

DECEMBER 26 -- (1)

Several blocks finished their Mochi poundings today. Other blocks will follow in the next few days. In one block residents had planned to pound it on the twenty-ninth (Niju ku nichi) of this month, but others objected ^{to} it because ku meant not only nine but also suffering. They postponed it until the thirtieth.

Yukawa of Block 5 moved to discourage Christmas gift giving among the evacuees. He stated that he had noted that the residents have been planning for "bigger and better" and more elaborate presents. The Council decided to send memorandums to the effect advising the residents to refrain from "too much Christmas presents"

10/14/43
Cultural Survivals

The funeral service for Mrs. Ono of Block 45 (October 7, page 2) was held this morning in the Poston Christian Church. About 400 persons attended the service.

It is interesting to observe that the Japanese have not yet gotten away from the old Japanese tradition of "Koden" yet. I was told that the Ono family received "Koden" amounting \$69.50 from various friends.

Last year the administration was cognizant of this practice and tried to discourage it. The matter was referred to the T C C in its regular meeting in September of 1942. The council at that time decided to inform the residents not to practice this tradition in this center --- a voluntary curbing, instead of passing a statute prohibiting the practice. Before the funeral service I announced publicly to the residents to refrain from giving "Koden". The intent of the persons to discourage the practice here is that we are getting only \$19.00 at most a month and cannot afford unnecessary expenditure. We felt that it would be wiser to abolish unnecessary formalities if possible.

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10/15/43
Cultural Survivals

One Issei woman who had been given a major operation by Dr. Wada gave a gift to the doctor as a ^{of} token appreciation. The gift consisted of a set of

OCTOBER 15 -- (6)

towels and a ten-dollar bill. A few days afterward the doctor returned the ~~money~~ to her, keeping just the set of towels, saying that he could not keep any cash. There had been so much talk among the people that the doctors were taking cash on the side and they agreed among themselves not to take any money from the Japanese in camp.

The foreman of the Sign Department told me that he often receives gifts of ~~cash~~ for the works done by him. He always returns those gifts; if the donors insist in giving he donate them to some social service agencies in turn.

However, there are many persons who are making money on the side. The plumbers, for instance, are accepting "sode no shita" (under the sleeve) money when they have done some work --- say, installing a faucet in an apartment --- with government material. Or the electric men charge ^a service fee for installing suckets in the apartment.

There was a considerable criticism against the tailor that he had been charging twenty five dollars for sewing ~~of~~ a suit of men's cloth, of course, against the WRA regulation.

10/20/43
Cultural Survivals

I noticed a little note in the Poston Chronicle of October 20. It said:

We wish to take this means to express our most sincere appreciation to those who extended congratulatory messages and gifts on the occasion of our wedding. Thank you very much.

Mr. & Mrs. Ichiro Okada
Blk. 305

It was one of the old customs of the Japanese in California to put wedding notices and notes of appreciation in the vernacular newspapers. (Of course, funeral advertisements were more prevalent.) It is interesting to observe that such a custom is making its appearance into the English newspapers of the Japanese.

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12/1/43
Cultural News

There has been rumors going around that Mochi Gome (Rice for Mochi) would not come to this project. Onishi of the Food Committee had made an investigation and reported as follows: The project asked for bids from the jobbers for a purchase of 25,000 pounds of Mochi Gome, but there was no bid made. The Steward made several inquiries to other firms and succeeded in getting 20,000 pounds from a Japanese jobbing house in Salt Lake City. The evacuees were assured of getting their New Year's Mochi by this deal. It would amount to about 1½ pounds per capita, while last year it was about one pound per capita.

The Council meeting was adjourned at 4 P. M.

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421
S.J.I

5-27-43

Conversation with Miss Patton and Dr. Harris by AHL
Attitudes of school children
C.R. Schools

Miss Patton was saying that the children felt sure Japan would win the war and were very sorry for poor America to have got herself into such a jam. As soon as Japan won, they would all be back in California and it would be in less than a year. They wouldn't believe anything about the success of the allies. Just recently they conceded that there have been a few victories (after Tunisia) but they are just as sure as ever of the outcome for Japan. Miss Patton found this very irritating - which may be one reason the children tell her these things. Dr. Harris agreed that he had similar experiences.

4. 7 - age 40

Sentiments

Via X

Recorded Feb. 14, 1943

time.
I believe her
Now some
listen to her.

The war will be over soon. We'll have a celebration at Brighton Beach on the 4th of July. (expressed about the beginning of June by L.A. girls);
40 yrs. ago.

The war will be over by Aug. 30. I bet 10 to one with a Nisei.

I got the inside dope. The war is going to end by Xmas. This time for sure.

The war is going to end on April 15, 1943. This is definite.

When she uttered 13th two sentiments many others & war would last longer. Her retort: "you want to stay in this place, huh? We'll let you stay here."

Recent sentiment by some party: "If I had known that the war was to last this long I would have sold out all the merchandise I had stored. (about Jan., 1943).

- "~~I am buying~~ I am buying a house and paying \$35 a month - let alone the initial payment of \$500. I'm renting it to a Mexican family for \$10 a month. I feel sad when I think that I can't enjoy my own house."

pre-conviction

"They can't take us out anywhere. There are too many Japanese to move and to take care. I know they are taking out Jap. from vital defense areas but they won't take us out of Boyle Heights section because there isn't anything vital here." She didn't believe in ^{any} articulate way that she was to move until the evacuation order had been posted.

"about June 15th Terminal Island was bombed. There is nothing left out there." Reaction to that: ~ ~ ~ "That's what they get for shoving us out like that. (this expressed by a Terminal Island woman.

October, 1942: "They are circulating a petition in L.A. for a negotiated peace with Japan. Lot of ϕ are signing it. ϕ outside are wary of the war already." ϕ believed this.

(X's ~~reply~~ to this when ϕ came up to ask truth of rumor:

"When a country is intending ^{to ask} for negotiated peace the govt. will change the present editorial attitude of newspapers ~~and pictures~~. And will emphasize worthlessness of carrying on. Right now the papers are clamoring for unconditional surrender. ~~this is~~ ^{at the time when} ~~this is~~ ^{when} this is something I wouldn't depend on too much."

Whereas ^{the} mail arrives, esp. during the time the Lexington went down or any other announcement of Jap. naval victory, "Oh, oh, tomorrow we'll see '20 Jap ships sunk!'" (Sentiment is quite widespread).

When headline says, "20 Jap ships sunk" reaction to this is: "Something must have happened to the U.S. Navy" (quite widespread).

They open newspapers & look first for small items in back pages or at bottom of front page..

- "all these news are three months old." This referred esp. to Lexington's sinking. It ~~was~~ ^{was} announced by Japan three months ago. Lexington is gone, the Saratoga's gone, the Ranger is gone, the Wasp is gone, the Enterprise is gone, the Yorktown is gone — they haven't got anything left."

- "They still haven't announced that they lost everything at Pearl Harbor. I wonder how long they are

4. going to keep it secret": (widespread) until Dec. 7, 1942 when disaster announced. still claim full damages, ^{have} ~~not~~ been announced.) - This sentiment prevailed thru summer + autumn.

"Huh, they said Singapore was impregnable + would withstand a siege of 7 years. Look what happened. Only 2 weeks. ~~Idon~~."

About the time I were going out to sugar beet fields general rumor going around that Jap. broadcast had warned them not to go out.

Beginning of November: "There was a broadcast night before last from Japan that we shouldn't go out from camp to any place for next 2 weeks."

Low Flying airplanes: たんた あいー ~~た~~ らこんた
PSI てんさうに ~~た~~ たんた" へて 何にもた
うたの ~~た~~ しやたの。せんさうに たーた
う 12 11" ~~た~~ やがるくせ12。

— What a hell, those guys can't fly that low on the beet field.

Feb. 17, 1943

Issei - both about 40-50)

"Did you know that the army wants Issei volunteers?"

"Yeh, things must be pretty bad."

"Yeh, I wanted to volunteer but they said they were going to make me a captain right away. ~~ta~~
I don't want to be a big-shot."

They say it's illogical to pledge allegiance + then say yes or no to bear arms.

May, June, July - 1942

via X
Recorded 7/20/43

The Yawata, Kamakura, Tateuta, ~~Chichibu~~ ^(Chichibu) Asama are convertible into aircraft carriers. They have gun turret in base, chimney so fixed that can be placed on side, A deck can be taken off, elevator can be used for plane elevator.

Japs have 6-motored planes ready that have not yet been used. Japs have not used planes made since 1938.

2/20/43

In greeting Nisei said: "Hello, sucker, did you volunteer?"

Answer: "No, did you, you sucker."

Nisei: What's the use of answering, "no"? They'll take you anyway.

Nisei: I answered, "yes" if drafted. I told Sgt. Kinoshita to put some more on it because I went to a Buddhist school in Japan & I was taught not to kill even fish.

Nisei: "Why don't you volunteer? You'll be a sergeant when the other guys are drafted peeling potatoes in the kitchen."

Old mother worried that if answered "yes" would it mean that he would be drafted immediately.

X: I would not give advice to anyone on question 27 + 28 because I feel it is an individual problem to decide. No one else knows what ~~you~~ ^{to} answered ~~on~~ but yourself. But remember if you expect to remain in this country it is your duty to fight for this country.

March 21, 1943

It is rumored that ~~Camps~~ Russia is negotiating for
separate peace with Japan. The war will end in a month.

December 1, 1943

Dear Tamie:

In your letter of November 25th you raised a very important question re the short wave broadcasts. I shall quote you here as a reminder: "If publicity is given to them (i.e. if the Issei find out the contents of these broadcasts) do you think they will become more publicly pro-Japan in the hope of gaining favors from Japan in the post-war period? I bet the guys at Tule Lake feel they are martyrs."

I thought I have been making myself clear on this point in the Journals for the past three weeks, but evidently it isn't so. This is the most important point, which I have been trying to describe with many passages in the Journals. The trouble with me is that I am moving with the group which ^{of} am observing; I take too many things for granted. I omit too many things inadvertently, thinking that the readers would understand the background without specifically analyzing the events. This question raised by you convince ^{me} all the more that I need directives and criticisms and comments for my Journals from the outside, i. e. from you and Prof. Thomas. You people on the outside have a better perspective for the events happening here. As for instance, Prof. Thomas has been sending many questions in her letters, and I realize by those questions that I had missed something which should have been recorded in my paper. I go back to the events and I can elaborate on them before I forget their significance, I try to make the readers understand, but I find that I had not made ^{not} the point clear quite often. To know what points I had ^{not} made clear is very important for me.

After all, you are not here to check my observations, or to verify the completeness of report. As you know, I cannot discuss these matters with anyone here. Discussions on the reports are essential to bring out what's lacking in them.

Wittes
Sounded Japan; U.S.

As to your question let me offer the following aspects:

1. The Japanese people here (especially the Issei and the Kibei) knew all the news reported on the first page of the report from Dr. Thomas as early as November 11 or thereabout. The news given in the latter part (pages 2 - 3) was spread among the residents in an abbreviated form. Evidently someone heard the original broadcast and condensed it for mouth-to-mouth reporting. Especially those last two paragraphs were given extra attention by the people.
2. Even after they had heard these news their attitude toward the Tule Lake incident did not change. They kept their original opinion, that is to say, the attitude of condemning the Tule Lake people for jeopardizing and endangering the interest and welfare of the Japanese in other center. They held those opinions recorded in my Journal, as for instance, the Tule Lake people are rash and irrational. "Tule Lake ni itta mono wa ranbo dakara komaru," or "Tsumara nai koto o shite sawaganai ho ga ii noni." It was surprising that the reactions of the Poston residents were moderate as a whole. There was no violent argument in favor of the tactics employed by the Tule Japanese. If there were any, those were from the "old bachelors" of Barracks 13 and 14, which did not amount to anything. Even the rural residents took these moderate views. As I recorded, some said, "They think they have become Nihonjin (meaning the Japanese in Japan), but they are mistaken. They are still in America." Even to the recruitment of harvesters to Tule Lake, there was no active opposition, although they frowned upon those who had enlisted. There was no agitation nor intimidation to the men enlisted, except possibly in two or three isolated cases. As a whole, they believed in non-involvement in the issue.

When the Army had moved into Tule, there was some sympathy expressed toward the Tule people. They were sorry that they were made the targets of unfounded publicity. (We know which newspapers charges ^{were} are true and which

~~were~~
~~are~~ true.) When the Poston people ~~had~~ heard that the Army had fired and had used bayonets, they were sympathetic passively. When they heard subsequently that the Japanese government had requested the Spanish Embassy to investigate into the matter, they were relieved that the trouble would be soon over. They felt a kind of soothing sensation, so to speak, that someone big enough was to get after their persecutors.

I do believe that our conception of "ambivalent attitudes" of the Japanese has again been varified. The residents do not have any ^{wish} ~~attitude~~ to capitalize on the action by the Japanese government. ^{there is} ~~They have~~ no indication that they might become more pro-Japan in the hope that they would gain some favor. They feel a sense of security, to be sure, of being protected by the Japanese government, but they do not wish to do anything themselves to put themselves in the limelight. There is a strong indication that they have a strong attachment to America. The general sentiment is to remain quiet and passive for the duration. They have no desire to embarrass either Japan or America.

Judging from the letters from Tule Lake which I had read, this sentiment is present out there, too. To what extent I don't know. All the letters indicated that they did not wish any trouble; they expressed their desire to live peacefully. In only one ^e ~~l~~tter I sensed a feeling that Uchida, Nogawa, Inouye, et al are their martyrs. Others felt that they had created something undesirable (not the early letters, but the later ones), which could have been arbitrated amicably. Maybe the mail censorship has something to do with these expressions, I don't know. I don't believe that the majority at Tule Lake had staged the riot to gain ^a ~~material~~ for the Japanese propaganda or to embarrass America, as Cozzen claimed to the reporters. No doubt, however, some out-and-out pro Japan groups look at those birds as their matyrs.

