

Regional Files, 002, Wash. D.C.
Miyamoto

C1102

Letter from Eisenhower to Bendetsen
March 24, 1942

Voluntary evacuees, settling in small communities in several states, are apparently being met with a wave of public criticism. Leaders in the states have been led to believe that the relocation of Japanese would be an orderly program with ample protection. But voluntary relocation without provision for protection is causing the states to question the whole policy of the Government. It, therefore, seems to me that voluntary evacuation should cease; otherwise the entire relocation program may be jeopardized.

Regional Files, 711, Wash., D. C.
Miyamoto

Let from M. S. Eisenhower to Honl Leland Ford
March 29, 1942

I am answering your recent telegram by letter because I want to go into some detail on our thinking and plans regarding the wages of Japanese evacuated from military areas.

In the first place, it was very unfortunate that premature and erroneous publicity was given to the wage situation. Putting first things first, the most important task at hand is removing the evacuees from military areas on a planned, orderly basis, with safety and decency. After this has been done we must make it possible for them to perform work that contributes the maximum to the useful skills and abilities that should not be allowed to go to waste at a time when the work of every able person counts for so much. To put evacuees on useful jobs requires a great deal of careful policy-making and planning in which wage considerations play an important part.

I wish to emphasize that no wage rates for evacuees have as yet been determined, and the policies on rates of pay may have to change, as the character of the program changes, and as varying types of useful public and private work are undertaken. However, this much is determined, and agreed to by myself and Col. Karl Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command: Under present conditions the minimum net cash wage of the American soldier, \$21 a month, will be the maximum net cash wage of evacuated persons working on public projects for whom subsistence and housing are provided. Pending the final determination of initial wage rates, evacuated persons will be expected to help in the maintenance of assembly and reception centers. The government will provide only food and shelter.

The matter of private employment is definitely in a different category. Suggestions for private employment of evacuees are pouring in from all parts of the West. However, we have not crystallized our policies with regard to private employment, and the mass evacuation now under way is such an enormous undertaking, that scattered possibilities for the employment of a few families to several hundred cannot be examined at this time with the care that we propose to take. We must first carry out the evacuation and relocate evacuees on suitable public projects until we have surveyed the private employment situation and have established definite policies and procedures.

We have to keep in mind, too, that the majority of the West Coast Japanese--two-thirds of them--are American citizens, and the evidence indicates that most of these are loyal to the United States. Once they have been removed from the military area they have the same legal rights as citizens of any other extraction, and are free to come and go as they please. They have relatives in the armed services of the Nation, and are themselves subject to military service on the same basis as any other citizen. They are, in the interests of national security, being required to make in addition the sacrifice of being uprooted from their established communities and being resettled in entirely new areas, under conditions that are uncertain at best. From my contacts with the leadership of the American-born and educated group of Japanese, it appears that they fully realize they are under severe test and are willing to cooperate in good spirit to prove themselves. We should not make it impossible for them to do so.

As you know, the executive order establishing the War Relocation Authority provides for a War Relocation Work Corps, in which able Japanese evacuees may enlist for the duration. The conditions of employment and wages, both public and private, for ~~Wor~~ Corps workers are to be determined by the Authority. From preliminary conversations with the leadership of the citizen Japanese group, I believe that a majority of them will enlist. In so doing, they will as long as employed on public projects, be foregoing any opportunities to earn the much higher wages that workers in private industry now command. As we feel it is desirable for them to move into private employment, they will, of course, not be asked to accept less than prevailing wages for the work they perform for private employers. It should be emphasized that no matter how employed, either in public or private work, they will pay the Government for room and board furnished them.

We also have to bear in mind not only the domestic, but also the foreign repercussions of the manner in which Japanese evacuees are handled by the Government. We must avoid playing into the hands of our enemies. We can be sure that the fate of some thousands of Americans held by the Japanese Government will depend in part on the treatment that we accord Japanese nationals. We cannot afford, as far as our treatment of American citizens of Japanese origin is concerned, to place by hasty and unwitting action, a powerful weapon in the hands of the Axis, particularly in the Orient, where Japan's major propaganda theme is that Democracies are democratic only as far as the white race is concerned, and do not practice democracy toward the Oriental peoples in their populations.

For the above and other reasons, the evacuation and relocation of Japanese is a touchy and difficult task. We will make some mistakes, but we want to avoid as many as possible by making carefully considered plans and proceeding with caution. The program will require the full measure of tolerance and carefully weighed judgment on the part of the American people.

March 30, 1942

WRA-38
✓ C-22

Mr. James Rowe, Jr.
The Assistant to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

I've been here five days, with an average of four hours a night for sleep. We are moving at a mad pace.

Confidentially, the total evacuation is going to move so rapidly that I quickly determined to divide the program into two phases. The first involves the rapid movement of the total Japanese population from the military area to a series of reception centers. The second involves the planned development of these centers and the gradual dispersal of evacuees into private and public employment.

The Army had selected a number of sites for reception centers before I arrived. However, Colonel Bendetsen recently agreed to hold up all construction until I had time to check these sites and, if I disapproved of the initial selections, to suggest alternatives. My desire is to bring about a reasonably good geographic distribution of the Japanese population to centers of 5,000 to 20,000 persons each, so as to multiply our opportunities to find productive work. Early next week I'll have four regional teams of four men each here at headquarters -- each team to select areas in its region.

In the meantime we've made a bare beginning at establishing a Community Planning and Development Division. A Division of Employment is a mere block on a paper chart, as are divisions of transportation, provisioning, protective services, and so on.

The hardest battles so far are about the property of evacuees. I am fearful that the voluntary system is going to bog down badly in spots. Colonel Bendetsen and I are trying to fix things up as best we can and on the whole, perhaps, justice will be done the Japanese. But there's no denying that there will be difficulties.

Please tell the Attorney General that I appreciate his courtesy in sending me the letters of introduction. Until I can get a small staff appointed and thus relieve the pressure somewhat I will not be able to call on Mr. Wright and the others, nor will I be able to establish an advisory committee.

Meetings with the Japanese have been reasonably good.

If you know of a few good people out this way who could make a real contribution to the program please wire me their names and addresses.

Sincerely,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director
War Relocation Authority

MSE:aw

Regional Files, 002, Wash. D.C.

Memorandum

C1.01

Memo from Bendetsen to Colonels Hass and Evans

March 31, 1942

Subject: Separation of families

1. In evacuation operations planning and temporary settlement operations planning, close liaison will be maintained in order that the separation of families will not become prevalent. Every effort will be made to prevent ~~separation~~ this. In addition, so far as practicable, based on the capacity of reception centers, communities will not be separated. This is particularly important from the point of view of future community planning, as in most instances, a community section is already reasonably well balanced with a cross section of professions, trades and crafts.

2. While we have evacuated persons from Seattle to Owens Valley and will include a group from San Francisco and San Diego there, this practice of mixing small sections of communities should be avoided as ~~early~~ as practicable.

of it is that the Japanese are selling for what they can get. Consequently, everyone agreed that the power to freeze property and to operate the farms until fair value could be received should be vested in the Department of Agriculture.

This power exists now in the hands of the Federal Reserve Bank, which is acting as the agent of the Treasury. This means that the agency which is recruiting people to operate, buy, or lease farms must, if it runs into any type of unfairness, appeal to a representative of the Federal Reserve Bank who is not on the ground and who knows little about farming and farm values.

It soon became evident that the power to freeze property would not be delegated directly to F.S.A. here in San Francisco, so Ed Dodd and I recommended that such power be delegated to you, and by you to the War Boards. Everyone here--General DeWitt, Federal Reserve, and all others--approve the purpose. In my judgment it is a necessary step and one which in all justice to many innocent people should be exercised by a responsible Federal agency, which is not only familiar with the problem but has a definite responsibility for maintaining production.

Now, I'm sure you know that General DeWitt has no authority to delegate any authority of the type I'm discussing. The greatest amount of authority rests with the Treasury. The President gave wide powers to the Alien Property Custodian who delegated his powers to the Treasury. The President gave me authority to assist with the property problem under limited circumstances and I do delegate this authority to the Treasury. This was all done in the initial belief that a single agency could best handle the situation. I still think that's true. But the Treasury should use a competent agricultural agency for agricultural property find as it is using a banking agency for other property.

