

Comments on Leighton's  
"Jap. Family in America."

November 21, 1943

Prof. Thomas:

Several interesting events are happening here simultaneously.

1. The FBI <sup>55</sup>attest of K. Kuroiwa, the former City Manager and the vice-chairman of the Community Council.
2. The political maneuvering surrounding the selection of successor to Ota, the Police Chief, who is relocating.
3. A juvenile delinquency problem -- gang fight.
4. The adverse publicity (with a full page of pictures) on the Poston Japanese in the Los Angeles Examiner and the counter measures taken by the Administration.

These events have been reported in the coming Journal. Poston is never dull!

This letter shall be the last addressed to Berkeley before the Chicago conference. I shall send the Journal to Chicago in care of Tamie. I shall mail it on the 24th and it should reach you when you arrive in Chicago. I wish you and W I a pleasant journey.

Inasmuch as you are to discuss on the Leighton's offer, I shall jot down a few comments on the article, "The Japanese Family in America," by the Bureau of Sociological Research.

page 150, the second column, the last paragraph:

"However, other factors entered the picture in the case of the Japanese and made their problem unique. The movement was a forced evacuation. . . ."

Before the evacuation I used to be told by my Caucasian friends that the Japanese were not the only ones who must suffer effects of migration. They told me that the ones drafted into the Army had to give up their business and homes. The sufferings of the Japanese could not be any greater than these soldiers. I told them that the causation and motivation for the forced

migration were different. Rewards for closing their business and homes were small, far outweighed by the financial losses. "We were dangerous and unsafe then. Now they are asking to relocate. Aren't we dangerous even now? We haven't changed a bit since we had moved out of California," cynical Japanese are saying now.

page 151, the first column, line 38:

"Many were left without means for making a new start in another area, and the older people felt that they were too far along in years to begin at the bottom again."

This was one of the subjects of conversation between myself and Leighton and Spicer. I didn't know I had convinced Spicer on this point. He seemed to give more credence to Hugh Anderson's story that the Japanese losses were not so great. They have enough money to start all over. Anderson came to Poston to work in the Community Enterprises and was formerly in the Board of Equalization of the State of California. It is getting more obvious now that the evacuees are concerned with the economic insecurity for the future, but at that time they were not certain how important this feeling of insecurity was to the interactions of the evacuee minds. I feel my blood come up when I conjecture on probable dynamic happenings if the WRA had said, "The Congress failed to give us any more money. We must close these centers. You must find your ways now." I hope I am around to see that.

page 151, the first column, the last paragraph:

"Thus, by the time the evacuees arrived in the relocation centers, they were filled with insecurity and pessimism regarding their future."

This is an over statement. At the time they arrived, they were resentful and antagonistic about the evacuation more than anything else. They were just sore. They could not think of their future. I don't think the evacuees could calmly think and analyze their future at that time. They were emotionally pent up. I don't know when and how the Bureau has come



around to this conclusion. At least they didn't think so last year.

page 151, the second column, the second paragraph:

"The special adjustment problem of the Japanese, then, is due to the fact that their relocation was a forced one which they interpreted as discrimination and rejection and which left them more uncertain of the future and therefore more insecure ~~of the~~ than other groups. This is to be contrasted with the war worker or the soldier, who is rewarded for his discomforts and sacrifices by a feeling of fuller participation and acceptance in the national life and an increase in prestige, if not in income." This is good. Especially, "acceptance in the national life and an increase in prestige". These are the antonyms for "prejudices and discriminations".

page 151, the second <sup>column</sup> ~~paragraph~~, the third paragraph:

"Though the evacuation itself was a result of the war with Japan, the factors making it possible were already present."

Again an acknowledgement<sup>d</sup> that the Japanese "already had a history."

page 152, the first column, the second paragraph:

This is our contribution (Tamie and X) to the Bureau. We got paid \$16 *a month* by Leighton for not doing very much. Now reading this paragraph I don't think we should feel any bad about it. I <sup>have</sup> a series of talks to the Bureau on this aspect; Tamie discussed this with the Senior staff. This was our starting point ; we believe we have advanced further along this concept.

page 153, the first column, the second paragraph:

"In the schools where there was comparatively little prejudice, they were . . ."

I felt funny reading this sentence. Ned Spicer insisted that the Japanese Nisei become conscious of race around five or six years of age as soon as they start going to school. I maintained that they are not fully race cons-

cious until their senior year in high school or after the graduation. We argued heatedly. Spicer said that this was so with the Negroes, whom he knew well, and this should be so with the Japanese. He thought I was dogmatic, although he did not say so explicitly.

page 153, the first column, the third paragraph:

"... many had special friends among the white people who would often stand up for them as individuals and protect them. It was largely from such white people, who were in a sense patrons, that the Japanese children acquired their goals and ideals in American life, as well as manners and language"

These statements are misleading and gross exaggerations. How about the <sup>^</sup>role of public schools? They are <sup>a</sup>much, much more important factor in their "Americanization". The influence of their teachers and school mates are much greater than anything else. I hope they are taking Tokutaro Slocum or his likes as the example and sentimentalizing it. I do believe that the above statement should have been omitted from such a short article on the Japanese to maintain a proper proportion of facts.

page 153, the second column, the third paragraph:

"In January, 1942, however, the situation changed . . ."

I raise the question whether the situation changed ~~in~~ January. There were two divergent attitudes regarding the treatment of the Japanese were present from the beginning. It was not a change in January.

"This seemed correlated with the repeated success of the enemy in the Pacific."

I wonder if they assume that the situation might have been different if the enemy were unsuccessful. I don't think it could have not been appreciably different either way. Of course, their guess is as good as mine.

"... by that time the damage they had brought to the Japanese in America was already accomplished."



Very true, indeed.

page 154, the first column, the first paragraph:

"Nevertheless, their temporary incarceration prevented their being on hand to guide their families through the uncertain times before and ~~the~~ during evacuation."

An over statement. Misleading and sentimental. Those picked up <sup>were</sup> are very small in proportion to the entire population. The older people were the ones who were more excited and indeterminate. They did not know what to do. They could not have guided their families as they say, the government policy being uncertain as they were at the time.

"Boys and ~~girls~~ and women were left to run farms in critical stages of the crops, and there was considerable loss due to inexperience and insufficient help."

It is misleading as a general statement. The loss was not so much due to inexperience. They had ample experience in previous years. Their loss was more due to the uncertainty of the government policy as to the Japanese and that created by the newspaper write-ups that the "Japs should be concentrated." They had sufficient farm helps. There were many Japanese who were anxious to work, and Mexicans were available, too. This is my observation after I made a survey with a field representative of the Department of Agriculture of State of California in the rural district of Los Angeles County. Of course, they may have something to back up their claim.

"Such services had always been considered secure from racial prejudice."

How many Japanese did consider so? More ~~than~~ <sup>than those</sup> people belonging to this belief had been saying, "Japs are Japs. The Kato will treat them all alike."

page 154, the first column, the second paragraph.

The first part is Leighton's pet conclusion from the bi-modal aspect of the Japanese population distribution.

"The older people blamed the younger ones for not having utilized the opportunities their parents had given them to obtain a more secure place in

This is true. But I would like to interpret it as the Issei's projection for their conflicts and sufferings.

page 154, the second column, the first paragraph:

". . . and there were widespread rumors that every community . . ."

Not only rumors. There were some Japanese who were actually informing.

There are ample evidence to substantiate this.

page 154, the second column, the second paragraph:

Very good, except "Curfew orders hampered produce deliveries to market."

Not so much. The deliveries were handled more by the Nisei, replacing the Issei.

page 154, the second column, the last paragraph:

"They felt that they lost heavily at this time through unscrupulous persons who took advantage of their position, their bewilderment, and their lack of leadership."

At this time the Japanese reinforced their anti-Jewish sentiment, which they had had previously. This paragraph is very true.

page 155, the first column, the second paragraph:

"Juvenile gangs who obeyed nobody but themselves appeared."

