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GUY P. JONES
Editor

THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA

A study of Japanese birth statistics in California is revealing. In 1906 there were but 134 Japanese births registered in this State—little more than half of 1 per cent of the total births registered. Less than 1,000 Japanese births were registered annually until 1912 when 1,467 such events were recorded, representing 3.7 per cent of the total births registered throughout the State. The next 10 years brought sharp increases each year until 1922 when the climax was reached, with 5,275 registered Japanese births in California.

The Federal immigration restrictions became effective in July, 1924, and migration from Japan all but stopped. The numbers of Japanese births fell rapidly from that time as shown in the fact that 5,010 Japanese births were registered in 1923 and 4,016 were registered in 1925. Since that time the reduction has occurred consistently each year and in 1940 there were but 1,493 Japanese births registered in California—1.3 per cent of the total.

The United States census data show the Japanese population in California in 1940 was 93,717 as compared with a total population for the State of 6,907,387. The Japanese birth rate in 1940 was 15.9 per 1,000 population as compared with a birth rate of 16.1 per 1,000 for the total population of the State in 1940.

Californians in 1913 became considerably agitated over ownership of land in California by Japanese. "Picture brides" arrived by the shipload and young Japanese farmers came to the boats from their inland

farms, carrying away the brides that they had known before that time only by a picture acquaintance. There is every indication that this was a planned colonization sponsored by the Japanese Government. The agitation became so great that William Jennings Bryan, who was then Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, came to Sacramento to personally as well as officially combat legislation that had been introduced to prevent the ownership of land in California by certain aliens. Bryan failed in his mission and the law was enacted.

In spite of this fact, the Japanese population increased rapidly and the birth rate rose each year until the Federal law restricted the migration of Japanese as well as other aliens to the United States. The storm of protests on the part of the Japanese Government that rose immediately after passage of this Federal law gave indication of the seriousness with which the Japanese regarded the situation. It seemed to have been more than the Oriental loss of face that was involved. A well-planned colonization in California was nipped in the bud. It would seem that the failure of the plan to take over this State through infiltration of its people and the breeding of a colony of Japanese who would own the State's valuable agricultural lands, was actually a leading factor in the production of the war in which we are now engaged.

The following table gives information relative to the total numbers of births in California, the birth rates, numbers of Japanese births and percentage of such births to the total number of registered births in California from 1906 to 1940, inclusively.

Year	Total births	Birth rate	Japanese births	Per cent of total
1906	20,974	10.3	134	0.6
1907	24,674	11.6	221	0.9
1908	28,077	12.7	455	1.6
1909	30,882	13.4	682	2.2
1910	32,138	13.4	719	2.2
1911	34,828	14.0	995	2.6
1912	39,330	15.2	1,467	3.7
1913	43,852	16.4	2,215	5.0
1914	46,012	16.2	2,874	6.2
1915	48,075	16.3	3,342	7.0
1916	50,638	16.5	3,721	7.3
1917	52,230	16.5	4,108	7.9
1918	55,922	17.1	4,218	7.6
1919	56,521	16.8	4,458	8.0
1920	67,198	19.1	4,971	7.4
1921	72,438	19.3	5,275	7.3
1922	73,321	18.4	5,066	6.9
1923	80,237	19.1	5,010	6.2
1924	86,899	19.7	4,481	5.2
1925	85,492	18.5	4,016	5.4
1926	82,372	17.0	3,597	4.4
1927	84,334	16.6	3,241	3.8
1928	83,638	15.8	2,833	3.4
1929	81,498	14.8	2,353	2.9
1930	84,382	14.7	2,040	2.5
1931	81,553	13.9	2,220	2.6
1932	78,108	13.1	1,851	2.4
1933	75,229	12.4	1,628	2.1
1934	78,442	12.7	1,603	2.0
1935	80,222	12.8	1,502	1.9
1936	84,460	13.2	1,448	1.4
1937	94,286	14.4	1,436	1.5
1938	101,617	15.2	1,528	1.5
1939	103,656	15.2	1,482	1.4
1940	111,840	16.1	1,493	1.3

When the registration of births began in California in 1906, 98.4 per cent of all births registered were in the white race. The percentage of white births to the total decreased each year, reaching a low point in 1922 when but 77 per cent of the total number of births registered in this State were white. Since that time there has been a gradual increase each year in the proportion of the white births within the State, until in 1940 this percentage reached 83.8.

During recent years the migration of whites from Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Texas and other South-Central States has affected the trend in the rising percentage of white births. This increase has been continued through the migration of young whites from other States who have obtained employment in aircraft and other war industries within the State, succeeding the agricultural laborers who had migrated during immediately preceding years.

It would seem at the present time that there can be no particular menace in the growth of a Japanese population within the State. The enforcement of the immigration laws, the aging of the colonizing

Japanese and the apparently lowered fecundity of the modern Japanese all have contributed to the reduced birth rates. There is considerable significance in the fact that the birth rate for the Japanese in 1940 was less than the birth rate for the total population of the State. The actual number of Japanese births that occurred in California in 1940 is almost identical with the number of such births that occurred in 1912. There can be no question regarding the reliability of the data for Japanese births in this State for the reason that the Japanese prize their citizenship in California because they realize that they must be able to prove their citizenship in order to acquire and hold real property in this State.

The following table gives the number of white births that occurred in California since 1926 and the percentage of such births to the total number registered:

Year	Number of white births	Percentage of total
1926	64,840	78.7
1927	66,073	78.3
1928	64,343	76.9
1929	62,716	77.0
1930	65,075	77.1
1931	64,009	78.5
1932	62,241	79.7
1933	60,222	80.1
1934	62,959	80.3
1935	64,508	80.4
1936	68,249	80.8
1937	77,576	82.3
1938	83,864	82.6
1939	85,857	82.8
1940	93,742	83.8

Japanese Population in California

The United States Bureau of the Census reports that in 1940 California's Japanese population of 93,717 constituted 73.8 per cent of the total Japanese in the United States. Of these 33,569 were alien Japanese or 71.0 per cent of the total in the United States. Los Angeles in 1940 had 23,321 Japanese residents, more than any other American city. San Francisco had 5,280; Sacramento, 2,879; Oakland, 1,790; Stockton, 1,259; Berkeley, 1,319; San Diego, 828; Torrance, 1,189; Fresno, 797; Pasadena, 759; Alameda, 700; Long Beach, 696; Belvedere Township (in Los Angeles County), 605; Gardena, 509.

