

PACIFIC COAST COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND FAIR PLAY



The Committee on American Principles and Fair Play vigorously endorses the following government policies. It is our conviction that these policies strengthen the war effort of the nation and are in line with our democratic traditions.

1. Segregation of all disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry.

"... all known subversive Japanese (should) be immediately segregated and removed from existing relocation camps and be confined in special detention camps for the duration of the war with Japan."

... Special House Committee of California
Representatives: Costello, Englebright,
Tolan, Izac, and Anderson.

"... Immediate internment of all disloyal Japanese."

... Recommendation by Senator Albert B. Chandler
to Senate Military Affairs Committee.
(A.P. Washington, May 7, 1943)

2. The protection of the right of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry to serve in the armed forces of the United States.

"It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle."

... Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

"I applaud the action of the Army in setting up facilities whereby those Americans will be able to show the world what they are able to do."

... Joseph C. Grew, former United States Ambassador
to Japan.

"Having been in charge of military intelligence activities since June, 1941, I am in a position to know what has happened. There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage, or fifth column activities committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941."

. . . Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Department.

"The Americans of Japanese origin are an invaluable element in our population; I welcome their presence, and regret the bitter necessity of imposing on a trustworthy and loyal majority of nisei the restraints which are made needful by the bad behavior and evil repute of a minority . . . I welcome the policies of our government which are designed to relieve the nisei of discriminatory restrictions as rapidly and fairly as possible."

. . . Joseph C. Grew, former United States Ambassador to Japan, April 26, 1943.

We support these government policies.

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The Committee has taken no position on any suggestion that persons of Japanese ancestry be returned to the Pacific Coast at this time. We have confidence in the present policies of the War Department.

Our primary concern is to insure the application of the following principles to the solution of these problems.

- (1) Attacks upon the rights of any minority tend to undermine the rights of the majority;
- (2) Attempts to deprive any law-abiding citizen of his citizenship because of racial descent are contrary to fundamental American principles and jepordize the citizenship of others;
- (3) Legislation to deprive Americans of Japanese descent of any of their legal rights would set a precedent for depriving other racial groups of their rights and would weaken the confidence of our allies, particularly those in Asia and Latin America, in the sincerity of our professions to be fighting for the rights of all peoples;
- (4) It is un-American to penalize persons of Japanese descent in the United States solely for the crimes of the Government and military caste of Japan.

"I have never had more whole-hearted, serious-minded co-operation from any troops than I have received from my present command."

. . . . Lt. Colonel Farrant L. Turner, commanding
100th Inf. Battalion, U. S. A., formed from
Americans of Japanese extraction in the
Hawaiian National Guard.

"The first prisoner of war taken by the United States was captured by a Hawaiian-born Japanese American national guardsman, who overpowered the operator of a Japanese submarine, while patrolling a Hawaiian beach on Dec. 7, 1941."

. . . . United Press, April 22, 1943.

3. The opportunity for loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry to resettle in the manner, which, in the judgment of the federal government, is best designed to meet the manpower shortage.

"In accordance with the directive of the Presidential Executive Order which created the Agency, the War Relocation Authority has developed procedures which are aimed at bringing about the relocation into normal communities of the largest possible number of the evacuated people consistent with the national security."

. . . Dillon S. Myer, Director War Relocation Authority,
June 9, 1943.

"Food will win the war and write the peace."

. . . . Claude Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture.

"Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve his country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution—whether it be in the ranks of the armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work essential to the war effort."

. . . . President Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 1, 1943,
commenting on the organization of the War Department's combat unit for Japanese Americans.

4. Fair Play for Americans of Japanese ancestry who are loyal.

"The mass evacuation of Japanese did not imply disloyalty on the part of all Japanese and it does not appear either right or in accord with the American conception of democracy to retain these loyal ones in restrictive custody, . . ."

. . . . Colonel William P. Scobey, War Department
General Staff

The Committee on American Principles and Fair Play was formed to support and defend the constitutional rights of law-abiding persons of oriental descent in the United States and particularly of the Japanese American evacuees. Persons desiring to aid the educational program of the Committee either through financial contribution or volunteer service should write to the Executive Secretary at:

465 California Street, San Francisco, California

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June 15, 1943

Japanese Americans in Hawaii

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Harper's MAGAZINE

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The Story Behind the Nisei Combat Teams

PACIFIC COAST

Committee on American Principles and Fair Play

PASADENA CHAPTER

presents this reprint so that soldier and civilian may know the origin of the United States Army combat teams of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. We publish it as a tribute to the thousands of these men now serving in many lands and in many branches of our service. As the Pasadena Chapter of the Committee we take this opportunity to honor by name the 52 of these Americans whom we know and respect as fellow citizens of Pasadena.

CITIZENS UNDER DIFFICULTY

ONE of the sour phases of our national history concerns the treatment meted out to new citizens. Folks who got established here took satisfaction in being ornery to those who came later and the habit continues to this very day. An Italian immigrant who settled in Albuquerque and achieved a comfortable living wrote to Louis Adamic, "Everything would be fine here if it weren't for these damned Greasers." Many of our people are still being deviled because of race—our Negro citizens, for example—and, of course, the Japanese Americans. "The Japanese Americans in Hawaii," by **Cecil Hengy Coggins**, tells of the difficulties which these people had to surmount before they were permitted to enter the Army and defend their country. Mr. Coggins is Lieutenant Commander in the Medical Corps of the Navy but his article is not a Navy release nor is it an expression of official opinion. The observations are exclusively the author's, based on his experiences in Hawaii, where he has been stationed for the past two years, and are not to be construed as official, nor reflecting, necessarily, the views of the Navy Department or the Naval service at large. Commander Coggins participated in the raid on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands.

Since this article went to press we learn that more than 10,000 volunteers have swamped the draft boards of Hawaii in order to serve in the Japanese combat teams. General Delos Emmons announces that enough volunteers are on hand to form a combat team from Hawaii alone.

From "Personal and Otherwise"
Harper's Magazine, June, 1943

Additional copies four cents each, thirty cents per dozen.
1170 La Loma Road, Pasadena, California

THE JAPANESE AMERICANS IN HAWAII

CECIL HENGY COGGINS



WHILE Americans are absorbed by exciting communiqués from the theaters of war there is being enacted in the Hawaiian Islands and in our own Western States a thrilling and significant drama. Before the bar of public opinion stand a quarter of a million American citizens—citizens with yellow skin, dark almond eyes, and a loyalty that has been finally and publicly challenged. These descendants of Japan anxiously await the verdict of their fellow-Americans.

Before Pearl Harbor, when the Hawaiian Islands were known to the average American as the loveliest holiday spot on earth, they were a huge and quietly efficient melting pot for nearly half a million people.

Blue-blood Island wives consulted Korean dentists, Japanese physicians; gossiped or shopped with Chinese druggists, argued with Hawaiian police, had their market baskets filled by smiling Portuguese, Filipinos, or Puerto Ricans. The kimono, the hula skirt, and the latest fashion were all commonplace. Rubbing shoulders in the schoolrooms in an atmosphere of perfect equality, the children of a dozen races studied or giggled together. Through those long years of peace the loyalty of the Japanese-descended Americans was frequently discussed, but it was one of those topics of conversation that get nowhere, beginning in idle speculation, ending in argument. All hands

would join the debate. The boy from San Francisco, the Hawaiian plantation manager, the old China hand, each felt qualified to give an opinion. In the end they would solemnly agree upon one point: that the loyalty of the Japanese born in this country (called Nisei) was a mysterious, elusive, unfathomable quality, destined to remain forever in the realm of conjecture.

This was the state of public opinion up to December 7, 1941. Then war, with all its attendant horrors, exploded full in the face of the peaceful Islanders. What had once been idle speculation now became a matter of gravest concern. Among the smoking ruins of Hawaii and along the alarmed West Coast of the mainland military authorities faced the need of immediate decision. While feeling was running high there was little time for cool consideration. Bloody race riots were a distinct possibility.

While the flames of Pearl Harbor still flickered on the horizon, the Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the FBI went into action. They scooped up in their net a score of known enemy agents, more than a hundred alien officials of the oversize Japanese consulate, and two hundred more deemed potentially dangerous.

Martial law was declared, a strict curfew established, total blackout enforced. In Honolulu each setting sun found a few tardy automobiles and breathless pedes-

trians scurrying for cover before darkness fell on deserted streets. Volunteer Police and the Hawaii Territorial Guard had been hurriedly organized; their nervous trigger fingers punctured the night with shots at moving shadows and reflected moonlight while the people sat in darkened rooms and waited for invasion.

As the full extent of the catastrophe became known, and the conviction grew that Hawaii was helpless and invasion was imminent, people sharply recalled the fifth columns of conquered Europe—and recalled also many previously forgotten details of the Sunday attack. Each story grew with retelling. Soon all sorts of wild rumors ran about. Some said that on the bodies of the enemy fliers had been found McKinley High School rings. People muttered behind their hands that the little Jap tailor had been shot in the uniform of Hirohito's navy, that the water supply had been poisoned, that a local truck driver had barred the road to Pearl Harbor but had been killed while trying to escape. The air became filled with such stories; a full breath of truth was scarcely possible.

Plantation overseers who for years had called their workmen friends suddenly recalled that they never had "trusted those damned Japs." Many a nervous mother for the first time dressed and fed her own children, and locked up the carving knives before going to bed. Long-trusted servants, humiliated, gave their employers face-saving stories explaining why they must return to their homes.

Young Japanese Americans meanwhile gravely discussed the wisdom of wearing American flag buttons and of buying defense bonds. Would such acts, they wondered, be interpreted as an effort to deceive or as loyalty to the United States? A hundred and sixty thousand Japanese Americans wanted to know the answer. How should they behave?

II

IN THE midst of this confusion the new military commander, Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, arrived. He was promptly subjected to terrific pressure. Self-appointed advisers invited him to

lunch, buttonholed him in the street, formed lines outside his office door. Some were for caution; many demanded a mammoth concentration camp for all with Japanese blood in their veins; a few hinted darkly of the need for more extreme measures. With their radios blaring reports from Manila, thousands of Filipino plantation workers had ideas of their own and quietly whetted their machetes.

But General Emmons refused to be stampeded. Additional emergency measures were placed in effect. Alien homes were searched, certain strategic areas were evacuated, others were placed under guard. Reassurances were given the Japanese population that they had nothing to fear so long as they observed the laws. Two Japanese-language newspapers were allowed to resume publication under military supervision. This had a good effect upon the older Japanese, though it riled the more belligerent whites.

Alarmed civilians began to take steps. A few well-meaning ones organized the Emergency Service Committee, later to become euphemistically known as the "Morale Committee." Before this group were haled Japanese Americans reported by amateur sleuths as suspicious characters. The quaking "suspects" were told that they had to be "one hundred and fifty per cent Americans" and were advised to donate a pint of blood to wash away suspicion.

The most serious problem of all was what to do about the armed and uniformed citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army and in the Hawaii Territorial Guard. Long before the war, and until mid-1942, men of all races had been inducted into the Army. The selectees from Japanese homes had been given banquets with patriotic speeches, congratulations, and farewell gifts before they marched away. Eventually they had come to number nearly 1,900 men, divided between the 297th and 298th Battalions. After training, they had been assigned to defense sectors where they served with distinction on December 7th and for months afterward.

