

VISIT OF THE SPANISH CONSUL

Dec. 12, 1942

The Spanish consul, Señor Francisco de Amat, accompanied by a representative of the State Department arrived in Poston about 10:00 A. M. Evans, the assistant project director, notified the Central Executive Committee which was in session at that time of his arrival and requested that it contact at least four or five Issei to interview him. The Committee thereupon invited the Issei members of the Labor Relations Board (Kadowaki, Mitani, Matsumoto and Nakachi) and the chairman (Kato) and vice-chairman (Mizushima) of the Issei Advisory Board to sit in with that body (Nagai, Okamoto, Nakamura and Niiseki) to draw up a few proposals for the Spanish consul to transmit to the two governments. The first proposal introduced by Nagai, former chairman of the Issei Advisory Board and at present the most prominent member of the Central Executive Committee, requested the Japanese government to send two hundred million dollars to the Issei immediately after the war to be utilized for rehabilitation. He argued that all of them had lost practically everything with evacuation and since the WRA ruled that all relocation centers must be vacated within fourteen days after the cessation of hostilities that sum was vitally necessary in reestablishing themselves. His proposal is said to have been received with great enthusiasm at that time but it is interesting to note that a few days later when those who had sat in the conference were approached individually

concerning it they invariably expressed the sentiment that they were opposed to it but were drowned out by the others.

The following proposals to the United States government were also framed at that time:

1. Storage of a three-month food supply in Poston. (The reason given for this was that rainstorms at certain seasons might prevent the needed food supply from reaching the camp.)

2. Improvement of living quarters: a) The restriction of one family to each apartment, b) The installation of toilet facilities in each barrack, and c) The installation of heating facilities in each apartment.

3. Payment of wages on time. Payment should be made within two weeks after the end of the month.

4. The immediate erection of school buildings. (The WRA had promised at one time that school buildings would be constructed as soon as the school term began but this promise like all "Poston promises" had not been fulfilled. If they depended on adobe bricks the rate of production was such that they would not be completed for another two or three years. Furthermore adobe bricks were unsafe for immediate occupancy -- a certain length of time must be set aside for the setting of the bricks).

5. Improvement of the hospital: a) The installation of more optical and dental equipment. b) An increase in the medical staff -- the present number was inadequate for so large a population.

6. The installation of telephones in the block managers' offices.

It is reported by those "in the know" that Nagai was most instrumental in the formation of the above proposals, strongly supported by his stooge, Rev. Mitani.

[As far as the majority of camp residents were concerned, the arrival of the Spanish consul on Saturday made little impression. Reports here and there claimed that the Spanish consul was in camp and was interviewing relatives of internees.

The news of the proposals "drawn up by ten prominent men" did not become public property until the agitation against the first proposal initiated in block G spread to adjoining blocks on Tuesday and Wednesday. Even then some blocks remained unaware of the agitation and were informed of it only when their Issei representative heard about it for the first time in the Issei Advisory Board meeting Thursday afternoon and reported that fact to the residents that evening.]

On Saturday evening Mizushima, the vice-chairman of the Issei Advisory Board and a participant in the conference, gave a report on the proposals to his block (G) at dimmertime. There was much hand-clapping after his speech. X sitting at one of the tables was greatly perturbed about the first proposal but decided the time was unripe for public comment so merely remarked to the person sitting next to him: "That's the silliest proposal I've heard of." That night he analyzed it from all angles and wondered how much influence he wielded in camp. At the same time he feared adverse publicity for the Nisei if the newspapers obtained the information.

Sunday, Dec. 13, 1942

At breakfast X sought out Mizushima and warned him that the opposition to the first proposal would in all probability come soon from the kyokoha (radicals or "actionists") in camp. He replied: "Well, I expected that. I opposed the plan strenuously during the conference but was overwhelmed by the others." While

they were still conversing No. 14, a yushi of the block, strolled along and attacked the proposal from an economic standpoint. A little later Mizushima instructed Nomura, the Nisei councilman, to get hold of a member of the Central Executive Committee to address the block residents since a strong opposition to the first proposal was in evidence.

No. 18 of block N was finally persuaded to talk to block G at lunchtime. As he got up on a bench to speak he received a big hand from the audience. He passed over the controversial proposal rather lightly and emphasized in great detail the other six proposals transmitted to the United States government. He mentioned at that time that the Spanish consul had informed them that he had been negotiating with the army for a permit to visit relocation centers since June and this was the first time he had been able to procure one. He had also voiced the hope that there would be cooperation between the evacuees and the administration since another rupture would prevent him from reentering camp to work for their behalf. As soon as he ceased speaking No. 14 stood up and began attacking the first proposal basing his arguments on the pre-war gold reserve situation in Japan. He claimed that sometime before the war he had met the zaimukan (a sort of Fiscal Officer) attached to the New York consulate and had been told that it would be an ideal situation if the Japanese government could store a five million dollar gold reserve in the United States. If that meagre amount could not be shipped here at that time

was it not preposterous to expect the Japanese government to send two hundred million dollars after the war? Should Japan lose the war would it not be asking indemnity from their own government? Etc. etc. No. 18's retort at this point was that they were not asking the Japanese government to send this amount -- in actuality it was asking the United States government to pay them that sum as an indemnity for everything they had lost in the process of evacuation. He then proceeded to explain that there were approximately 45,000 Issei in the United States and figuring about \$4500 for each person they had arrived at two hundred million dollars. They had wanted to include the Nisei also but had desisted fearing international complications. The sum, however, was intended to be divided with the Nisei when they actually gained possession of it. No. 14, however, remained adamant and demanded the retraction of such a preposterous proposal. At this time he also opposed the storage of a three-month food supply in Poston claiming that since people on the outside were suffering food-shortages such a request would create ill-feeling toward them. No. 18 then promised No. 14 that he would pass his criticism to the Central Executive Committee but he gave the impression to his listeners that he would do it in such a fashion that it would appear as though one individual had voiced such an opinion and not the block as a whole.

Another block resident then wished to know how many American prisoners were interned in Japan since he was convinced there was a direct correlation between the number of Americans

held there and the treatment of evacuees in relocation centers.