Most of the Japanese farmers have maintained their farms in excellent condition. When they leave at the rate of two to three thousand a day, however, production is going to be a bit retarded. Evacuees must leave their household goods behind, with only a storage receipt which disclaims all responsibility; their cars, trucks, tractors, and other machinery are impounded. They move to assembly points and then on to reception centers where, starting with sand and cactus, they hope to make a living.

I feel most deeply that when this War is over we consider calmly this unprecedented migration of 120,000 people. We are as Americans going to regret the avoidable injustices that may have occurred.

I hope very much that this explanation may dispel any notion that you or Carl may have (if you do) that General DeWitt has attempted to determine agricultural policies or action. Here on the ground, things are moving fast and are greatly confused. Consequently, our judgment may not always be sound.

3.

It now appears that I shall be in Washington for a day or two about the middle of April. I shall call if anything critical has developed.

Sincerely,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director, War Relocation Authority

MSEisenhower:MB

WRA
CHC

U. S. Dept. of the Interior
Office of Indian Affairs
Washington

April 3, 1942 .

Hon. Jerry Voorhis,
House of Representatives.

My dear Mr. Voorhis:

During our conversation recently concerning the resettlement of Japanese on Indian reservations, I agreed to give you a statement of what has taken place to date and our general proposals.

The War Department requested permission of the Department of the Interior to locate on the Colorado River Indian Reservation some 20,000 Japanese internees. Permission was granted and construction has been proceeding rapidly for the last ten days of the first camp, intended to accommodate 10,000. Two additional camps will be constructed immediately, each to house 5,000.

The Indians of the Colorado River Reservation have for years operated an irrigation project of 6,000 to 8,000 acres. The water has been supplied by pumping from the Colorado River. Within the boundaries of the reservation are approximately 100,000 acres of land susceptible of irrigation. The Indian Service recently completed a diversion dam across the Colorado and embarked on a 15 year program of subjugating and irrigating this 100,000 acre tract. The present Indian residents can not possibly use more than 15,000 or 20,000 acres, consequently, we have planned to colonize on the remaining acreage some 7,500 to 10,000 Indians from the Navajo, Hopi, and Papago reservations, or from other reservations where Indian land resources are inadequate. Work thus far has consisted of the building of the diversion dam and a short section of the main canal to connect it with the present irrigation system so as to substitute gravity water for the water now obtained by pumping.

It is our intention to utilize Japanese labor for the construction of the remainder of the main canal, of the necessary laterals, drainage ditches and levees, and for the subjugation and bringing into cultivation of the now unused waste land. Because of the shortage of heavy machinery there will of necessity be a great deal of pick and shovel work.

In addition to the construction work on the land and the planting of this, as soon as the land is subjugated and water available, we propose to utilize the Japanese in all forms of community services. We plan to erect schools, hospitals, recreational centers, stores, etc., and to staff these almost entirely by Japanese. In addition there will be considerable opportunity for clerical work, engineering work of various kinds and perhaps at a later date for some outside employment. The project, of course, can not become self-supporting until sufficient lands have been subjugated to grow sufficient food for everyone. Until that time, a pay roll of at least four million dollars annually will have to be supplied by the Federal Government. This figure may become much larger if the War Relocation Authority, under whose general supervision we shall operate, desires to pay more than a bare subsistence wage. In addition, of course, there will need to be funds for medical supplies, school supplies, and administrative staff.

It has been clearly understood with the War Department and with the War Relocation Authority that every Japanese will be moved off the reservation within 6 months after the close of the war. The War Department has also agreed to

supply necessary military guard both for the protection of the internees as well as to assure their custody. The improvements on the land, of course, will revert to Indian use with the removal of the Japanese.

Our total effort shall be directed toward the assimilation and Americanization of the group. This we believe to be the policy of the Congress as embodied in the report of the Select Committee investigating National Defense Migration, published under March 19, 1942.

Very sincerely yours,

William Zimmerman, (?)
Assistant Commissioner

Regional Files 002, Wash. D. C.
Miyamoto

Letter from Eisenhower to Rowalt
April 5, 1942

C101

We should arrange to contact selected state and local people before each project is announced--probably we should do this in cooperation with WCCA. For Example, I was told today that there would be considerable hostility to the establishment of a reception center at Tule Lake. Mr. Cooter told me that he could bring about a reasonable degree of acceptance through channels open to him. A little later Dave Davidson of AAA told me that a Mr. Lane of his organization has been at Tule Lake recently and reports a growing sentiment in favor of Japanese relocation there.

Will you please take on, as a special task, working through John Bird, WCCA, or whoever may be necessary, the management of whatever procedures may be necessary to establish the necessary location prior to the announcement of each area of resettlement.

Regional Files, 470- general Wash., D.C.
Miyamoto

Memo to Eisenhower from Cress
April 8, 1942

Subject: General Plan for Project Settlement Supply

I have carefully studied the supply plans prepared by Lt. Colonel Foy and Major Maston. The two plans are based upon opposite points of view. The Foy plan calls for maximum centralization of supply within the Regional SOS. The Maston plan shifts the bulk of the burden to the Projects as rapidly as they are able to assume it.

While appreciating that these plans were prepared by Officers of the Quartermaster Corps, I must disagree in part with the initial concepts included in each plan.

I have prepared the following basic considerations for your approval, which in my opinion, must govern in the formulation of any supply plan.

1st Consideration:

Projects generally are not near or adjacent to local sources of adequate supply nor Army installations.

2nd Consideration:

The use of Army contracts for subsistence supply is highly desirable in order to insure food priorities and avoid any competition with another Federal Agency in making purchases. However, the ration value will not be exceeded.

3rd Consideration:

The use of other Governmental Agencies for purchases of expensive items common to all camps is desirable in order to avoid duplication of federal purchasing functions.

4th Consideration:

Supply must not fail due to any avoidable cause. This will require local purchases at convenient points within 200 miles of camps, necessary reserves on hand in the camp, and facilities at regional headquarters.

5th Consideration:

Until experience is gained, Regional Headquarters should initiate pre-planning, overstock the first projects, and maintain channels for demands placed upon it by Project Superintendents. Overstock the project but demand strict accountability and close supervision.

The following procedure is suggested in order to establish a supply system which will insure an adequate flow of supplies in view of the above basic considerations.

- (a) The Regional SOS must ascertain exactly what will be at the Reception Center when WRA takes over from the Army.
- (b) The Regional SOS must have in advance at the Reception Center additional supplies and equipment in excess of anticipated requirement by 25%. The initial project administrator must keep especially careful check and records of his use of the equipment and supplies furnished in order to de-

Memo from Cress to Eisenhower, cont'd.

termine basic requirements for future new projects.

- (c) Stockage of ration articles should be not less than 10 days and preferably 30 as facilities for non-perishable and perishable items will permit. Fuel should be not less than 30 days unless wood is available locally. Medical supplies should be not less than 30 days. Stationery and blank forms should be not less than 90 days; utilities 25% replacement; automotive parts based upon manufacturers' experience tables for 90 days, sanitary supplies 30 days; gasoline, grease and fuel in accordance with contract scheduled deliveries but with 50% stockage to meet emergencies.
- (d) The general plan for subsistence must provide that charges against inventory be on a basis of consumption. In other words, with a \$250,000 stock of rations received, the value of the items consumed during the period represents the ration cost rather than the outlay on stock. This again calls for strict accountability and close supervision in the issue, preparation and consumption of the food. It has frequently been said; in inspecting any mess start with the garbage cans, bearing in mind that the less the garbage the better the mess.
- (e) Requisitions for ration articles must be on a 30 day basis, preferably 45 days in advance. Shipments must be in quantities on order to insure the lowest transportation cost. Shipments within any ten-day period must be balanced.
- (f) Local purchases of subsistence items within approximately 200 miles at convenient points, of all perishables and especially attractively priced, non-perishable items should be insisted upon. Where such points are common to more than one project they should be under SOS.
- (g) Community gardens and other enterprises must be utilized at the earliest date and to the maximum capacity.
- (h) Local prices of supplies and equipment, other than subsistence, in quantities sufficient for project needs will be reported at 15-day periods for comparison with prices available to the regional supply office. The lowest price with transportation costs included, will determine the place of procurement.