In Poston we find the situation whcih you would expect fr~~om~~ by chopping

off both extremes from the red and blue schematic chart of ours. Both solid blue and solid red are gone from this community.

3. However, the residents in general are hoping for the Japanese victory. That would be natural with the Issei and the Kibei, who believe that their future would be dark without the victory. (We discussed this sometime ago.) But lately, I was surprised to find that the sentiment is prevalent among the Nisei here, although they are afraid to speak up. Tom Sakai, for instance, believe that the future for the Nisei in this country ^{would be brighter} if Japan wins the war. Roy Furuya thinks that the Japanese would be treated just like Negroes if ^aJapan loses this war. Yosh Ekimoto thinks they "will be nobody if Japan loses." The Nisei as a whole believe that America would not be destroyed even if Japan wins the war, and they feel that they would have better economic and social security by the Japanese victory. I presume that their feeling is mingled with a secret desire that their tormentors should be "spanked in their seats".

Did I make myself clear? Please ask me more questions if this is not clear. Maybe I can make it plain when I see you again.

The current SW rumors are the destruction by Japan of so many American Cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft carriers at Gilbert and the annihilation of the American forces which landed on Tarawa.

The third paragraph, page 2, of SW reports from Dr. Thomas must have been written by some Nisei or by someone who had been in America. The minds of the Japanese in Japan ^{don't} react that way.

An Issei who has been rejoiced and spreading the Gilbert "victories" and Bougainville "victories" of Japan is persuading his brother-in-law (18 yrs old) to volunteer for Savage or Shelby.

I am enclosing the Examiner article. The following items are from my Journal for November 30.

The reactions of the residents to the Examiner articles, which had been


anticipated by the Administration, are divided into two distinct groups, a cleavage of the opinions along the age groups. The Issei are taking an attitude, which can be summarized as "Again," or "The usual Hearst Stuff." ~~"The usual Hearst Stuff."~~ The Nisei, on the other hand, are taking a more revolting attitude. One Nisei said, "Whatta hell, ^{the} use of working here for the project. Whatever we do is something which must be criticized." Another Nisei stated, "There is no use in being a good American-Japanese. They get after us anyway." Another Nisei exploded, "Goddamn America." Still another stated, "They are making us mad. I won't be a bit surprised if they start another disturbance here." Another commented, "Why don't they lay off us. We haven't done anything wrong." One Kibei said, "Baka ni shite iyaga ru"

One younger Issei asked Nomura this afternoon, "Why don't you do something about that? Young guys are plenty sore about that," Nomura replied, "There isn't anything we can do. It's best to keep quiet."

I have received the packages of coffee. Thank you. I am sorry that I have put you to trouble. Coffee is a luxury for "inmates" here. By the way, the newspapers haven't used "inmates" referring to us yet, have they?

I am going off to cover the Local Council meeting now. I also enclosed your Cal check. I took it out of your envelope to save postage. It was addressed in care of me, which is a wise move. Please acknowledge receipt of the check immediately.

Sincerely your,



P. S. Regards to Profs. Thomas.

Regional Files 103, Wash. DC
Miyamoto

Miss. attitudes

Letter from Edw. J. Ennis, Dept. of Justice, Wash., to Myer
August 6, 1942

Dear Sir:

I enclose for your kind consideration and whatever action you may wish to take in the matter a letter from a group of internees at the Immigration and Naturalization Service Station in Santa Fe, New Mexico, addressed to the Honorable F. de Amat, Consul of Spain, Special Representative of Spanish Embassy, San Francisco, California, regarding conditions at the Poston, Arizona, Relocation Center.

A copy of this letter was also sent to Mr. Bernard Gufler, Assistant Chief of the Special Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Regional Files 103, Wash. D.C.
Miyamoto

Japanese Detainees
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service Station
Santa Fe, New Mexico
July 9, 1942

Hon. F. De Amat
Consul of Spain
Special Representative of Spanish Embassy
San Francisco, California

Sir:

We hope this letter will find you and your staff in the best of health and spirit, despite ever increasing difficult tasks in representing the Empire of Japan and her subjects, of which we gratefully acknowledge.

The detainees here, whose families being located at the Colorado River Relocation Center, Poston, Arizona, have been receiving many ghastly informations as to the living conditions there, which a recent date death toll amounted to four, probably caused by an excessive heat rising as high as 125 degree without exaggerating and the typical desert sand storm, which render people helpless and results in a number of illness.

There were reported five hundred evacuees from Salinas districts on June 30th, one half of whom have been attacked and many fainted upon their arrival, partly due to a continuous thirty hour train ride, and the typical desert heat and the sand storm.

Since the air conditioning or a scientific apparatus to alleviate the heat are, at present, unavailable, some, particularly the weak and the elderly folks, with a hope of making life less unbearable, dig a hole in the ground under the house and place themselves in the excavated spaces during the day time.

We understood there are the cooling system equipped only in the hospital and the administration buildings, but due to insufficient electric power, such cooling facility is now unavailable for the evacuee's quarters.

In this respect, we, the detainees, whose wives, children and kin-folks undergoing such agony and suffering, respectfully and sincerely request and beseech Your Excellency to investigate the prevailing conditions by actually visiting this place, and after confirming aforesaid facts, negotiate with the proper authorities to provide adequate equipment as soon as possible to divert a rising death toll and sickness, and make the life at the center humanly bearable.

What they are in dire need at this time are sufficient supply of ice-cold water to drink, the cooling system, and possibly planting of any fast growing trees to make shades here and there.

Please bear in mind, this request, by no means intended to censure or criticize the administration of the Center because we were informed

the Administration Chief and his Staff have been exercising their full authorities to better conditions and trying their humanly best within their power to comfort our families in the midst of such an unbelievable inferno of the desert, of which we acknowledge.

Your prompt attention to this matter, we are sure, shall be immensely appreciated not only by all Japanese residents of this country but by the people in Japan as well.

Thanking you very much for your courtesy and kindness. We have the honor to be

Respectfully yours,

(1st signature /s/ Tomoji Sonoda

(signed by 74 other detainees at this Station)

Coop

ONLY IN AMERICA COULD THIS HAPPEN!
IN RE EVACUEE TRUST FUND; LET'S KEEP THE MONEY!

Press Bulletin
Wed., Oct. 28, 1942
VOL. VI NO. 20

You know, this could only happen in America. I mean about presenting the peoples' viewpoints without fear of a Gestapo.

Now this writer has always had much respect for the editorial comments of Mr. K.T. and with due respect to the fellow scribener, permit me to take advantage of our freedom of speech to digress a bit on the topic of the evacuee trust fund.

Perhaps the Issei Voice is right. Cooperatives may possibly border on Bolshevism. But it was my understanding that the fund is to be created, organized and held in trust by the people, thru their elected representatives on the Fair Practice Board.

On that account, maybe the Coop enterprise (canteen) should be discouraged. I wouldn't know. The h... with the people! Every man for himself!

Why not allow the cotton pickers to keep all their earnings? Vernon Kennedy, the Employment Chief, told me that there is available approximately \$2000 of the Caucasian personnel money for the trust fund, or as the Voice would like to have it, for the individual pockets of those rendering personal services in the way of maid and laundry service. Well, why not? Then maybe this writer would be within his rights to ask \$25 per week as ^a reporter. And maybe the chefs and the lawyers and the secretaries would be within their rights to demand wages compensatory to their positions!

Yeh, let's forget about all this community service idea! Let the suckers who vote for cotton picking go out themselves. Or if they get to hang on to whatever they earn, it might not be so bad. If the garnishing project pays prevailing wages, let those American citizens keep all the money they earn.'

Why should we worry whether the cotton's picked or not! Why should we worry about the next guy! Is that the characteristic trait of all human beings? If so, let it reign in all its inglorious state!

Being a bit on the younger side in age, this writer may not possess the foresight of the older generation in regards to cooperation, sacrificing for the good of the greatest number.

Perhaps this scribe has too much faith in mankind, is too idealistic. Perhaps we should overlook the fact that we're all in here together. And the idea of educating the people along cooperative and unselfish ideals discouraged.

Miss Okabe

10-15-42

via Mrs. Soy Taniguchi:

A twenty-year old girl called Okabe lives in block 26. She is noted for her "finichayas". You should hear the talk about her in the beauty shop. She uses an atomizer on the toilet seat before sitting down. She also refuses to flush the toilet with her hands so the 4 of the block got together one day and forced her to do it by hand.

Formerly she used to let her mother stand sentinel at the door of the women's latrine so she could take a private shower. The block ladies complained so she now takes her shower between 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. when the others are all asleep.

11/2/42

PAY DAY

With the arrival of our third pay day in the period of seven months, there have been many comments through out camp. This particular problem was discussed in another phase in an editorial in the Press Bulletin concerning petty thefts. In eaves dropping upon several older Hawaiian Nisei, whom I don't think read the Press Bulletin, the topic of the discussion was the prevalence of these thefts. One mother, a Hawaiian Nisei, said that you can't blame the people for stealing and selling those stolen goods when they don't get paid often enough for their "kozukai". A man of 40 said, "We had better put our rubber hose inside because there is a rumor that some boys are stealing this and selling them in Camp II and III.

It's very difficult to stretch \$12 or \$16 over a period of several months, especially, when one can not rely upon the kitchen to produce such things as pies, cookies, etc. regularly to satisfy the sweet-tooth of most youngsters.

(T.S.)

11/1/42

FOOTBALL GAME

At 3:30 the first football game for Poston was played at Dust Bowl in front of Block #21. Although this game was slated to be a tackle football game, it was finally played as a two-hand touch because of the lack of necessary equipments. The game was played by the high school boys of the west side of the canal versus the high school boys of the east side of the canal. They had been practicing for several weeks and this was the culmination of their efforts. There is not much to be said of the game itself, except that the boys were eager and sometimes over enthusiastic which resulted in unavoidable bodily contacts. The game ended with the east side boys winning the game by a score of 6--0.

I don't believe that the boys who participated are the cream of the football material that is to be found in Poston. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of these stars can be attributed to the fact that they do not wish to play touch football. There is hope among the boys who did participate, in playing against Parker High School if football suits are available. The attitude among the boys is one of contempt^t for the Parker High School football team and wish to defeat them with as high a score as possible. This brings in mind another point, that of, the lack of feeling among the boys that are going to high school because of the fact that there is no organized athletic competition which is vital in every youngster's life. Many of these boys would have starred in their respective high schools, and having been denied this opportunity they feel very much put out.

(T.S.)

Miss. attitudes

Poston Relocation Center
Poston, Arizona
June 6, 1942

Dear Dr. Embree:

Thanks for your letter of some weeks ago, listing the persons to whom I can write for positions.

Last Tuesday, we were suddenly ordered to this center from the Mayer Assembly Center where we had been located since May 8. The center is about 16 miles south of Parker, Arizona, is an old river bed, and dusty and windy. Our months are always gritty, and the rooms, including mess halls cannot be kept clean even by closing all the doors and windows because there are so many cracks in walls and floors. From about 1:30 p.m. daily, the wind rises, and often we can't see half mile ahead due to the dust cloud. Each step we take, we stir up dust. Dust settles on the typewriter and is noticeable even while writing a letter. The food is poor and inadequate. The supply of medicine is very inadequate. There are many sicknesses.

Last night, our camp had diarrhea. Men and women filled the rest rooms and had to stand, waiting for turns. The morale is bad. Very little cooperation or willingness to work. There is no open hostility but I know the people are very angry with the treatment they are receiving. If the government is going to force labor on us and drive us like a chain gang, they might get something done, but if they want cooperation and coordination, they will have to start anew.

Government showed poor judgement in sending clean-loving Japanese to this dump. The whole affair reveals lack of careful planning, lack of foresight, and utter ignorance of Japanese psychology. Authority are asking for cooperation and suggestion I understand, but such will not be forthcoming. The authorities themselves are indefinite, and don't seem to know anything. They don't know what our wages will be, how they are going to finance the project which they want to be (according to their interpretation) a cooperation or partnership with the government. The whole thing stinks. Will welcome secret investigation. Fault probably not due to local authorities but to the system--- the system of starting with a bang on a grand idea without attention to details.

I am not working yet. I don't feel like working. If they force me, I might have to. But at the same time, there is a chance of making an escape, just for the hell of it.

I can see no evidence of the much vaunted American sense of fair play, sportmanship, et cetera. The Niseis are sore because no distinction has been made between them and the Isseis, and

grumble that citizenship doesn't mean a damn thing. The Isseis are laughing at the dumbness of the Americans in treating us this way. The whole mess is rotten, as far as we know.

We understand the authorities want to run the camp as a municipality. It sounds like another of those grandiose schemes that fizzle down to nothing.

Am invited to join a group of evacuees studying consumer cooperation to be applied here (canteens) and also in cooperative production and marketing later when farmers start producing. Have declined the invitation so far. Might accept if it offers a chance to tell the authorities how they should treat the Japanese, and how the camp should be run, as far as the treatment of the Japanese are concerned, and how to get their cooperation. But I am not too anxious, and am sleeping all day to escape the heat and the dust.

Will appreciate if you will get someone in Washington to wake up and do something about this whole mess. Come and visit us, if they will let you, and I will tell you something. Hurry or the war will be over before America can wipe off the blot.

Sincerely,

P.S. I haven't written to parties you mention. If the camp is any sort of a criterion of American way of fair play, etc., I am not interested in working, either in camp or outside.

10/13/42

CONVERSATIONS AT THE AGRICULTURAL DEPT.