No. 18 replied that the only information available to the Spanish consul at this time was that war prisoners in Shanghai, contrary to public opinion, had been treated humanely by the Japanese. Another person then suggested that a vote be taken on the proposal. Since no one made any move X stood up and began: "I do not know the real motive of the Central Executive Committee in desiring to have such a proposal transmitted to Japan but as I see it there are two apparent motives: If they wished to report to the Japanese government the conditions of evacuation and the sufferings resulting from it that is an unnecessary step. The details were known to Ambassador Nomura who relayed them to the Japanese government. According to reports some of these facts were broadcast in Japan and created a tremendous furore among the Japanese people. They know how we have suffered. Another point I would like to emphasize is this: If they actually wanted money from Japan I will say that no true Japanese will ask for such at a time like this. Needless to say, our brothers are falling on the battlefields. Fathers and mothers in Japan are sending forth their sons for the sake of survival of Japan. They are sacrificing every comfort toward such an end. They are not thinking of themselves at this time. Their motto is: "To forget oneself and serve the country". How could the Central Executive Committee ask for money at a time like this? How can we call ourselves true Japanese? Are we forgetting the

real convictions and determination we had at the outbreak of the war? When this proposal is transmitted to the Japanese government and made known to the people what will they think of us? Will they consider us worthy of their brotherhood? Our true Japanese spirit has not decayed although we have remained in this country for twenty or thirty years. I am beseeching the wise members of the Central Executive Committee to reflect again and reconsider this proposal." X's speech was received with great enthusiasm. No. 18 had no ready reply to such a challenge. At this point Nomura moved that the meeting be adjourned. Everyone filed out of the mess hall in great indignation. No. 18 walked out like a meek lamb although he had arrived at the meeting confident that he could push this over the residents of block G. Although no vote was taken on the proposal it is interesting to note that the people of this block invariably remarked with pride later that "we in the block decided on retraction 100%."

Residents of block G expected No. 18 to transmit the message to the Central Executive Committee so considered their duty done and dropped the matter from their minds.

Monday, Dec. 14, 1942

About noon, a friend of No. 18 residing in block G informed X that No. 18 had contacted Nagai that morning but could get nowhere with him. Nagai had insisted that his stand was justifiable and that he was willing to fight it out. Moreover he was confident that if he made a round of quads and

explained the proposal to the people they would appreciate his convictions. In fact he had spoken in block ~~E~~^C on Sunday night and had received a tremendous applause from the residents. Even if block G were opposed to it there were thirty-five other blocks in Camp I which supported his stand. Therefore he contended the opposition from block G could not be considered.

X decided to verify the statements made by No. 18's friend so after supper visited No. 1 in block I and explained the situation to him. No. 1 informed him that he himself had listened to Nagai's speech the evening before and had been impressed by it. He had not realized how serious the situation was. He was willing to cooperate with X but the job of swinging camp opinion was much too big for him. Since X knew No. 2 in the same block why not contact him? He therefore visited No. 2 but he was not at home so dropped in to see No. 3, the Issei advisor of that block and a personal friend of his. He promised to see Nagai next morning to persuade him into retracting the proposal before the opposition grew beyond control. With No. 3 at that time was No. 4, a yushi from block Z ~~X~~, who was greatly moved by X's arguments and offered to create active opposition in his block. While talking to them X added another argument (the others being loyalty and economic reasons): The Central Executive Committee was acting on behalf of 45,000 Issei whom it did not represent. If the Committee wished to do so it was its duty to consult other Issei in other relocation centers. What about Camps II and III here in Poston? They had not even been consulted.

X then proceeded to block L and talked to No. 5 and No. 6

who introduced him to No. 7, the Issei advisor of that block. No. 7 had recently returned from internment camp and was in complete accord with X's plan. In fact he informed X that he had wanted to oppose the proposal himself but had feared it was the sentiment of the minority. He promised to work on the adjoining blocks K and M and at the same time requested him to stir up as much opposition as possible in the remainder of camp. No. 5 and No. 6 were instructed to line up block L. No. 5 further promised to swing everyone at his place of work and instruct him to work in his respective block. (According to X this was very effective).

Before coming home X intercepted No. 8 from block O in the northwestern corner of camp. Since he was a very influential person that section was left completely in his hands. Block P nearby was however assigned to No. 6.

When he returned to block G he reported his progress to No. 14 who offered to take charge of the adjoining blocks A, B, and F.

Tuesday, Dec. 15, 1942

In the morning X encountered Mizushima in the latrine and requested his cooperation since a little more work seemed necessary. He replied that that was impossible because more exertion on his part would cause him to lose his "balance as a councilman". X reminded him that it was his duty as the Issei advisor to carry out the wishes of the block residents. He further warned him that if he refused to do so he would

proceed to do it himself. Mizushima replied: "Go ahead". On that day X heard a number of accusations against him such as: "He doesn't deserve to be a councilman", "We should kick him out", etc.

About noon reports began to drift in (all reports were brought to X by stooges of the yushi). No. 3 claimed that he had talked to Nagai but could not induce him to retract his proposal. No. 6 maintained that block P was well under control. No. 5 reported that he had intended to call a block meeting but the residents of his block informed him that it was unnecessary since they would stand 100% back of him. He also related that at his place of work one person had been in favor of the proposal but the rest ganged up on him so he was now innocuous. Furthermore, all of them had consented to stir up opposition in their respective blocks. No. 7 claimed that many in his section were strongly in favor of the proposal so requested X to agitate in other parts of camp to compensate for it.

Therefore in the evening X began working on the Salinas strongholds which he had ignored up to this time. He visited No. 9 in block Q who introduced him to No. 10, the Issei advisor. Between themselves they decided to take full responsibility of Q, S, T, and U. X personally contacted No. 11, the Issei advisor of block R who was easily convinced. He purposefully skipped adjoining block 2 since its Issei representative, Nagai, was a good friend and former employee of No. 14.

He next strolled over to block I since the report from No. 3 indicated an uncertainty as to the position of the block.

