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THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII UNDER WAR CONDITIONS

By

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Eighth Conference of the
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AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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Introduction

Hawaii, whatever else it may have been -- tourist center, plantation frontier, or stopping point on the main street of the world -- is now chiefly a fortress. Inevitably, the officers in charge would prefer to have with them in the fortress only those who are qualified members of the armed forces. Most objectionable as residents of the fortress are naturally those who are presumed to be related to or sympathetic with the enemy. Thus simply may be stated the most significant facts which underlie the problem created for any by the Japanese in Hawaii during the present war.

There is no need to rehearse the facts as to the prime significance of Hawaii as America's military outpost in the Pacific. Both civilians and military had come to conceive of Pearl Harbor as America's chief protection from the west--a trust which the attack of December 7th did not seriously threaten and which has since been largely vindicated by months of arduous labor. To most Americans, Hawaii now represents the greatest concentration of armed strength for the United Nations in the Pacific and their chief interest in the Islands relates to the maintenance of that strength at its absolute maximum.

The current popularity of articles describing Hawaii's Japanese population undoubtedly stems largely from the widespread concern for their possible threat to the military effectiveness of the Islands. At least one of these popular treatises on "Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese" in a journal of liberal tendencies clearly implies that to permit them free residence in the Islands during war time is to risk unnecessarily "the internal stability of (America's) greatest base in the Pacific--the anchor of the whole Pacific battle line."⁽¹⁾

A single resident whose loyalty and devotion is open to question may constitute too serious a risk in a region of such high strategic value. The military strength of the Islands would obviously be greatly enhanced if it were possible to remove entirely all who do not contribute directly to the defense program. The reduction by perhaps 300,000 of the pre-war civilian population of Hawaii, including the 160,000 persons of Japanese birth and ancestry, would eliminate to a maximum the danger of sabotage and the cost of military protection and of economic imports. The military governor has repeatedly urged that all civilians not engaged in necessary defense work should leave the Islands, not only for their own safety, but as a means of conserving valuable shipping space across the Pacific. This appeal has been directed particularly to Occidentals having kinship and economic connections in continental United States.

⁽¹⁾ Albert Horlings, "Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese," The Nation, July 25, 1942, p. 69.

The Japanese residents of Hawaii, by virtue of their kinship and physical affinity to the enemy, their large numbers in the civilian population, and their presumed resistance to assimilation, have been the special objects of suspicion and distrust by both civilians and military. Rumor and myth play their inevitable part in building the attitudes and dispositions which alienate this important bloc from the rest of the Hawaiian community; even the deeply implanted tradition of racial tolerance in Hawaii has not sufficed to guarantee to every individual the consideration on the basis of personal merit and character which we ordinarily identify with American democracy. On the other hand, it seems apparent that the policy observed by the civil and military authorities in the treatment of Japanese in Hawaii represents a closer approximation to the conventional canons of American democracy than was evidently possible on the west coast of the United States.

The subsequent pages will be devoted to a review of the more pertinent facts of Japanese experience in Hawaii since the war in so far as they can be ascertained under present conditions, and an analysis and interpretation of these facts in the light of such local and intrusive principles of social relationships as appear to give meaning to the situation. It will be impossible to cover all phases of the problem in the present study owing to limitation of space. Special attention will be directed instead to the factors affecting the participation of the Japanese in the life of wartime Hawaii, reserving for later publication other aspects of their experience.

II. THE PREWAR SITUATION

The introduction and subsequent experience of the Japanese in Hawaii has been intimately associated with the history of the sugar industry in the Islands. The group of 148 Japanese who arrived in Hawaii in 1868, shortly after the Meiji Restoration, and thus initiated the modern emigration from Japan into colonial regions, were recruited by agents in search of labor for the expanding Hawaiian plantation interests. It was not, however, until 1884 that arrangements were completed by the Hawaiian government (acting in behalf of the sugar industry) for the systematic importation of Japanese on any large scale. During the following 23 years, Hawaii received the largest single body of workers that Japan sent to any foreign land. It is estimated that 180,000 Japanese laborers and their relatives have migrated to Hawaii since 1884 and they, together with their children, have bulked larger in the Hawaiian population than any other ethnic group within the Islands. The overwhelming majority of the Japanese immigrants have spent their first few years of life in Hawaii on a sugar plantation and most of their Hawaiian-born children have lived for some years in the plantation environment.

Table I. Japanese Population of the Territory of Hawaii, 1890-1940

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Number</u>	<u>Foreign Born</u>		<u>Per Cent of Japanese in Total Population</u>
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>	
1890	12,610			14.0
1896	24,407	22,329	91.5	22.4
1900	61,111	56,234	92.0	39.7
1910	79,675	59,786	75.0	41.5
1920	109,274	60,688	55.5	42.7
1930	139,631	48,446	34.7	37.9
1940	157,905	37,353	23.5	37.2
1941*	159,534	35,183	22.0	34.2

*(Estimate, June 30, 1941, Bureau of Vital Statistics.)

It was inevitable that any distinctive group which appeared in such large numbers in a region of so limited a size should draw to itself the marked attention, if not the criticism, of the other groups within the territory, and even the plantation sponsors of the Japanese immigration began to be alarmed in the nineties at the prospect of their being overrun by the "Oriental horde." At this early date, the adverse sentiment toward the Japanese was not so much a consequence of the economic competition provided by the newcomers as it was an expression of fear of the biological and cultural conquest of the Islands by a strange population.

Following annexation, when nearly 117,000 Japanese immigrants were added to the population of Hawaii within a period of ten years (1898-1907), anti-Japanese sentiment reached its highest level of intensity. This was occasioned in considerable part by the increasing movement of Japanese from plantation labor into the skilled and semi-skilled occupations in the cities and towns. Even the conservative reports by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1905 reveal an unusual depth of hostility toward the Japanese who had by this time secured a strong foothold in such fields as carpentry, plumbing, tailoring, barbering, retail trade, fishing, and independent farming:

Embarrassing as it has become in many ways for the planters, the Orientalization of the Islands is reacting still more disastrously on the white and native wage-earners, merchants, and even farmers, than it is on the planters The first effect of the incoming of the Asiatics was the taking over of unskilled labor of every sort, but the competition has now extended until it has become active in nearly every line of trade and in nearly all the skilled occupations. Most of the competition in the skilled trades comes from the Japanese, and it is insisted everywhere throughout the Islands that this competition is growing rapidly..... It is not easy to give an adequate idea of the resentment and the bitterness felt by the white mechanic and the white merchant who see themselves being steadily forced to the wall and even driven out of the Territory, by Asiatic competition. (2)

(2) Third Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on Hawaii, 1905, pp. 383, 392.

The cessation of further immigration and the departure to continental United States of a considerable number of both the Japanese and Caucasian competitors did much to alleviate the tension of this period, but the attitudes thus provoked have remained latent in the community. Plantation strikes in 1909, 1920, and 1924, and certain other dramatic incidents in Hawaii's social history, such as the language school controversy of 1922-24 and the Statehood hearings of 1933 and 1937, served to touch off attitudes of hostility which had remained dormant under normal circumstances.

Economic Status

More than most plantation frontiers, however, Hawaii has afforded its immigrant population the opportunity to rise in social and economic status, and the Japanese have been no exception to this general trend. The Japanese in Hawaii have clearly surpassed their cousins in continental United States in the struggle for occupational preferment. Despite race prejudice and vested interests, conditions of free competition prevailing in Hawaii have enabled Japanese to establish themselves in all of the major professions--law, medicine, dentistry, teaching, and the ministry.⁽³⁾ Fifteen per cent of the Japanese gainfully employed in 1940 were in preferred professional and proprietary and managerial occupations.⁽⁴⁾

A peculiar element in the Hawaiian social scene as compared with most plantation frontiers is the continued emphasis upon democracy in social relations, coupled with cultural and educational freedom. The newspaper and the public school as symbols of the American tradition of free speech and a common education are accessible to every immigrant and his children, and the Japanese have extensively utilized these two media of understanding and participation in a common cultural life. In 1940, approximately 65% of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry over the age of 25 had completed eight or more years of school and only 8% had less than four years of American education.⁽⁵⁾ Similarly, the ballot, symbol of the equality of every citizen in the processes of self-government, was available in 1940 to some 40,000 of the Japanese born on American soil.

The freedom to participate in the common affairs of political and cultural experience, as guaranteed by the American tradition of democracy, appears commonly to be associated with the obverse freedom to perpetuate peculiar old-country customs and institutions, insofar as they do not interfere with the welfare of the commonwealth. The Japanese in Hawaii, for example, were allowed and at times were even encouraged to pursue habits of

(3) Cf. A.W. Lind, An Island Community, pp. 245-74.

(4) Sixteenth Census of the United States, Series P-9, No. 8.

(5) Sixteenth Census of the United States, Series P-9, No. 9.

speech, thought, and conduct which had been acquired in Japan. The Japanese language has been the accepted medium of communication within the first generation Japanese home; and its perpetuation into the second and third generation was fostered through the language school, which as recently as 1940 commanded some time each school-day in the lives of 80% of the Japanese children of school age. Newspapers published in the Japanese language with an aggregate circulation of over 30,000 daily in 1941 provided an almost complete coverage of the alien population (35,183 in June, 1941) and were accessible to a large portion of the adult citizen population. Daily radio broadcasts of varying length in the Japanese language were provided by each of the three major stations in Hawaii prior to the war. News dispatches emanating from Japan, together with classical and popular Japanese music, constituted the bulk of the noncommercial portions of these programs which likewise had almost a complete coverage of Japanese households in the territory. Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples of Japanese origin and ideology had a very large following, especially among the first generation prior to the war, and almost every immigrant household had both its Butsudan (Buddha shelf) and its Kamidana (Shinto shelf) where daily rituals were performed.