I don't think we can call them "gangs". They were not banded together.

Instead, we should say, the boys acted smart and did not mind others. You should let Tamie tell you how their attitude changed suddenly during and after the November strike at Poston. It was a remarkable change.

page 155, the second column, the first paragraph:

"Young people who formerly thought of themselves only as Americans are now more under the influence of the culture of their alien parents. This is especially true of the younger children."

This is <sup>a</sup>very important observation. I have maintained that Poston, for instance, is a "cultural island".

page 155, the second column, the last paragraph:



"... and it supposes that through some almost magical quality of the Japanese parents, their children are inhibited from psychological and social maturity."

I like this.

page 156, the first column, the last paragraph:

As evacuation approached there was an increase in family solidarity as relatives moved together to be with one another wherever they were sent." Their conclusion is one sided. It was a factor for solidarity as well as for disorganization. The fact that they had gotten together was a source of many domestic troubles and of permanent ruptures later.

The last sentences: "There are no more loyal soldiers to be found anywhere, but you must give them something to be loyal to."

This is a little too sentimental, but it is a very good statement for the American public. I like "... give them something to be loyal to."

You cannot be loyal unless you are accept<sup>ed</sup> by the body to whom you are supposed to be loyal. This is the basis ~~problem~~ of racial problems and of colonial administration.

There are several other comments I would like to make some other time. This article, I think, should have appeared in the Harper's Magazine or the Saturday Evening Post, because it is too popularized.

Very truly yours,

P. S. I have received the supply of stationery from the Mailing Division.

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**THE JAPANESE FAMILY IN AMERICA**  
By THE BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH  
COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION CENTER



## The Japanese Family in America

By THE BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH  
COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION CENTER<sup>1</sup>

IN THE present article we have endeavored to condense a complicated subject into a few pages. As a result we have made many omissions and have not pointed out many significant interrelationships. Almost every sentence is open to qualification. Furthermore, all pertinent data are not available on the subjects we discuss, and not all that are available can be published at this time. Within these limitations, we have attempted to present what seem to us the best-established facts and most salient points bearing on the status of the Japanese family in America.

### UNIQUE POSITION OF THE JAPANESE

Although none of the people in the United States have been untouched by the events since Pearl Harbor, the Japanese as a civilian group have been the most drastically affected. The change in their geographical distribution between December 1941 and October 1942 indicates the extent of their dislocation. At the time of Pearl Harbor, about 112,000 Japanese, or 88.5 per cent of the total Japanese population in the United States, lived in the Pacific

coastal region.<sup>2</sup> A year later, with the exception of a few hospitalized cases, they had disappeared from that area. A small number were interned for anti-American activities, but the vast majority, against whom there were no charges, had been moved through wholesale evacuation by the Government into ten relocation centers administered by a civil agency, the War Relocation Authority, and guarded by the Army. These centers are in inland areas of California, and in Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and Arkansas. By June 1943, after spending some months in the centers, about 10,000 were resettling in the Middle Western states, hoping to become reabsorbed into the life of the Nation.

On the surface, this statement of geographical change may not imply dislocation more drastic than that affecting individual families of war workers and soldiers. They too have moved great distances to settle under unfamiliar and unfavorable conditions and have faced readjustment to life in strange communities. The overcrowded barracks of the evacuated Japanese, the common mess halls and community washrooms, created problems not too dissimilar to those found in overpopulated areas around big defense plants.

However, other factors entered the picture in the case of the Japanese and made their problem unique. Their movement was a forced evacuation on the grounds that they were dangerous to the Nation and that it was unsafe to leave any of them on the Pacific coast because some might aid the enemy through sabotage or espionage. It was

<sup>2</sup> 77th Cong., 2d sess., House Report No. 2124, 91-92, 1942.

also said that they were moved for their own protection, for fear of popular demonstrations of antipathy.

The Japanese, approximately two-thirds of whom are citizens of the United States by birth, interpreted this as a wholesale rejection by other Americans. The rejection was the more bitter because it singled them out from all other groups and placed American citizens of Japanese ancestry in a position inferior to and more suspect than German and Italian *enemy aliens* who were treated on an individual basis. They could understand the evacuation of the alien Japanese as a wartime measure, but the indiscriminate inclusion of American citizens and the mass nature of the evacuation left them suspicious of the motives prompting the measure. They were quick to equate this with earlier attacks against them as a racial group, and regarded it as a political and economic move which pressure groups had foisted upon the rest of the Nation. When their citizenship was placed in a special category, they felt that the way was opened for further discrimination against them, that might go to they knew not what limits.

Added to this was the fact that although the Federal Government had set up agencies to protect their property, forced sales and other events incidental to evacuation wiped out much of the economic security they had succeeded in obtaining after years of pioneering. Many were left without means for making a new start in another area, and the older people felt that they were too far along in years to begin at the bottom again.

Thus, by the time the evacuees arrived in the relocation centers, they were filled with insecurity and pessimism regarding their future. This was increased by new attacks against them in the press, which demanded that legislative action be taken to deprive those

born in the United States of their citizenship and to confiscate Japanese-owned properties such as farm equipment.

The special adjustment problem of the Japanese, then, is due to the fact that their relocation was a forced one which they interpreted as discrimination and rejection and which left them more uncertain of the future and therefore more insecure than other groups. This is to be contrasted with the war worker or the soldier, who is rewarded for his discomforts and sacrifices by a feeling of fuller participation and acceptance in the national life and an increase in prestige, if not in income.

### MINORITY GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES

Though the evacuation itself was a result of the war with Japan, the factors making it possible were already present and were only brought to focus by Pearl Harbor and the events since then. They ultimately spring from the status of minority groups in the United States.

It is a basic postulate of social science that no inherent differences in biological stocks of the human species exist that make it impossible for individuals of one stock to assimilate the culture practiced by another. An individual is born with a capacity to react in a great variety of ways, and assumes the behavioral patterns of those surrounding him because he is rewarded for conforming to their standards. Alternative ways of behavior are repressed by punishment or because they are not rewarding to the individual.

By and large, the United States, with its pride in the "melting pot," has accepted this postulate for those resembling in physical appearance the majority white group. The result has been the development of comparatively few barriers to full participation in Ameri-

<sup>1</sup> The Sociological Research project of the Colorado River War Relocation Center is directed at improving administration by the use of applied psychology and social anthropology. It is sponsored jointly by the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Indian Service, and the War Relocation Authority. The personnel is as follows: Lt. Alexander H. Leighton, (MC) USNR—Coordinator, E. H. Spicer, Ph.D., Elizabeth Colson, M.A., Tom Sasaki, A.B., Chica Sugino, A.B., Hisako Fujii, Misao Furuta, Iwao Ishino, Mary Kinoshita, June Kushino, Yoshiharu Matsumoto, Florence Mohri, Akiko Nishimoto, Jyuichi Sato, James Sera, Gene Sogioka, George Yamaguchi, Toshio Yatsushiro, and Kazue Uyeno.



can life and therefore thorough exposure to American culture. Such is the force of the impact of this culture through schools and other influences in the environment outside the home that even a determined effort on the part of foreign parents to hold their children to their own standard has little effect. Within a generation or two, children of white immigrants become thoroughly assimilated into American culture.

In some cases, however, Americans have helped to prevent the full assimilation of a group by walling it off in society and claiming that racial heredity is more important than the factor of culture. By discrimination and enforced segregation, they have denied such groups full participation in American culture, have strengthened the position of the immigrant or native Indian parents in their natural and often unconscious attempts to pass on their culture to their children, and have created definite barriers to assimilation. Economic and prestige rewards are minimized, and contacts with the majority group, which are the means whereby the new culture can be acquired, become punishing for the members of the minority. They tend to withdraw from such contacts back into association with members of their own group, where they do not meet with rebuff. When this has resulted in a slower rate of assimilation, the original attackers are inclined to believe this is proof of their assertion that the group is unassimilable, and by this, justify further discrimination.