The Japanese population in 1940 was largely concentrated in counties containing or located near important industrial and shipping centers.

The following table covering the Japanese population in the State of California by sex and nativity or citizenship by counties in 1940 provides detailed information relative to the distribution of Japanese throughout the State.

JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY SEX AND NATIVITY OR CITIZENSHIP, BY COUNTIES: 1940

County	All Japanese			Japanese born in the United States or its Territories and Possessions (Citizens)			Foreign-born Japanese (Aliens)			Total population
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	
The State	93,717	52,550	41,167	60,148	31,932	28,216	33,569	20,618	12,951	6,907,387
Alameda	5,167	2,745	2,422	3,382	1,754	1,628	1,785	991	794	513,011
Alpine										323
Amador	2	2		2	2					8,973
Butte	216	127	89	143	83	60	73	44	29	42,840
Calaveras	6	5	1	6	5	1				8,221
Colusa	155	89	66	103	58	45	52	31	21	9,788
Contra Costa	829	479	350	518	277	241	311	202	109	100,450
Del Norte			1							4,745
El Dorado	3	2		1	1		2	1	1	13,229
Fresno	4,527	2,442	2,085	3,019	1,574	1,445	1,508	868	640	178,565
Glenn										12,195
Humboldt										45,812
Imperial	1,583	878	705	994	513	481	589	365	224	59,740
Inyo	1	1					1	1		7,625
Kern	756	493	263	397	217	180	359	276	83	135,124
Kings	508	275	233	323	158	165	185	117	68	35,168
Lake	1	1					1	1		8,069
Lassen										14,479
Los Angeles	36,866	20,653	16,213	23,475	12,470	11,005	13,391	8,183	5,208	2,785,643
Madera	170	83	87	118	57	61	52	26	26	23,314
Marin	150	100	50	68	39	29	82	61	21	52,907
Mariposa										5,605
Mendocino	53	38	15	21	15	6	32	23	9	27,864
Merced	715	396	319	481	271	210	234	125	109	46,988
Modoc	4	3	1				4	3	1	8,713
Mono										2,299
Monterey	2,247	1,300	947	1,530	856	674	717	444	273	73,032
Napa	54	33	21	20	10	10	34	23	11	28,503
Nevada										19,283
Orange	1,855	1,125	730	1,178	670	508	677	455	222	130,760
Placer	1,637	923	714	1,147	643	504	490	280	210	28,108
Plumas	1	1					1	1		11,548
Riverside	552	296	256	369	191	178	183	105	78	105,524
Sacramento	6,764	3,685	3,079	4,489	2,346	2,143	2,275	1,339	936	170,333
San Benito	526	286	240	381	205	176	145	81	64	11,392
San Bernardino	346	203	143	211	115	96	135	88	47	161,108
San Diego	2,076	1,220	856	1,283	672	611	793	548	245	289,348
San Francisco	5,280	2,850	2,430	3,004	1,468	1,536	2,276	1,382	894	634,536
San Joaquin	4,484	2,659	1,825	2,759	1,479	1,280	1,725	1,180	545	134,207
San Luis Obispo	925	518	407	639	339	300	286	179	107	33,246
San Mateo	1,218	677	541	800	424	376	418	253	165	111,782
Santa Barbara	2,187	1,258	929	1,419	783	636	768	475	293	70,555
Santa Clara	4,049	2,124	1,925	2,829	1,439	1,390	1,220	685	535	174,949
Santa Cruz	1,301	712	589	931	503	428	370	209	161	45,057
Shasta	2	2		1	1		1	1		28,800
Sierra										3,025
Siskiyou	7	3	4	4	2	2	3	1	2	28,598
Solano	906	536	370	518	284	234	388	252	136	49,118
Sonoma	758	420	338	549	302	247	209	118	91	69,052
Stanislaus	369	234	135	231	141	90	138	93	45	74,866
Sutter	423	246	177	274	154	120	149	92	57	18,680
Tehama	38	22	16	27	15	12	11	7	4	14,316
Trinity										3,970
Tulare	1,812	1,126	686	1,101	638	463	711	488	223	107,152
Tuolumne										10,887
Ventura	672	399	273	421	226	195	251	173	78	69,685
Yolo	1,087	637	450	699	388	311	388	249	139	27,243
Yuba	429	243	186	283	144	139	146	99	47	17,034

SANITATION OF FLOODED WELLS

In view of the extensive recurrence of widespread flooding of wells by storm water, the following advice is given. With respect to wells which are merely flooded by dirty water or the overflow from fields and pastures, the history of experience indicates no serious danger to health. The common sense thing to do is to pump out such wells, after the flood waters recede until the well water becomes reasonably and sufficiently clear to use.

With respect to other wells which were in the path of flood water which may have picked up pollution from privies and other human excreta, the following additional precautions are offered:

1. Permeate the well with chloride of lime dropped into the well so that it will settle through the water from top to bottom. Use approximately

eight ounces per hundred feet of depth of water column. This figure is approximate only and is sufficient only for wells under 12 or 14 inches in diameter,

Or

2. If chloride of lime is not available (it is scarce nowadays), then procure powdered hydrated lime and likewise drop it into the well so that it will settle from top to bottom. Use approximately two pounds per 100 feet of water column.

3. In either case, let the well stand at least 24 hours.

4. Then pump out the water until it becomes clear and is reasonably free of taste of the chloride of lime or hardness of the lime, depending on which is used. The water is then practically safe. It may be necessary to pump out the equivalent of five or 10 times the content of the well.

Bacterial analysis is practically useless in these cases for the reason that flood waters contain so much harmless bacteria from fields and pasture lands that the test does not reveal the sewage hazard.