This is not the place to discuss the aggregate effect of these various influences upon the Japanese population. It is safe to say, however, that the above-mentioned institutions were primarily supported by and effective among the immigrant Japanese. With the passing of the foreign-born Japanese, three-fourths of whom were over the age of 45 in 1940, the Japanese language and ideology were gradually falling into disuse under the impact of Americanizing forces in the wider Hawaiian community.

Many observers of the Hawaiian social scene have been impressed, nevertheless, by the apparent slowness with which the Americanization of the Japanese community in Hawaii has proceeded. It is pointed out that more than any other "racial" group in Hawaii, the Japanese have preferred to marry within their own group. As recently as 1940 and 1941, 10.8% of the Japanese brides and 95.5% of the Japanese grooms found spouses of their own ethnic ancestry. The use of the language press and the language school, while steadily declining year by year, was nonetheless higher than in any other ethnic group. The facts that the Japanese constituted the largest single racial group in the Islands, that their immigrants were prevented by law from becoming citizens, that they were frequently encouraged to retain their ancestral institutions as a means of maintaining order among them, are doubtless among the factors which have delayed this assimilation of the Japanese; but they have not, of course, removed the bases of prejudice toward the Japanese.

Japanese Population Groups

Moreover, it would be inaccurate to attribute the old-country customs and practices to the entire population of Japanese heritage. The common distinction between Issei ("first generation" - those born in Japan) and Nisei ("second generation" - those born in America) suggests a third equally important--the Kibei ("returned to America" - those born in America but educated in Japan). It seems apparent that among the latter there are some who have been indoctrinated with the exaggerated conception of the Japanese as a race of demigods destined to be the new lords of all creation. Some of them have been disappointed and embittered upon their return to Hawaii because their exalted conceptions have not been shared, even by their own relatives. The great majority of the Issei were of the peasant class and had come to

Hawaii for the sole purpose of making a livelihood for themselves and their families. In the course of the 35 years in which the average immigrant has been engaged in this process, the enthusiasm for Yamato Damashii has greatly waned and a sentimental attachment to Hawaii as the native land of their children has taken its place. This is especially true if the immigrant has had the opportunity to return at least once to his home land to discover how much more fortunate he has been than his kinsfolk who remained behind in the Japanese village. The relatively small proportion of the educated and professional classes--language school teachers, priests, merchants, doctors--who have come to Hawaii has unquestionably included a number who have been thoroughly schooled in the fanatical chauvinism of Nippon Shugi and have utilized their residence in Hawaii as a means of advancing the cause of Japanese nationalism. Still further distinctions are made within the immigrant Japanese community between the outcaste eta and the marginal Okinawa families and the rest of the Japanese. Class distinctions also play a role among the second generation.

The Nisei of Hawaii, by virtue of the treatment accorded them in the public schools, in industry, and in the community generally, have doubtless identified themselves more completely with the rest of the local American community than have their Nisei relatives in California, and it is safe to say that their primary orientation was Hawaiian and American.

To the defense workers attracted in large numbers to the Islands from continental United States in recent years and to the military population, the picture presented by the Japanese group was distinctly not reassuring. The presence of 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, all of whom looked very much alike to the newcomer and were reputed to be religiously loyal to the institutions and ideals of Japan, could hardly be expected to be comforting to the average malihini (a stranger, a non-resident; a transient, as opposed to a kamaaina or islander). Scepticism with regard to the feasibility of the democratic experiment in Hawaii, especially as applied to the Japanese population, was widely felt, if not openly expressed, by many visitors and even some residents of long standing. Under the stress of feeling evoked by the sensational Kaahawai case in 1931, a prominent malihini expressed himself as follows:

If these islands were populated, as are the States of our Union, by American citizens, comprised in large measure of the Caucasian race, their allegiance and loyalty to the welfare of the whole Nation might not be questioned. But the fact of several claimed unassimilable races predominating in the civil population gives to the situation here a decided element of doubt, if not of actual alarm.

The large number of aliens in the Hawaiian Islands is a matter of grave concern to our National Government, and years of study by civilian, military, and naval authorities, of the probable attitude of certain of the island-born orientals has led to the conclusion that but doubtful reliance can be placed upon their loyalty to the United States in the event of war with an oriental power. The presence of oriental-language newspapers, of Buddhist temples, of oriental schools, of oriental organizations for various purposes, are indicative of the methods by which many of the island-born orientals are being educated to consider themselves primarily subordinate to the country of their racial origin, and tends to lessen to a considerable degree the so-called ties that might bind them to America.

Furthermore, racial feelings are strong amongst all oriental races, and there can be little doubt but that the so-called dominant white race is cordially disliked by practically all of these races. (6)

It is significant, however, that local sentiment, expressive in part of the American tradition of toleration and freedom, has consistently frowned upon discrimination on purely racial lines.

"The race mores of Hawaii are, or tend to be mores of race equality." (7) So strong has this Island ritual of racial equality--sometimes confused with the local "Aloha-spirit"--been that few public avowals of a contrary attitude have occurred, at least prior to the outbreak of the present war.

III. DECEMBER SEVENTH AND THE JAPANESE

The essential peacefulness and charm of the Hawaiian landscape on the morning of December 7th was probably as impressive to the average individual of Japanese ancestry as it was to all the other residents of the Islands. The announcement interjected in a Sunday morning broadcast of sacred music that "Oahu is under attack" seemed quite as fantastic and incredible to most Japanese in Hawaii as it did to the haoles (persons of North European or American ancestry) or the Hawaiians. The initial reaction of the overwhelming majority of all Island residents, regardless of racial ancestry or class, on December 7 was that "it can't happen here"; and the ensuing sense of anger, dismay, and horror was well-nigh universal among the civilian population.

It was to be expected that some of the revulsion and anger of the entire community at the events which took place in Hawaii on the morning of the seventh should be directed toward those residents of the Islands who bore the visible and inefaceable marks of kinship with the treacherous enemy. That no serious instances of mob attack upon Japanese residents of Hawaii occurred on the seventh or thereafter is evidence of the effectiveness of prewar interracial solidarity, as well as of the military and police controls imposed. There were expressions of deep resentment but they were surprisingly few in number as compared with the expectations of many observers who were not familiar with the Island codes of conduct. A student observer reports with some distress the following case of deviation from Island mores:

There was a small group of men and women gathered near the school (which had been bombed), each trying to tell the other of his experience and what he thought of the "Japs." Some of the individuals were "mad," some were frustrated and excited, and one or two were distressed but seemed to see the situation objectively. There was one person who was especially upset emotionally. From her conversation one could note that she hated and despised the Japs more than the others in the group. I had the impression that

(6) Quoted in Seth Richardson, Law Enforcement in Hawaii, p. 198.

(7) Romanzo Adams, "The Unorthodox Race Doctrines in Hawaii" in Race and Culture Contacts.

she was a wife of a service man or a malihini from the mainland whose ideas and conceptions of the Japanese were stereotyped.

While this group was absorbed in conversation, an old Japanese woman in kimono was passing by. The cloc-cloc of her "getta" attracted the attention of the group. As soon as the malihini woman saw this kimono-clad woman, she became furious and yelled, "Take that damn thing off!" and rushed to her and began to tear off the "tamoto" (sleeves) from the poor woman's kimono before anyone could stop her. Realizing what she might do to the woman, the other members tried to stop her with words, but failing in this they grabbed and controlled her and sent the terrified Japanese woman home.

Instances of a similar sort, particularly on the Island of Oahu, were sufficiently frequent to provide adequate grounds of uneasiness among the Japanese. Defense workers were ordered off the project at the point of a bayonet; medical attendants were prevented from doing their duties because they were of Japanese ancestry; trained civilians who responded to requests for guardsmen were refused posts while wholly inexperienced non-Japanese were accepted; maids who had given faithful service were summarily discharged. "These unfortunate experiences, by no means confined to the Japanese and doubtless inevitable incidents of the war situation, have appeared to the second generation Japanese to be primarily directed at them."⁽⁸⁾

Reports of such cases of discrimination and overt attack as did occur were widely circulated and enlarged upon within the Japanese camps and neighborhoods. Immediately after the blitz, there was a noticeable withdrawal of Japanese women and girls from their positions as domestic servants in non-Japanese homes, and Japanese employees in commercial enterprises simply refrained from coming to work. As one Nisei leader expressed it, "My mind tells me to get to work as I never worked before, but my sense of shame and fear impels me to pull in my head like a turtle. I hate to show my face in the community." For many this sense of humiliation and fear was so acute that they would not even leave their homes to secure necessary supplies of food.

The effect, of course, of such behavior on the part of the Japanese was to widen the rift between them and the remainder of the community. The failure of servants to appear for work in the home of their haole employers on the morning of the eighth of December was frequently interpreted as an evidence of a guilty conscience or of some sinister design. There were, on the other hand, more numerous instances of Japanese servants, particularly in the homes of kamaaina residents who remained on in service, trusting in the understanding of their employers and being trusted in turn.

Rumors of disloyal behavior among the Japanese were widely disseminated in Honolulu and elsewhere in the Territory on the seventh and for some time thereafter. The success of the Japanese attack--the accuracy of their knowledge of our military locations and the speed and secrecy with which the attack was made--all suggested the participation of an enemy within, and who more likely than the resident Japanese? They were accused of cutting arrows in cane fields to point the way of Japanese pilots to

(8) Report to the Director of Public Morale Section, Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, December 19, 1941.

military objectives, of sending messages to the enemy by signal lights, of poisoning the drinking water, of deliberately blocking traffic to prevent defense operations; these and many other rumored acts of disloyalty and sabotage were believed by many of the Island residents, including haoles of long residence in Hawaii and even some persons of Japanese ancestry, to be the work of Japanese residents.

No Sabotage

This is not the place to explore in detail the extent of Japanese culpability in the unfortunate events of December 7. The few official statements which have appeared since January 1, 1942, tend to exonerate the local residents of charges of sabotage prior to or after December 7. The Tolson Report on the "Evacuation of Enemy Aliens from Prohibited Military Zones" published in May 1942 is undoubtedly the best single source of information on the subject, and the following excerpts bearing on the situation in Hawaii are quoted:

"The War Department has received no information of sabotage committed by Japanese during the attack on Pearl Harbor." Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, March 30, 1942.