At 4:30, on my way home from the canteen, I dropped in at the Agricultural Department and found Frank Mizusawa, head of the Agricultural Department, with his wife. They were getting ready to close up the shop but upon seeing me they came out and chattered for a few minutes. Mrs. Mizusawa said, "That's the only thing that grows around here," pointing to the camouflage factory. Then Mr. Mizusawa said, "We have made considerable progress in our first half year in spite of the terrific summer heat." I counted back the months and sure enough it had been six month since we had come here to camp. However, in spite of the improvements shown in the land, there has been very little improvement as far as our barracks are concerned. We still don't have the wall boards promised us nor have we the free use of electrical appliances that was also promised us at the time of our intake. "Yes, we were promised many things, but now, I don't think we should have too much of a let down if we didn't get those things," said Mrs. Mizusawa. "If they would let us use the ironing room for our little heaters then we could warm some tea f or ourselves in the cold nights and that would help out a great deal."

"Another thing that gets me down is this new inspection of packages before being brought to the owners, although I don't think anyone is having real contraband sent in. I do know that liquer has been sent in but why should they deprive us from a little pleasure that is not harmful to anyone," said Mr. Mizusawa.

(T. S.)

9/18/42

I talked to a young nisei minister a few days ago and he had some interesting comments to make ^{about} ~~on~~ the Bureau of Sociological Research. He was gravely concerned about some immediate and acute needs of the people in Poston, and felt that the Bureau was the only channel through which some of these needs could be properly met. He felt that the administration here in Poston is powerless to do the things that the people would like to see done, and that if the W.R.A. officials in Washington were properly contacted about some of these immediate needs in Poston, quicker and more efficient action would be the result. He pointed out ~~as~~ one of the immediate needs as being the problem of housing, that is ^{part} ~~partitioning~~ some of the apartments to accommodate young couples and small families. He felt that Dr. Leighton in his official capacity as a naval officer, would be in a better position than any of the administration here to notify the proper W.R.A. officials in Washinton. He hoped that the Bureau would become a much more powerful and effective channel through which many of the immediate problems could be quickly and satisfactorily fulfilled. He said although you should think in terms of "long term planning", some of the immediate problems should be given immediate attention at the present. He felt that the people should be idealistic but they should be realistic. I explained to the minister that the Bureau is gradually becoming better organized and that it would undoubtedly do research ^{into} the various problems in Poston, and make the administration and proper authorities conscience of the various needs.

(T. Y.)

DateArticle

November 4, 1942

"Poston Working Hours Moved up One-Half Hour".

By the order of the Project Director in Administrative Instruction no. 11, all employees of Poston are advised that effective today, Nov. 4, working hours will be changed from 8:00 a.m. --5:00 p.m. to 8:30 am. to 5:30 p.m.

Breakfast will be at 7:30 am., lunch from 12:30 to 1:30 pm. and dinner from 5:45 to 6:45 pm.

5 hot -
wave
"rumors"

10/14/43
Communication

A rumor, crediting its source to an overseas broadcast, says:

"60 Nisei soldiers were taken in New Guinea by the Japanese as prisoners of war. At the headquarters they were asked whether they were volunteers or draftees. Then they were separated into two groups and were to be treated differently."

June 1,
1943

The Los Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Examiner carried a front-page article on the fall of Attu. People who read it remarked casually: "Oh, that's all right." Someone retorted that newspapers nowadays must claim that the ^{news} ~~article~~ is based on a Japanese broadcast before anyone ^{on the outside} ~~in the center~~ will believe it's authentic. *Out-grouped.*

12/22/43
Comm.
S.W.

A current rumor reports that Tarawa has been retaken by the Japanese.

The small atoll had been attacked by the Japanese force led by Brigadier General Funiwara and annihilated 6,000 American soldiers.

17/16/43
Communication

The dispenser of the overseas broadcast news ceased to bring in the news. He terminated his regular delivery service to Block 45, because he had been angered by a purported remark by a resident (#14) that the Japanese broadcasts contained too many Dema (false and groundless news).

6/22/43 Communications
The following 'rumors' are credited to a Japanese short-wave radio broadcast heard here recently:

The mayor of Manila now visiting in Japan made the following statements in a radio broadcast from Osaka: "Until the Japanese conquered Luzon we were suspicious of Japanese intentions because for

- 60 -

6/22/43
years we had been swallowing American propaganda. I realize now that Japan is our real friend. I'm happy to know that we are to be granted independence which under American domination we would never have had. Theirs was a false promise. We, the peoples of the Philippines are full-heartedly back of the Japanese war aims. We must crush and get rid of the 'Whites in the Orient'."

The battle for Guadalcanal is still undecided. There was a great naval battle recently in the valley side in which Japan lost 19 naval ships. However, our loss has been more than compensated. We destroyed 20 odd naval ships and ? merchant vessels. We also captured an American destroyer which had been incapacitated in battle.

Since the beginning of the war we have destroyed approximately 50,000 enemy airplanes of which 9,000 are accounted for by the Navy.

S.w. rumor - The Imperial Headquarters addressed to the 700,000 Japanese in the foreign countries that the Imperial Edict decreed that they should have a complete faith in the ever victorious army, navy and air forces of the Japanese Empire and that they should not have any fear as to their future.

#

8/24/43 Communications
A little article in the August 18th issue of the Rocky Shimpō is attracting a considerable attention from the residents:

Melbourne, Australia, August 16

The war correspondent, Osmer White, returned to Melbourne today

August 24th (cont'd)

and gave the following brief observation of actual fighting.

"The Japanese soldiers are stronger than the American soldiers. Either in the air or on land the American soldiers cannot fight the Japanese soldiers on an even term, one to one. Unless the American soldiers receive better and more intensive military training, they will be receiving unnecessary damages in the South Pacific front."

#

The following news has been withheld from Thomas: The SW reported that three (later one more was added) battleships and others (druisers and destroyers and so one) were sunk by the Japanese naval air force near Bougainville. Japan is claiming it as an epochal victory. I give ~~it~~ a credulity to the story more than usual. The residents are all excited now and the story is going around mouth to mouth very extensively. For instance, the news was announced publicly in the messhall in Block 6 (of all the places.) On thing ~~that~~ ^{that} should be noted, however, is the fact that the people do not go into scathing derogatory remarks about Amercia. They are happy with the news, but that is the end -- they do not insult America ^{as before} (Of course, there are some exceptions, but not many.)

Communications
(S.W.)
11/4/43.

Tokyo reports: "Buenos Aires: Another instance of American brutality was manifested in the recent trouble in the Tule Lake Internment Camp in California. Details of this case were recently revealed in a dispatch received here. Living up to the true spirit of the Japanese, the internees refused to work when forced to labor for America's benefit. Bewildered by the strong opposition of the Japanese, the American authorities threatened them with machine guns and arrested more than 500 Japanese." (Tokyo, in English to the Eastern U.S., Nov. 8, 6:15 p.m. EWT)

In another broadcast Tokyo says: "Buenos Aires: Fifteen thousand Japanese subjects residing in the U.S. who refused to do the work which the American authorities inflicted upon them by force were transferred to the Tule Lake Concentration Camp in California. With the approach of the harvesting season, the American authorities, very much (angered) by the attitude of the Japanese citizens, who continue to refuse to do any work which may help the American war effort, finally took recourse to machine guns and tanks in order to force these defenseless Japanese to work. The American military authorities on Nov. 4 sent (troops) armed with machine guns and tanks to the concentration camp where they opened (two or three words) on about 50 Japanese newly arrested." (Tokyo, in French to Southwest Asia, Nov. 8, 1:00 p.m. EWT).

Batavia reports: "Tokyo: Through the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador to Washington, Juan F. de Cardenas, the Japanese Government is making inquiries regarding American ill-treatment, including (intimidations) (word) (machine-gun) (word) troops of Japanese internees, incarcerated at Tule Lake segregation center in California. (Iguchi), spokesman of the Board of Information, announced no reply has been received so far. However, adequate measures would be taken after Tokyo obtains full information." (Batavia, in English to the U.S., Nov. 8, 9:30 p.m. EWT) (Compare Tule Lake Camp trouble described on Page FA-1 of today's, No. 9, Daily report--Ed.)

Federal Communication Commission. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. Daily Report Foreign Radio Broadcast. Tuesday, November 9, 1943.)

"Tokyo, Nov. 11. The CHUBU NIPPON, influential daily in central Japan, declared the furor created by American authorities over alleged disturbances by Japanese internees at the Tule Lake internment camp in California is carefully deliberated toward the end for further oppression of the defenseless Japanese. It said actions already taken by the American authorities will go down in history as one of the blackest marks against the conduct of the U.S. Government." (Tokyo, DOMEI, in English to America, Nov. 11, 3:00 a.m. EWT).

The broadcast continues: "This, however, is not surprising, the paper said, when one considers the unscrupulous and illegal actions taken by the U.S. Government against the Japanese, including American-born Japanese, who are American citizens by birth, since the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia. The paper said that although details are not available on the alleged disturbances at Tule Lake, it is clear the American authorities have been deliberately making a mountain out of a molehill in a vicious movement to aggravate the difficulties of the Japanese internees and other Japanese residents of America who have already been the victims of unwarranted discrimination. First reports apparently gave a nearly correct picture of the trouble at the segregation camp when it said some 1,500 internees passively objected to working on farms in protest against bad treatment.

"The charges that the Japanese at Tule Lake were armed with knives and clubs are too ridiculous to deserve comment. It is all part of a malicious campaign on the part of the American authorities to 'give a dog a bad name and kill it'. Hearings by a Senate Committee at Tule Lake on the alleged disturbances by the Japanese are part of this farce to describe the Japanese in general. The Ludicrous dispatching of American troops with tanks and machine guns to seize the camp a few days ago is also part of this melodrama being staged by the U.S. authorities to disenfranchise American-born Japanese with the alleged charge they are 'disloyal'.

"An order given by the Attorney General, Francis Biddle, yesterday (Nov. 10) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to carry out an 'immediate and thorough' investigation of the reported recent disturbances at the Tule Lake camp with a statement (that) 'prompt prosecution and action will be taken if any violation of the Federal law is disclosed' is another ... in the concocted plan to persecute the Japanese. It is small wonder there has been a revival of the anti-Japanese wave throughout the U.S., particularly on the Pacific Coast.

"Such statements as 'I never want to see another Japanese' as attributed to America's Pacific Coast, are enough to show the dastardly makeup of Americans generally. They find it convenient to forget the contributions Japanese residents have made to the

development of Pacific Coast areas, particularly from an agricultural viewpoint.

"On second consideration, this unjustified persecution of the Japanese is understandable in view of the disastrous defeats suffered by American Forces at the Hands of Japan since the outbreak of the war--at the hands of Japanese whom they so underrated. This persecution may be an outlet of their indignation at the impotency of U.S. forces, particularly the much-vaunted U.S. Fleet. Recent battles off Bougainville Island, wherein the Japanese scored an even greater victory than Pearl Harbor, must be sickening to the American public when it learns the truth.

"This latest smashing Japanese Naval victory ought to show the Americans their further oppression of Japanese residents will certainly not help toward halting the Japanese Armed Forces. The paper concluded: 'Let Navy Secretary Knox tell the American people the whole truth, for by so doing they may realize the futility of it all in persecuting the defenseless Japanese.'"

Federal Communications Commission. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. Daily Report Foreign Radio Broadcast, Thursday, Nov. 11, 1943.

DECEMBER 27 -- (2)

Here are some of rumors, which have a "Made in Poston" flavor.

The American forces attacked Tarawa again and were repulsed. (Tarawa, as I reported, is in the Japanese hand according to these rumors.)

The Japanese forces attempted invasion of Calcutta and lost 7,500 Japanese soldiers. However, during the naval battle in ~~the~~ Bay of Bengal the Japanese navy and air force sank 6 40,000 ton battleships, 9 30,000 ton cruisers, etc.

Some Issei claimed that these rumors are being manufactured in Poston for monetary compensation. There are so much demand for short wave news and if anyone is enterprising enough he can charge a regular subscription fee.

#####

Comm. (3.4)

12/5/43
Communications

An older Kibei said, "I can't believe everything in the short wave broadcasts. I suppose lots of them are false. But I can't be at ease unless I see those short wave news. If I read just American newspapers, I would become despondent." This is a surprising ^{articulate} statement — some might have been thinking this way, but they have not expressed so.
#####

11/4/43
SW.

11/4/43
Communications

Those "oversea broadcast" gatherings are appearing ^{again} here and there. But the people are more careful in selecting their company; they do not dispense with the news freely and indiscriminately as before. The gatherings are less ostentatious.

The following two rumors were dredged to some letters ^{from Tule Lake} to Poston residents:

"Japan broadcast that they (the Japanese in Japan) were grieved to find ^{that} there were only twenty thousand real Japanese among one hundred twenty thousand Japanese in America." (By "twenty thousand real Japanese" they mean those people at Tule Lake.)

"There was a short wave broadcast from Japan recently. It addressed, "Tule Lake ni okeru shin no Nihon jin shokun." (Ladies and gentlemen at Tule Lake who are real Japanese)

It is quite evident that ^{this} sort of rumor is going around at Tule Lake. All Poston residents who have heard these rumors are laughing at them. They

NOVEMBER 4 -- (5)

claimed that these had been manufactured at Tule Lake. One said, "I know all the oversea broadcast news. There was nothing like that among them." Another said, "Japan wouldn't say anything like that. I know Japan well." Another said, "Which are the real Japanese anyway -- the one who makes^d trouble or the one who obey the law and keep quiet?"

#####

At the breakfast table some Issei were discussing stories which they had heard as short wave news. Nomura was listening ~~at~~^{and} butted in the conversation, "Ach, those short wave news are dema (intentional lies). Japan is lying all time." One of the Issei was visibly mad, "That's all right even if it's dema. We enjoy them." Another said, "How about America, then?"

Later in the morning another of the group came to me and asked me, "What's^{the} matter with Nomura nowadays?" "I don't know. I guess he is no different from before," I replied. He continued, "Lots of people in camp are saying that Nomura is a rotten guy. They are saying that it's a shame for Block 45 to have him as the councilman."