"We know today that our world, yours and ours, depends at this moment upon the way in which the Englishmen behave and know how to die. We are proud of our kinsmen. We are proud that just as your nation, in the days of your agony, produced a Lincoln, so our British nations in the days of our trial have gained a Churchill. I see in him the personification of sublimity. 'Sublimity is the echo of a great soul.' How often across the Atlantic have we heard the echo of that great soul.

"We are proud to think, too, of the jaunty little Cockney, the man, I suppose, who hitherto has received less from our Anglo-Saxon civilization than anybody, but who, today, is making the soul immortal in thousands of little battered streets."

—Leonard W. Brockington (Canada)

MORBIDITY*

Complete Reports for Certain Diseases Recorded for Week Ending January 24, 1942

Chickenpox

1109 cases from the following counties: Alameda 163, Butte 9, Calaveras 5, Contra Costa 45, Fresno 58, Imperial 2, Kern 31, Kings 2, Los Angeles 403, Madera 3, Marin 2, Mendocino 1, Merced 8, Monterey 12, Orange 14, Riverside 36, Sacramento 13, San Bernardino 7, San Diego 81, San Francisco 40, San Joaquin 3, San Luis Obispo 12, San Mateo 15, Santa Barbara 60, Santa Clara 46, Santa Cruz 4, Stanislaus 10, Sutter 3, Tehama 3, Tulare 7, Ventura 8, Yolo 3.

German Measles

202 cases from the following counties: Alameda 23, Contra Costa 3, Fresno 11, Kern 8, Los Angeles 27, Mendocino 20, Merced 6, Monterey 7, Orange 5, Riverside 8, Sacramento 2, San Bernardino 1, San Diego 36, San Francisco 22, San Joaquin 1, San Luis Obispo 3, Santa Barbara 1, Santa Clara 5, Santa Cruz 1, Stanislaus 3, Tulare 1, Yolo 8.

Measles

2081 cases from the following counties: Alameda 97, Butte 7, Calaveras 9, Contra Costa 23, Del Norte 10, El Dorado 2, Fresno 293, Humboldt 31, Imperial 2, Kern 87, Kings 26, Los Angeles 139, Madera 18, Merced 4, Monterey 40, Napa 1, Orange 4, Riverside 9, Sacramento 166, San Bernardino 30, San Diego 123, San Francisco 40, San Joaquin 276, San Luis Obispo 8, Santa Barbara 94, Santa Clara 11, Santa Cruz 3, Solano 10, Stanislaus 244, Sutter 59, Trinity 1, Tulare 25, Tuolumne 19, Ventura 59, Yolo 58, Yuba 53.

Mumps

1370 cases from the following counties: Alameda 106, Butte 3, Colusa 20, Contra Costa 61, Del Norte 2, Fresno 37, Humboldt 3, Imperial 18, Kern 55, Kings 2, Los Angeles 303, Madera 9, Marin 7, Merced 2, Monterey 44, Orange 103, Placer 1, Riverside 10, Sacramento 87, San Bernardino 12, San Diego 88, San Francisco 158, San Joaquin 61, San Luis Obispo 20, San Mateo 14, Santa Barbara 15, Santa Clara 50, Santa Cruz 27, Solano 9, Stanislaus 10, Sutter 10, Tulare 6, Ventura 14, Yolo 2, Yuba 1.

Scarlet Fever

135 cases from the following counties: Alameda 3, Fresno 7, Imperial 3, Kern 6, Los Angeles 71, Marin 4, Monterey 1, Orange 2, Riverside 2, Sacramento 4, San Bernardino 4, San Diego 10, San Francisco 13, San Luis Obispo 1, Santa Barbara 2, Santa Clara 2.

* Data regarding the other reportable diseases not listed herein, may be obtained upon request.

Whooping Cough

263 cases from the following counties: Alameda 10, Butte 12, Contra Costa 12, Fresno 31, Imperial 1, Kern 11, Los Angeles 38, Madera 3, Monterey 1, Orange 2, Riverside 2, Sacramento 21, San Bernardino 2, San Diego 4, San Francisco 5, San Joaquin 32, San Luis Obispo 16, San Mateo 1, Santa Barbara 19, Santa Clara 28, Santa Cruz 1, Shasta 2, Solano 5, Stanislaus 2, Sutter 1, Tulare 1, Ventura 4, Yuba 1.

Coccidioidal Granuloma

One case from Los Angeles County.

Diarrhea of Newborn (Epidemic)

5 cases from Los Angeles County.

Diphtheria

18 cases from the following counties: Alameda 1, Calaveras 1, Imperial 1, Los Angeles 10, Riverside 3, San Bernardino 1, San Diego 1.

Dysentery (Bacillary)

3 cases from the following counties: Fresno 2, Los Angeles 1.

Encephalitis (Epidemic)

One case from Glenn County.

Epilepsy

36 cases from the following counties: Alameda 2, Contra Costa 1, Fresno 1, Los Angeles 25, San Bernardino 1, San Francisco 3, San Mateo 1, Stanislaus 1, Sutter 1.

Food Poisoning

13 cases from Los Angeles County.

Influenza

119 cases reported in the State.

Jaundice (Epidemic)

3 cases from Los Angeles County.

Malaria

One case from San Francisco.

Meningitis (Epidemic)

7 cases from the following counties: Alameda 2, Los Angeles 5.

Poliomyelitis

One case from Fresno County.

Rabies (Animal)

15 cases from the following counties: Los Angeles 8, San Diego 7.

Rheumatic Fever

7 cases from the following counties: Alameda 1, Los Angeles 2, Madera 1, Sacramento 1, San Diego 1, Yuba County 1.

Tetanus

One case from Los Angeles County.

Trichinosis

One case from Alameda County.

Typhoid Fever

3 cases from the following counties: Fresno 1, Los Angeles 1, Santa Clara 1.

Undulant Fever

5 cases from the following counties: Imperial 2, Los Angeles 2, Orange 1.



