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CHAPTER

HISTORY OF RELOCATION

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Even in the earliest plans of the War Relocation Authority - those that contemplated wholesale individual resettlement - the task of evacuation, itself, was so tremendous that no appreciable effort could be made to develop a program of private resettlement.

Suggestions for private employment of evacuees are pouring in from all parts of the West. We appreciate the cooperation of persons and groups who are suggesting these employment opportunities. However, we want to make it clear that the mass evacuation now under way on the West Coast is such an enormous undertaking that scattered possibilities for the employment of from 5 to 500 families cannot now be examined with the necessary care, and no action can be taken with regard to such proposals at this time. We must first carry out an orderly, planned evacuation program, and relocate evacuees in general in large groups, at least until definite policies and procedures have been established, and complete surveys have been made, with respect to private employment.¹

1. WRA, WCCA, Press Release of Joint Statement of Mr. Eisenhower and Colonel Bendetsen, March 29, 1942.

Further, at this time there also existed a determination to provide a controlled program that would protect the Japanese and ensure they would not be exploited to break labor markets and wage scales. Mr. Eisenhower wrote, shortly after the "freeze" of voluntary evacuation:

Many foolish promises have been made in the sugar-beet States about providing Japanese labor; these promises simply will not be fulfilled now. The pressure increases, but I have no intention of rushing people out into situations which would be bad for the normal labor supply and decidedly bad for the Japanese workers.²

2. Eisenhower to James Rowe, Assistant Sec to the Attorney General, March 30, 1942.

Two days before the Salt Lake City meeting, WRA's director expressed a similar thought in an official communication to the Director of the Budget:

. . . New pressures are developing. Many of the same people who wished to have the Japanese evacuated in the first place are now asking that Japanese labor be kept available for various types of work. In the sugar beet and truck crop areas of the West the demands for stoop labor are beginning to roll in. Politically this pressure is going to be hard to withstand, but if we break down the orderly program and begin to rush Japanese families here and there simply to meet demands for labor, we are once again going to raise fears in the West. Untoward incidents would not be unlikely. I am putting this statement in writing because I can assure you that I am going to become increasingly unpopular as the weeks go by and as I resist the demands from this area and that. I am going to meet the demands only if the Japanese can be fully protected.¹

1. Eisenhower to Smith, April 5, 1942. Italics supplied.

The Salt Lake City meeting on April 7 put an end to all individual resettlement. "The answer is no" Mr. Eisenhower told agricultural representatives (primarily beet growers) who petitioned for Japanese labor. This decision was made because of the demands made by the Governors present: that Japanese remain under Federal surveillance; that the Federal Government prevent evacuees from buying land; that the Federal Government guarantee the withdrawal of evacuees from the intermountain states after the war, ~~etc.~~ Since neither the Army nor the WRA was willing to meet these demands, there was a complete impasse.

Agricultural interests were willing to accept Japanese workers on the terms of the Federal agencies with respect to

wages, living conditions, and personal safety. State political leaders ~~were opposed to these conditions~~ and insisted on further guarantees by the Federal agencies. In turn, the Federal agencies could not agree to the conditions demanded by the Governors and would not agree to the proposals of agricultural groups in the absence of approval by the Governors.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Eisenhower's stand in this matter was a demonstration of political courage. He, in effect, refused to accede to either of the conflicting points of view, thus losing support from both sides. In a similar fashion he turned aside (1) the suggestion of Governor Maw of Utah that the states be given Federal funds to handle the matter,¹ and (2) the strenuous demand of

1. Cf. above, p. for Governor Maw's stand. The Governor wrote Mr. Eisenhower on April 8 and again on April 13 in support of this stand.

Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado that all voluntary evacuees be recalled and handled on the same basis as those on the West Coast.² The first of these problems was not

2. Cf. Johnson to Eisenhower, April 4, 1942, Press Release of Sen. Johnson, April 5, 1942, Eisenhower to Johnson, April 8, 1942.

seriously considered; Mr. Eisenhower was apparently in full agreement with Tom Clark's admonition: "Don't ever let the states handle it - or any part of it."³

3. Clark to Eisenhower, April 7, 1942. In this note Mr. Clark said he would refer to the Attorney General the Governors'

demands re prohibiting evacuees from purchasing land and giving Federal assurance of returning evacuees to California after the war. "Personally, I am against both," Mr. Clark wrote. Citizens had a right to buy land and the promise of return to evacuated areas was not "the American way." Both of these points were academic at this time, of course, in view of the decision to stop all individual resettlement.

Senator Johnson's demand was referred to the Attorney General¹

1. Eisenhower to Biddle, April 8, 1942.

for the obvious legal opinion: it was patently unconstitutional to corral citizens who had left the military areas.²

2. Mr. Eisenhower wrote Governor Maw on April 15 to the effect that voluntary evacuees would be "given every inducement" to move to relocation centers when they were established. Many WRA officials believed that most voluntary evacuees would be forced to come to relocation centers by the force of public hostility.

The hostile public reaction which led to the cessation of voluntary evacuation, plus the Salt Lake City meeting of April 7, 1942, together accounted for the perversion of the program of evacuation to a program of detention. The detention decision once made, relocation centers were planned "for the duration." Mr. Eisenhower predicated all decisions on this assumption,³ and so did Mr. Myer during his first

3. Cf. pp ., above, and Eisenhower to Director of Budget Smith, May 11, 1942.

months in office. Nevertheless, both directors always looked forward to returning evacuees to normal American living. Mr. Eisenhower, through his entire directorship, did not believe this could be done until after the war. In his final report to the President he wrote, "The first step in the relocation

program has been to find suitable areas where the evacuees might live and work in reasonable comfort for the duration of the war." And, in the same communication, mirrored his dissatisfaction with this solution: "Only when the prevailing attitudes of unreasoning bitterness have been replaced by tolerance and understanding will it be possible to carry forward a genuinely satisfactory relocation of the evacuees into American life when the war is over."¹

1. Eisenhower to Roosevelt, June 18, 1942; the same thought was expressed by Mr. Eisenhower in his letter to the Director of the Budget of May 11, 1942.

During the initial stages of the planning for war-duration communities, an agreement between the WRA and the Wartime Civil Control Administration provided for the individual resettlement of only a very limited number of people. This privilege was restricted to persons who "had made previous arrangements to evacuate voluntarily in accordance with the order in effect up to March 29, 1942, but were prevented from carrying out such arrangements by circumstances over which they had no control" and to evacuees with tuberculosis. In both cases, release was at the discretion of the WCCA and those released went at their own risk and were required to "furnish evidence that they will not become public charges." Evacuees further were asked to agree not to leave their destination "to enter or pass through any part of the States of Idaho, Nevada, Montana, Utah, and Colorado."²

2. Eisenhower to Colonel Boekel, Memorandum of Agreement on Policies, Japanese Evacuees, April 11, 1942. The restriction

on traveling in the Mountain States was, of course, extra-legal. It was included "to minimize the possibility of the WRA having to subsequently relocate the evacuees on one of the project settlements." Cf. Eisenhower to Colonel Magill, April 15, 1942.

The reluctance of the War Relocation Authority to grant any number of permits for individual resettlement was marked throughout these first months. Mr. Eisenhower pointed out the circumstances that had led to the cessation of voluntary evacuation and saw no great change in the situation.

Therefore, the position of War Relocation Authority is unchanged. It cannot approve of further voluntary evacuations, by permit, of individuals or small groups to localities within these states, nor any passing of Japanese individuals or small groups through these states. If this is authorized, it may adversely react against present negotiations for and future operations of War Relocation Projects in some of these states as well as against individual evacuees. And, as the result, not only will mass resettlement be retarded but, also, the individuals concerned may have to be gathered up, and moved under Federal protection to reception or assembly centers. War Relocation Authority must disclaim any responsibility if the bars against further voluntary evacuation are significantly relaxed.

Individual resettlement was believed undesirable for a second fundamental reason: it would make more difficult the establishment of war-duration relocation communities.

The problem of granting Special Authorization for private evacuation of nurses and doctors is an excellent example for illustration. At a time when military necessity is requiring the services of large numbers from the medical profession, should these Japanese nurses and doctors be permitted to leave the group of evacuees when they have previously attended?

To place them in a preferred class and permit them to evacuate as individuals undoubtedly will be at the expense of the health of the remaining Japanese who must go to reception centers and relocation projects. In these days, the Army cannot fill its requirements for doctors, it is unlikely that the War Relocation Authority will be able to find non-Japanese

civilians to serve the evacuees. We must depend on Japanese doctors to protect the health of these new communities.¹

1. Eisenhower to Colonel Magill, April 15, 1942.

One further exception was made to the non-resettlement policy from the very beginning. This was in the case of college students who desired to continue their studies at Eastern institutions. In the April 15 memorandum noted above, the WRA director expressed approval of releasing college students. Even before this date, Mr. Eisenhower had tried to "weave through the educational bureaucracy" to implement the scheme proposed in April by President Robert Sproul of the University of California that federal scholarships be granted Japanese student evacuees.² On May 6, Director

2. Sproul to Congressman Tolan, April 7, 1942. As early as April 1, a group of Western religious leaders had worked on plans for student relocation under the direction of Joseph Conard.

Eisenhower wrote President Sproul that though a program of student relocation would have to receive the sanction of the Federal Government, he was convinced the major effort would have to be in private hands. "Any attempt to handle the problem as a Federal undertaking, possibly with Federal subsidies involved, would be defeated in the face of misunderstanding and near hostility."³ With the approval of the War Department,

3. Eisenhower to Sproul, May 6, 1942.

Mr. Eisenhower on May 5 formally requested the American Friends Service Committee to establish a special group to formulate

and administer a program of student relocation,¹ and at a

1. Eisenhower to Pickett, May 5, 1942.

meeting in Chicago on May 29, the National Student Relocation Council was formed.

'Here will be inserted a '
'a brief history of early'
'activities of National '
'Student Relocation '
'Council '
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Student Relocation very early demonstrated the widespread public acceptance of selected Japanese Americans. But it was a relatively minor factor in the breakdown of the non-resettlement policy. Of greater importance was the growing demand for agricultural labor and the less belligerent attitude of state officials.

Following the Salt Lake City conference, the Governors of Oregon, Wyoming, Utah and other states were the object of considerable criticism. Agricultural interests needed labor badly and made direct representations to the Governors that they change their stand and allow Japanese to be recruited for field work.

Note to come

In response to this pressure, the Governors¹ softened

1. Including Governor Olsen of California who made an abortive attempt to have Japanese retained in certain sections of California, Cf. .

their original stand, and, in turn, the War Relocation Authority developed a program of work furloughs.

Thus, at the very time that planning was progressing at full speed for the erection of war-duration communities, the War Relocation Authority was developing a two-fold *relocation* program for (1) permanent college students and (2) ~~agricultural~~ *workers.* ~~from agricultural furloughs.~~

The first sign of capitulation on the part of state governors came as early as May 1.

Labor situation in sugar beet areas becoming more acute each day. I have information that either state civil authorities or sugar beet processors would be willing to assume responsibility for housing and guards. Is there any possibility of Japanese labor being made available in immediate future? I have said did not believe any labor could be available but pressure is getting severe here.¹

1. Telegram, H.E. Dodd, A.A.A., Washington, D.C. to Eisenhower, May 1, 1942.

This wire seemed to sound the opening of concessions on the part of states officials. On April 28, Mr. Eisenhower had written the Chairman of a USDA War Board, "I wish conditions were such that they could all engage in private employment. At present the military situation, public attitude, and the general inability to guarantee safety, all mitigate against private employment. I hope very much that fundamental conditions will rapidly change."² Nevertheless, Mr. Eisenhower

2. Eisenhower to Dave Davidson, Chairman USDA War Board, AAA, Berkeley, California, April 28, 1942. ,

wrote the Secretary of Agriculture that he did not see the

greater willingness of the states as an appreciable mitigating factor of the many difficulties involved in a program of re-settlement.

The farm labor shortage in a number of states--especially in sugar beet areas--had brought a great number of suggestions that Japanese evacuees be made available immediately for agricultural work, Mr. Eisenhower wrote, "This need for beet labor is recognized, but unfortunately it would be very difficult to utilize the labor of evacuees for this purpose in the planting and thinning season." For one thing, the actual evacuation had barely begun. Further, experience up to that date indicated that it would not be possible to interrupt the orderly process of evacuation for the purpose of supplying labor to distant points without disrupting the whole program. Later, Work Corps enlistees would be granted furloughs to enter private employment if state and community officials could meet the conditions that would be determined. But there was "a tendency to look upon the evacuated Japanese as a much larger potential agricultural labor force than they actually are." The peculiar age distribution accounted for this. "If it is borne in mind that a large proportion of the people of working age will be occupied in the management of their community business life (doctors, nurses, school teachers, cooks, waiters, etc.) and in the raising of foodstuffs for subsistence and for sale, it is readily apparent that the total number potentially available for private employment is

not very large."¹

1. Eisenhower to the Secretary of Agriculture, May 2, 1942.

On approximately the same date, a re-employment division was set up within the Authority and "very little, if anything, was said about the possibility of evacuees leaving the centers permanently for private employment . . . The prevailing idea was that almost all the evacuees would remain in the centers during the war . . ."² Nevertheless, on May 4, Mr. Eisenhower

2. Memorandum, Thomas W. Holland, Chief, Employment Division, to Myer, August 5, 1943. This lengthy memorandum is a review of relocation history up to January 1, 1943. The present writer acknowledges herewith his indebtedness to Mr. Holland's review for a large part of the account of this period that follows.

laid down a tentative policy for seasonal employment that was substantially similar to the one presented by Colonel Bendetsen at the Salt Lake City meeting. Recruitment would be voluntary and under the auspices of the United States Employment Service; prevailing wages would be paid; the employer would pay for the transportation to and from centers and would provide housing and medical service; the states and local communities would give assurance of their ability to maintain law and order.³

3. Eisenhower to Holland, May 4, 1942. On May 16, the name of the Re-employment Division was changed to the Employment Division.