"There was very little, if any, sabotage by the Japanese residents of Oahu during the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was considerable amount of evidence of subversive activity on the part of the Japanese prior to the attack. This consisted of providing the enemy with the most exact possible kind of information as an aid to them in locating their objectives, and also creating a great deal of confusion in the air following the attack by the use of radio sets which successfully prevented the commander in chief of the fleet from determining in what direction the attackers had withdrawn and in locating the position of the covering fleet including the carriers.

"However, during the actual attack, as I said above, there was little to complain of in the way of sabotage, either before or during the attack. Personally, I am gravely concerned about the situation in Oahu and have been urging repeatedly the removal of the Japanese element, if not to the mainland, to one of the other islands in the Hawaiian group, as a measure of safety. Since the primary responsibility of this rests on the Army, my efforts in this discussion are limited to recommendation." Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, March 24, 1942.

"Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has advised me there was no sabotage committed there (in Hawaii) prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent to that time." James Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, April 20, 1942.

"The affidavits we send are from civilians and probably cover the entire city and county of Honolulu....These show there was no sabotage in the nature of cutting marks in the cane pointing the way to Pearl Harbor and also shows there was no blocking of roadways in their vicinity." R.A. Vitousek, Chairman, Citizens Council, Honolulu, April 10, 1942.

A more extensive statement by the lieutenant of the Honolulu Police Department in charge of espionage investigation and liaison officer with

the office of military intelligence and the F.B.I. reveals:

That all investigated cases of flares were found to have originated from Army encampments; that investigation of reported signal lights disclosed that they resulted from carelessness of persons other than those of Japanese ancestry; that every case of sniping investigated failed to substantiate the claim of sniping; investigation of reported parachute troops showed that the reports were unfounded; that to date no unauthorized short-wave sending set has been found; that reports of collections of arms and ammunition in the possession of persons of Japanese ancestry have been investigated and found false except in one instance where a junk dealer of Japanese ancestry was found to have buried some 10,000 rounds of .22 ammunition and investigation of this case disclosed that mercenary reasons and fear prompted the action; that investigation has disclosed no evidence of plans for concerted or group action among persons of Japanese ancestry against the United States.

That both before and since the outbreak of war he has been assisted in his duties by persons of Japanese ancestry, both citizen and alien, who have reported to him persons of Japanese ancestry, whose attitude is inimical to the United States and persons of Japanese ancestry ~~an~~ investigation of whose activities might disclose subversive activities; that reports of disaffection for the United States on the part of persons of Japanese ancestry have in some instances been authenticated and the persons reported detained.

That in the course of his duties since December 7 he has also assisted in directing general searches made by officers of the various intelligence agencies in the many locales in the city in which there is a concentration of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry: that said searches in such districts were complete and thorough; that by way of illustration in one such search 132 men working on an 8-hour basis participated; that these searches did not result in findings which would indicate the presence of any plots for an uprising or concerted action for Japan on the part of residents on Oahu of Japanese ancestry, nor did said search result in the discovery of guns, except in isolated instances, or any quantity of contraband materials, except in the one instance heretofore referred to.

Reaction of Japanese

It is, of course, impossible to generalize on the psychological reactions of the 160,000 Japanese in Hawaii to the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. Unquestionably some hailed the report with real, if concealed, satisfaction--just how many, not even the lists of those immediately detained by the local police and the arms of the federal government are likely to reveal. Scattered incidents, such as the one on the Island of Niihau where a Japanese alien resident gave assistance on December 7 to a landed enemy pilot in an effort to capture the island for Japan, led many non-Japanese to assume that all persons of Japanese ancestry or birth were disloyal to the United States. Similarly the case of an inebriated Nisei on the Island of Kauai, who told a group of soldiers on a later occasion that they were fighting on the wrong side and that "the United States Army is no good and democracy is no good," brought widespread censure upon the

entire Japanese community as revealing the true state of their unrestrained feelings.⁽⁹⁾ Grammar school children of Japanese parentage, particularly in the younger years, sometimes expressed sentiments sympathetic to Japan and this was interpreted as reflecting the attitudes within the Japanese homes of the Territory.

The far larger portion of the Japanese population--both first and second generation--were too completely appalled by the turn of events on the seventh to give any public expression of their attitudes. It is probable that many of the Issei were torn between sentimental attachments to the land of their birth and of their ancestors and a sense of duty and obligation to the land which had given a livelihood and opportunity to them and their children. By one of the curious accidents of the war, there were more Japanese civilians killed by the bombs which fell on and around Honolulu on December 7 than persons of other ancestry, and the abstract devotion to Japan of many of the older generation, particularly on the island of Oahu, was shattered by the brutal treatment they were themselves accorded by the land of their birth. "To think that Japan could treat us so unkindly," was the naive way in which many subsequently expressed their feelings of the situation.

Expressions by older school children and by such members of the second generation generally who have been vocal since the seventh, reveal an overwhelming devotion to America and resentment toward the "enemy." A proper and wholesome scepticism of patriotic protestations among those who are frequently suspected of being unpatriotic, still leaves little ground for doubt as to the sincerity and honesty of many of the spontaneous expressions recorded after the seventh. A girl of twenty relates:

When word came over the radio that this island was being attacked by Japanese airplanes, a sense of shame and indignation arose in me. I told my folks that the Japanese were rats for attacking us when Japan and the United States were in the midst of peace negotiations. I laughed bitterly and wondered whether the two gentlemen in Washington from Japan could be crouching under their beds.....Even the hatred for Japan which came so suddenly and left a deep mark might never have been if I were not aware of the critical position in which all my fellow residents were now placed. Where formerly I would have been highly incensed at critical remarks toward me as a Japanese--such as when a little Filipino girl damned me for being a "Japanese--so damn greedy hog"--I was now more philosophical and accepted such things as inevitable.

I knew that what was happening to me was not happening to me alone. My plight was the plight of many, many people, and if I lost anything, so did others, and what I experienced as a "hateful Jap" was also being experienced by other citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Children of 14 to 16 years in one of the most thoroughly Japanese of the rural communities in Hawaii, in whom the influence of the home situations was still markedly evident, expressed themselves in similar sentiments.

I hate to think about December 7, how shocked I was over the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I didn't know my ancestral people were so ruthless. At first I couldn't believe it, thought it was only a

⁽⁹⁾ Honolulu Star Bulletin, August 18, 1942.

radio play.....I told my parents and they laughed at me. They told me "Don't be a fool. Japan won't start anything foolish like that, especially to a country like America." Who could dream that Japan would attack a place where so many of her subjects lived?

In numerous cases the children refused at first to believe that the enemy could be Japan, preferring to think that it must be Germany or Italy. One young man reported:

I would tell my father that his ancestors were the cause of this war. He gave me a quick reply, "I have lived in America 41 years of my life and am an American as the best in America could make me. Why blame me for these things over which I have no control?" I felt ashamed of myself for saying such a thing. Although he is an alien, his heart is with America as far as we can see.

On the other hand, several youngsters reported "rumors" from aliens to the effect that:

Hawaii would fall into the hands of the enemy within a month--that Japan was invincible; that American soldiers were afraid and didn't have the courage to fight back, which made me so angry that I told several of them where to get off and if they don't appreciate the government which gave them a home and protection and their children an education they are worthless like a rat.

IV. THE JAPANESE UNDER MARTIAL LAW

The announcement over the radio by the civil governor late on the morning of December 7 of a state of martial law came to the listening Japanese, as it did to many other residents of Hawaii, almost as a note of doom. The transfer to the commanding general of the civil rights which Hawaii has so jealously guarded for its residents ever since annexation, seemed particularly ominous to many of the thoughtful Nisei in Hawaii. As one twenty-five year old citizen of Japanese ancestry expressed it,

The agitated voice of the governor declaring a state of martial law almost made me weep and then the awful silence when the radio went off the air shortly afterwards seemed like death itself. I got to thinking, "Now with the Army and Navy in charge here with their prejudiced attitudes toward the Japanese, we will surely all be deported to Molokai or perhaps to a mainland concentration camp. We must least expect some pretty rough treatment.

That the doleful expectations of many Island Japanese have not been realized is a factor of major significance in stabilizing the critical social and racial situation in Hawaii.

Among the first pronouncements to the people of Hawaii after the fateful seventh was a radio address by Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, Military Intelligence Department, speaking as a representative of the Military Governor, General Short, in which there was a large element of reassurance to the loyal residents of Japanese ancestry:

Your behavior and spirit under fire have conformed to the best traditions of a free people. Your morale has been splendid. Your cooperation with the military and other officials on matters of vital importance to the defense of these Islands has been as might be expected of citizens of a democratic country. General Short is pleased with your conduct.

Remember that each and every one of you has a duty to perform. Continue to assist the authorities but do not let your eagerness to help lead you to take the law into your own hands. Those who in their zeal do so are actually a hindrance to those who are charged with the responsibility of law and order and with the security of these Islands. You may rest assured that the constituted authorities will handle subversive and unlawful elements swiftly, adequately and fairly. A number of enemy agents have been apprehended and detained. Many others have been apprehended on suspicion but most of them were found to be innocent and were released. There is no desire on the part of the authorities to organize mass concentration camps.

It is important for you to be alert but you must beware of unfounded rumors and fantastic flights of your imagination. Check carefully the authenticity and accuracy of rumors you may hear.

Let me again commend you for your splendid behavior in this critical situation. Continue to pull together; maintain that spirit of unity with which you have met the first test. The loyal citizens of all racial ancestries must work and fight together to the end. Your armed forces can operate effectively and successfully only when we are not hampered by a citizenry that is divided and discordant.