It is not that Nomura has changed his sentiment recently. He was saying that to his close friends. Now he has come out with the sentiment in the open. Intentionally or not, up to the time of segregation he was very careful about ^{expressing} this type of sentiment; the residents have been hearing critical comments about America from him. (I wonder^{if} he has misjudged^{too optimistically} the prevailing attitude of the community after segregation.)

#####

NOVEMBER 16 -- (3)

The following admin. instruction was distributed to the Managers:

NOTICE TO ALL RESIDENTS OF POSTON

REGARDING ALL RADIOS

Regulation 50.3.A provides that any citizen evacuee possessing a short-wave radio shall surrender it to a designated project official; that if the short-wave attachments are readily removable they will be removed on the evacuee's request and the remainder of the set returned to him; that a receipt will be issued for all items retained; and that sets or attachments retained will be stored by the War Relocation Authority during such time as the evacuee remains in the center and returned to him when he leaves.

Regulation 50.3.B provides that the Project Director has designated the Evacuee Property Officer to receive sets surrendered by evacuees for the removal of short-wave attachments on request where they are readily removable. Each evacuee surrendering a set or an attachment shall be given a receipt therefor. The name, family number, and address, and stored in a locked place in the center to which no evacuee has access.

Regulation 50.4 provides that any set or attachment surrendered under 50.3.3 shall, upon request be returned to the citizen evacuee who surrendered it upon his departure from the relocation center on seasonal or indefinite leave.

Report your radios to the Evacuee Property Officer at once at Room 48 - Administration Building. After inspection and adjustment, you will receive a certificate and the radio will be returned to you for your use here at this project.

/s/ W. Wade Head
W. Wade Head
Project Director

November 15, 1943

Coordinator Nomura stated that Charles A. Harper, the Director of Police, issued a warning ^{that} the above regulation will be enforced. Should any short-wave set be discovered after this instruction, the owner would be prosecuted under the law.

Communication

8/24/43
Communication

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It is reported that 6 - 10 copies of word for word reports supposedly given by the sw broadcast are taking round in camp everyday. In some blocks the copy is delivered and read ~~to~~ at a definite time to a group of people who have formed a habit of congregating at a set place.

One commented, "Why don't they mimeograph it while they are at it?"

Another said, "The administration knows about this, but they are getting lenient and condoning it. In other centers they are passing these copies more boldly."

#####

It was reported through grapevine that a man who was receiving sw news was arrested.

Communications

Tamela
Oct. 12, 1943

The following information was withheld from Thomas:

On the morning you left, the FBI agents came into Poston and first went over to the Machine Shop. They questioned the foreman, Jim, a Japanese, for a short wave set. The agents knew that a set was brought to the shop about ten days ago for repair. They knew that it was brought in a police patrol car. Jim gave excuses which was good enough. He took them to his apartment and let them search ^{for} it.

Then they went to arrest Mitani. While they were gone, Jim went to the Police Department and gave a warning. The policemen immediately got busy and went around the camp to hide the receiving sets. When the agents got through with Mitani and started on a search for s w sets they could not locate at the places where they had been tipped off.

A few days ago in the southwest section threat letters were posted on the messhall walls at three different locations. (Only three persons besides these guys know who did this.) It warned the residents to beware of inu, for they are in their midst. This was done by George Fujii and his friends, in trying to get even with his enemies. He is taking advantage of the present condition --- so much rumors about inu.

The hospital guys are trying to get Tanaka — as an inu.

Definitely established that there are three s w receiving sets in Unit I. About three sets were sent to Tule Lake in parts. There is a very good radio technician here and is producing more.

(Destroy these passages right away. Don't take a chance.)

" Rumors " credited to Japanese short-wave broadcasts:

The news coming on the American broadcast is 100% false. It is unbearable to hear such reports. It is bearable when it is 10% false and 90% true.

7/9/43
Communications
The American Navy landed and occupied Rendova Island. Afterwards they gathered sufficient strength to initiate a landing at Kula Bay in New Georgia Island. In the invasion force were 19 warships and 32 transports. We (i.e. the Japanese) knew of the approaching force. The Americans began landing in the afternoon. We offered no opposition at that time but when night fell we began to attack; mainly with aircraft and submarines. They were easy prey because they were still engaged in landing operations. The searchlights beamed toward the shore so we could pick our targets easily. By morning we had destroyed 35 vessels but 17 escaped. Among the 35 destroyed were the Helena ---- (This was followed by a string of names which our listener could not identify). Our forces are now in the process of annihilating those who had landed.

July 8, 1943

A man was going around camp recently stating: "The war will be over on August 2. The Japanese will raid the U.S. Better not go out of camp." He credited this bit of news to a Japanese short-wave broadcast. (We tried to verify this with the man who listens to the

- 10 -

broadcasts regularly and he claimed nothing of this sort had come over recently.) The dispenser of this information was hailed into Wade head's office a short time ago. The project director inquired: "I understand you are ~~gait~~ giving out news on Japanese broadcasts to residents here. Where do you get these news? Do you have a short-wave radio?" The man was indignant and exclaimed hotly: "Who told you that? I don't have a short-wave set. I don't need to have one. You see those articles in the newspapers which give Japanese broadcasts, don't you? Well, I collect them from many papers and give them to the residents."

Rumors

June 3, 1943

Comm. act.

I was informed via the grapevine today that the people are greatly concerned as to the future of the Japanese language school in Poston. It seems that about ten days ago a Caucasian taking Japanese lessons disappeared mysteriously. Now the rumor going around is that he was a representative of the Dies Committee and had been "planted" there to get a low-down on the Japanese language school situation. Today's L. A. Examiner carried an editorial stating that the residents of Gila are not relocating because they have been informed that Japan will attack the Pacific Coast shortly. The Postonese by connecting these two facts expect to get adverse publicity from the Dies Committee. regarding the language school.

7/21/43
Rumor
A rumor now making its round in camp is that the residents of Manzanar will be brought here soon and that each block will be filled to its capacity.

10/23/43
Communication
A visitor from the Granada center told me ^{that} the rumor about Hahn and Saki was circulated among the people there, too. She verified the story with Mrs. Fred Tayama (Wife of the J A C L president at the time of the evacuation)

OCTOBER 23 -- (11)

who visited Granada from Boulder, Colorado. She said that Sakai was still teaching^{at} the school. (Cf: October 5, page 3)

Among those at the Boulder school I know Masao Igasaki, attorney at law in Los Angeles; Joe Sano, a Stanford graduate and son of the principal of a Japanese language school in San Francisco; Suzuki, an Issei who was the principal of the Kinmon Gakuen^{in San Francisco}, and who used to brag about the decoration from the Emperor of Japan; Yoneo Sakai, Takeda, and Joe Inouye, all formerly of the Rafu Shimpo. Many Japanese people regard them now as the betrayers of the Japanese race.

#####

The Poston rumor factory is very active as usual. Some of the widely criculated stories are listed as follows.

9/23/43
Communications

The Rocky Shimp^o reported that the hospital at Gila was closed on September 10. All the patients are to be transferred to Poston. They are going to send the wounded soldiers to the Gila Hospital. (Although I looked through all the recent issues of the Rocky Shimp^o, I could not find such an article. Furthermore, I was in Gila on September 10 and visited the hospital several times during my stay there; there was no indication that the hospital was to be closed in the near future.)

A few days ago there was a big naval battle near New Georgia Island and the American naval force was completely destroyed.

The Gripsholm was attacked by German submarines and was forced to return to New York.

The Tule Lake camp is full already and the segregation plan as far as Poston is concerned has been abandoned. The Poston segregants are to remain here.

After segregation Manzanar and Poston will be closed. These camps will be used to take care of the wounded soldiers.

As America ^{is} taking more Japanese prisoners every day and it is too much trouble to bring them over here. So the American soldiers killed all the Japanese prisoners nowadays. In retaliation, Japan is doing the same thing.

As there are too many battles going on on the earth, the earth will bust about next January.

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Communications
10/10/43

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The rumor that Manzanar evacuees will be brought here is spreading wider and wider.

Another rumor, some people crediting its source to the Utah Nippo, says:

OCTOBER 10 -- (2)

A demented soldier, returned from ^{the} South Pacific on account of war shock, visited the labor camp in ^{Utah} ~~Idaho~~, where Japanese seasonal workers, mostly girls, are housed, and fired shots. One girl ^{was} shot in her leg and was hospitalized. The soldier had been saying, "I will kill every Jap I see. I got to get even with Japs."

The leaders of the nearby town were excited and called an emergency meeting to cope with the situation. They planned the ways to protect the Japanese, because there was an acute shortage of farm labor and "these people are helping us." They made a plan to move the camp to a safer place if necessary.

#####

There is a rumor going around that Manzanar people are coming in ~~from~~ ^{beginning} next week. The source is given to the letters from Manzanar.

Another rumor says that those interned from Hawaii are to be sent to Poston from Santa Fe.

10/8/43
Rumors.

The assistants to Snelson, whose duty is to coordinate individual messhalls and the Subsistence Department, ~~that~~ ^{these} are spreading the story that Head had informed the Subsistence Department that the Manzanar residents would be transferred here in December. Snelson had been instructed to order more food for the month of December, they broadcast.

#####

10/20/43
Communication

10/31/43

Rumor

When I showed the Topaz Times (October 30, page 1), Haas stated that Myer probably meant Manzanar and Rhower, because there the improvements are least. When I reminded ^{him} that Head had stated on October 21 that Poston would be kept open for the duration, Haas remarked, "Many of Mr. Head's predictions did not come true."

There are already a revival of rumors about Poston closing. Manzanar and Poston again are running neck and neck in the "popularity contest" with the Poston residents.

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A rumor is going around now that H. Nakachi of the Executive Board was hospitalized on account of tuberc^ulosis last night. The rumor further adds that there are about forty residents who are affected with tuberculosis in Block 19 (Nakachi's block).

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There is a rumor in some quarters that four Japanese soldiers, taken as prisoners, died in the Poston hospital. (It is clearly a distorted version of the accident in which three M. P.'s died --- Cf: November 4, page 5)

#####

Yesterday morning I heard a story that the Imperial Japanese headquarters announced the Allied's loss of five cruisers, three destroyers, and hundreds of planes. The news was reported on the Los Angeles Times

11/6/43

~~That's~~ Rumor

NOVEMBER 6 -- (3)

of November 6 under the title, "Tokyo Boasts About Sea Battle's Results"

Today's I heard that America lost eight aircraft carriers, the source of the information ^{being} credited to an oversea broadcast.

11/22/43
Commun.
A rumor is being circulated that the 5th Army Command has issued an order prohibiting all Nisei from the defense plants.

OCTOBER 9 -- (4)

Attaches
A young man who went out on seasonal leave in last May and came back yesterday remarked, "Gee, things have changed here. People are quiet now and look settled down."

Many families are saving a considerable amount of money out of their monthly government pay~~ment~~ --- the cash advances and the clothing allowances. I know a family of five, all of them working, has saved about eight hundred dollars since coming to Poston. Another family with six has saved about five hundred dollars. Mrs. Okamoto, the wife of the deposed councilman of Block 46, boasted to her friends that she had saved three hundred dollars with the man and wife working.

OCTOBER 15 -- (8)

On the other hand, there are many families which cannot live on the monthly income here. They are spending their cash reserve which they had saved before the evacuation. These are the ones who are planning to find some work on the outside in the next spring. One Issei, for instance, has spent a little more than three hundred dollars out of their saving. He is about forty years old and has three children. Another Issei, about forty-five years of age, told me that his bank account decreased by fifteen hundred dollars. He had bought a residence in Boyle Heights a few years prior to the onset of the war and has been paying for it ever since. He is very much concerned about his and his family's financial future and is looking around for a lucrative job outside. Seiichi Nomura, too, told me that he cannot live with his monthly nineteen dollars and the clothing allowance. He has three children and is the only one working. "I used up my veteran's pension, too, every month and even that isn't enough," he said. He intends to relocate in the spring. But all these men are saying that they will relocate alone leaving their families here. "If I took my family too, we would starve outside," one of them confided.

#####

One Issei woman reported that her friends (Issei women from the rural districts) are saying that they are thankful to have been evacuated. "They are saying, 'Arigatai! Arigatai!' (I am thankful. I am thankful.)"

In this connection I remember that John Powell recently told me that the evacuation resulted in the emancipation of Japanese women.

10/30/43
attaches

Nakachi informed me that the open air auditorium now under construction must be rushed so that it can be finished by January, 1944. "When the WRA comes in, they would not allow us to built a thing like that. We got to have it completed before they come in," he said. Nakachi said that he would ask volunteer workers from every block to rush the construction and asked for the cooperation of the block managers.

#####

10/20/43
attaches

There is a rumor going around that Miyeki Hayano is an "inu". Hayano is the Assistant Director of Education. He has been engaged in a controversy with one Ono on the dancing party question on the Poston Chronicle pages. (I have not had time to record this in the journal. I left it for a later date inasmuch as it has been recorded in the newspaper.) This rumor might have resulted from this controversy.

#####

11/14/43
attaches

An Issei commented, "These people are saying that they can't tell when they have to go out of this place. They are not going to do anything to their living quarters; they don't want to make any improvement. Then when they get linoleum (The block received linoleum for their apartments yesterday.) they are in a race to lay them down. You can't tell what they are talking about."

#####

10/16/43
attaches

Tom Sakai, the Block Managers' Supervisor on leave, sent me a postcard today. It said:

"....It's only Winslow, Arizona, and already there is a striking contrast to pre-evacuation days. At every station we see women doing men's work. Also the train is crowded with one half or more soldiers....."

