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Whitcomb Hotel
San Francisco, California
March 26, 1942

Mr. E. H. Wiecking
Office of Lands Coordination
Room 302
Department of Agriculture
Washington D.C.

Dear Ernie:

Last night I sent a telegram to Leland Barrows asking that he come to San Francisco immediately, as it is imperative that we get the Operations Office here organized as quickly as possible. In his absence it is necessary that someone represent me there to answer various calls from Congressmen and others, and to maintain liaison with the various interested departments and agencies with whom we are dealing. I would appreciate it if you would handle this for me.

To give you a quick fill-in on the background, most of which is confidential:

When we arrived here last Monday we found the situation somewhat confused, due to the fact that a large number of agencies had their fingers in the pie, and without any great amount of over-all planning as to what was going to be done with the Japanese after they were evacuated. A great amount of publicity had been issued by a number of sources, and commitments had been made right and left without following any uniform pattern. The Army has organized the Wartime Civil Control Administration to handle the evacuation and is starting to move large numbers of Japanese to a number of assembly points, and to several large reception centers, the first of which is the Owens Valley Project. They also have started construction of the housing at the Parker Project, which will be used, at least temporarily, for a reception center, as well as a work project for the duration.

One of our first moves was to make tentative arrangements with the Indian Service people for handling of the Parker Project. A copy of a tentative agreement between the W.R.A. and the Indian Service on this project is attached. I believe that we are going to get Cy Fryer, Superintendent of the Navajo Reservation, who Collier regards as his best man, to be the project manager.

One of the first unfortunate breaks that has occurred was the premature statement by the W.P.A. man in charge of the Santa Anita

assembly point that the Japanese evacuees were being paid \$54 to \$94 a month -- more than American soldiers. This caused a fresh outbreak of bad publicity and I received a wire from Representative Leland Ford wanting to know about it. The facts of the case are that the Army was merely considering using the subsistence wage scale of the W.P.A., and in any event would charge against this wage the cost of subsistence, which would leave a net wage somewhat less in most cases than the Army pay. In any event, they have not decided on the wage scale and the statement by the project manager was premature. I sent a wire, copy of which is attached, to Representative Ford explaining that the W.R.A. had nothing to do with this phase of the evacuation program, that the Army and the W.R.A. were going to shape up a combined policy on wages, and that in any event the pay of the American soldier would be borne in mind in determining wage policies. In order to prevent such breaks and the making of commitments by various agencies through press releases without our knowledge, Colonel Bendetsen and I have agreed on mutual clearance of all releases affecting evacuation, and have directed all other agencies in the picture to clear with us.

Perhaps the most important problem we have come up against is that of voluntary evacuation. Until we arrived on the scene the Army was urging Japanese to get out of the area under their own power as rapidly as possible. Although the voluntary evacuation was a mere trickle, it has caused such repercussions in the outlying states as to preclude, for the next few months at least, the possibilities of private employment, and it is apparent that for awhile at least we are going to have to depend entirely on public projects to furnish the evacuees with work. In the meantime, of course, we can proceed with an educational program looking forward eventually to use of Japanese in private employment. Yesterday the Army came around to our view-point and today are issuing an order stopping voluntary evacuation in favor of orderly planned evacuation. This will give us a breathing spell in which we may make some plans and build an organization.

It is apparent that I will have to spend practically all of my time on the Coast for an indefinite period. We are now putting all of our emphasis on the building of an organization to handle the program, and in the meantime are trying to hold some of the problems at arm's length until we can proceed in an orderly way.

Under separte cover we are sending copies of the various proclamations and press releases that have been issued by the War-time Civil Control Administration -- the Army's organization for handling the evacuation.

It is almost impossible to describe the many sides of this problem and I realize that this is a rather sketchy discussion of it. However, we will try to keep you informed on current developments and doubtless will have a number of special jobs to be done for us in Washington. It will be reassuring to know that you are standing by.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. EISENHOWER
Director
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

JB:jc
Enclosures

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File

March 29, 1942

Mr. Archibald MacLachlan
Director, Office of Facts and Figures
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. MacLachlan:

The evacuation of the Japanese aliens and citizens from the West Coast military zones and the relocation of these people in other areas, - one of the largest mass migrations in history, and without precedent in American history - seems to me to have great immediate implications in the war information program of the Federal government.

For one thing, the manner in which the evacuation and relocation are handled and interpreted certainly will affect our propaganda efforts abroad. Also, of immediate concern is the manner in which the migration is interpreted to the American people. This bears directly on the success of the relocation program, which by its very nature will be exceedingly difficult. And not least is the need for keeping an accurate informational record of this new American experience.

We have by no means fully explored all of the angles and possibilities of the relocation work, and I am not yet prepared to state definitely what line we shall take. However, certain parts of our job are becoming clear, and your organization can be of much help in gaining public acceptance and cooperation in these.

Before dealing with ways and means, here is a brief outline of the situation, the program we have in mind, and the problems involved:

Within the next few weeks more than 100,000 Japanese will be evacuated from strategic West Coast areas. Two-thirds of these are American citizens. The aliens among the group are not considered dangerous. They are registered, under surveillance, have been combed through by the F.B.I., and known dangerous ones have been interned. In addition, they generally are the older, poorly educated people. The great majority of the citizens are loyal Americans, according to the best intelligence to which I have access, and the ones regarding whom there is any question are fairly well known.

This question naturally arises: If, as I say, the great majority of the Nisei are loyal, why should they be evacuated? Of course, it isn't as simple as that. The unquestionably loyal Japanese themselves admit that there is a borderline group, perhaps very small, that they are not sure about. Furthermore, the various types - the aliens, the Nisei, and the Kibei (educated in Japan) - are all mixed together with strong family and clan ties. There is not time to perform a careful separation in the military areas. And finally, even if a separation could be made, this would be no guarantee that the white population, the Chinese and the Filipinos might not precipitate another crisis at any time, whether or not with

reason, that would require attention and manpower of the Army when it has more important things to do. In fact, turmoil of any kind, whether springing from racial or political causes, is a military handicap. In any event, the Army's decision to clean up the whole situation at once and have done with it has been made. I do not question that decision, but have tried to point out some of the factors involved, which carry over into our field of work in relocating the evacuees.

The relocation of these people would not have been such a difficult task had not emotions of public sentiment developed. Several factors seem to have played a part in whipping up sentiment against movement of Japanese into states outlying the military area. Many newspaper accounts were distorted and inflammatory. The public was not informed of the true situation regarding the number of dangerous Japanese - indeed, contrary to the facts, it seems to be commonly supposed that most of them are aliens and most of them are suspected of subversive activities. And, perhaps most conducive to adverse sentiment was the policy of voluntary evacuation. This deserves special emphasis. After the restricted areas were determined the Japanese were urged to leave voluntarily. Yet, nothing was done to prepare the outside areas for their reception. Most of the Japanese were smart enough to realize that inasmuch as they had been officially marked as undesirable in one place, they could not expect a welcome elsewhere, and very few cared to leave without Federal protection. However, the trickle of voluntary evacuees into outlying states was enough to set up a strong reaction that has threatened the interests of the larger group. In fact, it has made it necessary to eliminate the possibility of private employment for evacuees during the immediate future. To forestall any further development of adverse sentiment, voluntary evacuation has been abandoned in favor of planned, orderly evacuation to protected assembly and reception centers. These are now being built by the Army, and will temporarily house practically the whole evacuated population.

After this first step, the most important job is to make it possible for these people to perform work that contributes the maximum to the war production effort. They possess a wide range of skills and abilities that should not be allowed to go to waste at a time when the output of every worker counts for so much. At first, most of this work will be done on public projects, such as the Colorado River Indian Reservation, where 20,000 Japanese will develop irrigated lands. We are now canvassing the country for likely projects and types of manufacture, and have under consideration some very promising ones, such as production of camouflage nets and cartridge belts, shoe repair for the Army, production of gauze, silk production, wood-working industries, and the like.

In planning our projects, we are going to encourage and speed up the Americanization process among the Japanese largely by trying to give them a stake in the process, and letting them feel that they have a share in the war effort. From present indications, I believe that we will have the full cooperation of a majority of the evacuees. They know that they are on severe trial, and appear quite willing to make great sacrifices and to endure considerable hardship to prove themselves.

Obviously this whole program involves a very carefully planned public relations program. One of the first jobs is to get the facts in the case and clear up the present misconceptions. For example, the matter of wages for the evacuees has been subject to great distortion, through the erroneous report that a wage scale of \$45 to \$65 per month - or more than Army pay - had been adopted by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Army's evacuation organization, in the assembly and reception centers. The facts were that the W.C.C.A. had considered this scale,

Mr. Archibald Macleish
March 23, 1942

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among others, as gross wages, with deductions for room and board which would bring it into line with Army pay. Actually no wage rates for evacuees have been determined. Pending establishment of wage rates for work on public projects, evacuees are contributing work in the construction of their own housing and maintenance of these facilities. The government is providing only food and shelter.

Some of the public relations work is primarily an Authority responsibility; some bears directly on the overall war information program. Getting public acceptance in areas proposed for relocation requires detailed local work and would seem to be our particular chore. Explaining the aims and principles of the program as a whole to the general public is a job with which C.F.F. can give us lots of help, particularly in getting the official "line" across to top representatives of various media fields. We will have to conduct certain types of informational work within the Japanese groups, to get across to them what the American people expect of them, but we also will get from them a great deal of informational material that will be useful in interpreting them and the relocation program to the American people and may contribute to information directed toward foreign countries.

In the very near future we should like to work out rather definite plans with C.F.F. for fitting our information work into the total war information job. It will be necessary for me to remain on the West Coast for some time, but John Bird, who is handling public relations for the Authority will return to Washington within the next few weeks and will get in touch with you then.

In the meantime, I want to call your attention to a specific line of work that would seem to fall between your office and the Coordinator of Government Films. I refer to the need of covering the evacuation and the relocation program through the medium of motion pictures. I believe this large-scale migration should be recorded in motion pictures for at least three purposes: (1) To document this unusual process; (2) to interpret the problem, the needs and the program to the American public; and (3) to counter enemy propaganda in Allied and neutral nations that now is capitalizing on this migration. Because of the speed with which the evacuation program must move there is little time to lose if some of its most vital phases are to be caught by the motion picture camera. The news reels are recording some of it, but due to the immensity of the operation and the many facets of the picture, they are getting only superficial accounts of it as far as I have been able to observe.

I am wondering if it would not be possible for your office to work out as soon as possible some arrangement with the Coordinator of Government Films, the Foreign Information Service Branch of C.O.I., and C.I.A.A. for adequate documentary movie coverage?

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director, War Relocation Authority
Minuteman Hotel, San Francisco, California

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

D. ROLAND POTTER, CLERK
W. I. SMALLEY, ASST. CLERK

April 4, 1942

Mr. Milton Eisenhower, Director
War Relocations Authority
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

Lieutenant General J. L. Dewitt has wired me that you control the relocation and resettlement of Japanese citizens and aliens who are to be evacuated from the military areas of the Pacific Coast.

Hundreds of Japanese migrants recently have entered Colorado and have taken up residence throughout the state without permission from anyone.


I demand that control over such migrants be assumed by you and that their relocation be undertaken by you on the same basis as other Japanese citizens and aliens still remaining on the Pacific Coast.

All West Coast states have vast inland valleys, far removed from the restricted military areas along the coast, in which all of their Japanese residents could be properly cared for. Colorado also has extensive military areas and a relatively large Japanese population but we are not asking any other state to look after them. Most certainly we ought not to be made the dumping ground for the Pacific Coast states.

There may be counties in Colorado that can be used for resettlement of Japanese and there may be sites in these counties that can be utilized for enemy alien concentration camps, but most positively no Japanese migrants should be resettled in any county in Colorado, or allowed to remain there, unless first approved by the Board of County Commissioners of that county.

If you will follow that fair but simple procedure, I am sure that Colorado counties will cooperate with you fully.

Most sincerely,


Ed. C. Johnson,
U. S. Senator, Colorado

ECJ:GM

Do Not Release Before Sunday, ^{April} MARCH 5, 1942

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 00--(Special)--All former Pacific Coast Japanese who moved into the state of Colorado before the Army's recent "freezing" order of voluntary migrations must be placed on the same basis of federal control as the balance of Japs remaining in the coastal regions!