In effect, children of European immigrants are told, "Only behave as we do and you will be rewarded with complete acceptance and full opportunity to gain every economic and prestige advantage that we ourselves have." Children of other immigrant groups are made to feel, "Since you do not resemble us physically, there will always be barriers against you no matter how closely you

resemble us in other ways, and these barriers will increase as you grow up." This was in large measure the experience of the Japanese in the United States.

#### BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA

The majority of the Japanese, arriving about the turn of the century, settled in California, where they fell heir to pre-existing anti-Oriental prejudice because the state had just passed through a period of strong feeling against the Chinese. The Japanese were accused of lowering the "American standard of living" and of unfair competition with white laborers, but the chief argument used against them was that they were "unassimilable" because of "race." On this basis, extremists like McClatchy fought to keep California a "white man's country," and demanded that the Japanese be restricted from privileges enjoyed by other immigrants and that future immigration be prohibited. In 1920 he argued:

There are three main reasons why it is useless to attempt the making of good American citizens of Japanese material, save, of course, in exceptional individual instances. The Japanese cannot, may not and will not provide desirable material for our citizenship. First, the Japanese cannot assimilate and make good citizens, because their racial characteristics, heredity, and religion prevent; second, the Japanese may not assimilate and make good citizens because their Government, claiming all Japanese, no matter where born, as its citizens, does not permit; third, the Japanese will not assimilate and make good citizens.<sup>3</sup>

The result of this and similar influences was the successful exclusion of further Japanese immigration in 1924, denial to Japanese of the privilege of naturalization, passage of state laws for-

<sup>3</sup> House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, pt. 1, p. 240.

bidding Japanese aliens to own land in the state and forbidding intermarriage between Japanese and Caucasians, and legislated but never generally enforced bills to segregate Japanese children (citizens for the most part) in the public schools of the state. There were also well-recognized social, occupational, and economic barriers which operated to restrict the Japanese in their relations with the white group and which led them to associate to a large extent with other Japanese.

In spite of these obstacles, the second generation made tremendous strides in Americanization. In the schools where there was comparatively little prejudice, they were outstanding students and often leaders in extracurricular activities. Many became Christians, and to compete with the Christian churches, the Buddhist groups took on such features of Western culture as Young Buddhist Associations, Buddhist Sunday schools, and regular services.

A notable characteristic of the social relations of the Japanese in California was that many had special friends among the white people who would often stand up for them as individuals and protect them. It was largely from such white friends—who were in a sense patrons—that the Japanese children acquired their goals and ideals in American life, as well as manners and language. Their Americanization was also due to the fact that they did not feel the prejudice against them too strongly during their formative years. It was only as adults that they realized the full force of the economic, occupational, and social barriers. For this reason, their frustration was all the greater when they found themselves cut off from the things for which their education and social conditioning had fitted them and to which their emotions and expectations were attuned.

This oversimplified sketch of the

background of the California Japanese gives some clues as to why it was possible for them to become the subject of evacuation when other groups of enemy aliens and their children were not. In spite of the existence of the German-American Bunds and evidence that attempts were being made to indoctrinate the young of this group with Nazi ideology, the Germans and their children were treated on an individual basis. This is not to imply that those who knew the Japanese were unable to distinguish the thoroughly loyal, but only that an insufficient number did know them, and no group was mustered that could successfully refute the charge that it was impossible to tell.

#### AFTER THE WAR BEGAN

During the weeks that immediately followed the raid on Pearl Harbor, things went reasonably well for the Japanese in America. The newspapers called for moderation, ministers preached against anti-Japanese actions, and the Fair Practice Committee of Northern California which had been organized to combat race prejudice reported that on the whole the situation was fairly healthy.<sup>4</sup>

In January 1942, however, the situation changed and there appeared a growing desire to have all Japanese removed from the coast. This seemed correlated with the repeated successes of the enemy in the Pacific. Wild rumors of espionage and sabotage in Hawaii and on the mainland spread far and rapidly. Statements from reliable sources later showed that these rumors were unfounded, but by that time the damage they had brought to the Japanese in America was already accomplished.

In this situation the Japanese family and community life became subject to

<sup>4</sup> 77th Cong., 2d sess., House Report No. 2124, 149-51, 1942.



forces of disintegration. Great numbers of the alien heads of families were picked up for questioning and detained, and most of those who were left were afraid they would be taken at any time. The number of men who were subsequently released suggests that most were harmless. Nevertheless, their temporary incarceration prevented their being on hand to guide their families through the uncertain times before and during evacuation. Boys and women were left to run farms in critical stages of the crops, and there was considerable loss due to inexperience and insufficient help. Jobholders were dropped from their positions, and a particularly severe blow was the discharge of Japanese-American employees from state and municipal civil service. Such services had always been considered secure from racial prejudice.

The American citizens of Japanese ancestry feared for their alien parents and at the same time were placed under a great strain by the burden of responsibility that fell on their shoulders. This was the more difficult to bear because the majority of the second generation are still in their twenties, relatively inexperienced, and they were uncertain what to do in the crisis. Soon disagreements and strife split their society and their families. Some of the younger generation blamed the older generation for their failure to become Americanized. The older people blamed the younger ones for not having utilized the opportunities their parents had given them to obtain a more secure place in American society. Young men attempted to volunteer but were refused at that time, and soon many of the thousands already in the Army were being let out with honorable discharges. Some groups made overt demonstrations of their loyalty by going out of their way to co-operate with the Government, and they were accused by others of pro-

moting evacuation instead of working to prevent it. Some were frankly pro-Japan. Mutual suspicion became a destructive force and there were widespread rumors that every community had Japanese informers who turned in lists of innocent names in order to make money and ingratiate themselves with the authorities.

Every day the future became more uncertain and more threatening, with contradictory reports and notices appearing in the papers. It seemed impossible to make any plans to secure crops or business. Even evacuation could not be counted on until it was almost at hand. Restrictions appeared and increased. Farmers were uncertain whether or not to spend their resources planting new crops, fearing that if they were not there to harvest, they would lose everything they had. Curfew orders hampered produce deliveries to market. College students began to drop out in order to be with their families through the storms of uncertainty.

#### EVACUATION

Finally, on February 19, 1942, the coming of evacuation was officially announced, although its extent became apparent only by degrees. The people stored their goods, leased their land, and tried to find friends who would take over their growing crops. They felt that they lost heavily at this time through unscrupulous persons who took advantage of their position, their bewilderment, and their lack of leadership. All attempts to discover where they would be sent, what the accommodations would be like, what they should bring with them, and what the medical facilities would be, met with a wide variety of answers, many of them diametrically opposed. The certainty of evacuation increased rather than diminished other uncertainties. Just as the white popu-

lation on the coast had been a prey to the wildest rumors concerning the Japanese, so they too were victimized by equally wild rumors which seemed to "explain" the hardships they were enduring and made their difficulties appear far more horrible and threatening than they really were.

Within the relocation centers, influences of disorganization have continued to operate on the family in spite of the return of many fathers. Lack of privacy, communal mess halls, and crowded quarters altered home life profoundly. Parents felt they were losing authority over their children since they had little to offer them, and attempts at discipline became neighborhood events. They believed the children were growing wild and picking up all kinds of bad behavior through having to live in close proximity to all kinds of people. Juvenile gangs who obeyed nobody but themselves appeared.

Problems such as whether or not alien parents should seek repatriation to Japan, or whether or not a son should join the American Army (when volunteering again became open), cut some families asunder much as the Civil War split relationships. With the opening up of opportunities for jobs in the East and the Middle West, thousands of young persons have struck out to seek their fortunes and become as rapidly as possible again members of the American Nation. Others hesitate. What will become of their aging parents? What will happen to them and their families if they do go out? Almost every day, articles appear in the press denouncing the Japanese in America, and rumors of Japanese who are already out being murdered surge through the centers in waves. Some believe the Government is determined to empty the relocation centers come what may, and fear they will be crushed between this move and popular antagonism on the outside.

