

May 2, 1942

The Honorable

The Secretary of Agriculture

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In the last few weeks, the policies to be followed in evacuating and relocating the Japanese citizens and aliens from the West Coast have pretty well crystallized. In the belief that State and County War Boards will want to know ~~so~~ about these plans, I am preparing this short report for you. The relocation program will, of course, have a considerable effect on agricultural production, now on the Pacific Coast and later in the States where the relocation projects are to be situated even though only about 25 percent of the families are engaged in agriculture.

The farm labor shortage in a number of States--especially in sugar beet areas--has brought a great number of suggestions that Japanese evacuees be made available immediately for agricultural work. This need for beet labor is recognized, but unfortunately it would be very difficult to utilize the labor of evacuees for this purpose in the planting and thinning season.

For one thing, the actual evacuation has barely begun, and furthermore our experience thus far indicates that it will not be possible to interrupt the orderly process of evacuation, for the purpose of supplying labor to distant points, without disrupting the whole program. Your people on the War Boards will be interested in the steps that must be followed to move the evacuees from their present homes to their war-duration homes.

The able-bodied workers among the evacuees will enlist in a War Relocation Work Corps. The enlistees will go to work subjugating

theland for irrigation, producing food and war goods, constructing such necessary community facilities as schools, stores, etc. They will be eligible, as members of the Work Corps, to do public work outside of the relocation center if proper safeguards can be provided. The enlistees will be granted furloughs to enter private employment, if the prospective employers and the State and community officials can meet the necessary conditions that will be determined. They would return to the relocation centers at the expiration of the furlough period.

The relocation centers will be military areas under the protection of the Army. Since the Army cannot afford to have too many troops engaged in such guard service, a lower limit of 5,000 people to the community has been set. To establish communities smaller than this would present too large a guard problem. It is expected that 15 to 18 communities of from 5,000 to 20,000 persons each will be established to meet the problem involved in handling alsmot 120,000 people.

One more thought before I close. I find there is^a tendency to look upon the evacuated Japanese as a much larger potential agricultural labor force than they actually are. Figures I have seen show this sort of a picture: One-third are first-generation Japanese who average almost 60 years of age. The second generation are young people, averaging less than 25 years of age. Nearly one-third of the total are under 15 years of age. On the basis of this rough figuring there are about 40,000 men and women of the second and third generations who are over 15 years of age. It it is borne in mind that a large proportion of the people of working age will be occupied in the management of their community business life (doctors, nurses, school teachers, cooks, waiters, etc.) and in the raising of foodstuffs for subsistence and for sale, it is readily apparent that the total number potentially available for private employment is not very large.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower, Director

May 4, 1942

CT.02

To: Colonel Erle F. Cress

From: M. S. Eisenhower

1. I have just read, in rough manuscript form, the second report of the House Committee on Defense Migration (Tolan Committee). It is a constructive, statesmanlike document. All recommendations in it are clearly intended to be helpful and to strengthen the hands of Federal agencies which have the grave responsibility of managing all phases of evacuation and relocation.

(a) The Committee is most concerned about the property problem. It feels that the voluntary system of property disposal is all right as far as it goes, but that the evacuees are entitled to greater aid than has thus far been given them. It recommends that WCCA, WRA, the Federal Reserve Bank, Farm Security, and the Federal Security Agency immediately form a "Council", review what has been done up to now, and then join in a cooperative effort immediately to safeguard the interests of evacuees. The Tolan Committee speaks specifically of automobiles, farms, farm implements, and household goods. It stresses the interest of WRA in this problem because of the need of WRA for equipment on "Resettlement projects." I urge that Colonel Bendetsen call representatives of the appropriate agencies together, review the situation as it stands now, and then issue a press release which gives the maximum guidance on property problems to evacuees. If Colonel Bendetsen has left for Washington perhaps Colonel Evans could bring the group together. Let me make clear that at this distance I do not know that additional arrangements are needed; I do believe however, that a summarized restatement at this time would be beneficial.

(b) The Committee upholds the decision of WRA not to encourage private employment at this time. It stresses the need to hasten the establishment of economically self-contained relocation projects in which all democratic processes will be fostered.

(c) The Committee renews the recommendation it made in its previous report that local hearing boards be established in connection with the problem of German and Italian aliens and urges the Attorney General to speed up the naturalization procedures.

2. Because we have encountered a temporary delay in the selection of relocation centers, it is clear that a normal use of funds available to us until June 30, 1942 is not feasible. I mentioned this to Leland Barrows in a teletype message yesterday. Consequently, we should rush to the utmost the acquisition of irrigation and other ~~ye~~equipment; we should meet all possible land costs; we should buy those materials which in a few weeks ^{we}/shall need for additional construction. In short, we should anticipate our needs as best we can and buy materials now so that they will arrive on the ground when we need them. It may be, for example, that Cozzens should make up a list of equipment needed on the Tule Lake and Gooding projects; also we had better anticipate that at least three or four additional projects (perhaps 10,000 more persons at Parker, 10,000 at Yuma Mesa, 10,000 at Shoshone) will require equipment. So would a project in Arkansas; there we would need large bulldozers to clear the land. When do we pay the first year's rent for the Pima (Gila) lands?

3. I have written Cy Fryer about the desirability of initiating in assembly centers various types of training and work programs which will carry over into the relocation communities. It's high time to discard bureaucracy. By all means Mr. Nicholson should continue to supervise activities in assembly centers. And by no means should we

attempt to take over WCCA's responsibilities. But we are all interested in a single program. WRA is going to reap a damaged crop if in the assembly centers the evacuees are not kept busy at useful things. As I said to Cy, perhaps the Japanese could be making school furniture now. Nursery schools can be managed by the Japanese themselves. Sewing machines could be put in and work clothing could be made. Indeed, we shall eventually have to produce all we can--from coffins, to desks, to clothes--so why not inaugurate all such activities now and thus prevent idleness?

4. After trying to weave through the educational bureaucracy, I have decided to push ahead arbitrarily on the problem of University education. I am going to have Dr. Clarence Pickett of the Friends Service Committee set up a group of distinguished educators to work on this problem. I am extremely anxious for John Provinse to return and take hold of this and related problems.

5. John Bird is rewriting the pamphlet for evacuees. It simply must be completed and printed this week.

6. I believe the Hard Mountain division of the Shoshone irrigation project is feasible. As I indicated by wire, the winters are substantially the same as they are at Tule Lake and Gooding. About 7,500 acres of publicly-owned land are ready for immediate use and we can get 15,000 additional acres of public land next year. I am therefore wiring you to have Utz, one of Cozzens' men and an officer of the Engineer Corps visit the area immediately. We are already assured of Interior Department approval. Construction of buildings will have to be modified to meet climatic conditions; I leave it to you to see that the engineers do make the necessary modifications. The lands are so situated that two communities of 5,000 each will be more feasible and much less costly in the long run than one community

of 10,000. I am so confident of the feasibility of this project that the men may as well select the camp site while they are on the ground. After all, many voluntary evacuees have gone to Montana, Wyoming, and adjacent areas and we know that they will need a place to live.

7. Colonel Tate is discussing the Yuma Mesa project with the State Department. I may wire you on this before you receive this letter. If it should come down to a choice of 10,000 more on the Parker project or 10,000 on the Yuma Mesa project, which would be more feasible? I believe the canal is already in at Yuma Mesa. Is the temperature more moderate or worse?

8. The Arkansas location for 10,000 is feasible, provided the Army can give positive assurance that the evacuees will be removed when the war is over. Such assurance cannot be given but the War Department can state that it would recommend a post-war program of helping the Arkansas settlers move West again when the war is over. I think this should be saved as a last resort.