This demand was made of the War Relocations Authority by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, coupled with a vigorous statement that "no Japanese migrant should be resettled in any county in Colorado, or allowed to remain there, unless first approved by the Board of County Commissioners of that county."

Stating that he was acting in the interests of thousands of Colorado citizens who have deluged him with protests on Japanese moving into the state, Senator Johnson Sunday made public a letter in which he called to the attention of Milton Eisenhower of San Francisco the fact that Colorado citizens should be entitled to the same protective measures as other states enjoy now that the federal government has assumed the responsibility of resettlement of West Coast Japanese.

"I have demanded of Mr. Eisenhower, chief of the War Relocations Authority, that the federal government exert a control over the Japanese who have already moved to Colorado from California," Colorado's ranking lawmaker declared, "and that their resettlement be considered on exactly the same basis as other Japanese citizens and aliens still remaining on the Pacific Coast."

"All West Coast states have vast inland valleys, far removed from coastal military areas, where all Japanese residents could be properly cared for. Colorado also has extensive military areas and a relatively large Japanese population, but we are not asking any other state to look after them. Most certainly we ought not to be made the dumping ground for the Pacific Coast states."

Senator Johnson emphasized his belief that "citizens of Colorado are entitled to the same protection as other states and Colorado counties will cooperate fully" if Eisenhower would follow the Senator's suggestion that the Boards of County Commissioners be consulted in the matter of resettlement.

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Ch. 01
April 5, 1942

Honorable Harold D. Smith,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Director Smith:

I request that, to meet the urgent, immediate needs of the War Relocation Authority, there be allotted to the Office For Emergency Management \$10,000,000 from the President's Emergency funds for the use of War Relocation Authority, as follows: \$2,277,272 for the operation of the Colorado River Reservation Project for the balance of this fiscal year, and \$7,722,728 for the inauguration of additional projects in the immediate future.

If possible, I should like to have this allotment made from funds which will be available until expended. In view of the urgency of our problem and the extreme importance of saving time, I should like to suggest that the allotment be made on terms which will permit the War Relocation Authority to procure supplies, equipment and services (without regard to Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes), when the aggregate amount involved in any one case does not exceed \$5,000. In addition, I propose that the allotment permit the use of not more than \$50,000 for the employment of personnel without regard to Civil Service or Classification Laws. In other respects the language of our initial letter of authorization dated March 18, 1942, will meet the requirements of our program.

The General Situation

As background for an initial understanding of this request, I should like to give you a brief account of the evacuation and relocation programs as they stand at present:

For many weeks the military and civil authorities on the Pacific Coast encouraged voluntary evacuation. Less than 3,500 Japanese migrated to Colorado, Utah, Idaho and other inter-mountain states. But despite the smallness of these movements, difficulties developed in a great many small communities and violence threatened. At Yerington, Nevada, for example, eight Japanese relocated voluntarily, only to be met by a local group which surrounded the evacuees and told them they would have to leave the community within a few hours; so the evacuees returned to California. Protest meetings developed in Colorado and elsewhere. Thus, mounting adverse sentiment threatened the whole migration and, had a change not been made, public opinion might have compelled the Japanese practically to be interned with little opportunity for productive work. So at my request, General DeWitt issued an order discontinuing all voluntary, haphazard evacuation in favor of a planned, orderly, and protected movement.

Nearly 120,000 people are to be moved in the next six to eight weeks; the precise timing is strictly confidential. Our first effort is to get the people so geo-

graphically distributed and located as to provide the maximum economic opportunities for them for the duration of the War. But since permanent relocation centers cannot be located and constructed as rapidly as the military need of evacuation requires, it is necessary for the Army to provide temporary assembly points where the people can be housed for a few weeks, perhaps for several months. Obviously the evacuees should not be held in such assembly points longer than is absolutely necessary. There is only enforced idleness at such points. This is terribly demoralizing to anyone.

We are hard at work selecting sites for reception centers, some 15 to 20 in number, which will be located somewhere between the coastal range and the Mississippi River. The Colorado River Project in Arizona will house 20,000; Manzanar will house 10,000. I am hopeful that none of the others will exceed 10,000 and that many will be as low as 5,000. A wide geographical distribution of these centers will increase the opportunities for useful production.

We are planning five general types of opportunities for the Japanese people after the reception centers are once built and occupied:

1. There is useful public work to do, such as land subjugation: - work that later on would be done under Government auspices anyway. Public work will not only enable a large share of the population to begin doing something useful immediately but it can also serve as a backlog of employment in those seasons when other opportunities are not very large.

2. On the land surrounding the reception centers the Japanese can produce some of their own food and perhaps some for sale.

3. I believe we can make arrangements to produce camouflage nets, cartridge belts and other war commodities which require a great deal of hand labor and not very much machinery. Also, I think it will be possible to bring about the relocation of some small commercial industries which have always hired Japanese labor; for example, a knitting plant and a glove plant wish to move out of the Military Area to one of the relocation points.

4. There will be considerable opportunity for private employment at prevailing wages because as you know, the migratory labor supply is getting smaller right along. This, however, is a difficult problem because the wide dispersal of Japanese will lead to trouble, particularly for them, unless we can provide proper safeguards.

5. I am hopeful that, with the change in public sentiment, there will be some opportunity for the development of wholly self-supporting Japanese communities.

April 5
These things will be possible only if the whole migration is maintained on an orderly basis with ample military protection. If we stick to this kind of program, public fears will decrease.

In the meantime, however, new pressures are developing. Many of the same people

who wished to have the Japanese evacuated in the first place are now asking that Japanese labor be kept available for various types of work. In the sugar beet and truck crop areas of the West the demands for stoop labor are beginning to roll in. Politically this pressure is going to be hard to withstand, but if we break down the orderly program and begin to rush Japanese families here and there simply to meet demands for labor, we are once again going to raise fears in the West. Untoward incidents would not be unlikely. I am putting this statement in writing because I can assure you that I am going to become increasingly unpopular as the weeks go by and as I resist the demands from this area and that. I am going to meet the demands only if the Japanese can be fully protected. This in turn means that group housing will have to be available for the Japanese families - housing to which all Japanese may return at night for protection.

The only two reception centers so far under construction are the Manzanar and the Colorado River Relocation project in Arizona. The Army, itself, is operating Manzanar and will continue to do so until the War Relocation Authority is able to take over. This will be some weeks hence. However, the Army does not wish to staff itself to manage additional reception centers. Indeed I do not wish to have the Army do so because later on I would only have to take over staffs which I have not selected. Consequently it is imperative that I move rapidly so as to be prepared to manage each reception center as it is completed.

I wish to call to you attention the fact that a definite wage policy has not been determined. The wage policy question is a ticklish one. For example, if we were to announce that the Government is going to provide the minimum essentials of food, clothing and shelter and, in addition, would pay a maximum cash wage of \$21 a month for public work on such projects, I think the public would approve and we would hear nothing more about the matter. But this would be bad policy. We would have established an invitation to laziness. Those who did not wish to work would receive the same food and housing as those who wanted to work very hard. The only punishment that might be possible for those who refused to work would be internment on the grounds that they were saboteurs. Consequently one must think in terms of charging each individual his pro-rata share of all costs for provisioning, health, and education and then pay a wage high enough to permit each family to meet these costs and also to have a small amount of cash left over for essential clothing and incidentals. This in turn would require a wage scale ranging from, say, \$40 a month to \$75 a month and, for an average family, would yield a smaller income than would the plan first mentioned. Even so, a wage policy of this sort would meet a storm of public protest, and might lead to restrictive legislation. Still another possibility is to maintain a set of project accounts which recorded all expenditures and all income; the profits, if any, would eventually be paid to the Japanese. In the meantime a small cash allowance would have to be made to each individual.

Despite the fact that we must begin actual operations on the Colorado River Relocation Project in the very near future, I wish to postpone the establishment of a definite wage policy for a few more weeks. What we propose to do, therefore, is to provide shelter and food, and to make a small cash grant to each family each month. This policy will continue only for that initial period in which the evacuees are getting the camp in order and while the work program

is being developed. When all is squared away - when the necessary equipment is on hand and we are ready to go to work, we shall have to have a definite wage policy.

Colorado River Relocation Project

Attached, in support of our request for funds, is an estimate of expenditures for the Colorado River Relocation Project. This is necessarily a rather general estimate, but it has been prepared with as much care as possible under the circumstances. It was developed in cooperation with representatives of the Office of Indian Affairs, who were able to draw upon the experience of the Indian Service in handling housing, feeding and caring for large numbers of people under circumstances similar to those which will prevail upon the Colorado River Relocation Project. I believe this is a reasonably good estimate.

I knew three weeks ago, before I came West, that the Colorado River Reservation has been selected by the Army as a Reception Center. I knew that it would become the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority at its inception. Since I had no staff on hand, I entered into an informal agreement with the Department of the Interior, under which the Office of Indian Affairs, for the time being, would serve as the agent of the War Relocation Authority in administering this project. In other words, on the Colorado River Relocation Project, the War Relocation Authority will determine the broad policy and program. The Office of Indian Affairs will administer the program.

Since making these preliminary arrangements with the Office of Indian Affairs, I have selected to be Regional Director of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, Mr. E. R. Fryer, formerly Superintendent of the Navajo Indian Reservation, who was chosen by the Office of Indian Affairs to administer the Colorado River Reservation Project. His appointment may make some change in our understanding with the Office of Indian Affairs necessary. This is to say, the War Relocation Authority may administer the project directly, rather than through the Office of Indian Affairs. I intend to discuss this problem with Commissioner Collier in the immediate future.

Whether the project is administered directly by the War Relocation Authority or indirectly on the basis of our original agreement with the Department of the Interior, the plan of administration on which the attached estimate of expenditures was prepared will not be altered. In fact, time will not permit any change in our plans. The nucleus of a management staff is already on the ground at the project. Transfer of evacuees to the project will begin on April 10. It will reach large proportions on April 15. In a short while we shall be handling provisioning and other costs involving 20,000 people. Hence, immediate administrative action here, and immediate allotment of funds, are necessary. We have already authorized the manager of the Project to begin expenditures.

Other Projects

The Colorado River Relocation Project is the only one for which we are now prepared to submit estimates. It is evident, however, that for the remainder

of this fiscal year and probably for a much longer time the pattern of expenditures outlined for the Colorado River Relocation Project will fit the other projects we have under consideration. In addition to direct project expenses on a number of other areas, we shall have expenses for the purchase or leasing of land. As soon as our organization has developed to a point which will permit us to take charge of the evacuees at the assembly points, expenses for the transportation of persons and property will become an important consideration. Owing to the speed with which the evacuation must take place and the extreme importance, from the point of view of policy, of our being able to take over responsibility as soon as possible, I do not feel it would be wise to wait to ask for additional funds until detailed estimates can be prepared. I am, therefore, requesting sufficient funds to meet our expected needs for the remainder of this fiscal year. While this is necessarily even more general than the estimate for the Colorado River Relocation Project, I believe it is a conservative request.

In addition to selecting key staff members, our most important work during the past week has been the detailed review of proposed project locations and the selection of such areas for recommendation to the Army as sites for reception centers. This task is not complete, but I should like to outline briefly the characteristics of several projects which we are preparing to recommend.

Tule Lake, California

This is a Reclamation project area containing about 9,000 acres of good land and 6,000 acres of fair land now under irrigation and ready for immediate use. About 15,000 acres of additional good land can be brought into use in 1943 by the construction of necessary irrigation facilities. We are not entirely certain that a satisfactory supply of domestic water can be secured. If this problem is solved the project appears to be satisfactory as a site for a reception center for 10,000 evacuees.

Gila River Indian Reservation

This area, (under Pima Indian tribal ownership), contains 10,000 acres of irrigated land now in cultivation. Eight thousand additional acres might be developed although there is some question of the adequacy of the irrigation water supply for such development. The land must be secured on a cash lease from the Indians and we are not entirely certain that the lease can be negotiated. With respect to the ability of the land to produce cash crops for sale, the adequacy of transportation facilities, nearness to markets and the possibility of outside employment this project is among the most promising under consideration. This appears to be satisfactory as a site for a reception center for 10,000 people.

Black Canyon Project, Idaho.

This is an area of 23,000 acres of irrigable but undeveloped land. The water supply is adequate but there are no irrigation facilities. The land has not been cleared or leveled. There is little prospect of agricultural production this year but large opportunities for work in preparing the area for future production.