Their fine record availed little, however, against the rising tide of suspicion. To officers newly arrived from the mainland

they were an unknown quantity. The new leaders took one look and decided not to face the sea with those troops behind them. They felt that certain rifles in the rear might wisely be exchanged for picks and shovels. This was done, and thereafter the Nisei obediently dug miles of trenches, piled up mountains of sandbag emplacements for guns in other hands. After a period of indecision, Selective Service reversed its former policy and classified all Japanese, whether citizens or not, as 4-C, thus closing the door to further inductions.

Even less fortunate were the Japanese Americans of the Hawaii Territorial Guard. Authorized on December 7th, by proclamation of Governor Poindexter, the Guard was formed largely of the ROTC units of the University of Hawaii and local high schools. The call to arms found hundreds of Nisei struggling into their ROTC uniforms and racing to the armory to be handed rifles and ammunition. With young men of many other races they guarded public utilities and important buildings, releasing an equal number of regular soldiers for combat duty. Some came from the schoolroom, others from highly paid jobs in the city, but all from a common sense of duty.

For two months they served, exercising their constitutional right to bear arms in defense of their country. Then the storm struck, even more fiercely than it was later to strike their older brothers in the Army. Orders were given that all the members of the Hawaii Territorial Guard whose parents were Japanese should assemble in one place. The officer who looked down upon the rows of attentive faces spoke with noticeable difficulty. He informed them that they were no longer needed, that they were being "inactivated." As they stacked their rifles and turned back their uniforms the faces of the outcasts showed few traces of the dishonor they felt. Later, however, when their chaplain bade them good-by, many of them could no longer suppress tears of humiliation.

Yet all of them were more determined than ever to take part in active war service. A meeting was held at the University of Hawaii. A request was sent to the Military Governor asking that they be

permitted to do any kind of work to assist the armed forces. Their request was granted. Calling themselves the Varsity Victory Volunteers, nearly two hundred strong, they were again sworn in and sent to Schofield Barracks. Here they were assigned as laborers for the armed forces. Thus the VVV became the first organized labor battalion of its kind. Attached to the 37th Engineers, they made an enviable record. From his slender pay every man bought a war bond. Nearly half of them pledged themselves to buy a bond a month. Three-quarters of them contributed their blood to the blood bank. This was their answer to "inactivation."

Nevertheless the storm continued unabated. Many people felt that violent and radical measures were imperative. It was seriously suggested that all of the 160,000 with Japanese blood in their veins be returned to Japan, removed to some outlying Island, or concentrated on a mountaintop. Excited citizens wrote to people on the mainland, to Congressmen and newspaper editors. The gist of these letters was the same: "We know that the Japanese here have behaved up until now, but we also know that the Japanese are a cunning and treacherous people. How do we know that they are not biding their time? How do we know that all of their lives they have not been craftily waiting for a chance to strike a blow for the Emperor? Is it sensible to take a chance?" Some of these letters were signed, some anonymous, some marked "Vigilante." The melting pot now boiled in earnest. In April, 1942, the situation grew most serious. Everyone knew that a solution was urgently necessary. Few people knew that one was on the way.

III

THE solution was to come, not from the white leaders who had voiced the greatest apprehension, nor from the Islands' political leaders, nor even from the military. It was to come from the Japanese-Americans themselves.

In the heart of Honolulu was an organization called the Honolulu Civic Association. Largest and most influential of all Japanese American societies in the Islands,

it had long been devoted to the advancement of community interests. It had been the leader in removing from many a Nisei the stigma of Japanese citizenship imposed by parents in his infancy. It had taken part in all community projects, established a home for the aged, and maintained a scholarship at the University. Since the war began it had done gas-rationing for the local Japanese, provided volunteers to make gas masks for children, helped mightily in the rubber and scrap drives, and sold thousands of tickets for the Army and Navy Relief benefits. When American ships were lost at sea, or troops deprived of supplies, Association members had dug deep into their pockets, and at a cost of over \$40,000 had provided more than 20,000 comfort kits—with razor, soap, toothbrush, and stationery—for American fighting men.

Now the Executive Committee of this Association gathered round their council table—a lawyer, a merchant, a salesman, an editor, other businessmen. They represented only a few professions but the leadership of thousands. Their faces were Oriental; their ideas and language were pure American. Some had fought for their country before and belonged to the American Legion. They went to work.

Their problem was simply stated: "To find a way to convince the people of this country that we are loyal Americans in heart and mind, and thus remove forever the fear, distrust, and discrimination which prevents our being fully accepted as Americans." They discussed at length what had taken place on the West Coast. When war struck and the people of California, Oregon, and Washington had been flooded with fear and hatred, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, of the Western Defense Command, had been forced to act promptly, and had made what from the military point of view was the only possible decision—to remove from the coastal areas all those about whose loyalty there was any doubt. To the people of the Western States, and to the military as well, this had meant *all* with Japanese blood in their veins. So thousands of families had been uprooted from their homes and removed to ten great Reloca-

tion Centers scattered through the Western States.

Remembering all this, the Committee drafted a petition:

To the Military Authorities of the United States
Greetings:

With full realization of the crisis which threatens the democracies of the world, and with the deep sense of responsibility common to all free men, we American citizens of Japanese ancestry sincerely and humbly present this petition.

WHEREAS, there are, in the Territory of Hawaii, many thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, who are daily doing their best to carry on as loyal Americans, and,

WHEREAS, our education has been in all ways under the American system, and our associations and customs of living have followed the course of loyal Americans, and,

WHEREAS, Hawaii is our homeland, and will be the homeland of our children, and,

WHEREAS, we have participated in the advancement of community life, and exercised our American right of franchise for the promotion of a democratic government, and,

WHEREAS, war now threatens all these sacred, inherent, American privileges, as well as our national welfare and freedom, and arouses and inspires us, individually and collectively, to action and sacrifice for their preservation, and,

WHEREAS, American citizens of Japanese extraction have already been, and will continue to be, inducted into the armed services of the United States, and inasmuch as their continued presence in this vital outpost has caused a sense of insecurity among other Americans, which sense of insecurity should be removed, for the common good, and,

WHEREAS, to deprive us of the sacred birth-right to bear arms in defense of our country, is contrary to the principles upon which American democracy is founded, now,

THEREFORE, we American citizens of Japanese ancestry ask and petition the military authorities of the United States, to grant us the opportunity to fight for our country, and to give our lives in its defense.

Realizing that it may be thought inadvisable for us to serve in the Pacific theater of war, we, therefore, respectfully request the privilege not only of being inducted into the military forces of the United States, but also of forming combat units to fight on other fronts, where we may demonstrate for all time what American citizenship means to us.

Please give us a chance.

After the petition was drafted, they discussed how it might best be presented to the military authorities. As an intermediary they selected one of the most prominent men of the Hawaiian Islands, Walter Dillingham, President of the Oahu Railway Company and director of many other enterprises.

Mr. Dillingham invited the highest military commanders of the Islands to a luncheon at his home. The group included Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons; Rear Admiral Milo F. Draemel, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief; Rear Admiral David W. Bagley, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District; and Brigadier General Joseph L. Collins, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department. The petition was read to them. They listened, applauded, and approved. As Commander of the Hawaiian Department, General Emmons agreed to forward the petition to the War Department in Washington for the approval of still higher authority. He expressed the hope that the petition could be granted and promised his wholehearted assistance.

While waiting for an answer from Washington General Emmons insisted upon establishing the truth as to the loyalty of the population; and the Intelligence Services searchingly re-examined their files covering more than a hundred thousand individuals.

What did the records show?

1. That the alien Japanese included many who were dangerous to the security of the United States; that some of them were so dangerous that they should be arrested and placed in detention camps for the duration of the war, and that others required constant surveillance and restriction.

2. That there was some pro-Japanese sympathy in the Islands. This was found to be concentrated among the older aliens and in the small isolated colonies of Japanese scattered in the outlying Islands. Nowhere was this sympathy expressed in action and in Honolulu it was felt by only a minority of aliens.

3. That by their actions an overwhelming majority of Japanese Americans had shown hatred of the enemy and had made brilliant records in all of the war effort in which they had been allowed to participate.

4. That not one act of sabotage had been committed in the Islands, either by alien Japanese or by Nisei. Consequently every one of the hundreds of rumors that

had circulated in the Islands and on the mainland to that effect was proven definitely false. Furthermore, while it could be shown that dozens of aliens had engaged in espionage, there was no evidence to prove that Japanese Americans had done so.

Many Nisei had lost their lives at Pearl Harbor. Two young men of Japanese extraction were near a heavy machine gun when the attack came. They rushed to assist, loading ammunition belts and burning their hands in the process. When the slugs of an attacking plane ripped the ground about them they stuck to their post, helping to shoot down the attacker. Rushing to the fallen plane, they cut the insignia from the uniforms of the dead enemy and proudly presented them at Naval Intelligence Headquarters. When questioned as to where they had got their trophies they replied, "Off the damned Japs."

The intensive survey showed also many important facts that would have surprised the proponents of wholesale deportation. One of these was that, unlike California, the Hawaiian Islands could not continue to eat if this third of their population was sent away: the work of the Japanese feeds most of the Island population.

If you were one of four white people on a raft in the middle of the ocean, and two Nisei were also seated there—scared and glad to be alive—would you push them off? Perhaps you might be so inclined. But if you knew that they could supply ninety-one per cent of the food, eight per cent of the milk and butter, and sixty per cent of the drugs which might sustain the six of you until you were rescued you would allow them to remain. You would eat the food and use the drugs they supplied because you would prefer that to starving alone. That is what happened in Hawaii.

Then appeared the first small break in the stormy sky. Toward the end of May, 1942, word was received from Washington, not that the plan had been fully approved, but that the first step was to be taken. The selectees who were working as labor troops in the Army—the men of the 297th and 298th Battalions—were at last to have their chance to fight. Throw-

ing down their shovels, they hastily made their farewells and marched up the gangplank of the ship that was to take them away.

Landing on the mainland, which most of them had never seen, these Hawaiian-Japanese entrained for Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where they were reorganized as the 100th Infantry Battalion. Their officers were both white and American-Japanese; their Commander, Lieut. Col. Farrant L. Turner, had been born in Honolulu. They were promptly equipped for combat. The grinning Nisei lovingly slapped the butts of their new rifles and machine guns with their calloused hands.

Over the one hundred thousand acres of woods and fields of Camp McCoy the men from Hawaii hiked, maneuvered, and fought sham battles. The people of the State of Wisconsin found them to be intelligent, quiet, and courteous. The other units of the Army called them "J A's" and regarded them with respect and liking.

All in Hawaii followed the news of the 100th Battalion with eager interest. In December, a Christmas gift fund of \$1,500 was started for the lads in Wisconsin—and was quickly oversubscribed many times. When the Japanese of Hawaii learned that the people of Wisconsin were friendly to their sons, invitations were issued to many a son of Wisconsin in the regular Army for Christmas dinner, to Hawaiian *luau*s (feasts), and to other entertainments.

Colonel Turner, Commander of the 100th Battalion, wrote to General Emmons: "It is my belief that there is not a single Japanese family in Hawaii, whether alien or citizen, that does not have one or more relatives, friends, or acquaintances in my battalion. Consequently I feel that the well-demonstrated good will and general co-operation of the civilian population of Japanese descent in the Islands are to a considerable extent part and parcel with the continued success of this battalion." Here was recognition of the fact that loyalties are things that can be made or broken—and an indication of the means by which the loyalty of large populations may be assured. Just as we recognize the Japanese enemy within, and deal with him effectively, so must we recognize

those Americans of Japanese ancestry who have given definite and convincing proof of their loyalty.