I suggest that with these considerations and this general plan in mind, the machinery be set up and detailed plans prepared by the SOS.

I suggest further that the basic procedure in connection with the handling of funds for this supply be included in the detailed plans prepared by SOS for approval by the Director.

Regional Files, 711, Wash. D.C.
Miyamoto

C1.01

Tel from M. S. Eisenhower to Hon. Charles Cramer
April 8, 1942

Following statement issued March 30 by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, assistant chief of staff for civil affairs of the western defense command and fourth army, and I outlining present status of wage policies. Quote. Many inquiries are reaching us from every part of the country regarding the level of wages that may be paid to Japanese aliens and to Japanese-Americans evacuated from West Coast military areas who work temporarily under the program of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration, or who enlist for the duration of the war in the work corps of the War Relocation Authority. Paragraph. Putting first things first, the most important task after evacuees have been removed from military areas is to make it possible for them to perform work that contributes the maximum to the war production effort. The people being evacuated possess a wide range of useful skills and abilities that should not be allowed to go to waste at a time when the work of every person counts for so much. To put evacuees at really useful work as soon as possible requires a great deal of careful policy making and planning in which wage considerations play an important part. Paragraph. We wish to emphasize that no wage rates for evacuees have as yet been determined. Further, the policies or rates of pay established may have to change, as the character of the program changes, and as varying types of useful public and private work are undertaken. However, this much is determined: Under present conditions the minimum net cash wage of the American soldier, \$21 a month, will be the maximum net cash wage of evacuated persons working on public projects for whom subsistence and housing are provided. Paragraph. Pending the final determination of initial wage rates, evacuated persons wherever possible will provide for the maintenance of assembly centers and reception centers. The government will provide food and shelter. Unquote. Persons evacuated who find private employment will receive prevailing wages.

Regional Files 470- general Wash., D.C.
Miyamoto

Memo to Eisenhower from Foy, April 9, 1942

Since Submitting a recommended plan of supply for your approval, further developments have prompted me to submit briefly the following considerations for a supply plan for WRA:

1. Subsistence to be procured thru the Army Depot at Oakland for the duration thru this authority.

a. Army officials in charge have assured me that this can be accomplished satisfactorily and this is highly recommended due to simplicity in accomplishment and that it may avoid future difficulties that may arise from restrictions being placed on civilian agencies.

2. Supplies other than subsistence.

a. Take over the WPA agency now set up for procuring supplies, other than subsistence, for WCCA. This agency is operated under the direction of Mr. R. L. Nicholson who is WPA Director for this region. I have consulted with Mr. Nicholson on this matter and he is of the opinion that his agency could continue to procure supplies for WRA after it has taken over from WCCA. It is believed that the transfer should be gradual and during the period of transition the WPA agency now set up would procure supplies for both WCCA and WRA, severing relations with WCCA only after WCCA has completed its turn-over of evacuees to WRA. Mr. Nicholson has suggested a conference between Col. Bendetsen, Mr. Eisenhower, himself and any other representatives desired by the heads of WCCA and WRA at the earliest possible date, at which he believes a satisfactory solution to this problem can be made. This transfer is strongly recommended as it is believed to be the most satisfactory to WRA. WPA, under Mr. Nicholson, has an experienced and efficient staff who are experts in the line of procurement desired. The agency is all set up and operating efficiently for WCCA, from whom WRA will take over. Further, this will avoid a change to a different procurement agency immediately upon the transfer of evacuees from WCCA to WRA, which would no doubt cause a considerable amount of confusion. Lastly, it has been my experience that competent personnel is difficult to obtain.

b. Have the Army Oakland Depot take over procurement of all supplies. Col. Riley, QMC, the commanding officer of the Oakland Depot, has assured me that this could be accomplished and that his depot would gladly take over the job. It is believed that this system would be satisfactory. Col. Riley stated that in case this was ~~satisfactory~~ done it would be necessary to augment his staff as the situation required at the expense of WRA. I recommend this agency as second choice due to fact that it would require the Army to enter into new fields of procurement which may not work too well. Another thing to consider is that in case the Army agency became overloaded WRA would most likely be the first to be thrown on its own.

c. Mr. Ralph Thompson, head of the Procurement Division, OEM, seems to be of the opinion that his office could handle the procurement, other than subsistence, of WRA. However, he advises that he must get this approved from the Washington office, which approval he has not received to date. It is apparent that OEM would be compelled to enter ~~new~~ new fields of procurement which in my opinion would require adjustments and corrections for some time before smooth and efficient service could be expected.

d. Lastly, WRA might possibly establish its own procurement agency which I

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Memo from Foy to Eisenhower, cont'd.

strongly recommend against due to the fact that experienced personnel is difficult to obtain aside from the fact that it would have to be organized into a team from the ground up.

Regional Files, Wash. D. C. .002
Miyamoto

Letter from Kimura to Eisenhower
April 13, 1942

*Harold M. Kimura
3816 Oakwood Ave
L.A., Cal.*

This is written on behalf of a group of Japanese people who are members of or who are interested in the Hollywood Independent Church. Sometime ago, Mr. Tom Clark and his assistant Mr. Harrington advised us, upon my inquiry, to group ourselves together so that we ~~could~~ could live during this internment in the same resettlement camp.

There are about 250 people who have grouped themselves to evacuate with the Hollywood Independent Church members. They would like to go to the Parker Resettlement Area. Several men and women have already volunteered for work at Parker and will leave on April 20. The Japanese people of Los Angeles and of Hollywood, citizens and aliens alike, would like to have information on the following:

- (1) Would the stored goods be sent up to them later? If so who would handle the expenses involved?
- (2) Would church members, now in Manzanar be allowed to reunite with the church group at Parker?
- (3) What are the type or types of industry contemplated for Parker?
- 4 (4) What provisions are being made for persons with technical, professional, skilled labor, training and experience, in the form of compensation, continuance of work along their respective lines, opportunities for business, degree of self-government, financial aid and bonus?
- (5) What contacts can people in these resettlement areas make with the outlying communities in the way of social and economic readjustment, freedom to travel within prescribed areas, social recreation, church services and joint good-will meetings?

On behalf of the Japanese people, especially of Hollywood,, I would appreciate information on any or all of the above inquiries you can forward to me.

C102

April 13, 1942

To: John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War
From: M. S. Eisenhower, Director, War Relocation Authority

1. Personnel

Lt. Col. E. F. Cress was authorized a 15-day delay under existing orders with a per diem of \$6. This should be extended because it is not possible for Colonel Cress to return to Washington now. His present authorization expires April 13.

Lt. Col. L. W. Foy and Major V. E. Maston were authorized a 30-day delay, with provision for \$6 per diems. These should be extended.

Two additional officers of the Quartermaster Corps will be required at once. Specific suggestions will be submitted to the War Department within the next day or two.

An officer from the Provost Marshal's office will be required on the Washington staff of the Director of the War Relocation Authority at an early date to serve under the Deputy Director, Colonel Cress, and to maintain constant liaison with the Provost Marshall's office in providing necessary military guard service.

Lt. Col. Cress should be promoted to the rank of Colonel at the earliest possible date.

2. Limited Service Military Police Battalions

Because I have been in California it has been necessary of course to work principally with General DeWitt and Colonel Bendetson. Limitations in that area are such that for the present the Fourth Army Command feels it cannot provide military protection for evacuee communities of less than 5,000 population. This is satisfactory for the immediate present but will rapidly become a serious handicap. The States and local communities are not able to guarantee the maintenance of law and order. Consequently, smaller communities of evacuees could be established and smaller groups of evacuees could move out into agricultural work only if military guards are provided. In other words, the character of the relocation program is going to be profoundly affected by the number of guards made available.