Twelve days later an address by the Commanding General, Lt. General Delos C. Emmons, which was widely broadcast throughout the Islands, gave public approval to the traditional pattern of friendly relations between the various ethnic groups in the Territory. This address did much to allay the fears of the Japanese residents that they were to be the scapegoats for the accumulated resentment of the rest of the community. On the other hand, it offered no grounds for expectation of indulgence by those who were disloyal.

Hawaii has always been an American outpost of friendliness and goodwill and now has calmly accepted its responsibility as an American outpost of war. In accepting these responsibilities it is important that Hawaii prove that her traditional confidence in her cosmopolitan population has not been misplaced.

There must not be indiscriminate displacement of labor. In this connection, it has come to our attention that many people have been dismissed from private employment because of fear and suspicion on the part

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- (10) For some months prior to the war, efforts had been made by the military authorities to strengthen the sense of American solidarity among all the racial groups in Hawaii and to assure them of equal and just treatment in the event of war.

of their employers. I wish to emphasize the fact that if the courage of the people of these islands is to be maintained and the morale of the entire population sustained, we cannot afford to unnecessarily and indiscriminately keep a number of loyal workers from useful employment. Let me suggest to you that if there is any doubt concerning any individual who may be employed by you at this time, that you check with the constituted authorities before taking action.

As you were told a few days ago, there have been very few cases of actual sabotage. This does not mean that you can relax. Both the constituted authorities and the public in general must continue to be alert against possible saboteurs. But remember that vigilance requires calmness as well as determination.

Additional investigations and apprehensions will be made and possibly additional suspects will be placed in custodial detention, but their friends and relatives need have no fear that they are being mistreated. These people are not prisoners of war and will not be treated as such. I intend, very shortly, to permit an inspection of detained aliens to be made by representative citizens and aliens in order that the public may be reassured as to the treatment those detained are receiving. As you have been told before there is no intention or desire on the part of the federal authorities to operate mass concentration camps. No person, be he citizen or alien, need worry, provided he is not connected with subversive elements.

In connection with the conduct of the public as a whole it is worthy of note that despite the great activity during the past two weeks, arrests for all causes number less than at any time in Honolulu's history.

While we have been subjected to a serious attack by a ruthless and treacherous enemy, we must remember that this is America and we must do things the American Way. We must distinguish between loyalty and disloyalty among our people. Sometimes this is difficult to do, especially under the stress of war. However, we must not knowingly and deliberately deny any loyal citizen the opportunity to exercise or demonstrate his loyalty in a concrete way.

The statement to the American commonwealth at about the same time by President Roosevelt assuring just treatment to all regardless of race doubtless helped further to build the morale of the Island Nisei.

These reassuring public statements from high ranking officials of the nation and the military in Hawaii, together with the equal treatment accorded Japanese in the distribution of gas masks, the rationing of food and gasoline, and in other regulations imposed by the military governor, assisted greatly in counteracting the sense of fear which pervaded the Japanese community generally immediately after the outbreak of the war.

Certain regulations imposed by the military command upon the civilian community were, of course, directed specifically toward the Japanese population. General Orders No. 5 announced on December 8 "the policy to be observed toward all alien Japanese of the age of fourteen

years and upwards." They were instructed to "preserve the peace towards the United States, ... to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States," but they were also informed that:

So long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States. All citizens are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

Special Regulations for Japanese

The possession or use of the following articles was definitely forbidden to alien Japanese under penalty of severe punishment: firearms, weapons or implements of war or component parts thereof, ammunition, bombs, explosives or material used in the manufacture of explosives, short-wave radio receiving sets, transmitting sets, signal devices, codes or ciphers, cameras, and papers, documents or books providing graphic representations of any U.S. military or naval equipment or installations.

The following activities were likewise forbidden in the same orders: travel by air; change of residence or occupation or movement "from place to place" without military permission; and to write, print, or publish any attack or threats against the government of the United States.

Subsequent military orders have not singled out the Japanese for differential treatment, although naturally it was the Japanese who were chiefly involved. On December 18 the restrictions of General Order 5 were extended to all enemy aliens, and binoculars, field glasses and telescopes were added to the earlier list of articles prohibited to Japanese aliens. Provision was made, however, that "enemy aliens may go about their business and visit friends and relatives during daylight hours without special permits or passes....." Orders issued in February forbade the use of short-wave radio sets in households where they could be heard by enemy aliens. This, of course, was to prevent the reception of enemy propaganda, which had been a problem of serious proportion heretofore.

Presidential "freeze orders," federal regulations, and prior territorial laws likewise imposed special restrictions upon the enemy aliens in Hawaii. Under authority granted by the Territorial legislature in the so-called M-Day Bill of 1941, the civilian governor announced shortly after the blitz the prohibition of all "transactions involving property in which Japan or any national thereof has an interest" except as specifically authorized in a system of licensing subsequently described. Funds invested in the three Japanese banks in Honolulu, estimated at \$11,000,000, were temporarily frozen, but provision was made for cash withdrawals up to \$200.00 a month from accounts in other banking institutions for necessary living expenses. Japanese business involving aliens was theoretically brought to a standstill, although actually the interference with normal transactions was relatively slight.

The sudden suspension by military order of the ordinary means of communication such as the language press and radio, and the privilege of free assembly, has had far-reaching consequences in the Japanese community. Although all radio stations were permitted to resume on December 9, broadcasts in the Japanese language have continued to be prohibited.⁽¹¹⁾ Virtually the entire alien Japanese population was thereby deprived of a most effective means of news dissemination and of potential Americanizing influence, but the probable resentment within the wider community to the use of the Japanese language over the air seemed to demand such repression. Similarly the publication of all newspapers and periodicals in the Japanese language was suspended on December 10, 1941, and only the two largest daily Japanese newspapers in Honolulu were permitted to resume publication, under strict censorship, nearly a month later.

The prohibition upon any gathering of aliens in numbers exceeding ten meant the sudden collapse of the major part of the intricate system of social organization and control among the Japanese. Eliminated also was the host of local mutual-aid organizations, consisting of from ten to fifty neighboring households and serving in normal times to hold the immigrants and their children to the basic moral precepts essential in any community, and to assist the immigrants generally to make the necessary accommodations to American life.⁽¹²⁾

Economic dislocations incidental to the war and the requirements of martial law threatened for a time to be excessive among the Japanese. Seven hundred Japanese fishermen were immediately deprived of their normal source of livelihood by the orders prohibiting the use of small craft in Hawaiian waters except under close supervision. The Japanese fishing industry had, of course, long been under attack as a suspected source of espionage (12-a), and the immediate withdrawal of both ships and men, most of whom were aliens, was obviously necessary.

Smaller groups of Japanese aliens and citizens were adversely affected by direct military orders, as in the case of some 30 alien photographers who were prohibited from possessing or using cameras, and of a larger number of dealers whose business was closed for several months by the military ban upon the sale of intoxicating liquors. Automobile sales and repair work, employing some 2,100 Japanese in 1940, have suffered a drastic decline in Hawaii as they have elsewhere. The disappearance of the tourist at the outbreak of the war undermined the livelihood of 250 Japanese flower growers who had supplied flowers for leis; and the limitations on interisland shipping cut off the market for many of the 2,000 Japanese vegetable and hog raisers.

(11) Regular Filipino broadcasts have since been permitted.

(12) In the early stages of immigration, these institutions undoubtedly serve to perpetuate Japanese traditions and customs, but with the passage of time, an important function becomes that of assisting in assimilation.

(12-a) Barber, Joseph, Jr., Hawaii, Restless Rampart, pp. 174-7.

The prohibition upon the residence of Japanese aliens within certain areas designated by the Army or Navy has also destroyed the source of income for some hundreds of small farmers and charcoal producers, especially on the Island of Oahu. (The closing of the language schools, Buddhist temples, and Shinto shrines automatically deprived six to seven hundred persons of an occupation, but since most of the alien teachers and priests were interned, the problem became chiefly one of providing an income for the families of the internees.)

These various disruptions of the normal economic life of the Japanese have involved serious financial losses in many instances, but the dislocations have in most cases also applied to persons of other ancestries as well. Moreover, the phenomenal expansion of the defense industries has enabled all Japanese thus affected to find profitable employment in other occupations.

In general, the Japanese have participated in the inflation of incomes growing out of the war. Families whose joint incomes in 1940 were less than \$100 a month are now, with the increased employment of their children, receiving four and five times that amount. As one careful observer in the Japanese community expressed it:

The business situation is certainly very good. It's true that things looked bad for a while just after the outbreak of the war. I suppose it was the fishermen who were the hardest hit of all, since their business was completely wiped out, but they have succeeded in getting into other jobs and none of them is suffering want. Many of them, of course, are employed as unskilled laborers but they are being paid well for it....As far as I can see, there is no problem of financial distress among any of the Japanese. They can get work if they want it, even though they may be prevented from taking some of the better defense jobs.

The problems of personal and family adjustment to the enlarged war incomes is one which deserves separate treatment. (12-b)

Far more serious to the morale of the Japanese population than the temporary loss of employment was the economic discrimination which suddenly became overt as a consequence of the war. In a survey of labor policies of the larger employers on Oahu in February 1942, it was found that Japanese citizens and aliens were not acceptable on most of the defense projects and in many of the larger business and industrial firms in Honolulu. (12-c)

(12-b) See Yukiko Kimura, "The Social Effects of Increased Incomes of Defense Workers of Oriental Ancestry," Social Process in Hawaii, VII (1941), pp. 46-55.

(12-c) A more detailed account of this survey will appear in a subsequent publication.

The public announcement of this policy through newspaper want ads and notices at employment bureaus was more significant than the existence of the discrimination itself. The reaction of the citizen Japanese to this differential treatment was bitter at times.