9. We must set for ourselves a positive goal of having all locations selected by the end of May. Otherwise we shall see September roll around and schools and other facilities will not be built. If additional help is needed in site selection, talk to Utz (if he's still there) and to Fryer and Cozzens; then let me know if you need anything from me.

10. I intend to begin today to push hard for a gradual merger of certain WECA and WRA units.

11. I was delighted to hear today that you have been promoted to the rank of Colonel. I am anxious for you to be in Washington at the earliest possible moment. My own judgment is, however, that you are needed desperately where you are until the WCCA-WRA arrangement is agreed to. Please discuss this with Fryer and let me have your recommendation.

12. WCCA wishes us to take over the management of Manzanar at the earliest possible moment. The only reason for urgency is WCCA's dissatisfaction with Triggs, the WPA manager. I do not have a good impression of Triggs, but keep in mind that General DeWitt, Colonel Bendetsen, and I saw him for only 15 minutes. Curiously, Commander Ringle, who spend a full day at Manzanar, was quite impressed with Triggs. In any case, we should not take over Manzanar merely to expedite a change in personnel. The thing should be decided on its merits. The negative side is that we now have so much to do and we are so far behind in doing it that we should not take on an additional burden for some time to come. The Affirmative side is that we should be gaining experience in relocation-management, should get a farm program underway at Manzanar, ~~1000/1000~~ and should be free to send additional personnel there for training. Consequently, if you find that the following conditions can be met, I am ready to have a joint recommendation from you and Fryer:

- (a) The Army's possession of some 4,500 acres in the camp area must be absolute and of war-duration; we must not be put in a position of having to fight the City of Los Angeles about our right to occupy the land.
- (b) We must be certain of our right to use water for camp and agricultural purposes, and at what price.
- (c) Nicholson must agree to let us take over all project personnel, except Triggs.
- (d) We must have a competent project manager who has spent at least a week at the Regional Office so that we are satisfied as to his attitude and so that he understands our policies. My first choice is Chris Rachford. He may have written me by now in response to a long-distance telephone conversation

I had with him. Please feel free to call him to San Francisco in my behalf. My second choice (provided Cy Fryer is fully satisfied, because I do not know him) is Nash of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

- (e) General DeWitt and Colonel Bendetsen discovered many deficiencies at Manzanar, even in that portion of the camp which presumably was completed. These deficiencies should be corrected before we take over. Further, the occupied portion of the camp should be accepted from the contractor and the contractor should be excluded from that portion of the camp, so that we will be free to inaugurate at once a work program, including improvement of housing and school construction, without getting into trouble with the union labor still working on the uncompleted portion of the project.
- (f) Any tentative plans for self-government, police protection, and the like should be kept tentative until we have formulated basic principles. Such principles must be established within the next two weeks.
- (g) We must examine what the Owens Valley Citizens Committee, sanctioned by Tom Clark and WCCA, has done and determine in advance how we or WCCA will deal with the matter if the Committee's work is unacceptable to us.

Please let me know what you and Fryer wish to do.


14. As you know, WCCA has agreed verbally to let us have all assembly-center materials, except for designated ones which may be retained intact for troop use. This should be reduced to written agreement. Plans of work should be developed accordingly. And Major Maston should immediately estimate the cost of transportation; wire me his estimate because our budget will be placed before the Bureau of the

Budget the latter part of this week.

15. You undoubtedly know that we are now moving into the Barr Building at 810 - 17th Street, N. W. Colonel Tate promises to have the tactical line in by Wednesday.

/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

May 4, 1942



To: John Bird
From: M. S. Eisenhower

Please rush through a request for authority to print in the field. A \$25,000 authorization should suffice. Ed Waymack in the Office of Information can indicate the procedure. The OEM administrative office may be able to handle it. In any case, let's try to get word back from the Joint Committee on Printing at once so that we can put through the bulletin you are preparing.

May 4, 1942

Teletype to

Colonel E. F. Cress
Deputy Director
War Relocation Authority
San Francisco, Calif.

Ask Utz, one of Cozzen's men, and Army engineer to investigate Hart Mountain portion of Shoshone irrigation project in Northern Wyoming and report to me at earliest moment. Ask John Provinse when he will return.

M. S. Eisenhower

Phoned to: Miss Kraus
Time: 9 a.m.

Regional Files, 710, Wash., D. C.
Miyamoto

C1.01

Memo from M. S. Eisenhower to Thomas Holland
May 4, 1942

Subject: Responsibilities of the Reemployment Division

I am delighted that Secretary Perkins is willing for you to start in with WRA on detail.

Because some things require immediate attention, I am going to mention them at least briefly.

I. Wage Policies

As soon as possible, we should issue regulations covering basic wage policies for both public and private employment. The issue is controversial and my present feeling is that we should ask the President to make the initial announcement, to be followed immediately by a detailed WRA statement and the publication of regulations in the Federal Register.

Experience thus far indicates most strongly that we cannot pay wages for work on public projects which seem to exceed those paid the American private soldier. Indeed, some weeks ago protests over a premature announcement about wages became so voluminous ~~over a premature announcement about wages~~ that the Wartime Civil Control Administration (General DeWitt's organization on evacuation) and WRA issued an official announcement which said that a wage policy had not been determined but that under present conditions the net cash wage paid the evacuee would not exceed the net cash wage of \$21 a month paid the American private soldier.

Actually, of course, each private soldier costs the Federal Government about \$150 a month. I do not have the precise figure--I wish I did.

Now, it appears to me that an ideal system would be to charge all evacuees for board, room, medical services, and so on and then to pay a cash wage sufficiently high to liquidate this debt and to leave a small balance for incidentals. However, such a system would require a scale of wages ranging from about \$35 or \$40 for common labor to about \$95 a month for professional workers. The newspapers, Congress, and the public would crucify us. Such a scale would be necessary because of (a) the average size of the Japanese family and (b) the curious age distribution which gives us a disproportionately small number of workers over 16 years of age. (The average family has five members. One-third are first-generation aliens, averaging 60 years of age. The second generation averages about 21 years of age. More than one-fourth of the total population is 15 years old or less.)

Figuring very roughly, food for a family of five will cost \$60 a month, or \$720 a year. I have no idea what medical supplies will cost. Education (not including supplies and equipment) will cost fully \$200 per family per year. Incidentals--from tobacco to tooth paste--will amount to \$60 per family of five at the minimum. Clothes--I have no idea.

These cost figures are no doubt highly inaccurate but they are good enough to show that wages would have to be substantial to permit two wage earners in a family of five to come out even.

Consequently, Colonel Bendetsen of WCCA (which must soon have a wage policy in assembly centers) and I (our budget estimates are due the latter part of this week!) are thinking along this line:

Assembly Centers

1. All evacuees will be provided food, shelter, medical service, and material for home-made clothing free of charge.
2. Ration cards to cover incidentals at the canteen will be issued--\$2.50 to single workers, \$4.50 to a married couple, and \$1 to each child but not to exceed \$7.50 for any family.
3. Cash wages for common labor will be \$6 a month. In a typical community with all able-bodied persons working I presume this might account for 75 to 80 percent of all workers. We need to establish a better figure for budgetary purposes. Wages for carpenters, electricians, plumbers, and the like would be \$10 a month. Nurses, cooks, and perhaps a few others would draw \$14. The top wage, \$18, would be reserved for doctors and perhaps school teachers. The specific classifications need to be established as soon as possible.