3. Site Acquisition and Construction

All phases of evacuation are managed by the Army. The Army

moves evacuees from their homes to assembly points and ultimately on to reception centers. In the meantime the Army acquires the reception center sites as selected by WRA. The Army constructs the necessary buildings and installs the necessary facilities. The WRA takes over complete management when evacuees are moved into the reception center. This procedure is working well within States of the Western Defense Command. However, some reception centers must be located in Colorado and other states outside the Western Defense Command. It is necessary to conclude arrangements which will operate speedily in having the War Department or the appropriate military commander acquire sites and construct buildings and install facilities at points outside the Western Defense Command.

4. Commissions for Four Attorneys

In managing evacuation and relocation we are dealing more with American citizens than we are with enemy aliens. Consequently, it is necessary to develop at the outset and to maintain a logical legal theory with respect to Federal protection and management. Further, within each relocation area it is necessary to establish partially self-governing Japanese communities which in turn requires the maintenance of a consistent legal pattern. Therefore the WRA must be assured of continuity in a small nucleus of a legal staff. I should like to obtain commissions for the Head Solicitor, two Assistant Solicitors on management and litigation, and one Regional Attorney. All other members of the legal staff can be civilians, and if members of the staff are taken into the armed forces they can be replaced, though possibly temporary deferments will have to be requested occasionally.

5. Tactical Line Connections

It is necessary for the War Department, the Washington headquarters of WRA, the headquarters of the Western Defense Command, and the regional office of WRA at San Francisco to maintain constant communication with one another. The War Department and WRA are so closely tied together in this program that failure to communicate will cause serious difficulties. Consequently, a connection on the War Department's tactical line should be installed in the Director's office of WRA here in Washington and in the office of the Regional Director of the WRA at San Francisco. This would complete the necessary communication system.

6. Service of Supply and Priorities

We are going to be able to obtain food, clothing, and other essentials for evacuees and to obtain necessary equipment for the operation of the relocation projects only if we are able to use the procurement agencies of the various services of the United States Army and to have access to Army priorities. It is simply impossible to obtain food, equipment and other essentials under the normal priority system.

The Parker, Arizona project opens April 20. Procurement for this project for provisions and equipment is desired from the Quartermaster Depot, Oakland, California. Sufficient funds have been allotted by the Bureau of the Budget to WRA so that one and a half million dollars can be transferred immediately to the Finance Officer, United States Army, for necessary payments. ~~The initial construction~~

The initial construction of reception centers by the Army includes, of course, only the minimum essentials of living. As soon as the evacuees are moved into a reception center, it is necessary for WRA to take hold and using Japanese labor to construct additional facilities such as school houses and additional hospitalization. Any delay encountered in this work would be as serious a disadvantage to the War Department as it would be to WRA.

7. Space in Washington, D. C. - War Department Building

If at all possible, 10,000 sq. ft. of space should be reserved for the Washington headquarters of WRA in the War Department Building.

8. Military Priority on Travel

Despite the fact that we have a No. 5 priority on travel, several of our officials have been held up on essential travel because persons with higher priority filled all the airplane accommodations. For a considerable time it is going to be necessary for me personally to move from Washington, D. C. to San Francisco quite frequently. Would it be possible for me to obtain a straight military priority on air travel?

9. Policy Declaration

It may be necessary for the Secretary of War or the President to issue, within the next few days, a statement emphasizing that evacuation on the Pacific Coast is a military necessity requiring systematic procedures and controls; that the military procedures cannot be interrupted by permitting a wholesale dispersal of evacuees; that the military necessity demands absolute safety to communities and to the evacuees, and that the evacuation must and will be handled with the greatest degree of consideration possible for the evacuees themselves. The substantial shortage of labor in agriculture in the Inter-mountain States is bringing strong demands for the release of evacuees to work in the sugar beet fields. This demand exists at the same time that all State leaders are insisting that Japanese remain under Federal surveillance; that the Federal Government prevent evacuees from buying land; that the Federal Government guarantee the withdrawal of evacuees from inter-mountain States at the conclusion of the war and that the Federal Government by some method take back into custody all Japanese who previously left the Coast under policy of voluntary evacuation.

April 13, 42
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10. Surplus Equipment

Information furnished by Civilian Conservation Corps authorities in the San Francisco area indicates that on about March 31, 1942, General Somervell issued an order to the Director of the CCC in Washington, D. C., through the office of the Federal Security Agency, requesting that all surplus equipment be turned over to the Army under the Act of December 23, 1942 - Public Law No. 371 of the 77th Congress. It is understood that considerable motive equipment in this surplus property is being listed as available to various Government agencies. (For example, in the San Francisco area there is apparently an excess of 270 trucks and 50 tractors of various types -- all CCC equipment.

- a. WRA needs as soon as possible 400 $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, or trucks of equivalent capacity. We should like to have 200 $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks or equivalent tonnage thereof and 20 tractors from surplus CCC stocks or other available sources available at once (San Francisco). The 200 additional trucks and 5 tractors should be earmarked and made available to WRA on call from any convenient locations in the West. Any serviceable type vehicle, standard or non-standard, would be satisfactory.

DODGE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Mishawaka, Indiana

April 13, 1943

Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell
War Relocation Authority
226 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Shirrell:

Since my last discussion with you and since your representative was in this territory, I have had a good many discussions regarding the Japanese-American situation and I find there is very little antagonism anywhere regarding the rights which American-born Japanese should be entitled to. However, there is a very distinct objection to having them come into a community of this kind not subject to the draft.

At the last meeting of the War Manpower Commission held on Friday of last week a resolution was passed in which they said in short that they would not be willing to accept young Japanese-Americans in this community unless they were subject to the draft as all other boys in this community are.

This is for your confidential information. No publicity has been given to the subject and there probably won't be.

Yours very truly,

/Signed/ J. E. Otis, Jr.
President

JE Otis, jr.
HE

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

War Relocation Authority
226 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois

April 14, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Elmer Rowalt
Acting Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rowalt:

I am sending you herewith, for Mr. Myer's attention, a letter which I have received from Mr. J. E. Otis, Jr., President, Dodge Manufacturing Corporation, Mishawaka, Indiana.

I met Mr. Otis one evening at a conference held with some of the leading citizens of Mishawaka and South Bend and he is most interested in our program. He has been very helpful.

He has made a very decided point and I think the resolution of the War Manpower Commission should be given very careful consideration by Mr. Myer. We are running into the same situation every day. Until this matter of the draft is cleared up by the Army, it will continue to haunt us.

I felt Mr. Myer himself would want to see this letter and am therefore sending it to you as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

/Signed/ Elmer L. Shirrell
Elmer L. Shirrell
Relocation Supervisor

Encls.

Miyamoto

Letter from Fryer to Kimura
April 20, 1942

*Harold M. Kimura
3816 Oakwood Ave.
Los Ang. Cal.*

I am replying to your letter of April 13 to Mr. Eisenhower who is at the present time in Washington.

I cannot tell you to what extent, if any, people from the Los Angeles-Hollywood area will be settled on the Parker Project. I can assure you, however, that it is the policy that there shall be a minimum disruption of community life; consequently, people from the same community will be sent to the same relocation project.

The answers to your questions are as follows:

1. Goods stored in warehouses will be sent to the project by the Government. It is the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority to reunite family and furniture.
2. At the present time large shifts of people from one relocation project to another are not being contemplated. This policy does not preclude such transfers where they are in the public interest.
3. The types of industries organized at relocation projects will be determined by two things: (1) The skills of the people, and (2) war production needs.
4. It is the policy to utilize the professional skills, to the greatest possible extent, found among the evacuees in order that there will be a minimum disruption of their professional life; teachers will be assigned to schools; doctors, to hospitals; farmers, to project farms, etc. It is planned that there shall be a minimum of federal staff. The Japanese will be expected to supply clerical and managerial assistance in all fields for which they are qualified.
5. Thus recreational and spiritual opportunities needed for a well-rounded community life will be provided. However, their exact nature must be determined by the Japanese themselves.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 20, 1942

RESTRICTED

Honorable Herbert B. Maw
Governor of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Governor Maw:

I am glad to have your letter of April 13. As you say, the job that the War Relocation Authority has been established to do is a complex and difficult one. It is helpful to have the benefit of your counsel.