This area is under consideration as a site for a reception center for 10,000 people. One of its principal advantages is the fact that it is surrounded by several smaller areas of irrigable land which might possibly be secured and developed as permanent relocation centers.

Pine River Project, Colorado

This area includes 25,000 acres of irrigable land in four separate parcels around the city of Durango, Colorado. Nine thousand acres of this area is now being acquired by the Federal Government. It is probable that a headquarters site can be secured immediately on Indian lands adjacent to the area. There is no prospect of agricultural production this year but ample work will be provided in developing the area for future use. The area is under consideration as a reception center for 5,000 evacuees.

Manzanar Project:

In addition to these and other areas which will be recommended to the Army, the Manzanar Project now being operated by the Army must be taken over as soon as possible by the War Relocation Authority. Occupation of this area was begun by the Army more than a week ago. It is intended to provide for 10,000 evacuees. On a permanent basis the agricultural possibilities of the area will not support any such number. Consequently in managing the area we will be faced with two-fold problem:

1. Finding forms of useful work which can be performed in the area.
2. Finding permanent location centers to which the evacuees in Manzanar can, in the course of time, be moved.

The danger of insufficient work in this area is so serious that, even though the Army may be willing to operate the center for a considerable period, it is very important to the long-time program of the Authority that the project be taken over at the earliest possible moment.

I am planning to be in Washington the latter part of this week and would like to discuss with you our problems generally and specifically, if you desire, our financial needs. I hope you will allot the \$10,000 immediately, as requested, and wire me here to that effect.

Sincerely

MILTON S. EISENHOWER,
Director
War Relocation Authority

April 8, 1942

Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, ✓
Director,
War Relocation Authority,
San Francisco, California.

Dear Milton:

In accordance with the request contained in your letter dated April 4, 1942, I am enclosing a proposed Memorandum of Understanding between the Director of the War Relocation Authority and the Secretary of the Interior with respect to the establishment and operation of the Colorado River Relocation Project. The memorandum has been cleared with Mr. Collier and his associates. I should like to give you the following report:

A. Upon the basis of the statement prepared by E. R. Fryer and L. W. Adams of the Indian Office, and the comments contained in your letter of April 4, 1942, we prepared a draft Memorandum of Understanding which contained the substance of the Fryer-Adams statement, and which included all of your suggested changes. Lewis and I discussed this draft yesterday (Tuesday) with Mr. Collier, Mr. Zimmerman, Mr. McCaskill, and two other men in the Indian Office. The discussion was a pleasant one, and resulted in an agreement on all except four points:

(1) In Paragraph 7 of the proposed agreement, Mr. Collier objected to specifying that the Japanese Council will be elected. He indicated that although the elective process may be the preferable way of selecting the council, he believed that there is insufficient information to make that determination at this time. Paragraph 7, therefore, refers merely to the selection of a council in accordance with a method that shall be approved by the War Relocation Authority before it becomes effective. I believe this is adequate for our purpose. If the elective process is the preferable one under these circumstances, we can arrange for it when the detailed plan is submitted for our approval.

(2) In Paragraphs 12 and 14 of the proposed agreement, Mr. Collier objected to the inclusion of a provision which would require all instruction to be in English, which would prohibit Japanese language schools, and which would prohibit the conduct of religious

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services in the Japanese language. He could see no reason for a requirement of that kind, and I must confess that I agree with him. Many of the Japanese on the project may not be able to speak English. Although instruction in English should obviously be provided them, I cannot see the justification for prohibiting instruction in Japanese also. Moreover, if Japanese religious services are to be permitted, I do not understand why they should not be conducted in the Japanese language. In any event, Paragraph 12, in its present form, leaves the issue open. It provides merely that the Bureau of Indian Affairs will administer an educational program in accordance with policies established by the War Relocation Authority. Likewise, Paragraph 14 permits religious freedom only to the extent that it does not conflict with the national interest. If we should subsequently determine that the conduct of religious services in the Japanese language is inimicable to the national interest, it could be prohibited at that time.

(3) In Paragraph 12, Mr. Collier also suggested that no provision be made for the system of instruction to follow the California school program. Here too he felt that the subject should be left for future determination.

(4) In Paragraph 18, Mr. Collier objected to the inclusion of a provision which would give the project administrator virtually complete independence from the supervision of Mr. Collier's staff. He understands that your primary concern is one of speed. He believes, however, that Mr. Fryer will do a better job of administering the project and will also do it with maximum speed, if the staff services of the Bureau of Indian Affairs are available to him. I believe Mr. Collier's point is well taken.

Mr. Collier understood that you had not seen the proposed Memorandum of Understanding that was discussed with him yesterday. He did understand, however, that it embodied your specific comments on the Fryer-Adams statement. Since the four points listed above have all been handled by postponing the issues involved for future determination, Mr. Collier was hopeful that the proposed memorandum could be executed quickly. With that idea in mind, I have given him several copies of the memorandum, and have told him that I am sending the original to you. If you approve and sign it, Mr. Collier believes that the concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior can be obtained quickly.

B. There is also enclosed a draft letter for you to send to Wayne Coy, requesting an advance of funds to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. I believe it is important that the funds be advanced from the allocation made to the War Relocation Authority in order that we may have some control over them. The letter to Mr. Coy has been drafted with this idea in mind. It is our understanding that the funds will be advanced under Section 601 of the Economy Act.

3 - Milton S. Eisenhower

C. Inasmuch as the proposed Memorandum of Understanding is self-executing, I do not believe it is necessary for us to prepare a set of directives for Commissioner Collier to send to the administrator of the project. If you have any specific directions in mind, I shall be glad to write them up.

I am air-mailing this letter today with the hope that it will reach you before you leave for Washington this week-end.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures

Philip M. Glick.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

April 14, 1942

Mr. John Collier, Commissioner,
Indian Affairs,
Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Collier:

I am enclosing several copies of a revised proposed Memorandum of Understanding between the War Relocation Authority and the Secretary of the Interior. This revision has been prepared along the lines of our discussion in your office this morning.

I am very anxious to have this memorandum signed immediately. You will note that I have signed duplicate originals of the memorandum. Could you secure the signature of the Secretary of the Interior on these duplicate originals this afternoon, and return them to me as soon as possible?

We will proceed as rapidly as possible, in cooperation with your people, to formulate in greater detail the program for the work to be done on the land, as well as the proposals for community management and government. I hope to be able to communicate with you further on both of these items in the near future.

I understand that your lawyers will prepare a first draft of an improvement lease to be entered into by the Colorado River Indian tribes and the War Relocation Authority. We shall be prepared to examine this form of lease as soon as you submit it to us.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures

M. S. Eisenhower,
Director.

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April 13, 1942

Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower
Director
War Relocation Authority
Room 308 Administration Bldg.,
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

Dear Milton:

Herewith a very "rough and ready" statement on the genesis of the War Relocation Authority.

Cy Fryer looked it over very hurriedly late yesterday and suggested that I prepare an additional section on cost of the program.

As you will see from the statement, I have included a section on cost of the program which is largely qualitative. The figure of 75 to 100 million dollars is strictly from thin air.

I believe Cy would like to see more concrete material prepared on cost of the program and I shall immediately get together with Rupp on this subject. However, I am forwarding the statement as it now stands to you in order that you may have something in hand, at least.

If something worth while can be prepared, showing a breakdown of cost, I will send it on to you as soon as possible.

I am sending copies of this statement to both Cy and Elmer Rowalt, neither of whom have had any real opportunity to look it over.

I hope this fills the bill; I have a few doubts about it.

Regards

Vance Rogers

Incl.

C/c Mr. E. R. Fryer, Room 347

EVACUATION OF JAPANESE FROM WEST COAST

The evacuation order, of people of Japanese descent, from the West Coast area, is a measure of wartime necessity which is not subject to question. The Japanese who are to be evacuated, through organizations and individuals, have expressed their willingness and eagerness to cooperate wholeheartedly in this program of removal. No one seriously questions the military necessity of the removal order. The order has, however, created a problem of unprecedented proportions in the history of this country - not alone for the Japanese evacuees but also for the Government Authorities charged with the execution of the order.

The Characteristics of the Japanese Population

The 117,000 Japanese, citizens and aliens, who are now resident in the prohibited zone, constitute well over ninety percent of the total Japanese population of the continental United States. Two-thirds of this population are citizens, most of whom have lived in this country all their lives. A majority of the non-citizens has resided in this country since 1924.

The occupational characteristics of the Japanese are diverse but for the population as a whole there is a marked tendency toward specialization in certain types of activity. Agriculture and domestic service constitute the two outstanding categories of employment, with wholesale and retail trade looming as an important activity.

There are two broad divisions of the population which are of some significance: the issei, or those born in Japan; and the nisei, or those born in the United States. The average age of the issei is about 60 and the average age of the nisei, about 20. The younger generation has, of course, been much more exposed to American culture than the older generation but glib generalities

about the degree of "Americanization" are to be mistrusted. Many of the nisei, about one-sixth according to one source, have been educated in Japan whereas many of the issei have lived in this country most of their adult life. Cultural affiliation, sometimes used as a measure of loyalty, follows no hard and fast rule.

The Evolution of a Program

The first official Federal policy was one of encouraging voluntary evacuation from the prohibited area, and the apprehension of known dangerous aliens. Voluntary evacuation proceeded in a slow and unsatisfactory manner with relatively few Japanese leaving (about 8,000), with considerable resentment from inland areas to which the Japanese were migrating, and with unreasonable and unwarranted persecution of the evacuees.

The result of the failure of a policy of voluntary evacuation was the promulgation by Lt. General DeWitt, Western Defense Command and 4th Army, of a "freezing order" directing all Japanese to remain within the prohibited area under Army supervision. This order was ^{issued} wired March 26th and became effective March 29th.

In order to implement Army supervision of evacuation, there was established the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was designated to assist evacuees in the disposal and management of property left by evacuees. The Farm Security Administration was designated to arrange for substitute farm operation on agricultural lands abandoned by evacuees in order to assure a minimum loss of production. There was also created a new agency, the War Relocation Authority, to assist the Army in carrying out evacuation of military areas, to develop and supervise

an orderly program of relocation, to provide work opportunities for evacuees and to protect evacuees as well as the populations of the area to which they migrate.

^WThere was established machinery for orderly and supervised evacuation of Japanese from military zones, the care of evacuees and their property, the continued production of abandoned agricultural resources, and the final location and employment of evacuees in inland areas. A comprehensive program was under way.

The Mechanics of Relocation

By agreement among the several agencies charged with executing the orderly program of evacuation, several stages of removal have been established. Japanese are brought together in the prohibited military zone at what are called "assembly points". Here they are temporarily housed and fed while they are given physical examinations and registered by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. As soon as sites are selected in inland areas and minimum essential facilities constructed, the Japanese are moved to projects called "reception centers". The Wartime Civil Control ^{Administration} Authority is responsible for the care and delivery of evacuees to reception centers. The War Relocation Authority is responsible for the selection, development and supervision of activities at reception centers. Reception centers are selected ^{as} fairly permanent sites for residence ⊖ always with enough agricultural land at least to make the the population agriculturally self-sufficient and often with the idea in mind of growing agricultural produce for the market. In addition, it is contemplated that certain industrial activities will be established either on or adjacent to pro-

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jects in order fully to employ the skills of the evacuees in production effort that will contribute on the one hand, to the war effort and, on the other hand, to the support of evacuees. Ultimately, the program contemplates the location of smaller groups of evacuees on self-maintaining agricultural projects or in industrial activity. It is also possible that groups of evacuees will work away from reception centers temporarily as a labor force in agriculture, industry, or undertaking certain types of public construction. Final location of evacuees away from reception centers^o will be dependent on a number of factors and on policies to be established by the War Relocation Authority. It is already clear that the final step will require time and careful planning.

Selection of Reception Centers

At the present time some six reception centers have been selected. It is estimated that these projects will accommodate about 90,000 Japanese evacuees. All but one project contains agricultural land which is subject to immediate cultivation under irrigation. Most of the projects, however, will require further construction and development before cultivable land can be put to use. After all projects are fully developed, there will be some 120,000 acres available or about 2 acres per individual.