NOV 1945

Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast

By ADON POLI and WARREN M. ENGSTRAND*

THE most spectacular and unprecedented forced mass migration in the history of our nation was precipitated by the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan on December 7, 1941. Within a few months an entire segment of the population of the west coast was abruptly picked up and placed in ten relocation centers which were established inland west of the Mississippi River.

The proclamation excluding all men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast was issued March 2, 1942. Orderly movement of these people started shortly thereafter. By October 31, 114,222 persons had left; 92,785 had been evacuated from California, 12,892 from Washington, 3,714 from Oregon, and an additional 4,831 had migrated into the interior states of their own accord.¹

* Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture. The authors gratefully acknowledge contributions of R. B. Cozzens and Russell T. Robinson of the War Relocation Authority, and of H. E. Selby and Ruth E. Sauer of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the preparation of this article.

¹ War Department, *Final Report; Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 356-380.

The Japanese² had not been in this region as long as had most of the other racial groups. Few of them arrived until after 1885, when the Japanese government sanctioned emigration of its people. Then they began coming in such large numbers that immigration restrictions were imposed gradually, culminating eventually with the immigration law of 1924 which absolutely excludes Orientals.³ The trend in Japanese population since 1890 is shown in Table I and the 1940 distribution is shown in Figure 1.

Japanese were attracted to agriculture as a means of livelihood. Most of them started out as farm laborers. The usual arrangement was working in groups under the direction of Japanese leaders or "bosses," individuals who bargained with farmers in supplying laborers on a wage or contract basis.

The Japanese farm laborers soon became proficient in American farming

² In this article the term "Japanese" refers to all persons of Japanese ancestry, including both alien Japanese and American citizens.

³ V. Fuller, *The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California* (In U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor), Hearings . . . 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 54, *Agricultural Labor in California*, p. 19829.


TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BY DECADES, 1890-1940*

Area	1890		1900		1910		1920		1930		1940	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
California	1,147	56.3	10,151	41.7	41,356	57.3	71,952	64.8	97,456	70.2	93,717	73.8
Washington	360	17.6	5,617	23.1	12,929	17.9	17,387	15.7	17,837	12.8	14,565	11.5
Oregon	25	1.2	2,501	10.3	3,418	4.7	4,151	3.7	4,958	3.6	4,071	3.2
Three-State Totals	1,532	75.1	18,269	75.1	57,703	79.9	93,490	84.2	120,251	86.6	112,353	88.5
All Other States	507	24.9	6,057	24.9	14,454	20.1	17,520	15.8	18,583	13.4	14,594	11.5
U. S. Totals	2,039	100.0	24,326	100.0	72,157	100.0	111,010	100.0	138,834	100.0	126,947	100.0
American-born			269	1.1	4,502	6.2	29,672	26.7	68,357	49.2	79,642	62.7
Foreign-born	2,039	100.0	24,057	98.9	67,655	93.8	81,338	73.3	70,477	50.8	47,305	37.3

Source: Bureau of the Census.

proving the public school systems, subsidized industrialization of the region, conversion of the least productive and most severely eroded sections into national forests, regulating the use of other lands by means of rural zoning ordinances, and benefit payments designed to enable farmers to enlarge their holdings and establish a better-balanced system

of farming. Failure of public agencies to cushion the shock involved in bringing land resources and rural population into better balance will entail untold hardships and sufferings. The cooperative efforts of government—federal, state, and local—agriculture, labor, and industry will be required to hold these ills at a minimum.



techniques, and it was not long before they began leasing farms from some of their former employers, usually on a share basis. Most farm owners found this arrangement profitable. They received a good share of the crop; they were relieved of farm labor problems; and, as the Japanese were good workers, they usually obtained high yields. This transition from farm laborer to farm operator was encouraged by processing companies and commission merchants who financed Japanese farmers through crop liens or special marketing agreements. By hard work, industry, and shrewd bargaining, many Japanese farmers proceeded upward along the agricultural ladder from farm laborer to sharecropper and tenant, and some to ultimate farm ownership.

Farm Tenure

Of the 109,391 persons evacuated in 1942 from California, Washington, and Oregon, 5,930 were registered as operators of farms totalling 266,120 acres of land. Although the Army's evacuation program applied also to the southern part of Arizona, this area is not considered here because of the relatively few Japanese farm operators evacuated from Arizona. Furthermore, the figures do not include land in farms which may have been operated by any of the 4,831 Japanese who migrated voluntarily from the West Coast because their property was not subject to registration by the military authorities. Since the total evacuee-operated farm acreage registered in all 3 states, however, was somewhat greater than that classified as operated by Japanese by the 1940 U. S. Census, it is unlikely that much land was farmed by those who left voluntarily. The Japanese farmers who were evacuated were not all individual operators. Included were those in partnerships of 2 or more persons, and corporations.

The distribution of the evacuee farm operators and farm acreage by states is shown in Table II. The geographical distribution of the farms was similar to that of the Japanese population as shown in Figure 1.

Farm ownership by Japanese on the Pacific Coast has always amounted to less than 1 percent of the total number of farms, total farm acreage, and total cropland in the evacuated area. In 1942, 28 percent of the total number of evacuee-operators owned all of the land they operated; 6 percent owned only part. Sixty-five percent of the operators were tenants who leased all of the land they operated, and 6 percent were part-owners who leased part and owned part. Altogether, evacuee farm operators leased 70 percent of all the land they operated. Farm tenancy in this region as a whole is less than 20 percent.

In the evacuated region there is normally more tenancy in some types of farming than in others. For example, there is more tenancy in truck- and field-crop-producing areas such as Imperial Valley, Calif., than in fruit farming areas like Hood River County, Oreg. This relationship was also true of evacuee farmers. There was generally less tenancy in counties where they produced considerable fruit, grapes, and other perennial crops, than where they produced mostly vegetables and other annual crops.

As indicated previously, Japanese farmers usually started at the bottom of the so-called "agricultural ladder" as farm laborers, worked their way upward to farm tenancy, and then advanced, perhaps, to farm ownership. Even under ideal conditions, this method of attaining farm ownership status requires many years as a farm laborer and tenant in order to earn and accumulate sufficient capital with which to buy and equip a

farm. The high proportion of farm tenancy among evacuee farmers probably was due in part to insufficient time for them to have become owners.