There were occasions when some of my friends were discouraged. There are many jobs but the word, Japanese, has a curse on it. A friend of mine saw in the want ad that the C company wanted some clerks. He went at the first opportunity and was interviewed. The first question asked of him was, "Are you Japanese?" He said, "No, I'm an American of Japanese ancestry." Without any further questioning, the interviewer curtly answered, "Sorry, no Japanese." Angered by this statement, he stood, stared, and finally said, "Any time you're looking for an American, let me know." And he walked out.

The effect of President Roosevelt's Executive Order - "there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries...because of race, creed, color or national origin..." - was to reduce greatly the amount of such differential treatment, and of the corresponding resentment by the Japanese. Ten months after Pearl Harbor, there is a far greater disposition by the Japanese to accept such discrimination as occurs as an inevitable and minimal cost of the war.

V. DETENTION AND EVACUATION

The threat of detention and evacuation has been to both generations of Japanese the ultimate tragedy which might befall them as a consequence of shifting military policy; and in the minds of the Island Japanese, the two are more or less synonymous. Detention has usually meant evacuation, and during the first ten months of the war little voluntary evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii could occur. Even prior to the war there had been sufficient talk among military and civilian circles of a possible forced evacuation or detention of all Japanese, citizens and aliens, on some island such as Molokai, so that the idea was not wholly unfamiliar to them, but it was one which few cared to contemplate seriously. When mention was made of such a possibility in the conversations of the Nisei, it was in a gallows-humor vein, along with their prospects in case of government by a military commission. The latter possibility has become a reality far less calamitous than most had predicted; the threat of evacuation, which will doubtless continue as long as the war, might also prove to be less fearful in actuality than in anticipation.

Even while the initial attacks were being made upon Pearl Harbor, officers of the Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were busy gathering in the first group of Japanese suspects. Among those

placed in protective custody on the seventh were the members of the consulate staff, as well as many of the 200 consular agents scattered throughout the Islands. Despite the utmost diligence and application to duty by the constituted authorities, the number of detainees in Hawaii has never been large considering the size of the Japanese population. An official army communique from Washington on December 23, 1941, announced:

The commanding general of the Hawaiian department reports that 273 Japanese nationals are now interned. Of a total population of 425,000 in the Hawaiian Islands, 160,000 are of Japanese ancestry. Of these, 35,000 are aliens.

For the most part, the Japanese population of Hawaii have given no evidence of disloyalty. However, as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox reported on his return from Hawaii, there is strong evidence to support the belief that some Japanese engaged in fifth column activity and provided the enemy with valuable military information prior to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.....Military authorities have imprisoned all known Japanese leaders of subversive activities.(13)

Investigation and detainment of additional Japanese suspects--aliens and citizens--have continued during the succeeding months but the total number now in custody, although not a matter of public record, is still small in proportion to the population. In conformity with the provisions of international law, those who have been detained for the duration of the war have also been evacuated to mainland camps outside the combat zones or repatriated to Japan.

Groups Liable to Suspicion

Subversive dispositions inimical to the security of the community and the nation may naturally be expected chiefly among certain classes of the Japanese community, and it is doubtless from these groups that most of the detainees have been drawn. First in importance are the direct representatives of the Japanese Government, the consular agents, all of whom were presumably interned on the seventh. Shinto priests in so far as they are active exponents of the divinity of the Japanese emperor and of Japanese nationalism, although few in number in Hawaii prior to the war, obviously constitute a menace to American ideals. The Buddhist priests and priestesses were less directly associated in the propagation of Japanese nationalism, but as recent products of the educational system of Japan, the outlook and sentiments of many tend inevitably to be more or less sympathetic with the objectives and ideals of the present military regime of Japan. The same may be said of the alien language school teachers and principals, of whom there were 329 in 1940. The whole range of leadership among the alien Japanese was naturally somewhat suspected, and it is logical to assume that all persons who had assumed positions of any distinction in the organizational life of the Japanese community would be subject to special scrutiny. So pronounced has this impression become among the Issei that few are now willing

(13) Honolulu Star-Bulletin, December 23, 1941.

to accept any leadership lest they immediately become suspect. Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group of the second generation who, although citizens of the United States by virtue of birth within the Territory, are frequently more fanatically Japanese in their disposition than their own parents. Many of these individuals have returned from Japan so recently as to be unable to speak the English language and some are unquestionably disappointed by the lack of appreciation manifested for their Japanese education.

Detention in Hawaii long enough to permit their cases to be reviewed by a civilian board of investigation, has also afforded the Japanese community some understanding of the circumstances of the detainees. The impression is widely shared that conditions in the various detention centers during the first few weeks after the blitz were far from ideal, largely because of the sudden emergency created by the type of attack. Equally widespread is the impression that the internees have been treated with humanity and justice after this initial period. The following letter which appeared in the local press tells something of their outlook and condition:

It has been exactly one week since we were put in here. When we were first confined here, we felt as though we were thrown into hell. But contrary to our expectations we have been treated well. We have fine meals. We are allowed to go in and out of the building freely. Several new equipment have been added. Everything is being done to make our stay comfortable. A paradise has made its appearance in what was believed to be a hell.

One of the concrete results of this can be seen in the faces of our relatives who visit us daily. After seeing how we are getting along here, their worried faces would turn into happy, smiling faces. Today I heard one of the visitors say, "You are looking better and you seem to have put on weight."

Finally, we wish to thank the authorities through you for the protection and kind treatment we are receiving here in the Territory of America..... We are deeply touched by the great American spirit of fair play and magnanimity. In behalf of the group, I wish to extend to you our sincere gratitude. Thank you very much.

(signed) The Venerable
Hiseki Miyasaki (14)

In instances where it was impossible or impracticable for members of the family to visit the detainee prior to his departure, Nisei interviewers have brought back messages of a similar sort:

I am healthy and have gained weight, so please don't worry. Please take good care of yourself and wait for my return.

Wife, take care of yourself. Daughter, thank you for everything. Be helpful to mother. Children, wait for my return. I am well, so do not worry. We are treated very nicely. Pray for the day when we shall meet again in peace.

(14)

Quoted in Honolulu Star-Bulletin, December 22, 1941

For the most part, it appears that both the community and the families of the detainees have accepted the facts of detention and evacuation with good grace. It was commonly feared during the first few months of the war that the numbers detained would be very large, and the liberal policy of the authorities was a distinct relief. The restrained account by a seventeen-year-old Nisei of his own experience is fairly typical:

Several weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese enemy aliens were taken to the detention camp at X. There were numerous persons who were rather close friends to the family. We felt sorry for them and were surprised to see my father not taken in. But we knew that sooner or later he would be taken in too. For about two months nothing happened. Then Colonel B and Captain A came to investigate the house and to ask questions of my father. They made two more trips and that was the end. A week or two later Capt. A and Mr. R came to get him to be taken to the detention camp. I was not at home at the time but when I got there I was surprised to see the store closed and as I entered there they were with my mother talking things over. Capt. A told me in a nice way that he is taking my dad away. That wasn't a shock to me because I was expecting this to happen sooner or later. All of the family knew this too. He got dressed and before leaving gave us final instructions on the books and recent transactions. That was the last time I got to see my father, and, of course, that was a great disappointment.

Social workers delegated to assist the families of detainees speak of the "extraordinary stoicism with which they have received the shock and their patience and good spirit in making the necessary economic and social adjustments." Surprisingly few cases have required public relief.

The threat of mass evacuation is, however, still a crucial element in the Hawaiian situation. The announcement on March 3, 1942, of the order for the total exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the coastal portions of the Western Defense Area had a strikingly depressant effect upon the Japanese of Hawaii. This was conceived as a threat not only to their relatives and friends situated within the designated areas but also to themselves. "We will be next," many of them said, and the efforts of local morale agencies to allay these fears have not been wholly availing.

Importance of Japanese Labor

The public statement by Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, on March 27, 1942, should perhaps have settled the issue once and for all.

The Japanese problem is very complex and all tied up with the labor situation.....mass evacuation from Hawaii is impractical. (15)

The crucial part played by the Japanese in the Island economy, including now the defense economy, is apparent in the most casual examination of the occupational statistics of Hawaii, and this fact unquestionably plays a primary role in the decision announced by Secretary McCloy. In 1940 the

(15) Honolulu Star Bulletin, March 27, 1941.

Japanese constituted over one-third of all gainfully employed persons in Hawaii; one-half of all craftsmen, nearly three-fourths of all domestic service workers, over one-half of all small farmers and fishermen, over half of the proprietors of retail food stores and restaurants, and five-eighths of all auto mechanics. (16)

The problem of transportation over 2,000 miles of water for 160,000 persons or even a tenth of that number under present conditions of restricted shipping would be difficult, although not impossible to solve. In any case it would require a considerable amount of time. Should military necessity demand it, however, these obstacles would unquestionably be overcome.

Thus far it appears from their public statements that the military officials most directly concerned with the handling of the Japanese problem in Hawaii have been satisfied as to the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the Japanese of Hawaii and it has been their disposition to retain as nearly as practicable the Island tradition of equality and tolerance among the various racial groups. To what extent this sentiment is genuinely shared by all those who determine their destiny is still a matter of doubt to many Island Japanese. There is always the haunting fear that mainland doctrines of race relations may yet determine Hawaiian policy.

VI. MORALE AMONG THE JAPANESE

The crucial question about Hawaii--both in the Islands and in continental United States--"Are the Japanese loyal?" is still unanswered. Prior to the war it was said by thoughtful observers that only a war could give the final answer. Now that war has come, it is said by some that a more searching test of Japanese devotion to American ideals such as total evacuation or the revocation of American citizenship must be applied. Probably no ordeal would be adequate to resolve the issue completely. Loyalty is a matter of the inner spirit and devotion of men for which there are no wholly infallible or convincing proofs. Even death may be "a way out" or an evidence of "the last full measure of devotion."