Nearly 100 proposals for the establishment of reception centers have been considered by the War Relocation Authority. Many of the proposals considered were submitted by private realtors and speculators whose chief motive was the sale of unsuitable property at a profit. Many other proposals could not be considered at this time because they were too small to accommodate the minimum number of evacuees for which adequate protection could be afforded by the Army. The minimum requirement tentatively established is a project suitable for the location of 5,000 evacuees.

All reception centers contemplate the accommodation of evacuees by family units. Indeed, a guiding principle in the removal program from the assembly point to the reception center, to the ultimate location, has been the maintenance of the family unit.

Organizing a Project Activity

Each reception center will be supervised by a responsible officer of the War Relocation Authority and a small staff of technicians. Housing, physical development of the project, including agricultural land, health, medical care, education and community organization will be under the general supervision of the project director and his staff. Productive work, including agricultural and industri-

al activity, on the project itself, will likewise be supervised. By an arrangement with the Army, policing activities will be undertaken by military guards.

An effort will be made to delegate to the members of the community as much responsibility as possible for the internal organization of the project including the establishment and maintenance of a democratically organized government. The project director will be served by an advisory council elected from the community. Organization of stores and various types of service activities for the community itself will largely be the responsibility of elected representatives of the group. Advice and assistance will be given by members of the staff of the Authority. Cooperative, production activity will be encouraged as a means of meeting the variety of service functions necessary to the orderly operation of the community.

Production for the War Effort

Besides the activity designed to produce a good supply and to perform the necessary service functions for the community, it is contemplated that each project will undertake certain types of productive activity which will, on the one hand, help defer the costs of resettlement and, on the other hand, contribute to the war production effort. Projects have been selected which will permit the production of agriculture produce for the market. However, by no means most of the Japanese are fitted for farming, and, if they were, no project contains sufficient agricultural land to permit full employment of all able bodied persons to be located at the reception centers. Further, the Japanese have within their group many productive skills which can be much more effectively used in industrial activity. Likewise, many of the women and younger people can only be employed effectively on a part-time basis. It is, therefore,

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contemplated that certain industrial activity will be set up on each project. In some instances this may be under direct supervision of project managers and in some instances it may be by contractual arrangement with private industry willing to locate its facilities adjacent to the project. Supervised industrial employment suggested has included the making of camouflage nets, repair of shoes and uniforms, and the making of cartridge belts for the Army. A glove manufacturer and a knitting mill, both formerly employing Japanese labor have indicated a willingness to remove their facilities to reception centers and to continue production there.

Each site has been selected with the possibility in mind of undertaking certain types of public improvement work adjacent to the site, including such activities as conservation improvements, small flood control operations, stream bank protection, and similar activities. Also considered in the selection of sites was the availability of work opportunities, particularly in agriculture, in adjacent areas.

Private Employment

The most harassing problem which now faces the War Relocation Authority is the matter of private employment away from reception centers in agriculture and in industry. Already demands are arising in many quarters for the use of Japanese labor to overcome serious problems of local shortages incident to the migration of labor away from areas where they are accustomed to work, ~~into war industries and to join the military forces.~~ ^{An} particularly important case, which may ^{be} prophetic of the future, is now under consideration. Organized sugar beet growers in Montana and Colorado are particularly vociferous in their demands for

immediate importation of Japanese laborers. They contend they will be unable to meet war production goals set by the Department of Agriculture unless they are given assurance before May 15th that such labor will be available. Local communities in Montana and Colorado and State officials, however, are unalterably opposed to bringing Japanese into these areas unless (a) they can be given assurance that the evacuees will be removed after the war (b) that adequate military guard will accompany the evacuees, or that the Federal Government will supply funds for hiring guards from within the State and (c) that no Japanese will be permitted to own or lease land.

As the war progresses and shortages of Agricultural labor increase, it may confidently be anticipated that demands for the use of evacuee labor will likewise increase. Since these demands arise from perfectly understandable motives of a desire to make a profit and since they are often accompanied by a frank and candid hatred of Japanese, the situation is one that is fraught with temptations for exploitation. So far, there has been no definite crystallization of policy and procedure concerning the use of evacuee labor in situations of this sort. It is reasonably certain, however, that no responsible agency of the Federal Government will permit unrestricted and unsupervised use of evacuee labor by organizations or persons unsympathetic and unfriendly to the plight of the evacuees themselves. The approval of the War Relocation Authority and its general objectives, as far as the treatment of the evacuees is concerned, are already clear, *viz.*, that within the framework of orderly and effective evacuation, every effort will be made to secure humane and democratic treatment of all Japanese and, at the same time, develop for them opportunities

for the maximum productive effort.

A field of private employment of Japanese that promises to provide reasonable opportunity for productive effort and that offers a possibility of establishing fair conditions of work is the establishment of small industries adjacent to projects. As mentioned earlier, several proposals have been made by private industry and it can be anticipated that additional opportunities will be forthcoming. The problem for the War Relocation Authority is to develop such activity of this sort which will meet several conditions: (a) That it will provide no opportunity for sabotage (b) That it will contribute materially to the war effort (c) That it will effectively utilize the skills, both demonstrated and potential, of the evacuees and (d) That it will afford reasonable hours, wages, and conditions of work.

In terms of the broad objectives of the War Relocation Authority, the most promising opportunities for private ~~employment~~ of Japanese seem to lie in the field of industrial activity where such activity can be brought to the project. Such an arrangement permits the protection of the Japanese from unwarranted abuse and exploitation, reduces the responsibility of policing, and avoids antagonism of other Americans. It has, however, the disadvantage of isolating the Japanese and reducing their contact with other Americans to a minimum. In the present emergency, and with the increasing attitude of antagonism on the part of most Americans, the loss incident to partial isolation becomes less important than it might otherwise be.

Attitude of Inland States

The attitude of individual^s, communities and states in the inland area, ~~away from the prohibited zone,~~ toward the movement of Japanese to "their" areas, is

pretty largely what might have been expected. This phase of the problem is in, itself, an interesting study in mass psychology. At least four distinct phases are discernable. Surprise was quickly followed by fear, to which was added anger and finally chagrin.

The present violence of public reaction in the inland states is largely motivated by fear of an unknown people of foreign race, the military exploits of whose forebears are currently causing distress to so many Americans. This fear was greatly accentuated by the uncontrolled and unsupervised infiltration, by "voluntary evacuation". With the knowledge that evacuation to the inland states would be accomplished by control and supervision, fear largely changed to anger and, in many instances when it was observed by some that California was using military exigencies "to get rid of a long a worrisome problem", finally to chagrin. To put it briefly, general public reaction was at the boiling point. It still is.

The conference held in Salt Lake City with the Governors and other officials is both grim and revealing evidence of the attitude of the leadership, at least, in the inland states. Evidences of "politics as usual", unrestrained racial hatred, jealousy of states' rights, and disregard of democratic principles were widely prevalent. Charges of incompetence on the part of the Federal Government and ulterior motives on the part of the ~~states~~ of the West Coast were rife. A considerable sentiment was for the internment of Japanese, citizen and alien alike, in concentration camps and their use as "slave" labor.

There was a suggestion that each state be given a quota of Japanese and sufficient Federal funds for policing, in order to "solve our problem". This suggestion was widely endorsed by a number of the Governors

Despite the vigorous and militant attitude on the part of State officials,

they seemed to accept in principal, the need for evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast. They likewise accepted the principle of establishing reception centers under Federal responsibility. They wanted, however, assurances that movement away from reception centers to private employment ^{would} be under guard, that the evacuees would be removed after the war, that evacuees not be permitted to own or lease land, and that those ^{evacuees} Japanese who had already immigrated to their states be taken into custody at reception centers.

The effect of the attitude of ^{the} representation ^{was} of the several states is to preclude, for the time being at least, any employment of evacuee labor away from project. This attitude also throws into serious question the feasibility of locating evacuees in smaller numbers on farms or in industry away from reception centers.

Attitude of Japanese

No very reliable evidence is available on the attitude of the whole Japanese population toward the program of relocation in interior states. With few exceptions, their public expressions of attitude have been ones of wholehearted and active cooperation with the Army and the War Relocation Authority. Their behavior in promptly obeying instructions, in gathering at assembly points, and during transit to reception centers, bears testimony to the meaning of their public expression. In a word, they have cooperated admirably.

Their cooperative behavior cannot be taken as proof of their "desire" to evacuate, however. Since the Japanese are first and foremost human beings, they cannot be expected to feel anything but regret at being suddenly uprooted from their homes, property and means of earning a livelihood. Indeed, considerable latent resentment unquestionably is the experience of many. In a canvass of some thirty-odd Japanese cooks in San Francisco, in an effort to recruit

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cooks for reception centers, all but nine politely, in effect said, "To hell with it; I'll wait until I'm forced to move".

The perennial Japanese smile is no index of delight. Their willingness to take the present severe test of loyalty to this country, at least cooperatively, is, however, encouraging. It does not take much imagination to realize that the experience of the Japanese subsequent to their removal will have a considerable, if not determinant effect on their ultimate loyalty. Since past discrimination cannot fail to have left its mark, and since the present evacuation, no matter how valid a military measure, cannot fail to tax loyalty, the future course of the war is a factor of influence that cannot be overlooked.

The most articulate and the most organized expression of opinion of Japanese attitude has come from the Japanese-American citizen league. This organization claims to be the only one that can adequately represent the Japanese. Since it puts great emphasis on citizenship and since its members are restricted to citizens, it cannot, of course, pretend to represent the whole Japanese population nor the entire point of view. It is however, a responsible organization and certainly its suggestions to the War Relocation Authority are constructive ones.

The Japanese American Citizen League has volunteered its services to be used in whatever manner the Government sees fit. Its proposals call for a broad program of assistance not unlike the present program of the War Relocation Authority. Special emphasis is given by the Citizens League to the danger of isolation and the prohibition of contacts with other Americans. As they rightly point out, much of the population has grown up in close association with other Americans. They abhor and greatly fear the dangers of "Little Tokyos", particularly for the younger group.

The War Relocation Authority thus faces a neat problem of necessarily fostering cultural specialization in the face of demands for assimilation by the Japanese themselves. Whether any such view is representative of issei, whatever its functional significance, may be subject to serious question.

This Citizens League also calls for religious tolerance, including tolerance of those of Buddhist faith who represent about half of the total population. The time-honored principle on which the democracy of this country rests may be subject to serious strain if attention is not given to their suggestions.

Not the least important suggestions made by the Citizens League is a broad opportunity for local self-governments for which the League feels the Japanese is eminently suited. They are also concerned lest inadequate opportunity be provided for productive work which will contribute to the ~~war~~ effort. Finally, they urged that citizens be permitted to serve in the armed forces.

It is reasonably clear that the Japanese population as a whole accepts the program of evacuation and will cooperate with it fully. It is likewise clear that they expect and hope for humane treatment in keeping with principles of democracy. They hope to be given a chance to become self supporting and they wish to participate in the war effort. They, in turn, may be expected to conform to regulations, to take a large measure of responsibility for internal organization and operation of communities, and to become self sufficient if opportunities for productive effort are available. In brief, the Japanese may be counted on to meet their share of the bargain.

* * * *

COST OF PROGRAM

The speed with which it is necessary to relocate Japanese in inland States will make the program an expensive one in terms of costs. The agricultural resources of most of the projects require considerable development before they can be placed in full production. Since ~~The~~ development work, which will be undertaken by the Japanese, will accrue as benefits to public resources ^{and} the returns will be considerable. But the returns will be in kind rather than in cash. As agricultural resources become fully developed cost of feeding the population can be expected to decline. If the present war proves to be a long one, feeding the population - which is now estimated to cost \$1,500,000 a month - will decline sharply. Similarly, as projects become organized and industrial activity is created, returns in the form of industrial products will increase. However, it is likely that many industrial activities will be under publicly sponsored programs of production. Returns from such production will again be in kind rather than in cash. Finally, until productive activities, both industrial and agricultural, can be organized conservation and other types of public work adjacent to projects may be the most immediately feasible undertakings.

On the whole, as the program is now shaping up, it appears that the costs of operating the projects will require a considerable outlay of cash by the Federal treasury - probably 75 or 100 million dollars. Returns from this outlay, in the form of useful public works on and off projects, in agricultural production, and in the production of war goods, will also be great. Such returns will not however, yield cash revenue for the operation of projects under present proced-

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ures of public financing. It is important, therefore, that the sizable appropriation necessary for the operation of the program be considered in the light of the total productive effort, including the goods and services, of all the projects.