Although doubt has been expressed concerning the real effectiveness of the alien land laws, the forces which effected these measures probably deterred many eligible persons of Japanese ancestry from acquiring permanent tenure status, particularly ownership of farm land, in areas where local attitudes were not favorable. Because of this uneasiness, many may have preferred tenure of land which would permit them to move on short notice if necessary—and a type of farming that requires a minimum of capital investment for permanent farm structures and perennial crops. Thus, the restrictive measures, to the extent that they have discouraged farm ownership by persons of Japanese ancestry,

probably have contributed to establishing an unstable tenure pattern with associated undesirable features inherent in short-term leasing, insecurity of land occupancy, and high tenant mobility.

Size of Farms

Evacuee-operated farms on the West Coast were considerably smaller than other farms, on the average. In 1942, the average size of evacuee farms was 45 acres of land. That of other farms was over 200 acres. Evacuee farms in California averaged about 10 acres larger than those of Oregon and about 17 acres larger than those of Washington (Table III). Over three-fourths of the evacuee farms were smaller than 50 acres.

There was considerable variation in average size of evacuee farms between counties, ranging from 2 to over 200 acres, depending largely on type of

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF EVACUEE FARM OPERATORS, AND OF THE LAND OPERATED, BY TYPE OF TENURE, 1942*

	California	Washington	Oregon	Entire Evacuated Area
Evacuee operators (number)	4,908	692	330	5,930
<i>Tenure of Operators</i>				
Full-owners (percent)	28.4	21.4	39.0	28.2
Part-owners (percent)	6.3	7.8	4.6	6.4
Tenants (percent)	65.1	70.4	56.4	65.2
Managers (percent)	0.2	0.4	0.2
TOTALS (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
EVACUEE FARM LAND (acres)	232,650	21,320	12,150	266,120
<i>Tenure of Land</i>				
Owned by:				
Full-owners (percent)	22.3	25.1	37.3	23.2
Part-owners (percent)	7.4	4.1	3.4	6.9
Leased by:				
Full-tenants (percent)	60.5	64.9	57.0	60.7
Part-owners (percent)	9.4	5.7	2.3	8.8
Managed (percent)	0.4	0.2	0.4
TOTALS (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.00	100.0

* Source: WRA Evacuee Property Records

farming and degree of urbanization. Counties with greatest urban development generally had the smallest evacuee farms.

Japanese farms were small because of specialization in intensive crops with high returns per acre. Very few evacuees went into livestock farming which required extensive acreages of forage crops or range land. The few with dairy farms or those who grew field crops had considerably larger acreages than the average for all evacuee farms.

Most evacuees preferred to farm small acreages intensively. Through interplanting, double cropping, and the application of considerable hand labor, evacuees got production and incomes on these small farms often comparable to those of other farmers with larger acreages of similar crops.

Crops Grown

Most of the Japanese farming activities were concentrated in the intensive

farming areas of southern California, the great Central Valley, and the central coastal region of California; the Seattle, Tacoma and Yakima areas of Washington; and the Portland and Hood River regions of Oregon.

The acreage of crops on farms of evacuees during the early part of 1942 when the military evacuation began was about 181,000 acres (Table IV). This was 68 percent of the total land in their farms. Farming enterprises favored by evacuees were truck, grapes, fruit, berries, nursery stock, poultry, and a few field crops.

Evacuees were most successful in the growing of intensively cultivated crops such as vegetables and berries. Almost half of their cropland was in vegetables. The evacuee acreage of vegetable crops amounted to about a fifth of the total for the region. It is probable that their proportion of the total value of these crops may have been even higher be-

TABLE III. SIZE OF EVACUEE HOLDINGS AT TIME OF EVACUATION AND AFTER TRANSFER TO NONEVACUEE OPERATORS, WEST COAST EVACUATED AREA, 1942*

ITEM	Before Evacuation		After Transfer ¹	
	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Land	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Land
All Land in Farms (acres).....		266,120		266,120
Holdings (number).....		5,930		5,075
Average Size (acres).....		44.9		52.4
Size of Holding (acres)				
0— 9.....	20.0	2.3	19.4	1.8
10— 29.....	39.8	14.9	36.7	12.1
30— 49.....	17.1	14.2	17.8	12.9
50— 99.....	13.5	20.5	14.9	19.5
100—219.....	7.3	22.2	7.9	21.3
220 & over.....	2.3	25.9	3.3	32.4
TOTALS.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

¹ Former evacuee land only, excluding non-evacuee land with which it may have been combined.

* Source: WRA Evacuee Property Records

cause of their intensive methods of farming. Tomatoes, lettuce, melons, asparagus, onions, beans, cabbage, peas, celery, spinach, and cauliflower were favorite crops.

Berries were an important crop. In California, evacuees grew 70 percent of the total acreage of all types of berries, and 85 percent of the acreage of strawberries. Almost a third of the total crop acreage of evacuees in Oregon was in berries. They were grown in all 3 states.

Grapes were grown on about a sixth of the acreage cropped by evacuees. They were almost all produced in the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys of California.

Deciduous fruits and nuts accounted for about an eighth of the land cropped by evacuees. Popular varieties were plums, peaches, pears, prunes, apricots, apples, almonds, walnuts and cherries. With the exception of some acreage of apples, pears and cherries in Hood River County, Oregon, most fruit and nut crops were grown in California.

Although field crops occupied about a sixth of the crop acreage, in terms of

value of products they probably were not as important as the smaller acreages of the more intensively cultivated crops. Sugar beets, which made up a third of the total field crop acreage, were the major crop. Sugar beets were grown in California only.

Evacuees operated many nurseries throughout the West Coast, but most of them were in California, situated near and in urban centers along the coast and in the central valley. Nursery stock, seed plants, and flowers amounted to almost 3,000 acres.

Few evacuee farmers chose livestock farming, with the exception of poultry. Poultry often was raised on farms which also grew crops. Some strictly poultry farms were operated by evacuees in poultry-producing areas like those in Sonoma and Los Angeles counties, California.