Since I met with you in Salt Lake City, I have consulted with the War Department, a number of Members of Congress -- particularly Members of Congress for the western States -- the Bureau of the Budget, and with other appropriate officials of the Federal and State governments. These consultations have made it clear to me that evacuation and relocation must be handled as a Federal responsibility.

The task divides into two parts. The first is the initial evacuation and relocation of Japanese families. The second is the longer-time one of providing work opportunities for those capable of employment. Since this whole movement of nearly 120,000 people is strictly a military necessity, military considerations must prevail. Even gainful employment is possible only within the conditions imposed by military necessity.

It has been demonstrated that dispersal of the Japanese throughout the country without protection is out of the question. There is therefore no alternative to Federally-managed evacuation and relocation, with protective services provided by the Army to guard against civil disturbances. We have been advised by the Army that it is not now feasible to provide such guard service for groups of less than 5,000 people.

Consequently, the first phase of this whole undertaking, extending over a period of many months, may be outlined this way:

(1) Evacuees, affected by the military orders, move in family groups from their homes to assembly centers within military area number one. There they remain until a relocation center (reception center) has been constructed; at the assembly centers essential physical examinations, inoculations, etc., are handled.

(2) As rapidly as relocation centers are constructed, evacuees move there under Federal protection from the assembly centers. Each relocation area is a military area, guarded by military police.

(3) The household furniture of evacuees is then moved from military area number one, where it was stored at the inception of evacuation, to the appropriate relocation center.

(4) Evacuees then go to work within the new military or relocation area -- some performing public work, some farming, some handling community service, some engaging in manufacturing within the area.

While the movement of evacuees from their homes to temporary assembly centers is now under way and will be completed in an orderly fashion in a very short time, it will be some months before all are permanently located in war-duration relocation centers. The Manzanar center in California, housing 10,000 evacuees, is nearing completion; the Colorado River relocation center in Arizona, housing 20,000, is under construction and evacuees begin moving there today. The Gila relocation center in Arizona, housing 10,000, is under construction. Others will be announced soon.

Each relocation area must be selected in the light of the possibility that evacuees will work exclusively in that area for the duration of the war. Whether this proves to be the fact or not, we must obviously face that possibility. Hence each area, held in public ownership, must provide opportunities for public work, for food production, and for simple manufacturing.

During this first phase of the undertaking, it would be difficult to permit a large movement of workers into seasonal agricultural employment. To begin with, this is a critical period in Pacific Coast farming; consequently, as a general rule, agricultural workers are being moved to the assembly centers last. To make them available right now for work on inter-mountain farms would cause agricultural difficulties in military area number one. Secondly, to permit the wide dispersal of male workers while their dependents are moving as heretofore described would be exceedingly confusing; frankly, the Army and the War Relocation Authority would have difficulty in reuniting families and furniture at the appropriate relocation centers. Even so, General DeWitt has made it clear that workers may be recruited right now, provided those hiring the workers pay transportation both ways, recruit on a voluntary basis through the U. S. Employment Service, pay prevailing wages without displacing other labor, provide facilities for at least the minimum essentials of living, and provided the States and local communities give assurance that they can maintain law and order. The Army can guarantee the maintenance of order only on the planned basis I have described.

All that I have said thus far pertains to the initial, immediate task of evacuation and relocation. I should now like to say a few things about the longer-time or war-duration job of management, beginning after the entire population is housed in Federally-protected relocation centers.

This management will put the safety of the United States, of the local communities, and of the evacuees first. Because voluntary evacuation, involving wide dispersal, led to difficulties with which you are wholly familiar, we shall give each voluntary evacuee an opportunity come to a relocation center for the duration of the war. I hope this will solve all troubles incident to the early voluntary evacuation. If it does not, other steps will have to be determined in the light of the situation then prevailing.

All able-bodied evacuees will be enlisted, for the duration of the war, in the War Relocation Work Corps. If military and other circumstance so dictate, the enlistees will stay within the guarded areas. They will subjugate the land; they will produce food; they will build schools and hospitals; they will produce war goods; they will do all that is necessary to contribute the maximum to their subsistence and to needed production.

If the enlistees are then needed in private employment and if appropriate protective services are by that time available, they could be granted furloughs from the War Relocation Works Corps for specified periods of time. But, of course, they would return to the relocation centers at the expiration of the furloughs.

I repeat, however, that military and related safety considerations will have to govern when we weigh the possibilities of furloughs.

To conclude this long letter, I say to you candidly that I fully understand the statements coming to me officially from all States, to this effect: Since evacuation is a military necessity, the States receiving evacuees insist that there be no permanent, dispersed settlement (hence the Federal ownership of relocation lands); that the Federal Government protect communities and evacuees (hence the protected areas with minima of 5,000 population); that voluntary evacuees be withdrawn (hence the construction of sufficient housing to accommodate not only those now being evacuated but also those who left the zone prior to March 29); that unguarded dispersal cease (hence the freezing order), and that evacuees be withdrawn when the war is over (hence, again, the use of Federally-owned lands, the occupancy of which may be determined by the government itself.)

It seems to me apparent that it is not possible to meet now both the demands for wide dispersal of evacuees in agricultural areas and the demands stated in the previous paragraph. Consequently, the decision has been made definitely in favor of an orderly, protected system.

I can assure you that the Army will be in touch with you before establishing a relocation center in your State. And I shall welcome suggestions from you at any time.

Faithfully yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director

C1.01

Memo from Vance Rogers to Fryer
April 21, 42

One of the most controversial questions of policy now facing the WRA is the matter of wage policy for Japanese evacuees. Any consideration of this subject is shot through with questions of public reaction. The public may be expected to look with disfavor on any approach which gives the Japanese full compensation for work they do on projects. Indeed, the public is likely to look with disfavor on any decision to compensate the Japanese at all for work they do.

The approach suggested in this statement is based on the following analysis of the whole problem of Japanese evacuation:

- (a) The evacuation order of the Japanese from the West Coast is a measure of military necessity and public safety.
- (b) Once promulgated, the order has made the economic position of the Japanese untenable where they now are.
- (c) While orderly and planned evacuation removes the Japanese from an untenable situation, it is a situation that is directly attributable to necessary action by the Federal Government.
- (d) The Federal Government, since it is responsible on the one hand for the present plight of the Japanese, and since it is responsible on the other hand for the welfare of the citizenry of the country, has an obligation to provide full opportunity for work, with adequate compensation, for all Japanese willing and able to work.

If the foregoing analysis of the problem is valid the Federal Government has a clear responsibility for offering Japanese workers full compensation for all productive work performed on projects, either under direct supervision or by contractual arrangement with private enterprise. By the same token, the government may rightly expect from the Japanese reimbursement for such essentials as the provision of food and shelter and for such services as medical care and education. Deviation from full compensation places the government in the somewhat dubious position of exploiting the labor of a segment of its population whose only demonstrable sin is color of skin and shape of eye. Since two-thirds of the population are citizens and since the overwhelming majority is certainly loyal, and further since this population ~~are-citizens~~ ~~and-since-the-overwhelming~~ has already been required to make a tremendous sacrifice, the question of full compensation would seem one of easy solution.

But the problem is far from clear cut. A specious but nevertheless compelling argument against full compensation is the men in the armed forces are receiving only a nominal wage. The simple fact that the Japanese evacuees are not in the armed forces carries less weight in terms of public reaction than the ~~legis~~ ~~ef-the legis~~ logic of the situation would indicate. To suggest a complete disregard of public opinion on this subject is, of course, wholly irresponsible. ^{It} simply cannot be done. What may be done, however, is to give consideration to the following method of compensating evacuees for their effort:

- (a) Classify all work in terms of broad categories such as (a) professional (b) skilled (c) semi-skilled and (d) common labor.
- (b) Set up going rates of pay for each category.
- (c) Compensate workers with a nominal amount of cash proportionate to each category, say a rate roughly corresponding to the rates of pay of privates and non-commissioned officers in the armed forces.
- (d) Carry a book value against the account of each individual for the difference between the cash payment and the full value of service rendered, such value to be either actually diverted to war bonds and stamps or to be considered available as a loan to the government for the war period.