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April 24, 1942

Hon. Mon C. Wallgren
United States Senator
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Wallgren:

I have just returned to San Francisco from Washington, D. C.
I am sorry that earlier acknowledgment has not been given you
to your letter of April 16.

As you no doubt know, voluntary evacuation of Japanese aliens
and Japanese American citizens was the policy prior to March 29.
That policy led to numerous difficulties. Indeed, we reached a
point where there was genuine concern about the safety of many
people involved. Consequently, General DeWitt discontinued all
voluntary evacuation. Henceforth, all evacuees will move from
the military area to new communities of not less than 5,000
population. These communities will be on Federally owned land
and will be protected by the Federal Government. Within each
area the evacuees will have full opportunity to earn a livelihood
by farming, subjugating land, doing conservation work and related
things.

We do not have plans for the location of a project in Grant County.
Further, you may be sure that if a project is to be placed anywhere
in the State of Washington the matter will be taken up with the
Governor by the military establishment.

When I am in Washington sometime in the near future I should like
very much to meet informally, off the record, with you and other
Senators from the Western States to give you full information on
the program now underway.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director
War Relocation Authority

MSEisenhower:HC

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April 24, 1942

Honorable Harold D. Smith,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Director Smith:

This letter explains the relationship of the War Relocation Authority and the Bureau of Indian Affairs and points to the need for the retention in Washington, D. C. of sufficient Indian Bureau personnel to effectuate the existing agreement between the two agencies.

I realize, of course, what a critical space problem there is in Washington, and it is only after I have considered numerous alternatives and discarded them that I submit this recommendation.

Even before the President had signed Executive Order 9102, the Colorado River Reservation had been selected as a relocation site for Japanese evacuees. Construction was to start immediately and evacuees were scheduled to begin arriving at the project early in April. Consequently, immediately after my appointment, I entered into an agreement with the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, under which the Commissioner would administer the Colorado River Relocation Project for W. R. A. W. R. A. would establish the major policies and program; the Commissioner would effectuate these for W. R. A. Funds were to be transferred to the Commissioner to defray all project costs.

Subsequently, we found that equipment, provisions, and supplies could be obtained for this and other projects only through the Army. Hence, the housekeeping phases of the agreement were changed whereby the War Relocation Authority would place funds at the disposal of the Army to pay for materials ordered by W. R. A. Funds for administrative and related expenses were transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. But the basic agreement remained the same -- the Bureau administers the project for W. R. A.

Major policies are being developed daily on project self-government, enlistment, education, health, public works, agriculture, manufacturing, and a host of other things. It clearly is not possible for W. R. A. to lay such policies down in advance for the guidance of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. At the same time,

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Director, Bureau of the Budget - 2 -

it is imperative that we have reasonable uniformity in fundamental policies on all projects, whether these are administered directly or indirectly by the War Relocation Authority.

Another thing: We are having difficulty in finding resources on which to locate War-duration projects. We may therefore be compelled to place a fourth community of 10,000 evacuees on the Colorado River Reservation (we are now building facilities for three -- one of 10,000 and two of 5,000). In other words, present plans call for the Colorado River Relocation Project to carry a sixth of the total and it may possibly have to carry a fourth of the total of all Japanese evacuees.

Commissioner Collier and I will have to work together closely at all times. I do not know how many of his personnel he would have to retain in Washington. The Bureau of the Budget, of course, would make that determination if it favorably considered my request.

I shall deeply appreciate your giving consideration to this matter. I shall return to Washington on Thursday, April 30, and will be available for consultation, if you wish.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower,
Director.

MSE
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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, OFFICE
WHITCOMB HOTEL BUILDING

April 28, 1942

Mr. Dave Davidson
Chairman, USDA War Board
Agricultural Adjustment Administration
Berkeley, California

Dear Mr. Davidson:

I realize it would be helpful if someone in authority could now say definitely whether evacuees who will be located at the Tule Lake Relocation Center will be available for private employment in seasonal agricultural work this coming fall. A definite answer would, of course, immediately affect the management plans of farmers in that area. However, there is no one in the Government or outside the Government who can now give a final answer. It is only possible to state an official attitude and to express a hope with respect to circumstances that may prevail as the war progresses.

It has been demonstrated that dispersal of evacuees without protection is, for the time being, out of the question. Protective services by the Army to guard against civil disturbances are so limited that it is not feasible to provide guard services for groups of less than 5,000 people.

In the management of relocation centers, we must put the safety of the United States, of the local communities, and of the evacuees first. Gainful employment outside relocation centers will be possible only within the conditions imposed by military necessity and by positive assurances of safety.

As you no doubt know, all able-bodied evacuees will be given an opportunity to enlist for the duration of the war in the War Relocation Work Corps. If military and other circumstances so dictate, the enlistees will stay within the protected areas. They will subjugate the land. They will produce food. They will build and operate schools and hospitals. They will engage in simple manufacturing.

If the enlistees are needed in private employment and if protective services are available, they could be granted furloughs from the War Relocation Work Corps for specified periods of time.


2 - Mr. Dave Davidson - 4/28/42

General DeWitt has made it clear that workers may be recruited for private employment provided those hiring the workers pay transportation, recruit on a voluntary basis through the United States Employment Service, pay prevailing wages without displacing other labor, provide facilities for at least the minimum essentials of living, and provided the states and local communities give assurance that they can maintain law and order.

Finally, I should like to express a personal attitude. No one hopes more than I do that the evacuees, moved out of their normal economy, may make the maximum contribution to production. I wish conditions were such that they could all engage in private employment. At present, the military situation, public attitudes, and the general inability to guarantee safety, all mitigate against private employment. I hope very much that fundamental conditions will rapidly change. However, I cannot foresee the future. That is why I cannot give a definite Yes or No answer.

With kind personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,


M. S. Eisenhower
Director

P. O. Box 247
Berkeley, California
April 29, 1942

Mr. W. S. Eisenhower, Director
War Relocation Authority
Whitcomb Hotel Building
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

Yesterday afternoon Mr. Ernest E. Hatch informed me that he had an appointment with Lieutenant Colonel Bendetson and afterwards with you. I assume that this is the result of our recommendation of him. Needless to say, I am pleased that you are following up on the opportunity of obtaining Mr. Hatch's services, because I am certain that you will obtain a good man and because I feel that he can be of more value to the war effort in your organization, than in some routine army work.

Since he will see you today, I am presuming on his appointment and asking him to deliver to you an answer to your letter of yesterday and some further comments regarding the subject of the use of Japanese laborers from the Tule Lake Relocation Center.

I appreciate the trouble that you took in setting out at considerable length the status of possible private employment of Japanese who will be located in relocation centers. It is difficult, I realize, to make positive statements, and the situation is such that nothing short of a positive statement seems to be very much good. However, your letter did indicate some possibility and, since we are so much concerned with obtaining production/agricultural commodities, which otherwise just would not be produced, I am following our conversation with this letter.

The following two paragraphs are quoted from your letter:

"If the enlistees are needed in private employment and if protective services are available, they could be granted furloughs from the War Relocation Work Corps for specified periods of time.

"General DeWitt has made it clear that workers may be recruited for private employment provided those hiring the workers pay transportation, recruit on a voluntary basis through the United States Employment Service, pay

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prevailing wages without displacing other labor, provide facilities for at least the minimum essentials of living, and provided the states and local communities give assurance that they can maintain law and order."

If I interpret these statements correctly, they indicate the possibility that the Japanese can be used in private employment and they indicate the conditions under which General DeWitt would approve of such private employment. As I understand the situation in the Tule Lake Area, it would be entirely feasible to meet those conditions and I am quite certain that satisfactory assurance can be obtained that those conditions will be met, if the local people are given an understanding of what is necessary. We are so much interested in this subject that if you would indicate the desirability of getting the proper commitments from those concerned, we will be glad to do what we can to obtain any type of assurance that you want. Admittedly the time is short, but the matter is quite important so we would like to try, if there is any possibility that we can accomplish the production of these additional acreages of sugar beets and potatoes.

I have checked further and I find that the labor will all be used within a comparatively short distance from the relocation center, probably not more than 10 miles in any case. Also the number needed, in addition to the expected supply of labor that will be otherwise available, should be somewhere between 500 and 1000 workers. It would be advantageous to have them during the beet thinning season, but that will not be entirely necessary. The really important period is during the harvest, which would begin in September and carry through November with the peak labor demand in October. All the questions of methods of employment, wages, transportation, etc. are details which I am certain can be handled without any difficulty whatsoever.

It will, of course, be necessary for General DeWitt or you to indicate the type of protection that will have to be provided by the State or local authorities. However, in regard to that I am quite certain that we can obtain whatever is needed.

Please do not consider me unduly persistent on this matter, but I have the feeling that there still is a possibility of obtaining this agricultural production and I cannot cease working on the project while there is such a possibility. Also I believe sincerely that Tule Lake provides an opportunity for the private employment of Japanese from the relocation center in just exactly the manner in which you would like to have many of those Japanese used. In other words, this looks like the kind of thing that would be mutually beneficial to all phases of the war effort, particularly production of needed agricultural commodities and the satisfactory use of these people, who must be under supervision during the war.

- 3 -

If I can be of any further assistance to you in this matter,
or in anything else regarding your work, please do not hesitate
to call on me.

Thanking you for your consideration and trusting that something
definite may be worked out, I am


Very truly yours,

Dave Davidson, Chairman
California USDA War Board

DD:mgh
cc: Davidson

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON



Add to Chapman Part II
April 30, 1942

Mr. Cole E. Morgan
King Features Syndicate
1317 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Morgan:

In a story under your by-line dated April 18, appearing in various newspapers served by the King Features Syndicate, the following statement was made:

"Only about 20 percent of the approximately 75,000 American-born Japanese in the three Pacific Coast states — California, Washington, and Oregon — are loyal to the United States, in the opinion of Milton S. Eisenhower, director of the war relocation authority."

This statement is wholly without foundation as an expression of my opinion. At no time have I made any statement, publicly or confidentially, as to what percentage or how many American-born Japanese may be loyal or disloyal. In fact, I have no information on this subject.

Your story also gives the impression that I disclosed certain facts discussed with Members of Congress at an executive session which was closed to the press. I do not know from what source you obtained your so-called information, but certainly it was not obtained from me, and it was, in my opinion, highly unethical to seek to give this impression through indirect quotation.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director



Story appearing in Herald & American,
Chicago, Illinois
April 19, 1942



DECLARES ONLY 20% OF
U. S.-BORN JAPS LOYAL

Evacuation Chief Describes
Problems of Relocation

By Cole E. Morgan.
Special to the Chicago Herald-American.

Washington, April 18.--Only about 20 per cent of the approximately 75,000 American-born Japanese in the three Pacific Coast states -- California, Washington and Oregon -- are loyal to the United States, in the opinion of Milton S. Eisenhower, director of the war relocation authority.

Eisenhower, it was disclosed today, gave this estimate to a committee of west coast representatives in Congress, at a behind-closed-doors session on progress of evacuation and plans for the removal and resettlement of Japanese, aliens and citizens, from the prohibited military zones recently proscribed by Lieut. Gen. John L. Dewitt, commanding the army's Pacific coast area.

HEADED BY REP. FORD

This committee, headed by Representative Leland Ford of California, was created some weeks ago by a conference of all west coast Senate and House members to deal with the problems arising out of evacuation and relocation of Japanese from the military zones.

Eisenhower has just returned from a several weeks stay in the far west laying plans for the agency he heads to relocate the Japanese as the army evacuates them.

Eisenhower said he felt his first problem was, after the Japanese were evacuated by the army and placed in the Manzanar internment camp in Owens Valley, Cal., to get them housed and encourage them to get into production.

INTERMENT ONLY WAY

The director said he had found violent opposition to infiltration by the Japanese and was convinced that interment was the only

way to take care of them at this time.

Labor shortages in the western states, particularly in the beet growing areas, was serious and the beet growers were inclined to favor the Japanese being permitted to work in these areas, Eisenhower said, while the general populace would resent the Japanese being brought into these localities.

Through Gen. Dewitt, he explained, it had been worked out to have the farmers among the Japs the last to evacuate, and although they were being carefully guarded, they would be permitted to begin the raising of crops.

CLEAN UP CAMPS FIRST

Employment of the internees could start, Eisenhower said, by having them clean up and improve the internment camps, develop raw lands, cultivate farm products which would furnish food, and later hand manufacturing work could be carried on.