In a letter written to the President of the Montana-Dakota Beet Growers Association on May 5, Mr. Eisenhower explained the position of the Authority with respect to work

furloughs:

There is an intimation in your letter to the effect that the Federal Government will not exert itself to make evacuees available for private employment. In all fairness, I think you should admit that this is a surprising statement. Voluntary evacuation was encouraged until March 29. It ran into the most serious difficulties. Communities became inflamed and the safety of evacuees became doubtful. It was only when the decision was made to put the whole process of evacuation on a planned, orderly, and protected basis that feelings began to subside. It is clear that this government cannot under any circumstances afford to have a single untoward incident in connection with this evacuation. The safety of the United States, of communities, and of evacuees must be considered ahead of everything else. When safety can be assured, either through the use of military police on fairly large projects or by the States, you will not find anyone in the Federal Government discouraging private employment for evacuees.¹

1. Eisenhower to G.H. Wells, Fairview, Montana, May 5, 1942.

Meanwhile, the Solicitor of WRA submitted for consideration tentative regulations covering "Furlough From Relocation Areas." The legal personnel felt that it was necessary to have some specific procedure for allowing qualified evacuees to depart from relocation centers in order to strengthen the legal basis of the whole WRA program. The proposed regulations provided that the Project Directors would make whatever investigation of applicants he deemed necessary. In case the applicant wanted an indefinite furlough the Project Director was instructed to give attention to the applicant's past record of loyalty and cooperation, the destination of the applicant (taking into account public opinion toward the residence of an evacuee^{where}), and finally to examine the arrangements made for permanent residence and livelihood. Furloughs were to expire at any time an evacuee violated any of the

conditions applicable to his furlough or if the Director of WRA notified the evacuee that the public interest required his return to a place under the jurisdiction of the WRA. With the furlough regulations a companion regulation was drafted by WRA lawyers in order to provide some means of enforcing regulations. An evacuee on furlough was "to remain in the constructive military custody of the Western Defense Command and the Fourth Army of the United States." A violation on the part of the evacuee of the furlough regulations of WRA would subject him to the criminal penalties of Public Law 503.¹

1. These drafts were dated May 5, 1942. Cf. Holland memorandum, page 2.

On May 13, 1942, procedures were jointly established by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the War Relocation Authority under which workers could leave Assembly Centers for month-long (renewable) furloughs. In the history of the War Relocation Authority, this was the initial, halting step in the direction of a policy that was to become of the greatest importance. "At our conference in Eisenhower's office, there was general appreciation that an important step was being taken and I remember well the rather electric atmosphere that prevailed while Eisenhower made the commitments for WRA over the tactical line to San Francisco."²

2. Holland Memorandum, p. 3.

Since evacuees were still in Assembly Centers, these first regulations provided that approval or disapproval of

private employment rested exclusively with the War Department. The WRA's functions were limited to (1) obtaining "evidence and assurances necessary in making a decision," and submitting recommendations to the Army, and (2) administering the program once Japanese left Assembly Centers for employment. After evacuees were in Relocation Centers it was provided that the War Relocation Authority would accept full responsibility both for making decisions and for administering the program of private employment. The first conditions of employment were as follows:

First. All Japanese in the assembly centers must be enlisted on voluntary basis in War Relocation Work Corps. For this, a WRA representative or representatives must have the cooperation of the WCCA project staff at the assembly centers.

Second. Enlistees will then be eligible for furloughs of one month which will be extended by WRA one month at a time provided all conditions remain satisfactory . . .

Third. WRA must have in writing from the Governor of the State and from local law enforcement officials assurance that they can maintain law and order if Japanese laborers move into a specified area.

Fourth. The employer must give written assurance to WRA that it will provide bus transportation from assembly center to place of work and must also give written assurance that it will transport evacuees back to the assembly center upon expiration of furloughs or, if the assembly center has been evacuated in the meantime, the company must agree to pay to the Army which is responsible for transporting evacuees from assembly centers to relocation centers an amount equivalent to the cost of returning such evacuees to the assembly centers.

Fifth. The U.S. Employment Service must handle recruitment at assembly centers on a strictly voluntary basis. It must also have examined the living accommodations, medical care, and health facilities provided at the place of employment and give WRA written assurance

that such accommodations, care, and facilities are satisfactory.

Sixth. The employer must agree to pay prevailing wages and not less than wages required by law. If the employee's family is moved to permanent relocation center during period of private employment the company will pay, as determined by WRA, a proper part of the wage to WRA for the support of the employee's dependents, and the balance of the wage will be paid to the employee. The employer will submit to WRA each pay period a list of those to whom wages were paid.

Seventh. The U.S. Employment Service must assure WRA that other labor will not be displaced and that the wages offered and being paid are in fact prevailing wages and not less than those required by law.

Eighth. The U.S. Employment Service should make a weekly telegraphic report to WRA on general conditions in the area of employment.¹

1. Teletype, Eisenhower to Fryer, May 13, 1943. The message began, "Bendetsen and I have agreed to the following . . ."

These conditions were noteworthy for the responsibilities placed upon employers with respect to work conditions and upon state and local officials with respect to maintaining law and order and guaranteeing safety to evacuee workers. They were notable, in the second place, for what they did not contain: no Federal troops were involved; and no restrictions with respect to evacuees purchasing land were set forth. In the third place, the single month furlough and the provision for transportation back to assembly or relocation centers indicated the rudimentary and temporary character of the type of leave contemplated. ^{Even though the} ~~fact~~

military orders under which furloughs were granted were a definite bar to permanent Japanese settlement

^{as a whole} ~~that~~, the regulations represented a victory for the WRA and Army point of view and a definite retreat from the stand taken on April 7 by state officials. They did not represent however, any inauguration of a widespread relocation policy

(all furloughs were temporary) or any change in the fundamental purpose of the Authority to establish duration communities.

Even before these regulations were officially issued, an agreement based on them was signed by Governor Sprague of Oregon, the District Attorney, Sheriff and Judge of Malheur County, and the Amalgamated Sugar Company.¹ On May 21, the

1. The agreement was dated May 8, 1942.

first group of evacuee workers left the Portland Assembly Center under contract with the Sugar Company to work in Malheur County. This movement, as others that followed, was covered by a Civilian Restrictive Order issued by the Western Defense Command which set forth military approval for the removal of evacuees for private employment. Each Restrictive Order provided that evacuees would proceed only to the County of employment and return to an Assembly or Relocation center when ordered by the War Relocation Authority. Failure of evacuees to conform to this condition made them subject to the penalties of Public Law 503.

With a single exception, the regulations issued on May 13 remained constant through the Spring recruiting program. The important exception was the abandonment of Work Corps enlistment as a pre-requisite to furlough. Mr. Eisenhower, in his teletype of May 13, had emphasized that "under no circumstances should voluntary recruitment apply to persons not enlisted," and the first recruitments on May 16 and 17 at the Portland Assembly Center were unsuccessful as the result

of evacuee refusal to sign the Work Corps Enlistment form. Reasons for failure of evacuees to enlist in the Work Corps have already been described.¹ Here it is only necessary to

1. Cf. Supra, p. .

point out that, to use Mr. Holland's words, the Work Corps requirement was "put on ice." Workers were allowed furloughs without enlistment in the Corps. In a memorandum of May 23, written by Mr. Holland to summarize the conditions of farm labor recruitment, there was no reference made to the Work Corps.²

2. Holland memorandum, p. 4.

But the Work Corps was by no means the only stumbling block. The original agreement with respect to Malheur County requested 400 workers. Mr. Eisenhower analyzed the original failure to secure this number:

Recruitment in the Portland Assembly center started off fairly well but when transportation arrived for the first group of recruits only 14 would board the train. The others who had signed up appeared to fear for their safety if they left the assembly centers without military protection. Recruitment was next begun in the Puyallup, Washington, assembly center and was progressing favorably until local newspapers carried a story that the Governor of a nearby state had violently opposed the entrance of any evacuees into that State. Thereupon, further recruitment became impossible. Subsequently, the Governor just referred to wired the Director of the WRA giving assurances that evacuees who came to work in his State would be fully protected and be well provided for. WRA made this statement public If evacuees are assured as to their safety and the Oregon and Idaho agreements work out well, it is possible that private agricultural employment will assume sizeable proportions this season. Practically all of the first group of fifteen evacuee workers in Malheur County wrote back to the Portland

feeling . . . ~~last spring~~ and the expressed hostility in the areas in which job opportunities were, it was probably a pretty good showing."¹

1. Holland memorandum, p. 5.

Good showing or not, it has already been seen that this early relocation experience did not alter the concept of war-duration communities, which were at this time in their Utopian stage of planning. The tentative policy statement of May 29 still viewed the Work Corps as the foundation upon which employment, both inside and outside the projects, rested. Evacuees were eligible for furloughs of one month only. Furloughs were only renewable month by month. Employers were required to deduct from the wages of each worker the charge for maintenance of the worker's dependents remaining in relocation centers and to remit this money directly to the Authority. Other than these work furloughs, evacuees might leave centers temporarily (1) "to transact personal business, visit a medical specialist or for other legitimate reasons," or (2) in the case of students, to attend certain approved colleges or universities outside of military zones. No procedures at all existed for permanent resettlement. "Applications for permanent separation from the relocation center and the War Relocation Work Corps may be submitted through the Project Director and Regional Director to the Director of the War Relocation Authority for consideration." Similarly, each opportunity for individual private employment (as opposed to

group labor) would "for the time being be considered by the Regional Director on its merits."¹

1. WRA, Tentative Policy Statement, May 29, 1942. This statement required, in addition to the guarantees of the May 13 policy, that employers provide furlough workers with medical care and full-time work.

The assumption of this entire program was that the large majority of evacuees would remain in relocation centers for the duration of the war. Difficulties in achieving the "good life" in relocation centers were just beginning to be realized when officials of the WRA began to look forward to relocation on a larger scale. By the middle of June, 1942, it was apparent that the Authority could count on having a program for seasonal work outside the centers. There were no complaints either about evacuees as workers or about un-American activities; there was little or no violence. Evacuees were building up goodwill for themselves and at the same time were earning decent wages. "The country profited through the addition of evacuees to the gainfully employed at a time when it was vital that no source of labor be overlooked."

Yet it seemed to members of the Employment Division that a program of seasonal employment was not enough. For one thing, the first view of center life left a lasting and an unpleasant impression.

My first view of the realities of the evacuation was at the Portland assembly center and I don't believe that I will ever forget the sharp impact of this brief visit. Here were thousands of working people out of work at a time when their contribution would mean so much to the country; young and old, good and bad,

Japanese and American, were thrown closely together under one roof; and most of the people behind the barbed wire and the guns were American citizens. It seemed to me if military necessity had made this drastic confinement of Americans necessary that at the earliest possible moment after these people were out of the sensitive military area they should be encouraged and assisted to get back into the normal ways of American life just as rapidly as possible.¹

1. Holland Memorandum, p. 6.

Other considerations fostering a plan of resettlement were important. (1) It was felt that "the resettlement of evacuees throughout the country would contribute useful manpower to the country, would salvage the evacuees as Americans, would bolster the morale of the relocation centers, and beyond these immediate advantages of relocation it was hoped that this sort of approach might even go a long way toward solving the problem of the Japanese minority in the United States through an elimination of the pressure that had been generated by excessive concentration on the West Coast."² (2) The sugar

2. Ibid., p. 6.

beet labor program of the spring and early summer was encouraging. (3) There was a growing feeling among some of the WRA staff that to preserve the constitutionality of the relocation program, a vigorous program of relocation outside the centers was essential. (4) Evacuees themselves were interested, and there was much discussion of individual and group resettlement outside the evacuated area; the WRA and WCCA received many requests from individuals who wanted to accept jobs or hospitality offered by friends in the East. (5) A group of prominent

clergymen were encouraging resettlement. Representatives of the Federal Council of Churches, the Baptists, the Friends, The Y.M.C.A. and other groups urged resettlement on WRA officials and began to function in a small way to secure employment for evacuees in the middle west and the east.

(6) Personnel of colleges and universities exerted a strong, initial encouragement for relocation. (7) Finally, the Wartime Civil Control Administration had released a small number of (mostly of mixed blood) evacuees/to inland areas, after investigating each applicant and receiving assurances of favorable community sentiment; it was felt that the policy of WRA had to be at least as liberal as that of the Western Defense Command.

At the end of his first western field trip, Mr. Holland was prepared to recommend an expanded relocation program. He was "convinced that the great majority of the people will want to stay in the Relocation Centers for the duration of the war." But there were a number "just dying to get out of the Western Defense Command" and to take advantage of job offers. The Western Defense Command had indicated its willingness to release people from Assembly Centers to jobs outside the Command area. For the WRA to take a less liberal stand would be unwise. For one thing, it would mean penning up the most vocal and disillusioned Japanese which would add to the problems of center administration. For another, ^{to} ~~the~~ grant them leave would have "an excellent psychological reaction" on those who chose to stay. ^{would} It/~~turned~~ the Relocation Center into a genuine, free refuge. If the people were free to go outside

and take jobs and did not take advantage of their freedom, then the Authority would probably be able to persuade them to work more freely in the Centers.

Any trouble the Authority might have in the Relocation Centers in getting the Japanese to work, would be due to the feeling of a discontented minority that the camps were jail-like and the feeling that there was no clear-cut incentive for work. At least the former factor would be solved by allowing the discontented to leave. On June 17, Mr. Holland wrote:

To my mind, the most important thing that can be done to benefit our relocation centers would be to allow those Japanese who have propositions for outside employment to take advantage of them freely I will see Mr. Eisenhower the end of this week and hope to be able to persuade him, if he needs any persuading, as to the desirability of a liberal policy on departure for outside jobs.¹

1. Holland to Fryer, June 17, 1942.

On his way east, Mr. Holland interviewed several prospective employers of Japanese Americans and worked out a tentative policy for investigating evacuees, determining public sentiment, and contacting employers. He arrived in Washington to find a new national director. At a staff meeting on June 24, he urged that the Work Corps be eliminated and, more emphatically, that "we regard the projects as refuges for unfortunate people who could not go anywhere else and that we permit evacuees to depart from the centers for permanent relocation outside."² This

2. Holland Memorandum, p. 9.

meeting started a month-long series of discussions that resulted in the first Administrative Instruction on leave clearance.

It was generally agreed by all, and with the concurrence of the new National Director, that the Authority "could not risk numerous leaves from Relocation Centers until we have some evidence that general American public opinion was prepared to permit the evacuees to move about in this way."¹ The first policy was, therefore, a cautious

1. Glick to San Francisco Regional Attorney, June 15, 1942

one. It limited individual leave to areas outside the Western Defense Command (1) to American citizens who "never at any time resided or been educated in Japan."^{The} /applicant for a permit (2) was required to show that he had a specific employment opportunity in an approved area and to "state what arrangements will be made for the dependents who are to accompany him and for those who are to remain in the center." Project Directors (3) would "promptly investigate as thoroughly as practicable" each leave applicant, and forward with his recommendation all pertinent papers to the Regional Director. The latter official (4) would check the applicant's record with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and make "such other investigation . . . as may be necessary, forwarding the papers, together with a full report and his recommendation, to the National Director.

The National Director (5) was charged with the final

decision in approving the leave. He might impose special conditions with respect to any individual evacuee and would "make all necessary arrangements with the applicant's prospective employer, the local government authorities at the applicant's proposed destination, and such sponsors as may be designated for the applicant."