Relocation Centers

Of course, very few will have a chance to work in the temporary assembly centers. But at the relocation centers we must provide work for all who are able to work.

We shall enlist all able-bodied persons over 16 years of age in the War Relocation Work Corps. All enlistees will then be assigned jobs with earning opportunities as follows:

1. The entire community will be put on a cooperative basis. We will keep records of all income and all outgo, excluding the cost of housing. We will also keep individual time records by four basic classifications. When the project ends at the conclusion of the war the profits, if any, will be paid in lieu of wages to those who worked--divided pro-rata according to the four classifications.

In the meantime, we will make advances as described in (1), (2), and (3) under the previous heading. Should such advances, added to other project costs, cause the project to show a deficit evacuees would not, of course, be expected to acknowledge a debt to the government.

Wages for Private Employment

If private employment proves feasible, we shall have to determine whether the government should collect the wages (that would bother me) or whether the enlistee--technically on furlough while working off the project--should pay the government a fixed sum for the support of his dependents who might remain on the project. Thus an enlistee might earn \$100 a month in seasonal farm work; if four dependents remained on the project the charges for food, education, medical services, and clothing might amount to \$75.

If the government collected the wages presumably the money would simply be considered income of the cooperative undertaking.

The matter becomes more complicated if one of the four remaining on the project is doing public work.

If children under 16 work--cleaning up the premises, helping at gardening, etc.--I think we should simply consider this the same as their working about the house without pay. Their efforts will reduce costs--of food, for example--and thus enhance the possibility of profit.

Colonel Bendetsen will be in Washington early this week. I

want you and Bob Frase to attend any conference we may hold on this subject. Incidentally, I have some data compiled by the Census Bureau which may aid in calculating total costs of wages by the four crude classifications.

II. Manufacturing

The Manufacturing Division of WRA has the responsibility of finding public and private manufacturing opportunities for the relocation projects. You will be concerned, however, because again wage policy is involved.

Presumably workers on public manufacturing (such as camouflage nets for the Army) will be paid in accordance with the appropriate classification previously mentioned. But should they receive a wage for making furniture for their own homes? For the community school? For building the school? Or should we say that all work designed primarily to improve the living conditions and the immediate welfare of the Japanese should be performed free? Certainly if wages are paid for such work, the opportunities for profits begin to dwindle. What would Congress say?

If private industry (such as a glove factory) locates next to a project, enlistees should receive prevailing wages and pay the project costs for themselves and their dependents.

III. Private Employment Generally

Obviously one of the most difficult tasks of the Reemployment Division is the establishment of policies, the maintenance of policies in the face of severe criticism, and the negotiating through of specific opportunities for private employment.

The greatest demands will come from the sugar beet, cotton, and other agricultural industries which require large amounts of stoop labor.

As I indicated in a recent letter to Governor Maw of Utah, seasonal agricultural employment is almost an insurmountable problem while men, women, children, and household goods are undergoing a systematized evacuation. Later on, with all families housed and protected, private employment will be more feasible. Assuming that the male members of the family will be willing to leave the projects for given periods, I can see that we could use CCC camps for temporary housing in some areas. In Any case, private employment for seasonal work should be based upon some such principles as these:

1. Voluntary recruitment through the U. S. Employment Service.
2. Prevailing wages for enlistees without their displacing other workers.
3. The employer to pay transportation both ways and to provide essential housing and medical services.
4. The States and local communities to give absolute assurance of their ability to maintain law and order; and, for this, I think we should have minimum criteria which would have to be met.

Incidentally, some legal questions come up in this connection. Relocation projects will be military areas, with ingress and egress controlled by the Army. But once off the project each American-citizen enlistee, even though morally obligated to return under the terms of his enlistment, is no doubt as free as any other American citizen to go where he pleases. Of course, I do not object to this in itself; any citizen should go where he pleases. Of course, I do not object to this in itself; any citizen should go where he pleases. But if the right is exercised and if communities then develop the notion that this whole affair is not in fact controlled by the Federal Government I very much fear that all the antagonisms, so tragically evident a few weeks ago, will spring up anew.

IV. Classifications

The WCCA will register and classify all evacuees at assembly centers. The classification form is about ready for printing at San Francisco. If you wish, we could wire and try to obtain a copy now.

This classification will be of value to both the Reemployment and Community Management Divisions. The records are to be maintained, I think, by the Reemployment Division.

We know now, for example, that about 30 percent of the Japanese are farmers. There are less than 100 doctors. There are very few nurses and no nurse's aides. I have no idea how many carpenters, electricians, clerks, typists, etc. there may be.

I am not wholly clear on the matter, but since private work will be almost wholly agricultural, I presume these records will be of greatest value to project managers and to the Community Management Division.

V. The Regional Office

The line of administration in WRA runs from the Director to the Regional Director, to the project manager. All offices and divisions above the project level are staff units. Even so, you will be directly concerned with the Reemployment Division of the regional office.

By and large our job here is to formulate policies, standards, and the broad outlines of programs. We must do so in full consultation with Congress and various Executive agencies. The regional office job is project coordination and specific negotiation within the formulated policies.

At the regional office, then, the Chief of the Reemployment Division will, as time goes on, be carrying on specific negotiations with Company A which will want 500 laborers in Colorado for six months.

We have not as yet found a man to head up the regional Reemployment Division. Perhaps you can help Cy Fryer and me find the right man. He should know the West thoroughly and should possess all the other self-evident qualifications. The job merits a salary of \$6500.

We are trying to effectuate an arrangement whereby Colonel Evans, now with WCCA, will join us as Deputy Regional Director and then, among other things, give considerable attention to employment. However, Colonel Evans will want the Division post filled.

VI. Assistance in the Washington Division

I wish to hold to the absolute minimum the number of officials in the Washington Divisions. You and Bob Frase are now a pair, which I hope will be permanent. I doubt if Bob or you have secretaries. As soon as you have mapped the work out in your mind, let me know what additional personnel, if any, you need.

VII. General

This whole program must move so rapidly and there are so many persons and agencies to deal with that I personally cannot do one-tenth the things I should like to do. Consequently, I want each office and Division Chief to carry the fullest possible responsibility in his field. So long as we are together on general policies, attitude, and purpose, I look to you to handle essential contacts in the Reemployment field with Members of

Congress, with other government departments, with organized groups, and with individuals. Further, I encourage you to the utmost to establish the closest working relations with other WRA officials so that mutual problems--such as those affecting you and the Solicitor or you and the Chief of Community Management--may be met with a minimum of consultation with me.

Critical needs are immediately before us. The priorities in your field stack up in my mind about this way: A wage policy, basic to budget estimates this week; a statement by the President on wages; publication of regulations; an informative publication for evacuees; announcement of policies on private employment. Some place in there I should have mentioned staff.

Obviously all that I have said above is pretty crude--nothing more than ideas developed on the run. What we need now is to get policies and plans worked out precisely and then be prepared to defend them against all comers.

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Letter from Coverley to Fryer
May 5, 1942

FS
21.01

Under the form of administrative organization we have adopted, it is difficult to determine how forcefully a staff division should interject its recommendations into administrative channels. Since responsibility should properly carry with it commensurate authority, it would appear that a staff division should play a minor role in making any decision for which the project director must accept final responsibility. On the other hand, the purpose of establishing the technical functions was to make available advice and guidance to administrative personnel in special fields. In order that this purpose may be accomplished, it is often necessary for the staff division to exercise, directly or indirectly, quasi administrative prerogatives.