The war has unquestionably brought to a climax stresses and strains within the Hawaiian community of which none was more acute than that associated with the role of the Japanese. Their loyalty to the United States is in large measure a function of their participation in the common life of the Hawaiian community both prior to and during the present war. The question as to their proper place in the community is as old as their residence here and one which was never completely resolved. The traditional public profession of equality in race relations has enabled them to acquire an enviable status as compared with their mainland cousins and a sense of belonging which augured well for their loyalty and morale in the present crisis. On the other hand, there have always been elements in the community which have maintained, privately perhaps, distinct reservations as to the "value and success of the melting pot"; and they have insisted that the only sound basis

(16) The significance of these figures has not been greatly altered by the war. The occupations in which the Japanese are chiefly engaged, such as small-scale agriculture, domestic service, and retail trade, may not technically be classified as defense industries, but they are essential to the life of both defense workers and military personnel.

of Island morale in wartime is that which faces realistically the danger of a single Japanese saboteur and does not gamble national security on pretty sentiment. Undoubtedly many of the non-Japanese in Hawaii have wavered between these two points of view with the strength of their leaning one way or the other governed by the length of their residence in the islands, their social class, and their particular contacts with the Japanese.

Majority Loyal

The conceptions which the Japanese have formed of themselves and their proper place in wartime Hawaii are of necessity somewhat similarly divided. The effective Japanese espionage so manifest in the attack of December 7 points to the presence in the Islands of persons, some of them presumably of Japanese ancestry, whose primary allegiance was to Japan. Although the facts thus far available yield no evidence of Japanese sabotage⁽¹⁷⁾ in Hawaii prior to, on, or since December 7, there are instances on public record of clearly disloyal acts and sentiments by Japanese residents, both alien and citizen. On the other hand, the great mass of Japanese have during the past ten months displayed a genuine desire to be accepted as equal participants with the rest of the population in the American war effort. They would like to retain as far as possible the conventional Island pattern of race relations⁽¹⁸⁾ under which they have benefited so greatly. The intensity of their devotion to the American cause has fluctuated in response to the state of morale in the larger Hawaiian community and to the special factors affecting their place in the community.

The difficult situation faced by the Japanese in Hawaii in the event of a war had been anticipated long before the actual catastrophe occurred. For years the Nisei in particular have been told that they were "on the spot" and the subject had become a favorite topic for school and Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. discussion groups.

During the summer of 1941, a group of educational, religious, and business leaders--responsive to the Island "mores" of race relations--organized themselves in an effort to anticipate and avert in so far as possible the most serious ruptures of interracial solidarity which war was expected to bring. Even at that time rumors of widespread dismissal of Japanese by their haole employers, of the construction of concentration camps for Japanese as soon as war occurred, of conspiracies by Japanese maids to poison their employers,⁽¹⁹⁾ seemed to threaten the "unique interracial good will which had been built up in Hawaii," and efforts were made, with the approval of Army, Navy, and F.B.I. authorities, to combat these divisive tendencies. As a basic assumption, it was held that:

Unity of purpose and action is absolutely necessary for a strong national defense. We cannot afford to have a divided citizenry--

- (17) Early statements by military and naval officials refer to some cases, but later evidence indicate no authenticated cases.
- (18) It must be recognized that the public sentiment favorable to racial equality in Hawaii has offered no guarantee of such treatment in all cases. Many Japanese have encountered sufficient difficulty in climbing the social and economic ladder to evoke the charge, rightly or wrongly, of racial prejudice, and their cynicism is all the more acute because of the public professions of racial equality.
- (19) Barber's Hawaii, Restless Rampart provides a good sample of stories circulating in the haole malihini (white new-comer) community.

one race set against another, or one class against another. The people of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, compose about one-third of our population. Accepted and united in purpose and action, they are an asset to the community. Rejected and treated as potential enemies, they are a burden, even a danger, to our security.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, three members of this group, a haole, a Chinese, and a Japanese were designated to form a Public Morale Section, one of whose major functions was to help maintain and build morale within the Japanese community. This group, with its interracial personnel and its characteristically Hawaiian formulation of purpose, (20) is expressive of the local sentiment favorable to the maintenance of an unbroken interracial solidarity even in wartime. Similarly identified in an effort to conserve the confidence and support of the Japanese population in the common life of the community are most of the stable island institutions and such special agencies as the American Friends Service Committee, the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A., and the Christian churches.

The state of almost paralyzing fear which struck the Japanese community immediately after the outbreak of the war called for efforts of a reassuring character by these various agencies. Apart from the uncertainty of their treatment by the military, the Japanese were harassed by fears of possible retaliatory measures by other groups in the population. In some of the plantation communities the Filipinos, whose homeland was being invaded by Japan, were particularly agitated and some of the more excitable individuals threatened violence.

(20) "Promote the feeling that Hawaii has something worthwhile to preserve in the way of human relationships.

"Encourage complete faith of all the varied groups in the American way of life and their absolute willingness to defend it.

"Seek to overcome fear on the part of all the people. Calmness and determination must prevail at all times. Confidence in our armed forces and in the constituted authorities and the feeling that we are all pulling together toward a common goal will do much to overcome fear and unnecessary hysteria.

"Seek cognizance by the general public that every loyal citizen, regardless of race, color or creed must be given a place in the scheme of national defense. No one must be denied the opportunity to do his share because of racial or religious considerations. We are all Americans; and as Americans, we must all do our duty.

"Make clear to the people that loyalty grows only when it is given a chance to grow. It does not flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion, discrimination and denial of opportunities to practise that loyalty.

Occasionally, Filipino laborers could be seen sharpening their cane knives so as to have them ready for the emergency....They were on a rampage because of the Jap's invasion of the Philippines. The growing undercurrent of hatred was finally turned on us. Some of the older Japanese aliens who worked in the fields with Filipinos stayed home or kept a certain distance because they feared what might happen.

Prompt action by local police, social agencies, and by leaders of both Filipino and Japanese communities served to prevent any overt outbreak.

Minor incidents involving numbers of other racial groups gave grounds for resentment, if not fear.

My girl friends and I were walking home from a stroll, and as we passed a group of men sitting and talking, a Portuguese man yelled belligerently at us, "You damn stinking Japs...." His language was intolerable. We acted as though we hadn't heard and quietly moved away. Within me a flood of anger arose, but then it occurred to me that this man might have lost some one during the December seventh raid and I managed to quiet my anger.

The reactions of the Japanese have not always been so restrained and philosophical, but the counsel of patience and forbearance⁽²¹⁾ by morale workers, both Japanese and haole, have clearly borne fruit.

We were not accepted by all as Americans, but were treated as dangerous elements of the population. These were the petty, narrow-minded people. They would say things that would hurt us through and through. We were their scapegoats and they used us mercilessly. But when I stop to think, I can't be too harsh on them. After all, hadn't the F.B.I. uncovered many underhanded tricksters of our racial extraction? The Niihau incident was certainly against us.

Emergency Service Committees

Once the initial devastating fear among the Japanese had been partially allayed, it was possible to undertake constructive measures to build morale among them. An Emergency Service Committee of Nisei on Oahu was formed under the sponsorship of the Morale Section of the Office of Military Governor. Among the purposes announced were the following:

- (21) It was perhaps inevitable that in the excitement following the outbreak of the war, this counsel should frequently assume exaggerated forms. The Japanese were advised, for example, to demonstrate their loyalty by not only refraining from using but actually destroying, innocuous Japanese art objects such as kimonos, geta (slippers), dolls, and Buddhist shrines, along with such clearly objectionable articles as photographs of the Japanese royal family, Japanese flags, or nationalistic literature. A more restrained program of "house cleaning" is now being advocated and followed.

To carry on a program of education which will strengthen the loyalty to America of both the citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry.

To help them demonstrate their loyalty in concrete ways to speed the defeat of Japan and all other enemies.

To help them face realistically and cooperatively the difficult situation in which the war has placed them.

To work for the application of the fundamental values of American democracy in the treatment of all Americans, regardless of racial ancestry, fully realizing that military and other requirements sometimes may make impossible the full application of this principle.

During the eight months of its existence the committee has held over 170 meetings reaching something more than 10,000 aliens and citizens on the Island of Oahu with messages of encouragement and advice as to their conduct in wartime. This committee and later the Friends and the American Red Cross have been able to assist greatly in cushioning the shock to detainees and their families.

Similar committees on the Islands of Kauai and Maui were formed later, and the Kauai Committee in particular has received the hearty endorsement of Army authorities for its activities.

A considerable and growing number of the people in this group (Japanese) had, through fear of misunderstanding, withdrawn from any community participation in the war effort; they felt that they were simply not wanted in the community.....The purpose in forming this organization was initially to provide a means of participation in the war effort by residents of Japanese ancestry, thus preventing the formation of a dissident racial group, shunned by other elements of the community and thereby rendered susceptible to subversive influence by a minority within the group. It was also planned to use this organization in educational efforts toward Americanization, dissemination of propaganda, liaison between this group and the Military forces, and promotion of the sale of War Bonds and donations to other worthy causes. Definite progress has been made toward this goal, to the point that it is now thought feasible to take steps toward a more complete integration of the efforts of this group with those of the rest of the community.

The American Friends Service Committee with its special interest in establishing a friendly, personal relationship with those victimized by the war was established in Honolulu in March and undertook to provide counsel and support, particularly for the alien Japanese who were bewildered and dismayed by what had happened after December 7. The Honolulu Y.W.C.A., through its International Institute, found a ready response among the alien Japanese women to their proposal of volunteer war work. It is difficult to estimate the net influence of these various efforts but there was, in any case, a notable rise in the patriotic temper and spirit of the Japanese community as they were permitted and encouraged to participate more directly in the local war effort.

Spontaneous service contributions by Japanese to the community-wide activities, such as the Red Cross, the Blood Bank, and the U.S.O., were relatively meager during the first few weeks of the war but they have increased greatly as the Japanese have acquired a sense that they were welcomed. Over-all statistics of financial and time contributions to these agencies by the Japanese are not available at this time and would certainly indicate little as to the spirit which prompted them; ⁽²²⁾ but scattered reports of the actual labor invested indicate that many Japanese are doing more than their share in order to leave no doubt as to the devotion they feel and to compensate for the lukewarm sentiment of other Japanese.