Once approval for leave was received at the Project, the Project Director (6) would issue a permit.

The permit will show the name and address of the applicant and of any dependents who are to accompany him, the time of their intended departure, and any special conditions upon which the permit is issued; will state that the permittee is required to notify the Director of the War Relocation Authority of any change of employer or change of address; and will recite that the permit is issued under the Authority of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander, and that the failure to observe the conditions applicable to it will subject the holder to the penalties provided in the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942. (Pub. No. 503, 77th Cong.)

The Authority (7) would arrange transportation for the leaving person to the nearest railroad or bus station but all other necessary transportation was to be arranged and paid for by the evacuee. Every applicant issued a permit under the instruction (8) "will remain in the constructive custody of the military commander in whose jurisdiction lies the relocation center in which the applicant resides at the time the permit is issued." Any permit "may be revoked at any time upon the order of the Director, and the applicant . . . may be required to return to the relocation center or such other place as the Director specifies, if the Director shall find such relocation

to be necessary in the public interest."¹

1. Administrative Instruction #22, July 20, 1942.

Aside from the restriction of leave to citizens alone, noteworthy aspects of this instruction were the procedures for personal investigation by both the Federal Bureau of Intelligence and the War Relocation Authority, itself; and the provisions for "constructive custody" and the application of Public Law 503. There was no personal investigation whatsoever of the persons who originally obtained short-term leave for beet field work. But a formal investigation of loyalty was considered essential at every step in the procedures for indefinite leave. In an early draft of leave regulation, dated June 24, Mr. Holland had provided for an F.B.I. investigation that would clear aliens, as well as citizens.² It was determined, however, that

2. Holland Memorandum, p. 11.

the F.B.I. could only supply a record check and could not undertake any new examination of leave applicants.³ At one time,

³Ibid., p. 12.

arrangements were also made to check the names of leave applicants against the files of Military and Naval Intelligence units on the West Coast, as well as of the F.B.I. unit of that area,⁴ and for

4. Frase to Fryer, July 6, 1942.

a time the office of Naval Intelligence of the West Coast actually checked the records of leave applicants. The central-

ization of leave work in Washington, the request of Edgar Hoover that checks be made at the central office rather than at San Francisco, and the information that central F.B.I. files included material from the military intelligence agencies - all contributed to the final decision to make the record check with the F.B.I. in Washington.¹

1. Holland Memorandum, p. 12.

The rationale for the Intelligence agency's participation in leave clearance procedures was summarized by Mr. Frase, as follows:

A. All evacuees are now under suspicion in the public mind because of the evacuation program, regardless of the official reasons which are given for the program. We cannot expect many private employment opportunities to develop except under extreme pressure of labor shortage unless we take some official action to separate what goats there may be from the sheep and only allow the sheep to go out into private employment.

B. We cannot expect state and local authorities to refrain from imposing widespread restrictions on the movement and activities of evacuees in group private employment unless we make an individual investigation and give these persons the stamp of our approval. There are curfews, deputy sheriffs, and restrictions on going into town and visiting in every area where evacuees are working that I have inspected. We are now in no position to ask for the relaxation of these restrictions.

C. The War Relocation Authority will be held responsible for any disloyal act which might be committed by evacuees permitted to go out into private employment. For our own protection alone, it is desirable to review each individual who is given a work furlough.²

2. Frase to Fryer, Comments on . . . redraft of the Furlough Regulations, and on the latest draft of the Employment Regulations, July 3, 1942.

In line with this security program, the War Relocation Authority cleared its leave program with Army officials. At

this time, the operation of the Student Relocation Committee was being seriously circumscribed by the requirement that colleges had to be cleared, by the War and Navy Departments. The military offices had refused to approve the nation's largest educational institutions. Mr. Holland was particularly concerned over the possibility that military authorities might not approve of the idea of eastward relocation and might wish to clear destinations "town by town" in the same fashion that colleges and universities were being cleared. This, he thought, would seriously threaten the entire program.

After all the checking up and chaperoning that we would do on an evacuee who wants to go East to take a job I should think the assumption would be that WRA wasn't launching a set of dangerous saboteurs across the face of the land. Moreover, if the people from our relocation centers aren't allowed to move eastward to places where Japanese aliens who weren't in the evacuation are allowed to go, we find developing a restriction that doesn't make sense To my mind the Army attitude is a most important factor in the success of any program of outside employment. If the same attitude is followed on employment as has been taken on educational institutions, I have no hope for this part of our employment work.¹

1. Holland to Myer, June 25, 1942.

On June 27, WRA officials discussed the program with the Assistant Secretary of War:

I presented briefly the proposal for developing private employment outside of relocation centers for Japanese citizens who were interested in obtaining such employment by people who were willing to provide employment. We indicated that of course the people sent out would be carefully investigated both by WRA and checking with FBI, if possible. We stated further that we would try to work out a plan to develop local sponsorship in the area of their employment. Secretary McCloy said he thought this approach sound and suggested we go ahead

with our program. We promised to send him a copy of our proposals as soon as they were more carefully worked out.¹

1. Myer, Memorandum for Files, June 27, 1942.

Mr. McCloy's sanction of the first relocation procedures was important in getting the program underway. Once started, the program progressed to the point where it continued in the face of definite opposition from influential Army officers, including an official recommendation of General DeWitt of the Fourth Army Command that all evacuees be kept in the Relocation Centers for an indefinite period and an unofficial opinion of Mr. McCloy that it was of doubtful wisdom to release large numbers of evacuees.²

2. Cf. Infra, p. . For DeWitt Recommendation, Cf. Infra, p. , for McCloy opinion, Infra, p. .

In the very earliest discussion of a leave program, Mr. Glick, WRA Solicitor, made the point that all individual leave, when granted, "should be expressly conditioned on the right of WRA to require return to the Relocation Center if circumstances make that necessary." This was "in order to strengthen our theory of constructive custody and our constitutional rights to require such return if need be."³ In an earlier discussion,

3. Glick to San Francisco Regional Attorney, June 25, 1942.

the WRA Solicitor had concluded that "the detention of Japanese in relocation centers would probably be sustained by the courts as reasonably necessary to meet war needs." But he had also pointed out that the detention of all persons would be an

unnecessary hardship for many loyal persons and that "the shifting fortunes of war may lessen the military necessity for strict detention . . ." He had concluded that the constitutional basis for detention would be strengthened if sufficient flexibility were provided so that under some circumstances Japanese could be permitted to leave the centers either temporarily or permanently.¹

1. Solicitor's Opinion No. 2, April 15, 1942. (Confidential)
The extent to which Japanese may validly be detained or their movements restricted, under an Exercise of the War Power;
Staff meeting, April 27, 1942, Summary of Remarks of Mr. Glick. Cf. Infra, p. for a fuller discussion of these constitutional matters.

Thus, from the very beginning of WRA history, Relocation was an important legal aid to the detention ~~program~~ involved in the program of wartime communities under military guard. Nevertheless, it was the argument of the legal staff and of Colonel Cress, then Deputy Director, that put the "custodial detention" clause into the first leave regulations. An original draft of the regulations, signed by the Director and ready for mailing, was destroyed because it simply required an evacuee to agree "to return to a relocation center if there is a request to do so by the Director . . ." WRA's Solicitor objected to the contractual basis of this clause, preferring to place leave on the basis of conditional permission and subject to the penalties which Public Law 503 made available. Mr. Holland was opposed to the restrictive nature of the custodial detention on the twin grounds that it imposed a restriction on loyal evacuees in areas where unevacuated Japanese were subject to no such

restriction and that it was administratively unwise for the government to retain a wardship over released evacuees.¹

1. Holland Memorandum, p. 17; Holland to McEntire, July 21, 1942.

As the leave program gathered momentum, the validity of Mr. Holland's arguments was recognized.

The memorandum of June 29 (which was never sent) best describes the spirit in which the leave program was launched. "We intend to proceed slowly and carefully with this phase of our program. We are taking only a first step at this time and other phases of the program will be dealt with later, after this first phase has been taken care of satisfactorily." ² With all

2. The Director to Regional Directors, June 29, 1942.

the caution felt and expressed, at least one high ranking WRA official urged that the leave program be at least temporarily postponed. The question was "whether the time is propitious, rather than whether the policy is sound." He pointed out that the landings of Japanese troops on the Aleutian Islands was a disturbing factor, that the Tolson Committee report "indicates the time is not ripe to attempt relocation," that relocation seemed inconsistent with evacuation which was still going on, and, finally, that the policy was subject to complete nullification by military authorities.³

3. Colonel Cress to Myer, July 15, 1942.

Relocation was launched in the face of these objections. The anticipated backwash of public disfavor did not materialize

wages offered, and the housing facilities available. These forms were submitted by the farm operators to the nearest office of the Employment Service and forwarded to relocation centers for submission to the evacuees if the Employment Service confirmed the need for labor. The advantage of the procedure was the fact that it gave evacuees a clearer picture of the conditions under which they would work.

The new procedure greatly accelerated the whole ^{farm}/recruitment process. With the Spring experience on which to base activities and with the entire recruitment program in WRA's hands, the full efforts of the Authority were put into meeting the demands for seasonal labor. By September 30, 5302 evacuees had left centers for group agricultural work and over a thousand more were still at work on extensions of their original Spring leaves. At the peak of the harvest season, there were approximately 9,000 evacuees working in temporary jobs in agriculture in eight Western states.¹

1. Third Quarterly Report, p. 11. Add note here re lack of success in harvesting long staple cotton in Military Area #1

The effort put into this group recruitment decelerated the growing administrative plan for permanent leave. In the longer term view, however, events were taking shape that were of far greater importance than the more-than-anticipated success of the fall farm labor program. For one thing, the first center difficulties were being experienced. A farm strike occurred at Tule Lake and the famed Kibei meetings were held at Manzanar.

For another, employment opportunities began developing for evacuees in a variety of non-agricultural lines in many parts of the country. In September one group of twenty workers were permitted to return to their former occupations as maintenance workers on a railroad in eastern Oregon. During the same month two transcontinental railroads filed applications with the Authority for more than a thousand maintenance employees. The greater part of the non-agriculture job offers were for domestic workers. But the Authority received a wide variety of offers, including office workers in Chicago, social case workers in New York, seamen for Atlantic shipping, hotel workers in Salt Lake City, settlement house workers in Chicago, science teachers in North Dakota, an architect in Philadelphia, jiu-jitsu instructors at an eastern university, wine chemists in Oregon, linotype operators in Utah, diesel engineers in the Midwest, dental technicians in Cleveland, laboratory technicians in a hospital in Michigan.¹

1. Cf. Second Quarterly Report, p. 12.

These things were making themselves felt in terms of policy. The entire range of WRA policy was thoroughly examined at the staff meetings in San Francisco during August. There, the National Director stated that a vital and integral part of the Authority's program was relocation outside the projects. This was an event of importance: for the first time relocation was placed as one of the principal objectives of the Authority. The effect of the statement was described by Mr. Holland:

I don't believe that the Director's statement took too strong a hold on the staff at this time. In mid August of 1942 W.R.A. was just in the middle of its efforts to house, feed, and settle the evacuees in the relocation centers; the officials were preoccupied with these problems. Sugar beet recruiting had been rather unpopular with the project staff during the early summer. Little or nothing was known of the possibilities for relocation in the mid West. The development of the leave procedure was familiar to the lawyers and members of the employment division staff but not generally in W.R.A. An outside relocation program was generally looked upon as a novel and risky venture in contrast to a safe and sure relocation in the centers. What the Director's statement did do was to put everybody on notice that a relocation program outside the centers was to be taken seriously.¹

1. Holland memorandum, p. 27.

Despite apathy on the part of project personnel, the WRA proceeded to expand the procedures for permanent relocation. A committee, headed by Mr. Holland, thoroughly discussed an enlarged policy at the San Francisco meeting, using as a basis a new draft of regulations submitted by the Solicitor's office. Upon returning to Washington, Mr. Myer received approval of the new program from both the Justice and War Departments. War Department approval was given by the Assistant Secretary of War, although he pointed out "that some officials of the War Department, particularly the Western Defense Command, might raise some opposition."² Mr. McCloy's personal views were

2. Cf. Memorandum of Edward Ennis to Charles Fahy, September 7, 1942, recounting telephone conversation of Mr. Ennis with Mr. Myer.

by no means completely favorable to the new program.

Although I am quite clear that the policy to be adopted is up to the War Relocation Authority to determine,

I am doubtful about the wisdom of a widespread release of the Japanese at the present time We would be missing a very big opportunity if one failed to study the Japanese in these camps at some length before they are dispersed. We have not done a very good job thus far in solving the Japanese problem in this country. I believe we have a great opportunity to give the thing intelligent thought now and to reach solid conclusions for the future . . . we might very well influence their thinking in the right direction before they are again distributed into communities.

I am aware that such a suggestion may provoke a charge that we have no right to treat these people as "guinea pigs," but I would rather treat them as guinea pigs and learn something useful than merely continue to treat them, or have them treated, as they have been in the past with such unsuccessful results.

For the sake of the Japanese themselves, I would therefore wish that Dillon Myer would take some very long thoughts before committing himself to a principle of immediate and extensive release.¹

1. J.J. McCloy to Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, September 30, 1942.

This was a personal and not an official opinion. Officially, Mr. McCloy took the position that the internal security aspects of a large leave program were primarily the responsibility of the Department of Justice, except for certain military areas.²

2. Interview with Edward Ennis, date to come

Of first importance was approval from the Department of Justice. WRA officials first discussed the program with Edward Ennis, head of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, who wrote that the proposed regulations was "a very substantial change in policy under which the emphasis and most of the activities of WRA will be devoted to resettling Japanese throughout the country rather than to building up permanent war relocation centers alone."

Mr. Myer had pointed out that inter-camp tension would increase

greatly if a great many more Japanese were not released. Mr. Ennis commented:

Detention of the Japanese was never contemplated originally and was made necessary only because of the resistance of interior communities to resettlement. If WRA could devote its energies to liquidating that resistance and settling the Japs in interior communities, no reason for continued detention remains. On principle it is a very unwise policy to get the American people used to the idea of detaining for the duration a large minority of American citizens not accused of any offense.