Cooperative Marketing of Crops

An interesting characteristic of evacuee farming was the ability of evacuees to grow truck crops on small family operated farms and yet survive competi-

TABLE IV. ACREAGES OF MAJOR TYPES OF CROPS GROWN BY EVACUEES ON THE WEST COAST, BY STATES, APRIL 1942*

TYPE OF CROP	California		Washington		Oregon		Evacuated area	
	<i>Acre</i> s	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>Acre</i> s	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>Acre</i> s	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>Acre</i> s	<i>Pct.</i>
Truck crops.....	79,482	48.3	5,896	56.6	1,596	24.3	86,974	47.9
Field crops.....	27,067	16.5	2,350	22.6	875	13.3	30,292	16.7
Grapes.....	27,694	16.8	10	0.2	27,704	15.3
Deciduous fruits.....	17,736	10.8	49	0.5	1,907	29.0	19,692	10.8
Berries.....	6,075	3.7	2,089	20.0	2,137	32.6	10,301	5.7
Nursery crops.....	2,934	1.8	34	0.3	21	0.3	2,989	1.6
Nut crops.....	1,895	1.2	22	0.3	1,917	1.1
Subtropical fruits.....	1,557	0.9	1,557	0.9
<i>All types</i>	164,440	100.0	10,418	100.0	6,568	100.0	181,426	100.0

* Source: WRA Evacuee Property Records

tion from large-scale grower-shipper vegetable producers. In the Imperial Valley, for example, most non-evacuee small farm operators contend that vegetable production for them is too risky, principally because of difficulty in marketing. The non-evacuee truck crop acreage in this valley, therefore, is controlled largely by large-scale grower-shippers. This same condition exists also in many other parts of California where vegetable crops are grown.

This situation, however, was not true of evacuee farmers. Although their farms were small, they grew and marketed truck crops successfully. In the southern California coast region, evacuee farmers, mostly with small farms, were such successful truck crop producers that the non-evacuee grower-shippers complained of being frozen out by evacuee competition.

Important reasons advanced for the evacuees' success in truck farming are their aptitude for that type of agriculture and their ability to organize successful cooperative organizations. The evacuees were a cohesive group. They seemed to prefer group to individual action much more than farmers of most other nationalities. This trait is exemplified in the numerous religious, social, educational, and commercial organizations which evacuees had established throughout the West Coast.

Japanese farmers' associations and the employment by them of representatives who knew English and marketing practices were a rational outgrowth from the competitive inequality of the individual early immigrants who spoke little English and had not yet acquired familiarity with the hazards of marketing produce.

Evacuee farmers' associations in southern California were more complex and extensive in their operations than elsewhere on the West Coast. Farmers'

associations formed marketing organizations which were linked with the marketing associations in Los Angeles for the channeling of farm produce from farm to market. These Japanese marketing organizations were usually incorporated and financed by sales of shares and by assessments on units of produce marketed. Through their associations the truck farmers also engaged in group buying of fertilizers and other supplies at reduced rates. In addition, the evacuee farmers' associations and some of the marketing associations were joined into a service federation which, for an annual fee, provided its members with a daily newspaper and daily radio broadcasts of produce prices.

In other areas of California, such as San Joaquin County, the evacuee farmers' association appear to have operated independently of each other. Commonly, sales were made directly in the local public markets or to processors and packers for shipment East. And,

"It must not be assumed that the Japanese never took part in general community enterprises and agreements. In San Joaquin County, for example, all the tomato growers of a locality met with cannery representatives to establish the price per ton of tomatoes in the coming season. The Japanese cooperated and were in fact rather proud to be able to produce on a large scale and to have the security of a cannery contract. Also, as members of water districts they had to cooperate in the use of irrigation water. Probably no one really understood it, but most farmers felt themselves part of an intricate system, even before the war emergency and federal regulations further systematized agriculture . . .

"Also it must not be assumed that Japanese farmers rarely marketed their crops through private companies. In many neighborhoods from which crops went to the local fresh-produce market, there were direct dealings with the consumer or with private wholesale companies and large retail grocery chains. In some cases the individual farmer, in other cases his association, sold to the chain. In

Los Angeles the wholesale companies dealt with were usually Japanese. In much of San Joaquin County and in other places where there was a concentration on a few large commercial crops (prune plums or table grapes, for example) and where the Japanese associations had not developed to the point of having good outlets among wholesalers in the Midwest and East, then the privately-owned shipping companies provided the chief outlet."⁴

In the state of Washington, where the evacuees settled for the most part in the Puget Sound counties of King and Pierce, small truck farm acreages comparable to those of Los Angeles County were the prevailing type of enterprise. Produce was marketed through cooperative societies composed largely of evacuees, although non-evacuee growers also were members. These cooperative societies handled the produce for the local fresh market and also for shipment to the East.

Most of the vegetables in Oregon were raised on the farms in the area about Portland. Fresh produce for the most part was hauled by individual growers to the Portland wholesale market operated by an association, and smaller amounts were delivered to large wholesale distributing houses. A large proportion of the produce was taken up by shippers for delivery out of the state. Some vegetables and fruits for canning were raised under contracts with the canneries, whereby the latter were guaranteed a certain amount of the product in return for seed and fertilizer loans.

Disposition of Farming Interests During and After Evacuation

The evacuation of Japanese farmers from the West Coast raised a serious problem because of the possibility of disrupting the agricultural economy of

that region by the abrupt removal of about 6,000 established farm operators. To insure uninterrupted performance of farming operations and to protect growing crops, then considered vital in the successful prosecution of the war, a plan was placed into operation that would accomplish the intended evacuation with maximum expediency and a minimum of crop loss.

A field organization was established, consisting of agents stationed at service centers located throughout the evacuated area. Their duties were to register and obtain information about farms of Japanese subject to evacuation, and to find other suitable farm operators to take them over. Considerable publicity was given the program in order to inform the evacuees and the general public concerning the agricultural aspects of evacuation and to induce substitute farm operators to take over the farms as they were being relinquished.