Japanese in the Territorial Guard

Late in January 1942, there occurred an event which tested severely the morale of the Japanese community, as well as the resources of such agencies as then existed to cope with such problems. Almost immediately after the seventh, there developed considerable local and mainland agitation against the practise of allowing the sons of aliens to stand guard over vital public utilities, wharves, and warehouses. Seemingly in response to this critical sentiment, although undoubtedly for reasons of military expediency, orders were issued on January 23 resulting in the inactivation of the Japanese members of the Hawaii Territorial Guards. This unit of the defense forces on Oahu was created on December 7 by orders of the Governor mobilizing the R.O.T.C. of the University of Hawaii and four high schools of Honolulu. Made up largely of boys of Japanese ancestry who had responded to the call for recruits, the unit was nevertheless given important duties to perform and was incorporated under the commanding general of the Hawaiian department, who later expressed highest praise of its spirit and work.

When, therefore, orders came for the return to civil life of only the members of Japanese ancestry, they were particularly unprepared for the shock. It was a serious blow to the personal pride of the boys themselves, but even more serious was the threat to the morale of the entire Japanese community. Here seemed to be incontrovertible evidence that, despite public protestations to the contrary, the citizens of Japanese ancestry were not trusted. Efforts by sympathetic officers and morale workers to soften the blow--to explain for example the difficulties which mainland soldiers might have in distinguishing them from the enemy in case of invasion--helped some, but the bitter sense of unjust discrimination remained.

As a counteractive to the sense of frustration and unrest, unquestionably very acute among the university students, it was proposed that they offer their services to the commanding general to be used in any way which he saw fit. A petition to the commanding general was framed incorporating their sentiments:

(22) It is the impression of competent observers that the Japanese have been making contributions far exceeding their numbers in the population to agencies like the Red Cross, the Navy Relief, and volunteer labor battalions, and probably less than their share to the Blood Bank. According to recent figures of the Honolulu Blood Bank, 23% of the donors were Japanese. The efforts of the various morale committees have greatly stimulated the purchase of War Bonds and the contributions of money to the U.S.O., the Red Cross, and the Army and Navy Relief, but it means, of course, that the statistics afford little indication of the morale--the "free giving"--of the Japanese.

We joined the Guard voluntarily with the hope that this was one way to serve our country in her time of need. Needless to say, we were deeply disappointed when we were told that our services were no longer needed.

Hawaii is our home; the United States our country. We know but one loyalty and that is to the Stars and Stripes. We wish to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible, and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever services you may see fit to use us.

Their request was granted by General Emmons and they were placed as an auxiliary to a regiment of engineers and given semi-military status. Here quite clearly they were wanted and their balked desires to participate in the war effort were given satisfying expression. During the months since March 1942 the 125 original recruits, chiefly from the University of Hawaii, have manifested a readiness to accept any type of labor from quarrying and track-laying to carpentry, and they have received high commendation from their officers for the work they have performed. More significant, however, than the improved morale of the 160 boys of Japanese ancestry now enrolled in the Varsity Victory Volunteers is the symbolic effect of this experiment upon the wider community. To the non-Japanese community, it was a convincing testimony of the sincerity of the patriotic professions of the Nisei. To the Japanese, on the other hand, it was an evidence that they have a legitimate and honorable place in the common war task.

Nisei in the Army

At a somewhat later period, the experience of the Nisei in the regular army had a similarly demoralizing effect and in somewhat comparable fashion the loss has later been regained. Under the operation of the Selective Service Act, a sizeable group of Nisei (about 2,000) had been inducted into the Army and were assigned to regular duty prior to the seventh. In general, the Japanese community had conceived of such selection as a mark of honor and privilege and the draftee was usually widely feted by his parents and friends before he left for camp. He generally made a good record in the army. He was orderly and obedient by home training and he responded readily to camp discipline. His officers have spoken highly of his conduct on the seventh and during the period of attrition which followed.

And yet, like his fellow Nisei in the Territorial Guard, the Japanese draftee was a difficult soldier to place and use in Hawaii. The morale of the soldier from the mainland was endangered if he had difficulty in distinguishing between his comrades and his enemies and especially if he had any doubts as to the loyalty of his comrades. The issue was finally resolved in June 1942 by the transfer to continental United States of all trained draftees of Japanese ancestry, with the expectation that they would subsequently become a combat unit on some other front. The decision appeared, however, to the Japanese community as another evidence of official distrust and their morale sank to its lowest ebb.

A morale report at the time presents the problem largely in terms of a lack of official interpretation, inevitable perhaps because of wartime censorship.

The boys themselves seem to be both heartened and saddened by the orders. Most of them are highly pleased by the manifestation of official confidence in them and the military commendation which they have received for their services here. On the other hand, many of them are naturally depressed at the prospect of such a complete and sudden break of their home ties. Most of them have never been away from the Islands before and they view the future with mixed emotions. We have no doubt but that they will acquit themselves honorably.

Our chief concern is with the Japanese community which remains behind. It seems quite apparent that the young men in the armed forces have not succeeded--perhaps they have not tried--to interpret these orders as they were obviously intended, as an evidence of confidence and high trust in the Nisei troops. The parents, in the absence of any official interpretation of the orders, seem to have made their own, as another evidence of discrimination against the Japanese. They ask "Why are only the Japanese to be sent?" The Japanese mothers in particular seem to be greatly depressed and bewildered at what seems to be another case of punishment for being Japanese...

With the arrival of letters from the boys telling of their own improved spirits, a consequence in part of the kindly reception they received in the communities near their midwestern training center, the confidence and pride of the Island Japanese took a distinct upward turn. Reports of the continued high regard in which the Island draftees have been held by their officers add to the pride of the home-folks. To many Island Japanese families, the draftees on the mainland now serve as a symbol of Japanese equality⁽²³⁾ in the present war effort, and as a compelling bond to evoke their highest loyalty.

A variety of other incidents have affected the morale of Hawaii's Japanese to a greater or less degree. Frequently, incidents which pass unnoticed by others in the community assume a symbolic significance to the Japanese. Mention has been made of the announcement of evacuation on the west coast. The specific use of the term "Japanese" in newspaper captions describing misdeeds by persons of Japanese ancestry seems to the more sensitive not only superderogatory but malicious. On the other hand, the announcement in the press of the favorable impression created by the Nisei upon a mainland community serves to greatly raise the spirit of the Japanese in Hawaii. A letter from a haole defense worker expressing confidence in the loyalty of the local Japanese boosts their morale, while another letter charging the Japanese yardmen and maids with a conspiracy to undermine the war effort has as depressant an effect. Persistent rumors of mass evacuation have had a devastating effect upon Japanese morale and are among the most difficult forces with which the morale agencies have to grapple. Rumors in general, however, have as demoralizing an effect upon the Japanese as upon other elements in the population, and the Issei, in particular, seem to have suffered from an inordinate number, owing perhaps to the less adequate means of news dissemination since the war.

(23) It seems highly probable that the morale of several hundred recent Nisei draftees now in local labor battalions, might be greatly strengthened if they too were given assignments to regular fighting units.

VII PROSPECTS

If the most predictable element in any war situation is its uncertainty, then surely it is wholly fatuous to consider the present prospects of the Japanese in the Island situation. A striking victory for either side in any one of the many war theaters of the Pacific may alter profoundly the present picture. A dramatic act of disloyalty, such as the Niihau incident, or one which could be so interpreted, might readily inflame the critical dispositions of numerous elements in the Island population. The present situation can, at best, be described as one of unstable equilibrium. What, then, are the major factors which give to the situation its present equilibrium, unstable though it is?

By way of brief analysis and summary of the foregoing discussion, four principal factors seem to appear: (1) the Hawaiian tradition of race relations with its public emphasis upon the right of each individual to be judged upon his personal merits rather than by standards of race or caste; (2) the character and conduct of the 160,000 individual Japanese who reside within the Islands; (3) considerations of military strategy to which our leaders are responsive; and (4) the temper of the non-Japanese population, both in Hawaii and in continental United States.

There are competent observers in Hawaii who insist that the tradition of equality of opportunity across race lines is now in eclipse--that the violations prior to the war were at least as important as the public lip service which it received. Granted that significant departures from the norm have always occurred, it is nevertheless true that the Japanese in Hawaii have had far greater opportunity to rise in social and economic status than have their brothers and cousins in Japan or even in continental United States. Even granting that the era of "unlimited opportunity" is passed, (24) the egalitarian habits and customs of the trading frontier persist to a remarkable degree even in wartime.

Growth of Suspicion

The Japanese immigrants largely retain the conception of Hawaii as a land of hope and promise for their children, even though there has been much to dim their earlier expectations. The major institutions of the Islands still subscribe to the doctrine of racial tolerance and freedom of opportunity, and representatives of these agencies have played a significant role in the efforts to apply this doctrine to the Japanese even in wartime. The morale building activities among and for the Japanese have largely emanated from this source. There is, on the other hand, increased evidence of open suspicion of and discrimination against the Japanese, in violation of the traditional code. (25)

(24) Cf. Romanzo Adams, Interracial Marriage in Hawaii, pp. 41-2.

(25) The common specification in "Help Wanted" ads that "Japanese need not apply" could hardly have occurred prior to the war. References to race in want ads have been, in general, more common since the war than before.

The Japanese, by virtue of their strong cultural pride, the conception of themselves as descendants of the gods, and their habits of industry and ambition, elicited to themselves stronger prejudice than most of the immigrant groups which have come to Hawaii. Had they been less numerous in the Territory, less aggressive in their desire to capitalize upon the opportunities which Hawaii offered, and less devoted to the values of the homeland, it is probable that the "pictures" of them in the minds of non-Japanese would have been different, but it would hardly have prevented the strong antagonism to them since the war.