.
I recommend that the Attorney General approve the proposal of WRA to increase its effort to resettle Japanese American citizens out of resettlement centers, assist in obtaining War Department approval if that is thought necessary, and recommend the plan when it is submitted to the President.¹

1. Memorandum, Edward Ennis to Charles Fahey, September 2, 1942.

Mr. Ennis' approval of relocation was duplicated throughout the entire Justice Department. On September 7, Mr. Ennis wrote: "I advised Mr. Myer that the Attorney General had indicated that he was sympathetic with the plan and in a general way approved the development of the idea."² The next step for

2. Memorandum, Edward Ennis to Charles Fahey, September 7, 1942

the War Relocation Authority was to secure ~~the~~ War approval of the internal security aspect of the new leave program from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Ennis paved the way for this approval and on September 24, he could write: "Mr. Myer . . . advises me that he had a completely satisfactory discussion with Mr. Hoover who fully endorsed the program of relocating of Japanese."³ The final consummation of Justice Department

3. Edward Ennis to the Attorney General, September 24, 1942.

approval came through an exchange of letters between Director Myer and Attorney General Biddle. The WRA head wrote that the Relocation Centers were places of temporary residence where evacuees would stay until arrangements could be made for their permanent relocation. Those arrangements were now made and they were designed to accomplish two primary results: (1) The relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry throughout the United States under circumstances that would enable them to become integral parts of the communities into which they went, with the least possible disturbance; and (2) the delayed relocation - with residence continuing in the Relocation Centers in the meantime - of those evacuees whose individual records indicated that the war program would be endangered unnecessarily if they were to be relocated at the present time. Then followed the first categorical statement of the hope for the liquidation of relocation centers:

We believe that this latter group will be a relatively small one, and that it is safe to attempt to relocate the great majority of the evacuees before the war is over.

I should like to emphasize that we regard the Relocation Centers as temporary wayside stations between the former residences of the evacuees on the West Coast and the new ones they will establish elsewhere. We should like to complete the relocation process as rapidly as possible. To do so is essential from the standpoint of fairness and justice. The action will also have an important bearing on our manpower problem, and will do much to prevent the accentuation of a minority problem that may otherwise plague us for many years to come.

But it was not wise to undertake permanent relocations without providing an opportunity for segregating those who might be dangerous to the nation's security, Mr. Myer continued.

Therefore, a procedure was recommended by which the Department of Justice would check the record of each evacuee against the files of the various security agencies, including the FBI and Army and Navy Intelligence Services, before that evacuee was allowed to leave a Relocation Center. If this investigation produced no adverse results, evacuees would leave the centers subject only to the internal security safeguards applicable to the general population.¹

1. Myer to the Attorney General, September 24, 1942. On September 29, 1942, a similar letter was sent by Mr. Myer to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

The Attorney General's reply was in complete approval:

It is believed that the program outlined by you, which involves a check of all persons before they are granted leave, is sound from the internal security standpoint, and this Department, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will undertake the check the names of the persons to be granted leave against the investigative records.²

2. Biddle to Myer, September 25, 1942.

Thus, armed with the approval of the Federal Agency primarily responsible for the nation's internal security, officials of the War Relocation Authority issued the new leave regulations.³ The new regulations were, in general, a complete

3. The Regulations were first published in the Federal Register, September 29, 1942, title 32, C.1, part 5, becoming effective on October 1, 1942. Administrative procedures were spelled out in Administrative Instruction No. 22 (Revised), November 6, 1942.

liberalization of the rules of July 20. Two points were outstanding: Instead of citizens alone, all evacuees were eligible

for indefinite leave; instead of "constructive military custody" being maintained, relocated evacuees were required to keep the Authority informed with respect to changes of address and leaves were subject to revocation only when regulations were violated or when "conditions are so far changed, or when such additional information has become available that an original application . . . for leave would be denied"

Three types of leave were provided: short term, work group, and indefinite. The first was for not more than thirty days and was to permit evacuees to leave centers to attend to personal matters. The second continued, in substance, the procedures of September 1 for agricultural labor groups. The third was expanded to include not only persons with definite employment offers but also "for education or indefinite residence outside the relocation area." In all cases, character investigations preceded leave. Discretion for granting short term and work group leaves was vested in the Project Directors, with the added proviso that original approval of work groups was the responsibility of the National and the Regional Director.

Investigation of applicants for indefinite leave was similar, though more elaborate, than that provided in the earlier instruction. The Project Director was to carry out a character investigation on the Project, and transmit the record and recommendation to the National Director. The latter official was responsible for carrying through the record check with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the final

approval or disapproval of leave. But it was provided that

A leave shall issue to an applicant . . . as a matter of right where the applicant has made arrangements for employment or other means of support, where he agrees to make the reports required of him . . . and to comply with all other applicable provisions . . . and where there is no reasonable cause to believe that applicant cannot successfully maintain employment and residence at the proposed destination, and no reasonable ground to believe that the issuance of a leave in the particular case will interfere with the war program or otherwise endanger the public peace and security.

Nevertheless, special conditions could be attached to leaves "as may be necessary in the public interest." A system of appeals was provided for those denied leave. Even those evacuees who were not prepared to relocate, were urged to file leave clearance applications so as to expedite procedures if and when an opportunity for relocation came.

All leaves were subject to the restrictions imposed by military authorities with reference to restricted zones or areas. This was the only restriction on the travel of those with indefinite leave. Those with short term and group work leaves were limited in travel to the specific destination defined on the leave, itself. Travel in restricted military areas was authorized only when covered by a military permit.

Though Mr. Myer had written the Attorney General on September 24 of his hope that "the great majority" of evacuees would be individually relocated, this emphasis on the new policy was not communicated to staff members of the Authority until November 11. On that date, Mr. Myer made the announcement in no uncertain terms:

I have definitely decided that it is essential that

we clarify our objectives in this organization, so there will be no chance for misunderstanding; and as I see it right now, we have two major objectives.

One is to go just as far as we can with the relocation of people on the outside of relocation centers on a more or less permanent basis.

Having determined that, the second one would be the most effective and decisive administration of the work in the relocation centers, in the simplest manner possible, in order to effectuate the first objective.

I have arrived at that decision after a great deal of almost prayerful thinking and discussion with a number of people. There was a question in my mind two months ago, and even a month ago, whether we could get public acceptance, whether we could get the acceptance on the part of evacuees if we did get the public acceptance, to get a major job done in that field. I have now determined that we can get public acceptance, and we can get evacuee acceptance on a very large scale.¹

1. Staff Conference, Verbatim Report, November 12, 1942, p. 1
A similar statement was made at a meeting of Project Directors in Salt Lake City at the end of November, Cf. Holland memorandum, p. 34

Three things, (Mr. Myer continued) were necessary before the "one major objective . . . to get people relocated as quickly as possible" could be implemented. It was first necessary to be able "to say to J. Edgar Hoover that Francis Biddle thought this was all right." It was, second, necessary to convince the War Manpower Commission that the most effective utilization of manpower could be made only through individual relocation. And "the third keystone is the utilization of Japanese Americans in the Army." Internal security ^{had been} and manpower aspects ^{were about to be,} ~~of the situation had already been~~ cleared; and Mr. Myer "hoped" that re-entrance of Japanese Americans into the Army would be an accomplished fact "within a week or ten days."

^{he asserted.}
There were other straws in the wind, / The Army Intelligence

Service wanted to train 400 Japanese Americans. An Army arsenal in Utah had requested permission to recruit 250 evacuee workers. Three railroads wanted Japanese. Contractors wanted laborers. Government agencies wanted white collar workers. "Day after day, as far as I am concerned, the evidence is piling up that this job can be done if we set our stage to do it."

Camp administration would be simplified and streamlined in order that full energies could be devoted to relocation, Mr. Myer's statement to the staff continued. This might lead to an initial, further frustration within the centers, where long-term profit-sharing projects were already underway.

"Until we get over the hump and get it understood, we've got a terrific task ahead of us . . ." There might, further, be resistance to the new program among project personnel, who might exert pressure on evacuees to stay in the centers in order to assist in center enterprises, but these resistances would have to be broken down. There would be no one saying "If you leave the project and go out, you are doing the unpatriotic thing." Evacuees would have to be trained to replace evacuees leaving. Project personnel would have to be trained to adjust themselves and their programs to this routine and to aid, not resist, relocation.

The program would be further expedited by the establishment of field offices throughout the country to work with prospective employees and with the public. At the same time, the Regional organization would be simplified and projects

1. For other considerations leading to abolishment of Regional Offices, Cf. Infra. p. . (not yet written)

would report directly to Washington.¹ / A new program of inter-organization education would be launched. In addition, there would be planned "the most intensive face-to-face educational job with the general public . . . through the kind of contacts that will have people everywhere know what this program is [and] why it is that way" Local committees would be organized in cooperation with church groups and welfare agencies. A fuller cooperation would be give the Japanese American Citizens League as well as with Issei groups.¹

1. Ibid. pp. 2-32

Mr. Holland had again been in the field to discuss relocation with evacuees and with administrative personnel, as well as to meet with community groups and with educational leaders. At a meeting with representatives of national church groups under the auspices of the Federal Council of Churches and with several national social welfare agencies in October, programs were set forth by which evacuees would be aided in securing jobs and in receiving favorable public acceptance.² On

2. Digest of Information, No. 23, October 24, 1942.

September 19, there were 350 individual applications for indefinite leave in Washington.³ By November 21 more than a

3. Digest of Information, No. 18, September 19, 1942.

thousand applications had been filed for clearance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Up to this time, however, less than 150 applicants had been approved by the investigating

agency.¹ It was obvious that the first bottleneck in the re-

1. Digest of Information Nos. 25 and 26, November 21, 1942.

settlement process was the time necessary to make record checks by the FBI. Mr. Holland had estimated that this process would take no more than six weeks for each individual applicant. In practice, clearances took as much as three months.² Mr. Myer

2. Cf. Holland memorandum, p. 32

accordingly urged greater speed on J. Edgar Hoover and received promises for speedier action.³ By the middle of November, local

3. Note to come

committees to aid resettlement were beginning to operate in Chicago, Madison, Minneapolis, and St. Paul.

As time passed, WRA officials increased their determination ^{to} ~~to more and more~~ emphasize relocation. At a staff conference in San Francisco on November 27 and 28, plans were laid for a considerable expansion of the entire program, including the immediate establishment of field offices scattered throughout the country to expedite the securing of jobs for evacuees. Offices at Chicago, Denver, Cleveland, Kansas City and other places were planned.⁴ The Washington staff of the employment division was

4. The Chicago office opened on January 4, 1943.

considerably enlarged.⁵ "We had been planning to handle through

5. Digest of Information, No. 29, December 26, 1942.

Washington around five or six hundred applications a week. The

Director's idea was that we should aim to double, or if possible, triple this figure. 1

1. Holland, memorandum, page 35.

During this trip across the country, every activity of Mr. Myer testified to his determination to push the relocation program to its fullest extent. In his talks at the Relocation Centers, in his address before the national meeting of the Japanese American Citizens League², in his conference with pro-

2. Cf. Pacific Citizen, November 26, 1942.

ject directors at Salt Lake City, he emphasized relocation above all else. During this trip Mr. Myer also talked with General DeWitt.

I discussed the leave program for more than an hour with General DeWitt. He expressed no open disapproval, but he did ask about the danger of sabotage at a place like Salt Lake City, for example, where there was bound to be a rather large concentration of people relocated. I told him very straightforwardly that I thought there would be no greater danger from this group than from any other, even in the event of a Japanese attack on the coast. Plainly he had his doubts. At only one point did it seem to me that I received any real response from the General. That is when I told him that the agricultural groups were so insistent on recruiting labor that, even if we wanted to keep the evacuees in the camps for the duration, we would find it impossible to do so. The General said, 'I can understand that.'³

3. Grodzins' notes, interview with Dillon Myer, September 29, 1943.

Every device possible was utilized to encourage relocation. Consultations with the War Manpower Commission resulted in an unqualified recommendation for the program, and the appearance of what Mr. Myer had defined as the second foundation stone of

a successful relocation policy. War Manpower Director, McNutt wrote:

As I understand it, the War Relocation Authority has formulated an employment program for those of Japanese ancestry who have been evacuated from the West Coast to encourage their employment and adjustment, under proper safeguards, into the customary channels of American life. This policy should have the dual effect of benefiting the evacuees, many of whom are American citizens, and of making available to the country several thousand people for employment on farms and in industry.

The War Manpower Commission thoroughly endorses the employment program developed by the War Relocation Authority and assures it the continued cooperation of the United States Employment Service in its recruitment and replacement activities.¹

1. Paul V. McNutt to Myer, November 27, 1942. Cf. also Myer to William Hiber, Chief Planning Division, W.M.C., September 25, 1942.

As early as September 12, Mr. Myer had protested the order of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which had prohibited the certification of Japanese Americans to any Federal position until complete investigation of each individual case had been completed.²

2. Cf. U.S.C.S.C. Circular letter No. 3615, March 7, 1942.

It seems probable that such an instruction effectively bars citizens of Japanese origin from Federal service since very few appointment officers are willing to hold vacant a position pending completion of the investigation, (Mr. Myer wrote). "Furthermore, the letter would seem to constitute discriminatory action against one group of citizens since so far as I am aware, no such procedure is necessary in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry."³

3. Myer to Arthur Fleming, U.S. Civil Service Commission, September 12, 1942.

On March 27, 1943, the Commission again ^{opened} ~~closed~~ Federal Civil Service rolls to Japanese Americans.⁴ on substantially the same basis as other citizens.

4. U.S. Civil Service Commission, Circular letter #3982, March 27, 1943.

Arrangements were completed with The American Friends Service Committee and other church groups by which evacuees could leave centers to reside in church-operated hostels even before definite employment was secured.

The number of employment offers for evacuees, from the very first, exceeded expectations. Though these offers in the beginning were preponderantly for such jobs as domestic workers, clerks, restaurant help, and hospital workers, their caliber and attractiveness increased as time passed. By the end of December, however, only some 200 persons had left relocation centers on indefinite leave.¹ The increasing center tensions, made evident

1. Cf. Pacific Citizen, December 24, 1942. This number does not include the more than 250 college students relocated through the Student Relocation Committee or the several thousand men in various branches of military service.

by a prolonged strike at the Poston Center at the end of November and a riot that resulted in the death of two residents at Manzanar in December, increased the official determination of WRA officials to accelerate the leave program.² They were not deterred, either,

2. Grodzins' Notes, Interview with Dillon Myer, September 30, 1943

by the rising sentiment on the part of evacuees in opposition to relocation.³

3. Cf. Infra, p. .

The bottleneck in relocation continued to be the time lag between the application and granting of leave. The hostel arrangements solved this difficulty only for a very small percentage of evacuees. At a Denver Conference in January, one project official

described the acuteness of the situation:

I am going to pop! I am about ready to explode! We . . . go all out on relocation, and we have engaged in forums and discussions. We had all kinds of adult education programs in preparation for the relocation. We have had vocational education in planning for it. In fact, we have gone about as far as we can. The thing that has disturbed me most is that we have, to date, 56 indefinite leaves approved, other than for education, and we have some 1200 applications in Washington. There are fully 500 people who have managed to get their own jobs and who have been waiting, waiting, waiting--six weeks, two months, as long as 90 days--people who have done their own planning for relocation and worked it out themselves. I can't do any more on their relocation until we break the bottleneck in Washington!¹

1. Staff Conference, Denver, Colorado, January 28, 29 and 30, 1943, Verbatim Report.

This was by no means the extreme situation. And even under the best of circumstances, in specially handled cases, a period of weeks was necessary to complete the filing of forms and recommendations, the formal investigation, and the transmission of necessary papers from projects to Washington and back to Washington again. Employment, of course, was frequently lost as the result of these delays. Evacuees expressed doubts about the sincerity of the Authority's program. It was therefore determined to build up a file of all persons eligible for leave, irrespective of whether or not these persons had indicated a desire to depart from the projects.