There he sought out No. 2 who had not been home the night before and No. 12 who both promised to take charge of the block. No. 12 then introduced X to the Issei advisor^s of block C and further offered to take full responsibility of block D.

No. 13, the Issei advisor^s of block E informed X that his block was well under control. He then returned to block L and assembled 5, 6, and 7. No. 7 reported at that time that blocks K and M were so strongly in favor of the first proposal that he was unable to swing them completely to his side but had rendered them innocuous by neutralizing them. (In other words the Issei advisors had promised to cast the deciding votes when the proposal came up for a vote in the Issei Advisory Board meeting next day.) He proceeded to explain that Nagai had come to block M on December 14 and had received much ovation from the crowd.

He suggested that X also talk to that block to persuade it to change its mind. X, however, felt that in view of such limited time it was unnecessary to bother with individuals especially when the block had already been neutralized.

No. 7 was then selected to deliver the keynote speech at the council meeting next day to be followed by minor orations by other stooges. He was specifically commanded by X at this time not to go after Nagai's scalp. On discovering then that No. 6 was a relative of Nagai, the Issei advisor of block 2, X instructed him to "neutralized" him since he appeared to be on the other side of the fence.

When he returned home to block G late that night No. 14 informed him that there had been a great deal of excitement in blocks A, B, and F, but they were safely in tow.

Wednesday, Dec. 16, 1942

No. 6 reported to X at noon that he could do nothing with Nagai of block 2 since he was so much in favor of the proposal. X therefore sent No. 14 to intercept him before the council meeting (which happened to be a joint session of the Issei Advisory Board and the City Council) but it had already commenced and he was unable to see Nagai. About 4:30 P.M. X encountered No. 7 in front of the hospital and was informed that since Kennedy, the Employment Chief, had delivered such a lengthy address at the opening session of the council the matter of the two hundred million dollars could not come up for discussion. However, they were holding an exclusive Issei Advisory Board meeting (to which Caucasians and Nisei would be barred) in Sumo Headquarters in block 27 next day to deal specifically with this problem. X highly pleased with the turn of events strolled toward Ward 7 of the hospital and requested his young friend, Tsuchiyama, to aid him in swinging her Issei advisor into line. The arguments she was to use were to be based on the adverse criticism the Nisei would receive should such a proposal become publicized. She only consented to do so since her Issei advisor was her next-door neighbor and a good friend.

Immediately after supper Mizushima accosted X and chided

him: "Don't agitate so much. Block 28 was having a big fuss today claiming they were going to chase Nagai out of camp." X's answer at this point: "Alright. Shall I agitate in Camps II and III also?"

X sought out No. 12 in block I soon after and was told that blocks X, W, and Y had been wooed to their side. He had also sent someone to block C and D and had been reassured that they were well in line. He also related that at that time blocks H, I, and G were holding block meetings to discuss the proposal. X then visited No. 7, his keynote speaker, and informed him that he calculated at least twenty-four blocks had been completely swung over or neutralized by this time (of that number only three or four had to be neutralized). No. 7 cautioned that block X seemed to be only lukewarm in its opposition so he hastened to send No. 13 from block E to clinch it, in which he succeeded.

On the way home he feared that his young friend, Tauchiyama, unversed in political intrigues, might have got into hot water and failed in her task so primarily to reestablish her prestige in the eyes of her Issei advisor (it did not matter by this time whether block 31 opposed or favored the proposal since twenty-four blocks had already been won over) dropped in at block 31 and accosted the Issei advisor just as he was about to leave her apartment. Meanwhile for the past two hours she had been trying to convince him of the advisability of opposing the proposal but he believed that she was making

a mountain out of a mole hole and that the issue was not so serious as she imagined. Furthermore, he had not even heard of such a proposal. If it were really true it was a swell idea -- they would need it after the war. When she retorted that she believed it was not the appropriate time to make such a request when people in Japan were sacrificing so much for the "survival of Japan" he replied: "Oh, the matter will not go beyond the government officials. They will probably get a big laugh out of it interpreting that the Japanese in America were entertaining themselves in concentration camps by thinking up such fantastic proposals." This was the situation when X arrived on the scene. He first requested Tsuchiyama to leave the apartment (explaining after her departure to the Issei representative that he wished to tell him a few things not meant for Nisei ears) and then quietly presented the arguments he had utilized elsewhere (only in stronger terms) to change his attitude. When she returned to her room some thirty minutes later she was struck with the change in the Issei advisor. (I do not know exactly what X told him but his comments after the Issei's departure ~~was~~ interesting: "Well, you don't have to worry about your position in your block or in camp for that matter. I settled it for you tonight. Your Issei representative will have greater respect for you from now on." He intimated at this time that he would even have risked an open debate with Nagai in his block to convince the residents that he was wrong. He felt this step was unnecessary by Wednesday night, however, when twenty-four blocks

appeared to be on his side. This confession as well as his appearance in the Issei Advisory Board meeting Thursday afternoon indicates how serious he regarded the issue since his greatest desire is to work behind the scenes.) From there X proceeded to block Q but No. 9 was already asleep. He was confident, however, that it was under control realizing his friend's influence. When he returned to block G No. 14 related that the residents were becoming pretty sore at Mizushima. X then instructed him to work a little more on his friend, Nagai of block 2.

Thursday, Dec. 17, 1942

About noon No. 14 reported to X that he had finally succeeded in neutralizing Nagai. Since many of the Issei advisors did not seem to realize the full significance of transmitting such a message to Japan he suggested that it might be a wise step for X to appear at the meeting and explain to them. In such a case Nagai had offered to propose an "emergency motion" to secure the floor for him. (This was necessary since X is not an Issei advisor). X's reaction to this was that there was already sufficient opposition in camp to kill the proposal so it was an unnecessary step. Furthermore, he preferred to remain inconspicuous. But realizing that over-confidence could be as equally harmful as lack of confidence both of them finally decided to attend the council meeting that afternoon. The question then arose as to whether they

should go as block representatives or as individuals. They eventually decided to take it up with the Issei in the block at a special meeting directly after lunch.