This matter is being called to your attention at this time because project directors will be making selections of key personnel during the next few months. To a large extent, the wisdom of these selections will determine the success or failure of our agreed objectives. I understand that some appointments are being made to positions closely related to those activities in which I am interested without the appropriate persons in my divisions being consulted. This in itself is neither wrong nor objectionable so long as the full implications of such a procedure are fully understood by all concerned.

Under the circumstances, it seems important that you define at the earliest moment exactly what the responsibilities of those divisions under my supervision are in this respect. Our group will be very glad to help with the selection of qualified personnel for all activities coming under the head of "Community Services" if that is desired. If not, it will be entirely satisfactory to permit project directors to select any personnel they choose providing it is clearly understood that the regional divisions concerned are in no way responsible for the ultimate results. We will be glad to do the best we can under any set of circumstances, but I feel quite definitely that these circumstances should be made clear.

As far as I am concerned personally, it is my suggestion that at least all key personnel in the Community Services field should have the joint endorsement of the project director and the appropriate Division Chief or myself.

May 5, 1942

CH 01

Mr. Robert Smith.
Director of Personnel
Department of Labor
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Smith

I shall deeply appreciate it if your Department will detail Mr. Thomas Holland, on a non-reimbursable basis, to the War Relocation Authority so that he may immediately fill the post of Chief of the Reemployment Division. Mr. Holland's transfer will be put through as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director

May 5, 1942

Mr. C. E. Rachford
Route 1, Box 500
El Cajon, California

CI. 01

Dear Chris:

Thanks very much for your letter. When I next start West I shall either plan to go to San Diego or I shall wire you and ask you to meet me in Los Angeles. However, I can tell you right now what I want you to do.

We are establishing about 15 relocation communities where Japanese evacuees will live and work for the duration of the war. Most of these evacuees, as you know, are American citizens. They are restrained from going elsewhere simply because it is not safe for them to disperse widely throughout the West. On each relocation area it will be necessary for us to subjugate the land, raise food, do some simple manufacturing, set up elementary schools and high schools, and foster a high degree of democratic self-government on the part of the evacuees themselves.

The director of each project must be a person of deep human understanding and with liberal instincts. He must know government administration, and certainly he must be able to make decisions quickly and help get the whole job done. Frankly, I do not know of a more difficult job but it is very much worth doing. War causes us to do many peculiar things. I am not at all happy about the restraints that must be placed upon American citizens. Partially to offset that restraint we must do the best job of management we can in promoting a sound economy and a healthy democracy within each project area. Further, what we do has more than national significance. The rest of the world is watching us.

I know that for years you were the moving liberal in the Forest Service. You know the West. You know how to get a governmental job

done. And certainly you know how to work with people. I think you can make a tremendous contribution to the war effort by supervising one of these war-duration communities. The salary is \$6500. We shall take over the management of the project at Manzanar in the Owens Valley in two or three weeks. The manager at Tule Lake should be on hand now, though the active job of management will not begin for about a month. We already have managers for the Parker (Arizona), Pima (Arizona), and Gooding (Idaho) projects. There will be others though they are not yet selected.

I shall be in touch with you soon.

Sincerely,

M. S. Eisenhower

Director

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

FS
41.01

Memo from Province to Coverley, Rogers, Adams and Collins
May 8, 1942

The following excerpts from a recent letter from Mr. Eisenhower in Washington are transmitted for your information and guidance:-

"I have written Cy Fryer about the desirability of initiating in assembly centers various types of training and work programs which will carry over into the relocation communities. It's high time to discard all bureaucracy. By all means Mr. Nicholson should continue to supervise activities in assembly centers. And by no means should we attempt to take over WCCA's responsibilities. But we are all interested in a single program. WRA is going to reap a damaged crop if in the assembly centers the evacuees are not kept busy at useful things. As I said to Cy, perhaps the Japanese could be making school furniture now. Nursery schools can be managed by the Japanese themselves. Sewing machines could be put in and work clothing could be made. Indeed, we shall eventually have to produce all we can - from coffins, to desks, to clothes --so why not inaugurate all such activities now and thus prevent idleness?

"After trying to weave through the educational bureaucracy, I have decided to push ahead arbitrarily on the problem of University education. I am going to have Dr. Clarence Pickett of the Friends Service set up a group of distinguished educators to work on this problem. I am extremely anxious for John Province to return and take hold of this and related problems.

"John Bird is rewriting the pamphlet for evacuees. It simply must be completed and printed this week.

"We must set for ourselves a positive goal of having all locations selected by the end of May. Otherwise we shall see September roll around and schools and other facilities will not be built. If additional help is needed in site selection, talk to Utz (if he's still there) and to Fryer and Cozzens; then let me know if you need anything from me.

"The Washington job, Chief of Reemployment Division, is filled at least temporarily. Mr. Thomas Holland, formerly acting Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division, Department of Labor, is the man. He wants to stay with us, but feels committed to accepting a commission as Major in the SOS, provided he passes the physical. However, if he is ~~commissioned~~ commissioned, I shall request his transfer to WRA.

"WCCA wishes us to take over the management of Manzanar at the earliest possible moment. The only reason for urgency is WCCA's dissatisfaction with Triggs, the WPA manager. I do not have a good impression of Triggs, but keep in mind that General DeWitt, Colonel Bendetson, and I saw him for only 15 minutes. Curiously, Commander Ringle, who spent a full day at Manzanar, was quite impressed with Triggs. In any case, we should not take over Manzanar merely to expedite

a change in personnel. The thing should be decided on its merits. The negative side is that we now have so much to do and we are so far behind in doing it that we should not take on an additional burden for some time to come. The affirmative side is that we should be gaining experience in relocation-management, should set a farm program under way at Manzanar, and should be free to send additional personnel there for training. Consequently, if you can find that the following conditions can be met, I am ready to have a joint recommendation for you and Fryer:

- "(a) The Army's possession of some 4,500 acres in the camp area must be absolute and of war-duration; we must not be put in a position of having to fight the City of Los Angeles about our right to occupy the land.
- (b) We must be certain of our right to use water for camp and agricultural purposes, and at what price.
- (c) Nicholson must agree to let us take over all project personnel, except Triggs.
- (d) We must have a competent project manager who has spent at least a week at the Regional Office so that we are satisfied as to his attitude and so that he understands our policies. My first choice is Chris Rachford. He may have written me by now in response to a long-distance telephone conversation I had with him. Please feel free to call him to San Francisco in my behalf. My second choice provided Cy Fryer is fully satisfied, (because I do not know him) is Wash of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
- (e) General DeWitt and Colonel Bendetsen discovered many deficiencies at Man-anar, even in that portion of the camp which presumably was completed. These deficiencies should be corrected before we take over. Further, the occupied portion of the camp should be accepted from the contractor and the contractor should be excluded from that portion of the camp, so that we will be free to inaugurate at once a work program, including improvement of housing and school construction, without getting into trouble with union labor still working on the uncompleted portion of the project.
- (f) Any tentative plans for self-government, police-protection and the like should be kept tentative until we have formulated basic principles. Such principles must be established within the next two weeks.
- (g) We must examine what the Owens Valley Citizens Committee, sanctioned by Tom Clark and WCCA, has done and determine in advance how we or WCCA will deal with the matter if the Committee's work is unacceptable to us.

"You undoubtedly know that we are now moving into the Barr Bldg. at 810 - 17th St., N.W., Colonel Tate promises to have the tactical line in by Wednesday."