While this decision~~s~~ was taking shape, lengthy negotiations with respect to the re-admission of Japanese Americans into the armed forces were being concluded. It had long been felt by WRA officials that restitution of Selective Service procedures

to Japanese Americans would be a most significant step in restoring the minority group to its normal position in American life. The War Department, under WRA prodding, considered the matter for many months. What emerged was no Selective Service but an opportunity for Japanese Americans to volunteer for a special army combat team. To this was added an opportunity to be cleared for employment in industries producing war materials. Announcement of the combat team was made by Secretary of War Stimson on January 28, with the statement that "It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle." President Roosevelt warmly endorsed the program. "The proposal . . . has my full approval No loyal citizen should be denied the right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry"1 And WRA officials hailed the announcement

1. War Department Press Release, February 3, 1943

as their biggest victory up to that time. It was felt that the favorable publicity would open up new job opportunities and make the public more willing to accept evacuees. Aside from receiving volunteers, a Special Joint Board, set up under Army auspices, would review questionnaires of the entire adult citizen group "with the expectation" that the Army would "put the stamp of approval" on a large group of people for work in defense plants. Government agencies could now be expected to cooperate wholeheartedly in WRA's program. The "positive segregation" of relocation would be substituted for segregation, as such, and

the latter program needed no longer to be seriously considered.¹

1. Cf. Infra, pp. .

The entire relocation program would be given a tremendous boost.

We are agreed that we should go all out. Just as soon as this announcement is made we should have a press conference and answer any questions. We are working now on plans for radio program, movie shorts, newspaper articles, and hope by the middle of February we will be set to go on a program that will help to clarify the whole program. Until we got this Army thing established we would be running into snags right and left. Now I think we are ready to go.²

2. Mr. Myer at Staff Conference, Denver, Colorado, January 28, 29, 30, 1943, Verbatim Report.

As a part of the recruitment program for Army service, as well as to implement war plant clearances, the War Department decided to have all eligible citizens execute loyalty questionnaires. The War Relocation Authority decided to implement its own leave program and to build up complete leave information on all evacuees by combining its own leave clearance registration with the Army registration. By pre-clearing large numbers of evacuees, the bottleneck of relocation would be broken. But combining the two registrations was a major mistake in administrative strategy and WRA's greatest victory thus became linked with WRA's greatest error.

The causes and consequences of the hostile reception accorded Army and leave clearance registration by evacuees are analyzed fully in the next chapter. ~~Instead of immediately boosting the relocation rate, registration had exactly the opposite effect. Instead of attracting favorable publicity to Japanese Americans, registration resulted in unfavorable~~

~~publicity directed at the large number who refused to swear allegiance to the United States and the small number who actually enlisted for Army service. Instead of eliciting greater allegiance from evacuees, registration evoked a greater distrust towards government than ever existed before. Resistance to registration was both widespread and intense, and at several projects virtually all community activities ceased as the result. Resistance was partly due to the confusion arising out of combining of leave clearance with Army registration, many people believing that leave registration was tantamount to Army enlistment. This was patently a case of confusion as the result of inadequate explanation by WRA officials. Other causes for the registration of non-allegiance were no less removed from the matter of actual loyalty. Nevertheless, Registration~~ ^{results} ~~on their~~ surface, might have had disastrous results for the relocation program. More than 25% of all citizens of Japanese ancestry, for example, answered negatively, or refused to answer, or qualified an answer to the question: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese emperor . . ."¹

1. Cf. Infra, pp. , for further details

WRA officials were not willing to scrap relocation on the face of the results of registration. At first, Mr. Myer was not prepared to deny leave clearance even to those answering "No"

to the loyalty question. He turned to the Attorney General for advice. It was natural to assume, he wrote on March 1 to Mr. Biddle, that a citizen answering "no" to the loyalty question "is thereby openly confessing disloyalty to the United States and loyalty to Japan." This reasoning had led to the suggestion that these persons should be segregated and denied leave clearance. On the other hand,

There is some danger that the significance of a negative answer . . . can be missed, and the meaning of this phenomenon greatly over-simplified. For example, at Heart Mountain . . . a group of evacuees asserted that they were perfectly willing to fill in the questionnaires and volunteer for service in the Army but not when requested to do so from behind barbed wires . . . The more thoughtful reports I have received . . . point out that a negative answer . . . given by a person who is suffering this complex of emotions, may have quite a different significance than such an answer would have if given by the average citizen under average circumstances.

To deny indefinite leave to citizen evacuees who had negatively answered the loyalty question, Mr. Myer continued, would mean "punishing such citizens with detention for the duration of the war because of that action." Constitutional and legal difficulties stand in the way of such action. It also would break up families and move a large mass movement of evacuees which was "precisely what many of the evacuees fear most." On the other hand, "failure to take appropriate action . . . may impede the effectiveness of the leave program by causing general popular distrust of the loyalty of the evacuees."¹

1. Myer to Biddle, March 1, 1943

The problem that presented itself was clear: WRA officials were convinced of both the righteousness and the feasibility of large-scale relocation but they were faced by demands from many quarters that some proportion of "disloyal evacuees" should be segregated from the larger group and denied the privilege of relocating.¹ Though not convinced of the

1. Cf. Infra, pp. re segregation demands.

necessity for the latter program except for a few restricted classes (such as those who had expressed a desire to repatriate), the registration program had seemingly increased its necessity. And this was especially true because of the adverse effect non-segregation (or the withdrawal of leave privileges) might have public and thereby on the on the/larger relocation program. WRA's immediate solution to the dilemma it thus faced was (1) the submission of a comprehensive plan to the War Department to effectuate both widespread leave clearance and segregation, and (2) continued encouragement of relocation while holding segregation in abeyance.

The proposal to the War Department, transmitted in a letter of March 11 from Mr. Myer to Secretary Stimson, was breath-taking in its implications.

Under this plan, all American-citizen evacuees cleared by the Joint Board . . . would be permitted to return to the evacuated area and would be recommended for work in war plants throughout the country. Parents of men in the armed forces and other members of their immediate families would be released from relocation centers and allowed to return to the evacuated area provided their record was otherwise good. Provision would also be made for release of veterans of the last war and perhaps others whose record in no way was open to question. The remainder of the evacuees (except those who might be designated by the joint board for internment . . .) would be handled much as we are now handling the entire group. Those who wished to return to private life . . . outside the evacuated area would be processed under the regular leave procedures. Those who wished to remain at the centers would be

permitted to remain. Selective service would be re-instituted immediately for all American citizens of Japanese descent. Evacuees cleared by the joint board . . . would no longer be subject to discriminatory restrictions and regulations.

This plan was designated Plan "C" to differentiate it from two alternative lines of procedure. One alternative was conservative: the continuation of the then current course of action, emphasizing relocation; the other was radical: removal of all restrictions which applied to Japanese Americans and not to the American public at large.

The conservative alternative had two ~~dis~~advantages. (1) it was in existence and accepted; (2) it would lead, if successful, to a widespread dispersal of evacuees which "might well simplify the problem of assimilation . . . now and in the postwar period." But the disadvantages of the conservative plan outweighed its advantages. It would succeed in relocating no more than 25 percent of the evacuees in any short time and the ten relocation centers would have to be maintained. It thus would ~~have to~~ remain a costly program. It meant a limited contribution to the warpower problem, it would continue "the psychologically unhealthy conditions of relocation center life," it would continue exclusion of evacuees from the West Coast, leading to further serious property losses and "an ineffective use of many farm properties at a time when food production is badly needed." Finally "To a large degree . . . [it] involves continued discrimination against American citizens and law-abiding aliens on the grounds of race."

The radical plan was advantageous because it would

permit a full use of manpower, thus greatly reducing government costs; alleviate property losses; simplify postwar adjustments by the immediate restoration of loyal and law-abiding aliens to normal home life and normal economic opportunities; and it would "go a long way toward eliminating racial discrimination and disproving the thesis of the Japanese militarists that the United States is conducting a racial war." On the other hand, this plan would arouse "considerable conflict and criticism" particularly in the evacuated area "because of the economic and racial emotions that exist." It would also work against a dispersal of Japanese Americans throughout the country and might evoke criticism in regions where farm operators counted on using evacuee labor.

Plan C, representing "a middle ground approach" had some of these disadvantages, though the public criticism would probably be less intense, Mr. Myer wrote. On the other hand, Plan C "(1) would provide for a reasonably effective use of manpower; (2) would go a long way toward alleviating property losses and would provide for more effective use of many farm properties; (3) would return a considerable group of evacuees to normal social and economic life and would simplify the problem of evacuee adjustment in the postwar period; (4) would reduce government costs; (5) would largely eliminate the charges of racial discrimination; (6) would provide definite rewards for loyalty and sacrifice."

It was therefore recommended that "we adopt Plan C or something similar to it immediately." Further, it was

recommended that the program completely removing restrictions be adopted "as soon as all real danger of West Coast invasion seems to be eliminated."

The War Relocation Authority, Mr. Myer wrote, had operated from its inception with three basic assumptions. One was that "all evacuees of Japanese ancestry, except those who requested repatriation and those who may be deported for illegal activities, will continue to live in the United States after the close of the war." The second was that "the United States has no intention of conducting the war on a racial basis and that the relocation program should be carried out at all times in harmony with this principle." The third assumption was that "all American citizens and law-abiding alien residents of the United States should be treated by the government, insofar as possible under wartime conditions, without racial discrimination."

In the light of these assumptions, the many difficulties involved in the administration of relocation centers took on added significance, / ^{Mr. Myer asserted.} There was widespread individual and collective insecurity within the centers. Frustration, fear, and bitterness were present and were one of the fundamental causes behind nearly all the demonstrations that had occurred up to that date. Agitators had been able to produce results "out of all proportion to their number" as the result of these tentions. They had been able to encourage allegiance to Japan and discourage cooperation with the United States. They had been able to bring great counter-pressure on the citizen group. A "gradual breakdown of the pre-war structure of Japanese American

family life," had been brought on by enforced idleness, mess-hall feeding and the living conditions of crowded barracks. Abnormal economic conditions within the centers had resulted in large numbers of evacuees "becoming apathetic and . . . losing nearly all incentive for achievement." The use of manpower in the centers was highly inefficient and would probably remain so; the full use of the labor force could be realized "only in normal pursuits outside the relocation center." A further economic consequence was the separation of evacuees from their properties in the evacuated area. Much of this property was farm land and it was "of such a nature that it can probably be handled with full effectiveness only by Japanese American families who have had long experience in this highly specialized type of farming." As long as evacuees remain in relocation centers, many of the farms would never make their maximum contribution to the war effort. A final large problem was the growing drive against the citizenship status of Japanese Americans by "certain small groups who seem to have interests other than the immediate problem of coastal defense . . ." This drive might lead in a time of emotional stress to actions "out of keeping with our democratic principles--actions that might perhaps have serious international implications." Moreover, "I cannot escape the feeling that the arguments of these groups will continue to have a superficial air of plausibility just as long as an official stigma remains attached, in the public mind, to all the evacuated persons."

Some of these problems had been anticipated in the early days of the War Relocation program. Most of them, however, had

become far more acute and widespread than originally expected, and some had not been foreseen at all. They were particularly disturbing in the light of "several highly pertinent considerations":

The first of these is that the danger of invasion has undoubtedly receded. Another is the increasing seriousness of the manpower problem. A third is the need for pushing food production and other production activities to the utmost. And the fourth consideration is the high desirability of eliminating, insofar as possible, all discriminatory actions against American citizens and law-abiding alien residents of the United States at a time when we are fighting abroad for the principle of freedom and democracy.¹

1. Myer to the Secretary of War, March 11, 1943.

Plan C was suggested by officials of the War Relocation Authority because it was a means to (1) live up to the Authority's "fundamental assumptions," (2) solve the unsolvable problems of center administration by eliminating the centers as far as possible, and (3) adjust the Authority's program to meet the altered conditions of the military and manpower situations. It was a program of imposing greater restrictions on some evacuees while eliminating restrictions for others. ^{the Assistant Secretary of War} Mr. Myer wrote/that the imposition of greater restrictions through segregation "without offering compensatory benefits to the loyal would result in something very close to disaster . . . it would serve only to intensify those anxieties and fears which have led steadily to deterioration of the faith of the evacuees in America . . . it was time to take positive steps to reverse an obvious trend." The War Relocation Authority, Mr. Myer continued, was willing to leave to the War Department and the various intelligence agencies

to determine who would be interned permanently and who would be permitted free movement, or restricted movement, as outlined in Plan C. The operation of the plan would require two kinds of centers. One would be for persons of questionable loyalty who would be held for the duration of the war. The other would be for those who, though cleared by the screening process, were unable to relocate immediately. It would be Mr. Myer's hope "that only a few of this second kind of center would be necessary after a little while," and he would recommend that the ^{or} permanent centers be operated either by the War Department or the Department of Justice.¹

1. Myer to McCloy, March 12, 1943

No optimistic hopes were held by WRA officials that this type of combined relocation-segregation program would be immediately accepted. But Mr. Myer wrote "It is my plan to keep pushing the matter with the Secretary of War until we get his approval . . . It took six months to get the Army to accept the Nisei, and this move, much more sweeping in its ultimate effect, may take as long, or even longer. But Plan C is the goal toward which we are working now."²

2. Myer to All Project Directors, Confidential, March 15, 1943

In the meantime, the Authority proceeded to implement its own relocation program. Financial aid was offered evacuees granted indefinite leave for the purpose of accepting employment. The first policy provided that cash assistance would be granted to make up the difference between the family's cash resources and

the cost of railroad coach fare for each member of the family, three dollars per person per day of travel for meals en route, and an initial cash subsistence payment of \$50 for the wage earner plus a maximum of \$50 for his dependents.¹

1. Administrative Instruction #45 (Revised), March 24, 1943. Supplement 1 of this Instruction, dated April 14, 1943, liberalized its provision with respect to the families of soldiers. Supplement 2, dated May 19, provided that evacuees leaving centers for a hostel or "to accept private hospitality" were eligible to receive the financial aid. This largely removed the limitation granting aid only to persons who left centers for the purpose of accepting employment. Supplement 3, dated June 11, 1943, provided for safeguards to avoid giving relocation assistance grants to persons with sufficient funds to cover transportation and initial subsistence.