#### FACTORS STRENGTHENING FAMILY SOLIDARITY

Not all influences, however, have been in the direction of disintegrating family life. Members formerly living apart have come together to face evacuation in each other's company. This has been aided by a definite government policy to keep families together. The geographic isolation of the centers has reduced contacts with American culture and current events to a minimum. Young people who formerly thought of themselves only as Americans are now more under the influence of the culture of their alien parents. This is especially true of the younger children, who have no white playmates and who are being left in the centers as their older brothers and sisters move out seeking jobs.

Another factor contributing to family solidarity is that when people are rejected and made insecure, they must turn in some direction, and turning back to one's first security—parents—is a natural trend. The parents themselves also turn back to their early security, which was of course Japan. In the proportion that their hope in America is lost, so their hope in Japan is increased. There are traditionally well-established cultural patterns for the strengthening of family unity in times of stress, patterns which strongly emphasized filial duty and honor.

This fact has often been used as a point to prove that Japanese-Americans are never really citizens. Such an argument, however, is naïvely literal. It ignores what we have already stated about the assimilation of the second-generation Japanese, and it supposes that through some almost magical quality of the Japanese parents, their children are inhibited from psychological and social maturity. The argument displays lack of knowledge of the real and complex relationship between parents



and children, in which there are many forces of attraction and repulsion.

However, to the extent that filial duty is a trait of Japanese family life, it is a potent force for the creation of good citizens. It seems, therefore, that the problem of the Japanese family is a quest for security in the face of strongly demoralizing and disintegrating influences, and from this various reactions occur. In some, disintegration actually takes place with features of apathy and confusion, strife and child gangs. In others, there is a renewal of effort to be absorbed into American life and be identified with it. With still others, there is appearing a kind of family solidarity that is protective, reactionary, and atavistic.

#### SUMMARY

As a result of the war, the Japanese family in America has been subjected to an unusual number of stresses, many of which consist in an increase of previously existing strains due to their status as a minority group. The principal influences arising since hostilities began are:

1. Following December 7, 1941, a large number of families lost the leadership of their male heads through temporary detention for investigation or internment for the duration of the war. At the same time, because of various restrictions and popular reaction, economic security was threatened or destroyed. As a result, responsibility fell on the young and inexperienced shoulders of American-born children. This shift had been going on to some extent previously, but now it was much accelerated. Difference of opinion, fear, and confusion split both communities and families.

2. As evacuation approached there was an increase in family solidarity as relatives moved together to be with one another wherever they were sent.

3. In the relocation centers, families were faced with totally new conditions of life. The people lived close together in crowded barracks, sharing eating and toilet facilities in common and with almost no opportunity for family privacy. The role of the father as breadwinner and the mother as housewife was gone. Child discipline, family work and rituals, and even the role of the home itself were greatly altered. The people felt that family life was disintegrating. The later government policy of getting as many people as possible out of relocation centers tended further to split some families as the older sons and daughters left, while the first-generation parents and younger children remained behind. Difference of opinion as to whether one should look toward America or Japan in the future has been a very important dividing influence.

4. At the same time that these factors were operating, others were contributing to increased family unity. Emotional reaction against evacuation and discrimination, the geographic isolation of the centers, lack of white contacts and great increase in Japanese contacts, and the drawing together of parents and younger children because of the departure of the older Americanized siblings, have all tended to bring families closer together.

#### CONCLUSION

Not long ago, one of us was speaking with a high military officer who has had considerable experience with Japanese-Americans in the Army. He was asked if he found them loyal, and he replied by pointing to the tradition of family loyalty and commented that it disposed them to develop great devotion to their officers and duty. He ended by saying, "There are no more loyal soldiers to be found anywhere, *but you must give them something to be loyal to.*"

In our opinion, this epitomizes the problem of the Japanese in America.



ASSESSING HUMAN ATTITUDES in a DISLOCATED COMMUNITY

by

The Sociological Research Project<sup>1</sup>

The Colorado River War Relocation Center

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<sup>1</sup>The Sociological Research Project of the Colorado River War Relocation Center is directed at improving administration by the use of applied psychology and social anthropology. It is sponsored jointly by the U.S. Navy, the U. S. Indian Service and the War Relocation Authority. The personnel is as follows: Lt. Alexander H. Leighton, (MC) USNR - Coordinator, Edward H. Spicer, Ph.D., Elizabeth Colson, M.A., Rosamond B. Spicer, M.A., Tom Sasaki, A.B., Chica Sugino, A.B., Hisako Fujii, Misao Furuta, Iwao Ishino, Mary Kinoshita, June Kushino, Yoshiharu Matsumoto, Florence Mohri, Akiko Nishimoto, Jyuichi Sato, James Sera, Gene Sogioka, George Yamaguchi and Toshio Yatsushiro.

During the war and after it, this nation will have a variety of administrative problems in countries where human life has been severely dislocated and where the people are very different from the average American in racial descent, traditional values and predominant attitudes. These problems will include such matters as out-right occupation, relief and rehabilitation, the establishment of public health measures and the supervision of plebiscites. The present paper is oriented in terms of occupied area government, but the points have relevancy in varying degrees to these other kinds of administrative planning and action.

In governing any area, it is comparatively easy to keep abreast of events, but very difficult to understand opinions and attitudes and to follow their changes. The greater the ethnic difference between the governing and the governed, the greater is this difficulty; and administrators, as a rule, lack the time and the techniques necessary for dealing with it by means of more than intuitive guessing. Nevertheless, it is the opinions and attitudes of the people which often determine the success or failure of the government's acts and they are at least of equal importance with events.

For a democracy with its principle of adjusting the government to the people, this matter is vital. Even in occupying enemy territory, the chief aim of the agents of a democracy will not be to out-Fascist the Fascists, but, after the necessary house-cleaning, to rehabilitate the country by meeting the basic



needs of the people and by encouraging forms of self-rule which will lead to a peace that is more than an enforced interlude. To accomplish this, an occupied area government must know what ~~the people feel and it must know what~~ it is doing to the people and how they are reacting.

In the training now being given the potential administrators of such areas, cultural anthropology and other social sciences are providing knowledge concerning traditions, leadership patterns, predominant ideas and recent history. However, valuable as these are, after occupation they will soon become secondary to the question of what new attitudes and <sup>new</sup> types of social behavior have come into existence and how they are affecting plans and policies that have been inaugurated. It will be desirable to know what continuous modifications of administration are needed for the sake of effectiveness.

Applied social science has no magic formula with which to provide infallible answers. No matter what is done, there will be groping in the dark. However, it is possible to reduce both the groping and the darkness by the application of concepts and methods which in the last twenty years have not only widened the horizons of social psychology and anthropology, but have proved their practical value in problems of education, land management, agriculture, industry, welfare work, mental hygiene and in the administration of Indian tribes and colonial possessions.

With these needs and possibilities in mind, a Japanese Relocation Center has been utilized for the study of people and

their attitudes in a situation that bears some resemblance to occupied area conditions.

Relocation Center and Occupied Area Compared

A relocation center and an occupied area will have many differences and one must, of course, beware of transferring too literally the lessons learned in one to the other. Some of the most fundamental points of contrast will stem from the fact that the people in the occupied area will have been subjected to the bloodshed and destruction of war. It is also evident that for the most part they will be living in their native habitat, scattered through the country, or in towns and villages and will not be in compact camps where supply, supervision and military control are relatively easy. Furthermore, they will not have such artificial social relations and there will not be so strong a feeling that everything is temporary.

These considerations, however, should not cause one to underestimate the common elements. The following situations were significant in the Relocation Center and they will be found in occupied areas to varying degrees:

The government was imposed on the people without their consent, and yet it had to work through local leaders and native or newly-created institutions of self-government to accomplish its aims. Among these aims were the stimulation of work for the production of food and other necessities as quickly as possible, the maintenance of health, the distribution of relief, the establishment of law and order, and the apprehension of any persons



working secretly against the interests of the government.