May 11, 1942

Honorable Harold D. Smith
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Director Smith:

Enclosed are estimates and justifications in support of the first request of the War Relocation Authority for an annual appropriation. The total of these estimates by objective classifications is as follows:

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As I have pointed out to you in conversation and in my letter of April 5, 1942, it is extremely difficult at the present time to prepare precise estimates for the next fiscal year. The War Relocation Authority is, in the first place, confronted with a problem entirely without precedent in the experience of the United States. The

nation has never before faced the urgent necessity of removing from a comparatively limited military zone and relocating in appropriate surroundings nearly a quarter million people of both sexes and all ages. While some guide to the solution of phases of this problem may be found in the experience of other agencies, the work of no agency provides even a close parallel to the task of the War Relocation Authority.

In the problem of housing and feeding a large number of people, the experience of the Army, of course, is helpful; as will be pointed out in more detail in that portion of our estimates dealing with subsistence, we have drawn heavily upon the resources and experience of the Army in meeting this phase of our problem. For dealing with the educational aspects of community management, we have found some guide in the experience of the Indian Service. In planning other aspects of community organization, the experience of the Works Project Administration, and the Farm Security Administration has been helpful. In developing plans for the subjugation of land, the installation of irrigation systems, and the initiation of agricultural production, we have been able to draw upon the knowledge of the Reclamation Service, the Soil Conservation Service, and other agencies in the Departments of Interior and Agriculture. In providing medical care, we have enlisted the assistance of the Public Health Service. A large number of agencies, State and Federal, have participated in the important preliminary task of selecting sites for relocation centers. In short, we have, whenever possible, utilized existing information in planning our program and in preparing these estimates. Nevertheless, our program as a whole and the plan or organization on which these estimates are based are a pioneering effort subject to considerable modification in light of experience.

Preparation of estimates has been made even more difficult by the

short time available to us for program and organization planning. You will recall that the War Relocation Authority was established by executive order less than eight weeks ago. It was created to formulate and manage a program of relocation for persons who were already being evacuated. It was confronted immediately with the necessity of coordinating its work with the Army, which demanded speed, and with dozens of other agencies which wished to help but which knew little more about what was to be done than did the new War Relocation Authority. It had to deal immediately with such vital operating questions as the selection of ^{permanent} ~~the~~ relocation centers. To a great extent the success of the relocation program depends upon finding the best possible sites for the relocation communities. Consequently, from the outset a large amount of time of all members of our staff has been given to the problem of site examination and selection. Almost from the beginning ~~the~~ ~~we~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~confronted~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~desire~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Army~~ ~~to~~ ~~withdraw~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~relocation~~ ~~problem~~ ~~and~~ ~~to~~ ~~turn~~ ~~over~~ ~~as~~ ~~much~~ ~~as~~ ~~possible~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~job~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~new~~ ~~organization~~. We have, as a consequence, faced an exceptionally urgent task of recruitment and procurement in our effort to provide the necessary staff and equipment to enable us to take over promptly from the Army.

I mention these problems to indicate that even in the few weeks of our existence, we have not been able to give as much time as we would have liked to the necessary administrative planning on which a budgetary proposal should be based. We have, however, done as thorough a job in preparing these estimates as circumstances would permit. I am presenting them with much greater assurance as to their reliability than I believed three weeks ago would be possible at this time.

Evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent from the military areas of the Pacific Coast was determined early this year to be a military necessity. Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing such evacuation, was issued on February 19, 1942. On the basis of this order Japanese were officially encouraged to leave the restricted area voluntarily and to relocate elsewhere in this country. Acting on this official recommendation a large number of Japanese began to move immediately to inland locations. It is estimated that within six weeks after the issuance of Executive Order No. 9066 more than 8,000 Japanese voluntarily relocated themselves.

It was evident at the outset, however, that many Japanese would be financially unable to move without Government assistance. It was also evident that it would be impossible without an orderly direction of the movement for the full 120,000 Japanese to be absorbed into communities outside the restricted zone. It was planned almost immediately, therefore, to establish a few relocation centers to which Japanese could go, be housed, fed, and protected until permanent arrangements for relocation could be worked out. An evacuation program based on these considerations was planned, on paper at least, when the War Relocation Authority was established by Executive Order No. 9102 on March 18, 1942. Concurrently, however, some Federal officials were still urging voluntary evacuation and were making promises in the Inter-Mountain States with respect to voluntary evacuees which could never be fulfilled.

The reaction of communities and States outside the restricted area to the voluntary influx of Japanese from the coast was immediate and serious. Protests from virtually all of the Western States were received by Members of Congress, the War Department, the President, and, upon its establishment, by the War Relocation Authority. Many Japanese who moved voluntarily were threatened with violence in the communities

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This was the situation which the War Relocation Authority faced at the outset. After a preliminary survey of the situation, I recommended that voluntary relocation be stopped. The Army concurred in my recommendation and on March 29, 1942 a "freezing order" was issued by the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. Public reactions in the States most closely affected by the relocation program thus in considerable measure dictated one of the basic operating policies of the new Authority. Of necessity, all our efforts have from the beginning been directed toward selecting, constructing, equipping, and staffing relocation centers to which all the evacuees could be moved and in which they could be provided food, shelter, education, health services, and useful work opportunities for the duration of the war. Since this initial policy determination was reached every contact we have had with Members of Congress, State Governors, other political leaders, and leaders of public opinion has confirmed our decision. The entire group of evacuees must be relocated under Government auspices and protection, and public opinion must change to a very great extent before the possibility of private employment and of voluntary relocation, with the related possibility of permanent settlement by the Japanese, can again be considered.

During the first phase of the relocation program (which will extend throughout most of fiscal year 1943) every effort of the Authority will be to select and develop centers for all the population to be

evacuated, to relocate the population, and to provide useful work opportunities for the evacuees. Sites suitable for the development of such communities are not numerous. Nevertheless, site selection is so important that we have chosen locations only after the most careful ^{and} examinations / have reviewed and rejected a far larger number of proposed sites than we have been able to approve. For example, we have examined a dozen sites in Colorado, but have had to reject them all. At the present time one site to accommodate 20,000 people and four sites to accommodate 10,000 people each have been selected and are either under construction or in the process of being occupied. We expect that an additional site for 10,000 people and one site for 5,000 people will be selected and completed by July 1; two sites for 10,000 and two for 5,000 by August 1; two more for 10,000 and one more for 5,000 by September 1.

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Administration of relocation centers has assumed such importance in the program of the War Relocation Authority that it has naturally

been a determining factor in our plan of administrative organization. Each Relocation center will be so large and will require a staff of such competence that we feel justified in giving to the administrative officials of the centers a large degree of responsibility. Moreover, the availability of Japanese assistance^{and} the necessity of providing suitable work for all classes of the Japanese working population make it extremely important from an operating point of view that as much detail as possible in our administrative processes be carried on at the project level.

Direction of the individual projects from Washington seems, as a general rule, to be impractical in view of the concentration of our problem and our expected relocation centers in the Western States. Consequently, we have established a regional office in San Francisco and have given it a large degree of responsibility for supervision of the projects, for negotiations with the Army (so far as operations in the field are concerned), and for the review and preliminary selection of relocation centers. Detailed supervision of financial and personnel administration, of public works operation, and of community life will be conducted from the regional office. Under present arrangements the San Francisco office might well be thought of as a field operating branch of the central office of the Authority. If wide dispersal of the projects should make the establishment of a second regional office desirable, both regional offices will exercise authority within their respective geographical areas of the type now carried by the San Francisco staff.