Eisenhower said he thought at the present public lands should be used and put into production and that perhaps later private lands could be acquired by the government, which could then be bought and sold as improved lands after the war.

He developed that after the problem of housing and feeding the internees, other problems would come up, such as burying the dead, establishing American schools, furnishing medical supplies, etc.

SEEKS LAND BAR

He definitely felt that the Japanese should not be permitted to acquire land, even after the war, but that was strictly a federal problem and not one which could be handled by the states.

Eisenhower described a site near Phoenix, Ariz., a reservation occupied by the Pima Indians. This area contains 7,000 acres and could produce, if developed and further improved by irrigation, and could be made a paying proposition by the government, thereby diminishing initial expenses to some extent, he said.

May 5, 1942

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C. 102

Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower
302 Administration Building
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

This report is submitted as of Tuesday, May 5, 1942. Mr. Smith, Project Manager, Gila Project, informed me that the contract had been let for Unit No. 1 at Gila. The contractor is given 50 days from notice to proceed. He has not yet received notice, but has broken ground and has set up his sawmill at the railroad.

Colonel Hansston and Major Durbin of WCCA held a conference with Mr. Fryer and me yesterday evening. They proposed that we present to General DeWitt an agreement and request for mobilization type construction by the Army Engineers on all projects instead of T.O. type of construction, modified. In their opinion, the modifications which we were requiring practically made the buildings mobilization type of construction. They discussed in some detail the Military Police barracks area. We discovered that the idea of watchtowers for relocation centers was prevalent. Mr. Fryer and I both opposed the construction of any such towers. I have personally had considerable experience with watchmen stationed in towers. It is my opinion that a watchtower furnishes a good firing platform. But in limiting ingress and egress, ground positions are essential. The watchtower has its greatest value for observation through field glasses or other instruments at long range during daylight. The question of fencing relocation centers also arose. There are advantages in a three- or five-strand fence which outlines the limits of the center. There is nothing to be gained, and considerable to be lost if a hog-tight fence of any height is constructed.

Papers on the Delta, Utah project were forwarded to you by airmail last night. May I emphasize the necessity for secrecy until the U. S. Engineers have filed on the water rights and the water stock has been accumulated. Mr. Lindville left last night for the Beardsley area northwest of Phoenix. He will meet a representative of the U. S. Engineers there and complete the site board work. The project is ready to be written up, recommending approval. Messrs. Utz and Webster left this afternoon for Cody, Wyoming to investigate the Shoshone area. I have arranged for a representative of the U. S. Army Engineers to meet them at the Bureau of Reclamation Office in the Post Office at Cody, Wyoming Friday morning.

C1.02

Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower - May 5, 1942 - Page 2

We received an urgent message from Mr. Head at Parker for the classification forms. These forms were prepared by Dr. Dedrick in conjunction with representatives of W.R.A. The forms are now being printed and will be delivered to us Friday. The necessary number will be sent to Mr. Head as soon as received.

Mr. Fryer, Mr. Province, and I attended a joint conference with WCCA and an interdenominational group of Protestant ministers. The meeting was not especially productive.

A conference has been arranged for tomorrow between the Public Health Service Doctors Harrison and Thompson together with Army medical personnel and Colonel Foy. The subject of our discussion will be medical equipment and supplies for our projects.

I understand that the recommendations made by Mr. Stafford for staff positions on the Gooding Project were all disapproved by Mr. Fryer, excepting Mr. Best. And I understand that Mr. Best was offered a salary of \$3,800 instead of \$5,600.

I have been considering whether or not the Regional staff is excessive. I am not concerned at this time even if it is, because one Regional staff can easily furnish the nucleus for other Regional staffs. However, I suggest that this matter receive attention from the representatives sent out from Washington. The Pacific Region is now carrying a peak load. Staffs should not be organized in such numbers as to easily meet peak loads, rather, the number depends on normal requirements. My thinking may be premature at this time since we are not yet operating any projects. Nevertheless, after a number of months this should receive careful consideration. Meanwhile there are many advantages in overstaffing the Region. However, economy is not one of the advantages.

I received notification of my appointment as Colonel today. I am deeply indebted to you for what you did. May I assure you that my best efforts are always at your disposal. I am, indeed, grateful.

Very truly yours,

E. F. Cress
Colonel Cav.

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53 Shepard St.
Cambridge, Mass.
May 9, 1942

Mr. Milton Eisenhower
War Relocation Authority
San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:



The forced evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific coast is one of the most distressing acts which the Government of the United States is carrying out in the prosecution of the war. The injustice of indiscriminate and compulsory evacuation is absolutely contrary to the principles of democracy for which the war is supposedly being fought. I do not question the right of the Government to remove enemy aliens where definite acts of sabotage or other assistance to the enemy can be proved, but I fail to see what right the Government has to remove aliens who have given no proof of disloyalty and who have been denied the opportunity to become American citizens by the Government which now accuses them because they are not. Even more do I protest the evacuation of those Japanese who are American citizens. By removing them without proof of disloyalty to the United States, this Government is violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the rights due any American citizen.

It is highly significant that in Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson cabled on March 14 that there had been no acts of sabotage either on December 7 or thereafter. Why, then, should the entire body of Japanese in this country be under such suspicion? The Japanese have been doing their best to prove their loyalty by contributing to the Red Cross and U.S.O. and by purchasing Defense Bonds, and they would hardly contribute such great sums as they have if they were not loyal.

Unjustified discrimination against a minority group purely because of their race is a totalitarian act which destroys democracy and can only make the rest of the world suspect that, as in the case of the Peace Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, the United States does not practice what it preaches. In this time of national crisis when the need for a united country is so important, such an act of discrimination is exceedingly detrimental to the spirit of the nation. Other minorities have good cause to fear similar treatment against themselves.

Furthermore, the isolation of the Japanese can do nothing to further their much-needed assimilation into this country but is sowing the seeds for hatred and bitterness which will make future attempts at assimilation far more difficult if not impossible. If their resettlement is delayed until after the war, the problem will be immensely aggravated by the need for resettlement of soldiers and workers in war industries. I urge that those who are not duly proven guilty be allowed freely to resettle now.

The United States can have no justification for fighting totalitarianism if it fails to preserve democracy at home. By stopping the evacuation of the Japanese now, this Government will show that it is democratic and will keep-- perhaps one should say restore-- the confidence of the rest of the world, without which any attempt to conquer totalitarianism is futile.

Very sincerely yours,

Edith Roberts

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May 21, 1942

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Miss Edith Roberts
53 Shepard Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Miss Roberts:

Your letter of May 9, 1942, has been referred to me.
The motive which prompts you to write is sincerely
appreciated and respected.

The necessity for the evacuation of the Japanese from
strategic West Coast areas was determined in the light
of urgent military considerations. In these critical
times we do not feel that we can seriously question that
judgment. Our attorneys have given careful consideration
to the legal aspects of the evacuation and relocation
program and they have advised us that it comes within
the scope of recognized constitutional concepts, even as
applied to citizens of Japanese ancestry.

We, of course, deeply regret the necessity for the re-
location program and the inevitable tragedies which we
see arising from the evacuation problem. We are gravely
aware of our responsibility to administer our activities
in such a way as to afford to every evacuee the fullest
degree of liberty consistent with the necessary exercise
of the war powers conferred by the Constitution. It is
our earnest hope that by our conduct we may prove that a
democracy can cope with an unfortunate problem of this
kind in a thoroughly democratic way. I know that you
will join with us in this desire.

Very truly yours,

E. R. Fryer
Regional Director

RBThrockmorton:MW

FILE COPY

May 16, 1942

Mr. Robert Horton
Director, Division of Information
Office for Emergency Management
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Horton:

For the past several weeks, in conversations between Mr. Paynter, Mr. Straus, Mr. Bird, and myself, we have been trying to develop a satisfactory working arrangement between your Division and the War Relocation Authority on information matters.

Because I regard information as one of the most important administrative tools in operating a program, I have given this matter much personal thought and attention, particularly in view of the fact that the program of the War Relocation Authority involves the operation of total communities, covering the whole range of human relationships. Information is essential to the success of this program, and in many phases is so closely intermeshed with administrative and supervisory work that it is impossible to draw a valid distinction between information and administrative activities.

As I see it, the information work of the Authority divides into these general categories:

1. Current Coverage -- Day-to-day coverage of significant developments in the program to interpret this program to the public by means of mass communication media, as press and radio, news pictures, movies, posters, etc. This also involves providing special information to agencies engaged in foreign propaganda.
2. Information for Evacuees -- If we are to obtain the necessary cooperation from the evacuees we must provide them, first, with full information regarding the program and, secondly, with background and other interpretive information that gives them a workable rationale for cooperating. This is partly an information job, partly intelligence, and partly administrative.

3. Documentation -- Because this migration is an unprecedented and significant event in American history, it must be carefully documented as it progresses. This requires something over and above straight news coverage in the way of building up records of the program in textual and pictorial information, in continuing documentary research and liaison with sociological and economic research groups making studies of the evacuation and relocation process and its results.
4. Public Relations in Project Area -- A continuing, day-to-day public relations program has to be carried out in each area to see that actions and events within the project are properly interpreted to the people in immediately surrounding localities, to prevent where possible, dangerous tensions and misunderstandings.
5. Intelligence within Projects -- Lines of intelligence must be maintained with the evacuee population to:
(1) Provide the Authority with information that is helpful in administering the program effectively, such as information on morale, reaction to policies, etc., and (2) provide the military establishment, COI, State Department, FBI, and other agencies interested in the intelligence problem with useful information.
6. Administrative Information -- The preparation of statements of policy and policy documents, special reports to cooperating agencies and to Congress, the annual report of the Authority, periodic progress reports for internal distribution, etc.

As I understand it, your Division is interested primarily in the category of current coverage for public dissemination, and distinctly does not want to enter into the work involved in handling special information channels to evacuees, in documentation, community public relations, intelligence within projects, or administrative information. We all realize, of course, that there is some overlap and that work in all phases must be coordinated.

At the same time, the Authority definitely does not wish to set up facilities for current coverage and processing of information for public use if such facilities are available elsewhere on a satisfactory basis.

Consequently, I wish to suggest the following alternative working arrangements between your Division and the Authority:

Proposal 1

That the OIM Division of Information undertake the responsibility for providing the Authority with complete current coverage, as outlined under category No. 1. The Authority would continue to service its own needs in all other categories, but any information developed through these other phases of the program, deemed proper for public dissemination, would be furnished or made available to the Division of Information for its use.


Under this arrangement, as I visualize it, the Division would assign one full-time information man to the Authority in Washington to "live with" the current coverage job, and to maintain close liaison with the work being done in other categories. The Authority would eliminate the Current Information Section and the Visual Information Section from the Washington staff on the theory that these services would be handled by your organization on the basis of programs and copy developed by the assigned information man. The Authority would continue its Director of Information to coordinate all phases of its work bearing on information, a special Publications and Reports Section, and an Intelligence Section.

The Division would make appropriate arrangements to provide current coverage at the San Francisco office of the Authority, either by assigning an information man to that office, or through daily coverage provided by the San Francisco branch of the Division. The Authority would eliminate the Current Information Section, but would continue the Documents, Photography (for permanent records), Special Reports, and Field Operations Sections. Services of these Sections, and information developed in the course of their work, would, of course, be available to your Division representative.

Perhaps the name of the Authority's Information Service at San Francisco should be changed to more accurately reflect its revised duties.

Proposal 2

That the Authority maintain its present staff, in Washington and in the field, and maintain a working liaison with the OIM Division of Information, under which the latter would aid the Authority in planning and carrying out a complete current information



program. Under this arrangement all press and radio information, visual materials for public use, motion pictures, press conferences, and public statements, would be handled through the Division of Information. In other words, joint, general plans would be drawn; the Authority would provide the basic information, and the Division of Information would process and distribute it.

I have no particular preference as to these proposals, and would appreciate your candid appraisal of them.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director

JAB/ra



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a) We handle

1) Executive stuff

2) Documental

3) Intelligence

b) We prepare all our own

publications; OZM Louis Alvin,

file constitution criticism, but

final approval is with WPA*

OZM disseminate

c) Press, radio, - all current

news come - OZM handles -

line based not as - all

material subject to final

approval by WPA,



May 18, 1942

Mr. Robert W. Horton
Director, Division of Information
Office for Emergency Management
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Horton:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of today, I understand that you accept our "Proposal 1," outlined in our letter of May 16, subject to the following clarifications, on which we both agree:

I. The word "Information" will not be used by the Authority in designating titles of jobs, divisions, sections, branches, etc.