This proposal would seem to have the following advantages:

- (a) It would not meet with as much public favor as would a nominal compensation.
- (b) It would entail a considerable amount of bookkeeping. This cost, however, could be prorated and deducted from savings.
- (c) It would have the apparent effect of showing a "less favorable" balance between public costs and public returns for the whole program.

On the other hand, the proposal would seem to have the following advantages:

- (a) It would accumulate a surplus of credit susceptible of liquidation after the war which the Japanese could use to facilitate repatriation and reabsorption in normal economic life.
- (b) It would avoid further discrimination against a segment of the population which can scarcely be blamed for the role their forebears are playing in the present war.
- (c) It should have a strong influence on building up the morale of the Japanese during the period of the war and it should make their repatriation more expeditious and more effective after the war.

Add to WRA, Chapter 1, Eisenhower's appointment & early plans

Letter from Eisenhower to Elbert D. Thomas, Senator Utah.
April 23, 1942

I shall be in Washington again within a week or so and hope very much to have an opportunity to discuss with you present difficulties we are facing in evacuation and relocation.

As you know, I entered on this task with the belief that the Japanese themselves could handle most phases of relocation and that the roll of the Government was simply to provide such assistance as the Japanese would find to be necessary. I have been very much disillusioned, not by the Japanese but by many other forces and circumstances. The voluntary evacuation of about 8,000 Japanese led to the most extreme bitterness in the Inter-mountain states. Demands arose officially in all states for the Federal Government to withdraw the evacuees, to prevent Japanese from acquiring land, to guarantee that the Japanese would be removed at the end of the War, and to give positive assurance that the whole relocation program would be on an orderly, federally protected basis. Governors and Attorneys General told me in a meeting at Salt Lake City that the states would not be able to maintain law and order if voluntary evacuation continued. One Governor wrote me formally declaring that his state would not accept responsibility for the safety of a single evacuee. He warned me that he feared for the safety of the evacuees when casualty lists were announced in increasing numbers.

We have been compelled to adopt a program for the time being which involves moving Japanese from Military Area No. 1 to new locations outside this military area in communities of not less than 5,000. The reason for this minimum of 5,000 is simply that the Army cannot provide protection for a smaller number in view of the fact that it takes about as many men to guard a community of 500 as it does to guard 5,000.

Naturally I am hopeful that feeling will subside and that later on we can go ahead with the initial plans for providing employment and establishment by the Japanese themselves of their own self-supporting communities but only time will disclose the actual possibilities in that direction.

Frankly, I would not have become identified with this War task had I realized in advance all that was involved. However, now that I am in the midst of the thing, I intend to see it through. We will provide economic opportunities within the relocation areas; we will look to the Japanese themselves to handle their community affairs to the highest extent they can. Later on, if conditions permit, we will go ahead as I have indicated.

I am being warned by members of Congress and by citizens everywhere against a liberal wage policy. This disturbs me very much and it is one of the things I very much wish to discuss with you when I h

have an opportunity to see you. I have about reached the conclusion that only a ~~strong~~ strong statement by the President will lead to reasonable liberality in the management of this whole affair.

With kind personal regards, I am

Regional Files, 470-general, Wash., D.C.
Miyamoto

Memo to Eisenhower from Lt. Col. Foy, Q.M.C.
April 25, 1942

Subject: Property and Supply Procedure

1. Project Superintendents are immediately made responsible and accountable officers and required to keep a stock record account for their projects.
2. In the event that a Reception Center is taken over from WCCA, the Project Superintendent will carefully check, note condition thereof, and receipt for all property, equipment and supplies turned over by the proper WCCA Agent. When project installations are constructed by the Army Engineers and equipped by the Army Quartermaster or other agencies the Project Superintendent with sufficient assistants will report at designated site to check all installations, property and supplies prior to taking over from the proper agents. The Project Superintendent will arrange necessary administrative details for the reception of evacuees at the appointed time.
3. Procurement of subsistence supplies is accomplished by direct requisition of the Project Superintendent on the Army Agent designated (for Parker, Arizona, The San Bernardino, California Quartermaster Depot, San Bernardino, Calif.) using W.D., QMC Form 400 and 401 which will be provided by this office. One copy of this requisition will be forwarded to the Regional Supply Office. Subsistence will be requested for on basis of a 30-day supply, 45 days in advance of date delivery is desired. The Army Procuring Agent will furnish upon request a 10-day supply of a non-perishable Army ration for new projects not taken over from the WCCA. Immediately, the Project Supply Agent, with the assistance of the Mess Steward and any other required assistance, will prepare menus and submit requisitions to provide for the 45 days advance notice to the Procuring Agent. Thereafter, requisitions will be submitted periodically to insure that the Procuring Agent has the required advance notice. When a project is taken over from WCCA, this initial issue of a 10-day supply of non-perishable ration is not necessary due to the fact that arrangements can be made in advance by WRA Regional Supply Office to continue the regular ration in use by WCCA. Whenever possible, the Project Supply Officer and the Steward should be sent to the Procurement Agency for at least two days instruction in the proper procedure for procurement of supplies of all classes. This has been done for the Parker Project very satisfactorily and it will be of great value when that project begins to operate.
4. Procurement of supplies and equipment other than subsistence is to be obtained thru Army Agencies and will be requisitioned for by the Project Superintendent on W.D. QMC Form 400 and 401 the same as subsistence except that such requisitions will be forwarded to the Regional Supply Office for editing and forwarding to the proper Army Procuring Agent. Detailed instructions as to preparation of requisitions, number of copies prepared and disposition of same are being prepared for projects by this office.
5. The above procedure resulted from conferences with the Commanding Officer, California Quartermaster Depot, and the undersigned. This procedure, as a matter of fact, was prescribed in part by the Commanding Officer, California Quartermaster Depot, which depot was designated by the War Department as the Army Procuring Agency for WRA for Quartermaster supplies at the Parker Project. The War Department is also designating Army Procuring Agencies for Engineer, Medical and Signal supplies and equipment to be used by WRA.
6. The undersigned has been assured that the Army Agencies above can and will procure supplies of all classes for WRA in accordance with the priorities established by the War Production Board. In cases where rationed or restricted

Memo from Foy to Eisenhower, cont'd.

materials and equipment are desired priorities must be established and must accompany requisitions.

7. All procurement performed by Army Agencies must be performed entirely by those agencies, thru requisitions made on said agencies by WRA. They desire to know what is wanted and when it is wanted and claim that they will do the rest. All procurement done locally by Project Agencies must be done by Project Agents with funds allotted to them other than funds already allotted to Army Agencies.

8. A certain amount of procurement in cases of emergency will be required to be performed locally by Project Agencies, which are being set up on the project. This will be done by special WRA funds being allotted to each project by the Regional Fiscal Officer. It is recommended that Project Superintendents be authorized to procure locally in cases of emergency not in excess of \$500.00. Any items exceeding \$500.00 are to be procured only upon authority of the Regional Fiscal Officer with the approval of the Regional Director.

9. The above system of Procurement of Supplies provides a desired flexibility which will insure a continuous flow of supplies and equipment thruout WRA Projects as needed. The great majority of supplies will be procured by Designated Army Agencies but WRA has the alternative of resorting to local purchases or to other Government Agencies such as OEM in cases of emergency or when considered more practical.

10. This office is devising a system by which all project supply officers and Stewards will be given detailed instructions in procedure of supply by being instructed in said procedure by a qualified representative from this office.

C
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P
Y

M E M O R A N D U M

April 26, 1942

To: E. M. Rowalt

FROM: M. S. Eisenhower

1. Ralph Stanber should immediately familiarize himself with--

- (a) The material Tozier brought together on the treatment by enemy countries of American citizens and prisoners of war.
- (b) The Geneva convention (consult Tozier).
- (c) The American program on detention of aliens and the imprisonment of citizens suspected of subversive activity. (Ennis of Justice).
- (d) The developing thought in the War Department on Italian and German aliens. This is critical. I am led to believe that plans are moving ahead at great speed. You should introduce Stanber to Colonel Tate, explain the purpose of our so-called Kx Division, and arrange for Stanber to have access to as much information, including secret information, as the War Department feels it can possibly disclose to us. Mr. Jeritzki (spelling?) has been working on this problem. Stanber should spend considerable time with him.