IV

BUT in the months following the Battle of Midway, with invasion becoming more remote, the people of Hawaii grew more restless. Wartime restrictions, which had been scarcely annoying while danger was near, became the source of constant complaint. For the first time since the beginning of the war there was leisure for argument. Demands were renewed that the Army deal summarily with the Japanese population.

One critic of the military, more vocal than the rest, advocated mass deportation. In a pamphlet entitled "Shall the Japanese Be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii?" he wrote: "As soon as conditions warrant, at least 100,000 Japanese should be moved to inland mainland farming States. . . . If the Germans can move 3,000,000 men from occupied Europe within a short period, surely our great Government can move 100,000 from Hawaii to the mainland without grave difficulties."

This plan was much discussed. While it was criticized as illegal, unconstitutional, unjust, and un-American, it was nevertheless favored by some. Appeals for support were made to organizations on the mainland: to the California branch of the American Legion, the California Federation of Labor, the Native Sons of the Golden West. Under the plan an effort would be made to deprive Japanese born in the United States of their American citizenship rights which are now guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The Nisei in Hawaii were becoming discouraged. If such proposals were seriously considered, how could they continue to have faith in democracy? What, they wondered, was happening in Washington?

There was plenty happening in Washington. Several government departments were seriously debating the problem of the Nisei and his loyalty, and searching for a satisfactory solution. The War Relocation Authority, whose able director, Dillon Myer, had been borrowed from the

Department of Agriculture last summer to take over the thankless task of administering Relocation Centers, was finding that they contained many a problem. The chief one was to maintain the morale of Japanese Americans herded into the camps with their alien elders. The task of finding places where these citizens could make their homes and earn a living had been complicated by the distinctly hostile attitude of Midwestern white Americans. With no other place for the Nisei to go, the Relocation Centers had become what they were never intended to be—concentration camps, where alien Japanese with pro-Axis sympathies stirred up feelings of persecution and discrimination. With barbed wire about them, and armed soldiers outside, they had become centers of growing discontent. Without the means, the proper personnel, or the authority to separate the loyal from the disloyal, Mr. Myer was faced with a situation which was becoming daily more difficult.

Meanwhile the War Department had already embarked upon an investigation of its own. When the petition from Hawaii had first arrived in Washington it had been referred to a board, which however had failed to approve it. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had not been satisfied with this decision. Together with Lieutenant General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, and other general officers, he had reopened the case for further consideration. These men were determined to have the facts. What were the facts?

Special questionnaires were prepared to be executed by American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Teams were made up for the distribution of the questionnaires. These teams were composed of an Army officer and three enlisted men, including one Japanese American soldier of the Nisei class. After a short period of intensive training by the Provost Marshal General these teams were dispatched to the Relocation Centers to begin their task of separating the loyal from the possibly disloyal.

Once filled out, the questionnaires were referred to the Provost Marshal General, where they were checked with the records of Military Intelligence, the Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Doubtful cases were referred to a special board composed of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Navy Department, the War Relocation Authority, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Provost Marshal General. This investigation was fully co-ordinated by the office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

V

ONCE the evidence was all in and the facts established, the War Department acted with promptness and decision. On January 28, 1943, Secretary Stimson announced: "It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle. When obstacles to the free expression of that right are imposed by emergency considerations, those barriers should be removed as soon as humanly possible. Loyalty to country is a voice that must be heard, and I am glad that I am now able to give active proof that this basic American belief is not a casualty of the war."

The policy thus expressed by the Secretary of War was fully approved by President Roosevelt in a letter written only three days later; and in Hawaii, early in February, Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons announced that he had been directed by the War Department to induct 1,500 citizens of Japanese ancestry into the army as volunteers. "This call for volunteers affords an excellent opportunity," he said, "to demonstrate the faith the Army has in their loyalty and fighting qualities."

American citizens of Japanese ancestry between the ages of 18 and 37 now became eligible for combat service by applying to their Draft Boards. They were to be trained for service in an active theater. Company officers were to be of Japanese ancestry, to the extent that men with requisite military experience could be found. Opportunity for attendance at service schools and for promotion to higher grades would be open to all enlisted and commissioned personnel on the same basis as for the rest of the Army.

"The manner of their response," General Emmons said, "and the record these

men will establish as fighting soldiers will be one of the best answers to those who question the loyalty of citizens of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii."

Within 48 hours of General Emmons' announcement the Honolulu *Advertiser* hit the street with banner headlines: ENLISTMENT CALL MEETS WITH EAGER RESPONSE. As soon as the Draft Boards opened they were swamped by eager volunteers.

Wilfred C. Tsukiyama, for twelve years city-county attorney and a member of the American Legion, jumped the gun by sending in his application three days before the announcement of the formation of the combat team was made public by General Emmons.

At the Kaimuki Board, more than 30 American-born Japanese had applied for enlistment before 11 A.M. Included were two prominent physicians and a dentist.

Word came from Kauai in a cable message that 172 young men of the "Garden Island" had petitioned Major Rapp Brush, Commanding Officer for the Kauai District, to enroll them at once as volunteers for the Army.

The Honolulu Chamber of Commerce called upon its membership for the fullest co-operation in assuring American-born Japanese that their jobs would be waiting for them at the end of the war.

Forty members of Honolulu's Police Department, headed by Lieutenant Yoshio Hasegawa, volunteered for immediate enlistment.

Acting Governor Ernest K. Kai promptly issued this statement: "In connection with the plan of the War Department to accept voluntary enlistment in the United States Army from American citizens of Japanese ancestry, you are advised that this program has my unqualified approval and that every assistance shall be rendered to any territorial employee who desires to enlist."

The Varsity Victory Volunteers, that band of Japanese Americans who had remained active workers for the Army despite their "inactivation" from the Hawaii Territorial Guard, lost no time in joining up. At their request they were mustered out of civil service by Brigadier General Hans Kramer, Hawaiian Department Engineer, their commander.

Standing on the steps of Iolani Palace, General Kramer bade them farewell: "As department engineer under whose direction your work as VVV's has been carried out, I can attest to your loyalty and can deservedly commend you for that work. With this sincere commendation go my congratulations and good wishes—confidence in your performance in a new and greater role as fighting members of the United States Army."

Within two weeks of the announcement the number of volunteers in Hawaii had reached 7,500—five times the number that had been asked for. And they are still coming. The eagerness of this response is gratifying to the Army. It serves notice to our enemies that, while we fight for human rights abroad, we do not intend to surrender them at home.

The feelings of the Americans of Japanese descent have been eloquently expressed by "Mike" Masaoka of the Japanese-American Citizens League in what he calls their Creed:

"I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this nation. I believe in her institutions, ideals, and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her history; I trust in her future. She has granted me liberties and opportunities such as no individual enjoys in this world to-day. She has given me an education befitting kings. She has entrusted me with the responsibilities of the franchise. She has permitted me to build a home, to earn a livelihood, to worship, think, speak, and act as I please—as a free man equal to every other man.

"Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the majority of the American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such practices, but I shall do it in the American way; aboveboard, in the open, through courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and consideration. I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action

and achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics.

"Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times, and in all places; to support her

constitution; to obey her laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to actively assume duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a better American in a greater America."

Honor Roll

of

PASADENA'S JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE SERVICE

Including volunteers awaiting call to the
442nd Combat Team

JAMES K. ARIMA

HARRY ASAKA

GEORGE ASAKAWA

HIRO ENSEKI

JOSEPH ETO

TADASHI HAMANE

YATAKA HASEGAWA

JOE HAYASHI

TOM HOMMA

GEORGE HONDA

FRANK ICHINO

PHILLIP ICHINO

WM. N. IKEDA

ISAMU ISHIDA

TATSUI ISHIZU

GEORGE ITO

AKIRA KAWAI

NOBU KAWAI

ARTHUR KIRITA

JAMES KIRITA

MASAYUKI KOYAMA

MITSUO KUNIHIRO

SHIZ KUNIHIRO

MAMORU KURAMOTO

HENRY HIDEO KUWABARA

GEORGE MATSUMOTO

GEORGE MATSUOKA

TOMO MASUOKA

HISAO MIYAMOTO

FRANK MORIMOTO

MASAO WALTER NARITOMI

JOE F. NIKI

HIDEO NOGUCHI

TAKAO NOGUCHI

SHO NOMURA

WILLIAM Y. NUNO

SUICHI OGURA

EDDIE OKIMOTO

HARRIS OZAWA

MASASHI SAITO

KOICHI SHIBUYA

MASAO SUGANO

GEORGE SUZUKI

SHIGERU TAKAYAMA

HIDEO TAKAYAMA

TSUNEO TAJIMA

JAMES TANAKA

JAMES K. TANAKA

MAKOTA UCHIDA

THOMAS UCHIYAMA

KITAO YAMADA

World War I veteran, Nisuke Mitsumori, is a civilian instructor.

"We Must Remember What We Are Defending"

—Roosevelt



As to coupons for overalls, I apply for supplementary coupons (outside the regular allowance) for each type of worker as they become eligible, and explain to all the impatient others that they must wait till the authorities announce that their occupation is to be included in the list. Supplies of soap, hot water, and clean towels are matters I thankfully leave to the stores and cloakroom attendants.

Fortunate indeed is the welfare officer who can procure all the workshop and cloakroom facilities she wants in these days of scarce materials and scarcer maintenance staff. My dreams pass from such elementary advantages as steam-heated pipes under the coat rails to a garden, a library, dental clinic, convalescent home, and holiday hostel—other firms are already doing these things, but as yet they are the exceptions. After all, my firm had not even an employment and welfare officer till I was taken on about nine months ago. Like a lot of others, I must encourage our workers to use the facilities we have, which include a recreation ground and weekly dancing, and to supplement them with the town library, Youth Hostels Association, and other community resources.

Marketing, Babies—and Factory Work

THIS RAISES THE WHOLE QUESTION OF OUTSIDE WELFARE. The district welfare officer and I, between us, must tackle the women's home problems. Child care, marketing, domestic duties, transportation, recreation are directly related to one matter inside the factory which we can control—the hours of work. We have staggered the hours of starting work to ease transportation; we have arranged short and longer shifts for those who must do their own marketing; we have day turns for those who must be home early and late for their families. With part time work we are drawing on a supply of labor previously almost untapped, and finding that, once started, many part time workers see their way to giving full time service.

Briefly, our workers are in four main groups, of which the first is considerably the largest. This group works six-day rotating shifts from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M., 2 to 10 P.M., 10 P.M. to 6 A.M., with Sundays free. An experimental group works five and a half days one week, five nights the next, from 6 to 6, with about two hours a shift in breaks and rest pauses. Part time workers work 8 A.M. to 2 P.M., and 2 to 8 P.M., on alternating six-day weeks. Day workers work 8 A.M. to 5:30 or 7:30 P.M., and stop at midday on Saturday. We definitely do not believe in Sunday work except in cases of unavoidable breakdowns.

Even so, marketing and child care problems remain. The shops on the whole are uncooperative. The urgent need is for the dinner hour (noon) opening, and, still more needed, special evening opening "for workers only" with a proportion of all goods reserved till then. No neighbor's shopping, no grocers' and butchers' lists will secure those precious goods that are snapped up by the women with time through the day for the wearisome queueing. For example, I have not seen an orange since last October, had fish only twice, and one packet of gelatine.