The people with whom the governing body had to deal varied greatly in background, education and occupation. They were persons who had suffered what they regarded as disastrous economic and social dislocation and were dependent on the government for food, shelter and much of their clothing. Their attitude toward the government ranged all the way from intense hostility to a strong desire to cooperate. There was much conflict of opinion ~~among~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~then and there was~~ a breakdown of the previous forms of social control. Juvenile delinquency, petty crimes and gang activities appeared among people who had formerly been notable for their law-abiding character. Different pressure groups sought power and each tried to convince the government that they alone represented the feelings of the people. The mass of the population was out of touch with the administration and a prey to widespread anxieties which ranged in expression from apathy to outbursts of violence. The wildest rumors surged through the people and there was intense general suspicion culminating now and then in attacks on scapegoats.

Between the government and many of the people there were barriers of language, customs, scale of values, religion and physical appearance. The transmission of information and point of view in both directions was a problem of first magnitude. It was no less important than health, food, law and order and physical construction because upon it depended the success of these other things.



~~It was necessary to achieve~~ Integration <sup>had to be achieved</sup> between the various Government agencies concerned in the total problem. This meant developing a common understanding of the aims and reaching an agreement as to methods and the division of responsibility.

Related to this was the matter of adjustment to the changes of policy in Washington; the abandonment of promised programs because of the inability to get the requisite supplies; attacks in the press; and investigations based on misunderstanding or political goals and often resulting in unmerited abusive publicity aimed at the people, the administration or both.

Although the Government's main policy concerning the treatment of the people was clearly stated, there was considerable confusion in the minds of many individuals in the Center administration, particularly in the lower ranks. Some believed that the people being governed were enemies who should be punished and never trusted, while others emphasized the official policy of rehabilitation. The net result was the appearance of marked inconsistencies of action with consequent confusion. Such a situation was favorable to the development in the people of emotional complexes similar to those of the child who has unpredictable parents and never knows whether he will receive approval or a slap.

In conclusion it should be noted that the whole process of evacuation itself, including the specific conditions of movement and camp life for men, women and children, may turn out to be one of the duties the United States will have to assume in some parts



of the world in the past-war period, if not before.

### The Relocation Center

The Center in which we made our study is in southern Arizona, close to the California line and about 20 miles from the nearest town and railroad station. For 8 months of the year the climate is mild, but for at least 4 months in summer the heat is intense, reaching as high as 128° Fahrenheit in the shade. The total population of the Center was 17,867 at its peak and is housed in army type barracks covered with black tar paper. The average living unit consists in a room 20 by 25 feet containing from 5 to 7 persons, often several families together. The community is organized like a city and has the technical machinery of administration and record keeping, a health department, hospital, fire department, police force, a judicial commission for trying minor offenses, an elected municipal government, schools, organizations for adult education and community welfare, a newspaper, projects for land subjugation, irrigation, ~~construction~~ agriculture, some industries and stores. Less officially related to the administration, but just as important in community life, were numerous religious, recreational and athletic associations and activities.

In passing, it may be mentioned that a relocation center is not the same as an internment camp. All persons suspected of anti-American acts or intentions were interned as a result of vigorous and repeated investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies. The remainder of the



Japanese in the Pacific coastal areas of the Western Defense Command, against whom there were no charges, were evacuated to relocation centers. This move, however, was of necessity a hurried affair and, as a consequence, the evacuees suffered *loss of business as well as considerable loss of property due to forced sales.*

### The Research Project

From the very beginning, the research project was conceived as having three functions. First, it was to provide the Center Administration with facts and suggestions on current problems appertaining to the attitudes and sentiments of the people. Second, it was to gain experience and compile data that might be of use in the governing of occupied areas. Third, it was to train a research staff that would be capable of working in occupied areas and providing the governing body there with the same kind of service it gave the Center Administration.

The reserach was initiated by a psychiatrist and an anthropologist both of whom had had some previous experience in studying communities across language and cultural barriers. Together they planned the work and built up a staff, the Japanese members of which were recruited from among the evacuees.

One of the toughest problems the research staff had to face was a community attitude of hostility toward any form of investigation or inquiry. To some extent this is a universal human attitude and to some extent it went *far* back in Japanese culture to the *feudal* period when the spies of the Daimyo were a hazard in



village life. More important, however, was a fear of informers based on experiences since the war. The arrests which had followed Pearl Harbor had caused much uncertainty and economic suffering as well as the pain of family separation. In popular opinion, many of those picked up were innocent and the people really to blame for these "false" arrests were thought to be members of the Japanese communities who had reported names in order to make money, to settle personal grudges or to ingratiate themselves with the law enforcement agencies.

With this start, it was easy for the informers to become a symbol on which it was safe to discharge the pent up aggressive feelings that had resulted from the whole process of evacuation and relocation. In the Center, agitation about informers was rife during the first ten months. Gangs of men in the night attacked a number of suspected persons and beat them severely, while hundreds of people received actual threats, or thought they did. The more closely a resident was associated with the Administration, the more liable he was to suspicion, and there were times when many evacuees were afraid to be seen talking to administrative officers.

It can well be imagined what kind of a problem this posed to a research organization, one of whose principal aims was to find out what the people were thinking and feeling about all the current issues in the community. It was, however, a welcome challenge because it was a parallel of what will be



found in occupied areas. Through a combination of luck and the employment of certain techniques, the members of the research group obtained most of the data they sought and were never subject to any physical attack, although one was directly threatened and all of them received indirect threats.

### Samples of Research Results

To give an idea of the kind of applied social science that is possible in a dislocated community, three samples will be presented. The first is a general description of important attitudes during a particular period of time, the second is the answer to a specific question, and the third consists in recommendations given regarding a major community event.

#### 1.) Community Attitudes for April 1943.

For a graphic presentation, see figure I. Each of the small charts depicts variations in <sup>attitudes regarding</sup> a topic that was of common interest during the month. These ratings were obtained in the following manner: After utilizing all the techniques of information gathering which will be described later, the research staff met once a week for an hour in front of a blackboard on which were listed the dominant community feelings. Each topic was discussed in turn and a number value was assigned to it by general agreement on a scale between 0 and 10. This number indicated the degree of interest which the research group thought the community had shown in this topic during the previous week. The number was then further divided by the same method into components representing that portion of the total interest which



consisted in feelings of satisfaction and that portion which was made up of dissatisfaction. The main points of the discussion about each topic and the principal reasons for assigning the number selected were also recorded. In this way, a week by week evaluation of the community's sentiment was maintained.

For the purposes of the present article, there is no need to describe the significance of each of the charts, but three may be selected as examples.

Food: At the beginning of <sup>particular</sup> this month food represented the high point of community interest and ~~chiefly~~ <sup>this</sup> took the form of vigorous dissatisfaction due to a period in which the quality of the food had fallen off. People were afraid that the center would run short of food, isolated as it was in the desert, and there were meetings with attempts to have the ~~center~~ steward and his helpers removed from office. Toward the end of the first week, food improved and interest in it correspondingly declined.

The food sentiments were a relatively simple affair consisting in a popular reaction to a genuine lack, high-lighted a little by some individuals attempting to use it as a means of advancement in local politics. However, the kind of fears provoked by the <sup>food situation</sup> and the extent to which they went, ~~are~~ indicative of a general underlying uneasiness concerning the basic securities of life.

Toward the end of the month there was a rise in satisfaction with food on the appearance for the first time of products manufactured in the community.



Health: Health interest was high at the beginning of the month due to the appearance of a number of cases of infantile paralysis and typhoid fever, to the advent of hot weather and flies, and to the feeling of inadequate protection against them. With the cooler weather, better housing opportunities, insect control measures by the health department and the failure of an epidemic to develop, public attention shifted away from health toward the end of the month.