Financial incentives to evacuees were but one of the several administrative efforts to expedite relocation. Under the basic leave regulations of October 1, two distinct Washington actions were required before an evacuee could leave a center: (1) leave clearance had to be approved; and (2) an application for indefinite leave had to be passed. Whereas the first of these Washington investigations was a review of a form roughly similar to the one used during the registration, the application for an indefinite leave permit called for (1) information on the applicant's financial status; (2) the specific destination and arrangements made for employment or support outside the relocation center, and (3) an agreement to keep the WRA notified of changes in address or employment. The second Washington investigation was deemed necessary in order to bring character investigation up to the date of departure, as well as to provide a check on the validity of the employment offer and the temper

of public feeling in the receiving area.

Though it was possible for evacuees to submit simultaneously both application for leave clearance and an application for indefinite leave, the Washington paper work was time-consuming. It was especially an impediment when an indefinite leave application was filed on the receipt of a job offer by an evacuee. Jobs were frequently lost as the result of delays in Washington, even though the basic character investigation involved in the leave clearance had been previously concluded.

In March, important steps were taken to speed up these procedures by a process of decentralization. First, the^{almost} purely mechanical function of issuing leave permits, in cases where clearance had already been granted in Washington, was made a responsibility of the Project Directors and the function of checking community sentiment was transferred to the various relocation field offices. The discretion of Project Directors in granting leaves to those who had already been granted leave clearance was initially limited to evacuees leaving to accept employment offers secured through one of the WRA field offices.¹

1. Administrative Instruction No. 22 (Revised), Supplement 4, March 3, 1943.

Later, this discretionary power of the Project Directors was specifically restricted so that it excluded paroled aliens and all leaves for employment in the Eastern Defense Command; at the same time, the power was considerably extended to include

dependents or close relatives of workers.¹ The effect of these

1. Administrative Instruction No. 22 (Revised), Supplement 7, March 20, 1943.

provisions was to accelerate the handling of indefinite leave applications (though not of applications for leave clearance) and to give the field offices some control over the influx of evacuees into the communities of a given area.

An even more fundamental modification in leave regulations was promulgated on April 2. By this date, registration had been completed and the investigation of registration results begun. Once this process was complete and all dockets processed through the intelligence agencies, all evacuees would be granted or denied leave clearance. That is to say, registration supplied the basic data for the handling of leave clearance, en masse, and, once completed, clearance would be eliminated as a separate step in the leave procedures. The Administrative Instruction of April 2 anticipated this development, by giving Project Directors authority to issue leave in advance of Washington leave clearance provided certain requirements were met. These requirements limited the discretionary power of the Project Director to cases in which the applicant (1) had registered for leave clearance during the military registration of February and March; (2) had answered the loyalty question with an unqualified affirmative; (3) had not applied for repatriation or expatriation; (4) was not a Shinto priest; (5) had not previously been denied leave clearance; where (6) the Project Director believed, upon the basis of an investigation, that there was "no reasonable ground

to believe the issuance of indefinite leave would interfere with the war program or otherwise endanger the public peace and security; and where (7) the proposed place of employment was not within the Eastern Defense Command.¹

1. Administrative Instruction No. 22 (Revised), Supplement 9, April 2, 1943, Supplement 10, June 28, 1943.
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In addition to this extensive administrative decentralization, other efforts were made to encourage relocation. For one thing, an extensive program of vocational retraining was undertaken. The principal purpose of this program was "to provide such employment skills for Japanese Americans as will aid them in securing employment out of the centers, preferably in critical and essential occupations." The program was also designed to supply workers necessary for the day-to-day operation of center activities. Vocational retraining committees were established in each of the centers.² At first the retraining program was

2. Administrative Instruction No. 87, March 29, 1943.

confined to an intensification of project activities. Thus, quick courses were given High School graduates in stenography and typing. Also, employment sections of each project undertook the training of apprentices in such work as automobile mechanics, farm machinery operation, nurses aides, teaching, etc. Later, an out-of-school youth program was initiated in the metal trades and allied fields. This program was financed by federal funds given to states and was limited by both the federal appropriation and by the willingness of states to devote funds to the Japanese. Advantage was also taken, within the limitation of state funds

and the willingness of state officials of state vocational training programs which were principally in the agricultural field.¹

1. Grodzins' Notes, Interview with John Provinse, October 7, 1943

Arrangements were completed with the National Youth Administration for young Japanese Americans to partake in the resident training program of the NYA. This program was enthusiastically received by WRA officials, as well as by many young evacuees. More than 200 Nisei had already enrolled at NYA centers for national defense courses and approximately 500 more had indicated a desire to enroll when the program was cancelled. The cancellation came as the result of criticism directed at the WRA program by congressional leaders as well as by the already precarious political position of the National Youth Administration. In a conference with WRA officials, the NYA administrator, Aubrey Williams, frankly explained that NYA withdrew its program for Japanese Americans in order "to avoid any action that will endanger the continuation of the NYA program." This action was taken despite the fact that the entire question of that Authority assuming responsibility for such an unpopular cause was discussed prior to the arrangements being completed. The WRA "was given assurance that NYA was prepared to accept the burden of unfavorable comment or publicity which might arise." Since the NYA in the past had "stood strongly for certain principles of fairplay and racial tolerance" the decision to abrogate the agreement with WRA "came as a distinct shock" to WRA officials.²

2. Myer to Aubrey Williams, June 7, 1943. Dropping the Japanese program, incidentally, was no balm to NYA's unpopularity. It died by congressional action during the 78th Congress.

An endorsement of the relocation program was secured from the War Food Administration which, through Administrator Chester A. Davis, urged "the use of persons of Japanese ancestry . . . [for] work on farms."¹ And War Department regulations were

1. Davis to Myer, May 28, 1943.

altered to allow citizen evacuees to be employed at Army Posts and Establishments after investigation by the office of the Provost Marshal General.²

2. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Directive, May 3, 1943; Myer to Project Directors and Relocation Supervisors, May 10, 1943.

A Washington group worked on detailed procedures for putting Plan C into effect.³ But on May 10, the War Department

3. Cf. Memorandum, unsigned, Proposals and Procedures for Effectuating Plan C, undated.

replied to the Plan C recommendation. The answer was "no."

"The importance which the War Department attaches to segregation renders premature any consideration of relaxing the restrictions in force in the Western Defense Command against persons of Japanese ancestry . . ."⁴ WRA officials were in strong dis-

4. Stimson to Myer, May 10, 1943. Cf. Infra, pp. for detailed comment on segregation proposal.

agreement with the War Department stand that segregation had to precede a general relaxation of restrictions. The WRA, Mr. Myer wrote, favored the "positive" segregation of wholesale relocation of all loyal Japanese. It was "the only process of wholesale segregation which has very much to recommend it." To segregate

the disloyal without offering the compensations of relaxed restrictions to the larger group might be "something near to disastrous." From the point of view of the Japanese Americans, themselves, the disadvantages of this type of segregation outweighed its advantages. Nevertheless, public acceptance of the relocation of evacuees would no doubt be facilitated by segregation "in view of the importance . . . attached to segregation by the War Department and by other agencies and individuals who are guided by the War Department position. . . ." "For this reason primarily we believe it will be worth the effort and demoralization it will entail."¹

1. Myer to the Secretary of War, ^{date} Cf. Infra, pp. , for further consideration of this exchange of correspondence.

The determination to succeed with relocation thus became a prime factor in the decision to proceed with segregation. Segregation, itself, is fully discussed in the next chapter. Here it is only necessary to indicate its effect on the relocation.

Plan C was a program by which evacuees would be divided into three groups by a special board of intelligence officers. After screening, the first group would be freed entirely from wartime restrictions; the second would be free to relocate outside evacuated areas only; the third would be detained within centers for the duration. It was Mr. Myer's contention that the greater restrictions imposed upon the third group had to be counterbalanced by the withdrawal of restrictions against the first and larger group. Mr. Stimson, in effect, replied that

the two movements could not come at the same time: segregation had to precede any lifting of restrictions. The War Relocation Authority accepted this dictum with reluctance. It proceeded with a segregation program that was an emasculated version of Plan C, without the compensations to evacuees that could be granted only by the unwilling War Department. This is to say, segregation was designed by WRA officials to separate the evacuee population into those eligible for leave and those ineligible. Those ineligible for leave were segregated. Those authorized to leave were encouraged to do so. Such a program had been considered as early as November, 1942,¹ and had been abandoned at that time because

1. Glick to Myer, Confidential Memorandum, November 6, 1942; Cf. Infra, pp. .

of the hope that relocation would be so successful that no segregation at all would be necessary.

Segregation took leave privileges from (1) those ^{who} ~~that~~ had applied for repatriation or expatriation and had not retracted their application before July 1, 1943; (2) those who had negatively answered the loyalty question during registration and who after brief investigation demonstrated their answers were sincere and understood; and (3) those who after intensive investigation were deemed dangerous or disloyal because of such things as adverse reports by intelligence agencies, adverse records in relocation centers, changed or qualified answers to the loyalty question, trips to Japan, and ~~applicatio~~ affiliation with certain Japanese cultural, economic or patriotic organizations.²

2. Cf. chapter for full discussion.

Despite the adverse effect segregation had on evacuee morale, the War Relocation Authority devoted every administrative device to prevent the segregation from interfering with the process of relocation. Efforts to increase the attractiveness of "normal living" were increased and indefinite leave procedures again liberalized. Project Directors were given authority to issue leaves in every case except ⁽¹⁾those clearly marked for segregation, or (2) "doubtful cases" where further investigation was necessary. ¹ This apparently wide discretionary power

1. Cf. Handbook in Issuance of Leave from a Relocation Center July 20, 1943.

vested in the Project Director was much reduced by the inclusive criteria set up for "doubtful cases." These cases were first defined as those in which (1) the registration loyalty question was qualified or originally negative and later changed; (2) an expatriation or repatriation application had been made and subsequently retracted; (3) there was an adverse report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (4) the Japanese American Joint Board, established in the Provost Marshal General's office, did not affirmatively recommend leave clearance; (5) other information required explanation in the opinion of the National Director. In such cases, it was specifically provided that the Project Director had no authority to issue leave until clearance had been approved by the Washington office.² For such cases, elabor-

2. Cf. Administrative Instruction No. 22, (Revised), Supplement 12, June 5, 1943.

ate investigating procedures were provided in the determination of leave eligibility.

THE JOINT BOARD

As a matter of practice, most of the "doubtful cases" were returned to the Project as the result of the action of the Japanese American Joint Board. This Board had been set up by the War Department prior to registration for a dual purpose: "To determine (a) loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers, and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or may be available for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort."

The Board was composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the War Relocation Authority, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army, the Office of Army Intelligence, the War Department General Staff, and the Provost Marshal General's Office. Originally, it was concerned only with the questionnaires executed by Nisei citizens of military age who did not apply for voluntary service.¹

1. The questionnaires of volunteers were forwarded to a special staff of Army Intelligence officers in whom rested responsibility for the approval or disapproval of the induction of these people into the combat unit.

These questionnaires, accompanied by information in WRA files pertaining to the loyalty of the applicant, were checked through the Provost Marshal General's office against the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. At the discretion of the Provost Marshal, certain questionnaires were also checked against records of the Western Defense Command. The specific functions of the Joint Board were

(1) to recommend to the War Relocation Authority its decision as to whether individual evacuees should be given indefinite leave, and (2) to "state whether the Joint Board has any objection to the employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort of any of those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are released by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to its recommendation."¹

1. Directive of the Adjutant General's office, confidential, Loyalty Investigations of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in War Relocation Centers, January 20, 1943.

The advantages brought to the leave program by the institution of the Joint Board were ^{thought to be} manifold. In the first place, from the public relations aspect "nothing would have been better for our program than to spread the responsibility for indefinite leave so that we could say that a board, composed of representatives of all the national security agencies, had approved the departure of evacuees from relocation centers." In the second place, it was believed that a great number of evacuees would be cleared for work in war industries. "I had the definite idea that more than fifty per cent of the Nisei would be cleared for defense plant work, and this would have been a great boon," Mr. Myer stated.¹

1. With the approval of the Justice Department for the leave program, it was at first believed that no special ^{military} clearance would be needed by evacuee citizens to work in industries devoted to the war effort. However, the War Department, and not the Department of Justice, was responsible for internal security provisions in war industries and Army security officers objected to the employment of released evacuees in war centers without special investigation. Actually, several evacuees were already working in war industries before this problem arose. Later, a provision

was made for the investigation of those evacuees working in war industries who had not been previously investigated.

In the third place, it was believed that evacuees would respond favorably when it became known that they were cleared for work in essential industries.¹

1. Grodzins' Notes, interview with Dillon Myer, September 30, 1943.

The idea of opening up employment opportunities in war production was developed in the War Department when the decision was reached not to reinstitute selective service for American citizens of Japanese ancestry, but rather to provide a limited opportunity for voluntary induction into a special combat team. Some objection to the segregated combat team of volunteers on the part of relocation center residents was anticipated, and war plant employment was apparently conceived as a demonstration of further good faith towards Japanese Americans by the War Department. During the registration period in the relocation centers, the Army teams presented the alternative possibility of employment in war plants as well as the opportunity for military service.

The functions of the Joint Board were enlarged shortly after it was instituted. It had been decided that a special army clearance was necessary for evacuees to go into the Eastern Defense Command and the Provost Marshal General delegated responsibility for this clearance to the Joint Board. It thus became necessary for the Joint Board to screen not only male citizens of military age, but female citizens and aliens desiring to enter the Eastern Defense Command.

At first, the Joint Board by selecting the obviously "good" cases, moved with appreciable speed in recommending persons for leave clearance. But it was very soon apparent that the Board would not live up to the high expectations of WRA officials. For a time, it seemed the Board would hinder, rather than facilitate, the clearance program.