DECEMBER 14 -- (1)

A meeting of the Committee on Manpower was postponed this morning, because Rupkey, who was scheduled to appear before them, was too busy with other business. The committee members discussed the situation in the Community Activities Department, whose representatives were heard yesterday, and agreed tentatively that there was not much room to reduce among its personnel.

The members also chatted on the condition of residents about money spending. One of them reported that his friend, who used to work in the May Co^x Dry Goods Department, works in the canteen and reported to him that a materials, as for example, which sells for one dollar and eighty-five cents a yard is a very good seller. When she was with the May Co., such a material did not sell so fast as in Poston. Another commented that people are spending more money ~~and~~ for clothing and are dressed much more lavishly --- almost like in the pre-evacuation days. Another said that people are buying Takuwan, Nori No Tsukudani, etc. He claimed it was a great mistake for the Community Enterprises to sell this sort of merchandise. He added that in other relocation centers fish, vegetables, other food commodities are sold, but he would oppose establishment of such stores in this center. Some comments were offered on excessiveness of presents for baby births, weddings, etc. and of Koden. In clothings and in presents the residents have regained their old custom of rivalry, "We must do it because Joneses are doing it."

attends
12/14/43

10/23/43
attaches

Kiyoshi Okura obtained a job in Boys Town, Nebraska. (Okura was an employee of the City of Los Angeles and received ^{the} notorious publicity before the evacuation. This J A C L leader is regarded in the same manner as Slocum by the Japanese community. He was threatened at Santa Anita and had to sleep in an isolated barn under the army guard.) There ~~are~~ ^{were} some Japanese at Boys Town before Okura's arrival. When they had heard about Okura's coming they talked and waited. When Okura came through the entrance, the Japanese crooked their arms and waved their folded fists at him warning him to behave or else.

10/19/43
Internees
attaches

One Japanese, a former resident of Riverside, was arrested by the F B I in March of 1942 and was sent to Santa Fe. When I asked him why he had been taken, he said, "I really don't know. They did not tell me what I ~~am~~ ^{had been} charged with. I did not belong to the Japanese Association or to any language school. Nor did I contribute any money to any Japanese organization. I suspect that some Japanese had framed me for that 'twenty-five dollars' (The alleged reward from the F B I)" He returned to his family in Poston several weeks ago as a parolee.

10/22/43
Internees
attaches

The following article which appeared in the Poston Chronicle regarding the basis of internment of aliens is significant in that the Administration is aware of a tension (They don't know it in detail) in the community as the result of the arrests by the F B I of Tsukamoto and Mitani. They are trying to live down the rumors in camp --- no doubt, some of the rumors are seeping into the administrative ears. It reads as follows:

(Ed. Note: Since questions have arisen concerning the internment of alien enemies, Theodore Haas, Project Attorney describes briefly below the legal basis for their detention or internment.)

OCTOBER 22 — (9)

All citizens of hostile nation or government, fourteen years of age or ^{older} within the United States and not naturalized, are liable to be apprehended as alien enemies, according to Section 21, Title 50 of the United States Code. The President is authorized to establish regulations necessary for the public safety, stated Theodore Haas, Project Attorney. Pursuant to this statutory authority the President issued proclamations and regulations.

The alien suspected of actual hostility to the United States or other crime against the public safety is given a hearing before an alien enemy hearing board, which is under the administrative control of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice headed by Edward J. Ennis. The alien is ordered detained or released upon the basis of the hearing.

Most of the alien enemies of Japanese ancestry have been interned at Santa Fe Detention Camp, Santa Fe, New Mexico, whose Officer in Charge is Lloyd H. Jensen. The alien Enemy Internment camps are administered by the Department of Justice and the War Department.

#####

NOVEMBER 16 -- (4)

Okabe of the Executive Board requested the managers to file the names of the internees whose sons are in the armed forces of the United States. An instruction from Director Myer, in which he ^{stated} ~~satesd~~ that the fathers of soldiers would be given a special consideration by the detention camp officials, was ~~mailed~~ ^{mailed} from Washington in last March, but it was uncovered by the Family Welfare Department just a few days ago. Now the Executive Board is in rush to work on this matter.

Internees

#####

I was talking with an Issei about the future of the Japanese in America. He ~~said~~, "There are some people who believe that the ^aJ^apanese will fade out as it becomes the third generation and then the fourth generation by interracial marriages. They believe that the ^aJ^apanese will be absorbed into other races. Stop to think a moment. Negroes might be willing to marry with the Japanese, but how many whites from good families will be willing to marry the Japanese? Even if a Japanese married some one of a different race with true love and high ideals, ~~thar~~ ^{the} road ahead will not be smooth and straight. It is not a ~~alean~~ ^{clean}, easy road, because it is not realistic. If one had an ambition

*10/6/43
post-war attitude*

OCTOBER 6 -- (6)

to attain prominence in society, he must avoid the inter-racial marriage. Maybe it's all right for an opportunistic Japanese, because the Japanese don't have any future anyway in the social structure of America except as a minority. This Japanese might think that by marrying someone of other race he could forget that he is a Japanese. But the social set up isn't like that. After all, the Japanese will congregate and will make a group of Japanese. Like the Chinese have Chinatowns, the Japanese will create Little Tokyo again. They can't evade their own culture. They can't erase the realization that they are ~~THE~~ Japanese. They might say, "I am an American citizen" and "I am not a Japanese." But they can't deny that they are Japanese; they might self delude themselves in vain. The reality will always remind them that they are Japanese, because everywhere they go they will be looked upon as Japanese and discriminated as Japanese."

"At present the WRA is dispersing the Japanese all over America," the Issei continued. "But that's no good. 'Likes attract likes'. That's a law of nature. They may spread out for a while, but eventually they will congregate again in Little Tokyo. History will repeat itself. The Japanese in America don't have much hope in their future. They will be living as a parasitic minority race."

"Then, will Japan welcome us to return?" the Issei reflected. "The answer is no. A friend of mine told me, crediting the story to a prisoner of war of Japan taken at Midway, 'The people in Japan don't want to have the Japanese in America to come back. They are saying that with the stuff to feed 10000 Japanese from America they can feed 50,000 soldiers. They would be happier to see 10 soldiers return from battle fields than 100 Japanese from America.' Japan will not welcome the Japanese returning from America. We are too free, too selfish too egocentric, and too materialistic. Japan can't accept us like this."

OCTOBER 6 -- (7)

The ideology is quite ~~gt~~ different in Japan from that of ours. We will be put through investigations by the intelligence police and if found not compatible with the Japanese ideas we will be thrown in jail. So, I can't see a bright future for ourselves in Japan either.

It boils down to this: we will remain as a minority misadjusted either in America or in Japan."

This sentiment is surprising^x widespread and predominant among the stable, thinking Issei and among the Kibei who have seen and felt Japan. The defeatist ^{so} sentiment is _a prevalent and increasing among them that it is worth^u while for the reader to remember.

#####

Paul was at the

OCTOBER 15 -- (9).

About the flag waving incident in block 3 when the registrants were leaving,
one moderate Issei said, "That's the trouble with these Japanese. They don't care about the other Japanese. They are all right because they are going to Tule Lake and it couldn't be any worse any more. But they should be thinking of adverse criticism for the rest of us who remain behind." (Cf: Oct. 5, page 1)

He also mentioned about many Issei who went to Tule Lake with the idea that they would be given free passages to Japan prior to other Japanese. "Most of these people", he commented, "don't have any money to speak of; yet they are planning to go to Japan, because they have rich relatives or influential brothers. They intend to rely on them, but they do not know the Japanese people in Japan. They are not that kind. They might try to grab money from their relatives from America, but they wouldn't feed them ^{free} for long. The life in Japan is tough, and will be extremely tough after the war. We will have the worst depression we ^{have} ever faced when this war is all over. Even in the depression America will be an easier place to live in."

#####

At the Ono funeral (Cf: October 14, page 2) a floral spray was placed among many other beautiful floral wreaths of artificial flowers made by the evacuees. On this spray a card, about 12 inches by 24 inches in size, with the inscription "U S Army" was attached. I was told that it had been sent by the friends at Camp Fannin, Texas, of Ernest Ono, the third son, who was on a leave from the army to attend the funeral.

It was at the time when the casket of his wife was leaving from the altar at the end of the service. Mr. Ono bolted from his seat, stepped to the floral spray, took it to the moving casket, and placed on it tenderly with sorrowful expression on his face.

(Note to Tamie: Here is a good example of what we have been discussing for some time. His daily conduct and utterance are those ~~that~~ ^{would} we expect from any other Japanese of the more.

OCTOBER 15 -- (10)

^{an}
Remember the play put on the Block 4 stage by the Camp II players in last October --- the play about the school mom whose husband died in Shanghai --- and the reaction of the audience?

True, they are minor incidents. But it seems that they are ~~in~~ much truer give-aways of the real attitude of the Japanese than the result of the registration ^{or} ~~of~~ of segregation.)

#####

^{ad}
I talk with several educated Issei this evening about the future of the anti-Japanese sentiment in America. They all agreed that the feeling of the outside would worsen as soon as the Gripsholm returns to the United States about this Christmas and the repatriates begin ^{to give} their accounts of the internment in Japan to the newspapers. They also agreed that should Germany be defeated and knocked out of the war, this war will decidedly develop into a war between the white race and the ~~sk~~ ~~in~~ colored races. In that event, they conjectured, the racial hatred in America will be intensified beyond the control of ~~the~~ law enforcing agencies. Whether the United States win the war or not, they are expecting mob riots against the Japanese in America as the war approaches toward its end or at the end. They also agreed that fierce race riots between the whites and the negroes will occur shortly after the end of the war. "I was in Chicago in 1919. I saw the negroes slaughtered

OCTOBER 22 -- (7)

by the whites. It was cold-blooded, atrocious, barbarous. The whites had no right to take the lives of ~~the~~ innocent negroes. I know the same thing is going to happen after this war," one of them related.

#####

10/27/43
Post-war sentiment

12/5/43
Post-war sentiment

Several Issei and Kibei were discussing if the WRA policy of scatterering the Japanese ^{would} ~~would~~ succeed. They reached a conclusion that they would eventually congregate among themselves forming "Little Tokyos" after the war. Their reasoning was that most of the Japanese are not trained in those lines which would make them succeed among the Caucasian. The Japanese must depend on other Japanese for making their livings. Even if they are qualified to occupy positions among the Caucasians they would be barred from them on account of racial discrimination, which cannot be erased from this country however hard anyone tries.

They also agreed that it is best for the evacuees to play along with the contention of the WRA that the Japanese in the centers other than Tule Lake are loyal to the United States. They are willing to cooperate with the war effort of the United States. "There is nothing to gain by declaring otherwise. The WRA is fighting for us. That's the biggest organization ever fought for the Japanese cause. Up to now we ^{have} _^ never had any government agency fight for us," one of them stated.

However, they could not see [^] _^ wisdom of condemning publicly against the tactics used by the Tule Lake people. To them such a declaration meant an act of selling "their brothers" down the river.

It is significant to note that similar utterances are heard increasingly lately.

#####

June 13, 1943

Kelso.

An internee paroled from the detention camp in Bismarck, North Dakota, contributed the following information today: Last summer the Japanese internees in Bismarck wrote to Ambassador Nomura requesting information re the plans of the Japanese government for post-war resettlement of the Japanese in America. The answer came to them in the name of the ambassador but written by someone else. In essence it stated: No one can tell what is going to happen. At this time the Japanese government cannot commit itself in any way nor can it predict the outcome. However, I can cite what actually took place in China a few years ago. At the outbreak of the China incident Japanese residents were given 100 yen and evacuated to Japan. When the area became inhabitable again they were returned to China at government expense and their businesses were reestablished with government subsidy. This information was given in the hope that the established policy of the government be made known to the Japanese people in America.

10/19/43
Attitude

I was discussing about the Japanese in the United States with #14 and K. #14 is the former publisher of the Rafu Shimpo and K. is a former editor of the Sangyo Nippo and now an editor of the Poston Chronicle. The conversation began when ^{they} had asked me, "How much do they (the appointed personnel) know about the Japanese?" To this query I informed them, "Practically none. It is surprising that they don't know much after they had lived with us for the past seventeen months. They know something about the Japanese. But these Japanese are the ones on the periphery."

#14 and K were not a bit surprised to hear this information, "It is some thing to wonder about if they had known more about the Japanese. Look at those books and magazine articles written by the authors who claim that they are the authority on the subject of the Japanese. Did you see anyone of them striking the real truth about the Japanese? We haven't yet. I have read many books in past thirty years, but I have not come across a book which I could say, 'Here is the book!' The subject of the Japanese must be a very difficult one to treat. "

To this I contributed that although I had known Kawakami, Ichihashi, Kuno,

OCTOBER 19 -- (5)

Treat, Bell, Strong, and others personally and talked the subject with them, their Japanese are not the Japanese that we know as the Japanese of the United States. They know some phases of the Japanese, but they failed to depict the true Japanese in their configuration. I added that this might^{have} been caused by the fact that they looked at the Japanese over the wall, without living in and with them. (All the Japanese writers --- Kawakami, Kuno, and Ichihashi--- lived aloof from the Japanese community.)

K. said he met Ichihashi in Washington in 1924. Both of them worked for the Japanese delegate at the Washington Armament Conference. He told me that that was the impression he had gotten from Ichihashi, too.

#14 summarized the situation thus: Those who write (at least, up to date) don't know the Japanese and those who know the Japanese don't write.

I mentioned at this point the "Messiah complex" (Tsuchiyama's concept) of the Japanese toward their ~~own~~ race. We all agreed on this, but K offered an important statement, "Had there been no evacuation they would have known the Japanese inside out." He meant that the Japanese who know the community might have presented the truth about the Japanese, for many motives --- for one, in order to try^{to} gain a favor from the governmental agencies (like the periphery Nisei^{had} tried with the F B I and the Congressional committees.) "Thank God! Those Nisei didn't know the Japanese," K concluded.