However, the leaders of the community and those who had friends and relatives in the hospital were considerably bothered by the prospect of losing most of the doctors and nurses who were going to seek jobs in the outside. In the last week as a result of the activities of the leaders (Councilmen, advisers, and block managers mostly), the community at large gradually became aware of the problem.

Out-Group Relations: In the latter part of the month there was great concern about the attitude of the American public toward the Japanese in America. This was closely linked to the thought of *finding work* on the outside, and to wondering about the whole out-look for the future. The chief stimulus to the fears and dissatisfactions was the appearance of numerous articles in various newspapers abusing the Japanese-Americans and recommending harsh treatment without regard to citizenship. This was given great impetus by the popular reaction in the United States against the execution of the American fliers. Satisfaction was expressed at press articles that defended the



Japanese-Americans. However, the fears and dissatisfactions far out-weighed the satisfactions as the adverse press out-weighed the favorable.

Summary of the Month: Taking into consideration all the charts and the descriptive data that accompany each, it ~~was~~ <sup>during April</sup> apparent that the community was far from stable, and was subject to severe basic anxieties that interplayed, one with the other. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was a concern about the things on which life depended, such as food, health and housing. Equally felt, was a very great concern with social relationships, specifically resettlement and relations with other Americans.

Sources of security and satisfaction were evident chiefly in the spiritual realms of religion. There was a fair amount of satisfaction also expressed in connection with resettlement, but this was hope rather than a manifest security. Furthermore, even as a satisfaction it was disrupting, for it created family separations and diverted attention from attempts to build a secure and stable community.

Data such as here presented not only served as an aid in understanding what was currently happening in the Center, but through noting the direction in which changes had been taking place over a period of time, it was also possible to foresee to some extent the form that feelings and attitudes would probably have in the immediate future.

## 2.) The Answer to a Specific Question.

In connection with the program of rehabilitation, it



become important for the Administration to know what proportion of the people would respond readily to job opportunities outside the Center. With such knowledge it would be possible to plan the organization and work of the employment division and to prepare for the adjustments within camp that would become necessary because of population change. Utilizing the standard techniques of public opinion sampling, popularly known as the "Gallup Poll", it was learned that of the American-born, English speaking residents, 63% intended to leave the Center, 28% did not and 9% said that they did not know. Of the Japanese speaking and alien residents, 18% said that they were going to leave, 75% replied "no" and 7% said that they did not know.

This was, of course, not the only question in the survey. There were carefully considered related inquiries designed to reveal the reasons and rationalizations behind the desire to go out or stay in. However, for the purposes of illustration, the one example suffices.

### 3.) Recommendations Regarding a Major Community Event.

In November 1942, an extensive strike took place in one of the three units of the Center. Pickets were organized and staged a continuous demonstration for a number of days. The factors leading to this situation were many and complicated and there is not sufficient space in this article to discuss them. The main point, however, was that the Administration had to make a decision between negotiating with the strikers and suppressing the demonstration by the use of military force.



The heads of the research project gave it as their opinion that if the Administration negotiated carefully ~~it~~ would come out of the situation with much better influence in the community than ~~it~~ had previously wielded, while if ~~it~~ used force, there would be violence, loss of life, the permanent alienation of many hitherto cooperative residents and a costly disruption of the community lasting many months.

The Administration naturally considered numerous other things besides the advice of the research men, but eventually did act in accordance with their suggestions and subsequent developments were as predicted. Within a few weeks, cooperation between the people and the governing body was markedly closer and more efficient than it had been at any time since the Center opened.

It was of course impossible to test the half of the prediction relative to what would <sup>have</sup> happened if force had been employed. However, some confirmatory indications were found in another Center where under similar circumstances military force was used. Two deaths resulted and for many months the Center was in a turmoil requiring an augmented staff of government employees and causing marked increase in operating expenses.

#### Methods of Ascertaining Community Attitudes.

The points which the research department would like to think distinguished its work were not concerned with originality or revelation, but with the fact that they were based on methods which



gave them at least a first approximation of accuracy. Five types of approach were used which may be described as general observation, intensive interviews, collecting records, public opinion polls and personality studies.

1.) General Observation.

Spread about the community in as many strategic spots as possible, the research staff observed and recorded what people were saying in conversation around their homes, in the mess halls, in the shower rooms, at the doorsteps in the evening and similar places. Casual chats were developed with a variety of persons to find out what they were feeling and thinking, but they were not directly interviewed. In each observation, it was considered desirable to note the following points:

- a.) What were the sentiments expressed by word and action?
- b.) What were the circumstances under which this occurred?
- c.) What were the emotional tones and implications of the principal persons expressing and responding to the sentiments?
- d.) What kinds of people were involved?
- e.) What happened as a result?

As part of the general observation, various meetings for political, social, religious and recreational purposes were covered and carefully described.

The daily paper and other published material was scanned and notes made on the contents.



## 2.) Intensive Interviews.

Intensive interviews were prolonged discussions with individuals, usually on topics of community interest. Those interviewed were persons who occupied positions in the Administration or among the people from which they had a good view of at least one phase of community life. Sometimes they were leaders and sometimes they were samples of various kinds of followers. The success and validity of the interviews depended not only on having a good range of representative interviewees, but also on establishing the right relationship with these persons so that they felt free to express themselves.

## 3.) Collecting Records.

As the name suggests, this consisted in collecting from every available source data of social significance. It included material compiled in the census office, the employment division, the schools and churches and wherever else it could be gathered.

## 4.) Public Opinion Polls.

Opinion polls were conducted according to the regular techniques that have been developed in this field. We are greatly indebted to the National Opinion Research Center and its Director, Mr. Harry H. Field, for their courtesy and cooperation in training two of our members and supervising the surveys these men organized and conducted.

Essentially, the method consists in interviewing with specific questions a cross-section of the population that is large



enough to give statistically reliable results. The segment so interviewed must include all the important groups which make up the population and they must be in proper proportion.

#### 5.) Personality Studies.

This was ~~essentially~~ a psychiatric method modified so as to become an instrument for community study. It consisted in repeatedly long interviews with and observation of certain responsive individuals and emphasized life story, interpersonal relations, mental and emotional make-up, dreams, and psychological tests. It was aimed at learning something about the dynamic processes that lay deeper than the manifest sentiments but which nevertheless affected them. It was necessarily limited to few individuals, but an effort was made to include among them as wide a range of types as possible.

#### Focus

It is possible to collect information widely and indefinitely but one can never observe everything. Breadth of study is important, but if overdone it leads to thinness of substance. In the work at the Relocation Center, the following points were kept in view:

a.) The need to understand the various groups of people within the community and the interactions between these groups. They ranged all the way from formal organizations laid down by the Administration, such as the Community Council, to informal cliques, and factions within a block, and included groups that were



distinguished by age, sex, language, religion, economic background and previous geographic location. Since there were thousands of them (there were 83 baseball teams alone) it was impossible to study all. Emphasis was placed on those that had bearing on the political activity<sup>and leaderships</sup> of the community and on others which observation indicated were especially significant in the life of the Center. The rest were studied where opportunity permitted.

b.) Types of leadership change. These were analyzed and their relationship to the various groups noted.

c.) Opinions and attitudes. A very marked stress was laid on describing the principal sentiments and attitudes in the community, their nature, their change, and their distribution among the various groups and among the different types of leaders. "Who is thinking what?" was always an important question and whenever possible it was followed up with "why?".

Besides these general questions, there were specific problems frequently appearing to which one or more members of the research staff would devote most of his attention, or on which the whole group would work for a time.

#### Recommendations for Occupied Areas.

The personnel doing social analysis in occupied areas should be adequately trained and should devote their full time to the job. Although much of the work is nothing but the consistent application of common sense, it does take practice to perceive social structure, to know what to observe and to be sufficiently



on guard against one's own emotions in estimating interpersonal relations. It is also helpful to have the perspective provided by a good general background in social science. Over and above these things, there are special techniques that have to be learned, included among which are many matters related to recording data and presenting results not covered in this paper. Consequently, although closest working relations should exist between social analysts and administrators, the time and effort of the former should not be diverted to administrative operations or other activities not strictly in the analysts' field.