As suggested earlier, the differential experience of the Japanese in Hawaii--their varied economic opportunities, length of residence and date of arrival in Hawaii, American educational and social contacts, number and length of visits in Japan--make inaccurate any single "picture" of Hawaii's Japanese. There are such large obvious groupings as the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei; but even these require more minute classification. Not all of the detainees have come from any one of the above classes, although one would expect that the proportion is largest among the Kibei and smallest among the Nisei.

Loyalty Apparent but Fluctuating

The evidence available indicates that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese in Hawaii are loyal to the United States--most of them ardently, others moderately, and still others only nominally, because it pays. Just what proportion there is of each must vary from time to time, depending upon the trend of events and the way in which the events are interpreted to and by the Japanese. Thus far the Japanese, and particularly the Nisei who have assumed a new leadership under the conditions imposed by the war, have manifested their ability to "stand up" under the critical treatment to which they have been subjected. Whether they will continue to do so under more serious strains, no one can tell with certainty.

Military strategy has thus far dictated a policy of humane and equal treatment of the Japanese in Hawaii. In general they have been treated with greater justice and leniency than most of them had expected. There have been miscarriages of the formulated policies of the military authorities but they have been in general through faulty execution of orders by minor officials. The War Department has expressed the judgment that large-scale evacuation is impractical and it seems probable that Hawaii will not see a repetition of the mass evacuation on the Pacific Coast, with its attendant mass treatment of the loyal with the disloyal. There is, however, every possibility of a shift in the military strategy thus far observed here, should the conflict become acute in the Hawaiian area or should the present military leadership be changed. It must be recognized, however, that even under martial law, the military authorities are not insensitive to public opinion whether that emanates from the kamaainas of all racial stocks, the 160,000 Japanese, or the malihinis, military and civilian.

Mainland Sentiment Influential

Least certain of all the factors affecting the present situation is the psychological climate in the non-Japanese population of the Islands and on the mainland. The presence of a very large proportion of malihini defense workers, navy and army personnel, and of others not responsive to

Island sentiment of race relations offers a serious threat⁽²⁶⁾ to the present peaceful handling of the Japanese problem. The hostile attitudes toward the Japanese have thus far originated chiefly with the malihinis, but, of course, even the kamaainas, in the absence of protective doctrines, are gradually influenced by the attitudes of the newcomers. Letters to the newspapers, delegations to the governor, petitions, and other forms of protest tell of a growing sentiment adverse to "the coddling of the Japanese." Local officials are constantly made aware of the strong undercurrent of resentment at the "cocky attitudes of the Japs,"⁽²⁷⁾ and they are making strenuous efforts to prevent any overt expression of this feeling. Even more acute, however, is the threat of mainland opinion as it becomes focused in legislative action. The efforts already made by members of Congress to disenfranchise the Nisei and the sentiments expressed in favor of mass evacuation are highly disturbing to the local Japanese and they must have some effect even upon the local military authorities.

Obviously none of these factors is independent of the others and the equilibrium established between them is one which changes in minor degree from day to day. Thus far, the major effect of the various forces operating in the Islands has been to integrate most of the Japanese within the common civilian population and to give them some sense of their contribution to the common war effort. The effective theory, even though frequently not observed in practice, is expressed in an early morale report on the Japanese.

The problem of morale for the overwhelming majority seems to be contingent upon first providing them with a reasonable degree of security through a sense of their being needed and wanted in a common task. Dr. Romanzo Adams has frequently quoted the compelling words of Lord Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar, "England expects every man to do his duty," as illustrating the principle which must be utilized here in securing the full and complete loyalty of every member of this community. Certainly every effort should be made to eliminate, insofar as it is humanly possible, the disposition to single out the Nisei for differential treatment in this crisis. In these critical times, as perhaps never before, the characteristic Hawaiian tradition of racial justice and equality is the only one which can be successful. We must give to every citizen the feeling that he has an important part to play in our common destiny. We too must expect every American to do his duty.

The theory is likely to remain even though events may dictate still greater departures from the Hawaiian and American norm in the days which lie ahead.

(26) The adverse sentiments among the armed forces toward the Island Japanese have frequently disappeared after direct contacts have been established. The soldiers in the rural areas, in particular, often become enamored of Nisei girls.

(27) A term which had not been acceptable in Hawaii prior to the war, but which has come into considerable use since the war, even by the Nisei, in referring to the enemy. It is still frowned upon by kamaainas as referring to local residents.

copy

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HONOLULU, HAWAII

Cable: INPAREL, Honolulu

P. O. Box 459

May 26, 1943

Mr. John A. Hamilton
Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu
Dillingham Building
Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

In view of the fact that the Chamber of Commerce generously distributed 1500 copies of Andrew W. Lind's pamphlet, "The Japanese in Hawaii Under War Conditions," I think that you will be interested to know that Dr. Lind has just received a letter from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stating:

"I believe that your study presents the most thoughtful and accurate picture of the situation in these islands that I have yet seen, and I hope that you will continue your studies in this respect."

Sincerely yours,

Charles F. Loomis

CFL:H

From Chas F. Loomis

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
EMERGENCY SERVICE COMMITTEE

July 19, 1943

Advisory Board Members and Friends:

Perhaps you are not very familiar with the work of this committee. One reason for this is that its work has not been publicized. However, we want you to know what it is doing and trying to do. This news-letter, the first of many, is to help you get acquainted with the committee and in turn to give the committee a chance to know you and win your help. At a later date, we shall send you a resume of our activities to date and a copy of our purposes.

During the past we have assisted the Army in securing volunteers, assisted in the Speak American and Serve in Silence Campaigns, helped organize the V.V.V., promoted the Bombs on Tokyo Campaign, assisted the Blood Bank, counseled aliens in their readjustment to war, assisted similar groups in other islands, helped in the sale of war bonds, rendered service to families of evacuees, and have counseled and assisted many individuals.

Colonel Fielder will at a subsequent meeting speak to the entire Advisory Board about the past and present work of the Emergency Service Committee.

The Rising Tide of Anti-Japanese Feeling in Honolulu

There is unquestionably a growing "anti-Japanese" feeling in Honolulu and perhaps elsewhere in the Territory. This feeling seems to be directed particularly against the younger citizens of Japanese extraction. "Cocky", "untrustworthy", and "ungrateful" are some of the words being used to express this feeling. The recent slow-down tactics of the H.R.T. drivers, the walk-out at one of the local trucking firms, and other labor difficulties including the shortage of maids and other domestic help have served to accentuate this feeling.

A few days ago, at our invitation, Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, a very prominent business leader in Honolulu, spoke to the committee and its advisory board members. He told us about this growing "anti-Japanese" feeling even among some of the prominent haole leaders in the community who have been our friends and supporters. If you were at the meeting, you know what he said. If not, we want you to know that he was not only greatly disturbed at the way some of his own employees of Japanese ancestry have treated him but was expressing the feeling of many of the business and civic leaders in the community.

Here is a challenge for all of us. There is no use arguing about who is right. We might just as well be realistic about the whole situation and face it as we find it. We must all remember that we sink or swim together. Under the existing war psychology, the unfortunate actions of a few people of Japanese extraction can bring discredit to the whole group. It won't take very many incidents to fan the fires of racial hatred. Everyone must watch his step. It won't take but one race riot to start a string of them. One single case of sabotage may compel the repetition of the California experiment in Hawaii.

Each one of us must try our constant best to educate our men and women to be aware of these problems and to actively urge in them an individual sense of deep responsibility for careful conduct at all times; loyalty to our friends and employers, giving our best in work, speaking American, being courteous at all times, in short, by being American in thought and in deed.

No Time To Be Complacent

There seems to be a feeling of complacency among all elements of the population in our community, but again the complacency among the Americans of Japanese extraction

is more noticeable and certainly most irritating.

As wounded servicemen return from the Pacific, and families suffer the agony of death, anti-Japanese feeling is bound to grow. The cross we shall bear will prove the best in each one of us. Certainly, the leadership among us must not fail. Should we not again so highly consecrate our lives personally that those who believe in us and trust us will continue to have faith in the American Ideal? We cannot become complacent at any time. Thousands of our boys are now serving in the Army. Most of them are in combat units fighting or preparing to fight our enemies. We owe it to them to keep our home front intact.

Recently there has been organized a Blood Bank Subcommittee. Will you help in this effort? Call our office, 67464, or Clifton H. Yamamoto, chairman, at 6221 and give your list of blood donors. Blood donors have been few among us. In proportion to the whole population and certainly from the standpoint of the group who will need and use blood most in the event of an air blitz, our particular racial group would be the largest. Our record in this field has been most noticeably bad. War bonds are an investment, gifts of money by those who can afford it is not a great burden, but giving blood is certainly one of the deepest personal contributions one can give in our war effort. Will you help? Will you get your family and friends to help?

We Need Your Help

There are many other things we want to discuss with you. However, space limits us. We shall have interesting bits of information for you from time to time. We also want you to keep us informed. We need your ideas, your counsel, and above all, your active support. We cannot reach all of the people we must reach except through your help. In our succeeding letters, we shall have more specific suggestions on how we may better cooperate.

Members of the Committee

For your information, the members of the Emergency Service Committee are Katsuro Miho, chairman; Masa Katagiri, executive secretary; Dr. Robert Komenaka, treasurer; Dr. Ernest Murai; Dr. James Kuninobu; Mitsuyuki Kido; Dr. Shunzo Sakamaki; Baron Y. Goto; Iwao Miyake; Walter Mihata; Stanley Miyamoto and Shigeo Yoshida. Pvt. Masaji Marumoto and Capt. Katsumi Kometani are in active service.

Our office is in the adult building of the Nuuanu Y.M.C.A. Our telephone number is 67464. Give us a call or come in to discuss our mutual problems. Will you help us?

Sincerely yours,

EMERGENCY SERVICE COMMITTEE

By _____
KATSURO MIHO, CHAIRMAN