Child care in my area is largely a matter of child "minding." By the end of January 1942, some 10,000 children in this country were being looked after in nursery schools,

and many more schools and crèches are on the way. We finally have a nursery at our works, open day and night, providing trained care for the babies of our women workers. There is provision for baths, preparing formulas, everything. Needless to say, a few mothers have tried to do the minimum hours of work for the maximum hours of baby minding, but not many. Now our urgent need is for a full time nursery school for toddlers. Meanwhile, the minding system works fairly well on the whole. The Employment Exchange has a list of approved child minders—Registered Daily Guardians—and if necessary, the government contributes a small weekly grant toward payment. The chief difficulty arises when the child is not well. It is hard for a mother to decide then where her first duty lies.

Transportation, billets for workers transferred from other areas, recreation are other matters on which welfare departments inside and outside the factory have to get together. In our case, the workers mostly live so near both sections of the works and the center of the town that these are not difficult problems. We have a flourishing recreation club. Its Saturday night dances are particularly popular. Even women straight from work at ten o'clock join in with a will, oily overalls and all. (A different picture from a year ago, when night work consisted frequently of knitting in the air raid shelters, and community singing to drown the "noises off.")

My sort of job and the course of training for it are something new in all but a few exceptional British factories. The demand for more "Bevin Belles" is insistent. Canteen cooks, foremen, workshop welfare supervisors are all being recruited for short courses, and given the background that will help make the most of their ability. Superficial this training must obviously be, so the main essential is to keep the courses wholly practical. Our own might perhaps have been improved by giving us twice as long at work in two contrasting types of factory, and more factory visits to show us concretely just what can be done.

But that brings me back to the basic point I have tried to stress in this account of my job—the power to put our principles into action. What is the use of being instructed and fired with new ideas, if we cannot get those ideas across as essentials to management, over the barbed wire entanglement of pounds, shillings, and pence? Welfare officers in British war industry are recognized, to some extent organized. Now we need authority to get on with our job.



Strube for the London Daily Express

Japan - in - Hawaii

AN AMERICAN LOOKS AT HIS NEIGHBORS

by BEN HENDERSON

A WEEK AFTER THE BOMBING OF PEARL HARBOR I WENT OUT to the alien enemy camp on the island of Kauai to visit the Reverend Yamamoto*, Japanese priest of the most important Buddhist church on the island. The keeper shouted his name up the stairs, and in a short while he came down to join me on the back *lanai*. He is a little man, but he carries himself very erect for his seventy-three years. He clasped my hand tightly and said: "How do you do." Then his smile expanded to a grin, and he was silent. For with that handshake and the salutation in English, he had expended his entire working knowledge of things American acquired in forty years' residence in an American community.

Besides being the Buddhist priest at Lihue, the county seat of Kauai, the Reverend Yamamoto was head of the Japanese language school. His school and 171 others like it throughout the Hawaiian Islands have made Japanese the second language in this American territory. They have made it possible for the islands, with a Japanese population of only 165,000, to support twelve newspapers and five magazines in the Japanese language. Two of the newspapers are Honolulu dailies with a large circulation throughout the territory.

These schools have made possible the two well patronized, first-class movie theaters in Honolulu devoted exclusively to Japanese films. They were excellent films produced in Japan; the news reels were exclusively of war, with scenes from the battlefields of China and Europe—films never seen by *haole* (white) audiences. Later the films made a circuit of all the outside islands, where each important theater devoted one night a week to the Japanese, and then to small villages and plantation camps where other films were seldom seen; this gave them a far greater coverage throughout the territory than *haole* films.

These schools have made possible the daily radio hours in the Japanese language, which right up to the day of the Pearl Harbor attack were carried by every radio station in the territory.

The Reverend Yamamoto came to the Islands when he was thirty-three, and after brief preliminary training in Honolulu was sent to Kauai. His church and school—in reality but one—were a success from the very beginning. The island of Kauai is only twenty-five miles in diameter, but high mountains in the center forced the population to live along the shore. Transportation was difficult because of the hilly terrain; torrential streams cut deep gulches through to the sea, and the roads were either mud or dust. These physical circumstances kept the Japanese close to the locality in which they worked, and their lives centered around the Buddhist church and the Japanese school, which gave them a more complete expression of Japanese life.

Although the Japanese who came to the islands to work in the cane fields quickly adapted themselves to new methods of agriculture, when the day's work was finished they left all that was alien behind them and were

once again in Japan: a bath sizzling hot from a fire underneath the tub; kimonos; wooden clogs left outside the door; in the rooms, elevated floors upon which the family sat, ate, and slept. On Sundays they went to church, the women in dark kimonos, the men in black American suits. Women, girls, and small children sat on one side of the church, and on the other side the men and older boys. Incense floated up around the gold and red lacquer of the altar, and the Reverend Yamamoto, in a long kimono, intoned the chant. When he struck the bell, hands hardened through toil came together, and heads were bowed in prayer.

Close by were the school buildings where the community met to see what their children knew of the mother tongue, and to watch them perform the songs and dances of Japan. Here, too, met the organizations, for the Japanese of Hawaii have always been "joiners" and cheerfully pay dues and make donations for every funeral, every wedding, every departure, or for any other occasion that demands mutual assistance. This was, indeed, Japan.

Yes, but it was also Hawaii, U.S.A. And all this was forty years ago. Today roads are good, and a trip that used to take a couple of days, can be done in an hour—the grandchildren of those early Japanese settlers go tearing by in autos on the way to American schools. When the Reverend Yamamoto first came to Kauai, to keep meat from spoiling he hung it in the shade in a bird cage made of mosquito wire netting. In recent years he has had an electric refrigerator. Then the news from Japan was weeks old by the time it arrived, but a few months ago he could tune in on Tokyo for an eye witness account while something was happening. Hawaii has gone modern. What did this do to the Reverend Yamamoto, his Buddhist church, his Japanese school? Did it put them into the discard?

Traditional Folkways Persist

SHORTLY BEFORE PEARL HARBOR THE REVEREND YAMAMOTO performed a wedding ceremony. The religious part of a Buddhist wedding is only for the immediate family and the two go-betweens, but I was asked to the wedding party which, Japanese style, occurred about three weeks later. In the yard of the groom's home, tables and benches had been set up under an awning. The tables were piled high with Japanese food and American soda pop. All the little girls in the neighborhood, in bright colored kimonos, waited on the tables, and attended to the toasting—the latter being important but unobtrusive. A man who wants to drink with another sends a tiny cup to him by a waitress, who fills it with warm *sake*. The cup is immediately emptied and sent back so that the donor can have his drink.

At the head of the table sat the bride and groom. He ate heartily and talked with those around him, but the bride, her face powdered to a dead white, sat like a graven image. Over her kimono was wrapped a heavy brocaded obi. She kept her head bowed so no one saw higher than the tip of her nose under an odd shaped

* Not his real name.

cap whose purpose is to conceal the horns of jealousy. Occasionally she slipped out, changed her kimono and slipped in again to sit silently beside her husband. This bride had been to an American highschool, and on the campus, wearing sweater, skirt, and saddle shoes, could set a man back on his heels—when occasion demanded—with the same lingo used by highschool youngsters anywhere in the United States.

The marriage had been arranged by go-betweens (*nakodo* is the Japanese word for them), one representing each family, with the young people having very little to say about it. Life for these two had been started in the traditional way.

Not long ago I also attended a funeral at which the Reverend Yamamoto officiated. We assembled at the little house in the plantation village. On the *lanai* were piles of rice in hundred pound bags, each bag bearing the name of the donor written in large Japanese characters. There was far more rice than could be consumed by the bereaved family in many months, and on the next day all but a bag or two would be sold to the neighbors at 10 percent below the market price. Those who did not bring rice brought cash. Rice, however, is especially prized as visible evidence that the deceased had been generous in life and his benefactors many.

Before starting to the cemetery we lined up in the yard to have our picture taken. On one side of the coffin, which had been brought from the house, stood the sorrowing women of the family, clad in heavy, expensive kimonos, their bare feet in straw slippers that were held on with a double cord, exposing the whole foot. By the coffin were poles from which white paper flowers were suspended, and a long slender grave marker of wood inscribed with Japanese characters that some day would be duplicated in stone.

Schools "Made in Japan"

YES, THE REVEREND YAMAMOTO HAD BEEN doing all right with his Buddhist church. As for the Japanese school, figures for attendance tell their own story. He says that the highest attendance his school ever had in its forty years was 400 students; the last published report—the Japanese schools' census of September 1939 in the 1941 Japanese directory of the Hawaiian Islands—gave him 324. That drop of only 19 percent can probably be accounted for by smaller Japanese families; Japanese statisticians admit that the ratio of adults to children has been getting greater. But shortly before Pearl Harbor a Honolulu Japanese daily editorialized on the deplorable decline in attendance at Japanese schools.

Even on this little island of Kauai the Reverend Yamamoto was not a single candle in the darkness. On Kauai there are twenty-three Japanese schools. True, some of them are only one room schools, but nonetheless they are twenty-three centers around which Japan-in-Hawaii has revolved. In 1939 the Japanese students attending American schools in Kauai numbered 4,803; while 3,623 Jap-

anese also went to these twenty-three Japanese schools—75 percent of all Japanese of school age. Since they begin to drop out when they reach highschool age, attendance in the first eight grades must have been close to 100 percent. The same score undoubtedly holds for the 38,000 young Japanese going to these schools throughout the islands. And incidentally this school property, exclusive of the land, since most school sites are loaned for that purpose, is valued at half a million dollars, while the monthly tuition is about \$60,000, a per capita—every man, woman, and child—of 40 cents a month. These are large amounts when one realizes that much of it comes from the very low earning brackets.

Attendance at American schools in Hawaii is, of course, compulsory, so the Japanese schools have had to arrange hours that would not interfere. Grade students had classes from two to four in the afternoon, going directly from the American to the Japanese schools. On Saturday the hours were from eight to ten in the morning, with special classes for girls that lasted until the afternoon. The only time highschool students had available was from six to seven in the morning. Each day these young people had to be up at five to bathe and eat, in order to start their classes at six, and six o'clock in the Hawaiian winter months is black dark. At seven they left to go to the American schools.

No *haole* in the Hawaiian Islands really knows what has been taught in these Japanese classrooms. In recent years they have attempted to get girls interested in flower arrangement, tea serving, and kimono making—just as



Three Lions
Hawaiian street scene. There are 165,000 Japanese in this American territory.

they are done in Japan; and for the boys there has been *judo* and *sumo* wrestling. Leaders who can handle English a little better than the Reverend Yamamoto say that only the Japanese language is taught.

The Japanese schools association's most recent textbooks bear the copyright of 1936. These books were "made in Japan" exclusively for the Hawaiian Islands, as evidenced by the illustrations of waving palms and sugar mills. None of the text is devoted to things American. The student reads Japanese fairy tales, Samurai warrior adventures of old Japan, and stories of modern life. Through all these stories great stress is laid on what the Japanese call politeness, though to the American mind it appears just the reverse. There is no man-to-man consideration of each other when Japanese speak. By the construction of every sentence the speaker indicates that he is addressing his superior or inferior, and there are many grades of each. Imagine requesting a drink of water from the girl at the service station and forming that sentence in a way to let her know you consider her your inferior! That is the Japanese idea of politeness, and it is carried to such extremes that it makes Japanese one of the most baffling of languages for the non-linguistic American to learn.