Then, we talked about those Japanese --- the Japanese who denounced any tie with Japan and all the allegiance to the Japanese government, as in the Japanese community of Imperial Valley; or the Japanese who initiated the fund drives for bombers and tanks for the Allied' cause, as in Delano and as with the Okinawa people. K said, "Those guys are the ones who waved Japanese flags after coming to the centers. Once the tide turns they will be first to wave the Stars and Stripes^{again}. They are neither Japanese or Americans. They are the scums of human beings." (Although K's statement is trueⁱⁿ many instances, I cannot

OCTOBER 19 -- (6)

accept it as a general rule. I have known many cases like that, ^{yet} ~~but~~ I have known other cases, too.)

I talked with them for three hours on this subject. I was surprised that there was a general agreement in our opinion.

#####

10/7/42

At 6:30 p.m. I was caught in the showers by the wind storm that had come upon us. At the worst part of the storm we were unable to see the barracks across the way. There were many comments in regard to the storm which was also in connection with the Caucasian teachers, who had recently arrived. One boy said, "I hope these damn teachers get a good taste of this wind storm to give them an idea as to just how we've been living here. One teacher in #46 went nuts and they took her to Phoenix last night. She kept asking one little boy if he would like to be whipped or spanked and the little boy said that he would like to be whipped so the teacher chased the little boy around the room. During this process she kept saying, 'There's too many Japs in this camp'." The author of this little speech was a boy who was in the 8th grade.

(T. S.)

attitude

April 20, 1943

Via X : When the Caucasian foreman ordered the Maintenance Crew to install coolers in the Cauc. barracks today the men refused maintaining that the coolers should be installed in the hospital first. The Jap. workers won.

attitudes

I talked with a girl from Camp III. She told me that there ^{are} ~~is a~~ rumors going around in Camp III that Jerry Wumino is a "F B I inu" or that he is an "ass-kisser" for the Administration. She quoted Mrs. Wumino of saying, "Although people are saying all kind of things about Jerry, but he really hasn't done anything. He is trying hard for the Japanese people. But they don't realize that. Just because he goes around and talks with the Caucasians, the people think he is an 'inu', but he can't help it, because his job calls for that. That is the reason why I am avoiding Caucasian company. I stay away from them, although I am often invited by them to come over to their places. A few nights ago at the picture show, Mrs. Burge (the wife of Morris Burge, the Administrator of Unit III) sat next to me. I didn't know it at first; when I noticed her I talked with her. The next day, the people wanted to find out why I talked to Mrs. Burge and what I talked with her." Jerry Wumino is the Executive Assistant to the Administrator of Unit III.

Prior to the November strike the same condition existed in Unit I. Many people were accused of being an "inu" simply because ^{they were} ~~he was~~ friendly with the appointed personnel. Since the strike such a suspicion and criticism for associating ^{with} the Caucasians waned in Unit I.

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attitudes

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In the daily column, "Henshu Yoteki", Kitamura wrote as follows:
(The Poston Chronicle, November 17, 1943, the Japanese section)

"The thing called 'Sheen Leen Park' has been completed. Daytime at Poston is hot as summertime ~~even~~ now. To complete such an undertaking much hardship can be appreciated. Indeed, it is the result of untiring labor of Foreman Kadowaki and others. I pay my respect from deep down my heart to them.

"I thought after I had seen the park: If the park was to be built at all, the better location would have been back of the hospital. We could have comforted our brethren who are suffering from solitude and loneliness:"

Misc.
Last night I met Kitamura. He said, "Keto no tokoro ni anna mono
wo tsukutte yaru koto wa ira nakatta." (It was unnecessary to make such a
thing for Keto) He also stated that he had heard that the ^oMen's Club dis-
tributed those artificial chrysantheums to the appointed personnel after
they had been displayed at the grand opening of the park. Those flowers
were donated from residents for the opening. The editor met Mrs. Y. Kawa-
hara, the president of the Women's Club, and criticized, "Why didn't you
give those flowers to the hospital patients, instead of giving them to the
Keto?" Mrs. Kawahara frowned and did not like the comment.

#####

10/18/43
attch
Roy Furuya told me an interesting story which might happen anytime in
this project. It was in the Parker warehouse. A man was unloading sacks of
cement from a freight car. He was pushing a hand truck. He saw a wooden
box in his path and noticed a Caucasian foreman standing by. He asked the fore-
man to remove the box, but he did not budge. The foreman looked at the Japa-
nese with the expression, "Who the hell are you to tell me that?" So the man
got mad and quit the work, leaving the hand truck right there.

#####

DECEMBER 5 -- (1)

Attitudes

A policeman, M, went to ⁿDenver recently on a short term leave for some dental work. On the way he met lots of the soldiers on the train. He was surprised to find so many soldiers in one place. Among them he saw one with "Guadacanal" on his ^{sleeve}~~arm~~ band. There was a vacant place next to this soldier, but he passed it. He felt very uncomfortable find a soldier back from the South Pacific. He related that he had intended ^{rather} to remain standing if he had to sit next to the soldier. He was afraid ^M that this soldier might embarrass him or might do some harm to him. Soon afterwards, he noticed this soldier motioning him to come to his place. He went to him with an uncomfortable feeling, very much ill at ease. He told ~~him~~ ^M to sit next to him and began to speak to him when he had occupied the seat. He began to relate his experience in the South Pacific. The soldier then asked M if he had ever been to Japan. M replied that he was born in this country and had never been to Japan. He was reared in this country all this time and had difficulty to speak even an ordinary conversational Japanese. The soldier said, "You should go to Japan for once. It must be a great country. The Japanese are great fighters. The things you see in the newspapers are all bunks. The way they fight it's plenty tough to beat them. I don't want ^{to} go back there and fight them again if I can help it."

M was relieved with the sentiment of the soldier and began to open up himself. The soldier supplied him ~~to~~ with drinks constantly saying, "This is my treat. I admire you guys." When they ran out of whiskey, the soldier went to the store at the depot, ^{where the train stopped,} and replenished their supply. M told me that he was so drunk that he did not know that he reached Denver and went four stops beyond when he was reminded by the conductor.

I heard another story from a Nisei who had returned from Idaho. Coming back to Poston he met a sailor on the train. He was A W O L for four days. He was returning to the Pacific coast. He said that he had been on an aircraft carrier which had been sunk in the Solomons. The sailor told the Nisei that

DECEMBER 5 -- (2)

the Japanese are tough fighters. "They are crazy. You shoot them down again and again. Still they come after you. Finally they got us. You can't stop them," the sailor narrated to the Nisei. The sailor said that he would rather be put in "brigs" for A W O L than being sent back to the South Pacific.

Similar stories like these are told and retold among the residents here. Lately these stories are popular as many people have returned from the outside employments.

#####

attitudes

Howard

U. S.

#####

10/15/43
attitude

A document of six typewritten pages was^e circulated to me. I was told to pass it to some friend of mine after I finished it. I am supposed to tell him to pass it to some one else again. It is a copy of Jeanette Rankin's speech in the Congress. Somebody must have copied it out of the Congressional Record. I was told that there are about fifteen copies circulating in Poston. One Issei is translating it into Japanese for the non English-reading Japanese. Some copies will probably^{be} sent to other centers and circulated among the people there.

Having read this paper I can easily conceive some Japanese saying, "Miss Rankin said" or "A representative said in Congress" or "The Americans are awakening ..." or "Now they are talking! Rankin said ...". Or, perhaps, some Japanese may express the opinion in the paper as if he had conceived them themselves.

The document was copied here exactly in the way it is.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Proceedings and Debates of the 77th Congress, Second Session

(Some questions about Pearl Harbor)

Remarks of Hon. JEANETTE RANKIN of Montana

(In the House of Representatives --- Tuesday, December 8, 1942)

(Miss RANKIN of Montana) Mr. Speaker, we have been at war a year. During that time the American people have had abundant opportunity to take stock of the Nation's situation and to raise a large number of pertinent questions

OCTOBER 15-- (13)

not out of any spirit of disunity but in a firm belief that the Nation's welfare requires a vigilant exercise of the traditional American right of free inquiry.

As a Member of Congress who voted against the declaration of war on December 8, 1941, I wish to take advantage of this anniversary occasion to insert into the Record a number of historically significant documents bearing upon the hitherto obscure antecedents of the Pearl Harbor attack and to raise a few questions of my own as to the meaning of certain activities which led up to that attack.

Pearl Harbor was the greatest thunderbolt in American History. It is proper to inquire, indeed, whether any responsible American source foresaw the Japanese attack. In this regard I wish to present the following remarkable statement, amounting to a prediction, from the Christian Century magazine of November 19, 1941--3 weeks prior to the Japanese attack--page 1433:

It is no secret that the whole colonial structure of the white empires is threatening to fall apart unless we intervene in Asia. Many British leaders would welcome American involvement with Japan. So the thesis of Sidney Rogerson's pre-war book Propaganda in the Next War that the surest way Britain can bring the United States to her aid will be to involve us in war with Japan--is being validated by events.

"Show me the motive, and I'll show you the criminal," was a favorite saying of Sherlock Holmes. Here we have an apparently well-defined motive and also a suggestion as to the intended method of realization.

What does Mr. Rogerson, who is an English author, have to say specifically about the plans of the British imperialist? His book Propaganda in the Next War, published in London in 1938 as one of a series of books on the Next War edited by the well-known writer, Capt. Liddell Hart, was banned from export to America by the British censorship in 1939. A copy had been secured earlier by the Library of Congress, however, and now reposes in the rare-book room. On page 148 Mr. Rogerson makes this admission as to the plans of the British imperialists:

To persuade her-----

The United States-----

to take our part will be much more difficult-----

Then in 1914-----

so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America; a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen, before the Republic will again take arm in an external quarrel. The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan were involved and this might and probably would bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany.

In other words, 3 years before Pearl Harbor, Britain's imperialists had figured out just how to bring the United States once more to their aid.

October 15 -- (14)

But exactly how was Japan to be embroiled with the United States? There is no better way of goading a nation into war than by imposing economic sanctions, especially in the case of nations devoid of essential raw materials. Indeed, at the very time Mr. Rogerson was writing his revealing book, the phrase "economic sanctions mean war"---an echo from the League of Nations' threat to Italy in 1937---was still on everybody's lips. If Britain were merely to induce the United States to sever commercial relations with Japan, who was extremely dependent upon imports of raw materials in exchange for silk and manufactures for the continuance of her economic life, would not that suffice?

Is there any evidence of any specific occasion on which the British Government sold this policy of economic sanctions against Japan to the Roosevelt administration? In the Ladies Home Journal of July 1942, page 17, in an article entitled "How War Came," Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley---an intimate friend of the President---make the following significant revelation:

When they---

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill----

met in Newfoundland bight for the Atlantic Conference, Churchill wished to meet the issue head-on. He asked the President---as the British, Australians, and Dutch repeatedly had besought this Government before---to join in an ultimative declaration to Japan.

Now, an ultimatum is a demand accompanied by a threat. It sets up a dilemma: "Do so and so---or else." In this case the punitive alternative to be offered to Japan was to consist, as we shall see, of an economic blockade---in other words, sanctions---an admitted provocation to war.

But of what demand was the ultimatum itself---this first horn of the dilemma to be offered to Japan---to consist? And what evidence do we have that President Roosevelt actually accepted Mr. Churchill's Atlantic conference request that such an ultimatum be sent?

There seems to be excellent evidence that such an ultimatum was sent by President Roosevelt. No less an apologist for the administration's foreign policy than Mr. Henry Luce, editor of Time, Life, and Fortune, has admitted both that President Roosevelt served such an ultimatum in the Pearl Harbor attack. Mr. Luce alleges that the ultimatum was sent out of America's love for China, but inasmuch as it was sent at Mr. Churchill's instigation at a time when Britain desperately needed an ally in Europe as well as in the Orient and not as the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, during which indeed we continually sent to Japan both oil and scrap iron, may not the American public wonder whether it was the interests of the British Empire in the Orient which were primarily at stake? Here is Mr. Luce's historic admission, as found in Life magazine for July 20, 1942, page 30:

The Chinese, for whom the United States had delivered the ultimatum that brought on Pearl Harbor-----

Expected large lend-lease shipments, and so forth.

Just what was the wording of the ultimatum, then, since its existence is admitted?

OCTOBER 15 -- (15)

A perusal of the Department of State bulletins covering the period from the Atlantic Conference of August 12, 1941, to the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, discloses only a single item relating to Japan--a brief mention of repatriation of American and Japanese nations in the bulletin of October 11, 1941, page 276--though this weekly journal of the State Department was replete with even trivialities regarding other countries during this period, thus indicating that the American people were not being fully informed as to the negotiations with Japan. On December 15, 1941, a week after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt released a message to Congress purporting to cover the negotiations with Japan.

While candid admission that any of the communications sent Japan constituted an ultimatum is not made, the requirement made on September 3, 1941, that Japan accept the principle of "non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific" as detailed in the Department of State Bulletin of December 20, 1941, page 538, apparently constituted the gist of the Roosevelt administration's demands.

This requirement was the equivalent to asking Japan to guarantee the inviolateness of the white empires in the Orient, of which the British Empire comprised approximately 90 per cent in both area and population. The American people would have been gratified had President Roosevelt demanded assurance that Japan respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines, to whom we had agreed to grant independence in 1946, but the American public may well wonder where President Roosevelt got the authority to conduct our foreign affairs "as if Congress did not exist"--to quote one of my colleagues--and to commit American lives, fortunes, and prestige to securing a guaranty for British and Dutch imperial interests in the Orient--irrespective of the merits of those interests.

Later, more specific guaranties were demanded of Japan as to China, Indo-China, and so forth.

Concurrently, Japan was presented with the other horn of the dilemma hatched at the Atlantic conference; namely, economic sanctions of every-increasing severity.