To encourage further occupancy by non-evacuee operators, special short-term agricultural production credit for general operating expenses was provided to otherwise eligible substitute farm operators. A special negotiations unit was established to handle transactions involving the consolidation of small specialized evacuee farms into larger farm enterprises. In some instances, corporations were organized and sponsored by local leaders, agricultural cooperative groups, associations, and real estate companies to acquire and manage these consolidated farm holdings. Financial assistance was provided for this purpose also when necessary.⁵

Approximately 5,075 non-evacuee substitute operators took over the 266,120 acres of land registered by the 5,930 evacuee-operators. The transfer of opera-

⁴ United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, Community Analysis Section. *Relocation at Rohwer Center; Part III. "Background for the*

Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers," by Margaret Lantis. pp. 10-11, mimeo. 1945.

⁵ War Department, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-144.

tion and management of evacuee farming interests in most cases involved negotiation, reassignment, or cancellation of leases, rather than actual transfer of ownership title from evacuees to non-evacuees. Many farms were taken back by the original owners who had leased them to the evacuees. But the evacuation program also stimulated transfers of ownership, largely because of future uncertainties facing the evacuees.

The evacuee property records of the War Relocation Authority show that on March 1, 1942, the day before the evacuation proclamation was issued, there were approximately 2,300 separate Japanese ownerships of farmland within the evacuated area. These included ownerships of 1 acre or larger by individuals, groups of individuals, and organizations amounting to a total of about 80,000 acres of farm land. Some land held through purchase contracts was included as well as land in recorded ownerships.

During the military evacuation, which extended from March 2 to October 31, 1942, sales of farms by evacuees reduced the number of land ownerships to about 2,100 with recorded interests comprising less than 70,000 acres of agricultural land.

In all three states most of the transfers took place during the first several months of the evacuation period. There was a period of little or no activity starting immediately before and extending beyond the final date of evacuation, followed by a resumption of transfers in 1943. The uncertainty of future developments in nations at war and the desire to liquidate property into ready cash for emergency use undoubtedly were strong motives for disposal of property at the beginning when evacuation measures were being formulated and publicized. Some acquisition of property by Japanese was indicated by

recorded instruments, particularly during the early part of the evacuation period. This may have been stimulated by settlement of business affairs before leaving, such as the payment and termination of land purchase contracts and other liens and outstanding obligations. The period of inactivity starting immediately before and extending beyond the final evacuation date may have been due to difficulty of evacuees in negotiating business transactions while moving, first into Army Assembly Centers, and later into WRA Relocation Centers. Activity resumed during 1943 probably because the Evacuee Property Division of the War Relocation Authority was well established by that time to assist in handling of evacuee property transactions, and most evacuees had become settled in the Relocation Centers, and again were able to divert some attention to their property.

More recent figures for transfers recorded during 1944 and 1945 show that farm property transfers from Japanese to non-Japanese are continuing. Probable reasons for this continued activity are the relocation of evacuees in the interior and eastern states and the current high land prices. As evacuees become permanently relocated in other localities they may be inclined to dispose of their prewar property holdings on the West Coast.

As indicated by the smaller number of non-evacuee substitute operators than of evacuee operators, some consolidation of former evacuee-operated farms occurred in the transfer process. The average size of non-evacuee farm holdings of former evacuee-operated farms increased about a sixth over the average size of former evacuee-operated farms (Table III). The average size of holdings increased in all 3 states, but increased most in California.

This consolidation of former evacuee farms represents partly the acquisition of former Japanese farm interests by a few large-scale operators, many of whom were in the same competitive field, and partly the results of a special program of the evacuation authorities. After the farm evacuation program had operated a few days, it became difficult to obtain qualified farm operators for individual farms, particularly units with very small acreages. Experienced farm operators and farm workers had become scarce because of alternative employment opportunities created by the war. Prospective farmers, therefore, were not eager to acquire small individual evacuee farms with limited income capabilities when better opportunities existed elsewhere. It was discovered also that this condition encouraged unscrupulous large-scale operators in making "profitable" unauthorized deals at the expense of the evacuees by taking over and consolidating these properties.

In order to speed up the farm evacuation program, to keep up production schedules, and to more ably protect the evacuees' interests, special efforts were then made to induce grower and shipper corporations as well as individual farmers to take over the management of authorized consolidated evacuee farm holdings. Most of the consolidation of evacuee farms in certain fruit areas like those in Placer and Sacramento counties was sponsored by the evacuation authorities. In other areas there may have been considerable unauthorized consolidation by special interests.

Popular Attitudes Toward Returnees

The order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the western evacuated area was rescinded January 2, 1945. All such persons loyal to the United States are now free to return to

this area. What are the prospects for their orderly and peaceful return to their former residences, farms, and occupations?

That a latent or active antagonism against persons of Japanese origin is shared by many residents of the West Coast must be admitted. The roots of this antagonism have been cultivated for many years. The Japanese were among the last of numerous alien minorities to settle on the Pacific Coast. The original immigrants, some of whom have not learned adequate English and who have kept their Japanese ways, still make up a fair but rapidly diminishing proportion of the total number. Their children, who have gone through American schools, have been more hampered in being accepted as Americans than has the second generation of other immigrant groups. Furthermore, their easily distinguished physical characteristics, coupled with their conspicuous competitive position, have singled them out as targets for dislike.

Almost half of the Japanese-Americans have engaged in agriculture and as a result hostility toward them is much more pronounced in the agricultural counties than it is in the urban centers. This reaction has been re-enforced by the fact that the relative isolation of some rural areas has not fostered as much cultural integration as it has in cities and larger towns. Groups and individuals connected with agriculture have often taken the lead in anti-Japanese agitation. They allege that their economic welfare has been threatened by an aggressive minority. The tendency of any people to be guarded in its attitude toward an alien group has frequently been diverted into hostility toward the Japanese-Americans by assertions that their living standards are low and their

birth rate is high,⁶ that they mine the soil,⁷ and that they are Japanese first and Americans second. These and other allegations have a specious appeal; they are true only in specific instances and false generally. The restrictive legislation and discriminatory treatment directed toward the Japanese-Americans, contradictory to the principles of American equality, have been rationalized on the grounds of necessity.