Only an American can understand why the *haole* in the Hawaiian Islands doesn't know what is taught in the Japanese schools even though he resides a hundred feet from one. A part of his credo always has been to live and let live and to trust in the leavening processes of democracy. He does know about the bowing business, and it worries him, just because he believes in democracy. This bow of deference is made stiffly from the hips until the upper part of the body is almost parallel with the ground. From this position one is unable to see who passes—and that was the original purpose of this posture, to keep from seeing the Emperor or some other high dignitary as he went by.

In massed demonstration this bow is just as dramatic as a Nazi or fascist salute, and it antedates both by hundreds of years. Even when seen in a little Japanese school in Hawaii, it makes one pause. At the beginning of the school day the classes line up in the yard, and on signal they bow, all together like little automatons in the direction of the *empty* flagpole. It was only in recent months that American flags went up on these poles.

There is much bowing in the Japanese classrooms, too—when the class assembles and when it is dismissed, when a student gets up to recite and when he sits down. The picture of the Emperor of Japan used to adorn the wall to which they bowed. In recent months pictures of President Roosevelt suddenly blossomed out in every Japanese school—not one to a school, but one to every classroom.

Language: A Two-Way Wall

TODAY THE VITAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOUR DECADES OF the work of the Reverend Yamamoto and others like him are becoming evident not only to the *haoles* in these Islands, but to those of Japanese origin. The Japanese schools have made the Japanese language the only language of the large majority of Japanese homes in Hawaii, and this has been a tremendous bar to assimilation. Take marriage, for example. In the Islands every conceivable racial marriage mixture is commonplace, except the marriage of Japanese with those of other racial groups. These have occurred only in recent years.

In the Hawaiian Islands the Japanese language separates a Japanese from the other races with whom he lives and associates closely. It is a barrier through which he may reach at will, but through which no others can reach, for others rarely speak Japanese.

At the county seat of Kauai, there is but one tailor. He is Japanese and he runs his shop with Japanese girl assistants. He has been in business at this same spot for over twenty years, but when a *haole* customer comes in, the tailor calls one of his girls to do the interpreting. His lack of English is a convenient barrier behind which he stands; it does seem odd that American newspapers are so often seen on his desk.

The *haoles* have become so used to the Japanese language that it does not seem out of place, regardless of where or when it is heard: among servants in the home, on the street cars and buses, among clerks in the stores. In fact, whenever Japanese speak together, it is usually in Japanese. A former employe of mine was one of some two hundred Japanese who were working in Pearl Harbor right up to the day of the attack. At the naval base *haole* Americans had heard them talking together in Japanese without suspicion.

To many of Japanese origin this barrier, which has been raised by the yearning and effort to perpetuate Japan-in-Hawaii, has become almost tragically insurmountable. (And no American should ever forget that loyalty to America among these Americans of Japanese ancestry has been written even in these few months in unmistakable characters.) But even before that fateful December 7 there was plenty of evidence to reveal the anomaly of their position. Japanese workmen in Hawaii have received wages that enabled them to maintain a standard of living comparable to that of the continental United States and far higher than that of Japan. Visitors to Japan have brought back stories of the hardships of life in Nippon. Excursions for young Japanese have been frequent and so cheap that one naturally suspected subsidies from the Japanese government. These trips were enjoyable as long as they were conducted by government guides, but when some young Japanese from Hawaii tried to do a little traveling on his own, he was at once trailed and questioned by the police. Within the past year a newspaper in Japan carried a leading article advocating that foreign-born Japanese be sent back to their homes. Two years ago a group of Kauai-born Japanese boys were visiting Japan. After taking their cameras away from them when they landed in Yokohama, the chief of police gave them a lecture and told them that of *all* foreign-born Japanese, those from the Hawaiian Islands were the most lacking in discipline.

WHEN VICTORY COMES TO AMERICA AND THESE ISLANDS, though this generation of Japanese in Hawaii will have found the American way, that will never happen to the Reverend Yamamoto. I saw him only yesterday. The prison fare has been good for him, and he has taken on a little weight. On this visit I found him sitting out on the grass with his back against the prison wall. He doesn't mind prison. It doesn't bother him at all that he is interned as an enemy agent. He told me through an interpreter that he had a box of his books sent to him, that he was again getting the daily Japanese paper from Honolulu—and that he was perfectly content. And he did look content sitting there in the bright sunshine of Hawaii.

fight was there. But there has been so much bungling and plain dishonesty in the war industries themselves that the workers have a feeling that their extra efforts are wasted. Workers in a plant which is running part-time and inefficiently aren't going to stay steamed up about giving up half-hour lunch periods. The actual desire of the worker to contribute his efforts to winning the war is not being used. Instead they send out traveling lecturers to sell patriotism to him."

A sales engineer for a group of small Oklahoma companies who gave me a lift at a bus stop on a highway: "Ever since they caught those sales engineers making big money for getting contracts out of the army and navy—that guy making \$400,000 in a year and all like that—sales engineers have had a pretty bad name. Well, they're all different kinds. I'm a little one, and honest. When I first got up here from Oklahoma and began humping around to find some contracts for army kitchenware, this friend of mine says, 'Hell, Steve, you're not going to get any business that way. Last year I got three million dollars' worth of business. I had to pay \$55,000 in kickbacks to get it.'

"I told this guy, look, I was trying to get contracts for three small outfits, and if I got a hundred thousand dollars for all of them that would be the difference between them staying in business and folding. And if I couldn't get a measly hundred thousand honest, the hell with it. What I want to know is why they don't carry through with an investigation like that fellow who made the \$400,000. Listen, do you think anyone with the power to let contracts is going to give away even the government's money to a rank outsider? Hell, no. If you knew my business you'd know the only way a sales engineer can make \$400,000 is by paying kickback money to the guy who is letting the government's contracts and allowing the profits. What I want to know is why all these here clean-up investigations get to the sales engineers, but why they always stop before they get right on up to the guys inside the government who are taking the kickbacks."

A civilian employee of a government agency: "There are over ten thousand people in my agency. We have a guy for personnel director who has a very little mind. He used to play in an orchestra around Washington and then someone got him a government job for about \$2,600. People have been promoted indiscriminately. Now this monkey makes \$5,600. His old pals from the music world come streaming through the office and he still books orchestras—during office hours. He's an affable, inoffensive guy.

"He would be funny in this job if he weren't part of a tragic thing about Washington right now: incompetent people in jobs that are too big for incompetence. Here's how a man like this can clutter up a wartime

agency. Here is a letter he wrote to a field director—and circularized to all the rest of us in the agency—discussing the personality problem of a woman secretary. Read this thing. Here is a ridiculous ignoramus sitting in Washington giving what he thinks is a high-powered lecture on psychology to a field chief a thousand miles away, about a woman he has never seen. It would be all right to fire her. But that's not enough. He has to clutter up a vital agency with a stupid letter for everyone to initial—a piece of red tape that adds nothing to winning the war, but makes his position seem just a little more important—he thinks.

"This is a little thing. Microscopic when compared to the war effort. But it's an example of what Washington is eaten through with. What to do about it I don't know. But I know one thing. This guy, if the army doesn't draft him, could probably hold on to his job as long as there was a Washington. But let a good, fighting, liberal, anti-Fascist get into the same kind of a job and if he had ever made a public statement that he wanted Franco to lose in Spain the chances are that Dies and the civil service would be after his job in a month.

"The President has issued an order against racial discrimination. Right here in this agency we require job applicants to submit photographs of themselves. If their skin is dark or their names end in 'ski' there are no openings."

A Negro newspaperman: "Isn't the President worried at all at the way people like Talmadge and Dixon are whipping up race-hate in a cold-blooded attack on the New Deal? Why is he letting this business go by default? Talmadge is giving the bigots leadership. But why hasn't the New Deal made any effort to give some leadership to the men of good will who want to fight this thing? Doesn't he know this is a crisis with real military importance? Why hasn't he made a fire-side appeal to the simple decency in people, and why hasn't he tried to expose this thing as a cold-blooded campaign to hijack the New Deal in the South?

"The Negro needs real help. He needs it bad and he needs it now. And he needs more than liberal white journalism. All that Marshall Field's Sun and PM can publish would not have as much effect in breaking down economic barriers as fifty well trained colored girls in Marshall Field's store or in the Sears, Roebuck of Donald Nelson, who is managing all the war industries in which the President says there must be no discrimination."

This is how people are talking in Washington. It is unfortunate that, because it is wartime and they do not hold important credentials, the President no longer stands close enough to hear their voices.

THOMAS SANCTON

Washington

The Japanese in Hawaii

The editors of The New Republic do not know the facts regarding the loyalty of the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, which has recently been the subject of sharp debate in the press. We present, however, for its intrinsic interest the article below by a man whose views on the subject are entitled to respectful attention. Mr. Clark, who taught at the University of Hawaii from 1930 until very recently, is the author of the popular book, "Remember Pearl Harbor," in the writing of which he had access to official sources. — THE EDITORS

ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS mainlanders ask me is, "What are you people in Hawaii doing with all those Japs out there? Have you got them in concentration camps?"

Judging from the number of times I am asked this, a great many mainland Americans believe that most of the Japanese in Hawaii are hiding around in the canefields, ready at a signal to leap out and stab us in the back. This "news" doubtless accounted for the hasty removal of the Japanese from the West Coast.

The feeling in the mainland United States that the Japanese in Hawaii cannot be trusted is the direct result of the many rumors which came with a whirlwind rush along with the blitz of December 7. "There was a great fifth column in Hawaii! The attacking Japs had wonderful information," it was said. "They knew just where each battleship was to berth. They bombed the useless old Utah mercilessly because the fine airplane-carrier Lexington was scheduled to be there instead."

"A Hawaiian Japanese fifth columnist cut a broad arrow in a canefield," it was said, "directing enemy pilots straight toward Pearl Harbor!"

"One of the Jap pilots shot down had on a McKinley High School ring."

"Japanese saboteurs stalled old jalopies across the road to Pearl Harbor, blocking traffic, holding up ambulances carrying the wounded, keeping officers and men from reaching their battle stations."

Had our intelligence forces been asleep? Had organization for all these anti-American activities been going on while officials talked of the necessity of trusting the local Japanese?

Now let us examine the facts. Pearl Harbor has been exposed to public view for years. You can drive along the public highway or take a hike over the hills behind the harbor and observe at leisure the navy's vital installations and warships. No doubt Japanese consular agents took these jaunts frequently. The navy protested against this situation, but Congress refused to pass legislation condemning property overlooking the harbor. This failure made it fairly simple for the Japanese

consuls stationed in Hawaii to get information about the habits of the fleet.

Admittedly, we do not know just how much information the attacking Japanese had. The truth is that, regardless of what advance knowledge they did have, they needed no fifth column to provide it. A general idea of whether ships were likely to be in the harbor was sufficient. A battleship is a huge object, visible for miles. It is about as difficult to make out as the Chrysler Building would be if it were lying on its side in the Hudson River. Once the Japanese knew where Pearl Harbor is—which any tourist map of Hawaii clearly shows—they did not need to know what berth each battleship normally took. The attackers struck at every battleship in the harbor, regardless of position, size or age.

Corroborating evidence that the Japanese did not approach with the help and direction of fifth columnists has just come to light. The Japanese submarine which was sunk outside Pearl Harbor an hour or more before the attack has now been raised, and the ship's log has been translated. It tells how the submarine entered Pearl Harbor trailing a garbage scow, and cruised about, noting the types and numbers of warships inside. It then left and sent a radio message to the Japanese carriers, relaying the information.