We have reserved to the Washington organization authority for general supervision over administrative and program functions in the regional and project offices, for the formulation of basic policies, for the maintenance of contacts with other Federal agencies and private

organizations in such fields as education and health, and for broad control over the field program. In addition, the Washington staff is immediately responsible for developing plans for possible future evacuations (a task involving highly confidential contacts with appropriate Washington agencies) and for conducting such phases of the relocation program as are not directly concerned with the development and administration of relocation centers. As an example, arrangements for the transfer of college students who must be evacuated from their present colleges to others in the interior of the country will be handled by the Washington staff. Industrial opportunities for relocation projects ~~w/~~ must also be developed principally in Washington. The Washington office will be kept comparatively small, staffed with a few relatively high-grade personnel who will spend a considerable part of their time in the field.

One point of organization policy should be emphasized. As the project charts ~~have~~ here submitted indicate, we have planned project organization in terms of standard governmental positions. On each project we contemplate that these positions will fall into three categories:

- (a) Those few which as a matter of policy we will fill with appointed white personnel.
- (b) A very large number which will be filled only with Japanese. These positions are included on our charts merely as a guide to project directors in organizing their staffs and in utilizing Japanese assistance.
- (c) Positions which we believe will be necessary to the efficient, safe operation of the projects and which we believe should be filled with Japanese if they are available or can in a reasonable time be trained to fill them.

If Japanese are not available or cannot be trained in time to meet

necessary requirements, this third class of positions will be filled by appointment of white personnel.

Neither our experience nor the statistical information available to us provides sufficient basis for determining what proportion of this third category of positions we can reasonably expect to fill with Japanese at the outset. For example, we know that there are comparatively few qualified Japanese school teachers. At the same time, there are relatively large numbers of college-trained Japanese who might have become school teachers had the opportunity for employment not practically been denied to them by the attitude of most local school boards. We do not know, however, how many of these college-trained Japanese can be qualified under State regulations to teach before the time when it will be necessary for us to start school. In many other categories of community work there is inadequate evidence as to the number of Japanese who will be available.

In preparing our estimates we have made the best possible judgement on each class of these positions. We have indicated this judgment in the schedules of obligations by showing for each class of positions which may be filled either by white or Japanese personnel, the total number of such positions, and the average salary at classification rates. We have then indicated in parentheses the estimated number of such positions in all projects for which Japanese will be available. At the end of the schedule we have deducted the salary saving represented by the use of Japanese in such positions. The cost of paying Japanese is carried elsewhere in the estimates under the heading "Payment for Japanese Labor" and will be based upon the general wage policy of the Authority, a copy of which is included as an exhibit with those estimates.

Many white personnel appointed at the outset to positions in this third category will, as the training of Japanese permits, be replaced by the assignment of Japanese paid in accordance with the general wage policy of the Authority. One of the primary objectives in management of the relocation centers will be to train Japanese to occupy increasingly more important positions in the administrative organization of the projects.

I should like to point out that the program of the War Relocation Authority, like all other programs arising out of the necessities of the war, is subject to change as military necessities change. If other populations than the Japanese are evacuated and if their relocation is made a responsibility of this Authority, additional funds beyond those here requested will be necessary. Some allowance was made in these estimates for the probability that some Japanese will be evacuated from Hawaii and will be placed under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority. Even if we use our best judgment, however, some presently unforeseeable developments will arise. On the basis of the present responsibilities of the War Relocation Authority and the intensive experience we have had thus far, I believe the enclosed estimates represent a reasonable statement of our requirements.

Even so, I wish to urge again, as I did when I saw you several days ago, that a direct appropriation for the relocation program not be sought at this time; rather, that War Relocation Authority activities be financed for another three, four, or five months by allocations from the Emergency Fund of the President. My reasons for urging this are:

- (1) There is a great deal of misunderstanding in Congress and throughout the country about the West Coast problem. While, as you know, two-thirds of all evacuees are American citizens, most of whom

are no doubt loyal to this country, the general attitude is that "the alien orientals should be locked up." Only the fairly generous provisions of the Geneva Convention (which does not in fact apply to evacuees) and the fear of retaliation abroad restrains many Members of Congress from urging a detention-camp type of program. This attitude reflects the bitter feeling that was only recently engendered by voluntary evacuation which gave rise to cries to "keep these aliens from buying land; put them under Federal guard; withdraw them when the war is over." I very much fear that if a request for a large sum of money comes up in Congress now, prior to the fall elections, we may be faced with restrictions on a program which already imposes heavy restraints on American citizens.

(2) While we have done the best we can, some of our estimates are open to attack on the ground that we do not have sufficient supporting evidence. In its eight years of work the Farm Security Administration resettled only a fraction of the number we are expected to relocate in a few months. We are expected to subjugate and irrigate lands without having had the benefit of basic investigations, and we are expected to estimate the working capacities of a large population even before an occupational classification has been made.

(3) Some of our administrative and program arrangements are just being formulated. For example, we want to have the Bureau of Reclamation supervise the installation of the major irrigation works on several projects, but we have not as yet had time to enter into a memorandum of understanding. Consequently, just what amount of funds we shall have to transfer to the Bureau of Reclamation we do not know.

(4) Site selection is still our most intensive activity and of

course we cannot arrive at wholly reliable estimates until we know the character of the problem each relocation community will face. For example, we shall probably purchase the Beardsley irrigation project in Arizona for \$1,250,000 to \$1,500,000, if we can obtain the property at appraised value. If we do, the immediate cost will be high but future costs will be much lower. If we fail to obtain this property, we may have to turn to questionable and difficult areas where the development costs will be high for some years. If we obtain the Beardsley lands, our food bill on the project will rapidly decline; if we do not, two years may pass before the same number of evacuees can produce substantial amounts of food. Again, we are trying to obtain Farm Security Administration lands in Arkansas, and to buy about 8,000 acres of adjacent lands. We do not yet know whether we shall buy Farm Security Administration's lands or merely lease them at a price equivalent to taxes.

(5) Our estimates incorporate a wage policy which is based upon the idea that evacuees may enhance their income by making the relocation projects pay. We are starting out with miserably low monthly cash advances of \$12, \$16, and \$19. Early experience may cause us to increase these, especially the \$12 monthly advance to unskilled workers. Further, we may find it advisable to drop doctors, dentists, and nurses from the "cash advances", organize health cooperatives, have evacuees pay small fees for general health service to the cooperatives, and then permit the cooperatives to pay professional workers a somewhat higher wage. Yet ^{once} Congress has granted an appropriation with a low wage scale in effect, I think it may be almost impossible to change that scale thereafter.

(6) Some basic military decisions affecting the War Relocation Authority are going to be made in the near future. Confidentially, it

now appears that the War Department will order the evacuation of additional Japanese in the West--this time from portions of Military Area Number Two. Some Japanese will be received from Hawaii. Basic decisions about German and Italian aliens will soon be made.

For these and numerous other reasons, I hope you will find it possible to continue to finance War Relocation Authority's operations from the Emergency Fund of the President.

Sincerely yours,

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/s/ M. S. Eisenhower
Director

May 11, 1942

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Even so, I wish to urge again, as I did when I saw you several days ago, that a direct appropriation for the relocation program not be sought at this time; rather, that War Relocation Authority activities be financed for another three, four, or five months by allocations from the Emergency Fund of the President. My reasons for urging this are:

(1) There is a great deal of misunderstanding in Congress and throughout the country about the West Coast problem. While, as you know, two-thirds of all evacuees are American citizens, most of whom

are no doubt loyal to this country, the general attitude is that "the alien orientals should be locked up." Only the fairly generous provisions of the Geneva Convention (which does not in fact apply to evacuees) and the fear of retaliation abroad restrains many Members of Congress from urging a detention-camp type of program. This attitude reflects the bitter feeling that was only recently engendered by voluntary evacuation which gave rise to cries to "keep these aliens from buying land; put them under Federal guard; withdraw them when the war is over." I very much fear that if a request for a large sum of money comes up in Congress now, prior to the fall elections, we may be faced with restrictions on a program which already imposes heavy restraints on American citizens.