Mr. Calvin Dedrick, who had worked as chief statistician in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, was assigned to the Provost Marshal's office and in turn detailed to the Joint Board. Mr. Dedrick brought to the Board "the philosophy of the Fourth Army Command," which, generally speaking, was one that viewed Japanese Americans with a greater degree of suspicion as to their loyalty than did officials of the War Relocation Authority or other intelligence agencies. The wholesale clearance of persons for war plant work did not occur, it being decided at an early meeting of the Board that "it was not unreasonable to require a thorough investigation of such people.¹ At Dr. Dedrick's

1. Meeting of March 26, 1943, Cf. McCloy to Myer, June 25, 1943.

recommendation, on April 29, this investigation took the form of referring each defense plant case to the Western Defense Command. There the process for investigation took several months for each case and, consequently, it was decided by the Provost Marshal General's office, in whom discretion rested, that it would be practical to refer only a small proportion of the total number of applicants for this investigation.²

2. Grodzins' Notes, Interview with Dillon Myer, September 30, 1943. Draft of letter, Myer to McCloy, July 8, 1943.

With the appearance of Dr. Dedrick and the initial disappointments over the results of the Joint Board, the War Relocation Authority was ready to give up the entire idea. At the suggestion of the War Department, however, it was decided to allow the Board to continue its task.¹

1. Grodzins' Notes, Interview with Dillon Myer, September 30, 1943.

Mr. Myer's impression that "a panel of citizens eligible for employment in war plants was to be quickly established"²

2. Draft of letter, Myer to McCloy, July 8, 1943.

very quickly had to be corrected. The Joint Board was established on January 25, "Some 74 individuals" had been pre-cleared for war plant employment by April 29. "Because of the field investigation requirements for pre-clearance and the absence of any pre-cleared case, the whole plan has thus become a bottleneck in this employment field rather than opening it up more widely as was the intention of the original War Department proposal."³

3. Ibid.

Accordingly, Mr. Myer instructed Relocation officers of the Authority to postpone handling job offers coming from vital war plants until a panel of pre-cleared evacuees was built up.⁴

4. Myer to Project Directors, August 12, 1943. Early in 1944, War Plant regulations were relaxed. To come

The problem was complicated by the fact that no clear definitive description of a warplant was in the hands of the War Relocation officials, as well as by the fact a number of non-cleared

evacuees had secured employment in some plants making war materials before the Joint Board was established.¹

1. Myer to McCloy, July 8, 1943

Though the clearance of citizens² eligible for war plant

2. Employment of alien enemies in defense plants was outside the scope of the Joint Board. It is governed by special procedures directly through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Cf. McCloy to Myer, June 25, 1943, enclosure.

employment was thus almost a complete disappointment, the Joint Board's actions in recommending indefinite leave had more satisfactory results for War Relocation Authority officials. Recommendations for indefinite leave was made synonymous with approval to enter the Eastern Defense Command. By first processing the obviously favorable cases, more than 6,100 evacuees were screened by April, 1943, and of those the Board failed to recommend leave in only 125 instances. The 6,000 persons thus cleared for leave and for the Eastern Defense Command compared very favorably to the 74 individuals approved for War plant work. The Joint Board had 36,000 citizen cases to consider. By October, 1943, 18,000 individuals had been recommended for leave, while 6,000 had been refused this recommendation. The Western Defense Command had received 2,400 cases for investigation re warplant employment and had approved 363. No data is available on the alien cases considered for clearance to the Eastern Defense Command.³

3. Grodzins' Notes, Interview with Thurber, October 11, 1943. More quantitative here when available.

It will be noted that the Joint Board's function re war plant employment was regulatory: those not cleared for such work

had no further recourse except an appeal back to the Board.

On the other hand, the Joint Board's responsibility with reference to indefinite leave was simply advisory: the transmission record for adverse cases simply stated that the Board "cannot recommend in favor of the granting of indefinite leave at this time."¹ The War Relocation Authority, however, was not bound

1. Cf. Form PMGO-J-A2 - Office of the Provost Marshal General, Japanese American Section. Cf. also Holland to Rowalt, April 15, 1943, discussing problems created by non-recommendation of Joint Board.

to adhere to this recommendation, and conducted further investigations on every case not recommended for leave by the Joint Board. These cases fell in the category of "doubtful cases," noted above and were subject to the intensive investigation provided for such cases.² Of the first 6,000 cases in which the Joint Board did

2. Cf. Administrative Instruction No. 22 (Revised) Supplement 12, June 5, 1943; also Grodzins' notes, Interview with Thurber, October 11, 1943.

not recommend leave clearance, the War Relocation Authority had reversed the decision on 144 individuals by October 1, 1943.³

3. Since re-hearings were not completed by this date, it is probable that final data will show a much larger proportion of reversals. Clearance by WRA in the face of adverse action of the Joint Board was different only in that it carried no Eastern Defense Command clearance, as did favorable recommendations by the Joint Board.

In many cases, the decision of the Joint Board not to recommend leave was simply a ratification of WRA procedures which led to segregation. That is to say, there was complete agreement on repatriates and expatriates, unqualified and unchanged negative answers to the loyalty question, and certain adverse

intelligence reports. On the other hand, a considerable number of evacuees were not recommended for leave where, in the opinion of WRA officials, "a civilian or a judicial judgment would result in a contrary opinion."¹ These cases included many who

1. Holland to Myer, April 6, 1943.

had changed answers to the loyalty question, who had visited Japan one or more times for educational and other purposes, who had worked for the Japanese government, Japanese periodicals, or Japanese-owned firms, who had membership in certain Japanese organizations, etc.² Many of these cases would have been

2. Cf. Confidential Memorandum to Project Directors, October 11, 1943, Suggestions for Conduct of leave clearance hearings.

granted leaves under WRA procedures without further, intensive investigation. The Joint Board's reticence on these points, however, greatly increased the number of those put on "stop lists" and greatly increased the number of investigations of "doubtful" cases.

IMPEDIMENTS TO RELOCATION

Other deterrents to relocation were more important than the administrative complexities involved in insuring the public safety while simultaneously attempting to keep injustices to individuals at a minimum. From first to last, the relocation program was met by political hostility. Led by Congressmen of the Pacific Coast states, criticism started with the first college relocation. California American Legion groups carried the opposition to areas into which relocated

evacuees were moving. When rumors spread that evacuees might be returned to the Coast, hundreds of protesting resolutions were passed by groups of Native Sons, Elks, Moose, Scouts, Legionnaires, County supervisors, and various defense organizations. In many cases, these actions attacked not only relocation to the West Coast but the free "infiltration" of Japanese Americans into any section of the country, and the induction of Japanese Americans into the Army.

The Governor of California demanded that all Japanese Americans be kept in camps for the duration. The mayor of California's largest city put himself in agreement with those who were attempting to deny citizenship rights to American citizens of Japanese ancestry through court action or constitutional amendment. Numerous groups demanded that Japanese never be allowed to return to California. Others asked to have "disloyal" sections of the population - or all of it - deported at the conclusion of the war. The West Coast press gave more than adequate publicity to all the extreme demands and the Hearst papers adopted a specific editorial stand in complete opposition to any relocation whatsoever.¹

1. Cf. Chapter , infra, for full analysis of the Resurgence of Regional Pressure.

Two Congressional investigating groups, by bringing unfavorable, and in large part inaccurate, publicity to bear on alleged disloyalties of Japanese Americans were a serious deterrent to the relocation program. The activities of a

subcommittee of the Dies Committee, under the chairmanship of Congressman John Costello of Los Angeles, were particularly effective. Members or spokesmen of this committee declared at various times that:

As many as 76% of the Japanese at one camp refused to profess loyalty to the United States.¹

No evidence was available that WRA made a "proper check" before releasing Japanese.²

"The nation's most dangerous Japanese . . . were released . . ."³

The subcommittee's report would "oppose release of any Japanese whatsoever, American citizen or alien, from confinement."⁴

"The WRA must be releasing many who are not loyal to the United States, who would become distinctly dangerous should opportunity present itself."⁵

"Spies and saboteurs" were being released from relocation centers.⁶

1. Washington Times Herald, May 28, 1943.

2. UP Dispatch from Washington, May 29, 1943.

3. UP from Los Angeles, June 16, 1943.

4. San Francisco Examiner, May 11, 1943.

5. Los Angeles Examiner, May 14, 1943.

6. Los Angeles Times, May 29, 1943.

Indent [All relocation be stopped until the Committee could
issue its report.¹

1. Wire J. Parnell Thomas to F.D. Roosevelt, May 19, 1943.
For a more detailed discussion of Dies Committee and Chandler
Committee activities, Cf. Infra, The Resurgence of Pressure.

In the great majority of cases, relocated evacuees were
afforded fair and courteous treatment in the areas into which
they went. Employers were glad to receive workers, churches
and social agencies collaborated with WRA officials to cushion
first experiences in jobs and apartment hunting, and philan-
thropic individuals lent help and advice. A number of cases
of community opposition and even violence were reported,
however. Two college girls were forced to spend an evening
in jail at Moscow, Idaho, for their "self-protection;"² the

Note to come

Note to come

citizens of Park, Missouri and Elmhurst, Illinois, led by
Legionnaires, exhibited marked hostility;² farm workers in
Marengo, Illinois, had to be temporarily removed;³ Filipino

Note to come

sailors badly beat several young Nisei in Chicago;⁴ shots were

Note to come

fired by hoodlums into a Japanese farm-labor camp at Provo,
Idaho.⁵ In addition to these manifestations of illwill, con-

Note to come

flicting reports of treatment were brought back to camps by

seasonal workers and by letter from those on indefinite leave.

When relocation was first inaugurated, the two limiting factors anticipated were (1) availability of employment, and (2) willingness of the public to accept evacuees. Despite unfavorable publicity, both of these factors were soon largely overcome by the field offices specifically set up for that purpose. Manpower shortages were so acute that there were, very shortly, many more positions open than there were qualified evacuees willing to accept them. In a like manner, the economic need for manpower plus the benevolence of church and educational groups plus the work of WRA field workers, were sufficient, except in few instances, to overcome community resistances to the settlement of Japanese Americans.

If two anticipated difficulties were thus conquered early, three unanticipated ones remained to slow down the flow of relocation. One was an administrative problem: clearing evacuees through intelligence agencies; supplying character investigations; fitting evacuees to jobs; segregating the "disloyal". This ^{had yet been} ~~was~~ not completely conquered until early in 1944, when clearance investigations were still being held for "doubtful" cases. A second problem was that of housing: the greatest demand for evacuee workers came from war industry towns where housing accommodations were frequently already crowded. The combination of this fact and an indisposition on the part of property owners to rent to Orientals made housing difficulties most acute. Many ^{relocatees} ~~relocatees~~ settled in inadequate and sub-standard quarters.

EVACUEE RESISTANCES TO RELOCATION

The third problem was largely unanticipated, yet it encompassed and mirrored all other difficulties. At the time of this writing, it was the least successfully solved and the most likely to prove a permanent, insoluble stumbling block. This was the problem of evacuee resistances to relocation.

It is at first difficult to comprehend why residents of onerous apartments in physically uncomfortable and socially abnormal communities would resist the chance to leave those communities. Yet the reasons for this resistance were many and cogent. Only a few are suggested below:¹

1. For a full analysis, Cf. Thomas and others, op. cit. vol. 29, p. 109342

Though community attitude toward resettlers ^{were with} ~~was almost~~ ^{few exceptions} ~~without exception~~ favorable in the resettling areas, evacuees for the most part read West Coast newspapers, ^{only.} There was never an absence of some kind of unfavorable report with respect to Japanese Americans ^{in these papers.} There was always available for discussion reports to indicate unfavorable public sentiment with respect to Japanese Americans outside the centers. If Governor Warren ^{of California} was not warning the governors of other states to prevent the dangerous Japanese from moving into their areas, then District Attorney Howser of Los Angeles was reporting that he had letters from three organizations which indicated the Japanese would be slaughtered wholesale if they were allowed to return to the

West Coast. If the American Legion was not holding forth on the dangerous, excessive birthrate of Japanese, then the Native Sons of the Golden West were continuing by resolution and court action their attempt to deprive the Japanese of their American citizenship. If the mayor of a Washington city was not tacking up a sign "No Japs wanted," then the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce was distributing the results of a questionnaire that showed conclusively that the return of Japanese to the West Coast would be both unwelcome and dangerous.

That this hostility existed ^{almost exclusively} on the West Coast, where the Japanese could not go in any case, did not detract from its effectiveness as an impediment to relocation. The West Coast, to the evacuees, was their only contact with the country ^{known} ~~as a~~ ^{to evacuees} ~~whole~~, and even if ^{some distinguished the} ~~they were able to make the distinction,~~ ^{from that of the remainder of the country} ~~whole~~, ^{sufficient} evidence was available ~~in~~ in the national publicity of the Dies Committee, for example, . . . to demonstrate the unity of the coastal areas and the country as a whole. The various unpleasant incidents experienced by relocaters in the middle west substantiated this view. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of evacuees were treated fairly, and certainly without violence, it was the unfavorable adjustments that were publicized and discussed. Thus, to many evacuees, relocation projects despite their deficiencies were at least safe and friendly; the world outside was unsafe and hostile.

To the fears of physical danger were added the uncertainties of wartime living. Rationing, housing shortages, ~~food-cost~~, clothing deficiencies, and especially the high cost

of living,--all were uncertain factors that would increase difficulties of outside life. Many of them were magnified and distorted, yet they loomed large on any resettler's horizon. Relocation projects at least promised food and shelter; these were uncertain factors in the outside world.

Both of the above two situations were largely the product of partial and distorted information. Both were correctable through channels of information available to the WRA. Other factors, however, were neither imagined nor easily corrected.

A very large proportion of Japanese Americans found themselves with little or no financial resources after a year in the relocation center. The impoverishment of the entire racial group constitutes one of the most socially and politically important consequences of the evacuation. With few exceptions, evacuees liquidated farm and business property at considerable loss, ~~to themselves~~. In addition, many sold household goods and farming equipment at depressed levels. What cash was realized from forced sales was in large part depleted at assembly and relocation centers, in supplying small household comforts and buying clothing, shoes, medicine, and other incidental items not covered by the wage paid. As a result of all this, it was largely a financially dependent group that the WRA attempted to return to normal life. A WRA Community Analysis Report generalized on the evacuees' economic difficulties:

His savings are depleted if not wholly gone, and he is no longer in touch with sources of credit who know him and who can arrange with him for proper security on

loans . . . If he does go out, he needs money to supply himself and his family with food, clothing, a new outfit of household goods, kitchen utensils, etc. If he starts farming, he needs enough money to be able to keep his family until he can market his crops. If he sets up a business, such as he had before, in order to purchase goods, he has to secure priorities and get his previous business activities reference transferred to a new location. He has to secure credit for some goods, and have enough money to keep his family fed, clothed and sheltered until he can get his business running profitably. All this must be done in a wartime economy, under various restrictions at a time when goods are in strong competition, and the buyer needs cash . . . if he wants a chance to get as good a stock and as adequate a supply as his competitors.¹

1. Granada Community Analysis Report No. 2, Evacuee Attitudes on Relocation, page 89.

For a large proportion of evacuees, of course, there was no hope for setting up business anew. This in itself was a deterring factor since former business owners or operators were reticent to accept positions as subordinate workmen. Nor did the type of position usually offered make it possible for many to accept such positions, even if willing. Few jobs were open in the fields in which ~~some~~ evacuees had experience--such as irrigated farming. The majority of evacuees were not qualified for anything but the lower paying jobs that were offered. Such jobs did not offer salaries large enough to support families.