The man cutting the arrow in the canefield was not needed, nor, as a matter of fact, was he there. He was an unconfirmed rumor.

Nor was any special information needed by the Japanese pilots in order to locate the hangars at Hickam Field. I do not know why these hangars were not built back in the mountainside, where they would be hidden from view. But there they lay, not only the biggest objects on all the island, but, furthermore, painted white and gleaming in the tropical sunlight. They were an invitation that the Japanese pilots could see for more than twenty miles. The attackers apparently needed no information that an observant person in the Japanese consulate could not have furnished in one week's time.

The McKinley ring, like the cane-cutter, never materialized. A censor, whose business it was to run down rumor, told me he had checked with every official who had looked through the clothing and possessions of slain Japanese pilots. None had seen a McKinley ring.

If the local Japanese had blocked traffic on the road to Pearl Harbor, they would have committed the most effective sabotage possible that day. This is the obvious kind of sabotage an organized group would commit. The three-lane highway had been a bottleneck of traffic long before the enlarged defense program began two years ago. On December 7 the narrow road was a bedlam of racing emergency ambulances, trucks, taxis

and motor-corps cars. By disrupting this traffic, the Japanese could have cut the lifeline of island defense. However, officials found no indications of any such attempt. The rumor soon died in Hawaii. It was refuted by hundreds of local people who used the road that day. However, it has persisted on the mainland, and a question I am often asked is, "Did they shoot those Japanese who blocked the road to Pearl Harbor?"

In Washington I was told that a navy captain who had been at Pearl Harbor had given this story of the road-blocking to the press. I immediately talked with him. He explained that what had happened was this: He had jumped into his car in Manoa Valley, which is some five miles from the Pearl Harbor highway, and as he drove down Manoa Road he almost collided with a carload of Orientals. They were driving wildly and seemed excited. The captain told this story to a gathering of newspapermen in response to the repeated question, "Did you see any confusion?" He said that this part of his interview, which was only an incidental recollection, was picked up by several of the newspapers to the exclusion of the rest of his story and given wide publicity as a sabotage story throughout the mainland United States. He did not claim that these Orientals were Japanese or imply that they were sabotaging. They might even have been volunteer truck drivers rushing to their battle stations. The captain claimed he was sorry he had even mentioned the incident to the reporters.

Just the day before I left Honolulu, the chief agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii told me, "You can say without fear of contradiction that there has not been a single act of sabotage—either before December 7, during the day of the attack, or at any time since." Chief Gabrielson of the Honolulu police, which works in close collaboration with the army, told me the same thing. "If the Japanese here had wanted to do damage, December 7 offered them a golden opportunity," he added.

"Where were the Japanese on that Sunday if they were not out sabotaging?" you ask the chief of police.

"Hundreds of them were actively defending the territory," he will tell you. "Members of the Oahu Citizens' Defense Committee, most of them Japanese, rushed to their posts as volunteer truck drivers. They stripped a hundred delivery trucks of their contents, inserted into them frames prepared to hold four litters, and went tearing out to Pearl Harbor to aid the wounded. Some of these Japanese got there so promptly that their trucks were hit by flying shrapnel. They proudly display these pieces of steel now as souvenirs."

When the call came over the radio for blood donors, again the Japanese were among the first to respond, and by the hundreds. They stood in line at Queen's Hospital for hours, waiting to give their blood to save the lives of American soldiers.

At Pearl Harbor, two Japanese boys saw a machine-

gunner having some difficulty setting up his gun. They ran to him, helped him steady it for action, and fed him ammunition. Both worked so fast that they had to have emergency treatment for burns at the hospital.

Soon after the litter-bearers arrived at Tripler Hospital with the first wounded, Surgeon King sent out an emergency call for surgical teams. At that moment Japanese surgeons were sitting with other Honolulu doctors, listening to a lecture on war surgery. They leaped to their feet with the rest and were at Tripler within fifteen minutes. There they stayed, working swiftly and accurately for long hours, saving the lives of their fellow Americans. Many an American mother today owes the life of her son to their skill.

These loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry are on the spot. So far they have been remarkably level-headed. The strain on them is going to become even more intense as the weeks and months go on and the prospect of an attempted invasion of Oahu by the forces of Japan comes nearer. The pressure on them from Americans who distrust them will become greater. This pressure comes from the white man who says, "No matter what a Jap says, don't trust him. Once a Japanese always a Japanese. Just let a Jap make one false move when I'm around!"

This man believes that skin color and race are more powerful than democracy. He is making it difficult for the intelligence forces in the islands to proceed on a basis of fact rather than on a basis of rumor and hysteria. According to the findings of the intelligence services, the fact is that not all Japanese are the same—that the second and third-generation Japanese in Hawaii can be counted upon in any emergency, and that although the grandparent generation contains individuals who are sympathetic to the homeland in a nostalgic sort of way, they are not organized and the potentially dangerous have already been locked up.

The younger people have been grateful to their friends in Hawaii for not turning against them in this crisis. They were very thankful to Mr. Leslie Hicks, prominent Honolulu business man, when he gave a widely broadcast talk in favor of tolerance and fair treatment to the Japanese in Hawaii. He praised them for their fine record in the past and asked the American workers who arrived from the mainland recently to make a distinction between the Japanese imperialist government and the Japanese people living in Hawaii.

The Japanese in Hawaii have found the United States Army absolutely fair and impartial. At first there was a rumor that no Japanese would be taken into the army, and they were afraid that such official discrimination would foster all sorts of anti-Japanese feeling. They were relieved to find themselves drafted. "Now we have a chance to prove our loyalty," they said. They are convinced that they get a square deal in the army. On the day of the blitz a Japanese private, first class, rushed to his battle station, where he set such

a good example of alertness and quick thinking that he was promoted to the rank of corporal the following week. This recognition reaffirmed the local Japanese belief in the fairness of the army.

One of the few ancient Japanese customs which has persisted during this conflict is that of giving the drafted youth of the family a farewell send-off to the wars. Every so often, you see in one of the Japanese-language newspapers a little block advertisement, saying something like this:

Mr. and Mrs. K. Harada wish to thank all their friends who participated in last evening's celebration of the glorious induction of their eldest son, Kazuo, into the United States Army.

And they mean it. The Japanese believe that the son who works hard to become a good soldier will be appreciated by the authorities. They also believe that he will be promoted as fast as any white recruit, depending entirely upon his diligence and ability, regardless of his ancestry. They cannot help celebrating that.

What seems clear in the Hawaiian Japanese situation

is this: the great majority—the second and third generations—are overwhelmingly loyal to the United States. Of the older, first generation, alien Japanese, many favor Japan, but by no means all of them. Nowhere in any of these groups has there been evidence of a fifth column, or of any sort of underground organization. All of the individuals who the intelligence services had reason to believe were potentially dangerous have been interned. The rest have a clean bill of health.

Let us ask ourselves objectively and dispassionately, what is the best way to obtain the continued wholehearted coöperation of this large group? My belief, based upon the findings of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and upon my own observation during twelve years in Hawaii, is that these people already believe in democracy and want to fight for it. The more we extend democracy to them, the more they will have to fight for. If we take away what freedom and equality they now enjoy as loyal Americans, we abandon them to fascist propaganda and rob them of the incentive to resist fascist ideas.

BLAKE CLARK

Politics and a Second Front

NAPOLÉON USED TO SAY that he won his campaigns because he had only alliances as his opponents. Hitherto Hitler could say the same thing. For hitherto he has had no difficulty in dealing with his enemies one by one, thanks to the inability of the United Nations to evolve a united strategy and a unified command. This failure has been most marked and may have the most serious consequences over the question of opening a second front in Europe while the great bulk of Hitler's forces (estimates vary between two-thirds and four-fifths) are engaged in Russia.

The Soviet Union has always insisted that 1942 would be the peak year of the war, and that every preparation should be made to launch simultaneous and concentric blows at Germany before the end of the year. The British and Americans have gone on tranquilly preparing for their offensive against Germany in 1943 or later. This was partly due, no doubt, to the difficulty of speeding up American and even British preparations to the point where it would be materially possible for us to take the offensive in 1942, against even the limited forces Hitler has in Western Europe. Partly the unexpected vigor of Japan's aggressive drive, the serious set-back in Libya, and our shipping losses retarded the Allies' offensive capacity.

But even with full allowance for these factors, it is difficult to overlook the importance of political considerations, such as nationalist and imperialist conceptions of strategy and the skepticism among British

military authorities, to which free reign was given in the press in the summer and autumn of 1941, as to the staying power of the Soviet Union. For a long time after the USSR was attacked, the prevailing opinion of military critics in pro-government newspapers was that the Soviet Union's resistance could hardly be prolonged beyond five or six weeks. By January, 1942, this view had changed to a few months. But only about April was the idea abandoned that the fight being put up by the USSR was anything more than a large-scale diversion, like the last-minute resistance of Yugoslavia magnified many times; which was as welcome as it was unexpected, but could not reasonably be expected to last long enough to affect the major strategy of the war. That low view of the military power and will to fight of the Soviet Union was due at least as much to political prejudice as to military ignorance.

The question of opening a second front in Europe in 1942 can be said to be primarily and properly a political rather than a military question. It is political in the first place because it is a question of giving military effect to a political decision that has already been taken. When the British and American governments at the time of the signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty and the conclusion of the Roosevelt-Molotov conversations, stated that they had reached full agreement with the Soviet government on the important task of opening a second front in Europe in 1942, they gave what was for all practical purposes a pledge. Lawyers may pick holes in the formula to argue that it did not

Democracy and Military Necessity in Hawaii*

By Colonel Kendall J. Fielder

A. C. of S., G-2

I am glad to have this opportunity to speak to you, because, as educators and students, your role in democracy's struggle is on the same high plane as that of many other vital but unsung heroes both on and behind the battle lines. You help supply the intelligent cooperation and the enthusiasm so necessary to the armed forces of a democracy in the successful prosecution of a war.

You and I are part of a system which totalitarianism has called DECADENT, but whose vitality is reasserting itself more every minute and will show itself supreme ere this war ends. We need not—and DO NOT—fear education and knowledge, for it is out of this knowledge and the freedom to pursue it and share it that Americans have built and maintained a government which has never been equalled in its justice toward humanity.

We are not in the habit of burning libraries, imprisoning scholars, great or small, or trembling at the very thought of helping our people seek the truth. In fact, it is well known to the whole world that America is never too preoccupied with anything—even the battle for her own survival—to miss a good intramural verbal slugfest at home. And even though some of us are exasperated over this on occasions, we approve of the idea and even encourage it within bounds because we know that free speech is a sure sign of a healthy democracy.

No one in America should be disturbed over this phenomenon so long as it does not hinder actual prosecution of our goal. Undoubtedly, criticism is often of a very low order and is often voiced by petty people or professional cranks. There seem to be no strong and sure steps we can take to stop ill-founded, insincere or dangerous criticism without endangering the very things we're fighting for.

The axis countries often interpret

*An address delivered at the University of Hawaii, Thursday, March 25, 1943.

"It is not for the military to be too concerned at this time about the peace. But you of this audience should be concerned. You must look to the future, carry on the offensive toward a permanent, prosperous peace, toward political and economic stability throughout the world."

this trait as a sign of weakness. We know, however, that our squabbles at home, our frank criticism of anyone, from the alderman of the tiniest hamlet to the President of the United States, are really nothing more than honest democratic disagreement.