What is the evidence that the Roosevelt administrations, which had frozen Japanese assets in this country as early as July 5, 1941, rapidly accelerated its economic strangulation of Japan following the Atlantic conference?

To secure an accurate statistical answer, I applied to both the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, asking for month-by-month figures on American exports to Japan in 1941. To my surprise, I received from both Departments and identical responses: "Because of a special Executive order, statistics on trade with Japan beginning with April 1941 are not being given out."

Inasmuch as the Japanese certainly know what they received in the way of goods from the United States throughout 1941, it becomes proper to inquire, "From whom are these statistics being concealed?"

As a Member of Congress, I was, of course, able to exercise my congressional prerogative of securing this data from an administrative department. Because of its allegedly confidential nature, I cannot, however, reveal it at this time.

However, a perusal of other sources throws considerable light upon the extent to which the Roosevelt administration invoked economic sanctions against Japan in the months between the Atlantic conference and the attack upon Pearl Harbor. For instance in the New York Times of August 17, 1941, page 7, we read:

Vice President Wallace, the chairman-----

OCTOBER 15 -- (16)

Of the economic Defence Board-----

today confirmed reports that this group was already working on projects for exerting trade pressure on Japan.

In other words in less than a week after the Atlantic Conference the machinery of economic sanctions was getting under way.

Six Weeks later the economic stringency in Japan had become acute, as we read in the New York Times of October 24, 1941, page 36:

Japan's raw-material shortage has been sharply aggravated and her industrial activity seriously disrupted by the cessation of her trade with important foreign countries, the Department of Commerce reported today.

Ship movements and trade between Japan and the United States, the British Empire, and the Netherlands Indies, it is pointed out, have become virtually non-existent.

By December 2, 1941--5 days before Pearl Harbor--we read in the New York Times of that date, page 6:

Japan had been out off from about 75 percent of her normal imports as a result of the Allied Blockade, the National Industrial Conference Board reported yesterday. In an analysis entitled "The Effects of the Allied Economic Blockade on Japan", the Board asserted that despite the drastic restrictions imposed by that Government to stretch out available supplies, the blockade may ultimately prove disastrous.

"Premier Hideki Tojo of Japan dispatched the Kurisu mission to Washington because Japan today is on the verge of Economic collapse", Contemporary China, fortnightly digest of the Chinese News Service, Inc. stated yesterday.

A week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, I asked a prominent non-Japanese oriental:

Is the situation in the Pacific as serious as it appears?

Yes-----

He replied-----

It is serious. Japan has no choice but to go to war or to submit to economic slavery for the rest of her existence.

The question remains, Did President Roosevelt realize that "economic sanctions mean at the time he appears to have adopted Mr. Churchill's suggestion to impose them as the punitive alternative for his ultimatum to Japan?

It is hard to see how he could have failed to realize this, inasmuch as he himself had made the following statement to the Volunteer Participation Committee on July 24, 1941, as reported in the Department of State Bulletin of July 26, 1941, page 72, and also in the Saturday Evening Post of February 7, 1942, page 26:

Now, if we cut the oil off, they-----

OCTOBER 15 00 (17)

The Japanese-----

probably would have gone to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.

Whereupon, immediately after the Atlantic Conference of 2 weeks later, Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to invoke these self-acknowledged war-producing sanctions.

Was it not strange that Mr. Roosevelt, who by refusing for years to enforce the Neutrality Act of 1936 to prevent shipments of war supplies to Japan despite popular demand, had largely contributed to supplying that nation with the raw materials for the armament now being used against our own troops, after the Atlantic Conference when an incident with Japan seems to have been desired, suddenly changed his policy and not only cut off war supplies but virtually everything required by the civilian population of Japan as well?

As a member of the President's own party, Congressman Hatton W. Summers, of Texas, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, remarked in a letter to the Saturday Evening Post, published in that periodical on April 4, 1942, page 26:

We have been a very foolish people, which has made it possible for----- politicians to get away with murder. This blaming the Pearl Harbor tragedy on the treachery of the Japs is like the fellow who had been tickling the hind leg of a mule trying to explain his bungled-up condition by blaming the mule for having violated his confidence.

Astounding as the Pearl Harbor attack was to the American public as a whole, it was anticipated by the Administration why did the President permit our forces at Pearl Harbor to be taken by surprise. Even if a Japanese attack was desired, certainly no one desired a successful attack.

The answer seems to be that everything possible was done to warn our forces at Pearl Harbor of the extreme likelihood of attack. According to the reports of the Roberts Commission on the facts of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, who were in charge of the Hawaiian area, were sent repeated warnings by the War and Navy Departments.

Thus we read in the text of the Roberts report, as given in Senate Document No 159, pages 6-0, and also in the New York Times of January 25, 1942, page 30, that-----

On October 16, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and Navy Department
*****the possibility of an attack by Japan.

Another warning was sent on November 24, 1941.

The Roberts report continues:

On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian department, that *****hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible*****on the same day-----

November 27, 1941-----

The Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of

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the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatched was to be considered a war warning*****that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move in the next few dates.

Additional warnings were sent November 28, November 29, November 30, December 1, December 3, December 4, December 6, and December 7 -----the last one arriving in Hawaii after the Japanese onslaught had begun.

Thus, we see that for 2 weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor attack almost daily warnings had been sent, not to mention less frequent precautionary dispatches earlier. What more could have been done in the way of warnings is hard to see. Indeed, do not the frequency, urgency, the very wording of these warnings, indicate in themselves that the Pearl Harbor attack came as not surprise whatever to the President?

Why, then were our forces taken unawares December 7, 1941? Apparently simply because a deep-rooted and traditional sense of overconfidence insulated our Pacific commanders from taking these warnings seriously.

Has Prime Minister Churchill ever admitted attempting to get the United States into this war?

Yes; quite frankly--after we were in. Why was it that previously he said he wanted only the "Tool"? In February 1942, in a speech delivered before the House of Commons in an effort to save his administration at the time of the fall of Singapore, this boast was wrung from him -- as reported in the New York Times of February 16, 1942, page 6:

When I survey and compute the power of the United States and its vast resources and feel that they are now in it with us, with the British Commonwealth of Nations all together, however long it lasts, till death or victory, I cannot believe that there is any other fact in the whole world which can compare with that. This is what I have dreamed of, aimed at, and worked for, and now it has come to pass.

A blunt acknowledgement, surely.

Has either Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt ever acknowledged that the Atlantic Conference was the specific occasion of their efforts to get the United States into the war by embroiling us with Japan?

It is hard to see what else the following admission from Mr. Churchill's speech in Parliament, January 28, 1942--as reported in the New York Times of that date, page 10---- can be called:

It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged.*****

On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not been falsified by the events.

This would seem to indicate that not only did President Roosevelt accede to Churchill's pressure to send an ultimatum to, and impose sanctions upon, Japan

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but made a blanket commitment to bring America into the war even if Japan did not attack.

A very curious piece of evidence appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942, page 9, in an article by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, United States Navy, entitled "I Fly For Vengeance." Lieutenant Dickinson relates:

On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28--1941-----

under absolute war orders. Vice Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky and to bomb anything we saw on the sea. In that way, there could be no leak to the Japs.

Could such orders have been issued by Vice Admiral Halsey except by specific direction from the Commander in Chief, namely, the President of the United States?

In other words, if Lieutenant Dickinson's account is true, did not the President at least 9 days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, without a declaration of war, authorize an identical attack upon the Japanese--⁵ without a declaration of war?

Today approximately 1,000,000 American boys are fighting from three to eight thousands miles away from home. The American people are willing to struggle for the "four freedoms" but we realize that we must retain them at home if we are going to give them to others. Exercising our traditional right of free speech and free inquiry, we are going to continue to ask and to seek answers to all questions as they arise.

When are we going to get the full story of what happened at the Atlantic Conference? We asked for it then and ask for it now.

When President Roosevelt had so persistently refused to enforce the Neutrality Act against Japan when public opinion definitely demanded it, why did he so suddenly change his policy at the Atlantic Conference?

A year ago, one of my congressional colleagues, having observed for months the adroitness with which President Roosevelt had brought us ever closer to the brink of war in the Atlantic only to be continually frustrated in the final step by a reluctant Congress, seeing fate present the President on December 7, 1941, with a magnificent moral categorical, right out of the blue--a casus belli beyond all criticism--exclaimed in despair: "What luck that man has!"

But was it luck?

OCTOBER 15 -- (20)

RANDOM THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS

Before the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese people --- the core of the Japanese colonies in America --- had followed keenly and eagerly every turn of the international events, especially those pertaining to the relations between the United States and Japan. They had been sensitive to every turn of the events, because their fate --- their welfare and happiness in the future --- was dependent upon the over-hanging cloud over the horizon. Their daily life was controlled and governed in a great degree by every shift in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

As the cloud darkened the Japanese reluctantly realized against their wishful thinking the inevitableness of a war between America and Japan. When the United States government had invoked the economic sanctions in July of 1941, they resigned to believe against their wishes that the war could not be avoided. They were convinced that the United States had sent a ultimatum and Japan could not be strangled to death by the sanctions without a struggle. "Japan stood enough ignominies in the past from the Anglo-Saxon powers. This is the last straw," they were told and believed. Yet these people held a slight hope for a miracle to intervene in the crisis, although they could not bear to see Japan to back down.

The Japanese were surprised when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, but their astonishment was short lived. They had known this to happen. They had known it, for they had believed that there ~~were~~ ^{had been} enough provocations to force Japan to initiate such an attack. To the Japanese "Japan had been shoved around too often." It was not a "sneak attack" to them; they hated people say it. They did not believe it was a "treachery". They were irritated and incensed in hearing the words, "sneak attack" and "treachery". They hated anyone who expressed the opinion. Had a Japanese said the words it was enough to incite a fight. This is one of many reasons for hating --- sometimes hating to the extent of physical violence --- Tokutaro Slocum and Fred Tayama of the J A C L; Yoneo Sakai (Cf: October 5, page 3) and

OCTOBER 15 -- (21)

Togo Tanaka of the Rafu Shimpō; and Shuji Fujii of the Do -Bo.

Thus, the core of the Japanese community believes that Japan had been probed enough to envisage justifiably the initial attack. Therefore, a Japanese in the core will accept Rankin's idea as a ^bbilical truth without feeling repugnant or pungent. The periphery, on the other hand, believes and expounds that it was a treacherous ⁿsneak attack. This is, indeed, one of easy primary tests where a Japanese finds himself in the community. If he believes in the latter, he is decidedly in the periphery. Should he believe in the former, it does not mean that he is ~~par~~ se in the core; he must possess other qualifications besides this.

The content of Rankin's speech is not new to the Japanese. They had known it for a long time. In fact, they themselves have been and are stating it as a whole or ~~in~~ piecemeal. The popular appeal of the paper to the Japanese is found in that it has expressed in print what they want to say. They like to read in print what they know and what they believe. For instance, S. Sakamoto, one of more progressive, more reasonable Issei, sent a copy to his daughter who is enrolled in Temple University as a freshman. "Every Japanese should know these facts and should believe in them," he said.

The importance of this document lies not to the Japanese themselves, rather to the students of the Japanese in America in penetrating the core. It is a first step in understanding the ambivalent attitude of ^{their} the core. 21

We believe--- Tsuchiyama and Nishimoto believe at least tentatively -- that the cores in all the relocation centers are identical. How could it be otherwise? The cores of the Japanese in America were alike. Now the cores ~~were~~

L. The ambivalence is one of Tsuchiyama's theses. She will probably treat this subject in detail in the near future.

I had a sudden pang to jot down these comments. I doubt if they belong in this journal, but I wanted to record it so that I may enjoy reading it at a later date. The core may change and still may not. The future core may turn out to be one like that described as the present core by contemporary authors in magazines and books --- who knows? Up to the present all the authors have been missing the core by miles; Carey Mc Williams in his "Brothers Under the Skin" has come hitting it much closer than the others.

OCTOBER 15 -- (22)

split up in pieces and sent to different centers. In the center these segments of the cores joined together with other segments of other cores and formulated a homogenous core of the center.

The difference in the centers will be found in the degree of manifestation and articulation. Of course, the difference depends upon, among many other factors, the nature of the Administration, the degree of unity, and the amount of frustration. The articulation is equated with the interreaction of the external sanctions and the internal urge.

An anonymous author (I believe the article was written by Ringley, the chief of the Naval Intelligence on the Pacific Coast) said in the Harper's last year that the alien Japanese are passively loyal to the United States. How true that is! He should have said that the core of the Japanese community is passively loyal to the United States. But, of course, by the word "passively" the author meant one thing, and we mean some thing else.

The Japanese people talk loudly about the war and about the short-wave news. (Cf: October 15, page 1) They do not care who is around as long as he is a Japanese; they shut up as soon as they see a Caucasian. They are careless with their speeches. When some Japanese informs the authorities about their utterances --- like Mitani's case ---- they get mad and talk about terminating "inu". They think, "Japs are Japs and Japs should act alike." If they do not wish to be squealed on, they should deport themselves more carefully. They should realize that there are Japanese with different training and experience; they should be aware of the fact that all Japanese cannot act and react alike. There are many Japanese on the periphery. It is amusing to observe them when they are intolerant of ^{the} fellow Japanese on the periphery, once should they recognize them. This is one reason they hate anything which smells like a reserch. Once Leighton pulled a boner ---

OCTOBER 15 -- (23)

he publicly announced that he had established the research bureau^{here} to study the Japanese and help them. That was a Caucasian technique. The Japanese don't like to be studied and they don't want to be helped. They want to be left alone. They want to keep their own privacy.

The conception of Japan and the Japanese in Japan held by these people in the centers are outmoded by twenty to thirty years. Their knowledge of Japan is^{that} of the time when they left the country. Even Miss Cheney (of the Family Welfare Department and a former missionary in Japan) and Father Clement (the Catholic priest here) agreed with me on this.