II. In the execution of the information policy of the Director of the Authority, the OEM Division of Information will be exclusively responsible for all dissemination of information relating to the Authority by any mass communication media which would reach the public here and abroad; provided that:

A. The Authority will handle, through its own staff and its own channels (1) information for evacuees, (2) documentation, (3) public relations in project areas, (4) intelligence within projects, and (5) administrative information. These operations are described in our May 16 letter.

B. The Authority will prepare all of its own publications (pamphlets, booklets, etc); the OEM Division of Information will review these, make constructive criticisms, and will disseminate, but final approval of publications, prior to dissemination, will rest with the Authority.

C. The OEM Division of Information will handle all press releases, radio scripts, press conferences, graphics for public distribution - in other words, all mass communication involved in current coverage; however all material prepared and issued by the Division regarding the Authority will be subject to final

- 2 -

approval by the Authority prior to issuance. It is understood that you will appoint a competent information specialist to work with the Authority in Washington, and to be physically housed with the Authority.

If this clarification of "Proposal I" meets with your approval, I suggest that you confirm it, and that operations on the proposed basis begin as soon as possible.

Sincerely,



M. S. Eisenhower
Director

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May 18, 1942

Mr. Robert W. Horton
Director, Division of Information
Office for Emergency Management
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Horton:

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
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- 2 -

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Sincerely,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director



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May 18, 1942

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The Honorable

The Secretary of the Interior

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Under the agreement between the Department of the Interior and the War Relocation Authority I should have, much earlier than this, set forth in writing the general policies governing all relocation projects, including the Colorado River relocation project which is administered for the War Relocation Authority by the Office of Indian Affairs. However, we have been so occupied with one emergency after another that we just have not been able to do half the things we must do.

Naturally I do not wish to issue regulations, administrative memoranda, and fundamental policy documents affecting the Colorado River relocation project without first consulting with the appropriate people in your Department. Consequently, in view of the fact that evacuees are now arriving at the Colorado River relocation project and because I shall be out of the city for the next week or so, I am setting forth in this letter a few things which will be required on all projects, with the request that appropriate instructions be issued to the project manager under Mr. Collier's supervision. As I say, this is a stop-gap arrangement.

1. The Executive Order (9102) establishing the War Relocation Authority provides that all evacuees over 16 years of age shall be given an opportunity to enlist in the War Relocation Work Corps. Both Japanese aliens and Japanese-American citizens may enlist, if they wish.
 - a. Each evacuee, eligible for enlistment, should read a copy of the WRA bulletin, The War Relocation Work Corps. The project manager and his assistants should carry on necessary educational work with respect to enlistment. (I think enlistment is already under way at the Colorado River project.)

- b. Work should be assigned by the project manager and his assistants only to enlistees. If others, such as boys and girls under 16, undertake work about the camp, they should do so wholly on their own volition. No doubt many of these youngsters will wish to help clean up about the quarters and improve the living accommodations.
- c. Healthful food should be provided at a maximum cost of fifty cents a day. Costs at assembly centers are averaging about 37 to 38 cents a day, including milk for children under 12 and for adults who, on the physicians' advice, require it. We hope to achieve a general average of not more than 40 cents a day.
- d. The camp canteen should be established at the earliest moment as a cooperative of the relocation community. For the time being all goods should be sold at retail, the profits being used to expand the stock or, if this is not necessary, to begin repaying the loan to the Federal Government. Later, I think we shall provide that some goods will be sold substantially at cost -- such as soap and toothpaste.
- e. Fiscal officers on the project should of course record all expenses and all income. Simple methods should be developed for keeping records of all work by evacuees.
- f. There will be no wages, as such, for evacuees who are doing public, including community, work on relocation projects. There will be cash advances. Such cash advances should not be made to evacuees who are not enlistees and who are not performing work specifically assigned by the project manager. Moreover, cash advances should not be made to enlistees performing assigned tasks until an appropriate regulation has been issued and published in the Federal Register; however, time records should be kept on this group and regulations will be so drawn as to have cash advances cover the full time put in by enlistees on assigned work.
- g. The regulation just mentioned will provide (and budget estimates are being adjusted accordingly):

1. The actual earnings of enlistees will depend upon the financial success of the relocation undertaking.
2. Advances, which will be recorded as project costs, will include food, medical and hospital services, material for the production of work clothing, and education. They will also include \$12 a month for each evacuee working 48 hours a week at such common-labor assignments as farming, janitorial work, etc.; \$16 a month for each evacuee working 48 hours a week at such skilled and semi-professional tasks as nursing; and \$19 a month for each evacuee performing professional services in the community, as doctors, dentists, school teachers. If project income exceeds project costs (the elements in each to be specified in regulations) the above cash advances will be increased as a means of distributing such profits. Obviously housing and certain other costs will not be charged in this accounting.
3. Evacuees may, if they wish, organize their own cooperatives for the production of goods for normal commercial sale. Many Japanese are skilled in knitting, ceramics, leather goods, etc. and may wish to undertake business ventures wholly at their own expense. Each evacuee engaging in a commercial undertaking will be charged \$20 a month for his food, medical and hospital services, education, etc. (This figure will be adjusted when precise costs become available.) All such project income will be deposited in the Treasury.
4. Enlistees may be granted furloughs if they wish to engage in private employment off the project. The conditions of private employment have been announced by General DeWitt and myself. The San Francisco regional office of WRA will handle all procedures in connection with private employment. For the time being, the only responsibility of the project manager on the Colorado River relocation project will be to see to it that each enlistee, earning prevailing wages in private work, pays \$20 a month for the support of each of his dependents who may continue to live at the relocation center.

5. We shall not have sufficient funds to buy standard school equipment. Consequently on each project we shall undertake, as public work, not only the construction of school houses and other necessary structures, but also the construction of equipment, as desks, chairs, tables, work benches, etc. Such activity should of course get under way at the Colorado River project. The Farm Security Administration is preparing simple designs for WRA, and these will be available to the Office of Indian Affairs. However, I know the Office has its own facilities.
6. Needless to say, Japanese should be given an opportunity to fill every possible position. Specifically, I hope that from 10 to 25 per cent of the high school teachers can be Japanese, fully accredited, and that from 25 to 50 percent of the junior high and elementary school teachers will be Japanese. Most clerical, stenographic, and related positions need not be filled by Caucasians. Indeed, I am so convinced of the ability, self-reliance, and skill of the Japanese that I think we must look to them to operate their community and to make a success of it.
7. Religious freedom can be taken for granted. Only English will be used in schools.
8. The WRA regional office at San Francisco will continue to obtain necessary equipment, provisions, and so on for the Colorado River project.
9. Each of the three centers at the Colorado River project will wish to issue a mimeographed newspaper. The government will provide mimeograph machines, and for the time being (until the community is fully organized) will provide mimeograph paper and stencils. Later the paper and stencil costs may be met by the community, such as by selling the newspaper through the canteen. The Japanese themselves should handle their own newspaper, of course. Japanese language is permissible, though probably unnecessary.

10. Project self-government may vary somewhat, project by project. Certainly WRA has no desire to insist upon needless uniformity. However, certain fundamental principles, if departed from, would cause trouble. For example, if all enlistees were allowed to vote at one location but only American-citizen Japanese were allowed to vote at another, we should properly be criticized by the Japanese and by everyone else, too. Consequently, I ask that no final arrangements on project self-government be made at the Colorado River relocation project until we have an opportunity to formulate general policies. In the meantime the basic groundwork can be laid. If out of this initial work your Department has suggestions to make for all projects I shall be delighted to have them.

11. I earnestly invite your Department to give me, either in writing or orally in conference, detailed suggestions on the basic policies and regulations which should govern all relocation projects. A tentative set of policies should be issued within the next ten days -- or immediately upon my return to Washington.

12. A work program, including land subjugation, will soon be under way on the Colorado River relocation project. As indicated in our agreement, I should like to have an opportunity to review the proposed work program. Could this be supplied within the next few weeks?

13. As you know, military police will guard all projects. But such guards will have nothing to do with internal security. Policy systems will be set up as part of the project government, but we are planning to have on each project one Caucasian official deputized by the State to handle serious crimes, if any develop. Your situation, on Indian Lands, may be somewhat different. If so, I should like to be informed so as to make an appropriate exception in the regulations.

2. No doubt Commissioner Collier has given considerable thought to the establishment of community enterprises, such as barber shops, motion pictures, and so on. Regulations will provide that all such undertakings be established as broad community cooperatives, the price schedules to allow profits which will be used to repay the Federal loan, if any; thereafter prices will be reduced so as to eliminate profits.

3. I understand that furniture has been purchased for employees on the Colorado River relocation project. I had hoped to avoid this but apparently it is inevitable, on all projects. Regulations will therefore require that single employees amortize the government's investment in 14 months and that employees with families amortize the investment in 20 months.
4. I am not informed on plans for the construction of school houses and other buildings on the Colorado River project. Such buildings should be as simple and inexpensive as possible -- planned only for use during the war. If more permanent buildings were to be built, such as for subsequent Indian use, the difference in cost would have to be borne by the Office of Indian Affairs.

I have visited the Colorado River project once. I was impressed, as was General DeWitt, with Mr. Wade and his associates. Indeed, we in WRA have had nothing but the most wholehearted cooperation from Commissioner Collier and all his people as well as from Commissioner Page and his associates. I want to tell you how much I appreciate this.

One final thing for the time being: If there is no change in the plans involving the move of the Office of Indian Affairs to Chicago, then it seems to me that one of the Office's employees should be housed with WRA at its headquarters in the Barr Building. Maintaining liaison is going to be difficult at best, but if Commissioner Collier has one man in whom he has complete confidence living with us all the time I think we can be benefited mutually.

Most sincerely,

M. S. EISENHOWER (Signed)

M. S. Eisenhower
Director

May 28, 1943


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Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

The War Food Administration urges the use of persons of Japanese ancestry released by the War Relocation Authority to work on farms. Thousands of these workers were used successfully last year and are now helping to produce vitally needed farm products. Additional labor is needed. Those who cooperate in making the best use of this valuable source of farm labor are rendering a real service to the United States and the war effort.

Sincerely yours,



Chester C. Davis
Administrator

run for :

Mr. Soben

Distributed to Dept. of Agric., Extension Service.

X ref

June 5, 1942

Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

When the Colorado River Relocation project was first planned, I was considerably disturbed about what might be involved in moving women and children into a location with such intense heat. I discussed the matter with WCCA officials, who agreed that the construction requirements for this relocation project should include desert cooling systems.

The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army has now made the determination that the minimum construction requirements for the Colorado River center shall not include desert cooling systems for other than hospital facilities. I think General DeWitt is entirely correct in concluding that desert cooling should not be provided for individual apartments or barracks. However, it does seem to me that desert cooling should be included in school buildings, mess halls, and hospitals -- in other words, in all buildings where large numbers of persons congregate and especially where children are housed during the intense heat of the day.

I simply ask that the War Department give careful consideration to this matter.

Sincerely yours,



M. S. Eisenhower
Director

MSE:FC

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Founded by Jane Addams 1915

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

CALIFORNIA STATE BRANCH

Los Angeles Branch - 3967 1/2 S. Normandie Avenue

June 11, 1942

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Mr. Milton Eisenhower
Director War Relocation Authority
Hotel Whitcomb
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

Recognizing that your department is anxious to conduct its duties so that as little hardship as possible will devolve upon innocent people and appreciating the cooperative spirit which has been shown by the Japanese may we, the Los Angeles Branch of the W. I. L. acquaint you with our concurrence with the resolution adopted by the main body at its recent annual meeting on Hearing Boards for the Japanese. We believe the detention of the Japanese and Americans of Japanese origin in reception centers is contrary to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of our Constitution. Moreover this segregation is in part an act of racial discrimination engendered by pressure groups with ulterior motives. We understand that these centers are physically inadequate and psychologically unhealthy and that the present treatment of the Japanese furnishes a propaganda weapon to the totalitarian countries. Furthermore we deplore the authority given the military over the lives and properties of American citizens.