Why is it necessary for a professional army officer to tell educators and students about democracy? It isn't, but I believe my remarks along these lines serve better to illuminate this discussion of democracy and Military Necessity. I will not attempt to describe or define democracy to this audience. You may rest assured, however, that the professional Army officer is just as appreciative of the high purposes and processes of a democracy as are members of the civilian community. And he believes in them fully as much.

Now then, can the military protect these principles when faced with the nice problem of defending a vital part of America—such as Hawaii—from dangers within and without?

To intelligently discuss this it is necessary to consider just where military authority fits into our democracy. Congress has vested in the Army and Navy the duty of protecting the country and its people in time of danger. Congress is selected by the people, therefore military authority is nothing more or less than the will of the people.

Military necessity is almost a self-explanatory term. In so far as Hawaii is concerned it is action taken in exercising military authority to carry out the obligations imposed by congress on the Army. It is an understatement to describe as "military necessity" the sacrifice of certain prerogatives or liberties in order to preserve lives, bases, democratic

principles and perhaps our very nation itself. Perhaps, in that sense, the term "military necessity" is almost as eloquent a bit of understatement as the use in the European theatre of war of the term "liquidate" when they mean "annihilate." "We liquidated so many divisions," they say, yet we know the terror and pain and courage connoted by that simple, almost laconic term.

Without calling it MILITARY NECESSITY, a contemporary French writer of considerable fame, Antoine de Saint Exupery, has summed the matter up neatly and concisely. In his book, "Flight to Arras," this French aviator discusses the awful necessity of sacrificing your own village in order to render it useless to the enemy as follows:

"'WE SHALL NOT HESITATE TO SACRIFICE OUR VILLAGES.' I have heard these words spoken. And it was necessary to speak them. When a war is on, a village ceases to be a cluster of traditions. The enemies who hold it have turned it into a nest of rats. Things no longer mean the same. Here are trees three hundred years old that shade the home of your family. But they obstruct the field of fire of a twenty-two-year-old lieutenant. Wherefore, he sends up a squad of fifteen men to annihilate the work of time.

"In ten minutes he destroys three hundred years of patience and sunlight, three hundred years of the religion of the home and of betrothals in the shadows around the grounds. You say to him, 'My trees!' but he does not hear you. He is right, he is fighting a war."

One example of military necessity
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The Chips Are Down

By Peter H. Odegard

Assistant to the Secretary, U. S. Treasury Dept.

ONE of the questions raised by the war is whether or not American education has given us the economic intelligence to reduce our living standard voluntarily. To cope with total war and its aftermath, this has to be done rigorously enough to let the steam out of war production's pressure on prices. We have never done it before. Sugar cost \$20 a pound in 1780-81. And Washington—George, not D. C.—filled many a page with his complaints on the inflationary practices of the merchants with whom his Quartermasters had to deal. "Gone with the Wind" describes what happened to prices in the South during the Civil War, while 500 million dollars were added to the government's outlay in the North, by rising prices. The price history of World War I is familiar.

"In the past," said the President in his budget message to the Congress, "wars have usually been paid for mainly by means of inflation, thereby shifting the greatest burden to the weakest shoulders and inviting post-war collapse. We seek to avoid both. Of necessity, the program must be harsh."

In the ivory tower of economic theory, production and consumption must achieve approximate balance if the body economic is to function in the classical manner. Money and the equivalent thereof are the mediums of exchange that make this possible. War increases production and the circulation of money, but the two of them don't balance just because the money goes round and round. Too high a percentage of production is consumed on the battle field without any reference to money whatsoever. Dollars in search of commodities naturally bid prices up.

The War Savings program was designed to divert this "excess" money and so to maintain the balance between production and consumption. Secondly, it is expected to create a reservoir of savings that will flow back into post-war circulation in sup-

"Even though the personal, habitual choice of all of us should be what the British label austerity, it is not a hard choice to make, once the will to do so is habitual. All that the government is asking is that we take a lien on the future instead of scrambling now for the comforts of the past."

port of private production. The spectacular ease with which the Treasury has raised billions of dollars from the big holders of savings obscures the fact that such savings are virtually absorbed now. That does not mean the ability to borrow has been affected, but it does mean government borrowing must come out of current income if excessive creation of credit (purchasing power), is to be avoided.

This need for savings out of current income points up one of the premises of the War Savings program. Unlike the Liberty Loans of World War I, when the highest total amount was the sole goal, our present War Savings program is also designed to achieve maximum participation in savings. Maximum volume of savings is important too, but this time it is only one of the goals. Not only must the money to pay for this most costly war be raised, but to an unprecedented extent it must come from current income, so as to take purchasing power out of the market and to create a genuine mass purchasing power in the future. Science and industry are preparing a bonus for those who follow this policy in the form of new and cheaper products.

School administrators have a double stake in the success of the War Savings program. Should its objectives not be reached, the problems of school support would be multiplied. The incidence of children and taxpaying ability is frequently inverse, and financing the schools so that the purposes of democracy are achieved depends on taxpaying ability. Retirement plans of many teachers would be upset by drastic changes in the value of the savings set aside for the purpose.

Avoiding post-war problems in

school administration is, of course, only the frosting on the cake. The basic fact for educators is that war indicates education. Eradicating the effects of Fascist education for death will be a post-war problem of the first magnitude. It concerns American educators as well as German and the improvement of education here and now is an essential preliminary to world-wide post-war advance.

Educational outcomes are customarily marked for future testing, but in time of great national undertakings, it is not satisfying to be insulated from the present. Sharing and leading vigorously in the War Savings program, as a citizen as well as an educator, is a bridge between your professional obligations and the need for all of us to help now. Buying War Bonds, doing without, are direct acts of war.

To bring about widespread sharing in War Savings, we have relied in part upon the creation of a fashion for saving by general propaganda and in part on specific group approaches. Specific clinchers of general appeals have been made with most success through the Payroll Savings Plan. Nearly thirty million people are saving out of current income through payroll allotments. War costs have reached the point, however, that makes still further cuts in current income imperative. Equally specific methods and equally extensive coverage will have to be achieved. General propaganda to maintain savings as a war habit is not alone enough to hold savings at the level necessary to accomplish the objectives we have in view. This moves the main problem of war savings into the field of education.

To define the educational phase of

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diplomacy. His upbraiding of Kurusu, the special envoy sent from Tokyo to discuss peace while Japanese bombers were being readied for Pearl Harbor, was typical of this outraged faith. His earnest and simple belief in the distinction between the Pétain-Darlan clique and that of Pierre Laval was similarly doomed to disillusionment, though the final rupture with Vichy has not yet come about. Ambassador Henry-Haye enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary long after most of Washington looked upon the collaborationist envoy with a jaundiced eye. Until the restoration of Laval, Hull received Henry-Haye frequently, both in his office and less formally at his home, to the mounting discomfort of the United Nations diplomatic corps. Henry-Haye worked assiduously on the Secretary's weak spot, impressing him with the contribution that a befriended Vichyite regime might make to a free-trade world after the war, and Hull's irritable outburst when the Free French seized the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon was a measure of the lengths to which he was prepared to go to nurse along this fruitless connection with the regime of the old Marshal.

Officials of the department have privately admitted that the wording of the protest over the seizure—especially the allusion to the "so-called Free French ships"—was unfortunate, and one of them explained that the Secretary used the qualifying phrase only because the news report that the ships were part of the Free French fleet had not yet been officially confirmed. This explanation, while not entirely convincing, was considerably more understandable than the Secretary's own attempt

at clarification, which had it that the term "so-called" referred not to the Free French but to the ships.

In his motivations the idealistic, salty, stubborn Secretary of State stands head and shoulders above most of his department colleagues. If he has often been proved wrong by events, it is no more than just to insist that his mistakes be assessed against the background of a country and a Congress which chose by and large to ignore unpleasant realities. Nevertheless, even in a democracy an obligation rests upon the leaders to see farther and more truly than the led. In his nearly ten years as Secretary of State, the longest tenure in the history of the post, Hull has maintained an unbroken silence on everything that has not borne intimately on his department. In one of the most controversial Administrations of American history the ranking Cabinet officer has never expressed himself on domestic issues that have shaken the country. He is a specialist and has the specialist's scorn for stepping outside his own province. At a time when the foreign policy of every nation is more surely an extension of its domestic policy than has ever been true in the past, that trait in a world figure is less laudable than it might be in other circumstances. Cordell Hull's vision, limited by the boundaries of a laissez faire Utopia, has been inadequate to the task of checking the advance of fascism. In all charity, it is likely to be less adequate for the problems of a world that will have passed through the revolutionary fires of World War II.

[*"The Old Welles and the New" is the subject of the second article of this series, to appear next week.*]

Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese

BY ALBERT HORLINGS

THE United States is making one of the most dramatic bets of history in Hawaii. It is gambling the internal stability of its greatest base in the Pacific—the anchor of the whole Pacific battle line—on the loyalty of 150,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans, 40,000 of whom are aliens, the majority of whom cannot read or speak English, and few of whom have ever seen America or have a clear understanding of what America stands for.

This is no mean wager. A Japanese fifth column in Hawaii could do great damage during an attempted invasion. It could halt civilian transportation, block highways, destroy the vulnerable reservoirs upon which Honolulu depends for water, wreck gas and electric service, destroy food, and terrorize civilians. By diverting man-power from the exterior defenses this fifth column could turn defeat for the invader into success.

Sabotage would be easy for it; the Japanese population is 40 per cent of the total, and its members hold hundreds of strategic positions in public utilities, in civilian defense, and in other services.

We might deserve praise for risking so much on the human heart if only we were not making the bet for the wrong reasons. I suspect we are making it not because the military authorities in Hawaii really trust the Japanese but because (1) pressure has been brought on them, and (2) they have been told that the economic life of the islands will collapse without the Japanese. Hawaiian business men are variously motivated, but some of them appear to favor a liberal policy toward the Japanese simply because they favor business as usual. And in the background hovers the case for Hawaiian statehood. The Japanese in Hawaii have long been held up to the mainland as first-class Americans by those pressing for

the island's admission to the Union, and many islanders fear that to cast doubt on Japanese loyalty now would ruin the chances of admission. The real conviction of the white islanders is shown by the large-scale evacuation of women and children that has been going on ever since Pearl Harbor.

In this historic gamble we have certainly something to win. First, we can win the confidence of some good citizens of ours. Japanese communities in this country have in general realized that their members could never blend physically into the American stream, and so far they have shown no evidence of wanting to be anything but a Japanese colony abroad. But a few individuals in these communities, in Hawaii and in the states, have become truly Americanized in spirit, and it would be a tragedy if they were discriminated against by measures aimed at Japanese who merely live here. No one who knows the able, spirited, and likable American of Japanese ancestry will underestimate the contribution these people can make to American life once they choose—and once we permit them—to turn irrevocably to the West.

We gain something also by admitting that Hawaii has handled its peculiar racial problem sensibly and well, and by refusing unnecessarily to disturb the islands' equilibrium. Sociologically and genetically we have everything to win. Hawaii is one of the great anthropological laboratories of the world, and it would be easy to arouse antipathies that would destroy its value. The racial *aloha* of the islands is a real and priceless thing.

But the greatest thing we stand to gain is the aid of hundreds of millions of people whose skins are not the color of ours. Whether we win or lose the peace will probably depend greatly upon our success in convincing Asiatics, Indians, Negroes, and others that our plea for world leadership is not a screen for world domination. We must convince them that we are fighting not for an Anglo-Saxon world or a Caucasian world, but for a world in which humanity is the test of franchise.