(2) While we have done the best we can, some of our estimates are open to attack on the ground that we do not have sufficient supporting evidence. In its eight years of work the Farm Security Administration resettled only a fraction of the number we are expected to relocate in a few months. We are expected to subjugate and irrigate lands without having had the benefit of basic investigations, and we are expected to estimate the working capacities of a large population even before an occupational classification has been made.

(3) Some of our administrative and program arrangements are just being formulated. For example, we want to have the Bureau of Reclamation supervise the installation of the major irrigation works on several projects, but we have not as yet had time to enter into a memorandum of understanding. Consequently, just what amount of funds we shall have to transfer to the Bureau of Reclamation we do not know.

(4) Site selection is still our most intensive activity and of

course we cannot arrive at wholly reliable estimates until we know the character of the problem each relocation community will face. For example, we shall probably purchase the Beardsley irrigation project in Arizona for \$1,250,000 to \$1,500,000, if we can obtain the property at appraised value. If we do, the immediate cost will be high but future costs will be much lower. If we fail to obtain this property, we may have to turn to questionable and difficult areas where the development costs will be high for some years. If we obtain the Beardsley lands, our food bill on the project will rapidly decline; if we do not, two years may pass before the same number of evacuees can produce substantial amounts of food. Again, we are trying to obtain Farm Security Administration lands in Arkansas, and to buy about 8,000 acres of adjacent lands. We do not yet know whether we shall buy Farm Security Administration's lands or merely lease them at a price equivalent to taxes.

(5) Our estimates incorporate a wage policy which is based upon the idea that evacuees may enhance their income by making the relocation projects pay. We are starting out with miserably low monthly cash advances of \$12, \$16, and \$19. Early experience may cause us to increase these, especially the \$12 monthly advance to unskilled workers. Further, we may find it advisable to drop doctors, dentists, and nurses from the "cash advances", organize health cooperatives, have evacuees pay small fees for general health service to the cooperatives, and then permit the cooperatives to pay professional workers a somewhat higher wage. Yet ^{once} Congress has granted an appropriation with a low wage scale in effect, I think it may be almost impossible to change that scale thereafter.

(6) Some basic military decisions affecting the War Relocation Authority are going to be made in the near future. Confidentially, it

now appears that the War Department will order the evacuation of additional Japanese in the West--this time from portions of Military Area Number Two. Some Japanese will be received from Hawaii. Basic decisions about German and Italian aliens will soon be made.

For these and numerous other reasons, I hope you will find it possible to continue to finance War Relocation Authority's operations from the Emergency Fund of the President.

Sincerely yours,

?
/s/ M. S. Eisenhower
Director

US. WRA

May 12, 1942

INFORMAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Alfred Jeretzki
War Department

✓ 1,02

Here are my views on proposals for future control of enemy aliens: I believe that mass evacuation should be avoided if there is any practicable alternative. Since the present problem does not involve aliens exclusively, but citizens as well, and since protection around strategic works would not prevent espionage, the most feasible single approach to the problem appears to be intensified and rapid personal investigations by FBI and other intelligence agencies. .

However, the War Relocation Authority must look to the War Department for all decisions with respect to military necessity. If the classification method of evacuation is adopted for German and Italian aliens, as suggested in several memoranda on this subject, consideration should be given to the following additional groups:

- a. Wives and widowed mothers of citizens,
- b. Persons who have been in the United States for ten years and have made application for their first naturalization papers,
- c. Austrians and Koreans who are registered as such under the Alien Registration Act of 1940,
- d. Persons approved by the Army or Navy for work in special war jobs,
- e. Foster children living in the homes and under the guardianship of citizens, non-enemy aliens, or accepted persons,
- f. Inmates of public institutions,
- g. Chronic invalids confined to beds.

In case individual aliens are to be evacuated but not detained, I believe that the Government should provide havens of refuge at relocation centers for evacuees until these persons can establish them-

selves in unrestricted areas or localities.

/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

M. S. Eisenhower

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/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

M. S. Eisenhower

Director.

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Memo from Fryer to Project Directors
May 12, 1942

Subject: Recruitment of project staffs.

It is the policy of the San Francisco Regional Office to authorize Project Directors, or acting Project Directors, to recruit staff personnel. However, it must be understood that all appointments must be made within Civil Service regulations and, furthermore, that such appointments, before becoming definite, must be approved by the Regional Director.

It shall be the policy of the Regional Director to refer, through Personnel, to the appropriate divisions for recommendations, the suggested appointments made by the Project Directors.

May 13, 1942

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C1.02

The Honorable

The Secretary of War

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The War Relocation Authority will soon have under its management 15 or 18 communities containing in all some 125,000 aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry who are now being evacuated from the West Coast.

Finding useful work for the evacuees to do will be one of our largest problems. Of course many of them will be producing subsistence foods, but by no means will we be able to keep them all busy working in agriculture. Some industry must be brought to them.

It is of course desirable to find the kind of work that contributes directly to the war effort. I know the Japanese-American citizens would welcome the chance to do such work.

There are without doubt many items that require a great deal of hand labor, or simple machinery, which the Japanese could manufacture, process, or repair for the military establishment. For example: repair of soldiers' shoes; salvaging military equipment; garnishing camouflage nets, etc.

It is therefore requested that the Secretary of War authorize the War Relocation Authority to undertake this type of work for the War ~~Relocation Authority~~ Department, employing citizens of Japanese ancestry. We already have submitted a specific proposal. The War Relocation Authority proposes to undertake to garnish camouflage nets for the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. Initially this work has been assigned to the Santa Anita Assembly Center and the Manzanar, California and Parker, Arizona, Relocation Centers, the first two being under the management of the Western Defense Command.

We are suggesting that, when the work is directed by the War Relocation Authority, it be handled as a book credit for cost accounting

purposes, thus avoiding exchanges of funds or actual cash payments. The cost data for computing credits will be supplied to the War Relocation Authority by the Army Engineers.

The U. S. Army Engineers have agreed, if the Secretary of War approves, to place the camouflage nets on the project, to provide plans, patterns, and any necessary frames or structures, and to provide supervisors and instructors for the work. When the garnishing is completed the nets are reboxed and routed by the U. S. Army Engineers to their destination.

The War Relocation Authority would undertake to provide the necessary unskilled labor needed to complete the work within the time required by the U. S. Army Engineers for each lot of nets.

There are over 75,000 American citizens among those of Japanese ancestry who are being evacuated from the Pacific Coastal Area. The implication of doubt as to their loyalty is obvious to them. They would welcome work of the type that is requested. It would give to these citizens a measure of assurance and trust should we afford them an opportunity to do their part in the war effort, with the possibility that recognition of this contribution eventually may be accorded by the American public.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

M. S. Eisenhower,

Director

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Letter from Eisenhower to Fryer
May 14, 1942

"As you know the State Department is responsible for maintaining relations with foreign countries, including the Protecting Powers for the countries with whom this Nation is at war. This responsibility requires familiarity on the part of the State Department with such activities carried on in this country as affect the well-being of citizens of other countries; and for this reason it is highly desirable that the Department be fully informed concerning the WRA program.