We therefore are requesting you, and have also written to the President, immediately to set up civil hearings as recommended by the Tolan Committee to determine those Japanese who are dangerous to our country and those who are loyal and innocent.

Yours very respectfully,

Ruth Benedict

Ruth Benedict

Chairman Legislative Committee
For the Los Angeles Branch of the W.I.L.

4115

RDO

Confidential

Mr. M. S. Eisenhower,
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building, 17th & Eye Sts. N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Eisenhower:

You will find enclosed herewith copy of a memorandum from Colonel Cress which I think you should have before you when considering the "Memorandum of Considerations for Assembly Center Operation" which I airmailed to you last week. I should point out that the memorandum sent you last week was intended to be exactly what it was called--"A Memorandum of Considerations".

Obviously there are many evils inherent in the assembly center system and possibly, as Col. Cress says, the War Relocation Authority cannot do much about them. The plan would work only if there is mutual recognition on the part of WRA and WCCA of their joint responsibility and if there is a proper "give and take" attitude on the part of both agencies. It would have to be more than a verbal partnership--it would have to be a harmonious working partnership and, considering the recent negative attitude which I have detected on the part of WCCA, perhaps a working partnership would be too much to expect.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. Fryer
Regional Director

Enc. 179

ERFryer/ckd/jp--6/15/42

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VERY IMP. 1
LETTER 6
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June 18, 1942

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In view of my immediate transfer from the directorship of the War Relocation Authority to the Office of War Information, I am submitting a brief report on the work of the Authority from the time of its establishment on March 18, 1942 to the present.

Number of Evacuees Affected -- To date, about 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry have been affected by the military orders of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. Of this number, approximately 81,000 are now in temporary assembly centers, roughly 20,000 are in war-duration relocation centers, an additional 15,000 have been "frozen" in Military Area No. Two of eastern California, and from 5,000 to 8,000 voluntary evacuees from the West Coast are still living rather precariously in the inter-mountain States, principally in Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.

Voluntary Evacuation -- For nearly four weeks following Lt. Gen. DeWitt's initial proclamation of the West Coast as a military area on March 2, the Army and other Federal agencies encouraged people of Japanese ancestry to move out of the prohibited zone on their own initiative. At that time mere removal of the Japanese from the potential area of combat appeared to be the principal problem. During the ensuing weeks, however, as some 8,000 Japanese filtered into the inter-mountain States, it quickly became apparent that voluntary evacuation was not a feasible solution. Public opinion in the inter-mountain States, as reflected in press comments and in statements made by governors, attorneys-general, and other public officials, was bitterly antagonistic to the influx of Japanese from coastal areas. Demands arose that the Federal Government take all people of Japanese descent into custody, surround them with troops,

prevent them from buying land, and return them to their former homes at the close of the war. Violence was threatened. Japanese were arrested. Mass meetings that warned of trouble were held.

This was the situation which the War Relocation Authority faced at the outset. Before the agency was even a week old, it was abundantly clear both to the Army and the Authority that voluntary evacuation would have to be discontinued. Consequently, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command issued an order "freezing" all Japanese in Military Area Number One as of March 29. This action paved the way for a planned and orderly program of relocation under Federal supervision.

Selection of Sites -- The first step in the relocation program has been to find suitable areas where the evacuees might live and work in reasonable comfort for the duration of the war. Of necessity, the standards for site selection have been somewhat exacting. To be suitable, an area must be located at a safe distance from military establishments. It must have adequate power, transportation, and water supply facilities. In order to insure economy in the use of funds and in the assignment of military guards, it must provide a resource base capable of supporting at least 5,000 people. In the arid and semi-arid West, areas meeting all these requirements have been extremely difficult to find. As of June 15, nearly 75 potential sites had been examined. Eleven had been approved in California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas. These would accommodate 130,000 evacuees -- 120,000 from the Coast and 10,000 from Hawaii. On the 15th, however, one excellent project area was disapproved so now a substitute location must be found.

Wage Policies -- From the very start of the relocation program, public opinion has strongly influenced all considerations of a wage scale for the evacuees. Following a premature announcement in the press that evacuees would receive WPA wage rates for their work in assembly centers, the public reaction was immediate and unmistakable. It was clear that no wages for evacuees in excess of those paid the American soldier would be tolerated even though the costs of subsistence for each evacuee and his dependents might be deducted from the wages paid. In the light of this feeling, the War Relocation Authority has abandoned the idea of straight wages in favor of a plan under which

evacuees who enlist in the War Relocation Work Corps will be permitted to share in the profits of their own agricultural, industrial, and public works enterprises. During the development period on relocation projects, before any profits are realized, members of the Work Corps will receive cash advances of \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month depending on their skills. In addition, shelter, food, medical care, and education will be provided for all evacuees and their families.

The chief disadvantage of this low scale of cash income is that it rather severely limits many of the evacuees in planning for their reassimilation in American life after the close of the war. If public opinion had permitted, it might have been preferable in many ways to pay WPA wages to members of the Work Corps and to provide their families with subsistence in addition. This would have been more in keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Convention.

I sincerely hope that changing public attitudes will later on permit a change in this severe wage policy.

Types of Work -- Fulllest possible employment of the evacuees has been a cardinal principle of the relocation program. In relocation centers members of the War Relocation Work Corps will be assigned mainly to public works, agricultural production, or manufacturing. Public works will include irrigation, drainage, land clearing or levelling, and similar projects designed to develop natural resources. Agricultural production will be aimed primarily toward meeting the needs of the evacuee population and secondarily toward producing a surplus for use in the Food-for-Freedom program. Manufacturing projects will be planned so as to produce a variety of useful articles needed for the war effort and by the Nation as a whole.

In keeping with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 (which of course is not legally applicable) the Authority has decided not to permit alien evacuees to take part in the manufacture of goods for the armed forces. With that one exception, however, I strongly believe that the evacuees, and particularly the American citizens among them, should have an opportunity to produce any manufactured goods that are needed without restriction. To limit all evacuees, as some officials of the War Production Board have suggested, to manufacturing work which is wholly non-competitive with American industry would be, it seems to me, a serious mistake. In a period of all-out production I cannot believe that any American citizen, regardless

of race or color, should be denied the opportunity to participate as fully as his skills and energies will permit.

Private Employment -- Because of the bitterness of anti-Japanese feeling particularly in the inter-mountain States, it seemed unwise in the early days of the relocation program to contemplate any employment of evacuees outside the boundaries of Federally-supervised relocation areas. More recently, however, the growing need for labor, especially in the sugar beet areas of the West has led to the adoption of a policy permitting private employment under specified conditions. The War Department and the War Relocation Authority have agreed to grant furloughs to evacuees in assembly centers or relocation centers for private employment in agriculture or industry wherever State authorities can provide the following assurances: (1) that the safety of the evacuees will be guaranteed by State and local law-enforcement officials, (2) that working, living, and sanitary conditions will be adequate, (3) that prevailing wages will be paid, (4) that local labor will not be displaced, and (5) that transportation costs will be paid by employers. Three States -- Oregon, Idaho, and Montana -- have now given these assurances, and about 1,000 evacuees have already left assembly centers for the beet fields.

Community Living -- One of the fundamental objectives of the War Relocation Authority has been to make life in the relocation center just as close to normal as wartime conditions will permit. Schools are being planned for all relocation areas so that evacuee children will be able to continue their education through the high-school level. Efforts are being made to arrange for the transfer of college students to midwestern universities. Hospitals will be established at relocation centers and staffed with qualified doctors and nurses (recruited as far as possible from the evacuee population) in order to keep the evacuees in good health. As soon as each relocation center is fully populated, the evacuees will be given an opportunity to establish their own community government and elect their own officials.


Recommendation -- These are some of the highlights of the relocation program during its first several weeks. The future of the program will doubtless be governed largely by the temper of American public opinion. Already public attitudes have exerted a strong influence in shaping the program

and charting its direction. In a democracy this is unquestionably sound and proper. Yet in leaving the War Relocation Authority after a few extremely crowded weeks, I cannot help expressing the hope that the American people will grow toward a broader appreciation of the essential Americanism of a great majority of the evacuees and of the difficult sacrifice they are making. Only when the prevailing attitudes of unreasoning bitterness have been replaced by tolerance and understanding will it be possible to carry forward a genuinely satisfactory relocation program and to plan intelligently for the re-assimilation of the evacuees into American life when the war is over.

I wish to give you my considered judgment that fully 80 to 85 percent of the Nisei are loyal to the United States; perhaps 90 percent of the Issei are passively loyal; but a large portion of the Kibei (American citizens educated in Japan) feel a strong cultural attachment to Japan. At the appropriate time, therefore, I hope you will find it possible to:

- 1) Recommend to Congress a program of repatriation for those who prefer the Japanese way of life;
- 2) Issue a strong public statement in behalf of the loyal American citizens who are now bewildered and wonder what is in store for them;
- 3) Call for a more liberal wage policy for evacuees, and
- 4) When the war is over, recommend to Congress a special program of rehabilitation designed to help this displaced population find its place once again in our economic and social life.

Respectfully yours,



H. S. Eisenhower

COPY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

254. (PM)

August 27, 1942

Mr. E. R. Fryer,
Regional Director, War Relocation Authority
Whitcomb Hotel,
San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Mr. Fryer:

For the purpose of providing uniform instructions to commanders of military police units on duty at War Relocation Centers in the area of the Western Defense Command, it is suggested that there be a written statement of policy on the subject of maintenance of utilities and installations within the military police areas at such centers.

An agreement between the Commanding General and Colonel Groves, Office of the Chief of Engineers, was entered into on June 8, 1942, regarding initial construction at Relocation Centers. The Memorandum of Agreement is titled "Standards and details - Construction of Japanese Evacuation Centers." Those portions of the agreement pertaining to the military police units provide:

1. In general - shelter and facilities for M. P. units.
2. To be provided for a strength of four officers and one hundred twenty-six enlisted men. Actual strength will be given in specific directives.
3. Officers quarters should provide individual cubicles for sleeping quarters with bath and toilet facilities.
4. One 20' x 100' building will be provided for each of the following: Administrative Headquarters and Unit Supply; Guard House; Recreation Room and Post Exchange; and one 20' x 30' equipped with hot water and sanitary facilities to be used as a dispensary.
5. Garage or shed to house emergency vehicles of the unit.
6. Suitable shelving to be constructed in kitchen store rooms and M. P. supply room, post exchange and barracks.
7. Watch towers equipped with searchlights, not to exceed eight, without approval of this headquarters.

(Ltr to Mr. E. R. Fryer, 8-27-42, con't.)

8. A standard stock fence around the M. P. Area.
9. A flagpole in the military police area.
10. Coal bins and screened garbage racks for each kitchen.

In addition to the above installations it is the policy to determine such additional construction as is necessary subsequent to the arrival of the military police unit at the center and prior to the completion of the general construction contract. Such additions are a part of the initial construction.

The memorandum of agreement between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, dated April 17, 1942, places responsibility upon the War Relocation Authority for "complete operation and maintenance." To clarify this clause the following is recommended:

1. That the War Relocation Authority shall provide for the maintenance of all existing utilities.
2. That the War Relocation Authority shall provide for the repairs to military police buildings and installations.
3. That requests by military police units for work on barracks or installations, which is beyond the scope of responsibility of the War Relocation Authority, be addressed thru military channels to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, for action by military authority.

If the suggestions meet with your approval in principle, would you address a communication to the Commanding General Western Defense Command, indicating what policies you wish to follow in this region.

Yours very truly,

R. P. BRONSON,
1st Lieut., A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

R.A.O.
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Choi

E. R. Fryer

JUN 30 1942

Mrs. Esther Gerber
Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom
523 South Rampart Boulevard
Los Angeles, California

Dear Mrs. Gerber:

Your letter of June 24, addressed to Mr. Eisenhower, former Director of the War Relocation Authority, has been referred to me. The motive which prompts you to write is sincerely appreciated and respected.

We, of course, deeply regret the necessity for the relocation program and the inevitable tragedies which we see arising from the evacuation problem. We are trying to administer our activities in such a way as to demonstrate that a great democratic nation can meet a difficult situation of this type in a thoroughly democratic way.

The War Relocation Authority welcomes your advice and would appreciate your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

(SIGNED) E. R. FRYER

E. R. Fryer
Regional Director

EEFerguson:MW 6/29/42

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