Before lunch X hopped over to block I and reported that both No. 14 and he would be present at the meeting. Block I as a result decided to send a special observer also. Then he proceeded to block L and acquainted No. 7 with the change in plans.

In the block meeting held after lunch No. 14 explained what he and X proposed to do in case of danger of defeat. A vote was taken and the Issei decided to send both men as special block representatives. At that point Mizushima interrupted:

"Where are you two going anyway?" When informed he simply uttered, "Oh", and walked out of the mess hall (a political faux pas on his part). To defend him an Issei got up and explained that the reason Mizushima had not appeared at the special meeting Sunday was that he had induced him to go to the ironwood forest with him that morning. He hoped that the Issei advisor would not be blamed for his absence. He further requested that when X and No. 14 appeared at the council meeting that afternoon they remember that he was the official representative of the block and cooperate with him. Two or three dissenting voices broke out from the group at this point so X proceeded to explain that he had encountered Mizushima ^{two} ~~the~~ days before and had asked him to work a little more since Nagai was insistent in having the first proposal accepted.

He had replied that he could do nothing more so X had gained his permission to go ahead and contact a few influential persons. If the block objected to their going as official block observers they would just as soon go as individuals. The Issei answered that he was only working for the harmony of the block and was satisfied to have them go in an official capacity. Rev. Niisato, the blind Evangelist, offered a piece of advice at this point: When a flood had destroyed certain sections of Imperial Valley several years ago they had requested the Japanese government to send them fifty thousand dollars which was refused. Hence he figured it was useless to ask for so large a sum at this time.

At the Issei Advisory Board meeting held in Sumo Headquarters in block 27 that afternoon, Nagai of the Central Executive Committee appeared extremely uneasy from the very beginning. No. 18 of block N was conspicuously absent. About 3:30 after certain routine matters had been disposed of a young Issei advisor (X cannot recall his name) casually inquired whether there was any report concerning the Spanish consul who it was rumored had visited Poston on Saturday. Mizushima as acting chairman proceeded to enlighten him but was soon interrupted by Nagai who asked permission to do it himself. He then simply stated that the proposal requesting the Japanese government to send them two hundred million dollars was being withheld. He could not tell them his real reason for making such a request but he felt that since the people here would be

destitute after the war it was the wise thing to do. Since there seemed to be much opposition to the proposal he considered it wise to withhold it. As soon as he ceased speaking the Issei advisor from block A, No. 14's spokesman, jumped up and began attacking the proposal from the standpoint of international finance: that the outflow of gold to the amount of two hundred million dollars, i.e. 860 million yen, from Japan would create an acute internal problem; that it was outrageous even to assume that such an outflow of gold was possible. (He proceeded to elaborate this point).

No. 7 (X's chosen speaker) then presented his arguments: that when people of their own blood were falling on the battlefields it was improper to be thinking of something so mercenary as money to be sent them for rehabilitation. The national policy of Japan at present was: "Ichi oku isshin. *One hundred million one spirit* messhi hoko". The transmission of such a proposal was *forget oneself serve* against this principle. He then demanded retraction.

The Issei advisor from block B followed in a similar vein: "The idea of my going out to gather ironwood is not to make a collection of ironwood stumps but for the training of an iron will. ^{An} iron will means to forbear and to withstand whatever sufferings that come our way. It is the Japanese spirit to receive all sorts of persecution with a smile. The Central Executive Committee acted without proper authority. They did not even consult the Issei Advisory Board. The proposal should be retracted immediately". (He spoke in a highly emotional tone).

Nagai replied simply: "Well, the proposal has been retracted already". Someone inquired suspiciously: "How did you retract it?" Nagai referred the question to his stooge, Rev. Mitani: "How did you phrase the message, Mr. Mitani?" (Meanwhile those who had participated in the conference were squirming uncomfortably in their seats). Mitani pretended to feel his pockets saying, "Maybe I have a copy here." Then not finding it he related that he had simply wired the Spanish consul to retract the first proposal. He added that he had a copy in his office and would read it to the group on another occasion if they so desired. The representative from block A jumped up excitedly at this point and shouted: "Retraction is not enough. Apologize to the group". Nagai sprang up from his chair speechless with surprise.

At this stage the advisor from block 3 (Nagai's block) stood up in defense of Nagai: "I wish you would interpret the whole affair in a good-natured way. Mr. Nagai was greatly concerned with the situation that might arise after the war. He was worried about the people who would be destitute after the war. He acted in the sincere belief that this would help the people. Please do not accuse the Central Executive Committee." No. 7 interrupted: "Well, if you had said in the first place that you had retracted the proposal I would not have said anything. Since you simply said that it was being withheld, that word necessitated my speech. (He laughed to break the tension -- even Nagai was

compelled to smile.) The representative from block F echoed: "It's okay, if it has been retracted." No. 7 continued: "I am willing to support the Central Executive Committee's policy 100% but that does not mean we have to follow it blindly. It is the duty of the Issei advisors to point out their mistakes and ask for corrections. There is a tendency on the part of the Central Executive Committee to neglect or forget our existence. From now on we won't hesitate to criticize their policies. We let it be known that we have that right."

Nagai replied in a very humble tone: "We are liable to make mistakes although our intentions are good. After all our experiences and our capabilities are limited. We intend to carry on our heavy burden with your able advice and assistance. We are always willing to cooperate with your representative body. Please do not hesitate to guide us. I beg you to lead us with your great ability."

When the meeting resumed its discussion of routine matters X sneaked out of the building and went around thanking the yushi who had helped him. A little later he met the Issei advisor of block F who confessed to him: "Nagai seemed so weak I didn't want to mistreat him. When a person is down I don't want to hit him." He added that since he knew that the agitation against the proposal started in block G and had spread to A, B, F, he was intending to bring Nagai to a quad meeting that night. He would act as chairman and

and let the quad people attack Nagai as much as they wished and embarrass him into resigning from the Central Executive Committee. X reminded him that he was only interested in the retraction of the proposal and not the scalping of Nagai. Therefore the bringing of Nagai to the quad meeting was unnecessary.