However, our kindness to enemy aliens and enemy sympathizers at a naval outpost will avail us little so long as we needlessly affront our friends. The propaganda value of extraordinary solicitude for Hawaii's Japanese—and it is certainly extraordinary measured by Japanese and German standards, as well as by our own past performance—will be completely nullified unless we mend our manners. A Chinese seaman who was on our side years before the State Department knew which was our side is prohibited from coming ashore at an American port. And if it is true that an exclusion law aimed at all Orientals arouses more resentment than good treatment of enemy-alien Orientals can ever undo, then we must wonder whether we have not put the Honolulu cart before the Washington horse.

In any case Hawaii's safety is not a local matter, and a decision relating to control of a possible fifth column

must be determined by national interests. How does our present policy look from that point of view? I am afraid that it looks crazy. I never found anyone in Honolulu, not even the most enthusiastic member of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, who would say that Hawaii's Japanese were overwhelmingly loyal to the United States. Why should they be, and why should they want us to win this war?

The political and economic fortunes of a few depend upon our winning. Some have been released from stark poverty by living under the American flag. Some have washed away the stain of ostracism that attached to their family in Japan. Some believe that America's accent upon the worth of the individual will lead to greater happiness for themselves and the world. A few would rather see a defeated Japan than a militaristic one. Some have deeply rooted prejudices and sentiments binding them to our side.

But the proportion of these is not large. The majority have nothing to gain by the defeat of Japan. Their prestige as expatriates depends in large part upon the prestige of the Japanese empire. Their economic fortunes are often tied more closely to Japan than to America: they work for Tokyo banks and business houses; they import goods from Japan; they invest in Japanese securities. Even if they live entirely off Hawaiian land or its surrounding waters, their customers are likely to be members of their own race. When they work for the white man, it is in a menial position, one that is more likely to arouse resentment than regard. To a remarkable degree Hawaii's Japanese are untouched by American ways; all their pride of race, family, and religion binds them to Japan. Thousands see or hear almost nothing American, while they consume Japanese food, Japanese clothing, Japanese music, Japanese pictures, Japanese newspapers and magazines by the shipload.

In common with all the other races there, the Japanese love their purple islands, but they can imagine Hawaii without American rule. Indeed, Japanese propaganda has frequently drawn the picture for them. Instead of doing menial labor at the low end of a double wage standard, they would occupy lofty positions in the economic life of the islands. Instead of being crowded in slums, they would live in the cool valleys back of the city, from which deed restrictions now generally exclude them. Instead of seeing their children admitted to the best schools only in token numbers, they would enjoy all the emoluments of the ruling class. In hundreds of ways even the "good" Japanese would gain, not lose, by Japanese rule of Hawaii.

Nor are they unaware of these facts. In impressive numbers they fail to burn their bridges to Japan. Despite the numerous campaigns for renunciation of Japanese allegiance, there are still 60,000 dual citizens in Hawaii—in other words, the majority of American-born Japa-

nese in Hawaii are willing to let the Japanese government claim them as its own. Some 15,000 Hawaiian-born Japanese have cast their lot permanently with Japan. Thousands of others shuttle between Tokyo and Honolulu, "taking my father's ashes to his homeland," seeking better jobs, or simply taking advantage of the low steamship rates through which Japan keeps in touch with its foreign colonies.

Only a Pollyanna could conclude that there is no danger in this situation. If only because it hides the emperor's agents, this large unassimilated group constitutes a real menace. Nor are the professional saboteurs who escape the FBI the only ones who would act with zest if they found themselves in a position to swing the balance against the United States forces. There are also congenital white-man haters (*haole*-haters in the island vernacular) among both the alien and citizen Japanese. The most innocuous *papa-san* could easily become their dupe. I do not say he will; the point is that we cannot be sure he will not. With no better material the emperor's men certainly welded efficient fifth columns in the Philippines, in Malaya, and in the Dutch East Indies. (There is another side to the coin, and in a happier time I would rather be polishing it—it presents the Hawaiianization of Japanese who can never be Americanized, for instance, and the human qualities which we must admire in these fine people whether they happen to be on our side or not.)

People who have been interned do not buy theater tickets or serve cocktails, and some islanders have argued that this is not the time to disturb matters in civilian Honolulu. Hawaii's Congressional delegate, Sam King, has worked assiduously to convince both Congress and the military that nothing should be done beyond apprehending known spies and treacherous ringleaders. Everywhere one hears repeated the testimony of Captain John Anthony Burns of the Honolulu police force that he has found the accounts of sniping at American soldiers untrue, and the touching story of Yoshio Yamamoto, who saves all his pennies for war stamps. Everywhere people emphasize that the Japanese are indispensable in Hawaii. But many of these are interested persons who overlook the Buddhist temples, the Japanese-language schools, the dozens of Japanese societies and organizations, some with official Tokyo connections, the ubiquitous pictures of the emperor, the Japanese holidays, the crowds flocking to see the emperor's cruisers, the subscriptions to Japanese war loans, the strongly nationalistic propaganda uncovered in Japanese-language publications.

The argument of Japanese indispensability, the one that has been dinned into the ears of Congress and the military authorities, is a fallacious one. It would be inconvenient to get along without the Japanese, but it would not be impossible. The Filipino has long been the backbone of the plantation labor supply, and there are thou-

sands of Chinese, Hawaiians, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and Caucasians to carry on essential functions. If the plantations should stop raising sugar and pineapples, which they would be forced to do during a long siege, there would be an over-supply of labor. Conversion to food crops has not taken place in Hawaii to the extent always thought necessary.

One articulate group in Hawaii advocates internment of the Japanese. The leaders of this group are life-long islanders, some of whom were raised with the Japanese and speak their language. Those I know are not given to jitters, and when they say that the absence of sabotage on December 7 proves nothing, I agree with them. If Japan has a well-organized fifth column in Hawaii it would certainly not have exposed it prematurely, before any effort was to be made at invasion, and when the saboteurs could have accomplished nothing but their own extinction.

I cannot agree, however, that large-scale internment of Hawaii's Japanese would be wise. Not only would internment be sure to cause great hardship, but it would be ineffective in one particular—in getting out of the invader's reach a large and competent reservoir of manpower which could be depended on to carry on civilian life in the islands. For whatever doubt there may be about the attitude of the Japanese before or during an invasion attempt, there is no doubt that the vast majority of Hawaii's Japanese will work with alacrity with the emperor's forces if Japan ever takes the islands. I favor evacuation, which would (1) remove this labor force, (2) bring less hardship, and (3) reduce Hawaii's consumption of food, much of which is convoyed from California. Since ships return from Hawaii with only sugar and pineapples, which we can forgo momentarily, plenty of bottoms are available for the purpose.

We should not underestimate the importance of what we are gambling. Hawaii consists of seven islands—only one of them fortified—as against the 2,500 islands of Micronesia; it is virtually our only neutralizing agent for the vast insular system of "stationary aircraft carriers" that projects Japanese power south to the Equator and east to within bombing distance of Honolulu. Hawaii is indispensable to us if we are to protect our flanks in the Antipodes and Alaska, safeguard the Panama Canal and our West Coast, and eventually carry out a frontal attack on Japan. Without it we should be impotent in the Pacific.

If it was expedient to remove a scattering of Japanese from our Western coastal regions, the American people should be told why it is not many times more necessary to remove this heavier concentration of Japanese from islands which are in greater danger and harder to defend. We are playing for the highest stakes: Congress should investigate immediately and tell us what the odds are.

Hitler's Quarreling Puppets

BY EUGEN KOVACS

DURING the critical period on the eastern front which preceded the present German offensive Adolf Hitler found time to go to Finland for a talk with Field Marshal Mannerheim. The reason given for his visit was that Herr Hitler wished personally to congratulate the Finnish leader on his seventy-fifth birthday. It is generally believed, however, that Hitler went to beg Mannerheim to contribute more troops to the war against Russia. Heretofore when the Führer has wanted something from the head of one of the "independent" states now allied to Germany, he has ordered his ally to come to him, but on this occasion he evidently thought it necessary to use gentler methods. What answer Mannerheim gave him is unknown, but there have been no signs of increased effort on the part of the Finns.

The Russian war has been very costly, and the new offensive is a tremendous drain on German man-power. Large numbers of troops must also be maintained in other parts of Europe to keep down underground activity, combat the Serbian guerrillas, and be prepared for an Anglo-American invasion of the Continent. At the same time the great need for war materials and food-stuffs calls for more and more men on the production front. Hitler is therefore asking for increased military support from his so-called allies, and since Italy is neither willing nor able to take part in the Russian war on a large scale, he is seeking fresh troops not only from the Finns but from the Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Croats, and Slovaks. The answers he has received from the peoples of Southeastern Europe show that they do not intend to increase the aid they have already granted.

Their attitude surprises no one who has lived among them. The support they have given Hitler has always been compulsory and half-hearted. How small it really has been is revealed by the German communiqués, which from January 1 to July 15, 1942, have mentioned the Rumanians thirty-six times, the Hungarians thirteen times, the Slovaks and Croats five times each.

From the beginning these allies of Hitler's formed a strange and unnatural group. Most of them have always been arch-enemies. They joined in the war against Russia—and against Yugoslavia and Greece—only in the hope that they could thereby realize their own national aims. Now that the war has left their borders and the danger of a Russian invasion is past, they consider their part in it finished and are returning to their own na-

tional politics. The accounts they wish to settle are not with the Russians but with one another. All of them are pressing Hitler to fulfil the promises he made to them a year ago. But Hitler is in a bad position and has to postpone fulfilment. As a result these countries are preparing for a direct settlement, and Hitler has his hands full preventing war between Rumania and Hungary, Hungary and Slovakia, or Rumania and Bulgaria.

In his original plan of strategy against Russia, formulated in August, 1941, Hitler reserved an important role for the Hungarian army—the defense of the Carpathian Mountains. The partition of Transylvania, which gave the northern part of that province to Hungary, was in preparation for this. But the war against Russia was very unpopular in Hungary. It had been necessary to blame the Soviets for the bombing of the town of Kassa in order to find a pretext for a declaration of war against them. The Hungarian army participated only on a small scale, preferring to remain on the Rumanian and Slovakian borders and to hold the Bácska, which was "retaken" from Yugoslavia in spite of a pact of "eternal friendship." The former Hungarian Premier, Ladislas de Bárdossy, declared in Parliament that his country would not increase the "expeditionary army" against the Russians, and his successor, Nicholas de Kállay, has made every effort to hold to that position. On his recent visit to Hitler he is reported to have said that Hungary needed its man-power for the harvest and to have offered grain instead of men. The government has been wholeheartedly supported by both Regent Horthy and the Hungarian aristocracy, which, though long notorious in Europe for its anti-democratic and fascist sentiments, is in the main anti-Hitler because it fears that after the Führer is victorious and no longer needs the support of the great landowners, he will advocate expropriation of the estates.

Hungarian policy is clear: Hungary wants to keep the former Hungarian territories "reconquered" from the Czechs in 1938 and from the Yugoslavs in 1941, and also that part of Transylvania which was retroceded by Rumania after Ribbentrop and Ciano worked out the Vienna award in 1941. But Hungary remembers its experience in 1918-19, when, its army having been destroyed, it had to submit not only to the dictates of the Allies but also to a Rumanian invasion and the occupation of Budapest. It refuses to repeat the mistakes of the last war and to sacrifice its youth in the cause of Germany. It remembers how, "*mitgegangen, mitgefangen*,