2. Pop Utz should determine whether he wishes to begin by coming to San Francisco for a few days or whether he feels he can initiate important activity in Washington that is not now underway. For example:

- (a) In the near future, Executive Order 9102 will be amended to authorize WRA to provide employment for Japanese in all parts of the country. Their discharge from private employment is causing acute difficulty. Should we, then, explore the possibility of establishing one project in the East, such as Florida? If so, FSA and BAE could give us the leads and we could quietly initiate the necessary studies.
- (b) Whitaker will be back in Washington Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday with the first confidential Mississippi Delta proposal. We must handle this at headquarters. I am sending the project score sheets under separate cover.
- (c) At Manzanar a few evacuees have built a lath house and are raising guayule cuttings--thousands of them. Will guayule production be feasible at Manzanar?, Parker?, Gila? If not, can we produce cuttings for transplanting in Southern California?
- (d) Long-staple cotton is a good bet for Gila and Parker, but would we run into trouble generally with Southern farmers? Specifically, I understand that seed for long-staple cotton is short, on priority. Our purchase of seed might deprive Caucasians of

it. Will the seed situation be better next year? Can we produce the seed for ourselves and for sale?

- (e) Let's run down once and for all the whole story on silk production.
- (f) Will evacuees be eligible for AAA payments? Normally, persons farming on public lands are not eligible, but evacuees seem to me to be in a special category. Indeed, WRA itself might obtain the payments.
- (g) Can we engage in sugar beet production? If we raised beets when other producers could not obtain labor, we might be in serious trouble. Moreover, it may not be feasible because of distances from sugar factories.
- (h) Are there special needs not now being met in the food for freedom program? For example, does lend-lease need more dehydrated vegetables and if so, can we build a dehydrating plant or two?
- (i) In summary, what is the most successful agricultural program we can undertake at Manzanar, Parker, Tule Lake, Gooding, Gila and elsewhere?

3. I am anxious to reach an agreement with Commissioner Page under which Reclamation will have a high degree of responsibility for land subjugation and irrigation practices. I hope Reclamation can make some of its men available at no cost to WRA. We will hire other men, either from Reclamation or upon Page's recommendation. It was to prepare such an agreement that I hoped Commissioner Page would send a representative to San Francisco. If in your judgment it would be feasible, you might ask Page to have one of his men draw up a tentative draft of an agreement.

4. Plans for education on projects and for self-government are beginning to take shape. Hence, the need for John Province to be here.

5. I enclose for our Washington file a confidential letter I have written to Director Smith.

cc: Washington Office

C O P Y

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Farm Security Administration

WRA

Donaghey Trust Building
Little Rock, Arkansas
April 27, 1942

R6-RP-EBW

Mr. Milton Eisenhower
Director, War Relocation Authority
Third Floor
Whitcomb Hotel
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

As per my telephone conversation a few minutes ago, I am writing to state that we had a conference with the Arkansas Governor and several of his advisors at 11:00 A. M. this morning. We found the governor and his committee sympathetic but at the same time not enthusiastic. The questions crystallized out of the meeting with the governor are as follows:

- (1) The governor would like to get a formal request from the War Department asking that the State of Arkansas, as a patriotic duty, accept a number of these evacuees.
- (2) It was the definite opinion of the governor and his advisors that the army should pledge itself to move these Japs back to their original homes after the emergency.
- (3) That the army assume full responsibility for keeping the Japs under control and be responsible for their whereabouts at all times.
- (4) That the wages paid these people would be the same as those commonly paid for the same kind of labor in this area. They were very much concerned about the rising price of labor. The committee was also insistent that these camps be guarded by white troupes.

The general attitude expressed by those in attendance was that Arkansas as a state could not afford to do otherwise than to cooperate with the government completely. I was very appreciative of the splendid attitude manifested by each individual in attendance which included the Adjutant-General, E. L. Compere. You can rest assured that the governor will give his cooperation. Please give also, as many of the details as possible incident to the handling of these evacuees. I would like to be advised when the request is sent to the governor so that I can follow up on it.

As per our telephone conversation I expect to have a conference with Governor Johnson of Mississippi, tomorrow.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ E. B. Whitaker

E. B. Whitaker
Assistant Regional Director

cc: Sent to Washington

Confidential

April 28, 1942

FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION - D. S. MYER

Dear Dillon:

In line with your request made on your recent visit here, I am sending you an informal report on what I have found out to date regarding the investigational program of Mr. Nielson of the Civil Affairs Division. This information has been obtained from three conferences with Mr. Nielson, two of which were in his office at the Presidio. On those two occasions I had an opportunity to go extensively into his files and records.

While the information I have obtained is extensive, it is far from complete and I will use every opportunity to get additional information. I have not been able to obtain any significant additional information regarding Mr. Nielson himself, but will keep this in mind.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Phil Webster

enclosure

Confidential

8/24/43

Robert Frase

Frank Sweetser

Subject: Memorandum from Philip Webster, dated 26 April.

The attached document describing the investigational activities of Victor Nielson of the Civil Affairs Division, WDC is transmitted for your information. Apparently the project is an elaborate one, and is being conducted with considerable attention to detail.

However, the reported estimates of Mr. Nielson as to the number of subversive Japanese and Japanese Americans he expects to identify are very high:--so high as to raise serious doubts as to the validity of the criteria he is applying. Inasmuch as transmissions of funds to Japan seem to figure prominently in his estimates, it is worth remembering that the Japanese group in the United States in the years between China "incident" and Pearl Harbor had all manner of legitimate reasons for sending money to their country of origin, and the gross sums involved probably signify little.

Contributions to Japanese organizations, too, may have much less significance than seems to be attached to them by Mr. Nielson. Many such organizations are entirely innocent, and even those which are clearly subversive have members (and solicit funds from people) who are not subversive. Contributions for Japan's war use in China were, for many Japanese--especially those whose business depended on relations with Japanese firms--as necessary as are contributions to, say, the Community Chest, for American business men.

Mr. Nielson is to be complimented for recognizing that chapters of the same organizations in different localities varied widely, so that what may have been a subversive organization in one area was quite different in another (p.4, P.2). His perspicacity in this regard is a pleasant contrast to the uncritical thinking in some quarters which would damn any Japanese or Japanese American who ever belonged to to any organization, any branch of which is known to have been subversive.

A point of final interest is the rarity of any kind of pro-Japanese record for Japanese Americans under 28 or 29 years of age (p.3, P.2). A check with the Relocation Planning Division showed that 89.7% of all Nisei were under 29 years, and 86.3% were under 28 years in 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 26, 1943

FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION D.S. MYER

INVESTIGATION OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES
BY CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FOURTH ARMY

General Statement

On April 9 Mr. Victor Nielson of the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, brought to the Field Assistant Director's Office of the W.R.A. in San Francisco a film designated "Film A-L". The film is entitled, "Dockets of the Individuals Listed as Subversive (Pro-Japanese), or as a Participant in a Crime at an Assembly Center, on the 'Designee List' under Date of December 17, 1942." This "Designee List" was forwarded to the War Department in Washington by General DeWitt and contains 332 records. No parolees or persons requesting repatriation are included in this list.

Mr. Nielson explained that General DeWitt had been instructed by Colonel Scobey of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, to deliver this film to us. We acknowledged receipt of the film and now have it in our possession. We have a Recordak Viewer in the San Francisco Office and can thus make use of these films should the need arise.

I took advantage of Mr. Nielson's visit to inquire as to the nature of the work which he is doing in the Civil Affairs Division in investigating the record of past activities of Japanese evacuees. Mr. Nielson gave the following information.