After the meeting X knew that Mizushima wished to resign as Issei representative of block G so sought him out. He told him: "If you do such a thing we shall be in a quandry. What we have done to help you has been in vain. What I did day and night was intended to further your political career. I have no political ambitions and I promise to support you. From now on you must do your best for us." Mizushima greatly touched responded: "Alright. Instead of accusing you I should thank you. Let me thank you from deep in my heart." (Mizushima informed X the following night that he had a run-in with the C.E.G. members that day and they had inquired: "Do you want to quarrel with us?" He had answered: "Sure, if you want to. I have lots of backing." The C.E.C. knows that block G initiated the agitation against the proposal and is rumored to be afraid of it. X informed me with great amusement the other day that Mizushima told him that the C.E.C. comes up to him whenever it has something up its sleeve to sound out his reaction and to request his cooperation.)

Friday, Dec. 18, 1942

X contacted the man in charge of telegrams in the administration ~~office~~^{building} and learned that the retraction wire had been sent only that morning. Hence Nagai and Mitani, as he had suspected, were lying when they claimed that the proposal had been retracted. X, however, did not divulge the secret to anyone lest the people become infuriated and molest the members of the Central Executive Committee.

That day the residents of block A were still agitated and insisted on scalping Nagai. They maintained that the milk had been spilt and mere wiping of the puddle would not restore the liquid into the bottle. They therefore sent K. Matsumoto of the Labor Relations Board ^{and Karakane, the Issei advisor} to invite Nagai to speak at a quad meeting that night. Blocks G, B, and ~~#~~ F were rather lukewarm in their support of the plan. Nagai informed Matsumoto that there was a funeral in his block that day and was unable to accept the invitation. At the same time he sent the Issei representative from his block to explain the situation to the people. Meanwhile, it is rumored that Nagai contacted the Issei advisors of the quad and entreated them to quiet the agitation.

Block A,

ANALYSIS

As far as the administration was concerned the visit of the Spanish consul made only a slight impression. Here and there according to Spicer a few officials cursed the Japs for their audacity in framing the first proposal but no one knew or was sufficiently interested in discovering what happened to it after it left the conference room. As far as the Press Bulletin was concerned the news of the Spanish consul's visit was restricted to the following meagre lines in December 15th's edition:

Spanish Consul to Report Poston Center Problems, Activities.

Senor F. de Amat, Consul of Spain representing the government, which is the "protective" power for Japanese interests in the U.S., arrived last Saturday here to "talk with the enemy alien evacuees" on problems regarding center activities.

The consul who makes the report from all relocation centers to Spain made his rounds in Poston, observing various projects.

From the standpoint of research the report is of great significance since:

1. it affords an insight into the mechanics of camp politics,
2. it gives the reason ~~for~~ the ascendancy in power of the Issei Advisory Board over the Central Executive Committee enabling us to appreciate more fully the present struggle for existence of the Central Executive Committee (which will be discussed in detail in the report on the aftermath of the strike to be sent in a few days),

3. it explains the "rise" of Mizushima (a political figure to watch in the next two months) from his lowly position after the strike,

4. it presents an invaluable collection of prevailing Issei sentiments in camp, and

5. it illustrates to a certain extent the helplessness of the Nisei in changing Issei attitudes.

1. Insight into camp politics:

The report discusses for the most part the technique employed by X, one of the most influential political leaders in attaining his ends. The small number of yushi (literally "public-spirited men") contacted by X to aid him in swinging public opinion from one extreme to the other indicates that there are only a very few really influential men in camp. In fact X confessed to me a few days ago in a strictly confidential conversation that only four persons (with X as coordinator) representing four different pre-evacuation geographical areas are necessary to mold public opinion in camp. Thus in any great crisis no. 12 can be depended on to control the Orange county sections; no. 14, the Los Angeles groups; no. 9, the Salinas blocks, and no. 7, the Imperial Valley areas. These four yushi, with the exception of no. 7 whose position as Issei advisor sometimes necessitates his intervention in petty politics, rarely if ever participate in politics aside from those bearing international complications, e.g. the November strike and the two hundred million dollar incident. The report also bears out my earlier contention that the real leaders are

not represented in the Issei Advisory Board -- that many of the block representatives are merely spokesmen or stooges for the yushi.

An analysis of the distribution of yushi mentioned above shows rather clear-cut geographical groupings (a small circle after a numeral denotes that that individual is an Issei advisor):

nearly { Block I -- 1, 2, 3°, 12.
Block E -- 13°.
Block L -- 5, 6, 7°.
Block G -- 14, x.

Contiguous { Block R -- 11°.
Block Q -- 9, 10°.

contiguous { Block O -- 8
Block Z -- 4.

According to X a scattered distribution of yushi is highly advantageous in preventing a coalition of leaders turning against him. Thus 7, 12, 9, and 14 are politically unknown to each other and the probability of their uniting against him is rather remote. So far X's ideas have been in perfect conformity with those of the four just mentioned so there has been no ~~case~~ cause for friction to appear. It is interesting to note that not all of the fifteen yushi cited in the report are Issei -- two of them, according to X, are Kibei.

2. Ascendancy in power of the Issei Advisory Board:

On Friday, Dec. 4, 1942, at a meeting of the City Planning Board, an unsuccessful coup d'etat was staged by a small number of Issei (the same group that is attempting at present to

dethrone the Central Executive Committee) who accused the existence of the Labor Relations ^Board as being undemocratic since its members had been appointed by the C.E.C., and not the elected by the delegates. ^At that time ^Rev. Mitani, the executive secretary of the L.R.B., maintained that its existence was based on democratic principles since the C.E.C. which had appointed them had been elected by the 72 delegates of the City Planning Board who in turn had been elected by the people in their respective blocks. ^As a result of the fiery accusation which lasted several hours the L.R.B. and the C.E.C. resigned but were returned to power by a vote of confidence from the Nisei and the majority of Issei delegates who feared adverse publicity from the administrative side if they gave up in three days after formation. ^At that time the delegates promised full cooperation and support in whatever the C.E.C. and L.R. B. decided to do.