It was the older Issei group, with families, that was most firmly caught in this net of circumstances. They, by and large, were the independent farming group. They were unqualified for the type of job offered, and they were responsible for the largest number of dependent children. They were most susceptible to the fears over unfavorable community sentiment and

the uncertainties of wartime living. To all these handicaps was added the handicap of language, many of the Issei having little or no command of English.

The cohesiveness of the Japanese family unit and the Japanese community was an added factor impeding the relocation. Parents could obviously not leave relocation projects without their younger children. At the same time, parents exerted an influence on normally independent^{er} offsprings. The argument was that the family, at least, should be preserved at a time of such great adversity. An extension of this attitude was the reluctance to move to areas where there were no other Japanese Americans, where there would be no friends, no Japanese language spoken, the difficulty in securing Japanese food and the impossibility of creating a small in-group of acquaintances.

The ever-present possibility ^{that} of the reinstitution of Selective Service processes would interrupt relocation plans also impeded the relocation. The determination of many evacuees to return to California as soon as that was legally possible was still another deterrent. Despite all the hostility of the West Coast, the West Coast was home, the only home known to the vast majority of evacuees. Among those who owned property or businesses and who retained friends on the West Coast, there was a special determination not to move to the Middlewest, when such a move was only a prelude to still another.

All the above factors are only the immediate consideration that prompted evacuees to stay where they were. Another

set of reasons operated less immediately but with no less effect upon the relocation process. Foremost here was the reaction to the evacuation itself. These reactions ranged from confusion to bitterness, from inability to decide where to turn to a determination that the government should support the evacuees in compensation for the losses of evacuation.

Japanese aren't treated equally as the other minority races. (Male Issei)

Too many people take advantage of us by working us too cheap. (Male Nisei)

I think as the government thought fit to put us here, now it is up to them to help us to establish ourselves as before. (Female Nisei)

Due to evacuation, I have lost everything I built upon sweat and blood; therefore, I have lost my faith and confidence in making a living for the future. (Male Issei)

America, a melting pot of all races, is a democratic nation. Why in the world do they have to pick on a small minority (Japanese). The politicians are out to ruin the names of the Japanese . . . wrecking the lives of innocent loyal Japanese Americans. Until these things could be stopped this country is not a true democratic nation. (Male Nisei).

Our status as an American citizen has not been restored to us fully by the military authorities. (Male Nisei)

Lack of confidence in American democracy . . . don't care to be kicked around and driven out again from new localities, when resettled. (Male Nisei)

The real reason behind my hesitancy is that we have no guarantee of safety for our life. I cannot see through the situation to make a satisfactory living. (Male Issei.)¹

1. The above quotations are taken from tables 4 and 5, Granada Community Analysis Report No. 2, Evacuee Attitudes on Relocation.

The debilitating effects of "living on the government" also were noticeable. Previous to evacuation, the Japanese community had been conspicuous for its absence on State and Federal relief rolls. Once within assembly and relocation centers, however, this reticence to accept government relief was replaced by demands for more liberal subsidies. Such demands were understandable when considered in the light of project conditions. Nevertheless, they were the source of considerable official concern. The transformation of a highly independent resourceful group into one that made continuously increasing demands upon the government was one of the first noticeable social phenomena of evacuation. As we have seen, it was one of the determining causes for the first decision to emphasize relocation. At the same time, it was one of the most potent factors retarding relocation. The financial grants offered evacuees for transportation and initial subsistence were considered inadequate.

If this growing dependence on federal subsidies was in large part the last resort of a bewildered group, it was also partly a conscious determination to make the government repay, as fully as possible, the losses suffered during the evacuation. There was, in other words, a group of evacuees who refused to relocate because they felt the government was obligated to support them at least for the duration and, perhaps, permanently. This attitude was adopted by many of those who were determined to return to California after the war. And there is evidence that it was ^{also adopted by} ~~partly made up of~~ persons who were waiting for an

ultimate Japanese victory, at which time the Japanese government would insist upon full retribution and repayment. These people regarded relocation as a trick by which the government would relieve itself of its responsibilities and they were opposed to cooperating with the government even if it were sincere in its protestations that relocation was the "democratic way." For still others of less positive faith in Japanese victory, the relocation center offered a convenient resting point of neutrality: during the war itself, there would be food, clothing and shelter supplied; if the Japanese government was victorious in the war, they could not be accused of aiding the United States government by relocating and could, therefore, take full advantage of any benefits brought to the evacuees by the Japanese government; if the United States won, they would presumably be able to return to their former homes on the West Coast.¹

1. Note to come

Altogether removed from the factor of political allegiance was the peculiar age composition of the Japanese population which was a potent factor in the retarding of the relocation program. The immigration of Japanese males who were followed some years later by females, produced a population in 1940 in which the preponderant group of wage earners were non-citizen Issei. The largest proportion of the citizen group was below the age of 20, whereas the largest number of male Issei were above 50 years of age. It was the Issei who were the family

leaders. Success of the entire relocation ^{program depended upon} ~~process necessitated~~ success in relocating these Issei. Yet it was precisely in this group that the greatest resistances to relocation existed: they were old, they were non-citizens, they had the greatest language difficulties, they had suffered the greatest economic losses, they were prey to the greatest fears with respect to public sentiment, they were most wavering in their political allegiances, they were most dependent upon social and cultural contacts with other Japanese.

Traditionally, migration has exerted its greatest appeal for the young, the unmarried, the strong, and those without family obligations. But success of the program of relocation depended upon the migration of that group of persons who, traditionally, were the least prone to migrate, that is to say, the aged, those with family obligations, and the least strong.

PROJECT OFFICIALS

One of the serious deterrents to relocation was the attitude of WRA officials themselves, especially those on the projects. Like evacuees, they had entered projects with the understanding that they were duration-length communities and with the determination to make those communities as livable and as normal as possible. Many months passed before the national officials of the Authority were able to convince their own project personnel that relocation was the first task. (It is doubtful if they have been successful up to the time of this writing). It was difficult, for example, to convince a person

responsible for the efficient maintenance of farm machinery and transportation equipment that his responsibility could best be discharged by urging his best mechanics and drivers to leave the project for outside employment. To succeed in such a program, it was necessary to convince each WRA official of the necessity of sacrificing the efficiency of his own particular unit for the larger purposes of the Authority. The difficulty of this task was enormous.¹

1. Many documents discuss the resistances of relocation. The Granada Community Analysis Report, cited above, is perhaps the most comprehensive WRA work, though even it is unsatisfactory. Cf. also Barber to Provinse, March 23, 1943; Provinse to Myer, March 29, 1943; Barber to Myer, September 22, 1943.

RELOCATION RESULTS

The total effect of all these factors made the rate of relocation a slow one.

- - - - -
'Here will follow a statistical '
'summary of relocation, including '
'the immediate "draining off" of '
'most likely resettlers, and effect '
'of new administrative moves on '
'rate of resettlement. Data are '
'now becoming available for this '
'summary. '
! - - - - - !

Despite the slowness with which relocation progressed, WRA officials pushed the movement with ~~anergy~~ every available resource.

A special Administrative Instruction on Relocation Guidance declared "the re-establishment of loyal Japanese Americans and law-abiding aliens of Japanese ancestry in American

communities is now the primary concern of WRA," and that the furtherance of this program had to "become the definite responsibility of all members of the WRA staff." The new Relocation Guidance program was designed to bring about "the successful social and economic adjustment of evacuees to normal American life by assisting in developing more favorable attitudes toward relocation by the evacuees and the public at large," as well as to "integrating into a single focus all existing efforts of the relocation program " and by devising additional or improved techniques for the relocation effort. An advisory committee in Washington and similar committees on the projects, working with evacuees, would be responsible for the program. It was recognized that relocation was a joint responsibility of evacuees and staff, and education for relocation was directed at both groups.¹

1. Administrative Instruction No. 96, June 12, 1943.

RELOCATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DETENTION

All other considerations aside, the constitutional difficulties of detaining evacuees for the duration was one of the most important factors in originally shaping the relocation program and in its step by step development. It will be recalled that the original Executive Order establishing the War Relocation Authority did not provide for the detention of evacuees, nor did the first plans of the Authority visualize any permanent concentration. When it became necessary because

of public hostility to cease voluntary evacuation and to set up relocation centers in which Japanese were forcibly detained, the whole program took on new constitutional difficulties. It was one thing to remove certain groups from coastal areas to meet military demands, but it was quite another to detain those groups for any length of time within inland centers. In discussing the validity of such detention in April, 1942, the WRA Solicitor predicted that any decision of the Supreme Court would "depend upon the strength of the showing to be made that the action was dictated by military necessity . . ." He suggested that the project areas be designated military areas, so that "the detention will have a measure of legislative sanction in the form of the recent statute providing a criminal sanction against violation of regulation applicable to military areas."¹

1. Solicitor's Opinion No. 3, Authority of the President to detain citizen Japanese without further action by Congress, April 16, 1942. As a consequence of this advice, the project areas were made military areas.

In a separate opinion the Solicitor explored the extent to which evacuees might validly be detained under the President's war power. He concluded that the alien enemies enjoyed no civil rights whatsoever and that the War Relocation Authority, through power delegated by the President, had "absolute control over the manner and degree of their detention." He concluded, also, that citizens of Japanese ancestry might be detained to the extent reasonably necessary for the national safety. Other classes of citizens did not need to be affected by this restraint if the discrimination could be showed to be related

to a genuine war need and did not "under the guise of national defense, discriminate for a purpose unrelated to the national war effort."

The chances were "good," the Solicitor continued, that the courts would sustain the detention of even citizens of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers. This judgment was based "harshly on the facts indicating that unrestrained movement of Japanese may interfere with the war effort and partially on the fact that the judgment of the military as to steps needed to protect the national security will not be lightly set aside by the courts in time of war." This opinion added an important proviso. The chances that the courts would approve detention would be improved "if sufficient flexibility is provided to permit the Japanese some freedom of movement in certain circumstances and under special precautions."

This line of reasoning pointed out that many loyal citizens would be subject to unnecessary hardship if detention were universal and that "the shifting fortunes of war may lessen the military necessity for strict detention . . ." Therefore, a device by which restricted travel would be permitted was not only administratively desirable but "it would also strengthen our position on the constitutional issue."

Even if a court felt that it could not conscientiously uphold absolute detention on the basis of the evidence presented, it would be quite difficult for the court to say that the facts did not justify the detention of all until those who wished to leave could present their cases, and administrative judgments could be made upon the merits of each case in relation to the national safety. Furthermore, in cases where the privilege of travel has been sought and denied under such a procedure, a court would

very likely give the judgment of the administrative people considerable weight in determining whether continued detention is warranted.

There may be an additional advantage. As a general rule, courts will refuse to entertain jurisdiction over a case until the complainant has exhausted his administrative remedies. If there is an administrative procedure under which the detention restraint may be lifted as to individual Japanese, a court may well refuse to grant relief against detention until the administrative remedy is exhausted.

Again, if litigation should arise over the constitutionality of detention before a restricted-travel procedure is worked out - but we should nevertheless be able to point out that we were preparing such a procedure - a court doubting the constitutionality of indefinite detention would be more inclined to sustain detention until the procedure is established than to resolve the issue against the Government, in view of the possible serious consequences of unregulated movement of the Japanese.¹

1. Solicitor's Opinion No. 2, Confidential, The Extent to which Japanese may validly be detained, or their movements restricted, under an exercise of the war power, April 15, 1942.

This line of reasoning was consistently followed in all the early planning of the relocation program. Mr. Myer, for example, in describing to the Attorney General the leave regulations of October 1, wrote:

I am sure I need not emphasize the importance of the early promulgation of the proposed leave regulations, if only from the standpoint of litigation now challenging the validity of the entire relocation program . . . The regulations will in fact convert an virtually absolute detention at the relocation centers into a qualified and very limited detention that can much more easily be justified in terms both of law and of national policy.²

2. Myer to the Attorney General, September 24, 1942.

And Edward Ennis in recommending the leave program to his superiors in the Justice Department:

It is, of course, much more difficult to defend indefinite detention than it is to defend mere evacuation.

The Government's position in these cases will immeasurably strengthened if a plan of orderly resettlement of the Japanese out of the camps in the near future is developed. It is believed that almost any judge would give the Government the time necessary to execute such a plan if it could be shown that it is concrete and in operation and not merely a vague hope for the future.¹

1. Memorandum, Edward Ennis to Charles Fahey, September 2, 1942.

As the war went progressively better for the allied cause, the legality of absolute detention became increasingly difficult to maintain, involving, as it did, the detention of citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness had been made. The principal justification for detaining citizens in relocation centers became that such detention was merely temporary and qualified, since administrative procedures existed by which detention could be escaped. The relocation program, in effect, made detention simply an incident to an orderly relocation program and made it unnecessary to attempt to defend the constitutionality of absolute detention. Indeed, the defense of absolute detention for the entire group was acknowledged to be impossible.

The ~~validity~~ of the necessity of relocation as a constitutional safeguard for the entire WRA program has been directly supported on at least two occasions up to the date of writing:

In the Federal District Court for the northern District of California, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee was dismissed on the short ground that the petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by

applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave.¹

1. In re Endo

Though less direct, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Hirabayashi v. the United States* was no less a corroboration of the legal necessity for the relocation program. Though the Court here sustained a conviction on the validity of the curfew regulation, it avoided any consideration of the problem of evacuation. There is concrete evidence in both the majority and concurring opinions of the Court that it believed evacuation, itself, presented difficult questions of constitutionality, and detention within a relocation center an even more difficult question. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy stated: "In my opinion, this goes to the very brink of constitutional power." Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurrence, wrote:

Detention for reasonable cause is one thing.
Detention on account of ancestry is another . . .
Obedience to the military orders is one thing.
Whether an individual member of a group must be
afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that,
being loyal, he must be reclassified is a wholly
different question . . . but if it were plain that
no machinery was available whereby the individual
could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order
to be reclassified, questions of a more serious
character would be presented . . .

In commenting on this decision and on the legal principles involved in the relocation program, the WRA pointed out that during the year of its existence there has been time to make necessary investigations and to begin the process of considering the evacuees on an individual basis. "The leave

regulations are intended to provide the due process of hearing which fair dealing, democratic procedures, and the American Constitution all require."

' Note: A new publication of the WRA
' Solicitor, A Memorandum on the Validity
' of Detention under the Leave Regula-
' tions of the War Relocation Authority,
' January 1, 1944, examines at great
' length the constitutional issues in-
' volved in the WRA's program. This
' publication will form the basis of a
' revision of the incomplete discussion
' above.
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