An extensive program of investigating Japanese activities prior to evacuation and setting up an elaborate system of records has been in progress in C.A.D. for a number of months. This activity is continuing at the present time on a large scale. Mr. Nielson is in charge and has a staff of about 20 persons working on this program full time. His staff includes clerks, statisticians, and interpreters. At one time there were four interpreters but at the present time there are only two. Mr. Nielson estimates that he now has in his office more than 12,000 separate cards giving information concerning individual Japanese evacuees (one card per person) and it is his personal opinion that at least 8,000 of these individuals have a record that shows they are definitely pro-Japanese.

Mr. Nielson stated that there is an "enormous amount of work" yet to do in completing this investigation and that, with his present staff, it will take several months at best to complete it. As far as he knows it is planned that this investigational program will continue and he estimates that, if and when it is completed, he will have a total of about 25,000 records of individuals who show definite pro-Japanese leanings.

It occurred to me that this whole program was of sufficient interest to W.R.A. for me to ask Mr. Nielson if he thought the records that he was compiling could be made available to W.R.A. He said that he would find out. After three or four days I was informed that this question had been taken up, through Colonel Bendetsen, with General DeWitt and that General DeWitt had stated that it would be all right for me to visit Mr. Nielson's office and see first hand the work he is doing. Also, if there is any particular information which we wanted duplicated he would be glad to consider each separate request on its merits.

On April 13, after receiving this word, I made a special trip to the Presidio. Mr. Nielson personally showed me in some detail the program he is directing, including several different types of files he is building up, the checking of Japanese newspapers, bank records, and the translation of a 1,000 page Japanese book on the history of the Japanese in America. The program is so extensive and involved that I made a second trip to his office on April 22 and obtained considerable additional information.

The information obtained to date is summarized below.

Description of Files

File 1. Card File. History of Individual Japanese.

There are over 12,000 cards in this file giving information on individual Japanese. The information contained on these cards has been obtained from several sources the most important of which are: Japanese newspapers published on the West Coast, dating back to 1937 when the Japanese-Chinese Incident took place, an investigation of Japanese organizations, and information obtained from bank records showing contributions of Japanese to Japan in connection with war activities.

Presumably, any Japanese who has his name in this file has done something that would make it advisable to check his record more carefully, with the thought that he shows definite pro-Japanese leanings. Mr. Nielson states that he considers approximately 8,000 of this group to be definitely pro-Japanese.

Mr. Nielson places quite a bit of importance, when deciding whether to include a Japanese in this file, on contributions that have been made by him to any one of several phases of the war effort in Japan. He uses several criteria as to whether a contribution is important. The file includes the name of every Japanese

that has committed any kind of an act that might be interpreted as pro-Japanese. However, Mr. Nielson does not consider a contribution significant unless it is repeated or particularly large. He also tries to consider the financial circumstances of the donor. For example, a relatively poor man making a \$25 contribution would be more significant than a rich man giving \$25.

Mr. Nielson has not had time to carefully analyze his records but he estimates that about 90 percent of the 12,000 Japanese on file are males and 98 percent of all the cards are for people over 21 years of age. He states that it should be kept in mind that, while the Nisei represent approximately two-thirds of all the Japanese in America, only about one-third of the Nissei are over 21 years of age. Also, many of this one-third are under 30 years of age. In general, he finds that seldom does anyone, Nissei or Essei, under 28 or 29 years old, have any kind of a pro-Japanese record. He thinks this is because young people have developed no particular interest in Japanese-American relations.

The cards in question are 5x8 inches and are similar to those microfilmed on Film A-L (see above). Blank copies of the "old" and "new" cards are attached hereto.

File 2, File of Newspaper Articles.

This file consists of several thousand 5x8 cards upon which are recorded digests of articles appearing in the two San Francisco Japanese newspapers and one published in Seattle, Washington. One of the San Francisco papers was a daily which had a circulation of about 20,000 in the Bay Region and adjoining territory. This paper was printed partly in English and partly in Japanese and Mr. Nielson believes it was very influential. He thinks that its policies and management were closely related to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco and to the Japanese Government.

The reading of these newspapers by interpreters, issue by issue and page by page, to glean out any and all articles and references that in any way appear pro-Japanese, is nearly completed. In addition to the above there is an important Japanese newspaper which was published in Los Angeles. The same kind of checking of the issues of this paper has just started. The checking goes back to the Chinese incident in 1937.

These cards are arranged in the file chronologically and "tie in" with the pro-Japanese name file in the following manner:

The information on the cards in the pro-Japanese file (File 1) indicates the date of the article and the name of the Newspaper, and gives a very brief synopsis of the article in which the name of the person in question appears. If one wants to check back to get a clearer and more detailed description of this article, refer to this newspaper file and look up the card which contains this lengthy description by merely referring to the date. In this manner reference can be made back and forth between these two files.

File 3. File of Japanese Organizations.

This file consists of over 1100 5x8 cards upon which is recorded information concerning various types of Japanese organizations. Although there are more than 1100 cards, and every card represents a separate group, Mr. Nielson said that there were in reality only about 150 basic Japanese organizations and the others represented branches or affiliations. Japanese organizations and the others represented branches or affiliations. He stated, however, that he preferred to analyze each separate organization for the reason that he found a considerable difference in the activities of the various groups even though they belong to the same "basic" organization. This was so because, in many instances, both the members and the leaders were more pro-Japanese in one group than they were in others.

These cards are useful in determining the nature of the organizations referred to on the cards containing the history of individual Japanese (File No. 1). For example, if the back of one of these individual Japanese cards shows that the individual had membership in three or four Japanese organizations, and there is doubt as to the purposes and activities of these organizations, the details can be obtained by referring to this Organizations File. The information on organizations in this file is given in considerable detail.

File 4. Translators' File.

- This file consists of a set of several thousand 3x5 cards which were made out by the translators at the time newspaper articles were summarized. Each card contains the name of the individual, both in English and in Japanese characters, and also any aliases or other translations of a name that could be derived from the characters appearing in the paper. In other words, these cards are the original ones from which the cards in Card File No. 1 were made up. In all cases these cards were also signed by the translator who translated the article from the newspaper or periodical.

File 5.

This file consists of a set of regular letter-size forms upon which is recorded all incidents in which Japanese got into trouble at the various Assembly Centers before they were transferred to Relocation Centers. This information, however, has been transferred to, and appears on, the cards in File No. 1. Apparently this information is rather incomplete and not very important.

File 6.

This file contains all sorts of information concerning all

phases of Japanese life and activities in the evacuated area and contains such items as lists of Japanese who are heads of pro-Japanese organizations, surname lists, code lists, and confidential letters sent by Japanese individuals and agencies to Japanese agencies in Japan. The most interesting information in this file is a report on a one thousand page book giving a complete history of Japanese activities in America, and a letter sent by an official of a prominent Japanese bank to the home office of the bank in Japan giving a complete plan of action when war broke out between this country and Japan.

Mr. Nielson places a great deal of importance on the book and letter. Only about one third of the book has been translated so far but this includes the Table of Contents which I read. The book is very exhaustive, covering all important phases of Japanese life in America. The author appears to have been a very prominent Japanese and his acknowledgments show that he received assistance from many other influential Japanese. I asked Mr. Nielson if he thought the book contained pro-Japanese information that was not intended for other than Japanese. He said, "Yes", and pointed out that the edition was very limited, was printed in Japan, and that only two copies of the book have been found by the authorities in this country since Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Nielson stated that the bank letter (written before Pearl Harbor) indicates that the writer was sure that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable.

MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES OF
MR. NIELSON'S STAFF

Various members of Mr. Nielson's staff are engaged in making a work sheet record of the various Japanese organizations which made significant donations to the Japanese Government during the years 1937-41 inclusive. A tentative work sheet indicates that some \$22,000,000 left this country in one year. Many Japanese pledged themselves to pay one dollar a month to support various war agencies in Japan. Some individuals have donated large amounts.

Mr. Nielson originally had four interpreters working on his staff but now has only two. These are engaged in reviewing the Japanese newspapers and are just now starting reviewing newspapers which were published in Los Angeles. One girl is working full time checking various bank drafts which left this country for Japan, in order to obtain clues to records indicating substantial donations made to the Japanese Government. The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank are the most important banks in this connection.

/s/ Philip Webster