Page 20 of my report therefore is of great significance since it indicates a complete round-about face in the attitude of the Issei delegates toward the C.E.C. No. 8's assertion that the I.A. B. would not hesitate from then on to criticize the policies of the C.E.C. and Nagai's humble acceptance of the fact demonstrate the rise in power of the I.A. B. over the C.E.C. (At present a few members of the I.A. B. led by Mizushima are attempting to dethrone the C.E.C. in the hope of attaining that position themselves. This will become more comprehensive to you after you read my report on the aftermath of the strike).

3. The "rise" of Mizushima:

At the beginning of the November strike Mizushima's political career was at its peak but due to a faux pas he committed on the first day of the strike he was branded an "Inu" or dog and his prestige was considerably lowered. Thus during the strike he was only chairman of the Ground Patrol, a minor committee of the Emergency Council. After the strike he was reelected Issei representative of his block merely because X, the only other likely candidate, wished to remain inconspicuous and unhampered in his political movements (attachment to the I.A.B. will considerably restrict his actions). Mizushima again incurred the resentment of his block during the two hundred million dollar incident because of his passive opposition to the first proposal and his resignation from the I.A.B. was prevented solely because X did not wish to replace him as the block representative. Mizushima's present "rise" in power is based on the C.E.C.'s and the I.A.B.'s knowledge that the agitation against the first proposal began in his block and spread to adjoining areas. According to X these two ~~bodies~~ bodies feel that he has strong backing in camp, especially in his block. (X is wondering at present whether it might ^{not} have been wiser for him to have "killed" Mizushima politically at that time to have avoided the current unpleasantness between the I.A.B. and the C.E.C. It appears from conversations with him that he is anxious to see Mizushima rise to the very top of the C.E.C. since in all probability Nakamura of the present C.E.C. with the aid of two or three

kenjinkai (prefectural organizations) will dethrone him within two months with such a bang that he will be politically dead for the duration and the block will not have to be bothered with him).

4. Sentiment of the People:

I believe that the sentiments and attitudes expressed in his report are representative of a large number of Issei in camp. The extremely "subversive" utterances of X, however, are not quite indicative of his character. The time limitation compelled him to utilize the most potent and unchallengeable arguments to which as an individual he may not subscribe.

5. Nisei influence on Issei:

Pages 13 and 14 of the report indicate to some extent the helplessness of the Nisei in changing Issei attitudes. In this case the situation was of a more exaggerated nature than usual since as a hakase (literally a Ph.D. but frequently employed to demote a person who has had several years of post-graduate work) she is considered one of the foremost Nisei in camp whose opinions are generally respected. If such an individual could not sufficiently impress an Issei advisor, who has the highest regard for her, to change his attitude one can appreciate the apparent timidity of the Nisei council in the face of Issei opposition.

Jan. 10, 1943.

KEY

Hereafter in reports of a confidential nature the same alphabetical letters will be assigned to the blocks and the same numerals to the individuals mentioned in this report. Thus block G will always be block 45, and no. 14 will always be the same individual in block 45.

Blocks

A -- 35	N -- 60
B -- 36	O -- 5
C -- 37	P -- 13
D -- 38	Q -- 16
E -- 39	R -- 15
F -- 46	S -- 17
G -- 45	T -- 18
H -- 44	U -- 32
I -- 43	V -- 2
J -- 42	W -- 27
K -- 53	X -- 28
L -- 59	Y -- 26
M -- 54	Z -- 12

PROTECCION DE LOS INTERESES DEL JAPON

I N S T R U C C I O N E S

REPATRIATION:

A. Departure of the next exchange vessel.

This Office has as yet received no official word as to the exact date of the next exchange. Thus far there have been upwards of 8000 applicants for repatriation and besides these the Japanese Government has asked for about 3000 priorities. The exchange vessel accomodates about 1500 persons per trip. Only one ship has left so far, the departure of the second having been delayed for lack of agreement between the American and Japanese Governments on the priority list proposed by the latter. Presumably there will be a resumption of the exchanges, but we do not know when. It is impossible to estimate your chances of repatriation in view of the above circumstances.

B. Amount of luggage and money allowed to be taken in repatriation.

Each individual is allowed to take with him 32 cubic feet of luggage packed in trunks and valises, or, if boxes are used, an endeavor should be made to have them of equal size with handles at either end to facilitate handling.

\$300 per adult is allowed.

C. Type of things that may be taken and that are prohibited.

The Japanese Government initially prohibited the exportation by American being repatriated from Japan of books, printed matter, sketches, documents of any sort, gold objects, photographic apparatus and radios. Similar restrictions have been imposed by the American Government on Japanese being repatriated from the United States. Within the 32 cubic feet of baggage allowed Japanese may take with them such articles as clothing, linen, silverware and other types of personal effects except those articles mentioned in the preceding sentence and such other materials of which the exportation is prohibited by the export control regulations of the United States Government.

The Portuguese authorities have prohibited the export from the Lorenzo Marques of the following articles:

Provisions or estables
Articles of clothing
Shoes
Medicines

D. Cost of the trip, to the port of embarkation.

Transportation to the departing ship will be taken care of by the Department of State in the case of Official personnel and in the case of those persons forced to leave the United States.

Those who are repatriating voluntarily will pay their own way.

Those who wish to repatriate and have not the funds will have to wait. No provision has as yet been made for them although the Embassy has inquired of the Imperial Japanese Government in this matter.

E. Who may be repatriated besides Japanese nationals.

It has been concluded that in general American wives and children of enemy aliens will be granted permission to depart from the jurisdiction of the United States when the enemy aliens are about to leave the United States as a result of an agreement between the United States and an enemy country for the exchange of their nationals. However, American passports or other documentation as American citizens will not be issued to such wives and children.

It may be added that the Citizenship of native American citizens is not affected solely by reason of protracted foreign residence.

The attitude of the United States Government toward the departure from this country in connection with exchanges of persons possessing both United States and Japanese nationality depends largely upon the circumstances of each individual case. For example, the United States Government raised no objection to the departure of American citizens of Japanese race who were employed in the former Japanese diplomatic and consular establishments in this country. It likewise raised no objection to the departure with enemy aliens of their accompanying wives and children who might be able to obtain documents as enemy nationals.

