of the Project Director. It was also learned that at least four other Japanese persons were to be assaulted. Certain individuals were heard to say that they would shut off the water mains, set fire to the canteen and other buildings, cut off power and communication lines. In general, the situation was regarded as most grave.

Mr. Cozzens, Project Director, was notified of this condition and it was decided that the arraignment of the defendant be postponed indefinitely. The defendant was notified of this change of plans at about 10:30 P.M.

Apparently this news was relayed to the meeting of the Block Representatives in Mess Hall #5 and was greeted with applause and cheering, according to our information.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

December 2, 1942

EXTRA COPY

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane (Additional Information)

The strategic move of the Project Director in postponing the arraignment of Chota Hirokane bore fruit in that the general strike ordered for this morning was called off.

A conference was held in the office of the Project Director this morning. Project Director, R. B. Cozens; Assistant Project Director, L. J. Korn; Director of Internal Security, W. E. Williamson; Dr. William Furuta; Ben Fukuzawa, Probation-Parole Officer of the Canal Community Wardens' Office, and myself were present.

The matter of Chota Hirokane assaulting Takeo Tada was discussed and it was decided that he be arraigned before the Project Director at some future time and that the defendant and the group championing his cause be notified that:

1. They be prepared to present facts in behalf of the defendant.
2. They be further prepared to present any grievances they may have against the administration before the Project Director but that this meeting would be entirely separate from the arraignment.

W. E. Williamson, Director of Internal Security; Ben Fukuzawa, Probation-Parole Officer; and myself went to the home of Kiyoshi Tani, 7-7-B, to relay this information. A few representatives of this group were present and were pleased to be given such consideration. They stated that they could not possibly be prepared for the arraignment until tomorrow morning and that any time after that they would await the pleasure of the Project Director as to the presentation of evidence in Hirokane's behalf. There would be about fifteen persons present - one representative of each block. They also stated that in order to compile their grievances regarding administrative functions that they would not be ready for several days and that it would be necessary to call a mass meeting tonight to gather this material. They promised that in return for this consideration that they would guarantee that no strikes or general disorder would take place pending negotiations to settle these grievances. It was especially noted that their attitude toward the Project Director was most favorable and that they held him in high regard for being so fair and understanding of their problems.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

December 2, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota E. Hirokane (Additional Information)

At about 2:30 P.M., I received a telephone call in Canal Community from Assistant Project Director, L. J. Korn, telling me that it was the desire of Mr. Cozzens to have the defendant, Hirokane; John Kono, who notified Takeo Yada, the victim, that his presence was requested at the meeting of the Engai-bu Dramatic Society on the night of the assault; and three or four representatives of the defendant brought before him at once. I asked about the purpose of this meeting and was told that Mr. Cozzens wanted to talk to them.

Mr. Fukuzawa, upon being notified of this sudden move, notified me that he was severing his connections with the Internal Security Department and that he would have no part in such an underhanded deal.

In the meantime, Mr. Korn came to Canal Camp and notified me that Mr. Gaba, Acting Assistant Chief of Community Services, had already picked up two of the representatives and that he wanted the name and address of the defendant so that he could take him before Mr. Cozzens. He told me to pick up two or three more representatives and bring them before Mr. Cozzens. I informed him that these people had told us this morning that they could not possibly be ready for an arraignment until tomorrow morning and that it did not appear to be good judgment to suddenly call this hearing. Mr. Korn took me to the Administration Building in Canal Community and contacted Mr. Cozzens by telephone telling him that these people did not want the arraignment until tomorrow morning, but did not explain to Mr. Cozzens the reason for their wanting it delayed. Mr. Korn proceeded to the home of the defendant after he left me at the Warden's Office.

At this time Mr. W. E. Williamson, Director of Internal Security, came along and he was acquainted with the developments in this matter. We proceeded to Mr. Cozzens's office hoping to be able to explain why the hearing should not be held this afternoon, but found upon our arrival that it had already been started. We sat through the hearing and it was decided that the arraignment be continued in Canal Community at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow in 16-10-D. Mr. Cozzens emphasized the fact that there would be no mass meeting held tonight.

An appointment was made with the project director for 7:00 P.M. tonight, and Mr. Williamson, and myself conferred with Mr. Cozzens at this time and the problems of the circumstances surrounding the incident of the assault of Yada were discussed. It was decided that:

1. The people in Canal Community be instructed that the hearing or arraignment to be held tomorrow morning was solely for the purpose of fact-finding.

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

December 2, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane

(Additional Information)

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2. There would be no sentence meted out tomorrow because the project director wished to study the case thoroughly before disposition of the defendant is decided.