No general statement can be made as to how many social scientists would be needed in an <sup>occupied</sup> area. Such a matter will depend on the size, population, and nature of any given place and will have to be determined accordingly. However, as a basis for discussion, let us suppose that the organization which is to govern a <sup>particular</sup> ~~given~~ occupied area has one seasoned social analyst and four junior assistants. The development of the work might be as follows:

- 1.) The chief analyst should accompany the very first of the administrators into the territory either with, or immediately after the main body of the military force. From the moment he arrives, the analyst should put into practice what has been described in this article as general observation.

As soon as possible his aids should join him and together they should rapidly describe the people, noting particularly any marked differences from what had been anticipated. At least



once a week they should prepare a report on their findings with comments as to the bearing it has on what the <sup>military</sup> ~~the~~ government is trying to do and submit this to their immediate superior. Every month there should be a longer and more matured memorandum. At first these reports would be very rough and incomplete, but would become more penetrating and accurate with time.

2.) As soon as feasible, intensive interviewing should be added to general observation. This means that responsive natives must be discovered who are willing to talk to the interviewers and who at the same time are in positions that make what they have to say of value. It takes a while to find such persons though they exist in every community and the right kind of rapport has to be built up with them. However, once this has been established, they can be approached again and again. Eventually some may become members of the social analyst's staff, especially in outlying districts from which they can turn in regular reports.

3.) Very early it should be possible to begin collecting records of social data. If many of the community's documents have been destroyed, it may be that individuals can be interviewed who were acquainted with them and who can give approximate statements of their contents from memory.

4.) Public opinion polling will yield very important information, some of which will eventually come to replace part of the general observation and interviewing, but it will have a number of serious obstacles to overcome and it will be some time before it can be properly established. There will be among the



natives both a fear of informers and a fear of being thought an informer which will make them averse to being interviewed by strangers and will expose such interviewers to the danger of being beaten or shot in the back. Less dramatic but just as serious for the validity of the polls will be the tendency of those interviewed to say what they think is acceptable rather than what they really feel.

However, if the groundwork is well laid by analyzing the results of general observation, intensive interviewing and collecting records, it will be possible to frame questions that will be important without being disruptive, to secure the support of the right leaders, to carry out the necessary preliminary education of the public, to find and train interviewers who are acceptable to the people and to make sure that the segment of the population interviewed is a sufficiently representative cross-section of the community. Once this is accomplished, the government of the occupied area can be repeatedly supplied with speedy and accurate data concerning how, and often why, the natives feel, <sup>as they do</sup> on specific issues that are up for administrative decision.

Harry H. Field has frequently stressed that one of the great hazards which the government of an occupied area must face will be the difficulty of distinguishing between the pressures of groups with special interests and the attitudes of the majority of the people. The experiences in the Relocation Center bore this out and there was evident a tendency for leaders and



groups seeking power to attempt to isolate the Administration from the people, and by constituting themselves as go-betweens to strive for power by playing one against the other. Numerous instances in world history illustrate the same thing. An important function of the social analysts will be to provide the government of occupied areas with information ~~in~~ this matter and one of the best instruments will be the public opinion survey if it is well established.

5.) Personality studies <sup>emphasizing</sup> ~~of~~ the behavior patterns and characteristic sentiments of important leaders can be started early, followed ~~later~~ by similar studies of persons who are representative samples of the <sup>major</sup> ~~important~~ groups who compose the community. Deeper-going studies will not be possible until much later, but it is probable that from them will eventually come some of the best insight into the basic motives of the people.

All these five procedures are of course aimed at providing useful ~~data~~, not accumulating archives. Some of the most important questions will unfold themselves as matters develop in the area, but from the very first moment the following can be kept in mind as major topics for attention.

What are the principle groups in the community? What attractions and repulsions exist between them?

Who are the individuals with whom the occupied area government is dealing? Where do they fit into the community? What groups are for and against them and why?



What leaders and what groups of importance exist with which the occupied area government has as yet little or no contact?

What effect are the various acts of the occupied area government having on the different groups and leaders?

What is the state of public knowledge and ignorance concerning the plans and policies of the occupied area government and how is this affecting the plans and policies?

What are the basic anxieties of the people and what rumors are going about? What are the predominant sentiments in regard to local leaders, the enemy, and the occupied area government? In what direction are the attitudes changing? What future events do they portend?

What are the habitual, unstated but characteristic assumptions about life, society and government found in the people of the occupied areas which are different from those of the people in the occupying government?

### Conclusion

An experiment in the application of practical social science in a Relocation Center for evacuated Japanese indicated that under occupied area conditions such work could aid in the establishment of a government adjusted to the needs of the people. A number of methods for observation and investigation were utilized and found to be more effective when integrated than when any one was used alone. To employ them in occupied areas, however, it would be necessary to have adequately trained persons devoting



all their time to the work in order to secure satisfactory results. If this were done, it would be possible for the government of the occupied areas to have better knowledge of the customs of the people, their principal groups and leaders, their prevailing opinions and attitudes, their reactions to the acts of the government, and the general directions in which changes of feeling are taking place. Such information, if kept consistently up to date, would assist not only in the more efficient management of the occupied area, but would also facilitate programs for relief and rehabilitation, public health, and the planning of plebiscites and other measures pertinent to political reorganization aimed at creating stable self-management.

Although social science to be employed could include much practical knowledge that has been learned in the last 15 years from experience in agriculture, industry, colonial administration and similar fields, the conception and the common sense basis is far from new. Probably through all history there have been individuals who have successfully applied these principles, no matter whether calculated or intuitive and no matter what name they went by. In the last war, for example, T. E. Lawrence employed them and eventually roused and brought together the energies of thousands of hitherto mutually conflicting Arabs to support Allenby's army in its march through Asia Minor. He said,

"Arab processes were clear, Arab minds moved logically as our own, with nothing radically incomprehensible or different, except the premise: there was no excuse or reason, except our



Comments on Leighton's  
Assessing Human Attitudes in a Dislocated Community  
(no restraint exercised)

Take a look at the roster of the Bureau, first, on the cover page. Rosamond B. Spicer was here only for a short while, and didn't get down to work. Elizabeth Colson came here in the middle of November, 1942, and remained in Poston until the first part of the following February. She could not, and could not be expected to, get anything during her two months and a half stay here. (The Bureau moved out to a new Mexico Town in February.) Hisako Fujii, May Kinoshita, Florence Nobri, Akiko Nishimoto were stenographers. The list typifies Leighton — going after "effect." The roster looks imposing to the reader.

p. 2, bottom: "... a Japanese Relocation Center has been utilized for the study of people and their attitudes in a situation that bears some resemblance to occupied area conditions." (my underlines)

The residents suspected Leighton. They did not trust him and anyone who was associated with him. They regarded the Bureau members as insu. Leighton was suspected for his ulterior motive — he said he was here to help the Japanese, but the people did not believe him; they thought he was here to study colonial administrative technique for the Navy and not interested in the welfare of the Japanese primarily. In fact, Leighton came out with denials that he was not interested in the administration of colony.

The residents refused to be studied; they refused to become guinea pigs. Now they have been vindicated in refusing to cooperate with



him and hating him. (who wants to become a guinea pig while he is in the misery and distress in a relocation center?)

p. 4, line 6 "Their attitude toward the government ranged all the way from intense hostility to a strong desire to cooperate." An extensive paper can be written about this, although Leighton <sup>would</sup> hardly have the material. Who constituted each group? What was the characteristics of each group? Their causations? How they compared in size? It was a dynamic process. It changed from time to time. Situations and motivations for such changes? After all, it is the core of the colonial administrative problems which Leighton was interested in.

p. 4, line 12 "Different pressure groups sought power and each tried to convince the government that they alone represented the feelings of the people."