Should United States citizens of Japanese race not covered in one of the foregoing categories apply for permission to travel to Japan in the exchange, the United States Government would naturally wish to examine their cases in the light of the peculiar circumstances surrounding each of them before indicating a decision whether such departure would be permissible.

F. Procedure

An application for repatriation must be filed either with the Spanish Consulate in San Francisco or with the camp authorities. All applications have the same ultimate source. It is the American and Japanese Governments who make the decision of who is to go back to Japan and when. If accepted, you are notified directly by the Department of State about one week before the departure of the vessel.

If a family is separated, and one of its members receives the

"Order of repatriation", that member should immediately communicate to the authorities of the camp in which he is residing the following:

Whether he has a family
Whereabouts and address of same
Desire to be repatriated together

G. Compulsory or Voluntary Repatriation

The United States Government does not propose generally to insist on the repatriation of Japanese nationals who do not wish to return to Japan.

The Japanese Government does not obligate any of its nationals to be repatriated.

H. Object of a form letter regarding repatriation which may have been received by some of the Japanese.

In the relocation centers and internment camps a form letter was placed before the individuals named for repatriation by the Japanese Government. The Department has no information to indicate that such forms were placed before persons not named by the Japanese Government. If such cases occurred they were undoubtedly errors caused by difficulty in indentifying the Japanese nationals whom the Japanese Government had in mind in making up its repatriation list.

The action of the United States authorities in endeavoring to ascertain the repatriation wishes of all persons named for repatriation by the Japanese Government is justified by the recent request of that Government that all persons designated by the Japanese Government who have refused the offer of repatriation be re-canvassed regarding their desires in the matter. This clearly indicates that the Japanese Government wishes all such persons to be informed of its interest in their repatriation so that the final decision of such persons may be made with a full knowledge of the facts.

I. Telegrams requesting priority.

For those who desire to request priority from the Japanese Government, it is possible to send a telegram to the Japanese Government through the Spanish Consulate via Madrid at a cost of approximately \$10.00 depending upon the words necessary to express the reasons why such a person believes himself entitled to priority.

It must be pointed out, however, that a number of such messages have already been sent and this will necessarily have a tendency to minimize their effectiveness.

(La Embajada nos ha dicho que podemos hacer como mejor nos parece, pero aconsejan que no se manden mas telegramas por no tener eficacia)

REHEARINGS:

A. Procedure

Unfortunately at the present time it is impossible for an internee to be released to a relocation center without first having a favorable rehearing of his case. Application for such a rehearing may be made by the internee, member of his family, or friend to the United States Attorney who handled the case in the first instance. It should be accompanied by substantial factual information in the form of letters or affidavits from persons who are reliable and have a good knowledge of the subject's character, activities and loyalty to the United States. Where there is doubt of the place for filing the application, the department of Justice, Alien Enemy Control Unit, in Washington, D.C. will furnish to a proper party the name and address of the U.S. Attorney in charge of the case. In general case of an internee cannot be reopened unless the application and supporting papers clearly disclose either new evidence or point out important aspects of the case which were not considered at the first hearing. The applicant should notify the Department of Justice, Alien Enemy Control Unit of the filing of his application with the United States Attorney.

B. Delay in considering applications and conducting rehearsings.

An investigation has revealed that there are several factors, which create an unavoidable delay in considering such applications. The procedure for obtaining rehearing requires that the petition be forwarded to the local United States Attorney to be passed on by him before it is communicated to the Department of Justice. Some time is necessarily consumed in this process. Since the internment camps are situated at considerable distances from some of the United States Attorney's districts, it is necessary that a number of cases be accumulated before the rehearsings can be held. In the process of accumulating these cases, the United States Attorney not infrequently fails to answer individual petitions until the cases can be examined and viewed as a group. All applications receive due attention and are considered with such promptness as the situation permits.

C. Possibility of release under parole of Japanese nationals whose sons are American citizens by birth and are serving in the United States Army.

An investigation has revealed that the appropriate American authorities are of the opinion that no rule of general application can be made with regard to this matter, since the enlistment or drafting of a son does not necessarily reflect the attitude of the parent. A procedure has been established, however, by which the case of any interned alien enemy will be carefully reconsidered with a view to release or parole upon receipt of information that the subject's son has joined the armed forces of the United States. When the circumstances of a case would seem to justify such action, a parole or release will be ordered.

FAMILY INTERNMENT CAMPS

A. Procedure

The Alternative to applying for a rehearing is to apply for a reunion of the family at one of the proposed family internment camps. As soon as additional facilities now under preparation are available, consideration will be given to transferring such applicants and their wives and younger children to a family camp. Transfer will not take place immediately. This is due to the fact that considerable cross checking with the Justice Department is necessary to avoid transferring to the camp any internees who may be paroled and could therefore join families at the relocation centers. It may not be possible to move all cases from any centers at one time. Some cases may receive prior attention depending upon the Department of Justice. As space and other factors permit adult children will be admitted to the family camps, subject, however, to certain limitations which arise out of the requirement that persons who enter such camps must be prepared to remain there on a permanent basis. This, of course, will tend to exclude students and others who for any reason may find it necessary to leave the camp at periodic intervals.

B. Facts about the Family Reunion Camp at Crystal City, Texas, as taken from the MINIDOKA IRRIGATOR- May 29, 1943 and June 5, 1943.

1. Location- Approximately one hundred twenty miles southwest of San Antonio, Texas.
2. Climate- Mild: heat somewhat excessive during summer months
3. Water- Approved city water from deep wells.
4. Housing- Individual family units in duplex, triplex or quadruple; types of buildings, frame construction with wood or gypsum board siding and with gypsum board partitions; concrete floors and electric lights. Floor space from 40 to 70 square feet per individual, depending upon composition of families and ages of children.
5. Housekeeping Facilities- Each housing unit has a kitchen sink with running water, and oil stove with oven and dishes. Each duplex and triplex building has one toilet and laboratory. Persons occupying units in the quadruple building use central toilet facilities. Essential items of furniture and furnishings are supplied some of which are made on the project by internees.
6. Schools- It is intended to provide standard grammar and high school courses. These schools will not be in operation before the beginning of the fall term. To the fullest extent possible teachers will be selected from internees, but the Government will furnish such teachers as are needed.
7. Library- Provision is made for a library but at the present time very few books have received. Effort will be made to secure additional books.