3. The project director would address the public in Canal Community tomorrow night at 8:00 P.M.

Mr. Williamson and myself saw to it that the above listed information was circulated among the people and again contacted the group championing Hirokane's cause, relating this information to them. It was especially noticeable that the first question put to us after delivering this information to them was, "How do we know we can trust Mr. Consens?" This change of attitude toward the project director can only be attributed to the fact that they felt they had been tricked in the matter of the arraignment being called so suddenly this afternoon. They also lost some confidence in the Internal Security Department in that they felt that we were the agents of the project director and had either taken part in this treachery or had lacked enough influence to stop the commission of this "sneak play".

It is believed that these people blame Mr. Korn, Assistant Project Director, and Mr. Gaba, Acting Assistant Chief of Community Services, for the underhanded move since they were refused the use of the stage for a mass meeting by Mr. Gaba and that shortly after this refusal the unexpected hearing was held. A statement made at the hearing by Mr. Gaba, when mention was made about their being refused the use of the stage, strengthened this fixing of blame. Mr. Gaba said, "That's what you are now here for", intimating that this hearing was called because they had asked for the use of the stage for a mass meeting. It must be born in mind at this point that this proposed mass meeting was to secure or compile data regarding complaints or grievances of the people to be later presented to the project director and that the presentation of this data was at the invitation of the project director. The emphasis laid on the fact that there should be no mass meetings further convinced them that Mr. Gaba had influenced the project director and had contributed largely to the calling of this unexpected hearing.

It should also be stated here that a mass meeting was held in spite of the instructions of the project director at the arraignment that there should be no mass meetings, and in spite of the fact that Mr. Gaba had refused permission to use the stage for this purpose.

This group told us that they would try to prevent disorder and strikes from occurring until after the hearing to be held in Canal Community tomorrow, but could not guarantee this because the people were incensed by the underhanded treatment of the administration.

(P ending)

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

EXTRA
COPY

December 3, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane (Additional Information)

Large groups scattered about Canal Community were observed this morning and as the time for the arraignment neared, the crowds increased in size and in number. There was no strike this morning.

The hearing was conducted in an orderly, business-like manner. Evidence and testimony was submitted by the Internal Security Department for the prosecution and the defendant was given every opportunity to submit any evidence and testimony in his behalf.

There was no disorder reported and things seemed to be at a standstill awaiting the talk to be given the people by the project director at the mass meeting scheduled for 8:00 P.M. this evening.

(Pending)

F. B. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal
Security

FSFrederick:mm
cc/P roject Director
D. G. Johnston

December 4, 1942

EXTRA
COPY

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane (Additional Information)

The talk given by Mr. Cozzens at the mass meeting in Canal Community last night was the topic of the day among the evacuees.

Reactions were varied and it is difficult to definitely say at this writing just what the majority of people think about the talk.

The main complaints heard about it were that:

1. The Japanese translation of the talk was poor in that it was weak and incomplete.
2. The remark about the evacuees remembering that they got three square meals a day here is said to have spoiled the whole speech. Resentment of this remark was felt in that they say that being brought to the relocation centers was not at their request; that the government was obliged to provide these meals for them since the government instigated the evacuation and is charged with the responsibility of caring for persons held in such custody; that they were removed from their homes at much personal sacrifice and that the losses incurred by them as the result of such evacuation is not their fault; that they were productive residents before the evacuation and were able to procure three meals a day through their own efforts until the government caused them to lose their jobs, businesses, etc. All this because of the remark regarding three meals a day that the government provided.

At this writing it appears to be the opinion of the majority of the population that Chota Hirokane be given probation rather than jail sentence. Just what the reaction will be if he is incarcerated is not definitely known at this time. The time that has elapsed since the assault has resulted in a definite cooling-off of the intense feeling that existed a few days ago.

(Pending)

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal Security

FSFrederick:mm
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston

EXTRA
Copy

December 5, 1942

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Chota B. Hirokane Taken to Pinal County Jail at
Florence, Arizona

At about noon today, the above captioned subject was taken to the Pinal County Jail at Florence, Arizona, by Fred J. Graves, Associated Director of Internal Security, and myself.

He is to be incarcerated for a period of one month.

Hirokane was arrested on November 30, 1942, for assaulting Takeo Tada and was sentenced to six months in Pinal County Jail by Project Director, R. B. Gozzens. He is to serve one month in jail and will be on probation for the remaining five months.

A receipt for this prisoner is attached to this report.

F. S. Frederick
Associate Director of Internal
Security

FSFrederick:MM
cc/Project Director
D. C. Johnston