The war against Japan and the dramatic mass exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast was proclaimed by many residents of these states to be an overt admission that the evacuees were, as a race, actively dangerous to public safety. Their expulsion was regarded as a victory by all those who felt they were rid of economic competitors and by those who, without having any material interest, disliked them on the grounds that they were a culturally alien and unassimilable race.⁸ Agitation did not subside after their evacuation. In its more extreme form, hatred of the enemy, Japan, included the evacuees as well. In its more moderate aspects, antagonism against their return was concealed in declarations that they be kept in "protective custody" for their own safety.

The announcement in December 1944⁹ that the evacuees would have the legal right to return provoked more agitation in the form of resolutions and intimidations. Despite the repeatedly expressed determination of state and local officials

⁶U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. *National Defense Migration; Fourth Interim Report (H. Rpt. 2124)*. 77th Cong., 2d Sess. Pursuant to H. Res. 113, A Resolution to Inquire Further into the Interstate Migration of Citizens . . . Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones, May 1942. p. 91. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Printing Off. 1942).

⁷E. G. Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast; Their Legal and Economic Status*. Preliminary Report Prepared for the July 1927 Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 245, 246.

that their return should be peaceful and unimpeded, several acts of violence occurred in the agricultural valleys of California. Incendiary fires were started and random shots fired into evacuee homes. Organizations interested in discouraging the evacuees' relocation on the Pacific Coast have condemned violence but by their very vehemence have probably incited it.¹⁰

Anti-Japanese sentiment reflects only one division of public opinion on the West Coast. Particularly after the first apprehensions over a possible invasion had quieted, many people began to raise questioning doubts of the necessity for the transportation and segregation of a whole people. It began to appear that probably race hostility had been a primary motive for their elimination. Even though the evacuees were receiving fair treatment, the Japanese government was propagandizing throughout the Far East that this was a race conflict despite the pretensions of the democratic Americans that they were waging a war to suppress fascism. An increasing number of thoughtful persons regarded the evacuation as a violation of constitutional rights and an unwholesome precedent.

It is this conviction which has brought together on the West Coast a considerable body of associations and civic groups as well as prominent individuals who have united in affirming that American principles of tolerance and equality must be vindicated. Among

⁸U. S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, Community Analysis Section. *Prejudice in Hood River Valley; A Case Study in Race Relations*, p. 3, mimeo. Washington, D. C. 1945.

⁹The actual order followed this announcement on January 2, 1945.

¹⁰Noteworthy among these organizations is the Japanese Exclusion League of Oregon. Its journal calls attention to the brutalities of the Japanese enemy and at the same time censures violence. This organization has changed its name to the Oregon Property Owners Protective League probably because of its wider appeal.

these organizations are the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, League of Women Voters, Council for Democracy, American Civil Liberties Union, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. Shortly after the exclusion orders were lifted a large number of organizations met in San Francisco under the auspices of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play where they worked on plans for easing the return of the evacuees. Even more significant has been the continued activity in California, Washington, and Oregon of councils of civic unity, church conferences, labor unions, and laymen who are fostering a tolerant reception of the evacuees.

Reaction to the announcement of the return of the Japanese evacuees was for many people a release of emotion over one more unresolved problem. The Pacific States are congested with an unparalleled in-migration. Housing, transportation, and other shortages are prevalent. The war has altered the economy of these states more than that of the rest of the nation, and their residents are concerned over the postwar future. Some resentment against the returnees is inevitable. But the first rush of feeling has receded and opinion is tending toward a more neutral course. Many will not welcome the returnees back to their homes and farms but leadership on the West Coast is in the hands of those who insist on their peaceful return and the great majority of people are joined with them.

Are They Returning?

Very few Japanese returned during the winter and spring months following the rescinding of the evacuation order on January 2, 1945. But by the end of

¹¹ By January 2, 1945, when the exclusion order was abrogated, about 35,000 had relocated outside of the West Coast.

September the number leaving the evacuee centers was approximately on the schedule anticipated by the War Relocation Authority. At that time about 25,000 had resettled in California, Oregon and Washington. Since then, however, the proportion of resettlers returning to their states of origin has increased and it now seems likely that somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 out of about 110,000 evacuees will have returned to these three states by December 15, 1945, the date set for the closing of the relocation centers. Others¹¹ will have scattered in the Midwest and Eastern States with a very few settled in the South.

Undoubtedly a large proportion of the evacuees would prefer to resume their former ways of life in the familiar environment of the West Coast. But the fact that several thousand have decided to relocate in the relatively unknown East and Midwest indicates that they expect to receive more equitable treatment in those areas than they did in the West.

The evacuee farmers are more attached to their former occupation than those who followed other pursuits. Despite restrictive measures imposed, many felt a deep devotion to the land and it is hard for them to conceive of any other way of life. They realize they face opposition on their return to the farming lands of their previous residence. They fear that if they resettle in groups, that public opinion will not permit it, and that if they locate separately, they will be frozen out by other racial groups. Farm laborers fear to be employed singly, but in groups under leadership of their own race they anticipate discrimination.

The large proportion of the evacuee farmers who had leases will experience considerable difficulty in re-establishing

themselves on farms because nearly all of their leasehold interests were transferred to non-Japanese during and after evacuation. Immediate reoccupation of farms by former evacuees on the West Coast, therefore, is limited largely to the relatively few who have managed to retain ownership of their farms.

Farm ownership by Japanese amounted to about 30 percent of their total pre-war farm operations. Ownership transfers to nonevacuees during and after evacuation has probably reduced these farm ownership interests to less

than a fourth of the total pre-war Japanese land holdings, including leaseholds. This will amount to roughly 60,000 or 65,000 acres, or less than 0.002 of all of the land in all farms in the 3 states.

Even though some of the evacuees who have already relocated in the Midwest and the East may return and reacquire farms on the West Coast, there is now little evidence that the Japanese-American will soon regain any prominence in the agriculture of the West Coast.