8. Visiting- Visits of limited duration are permitted, but must be approved in advance by the Officer in Charge. Children who do not enter the camp may visit relatives who are interned, under certain specified conditions. Such visits by those in relocation centers will be contingent upon approval of leave for such purposes by the center project director.
9. Departure-As a general policy a person accepting voluntary internment will not be permitted to leave the camp while the interned member of the family remains in that status. However, in exceptional cases, application to depart from the camp will be accepted, approval to be based on the merits of each individual application.
10. Pets - No pets are permitted at the camp.
11. Personal- The quarters occupied by individual family groups are small and the space in which personal property which may be stored is limited. Persons may bring with them or have shipped to them at Government expense to the camp. The personal clothing, toilet article, hot water bottle, small items of household equipment, such as portable sewing machines, scatter rugs, curtains, couch cover, small long-wave radios receivers, small tools for craft and gardenwork, garden hose, small electrical appliances, such as irons, sports equipment, such as racquets, balls, bats, a limited number of books and small table games. Other articles may be brought only after securing in advance specific approval from the Officer in Charge. The application for permission to present such articles should explain the need and intended use thereof and its approximate size and weight.
12. Canteen- A canteen operated by internees, is available where internees may purchase with their own funds articles they desire.
13. Laundry- A central power operated laundry has been established for the laundering of sheets, pillow cases, work clothes, etc. A central hand laundry with stationary tubs is available for the laundering of personal apparel.
14. Sanitary- Adequate community bath houses and toilet facilities are available. These facilities are separate for the different racial groups.
15. Hospital- Adequate hospital and dental facilities are available either in the town of Crystal City or at the internment camp.
16. Opportunity- Internees engaged in performance of work not connected with the management, administration or maintenance of the facilities will be paid at the rate of 80¢ per hour. Certain projects to provide useful employment

8. ment have already been organized, such, for example, as a farm and the manufacture of clothing and household furniture and furnishings. The opportunity for paid work, however, is limited.
17. Recreation- Adequate space and equipment for outdoor recreation will be provided and the interned will be afforded an opportunity to organize their own sports, motion pictures for amusement and educational purposes are shown twice weekly.
18. Internee - Internees are represented by an elected spokesman and council. The Japanese and Germans have separate organizations.
19. Citizen- Citizenship will not be effected by voluntary internment. The WRA has no reason to believe that persons going to such camp will be arbitrarily or forcibly repatriated or expatriated to be sent back after the war.
20. Financial- All money or checks sent to interned individuals must be deposited with the official financial officer and thereafter the funds handled through said officer. Money in the hands of any person at any one time will be limited, possibly to \$10.
21. Censorship- All mail and parcels entering or leaving the camp are subject to examination and censoring by camp authorities. International mail is censored in New York. The number of letters and postcards per individual is permitted to send must be limited. However, at least two letters and postcards per week will be permitted.
22. Eligibili- Transfer from a WRA center will be in the best interest for transfer to camp. Interests of all members thereof and of the Government.
23. Nationali- Internees of both Japanese and German nationalities and their wives and children will occupy this facility. A small number of persons of other nationalities may also be detained here. Insofar as it is practicable, each group will be permitted to have its own facilities but it will be necessary for them to share certain of the major facilities, such as the Hospital, store, auditorium, outdoor recreational facilities and main laundry.
24. Property The appropriate War Relocation Authority Property Management Officials will continue to care for any property left by the families either in the relocation center or at their former residence. Internees may communicate directly with the Property Officer of the War Relocation Authority regarding the handling of their property.

LEAVES TO VISIT OTHER CAMPS:

- A. This is possible, but the exact procedure should be ascertained from the Camp authorities, for permission, etc.

CORRESPONDENCE:

- A. Policy governing the transmission to or from enemy territory of private messages or of documents intended for private use.

Subject to censorship, brief paraphrased messages of a personal nature, including welfare and whereabouts inquiries, may be transmitted by telegraph or, where possible, by mail to or from enemy territory through the facilities of the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross, and other national Red Cross societies, or those of other organizations or societies licensed by the Director of Censorship.

Only where efforts to communicate through Red Cross facilities are unsuccessful or in other exceptional circumstances will the United States Government permit the transmission to or from enemy territory by official telegrams of messages of a personal nature. Messages so permitted shall be (a) brief, (b) paraphrased, (c) subject to censorship, and (d) transmitted in plain language.

- B. Correspondence from the internment camps and detention stations.

Internees held in camps by the War Department will be permitted, at their own expense, to send one cablegram or telegram per month consisting of not more than fifteen words in the message proper. Detainees held by the Department of Justice will be permitted to send similar messages though the number and length of the communications varies from camp to camp---(Via International Red Cross)

Internees held in army camps may not send more two letters and one post card per week. Those held by the Department of Justice may not be limited to less than two letters per week, though in fact, most camps permit more than this minimum correspondence.

FINANCIAL AID

- A. A special appropriation has been provided for the relief of needy wives, children and other dependents of internees, whose straitened financial conditions or loss of support results from the internment. Application for this relief may be made to the United States Attorney in the district where the dependents reside. On request the Department of Justice will furnish the name and address of the United States Attorney.

UTILIZATION OF FUNDS WHICH AN INTERNEE MAY HAVE OUTSIDE OF CAMPE

- A. The Treasury Department will grant licenses to internees permitting them to withdraw from their bank with the United States or its possessions, a sum not to exceed \$180 monthly.

of this, \$150 may be used to aid the family of the internee or to meet debts, insurance premiums, etc. The remaining \$30 are ~~are~~ for the internee's personal expenses in camp.

MILITARY SERVICE:

- A. If the second generation Japanese so desire, they may do military service with the American Army. On the contrary, they are not obligated to do so if they don't want since it would be absurd to have an army composed of enemies of the country.