In connection it is interesting that thier knowledge of the outside of the centers is that of the time when they were evacuated. It is inconceivable^{to them} that there is a shortage of milk and meat. They can't see why they can't buy a new electric iron or radio tubes.

#####

The speech by Rankin (Cf: October 15, page 12) had been translated by some residents and is being circulated sub rosa. I was told that there are at least three different translations. One Issei asked me, "Do you think that paper is all right? Don't you think it is a subversive literature?" I told them that it is an excerpt from the Congressional Record and should be all right in any place. He was not quite convinced with my statement. This explains the way the people are keeping secret that the paper has been going around camp and treating it secretively.

attitude
10/17/43

I was also informed that the stencils are being cut to mimeograph the Japanese translation of the speech in some private quarters.

#####

I overheard some Issei saying, "Although Poston is occupied by the Japanese, it still is an American territory. We should be more careful of what we do and what we say."

10/15/43
attitude

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From Kibei and Issei I heard, "Mo inu no ko ga okiku natta kara taiji shina kereba ikenai." (The offsprings of "dogs" have grown up. We must terminate them again.)

An Issei, commenting on this, said, "We better not pull it again. It's

OCTOBER 15 -- (12)

too dangerous this time. Besides, we must consider the damaging publicity resulting from it."

#####

altitudes
toward
Japan

The Seventh Day Adventists of Poston has^{ve} presented a series of outdoor meetings at the places where the regular movie programs are held. It began on September 23 at the Block 59 stage and held it every night, except the night of storm, until last night. The main speaker is Shigeru Aso, a minister visiting from Topaz. It was noteworthy in that this event caught ~~the~~ fancy of the re-

9/28/43

~~Ref. to~~
altitudes

SEPTEMBER 28 -- (4)

sidents and drew a great crowd every night; in fact, the crowds at times were larger than those for the weekly picture shows. It was not that the residents have turned religious all of sudden. A great curiosity and interest were aroused by the adroit advance publicity which the church followers had given and the subsequent mouth to mouth ravings about the motion picture films shown. The notice in Japanese (attached) was posted in at least three places in every block, announcing that newsreels would be shown in conjunction with the lectures to be given by Rev. Aso. It read as follows (translation):

Series Of
Movies And Lectures Meetings
from September 23 to September 26

Sponsor -- The Poston Seventh Day Adventist Church

Thursday -- September 23 8 P.M.

at the Block 4 Outdoor Stage

*Films

The Bombing of Pearl Harbor
Invasion of Sicily
Hunting of Wild Animals in Africa
Adventures in the North Atlantic

*Bible Lecture
"Beyond The Horizon"

Topaz, Rev. Shigeru Aso

Friday -----September 24 8 P.M. at the Block 35 Messhall

*Fims

Scenic Views from the Sky of Unusual Scenes of the World
Beautiful California
Views of Japan (Colored Slides) 100 sheets

*Bible Lecture
"Why This Suffering?"

Rev. Shigeru Aso

Saturday --September 25 8 P.M. at the Block 36 Messhall

Film

Bombing of Tokyo
The Bloody Battles Between Soviet Russia and Germany
World News 1942 Edition

*Bible Lecture
"What Hitler Did Not Know"

Rev. Shigeru Aso

Sunday ----- September 26 8 P.M. at the Block 46 Messhall

*Film:

The Japanese American Naval Battle -- The Bismarck Strait
Occupation of Manila
One Day at Zoo

*Bible Lecture
"Science and Bible"

Rev. Shigeru Aso

SEPTEMBER 28 -- (5)

On this announcement the reader would notice that from the second night on the meeting was to be held in the messhalls of various blocks. But the crowd of the first night at the Block 59 stage (Originally scheduled at the Block 4 stage) was so large that the sponsor was compelled to move the meetings to the open places where the weekly movies are shown; the second and third nights at Block 35 and the fourth night at Block 18.

Several interesting incidents were reported by an observer which are recorded here at random:-

1. In the film, "The Bombing Of Pearl Harbor", the Japanese Zeroes were shown attacking Pearl Harbor. A girl, about eight years of age, hissed. This elicited a tremendous hand clapping simultaneously from the rest of the audience in excitement over the Japanese planes bombing.

2. As soon as the picture of the Emperor of Japan on his favorite horse, Shirayuki, (White Snow), was shown, a tremendous ovation resulted.

3. In the film, "The Japanese American Naval Battle", a scene showed the naval flag of Japan. As usual, the audience went into unroar with hand clappings. There was one man who shouted, "Oi, koko ni keto ga iru zo. Yose! Yose!" (Hey, There are ketoes here. Stop it! Stop it!) Some, two or three men, shouted back, "Nani, kamau monka!" (Hell, whatta hell we care.) The crowd took up immediately louder and more vigorous hand clappings.

In contrast, when the Stars and Stripes was shown in the same film, there was a meager and weak hand clappings from several young children.

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At the movie show at the Block 59 stage, a newsreel was shown. In it there was a scene at Coral Sea where a plane was dropping bombs on a ship. A young Nisei girl, about twenty, said, "Go to it! Go to it!" Her Issei neighbor reminded her that the plane was American and the ship Japanese. "Oh, that's different, then."

#####

10/29/43
Attitudes

DECEMBER 11 -- (3)

A Kibei informed me that he had received a letter from his friend in Tule Lake. The writer had informed the Kibei that The segregants from Poston ^{have} ~~having~~ been feeling small (Katami ga semai) at Tule Lake. They are of ill repute, for their fellow residents from other centers are openly condemning them of coming from Poston which

Attitudes
Tule Lake

1. Attempted to make an appeal to the Japanese government for an indemnity in the amount of 200,000,000 yen for the Japanese in America. (Cf: Tsuchiyama's report on the Visit of Spanish Consul.) They consider the Poston residents as traitors and betrayers of the Japanese cause.

2. Sent a number of harvesters to break up the strike.

I heard this story from three other independent sources recently.

#####

12/10/43
Attitudes

The Issei are still discussing the Battle of Tarawa. Their opinion is well divided. The division or divergence of their opinion is well represented by the following discussion among four Issei.

One of them said that it was a strategic ^{retreat} ~~treat~~ for Japan inflicting heavy losses to the American forces. It was a similar scheme as the one which had been employed by Japan at Salamaua, Lae and ^SFinchhafen. The Japanese army had evacuated the New Guinea towns in succession to draw the American army near to the point of their advantage. As the Americans were "sucked in" Japan counter attacked and recaptured ^SFinchhafen. Likewise, Japan is trying to draw the American forces to the inner defense zone for a complete annihilation.

Another said that it was a local set back for Japan, but she will recapture Tarawa eventually. She had gained enough prizes for giving up Tarawa by "sinking so many battleships, aircraft carriers, and cruisers of America." "Even if they say that America is producing enough battleships and aircraft carriers rapidly, she can't afford to lose so many in a single battle to take

DECEMBER 10 (4)

one small coral atoll," he argued.

The third said that Japan fought with every means she had to keep the atoll, but could not repulse the American attack. Japan was not strong enough and lost the atoll. By this, ^{the safety of the} American supply line to Australia has been secured. The Gilberts are very strategic islands. By possessing them, Japan could menace the supply line. Now, the materiel will follow freely into Australia."

The fourth said, "The fact that Tarawa had been taken by America is a Japanese loss. You can't deny that Japan has lost a battle. The American bombers have been bombing the Marshalls. ^{right on the tail of the Tarawa battle} It indicates that America has plenty of power to spare without recuperating after the Tarawa attack. Japan is in a dangerous position. It is a big question how and where she can stop American advance. If Truk is taken, that's the end of Japan."

"I read in a newspaper," the fourth Issei continued, "that Aoki and Fujiwara made a series of broadcasts peppering up the Japanese people for more airplanes. I interpret it as an explanation of the ^{recent} losses of the recent and of those yet to come soon. The prices America paid -- battleships, aircraft carriers, etc. -- are immaterial ^{from} a broad perspective of the war. Taking of Tarawa is the most significant factor which must be considered utmost by us. The fortune of the war is not bright for Japan right now."

#####

I was told that there is a large sign in Japanese posted somewhere in the hospital. It said that China sued to Japan for peace.

One Issei informed me that he had not heard of such a news himself; he thought it was a "Made in Poston" news. He added that he had heard that the Minister of War of the Chungking government had capitulated to the Nanking government.

#####

12/11/43
attitudes

I was called my attention by several Issei and Nisei to the article in the Los Angeles Examiner (December 10the issue), /"Biddle Gives Japs Credit." I also noticed that They were telling others about the article. They specially noted:

"... Biddle asserted Japan has gone far beyond requirements of the Geneva pact in the treatment of American internees."

"There is no doubt that Japan is watching treatment of the Tule Lake internees with keen interest," he stated. "Tokyo broadcasts carry every development of the case."

There is a revival of the old arguments based on a false contention that the Poston residents are prisoners of war. Others are arguing more naively whether evacuees in relocation centers are classed as prisoners of war. Some others argue whether the Tule Lake residents can be classed as the prisoners. However, the saner and calmer sentiment is prevailing. A typical of such sentiment is : "I had heard many short wave broadcast^{news} from Japan that we should remain calm and quiet. Even Premier Tojo said that. The Japanese government does not want us to take rash, irrational acts. They don't think those hot-heads as exemplary, model Japanese. Truer Japanese would remain quiet for the duration."

DECEMBER 11 -- (4)

Of course, there are some who are saying: "We are same as prisoners. We should ask for better food. We should ask for the same rate of pay as American soldiers." However, these speeches do not have ~~the~~ popular audience as in the past days.

1-10/43

L. A. Examiner

BIDDLE GIVES JAPS CREDIT

Says U. S. Internees Treated
Better Than Law Requires

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9.—(INS)—Attorney General Biddle declared before a congressional committee today Japanese had treated American prisoners of war much better than required by international law.

Appearing as a witness before the Dies subcommittee investigating Jap rioting at the Tule Lake (Calif.) segregation camp, Biddle asserted Japan has gone far beyond requirements of the Geneva pact in the treatment of American internees.

"Internees have been given clubs, houses and adequate food — far better treatment than Japan was directed to give," he stated.

Biddle appeared before the committee after it had heard the State Department's views on the Tule Lake rioting in a closed session.

WARNING GIVEN

The Attorney General was emphatic in stating the Justice Department "did not want" charge of the Japanese centers, but warned the Japanese would take steps against American internees if the United States Army continued in control of the Japanese segregation camp.

Biddle expressed regret Director Dillon F. Myer of the War Relocation Authority was not present at today's hearing. He said WRA's actions have been "misunderstood" and he believed Myer was doing a good job.

"Moreover, the legal aspect in the problem of relocating allens is very serious," he said. He explained that under the Constitution American citizens "can not be taken from their homes", yet 75 per cent of the interned Japanese are American citizens.

Biddle said he had given no thought to taking over the center but would do as the President directed. "I don't want Tule Lake, however," he added.

JAPANESE ON WATCH

"There is no doubt that Japan is watching treatment of the Tule Lake internees with keen interest," he stated. "Tokyo broadcasts carry every development of the case."

He warned American citizens will be brought under Japanese military discipline if Tule Lake is kept under Army guard. "That would be much worse for American internees in Japan than for the Japs over here," he declared. Biddle said the November 1 riot must not be overemphasized. He compared the Tule trouble with physical violence in Army camps.

"In large groups of men someone will step on someone's toes," the Attorney General commented.

The news of the attempt in the Congress to disfranchise the Kibei has been revealed to the Community through the Japanese language newspapers, which reached here in the last three days.

There has been very little reaction on the news, either among the Issei or among the Kibei or among the Nisei. They ^{for the Kibei} think it as a logical consequence of declaring themselves disloyal to the United States.

I heard in several sources, (Issei) "If this was Japan, they (the disloyal Kibei) would be shot to death. They would not be tolerated for a moment. The authority would deal with them speedily. The United States government is too lenient."

H. Okabe of the Executive Board, who is on the stop list because of the Kibei restriction, said, "That's the price of being stubborn."

K of the Poston Chronicle and two others commented, "Those Kibei are the ones who returned to this country to avoid being drafted into the Army for the China war. Now they have declared themselves disloyal to the United States

DECEMBER 23 -- (20)

and are trying to dodge the draft here. The Japanese government is cognizant of their reason of leaving Japan; they would not accept them."

Another Issei added on K's comment, "More than a half of the Kibei at Tule Lake are like that. They are ~~are~~ the worst type of Japanese there are. They are putting a bad name to all the rest of them."

At present there is very little talk on the matter.

12/23/43
out group Rel.
(subt.)

attaches 1
(Japan)

Attitudes toward Japan
4/7/43

#14, K of the Poston Chronicle, Sakamoto revealed to me separately that they believe Japan will lose the war. I understand there are a few others who have the same view. I was also told that quite a number of Issei ~~who~~ believe that the chances are against Japan. It is very important to note that they began to feel safe enough to express an opinion of this type; even among their friends. ^{+this was not done before} They feel less restraint in their verbal expressions now. Of course, this sentiment is first ^{observed} in the urban section. It takes time before such a sentiment ^{can be} heard in the rural section. It is certainly interesting to observe the changing sentiment with the changing tides of the war.

K added, "Even if Japan loses, I am satisfied, because she has put up a hell of good fight. With the American foreign policy as it was, she had to fight."

#14 said, "Only a miracle can bring a victory to Japan."

This is the study for you and me. The reactions of the residents when the sentiment permeates throughout camp -- if it should occur -- will be the basis of our study which will be the most important contribution to Cal.

This is also confidential. The Japanese government in 1938 made an attempt to put an extensive propaganda through the Negro population. The go-between was #14. The plan was worked out, but the war began before Japan could put it into action. The purpose was to gain an active support from the Negroes. The detail will be given when I see you.