Several representatives of the Special Service Division of the State Department are likely to be in the field from time to time, and I am inviting them to visit our Relocation Areas at their convenience. We are advised that Mr. Bernard Gufler and Mr. James H. Keeley, both Assistant Chiefs of the Special Division, and Mr. Whitney Young and Mr. P. W. Herrick, members of the staff, may be in the field in the near future. I should like you to be certain they they are shown every courtesy and given full information concerning our program.

It may also be that the Protecting Powers of some of the nations with whom we are at war, e.g. the Spanish in the case of Japan, may ask to visit our projects. Should such a request be made, either on a project or at the Regional Office, please refer the person making the request to the State Department, which, I believe, should determine the policy in this connection. If the State Department believes that representatives of other Powers should be permitted to visit the projects, I am quite willing for them to do so, but I believe such visits should be made under the auspices of the State Department. Doubtless more specific arrangements in this connection will be developed, and we shall advise you as progress is made.

Will you please see that all project directors are fully advised.

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Y

May 16, 1942

Mr. E. R. Fryer, Regional Director
War Relocation Authority
Whitcomb Hotel Building
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Fryer:

This will supplement my recent telegram with reference to the use of War Relocation Authority employees for the purpose of organizing at relocation centers cooperatives that will later be turned over to the Japanese.

Our unwillingness to use War Relocation Authority employees for this purpose is due to the fact that it will looklike a device for setting up a revolving fund in violation of established governmental regulations. As long as our employees are in control of the cooperative, it will be difficult to maintain in the face of criticism that the cooperative is really a Japanese enterprise. Feeling on the subject would undoubtedly be influenced by the recent holding by the Comptroller General to the effect that rural rehabilitation loans by the Farm Security Administration to cooperatives composed entirely of Farm Security Administration employees for the purpose of buying land were in violation of law.

In Mr. Ferguson's telegram dated May 12, 1942, he referred to several problems that would be encountered if War Relocation Authority employees were not permitted to organize a cooperative in advance of the arrival of the Japanese at a relocation center. The difficulties indicated in his telegram do not appear to us to be serious. We do not believe that the stock-in-trade would need to be sold through the surplus property procedure, or that receipts would need to be covered into miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury before allowing for refunds and exchanges. The responsibility for accidental inventory losses would be no greater in connection with this property than it is in connection with any other Government property. The necessity for bonding employees and setting up a cost accounting and inventory procedure should likewise not be burdensome. It is true that the profits from the enterprise would not be available for welfare purposes, but the use of profits for that purpose as long as the enterprise is under the control of the War Relocation Authority is one of the things we wish to avoid.

I wish you would explore the possibility of arranging with a wholesaler of the kinds of goods with which the canteen is to be stocked to equip and operate a canteen within the center until such time as a cooperative of Japanese members is prepared to assume operation of the canteen. You should charge a reasonable rent for the space to be made available to the wholesaler. When the cooperative is ready to take over, the War Relocation Authority can make a loan to it to enable it to buy the stock-in-trade from the wholesaler. Your original agreement with the wholesaler should provide that he will sell the merchandise to the cooperative at such time at wholesale prices. The terms of repayment of the loan can be made such that the cooperative will be able to repay the War Relocation Authority out of profits. The repayments will, of course, need to be deposited in the Treasury at miscellaneous receipts.

If you are unable to make such arrangements with one or more wholesalers, I am afraid it will be necessary to postpone organization of the canteen until a cooperative of Japanese members is prepared to operate it on the basis of a loan from the War Relocation Authority.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ M. S. Eisenhower
M. S. Eisenhower
Director

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Letter from Fryer to Head
May 18, 1942

"This will refer to your letter of the 12th in which you discussed several of the Parker problems. In order to keep your files clear, I shall discuss them in separate letters.

This will refer to the lack of information given evacuees. We held two conferences here with the several Federal agencies concerned. As you know, it is all very confused and, on the whole, the problem is being handled as well as could be expected.

The Farm Security Administration has the responsibility for all farm property and farm implements. The Federal Reserve Bank has the responsibility for transporting the evacuees from the evacuation areas to the reception centers. Unfortunately, the actions and decisions of these agencies are not always well integrated. I do not believe that you will experience the same difficulty when you start receiving evacuees from the assembly centers.

You suggest that the War Relocation Authority take over the whole job. You are being highly complimentary. I am afraid that would increase rather than lessen the confusion. The War Relocation Authority is not staffed for the whole evacuation job.

However, to return to the first paragraph, out of our meeting with the representatives of Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration, as well as representatives of the United States Employment Service who have other responsibilities in connection with evacuation, we have reached an understanding and have made certain definitions of policy wherein I think that evacuees will be given some information. This is based on the assumption that those people at the Control units have a sense of balance and good judgment and are equipped with a modest amount of human understanding.

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Letter from Nash to Fryer
May 21, 1942

"As you undoubtedly know, Mr. Ralph Merritt, one of the best known and most prominent men in the State of California, heads our citizenship committee, or the one previously appointed by Tom Clark.

As luck would have it, Mr. Merritt and I were classmates at the University of California, and when I talked at length with him two or three days ago, his strongest and most immediate recommendation was that the WRA try reassuring the county supervisors of INYO County that no financial burden would be put on their poverty stricken county because of the Japanese thrust upon them.

As things stand at present, I am informed by our legal division if a crime were committed on this Relocation Center, it would go to trial under the laws of the State of California in Independence, the County seat of Inyo County. Likewise, there would be additional burdens thrown on the coroner and the sheriff's office.

It will greatly help to straighten out public relations in this community if this assurance can be given the county some time soon.

Regional Files, 710, Wash., D. C.
Miyamoto

Work Corp.

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TT from E. R. Fryer to M. S. Eisenhower
May 28, 1942

Approximately half of eligible persons in advance detachment Tulelake Center have refused sign enlistment form because of Provision Paragraph 3 sentence 2. Evacuees fearful this provision may mean separation of enlistees from other family members not enlisted. We are assuring Project Director this is not the case but believe revision of form might clarify point.

Tel from E. L. Shirrell, Acting Project Director Tulelake Center to E. R. Fryer, atten. Harvey M. Coverley
May 28, 1942

About fifty percent of the colonists were interviewed for enlistment in the War Relocation work corps yesterday. Over half of those interviewed refused to sign because of promise in paragraph 3 sentence 2. All are fearful of this sentence objection being that they might be transferred away from their families. Please advise us on this.

Regional Files 470, General Wash., D.C.
Miyamoto

Letter from Fryer to Eisenhower
May 30, 1942

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We find that emergency local procurement by our projects is being dangerously hampered by the requirement that we furnish individual priority certificates on local purchases of items on the restricted list. Normally, of course, our procurement of such items would be handled through Quartermaster channels, but delays in delivery will necessitate some emergency procurement from local suppliers. When these suppliers demand the surrender of priority certificates, it is necessary under present procedure for us to apply for preference rating to the War Production Board in Washington, resulting in a delay of one to two weeks.

We understand there is a possibility that the War Production Board Regional Office which is being established in San Francisco may soon be authorized to grant emergency certificates, but we can get no definite assurance here to that effect. Will you please try to ascertain what is being planned in that direction? Unless the War Production Board Regional Office here is to be empowered very soon to issue certificates, we believe every possible avenue should be explored in an attempt to secure some measure of relief from present restrictions. We are wondering, for example, whether it would be possible to secure a blanket clearance on ~~stated~~/ stated quantities of such items as fire hose and extinguishers, to be purchased locally as needed to meet fire hazard on projects where Army fire-fighting equipment has not been delivered.

We shall greatly appreciate your efforts to alleviate what we feel is a most burdensome restriction.