This is an exaggerated explanation. He probably referred to the small, loosely banded cliques, such as Nakamura-Okamoto clique, Nagai-Nakachi clique, Mizushima-Kato-Tanaka combination. It sounds too imposing and too invincible to call them "pressure groups."

Whenever any of these groups was falling out of political power, they went to the A.P.'s to grab a last straw in their dying moment. While they were sure of their positions, it was not necessary to obtain any support from the Administration. It was, however, true that although they had been anti-administration they became "ass kissers" as soon as they gained their political positions. This phase will be discussed in full by Tamie.



p. 4 line 22 "The transmission of information was  
... a problem of first magnitude.

Because they failed to utilize bilinguals, and  
due to the resistance of evacuees.

p. 5 lines 5-22 The Bureau is stronger on the  
administrative inner politics than us. The  
analogy in the last part is poor — not fitting.  
The evacuees were quick to pass information  
on the A.P.'s among themselves, and knew ~~in it~~ who  
were friendly and who were unfriendly. They  
differentiated the A.P.'s very quickly in their  
typical manner — pro-Japanese and anti-  
Japanese. They cooperated with the pro-Japanese,  
and hated and avoided the anti-Japanese.

p. 7 lines 3-6 I don't like <sup>the way</sup> the financial losses  
are treated here. To the evacuees' point of  
view it is of a prime importance.

p. 7 bottom. Why bring in the Daimyo stuff? No  
connection at all. Is Leighton trying to rationalize  
the hostility toward him?

p. 8 line 15. Including the Bureau members.

p. 8 bottom — p. 9 line 5 A damn lie. Sour  
grape! "a welcome challenge"? Leighton cried  
and lamented to me all the time why people  
couldn't trust him. Spicer confessed often  
that he could not get into the community. Ted  
Haas will have a great kick out of this if he  
reads this. The ~~luck~~ combination of luck and  
the technique gave them no more research  
material than those on the surface. They went  
a little deeper than those articles in the Boston  
Chronicle, I admit.

My criticism which follows will bear how  
shallowly the luck and technique dug into the community.



I shall now give you a "preview" in brief of what we observed during April, 1943. No doubt they will be handled more fully and more authoritatively by Tami in her report. I want to point out the discrepancies between our observations and Leighton's <sup>which</sup> ~~what~~ version is more truthful is up to the reader to decide. You would be surprised how different they are.

The month of April was an eventful month (like any other month in Poston) Our observations reveal that there were two major subjects of a great importance which held the interest of the community more than anything else.

1. The police corruption and gambling: This was reported in detail in my "Gambling" paper. The communal desire to clean-up Poston was developing in February and gained a great momentum at the end of ~~March~~ April. It resulted in the forced resignation of Kiyoshi Shigekawa, the Police Chief. It was a bold, courageous attempt to curb the police and the vice interests. (You have read my report. You understand how powerful these interests are and how much they were feared.) Everyone in the community talked about some phases of the situation. (I suspect that the Bureau boys were scared to report to Leighton on this matter. I should think they could have scratched the surface. The boys were trying to live down the inu reputation.)

Retroactively speaking, the clean-up was the turning point in the history of law and order at Poston. Since then Poston trodded on the road <sup>toward</sup> ~~to~~ a <sup>more</sup> stable, more controlled community. It could not have been accomplished without a



general awakening and support of the community. Petty thefts and juvenile delinquencies were inter-related with this situation.

2. Manpower shortage: This resulted from the young and able working in the Camouflage Net project and relocation. The various mess-halls felt the pinch first, or at least at the earlier part of the month. Draftings of residents into the messhall occurred. I have dealt in my Journal how the residents would get excited over the shortage of personnel in their messhalls. There was a shortage in the Fire Department, which was significant <sup>in connection</sup> with the burning down of the Block #4 Messhall. It also created a partial disruption of the food delivery to the messhalls. There was a great effort to keep the Adobe school construction going. Residents were concerned about doctors and nurses leaving Porton (Leighton's paper touches only this phase.) (his page 11, the second paragraph)

The Manpower Commission reclassified \$19, \$16, and \$12 ~~people~~ jobs. People to get \$19 a month were greatly increased. Those left out complained and demanded an increase for themselves.

Looking at these two subjects event by event, it should not be difficult to understand that they held the interest of residents further and deeper than anything else. It should not be necessary to produce my "guess graphs" <sup>as Leighton</sup> As you will remember, a conference of Block Council members of all blocks met with the evanell leaders in the Block 32 messhall toward



- 6 - <sup>listed above</sup>

the end of April. Those <sup>listed above</sup> were the subjects aired by those present. How come there are not mentioned by Leighton at all? I repeat again. His "Research Results" for April, 1943, stink.

Now, there were minor topics discussed by the residents

1. Private enterprises - especially the Stone - Polishing of Nisei, the former Executive Board member, and its political repercussions.

2. Rumors of closing of Poston

I shall now criticize his observations for the month point by point.

Food: People took it lightly. Most of them joked about neckbones, which were supplied in abundance

p. 10 line 12 " --- afraid that the center would run short of food --- " In February, yes. ( Cf. Tamie's report on the Spanish Consul's visit )

Even in February it was not held too widely.

p. 10 lines 20 - 23 They do not think about possible starvation. Fears were not presented - that was in the summer of 1941 - not in April, 1942. Looks as if Leighton guessed it.

p. 10, <sup>the first paragraph</sup> The faces of Sukichi and S. Sakamoto of the Sanitation Department, would be red ~~at~~ if they read this. They are good friends of mine. They always complain that they cannot put ideas of public health over to the residents. They fought polio and typhoid fever successfully in spite of public indifference. They should know. They run the Sanitation Department.

p. 11 the bottom - The community reaction on "American fliers" did not develop until in May.



p. 12 the third paragraph. Religion does not play a major rôle here. The latter part of the paragraph is acceptable.

p. 13. In your comment to my Journal, you have stated objections to an opinion survey. I agree with you fully. The same criticisms apply here. Only more so.

pp 13-14 Re: strike. "I, Leighton the Great, take a bow." What would Head, Evans, Haas, Kennedy, Powell, and others say about this?

pp 15-18 I have no quarrel with Leighton if this is what they should have done. He and his staff certainly did not do those prescribed on these pages.

p. 15 line 6. Geography, probably yes. Not in any other way.

p. 15 lines 7-12. These were what they could not do. They were considered as inadequate as Leighton himself ~~had~~ admitted earlier in this paper.

p. 16 lines 3-7. I know they interviewed (not free association) Nagai, Nakachi, Okamoto, Sugiyama, and others. But I know for sure <sup>they did not tell the interviewers</sup> what they actually thought. They played for the "purpose" and "occasion". They are too clever and too sly for the young kids. The kids cannot tell when they are "led on". They have to have a thorough understanding of the inner politics to catch on "tricks".

p. 17 re: Personality Studies - This is the only material I would be interested in to see.

p. 17 line 17 "Breadth of study is important, but if overdone it leads to thinness of substance." The filing cabinet of the Bureau certainly does not bear this statement.



p. 15 4-7 We are doing exactly the same thing.

p. 15 8-109 I wonder if they have enough on it.

p. 15 lines 10-15 " " " "

pp 15-23 Re: Occupied area. I have no interest, at least for the present, in the colonial administration. There is one passage of a great importance. It is the statement of Harry H. Field on page 21 (at the bottom). Leighton's statement following Field's is poor — " --- so attempt to isolate the Administration from the people". Evacuees attacked and criticized severely inefficiency, bunglings and errors of the Administration. Was a desire to seek power the motive for the attacks? Poor guess!

Leighton is better if he confined himself to the generalities and abstract observations of the Japanese, e.g. "The Japanese Families in America". When he writes such an article like this one, too many flaws are bared, e.g. his observations for April, 1942.