

Corrected Copy

PART IV

ABORTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPT TO FORM REPRESENTATIVE BODY

THE OKAMOTO SHOOTING

Administrative Attempt to Form Representative Committee

April 15?
Once the Co-ordinating Committee had resigned the primary aim of the Administration was to obtain another legitimate representative body. The requisite permission for this arrived April 14. Even though an announcement had been made on April 4, the method preparing the people for this action was not particularly well formulated at this time. Mr. Black had suggested a mass meeting, to announce the matter to the people. Other members of the Administration did not favor this, believing that a meeting without questions and discussion would accomplish little.

On April 22, the matter was re-announced to the people by way of the Newell Star. Mr. Black re-explained that block delegates were to be elected who would take the responsibility of selecting an Arrangements Committee who would make the final plans and supervise the election of the permanent committee. The administration did "not wish to prescribe any method for the selection of the block delegates." Black also pointed out that there would be "no community government within the Tule Lake Center similar to that which exists in the relocation center" and that the permanent representatives would serve only in an advisory capacity. This announcement was accompanied by the text of Dillon Myer's approval of the formation of a representative group.

After the publication of this authorization, more than two weeks passed while the administration waited in vain for

the slightest evidence of initiative on the part of the colony. Finally the administration "prepared to assume the responsibility for proposing definite plans to bring about the organization of the Representative Committee and the establishment of harmonious and practical working relationships with it as the recognized and official spokesman of the residents." It was a curious reversal of the November situation. In November, the Administration had exerted itself to the utmost to inhibit and slow down the development of a representative body. Six months later, when it stood ready to welcome one with open arms, there was no response. On May 8 another explanation and plan was printed in a special edition of the Newell Star. Dillon Myer's instructions were reprinted. The article states: "There has been no substantial response to the administration's invitation to proceed with the formation of the Representative Committee. Therefore, in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation, the administration is prepared to assume the responsibility for proposing definite plans to bring about the organization of the Representative Committee."

It was announced that elections would take place in each block on May 22 to select two Block Delegates who would form a Ward Council. The Ward Council would meet on the 25 and select the Arrangements Committee, which was to make the preliminary plans for the election of the permanent Representative Body.

Elaborate plans were outlined to prepare for the election of May 22. The Block Managers were instructed to make frequent announcements and post notices for block meetings to be held May 18 at which time nominations for the proposed Block Delegates were to be made and a Block Election Board selected. The duties

of the Block Election Board and the Ward Delegates were described in detail.

Fear that agitators might be elected to office was still felt by many of the members of the administration. This fear had haunted the administration for many months and probably delayed the preparations for the formation of a representative body during the months that the Co-ordinating Committee was striving to extricate itself from its unwelcome duties. At the last meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee Mr. Huycke had said, in reference to the election of a new body: "In some blocks they're going to try to put up Daihyo Sha Kai members," by which he meant that the status quo group would attempt to nominate "agitators." Mr. Provinse, who sat in on this meeting, remarked, "What if they do?"¹ It is said that Mr. Provinse exerted a considerable influence on those members of the personnel obsessed with the fear of agitators, among whom could be numbered most of the high ranking member of the staff.

ATTITUDES OF THE RESIDENTS BEFORE THE ELECTION

However, instead of planning to obtain places on the body, the leaders of the underground pressure groups were putting all their efforts into an attempt to make the election an utter failure. In this they received the active or passive support of most of the colonists.

"K", while believing that a body ought to be formed, pointed out that any one who accepted a place on it stood in great danger of being branded an inu. The knife edged path of resisting the administration sufficiently to gain the respect and confidence of the people and co-operating sufficiently to

¹ibid., May 17, 1944, p. 2.

keep from being thrown into the stockade could be travelled in safety only by an extremely able individual. And such individuals were not interested in the office. "K" was also the only informant frank and well informed enough to hint, albeit cautiously, at the existence of pressure groups working against the election.

"I know only a little about it. I'm not sure, but I'm afraid this thing is going to cause a little trouble. There is a party opposing it. The one who is opposing it, not because he knows anything about it, but because he merely took a dislike to it. He has some sort of false impression. He may try to cause a little trouble.

"People are not very enthusiastic about it. But I think that a body ought to be formed to try to co-operate with the administration and set things rolling harmoniously. You'll find the issei will try to co-operate with the administration whether they like it or not. The nisei will fall in with them too. So eventually they are all going to be called inu.

"It would be best if the body stood up and spoke for the rights of the Japanese, even if they are thrown into the stockade. Then they'll be idolized. But if he falls into line, he's going to be called a stooge no matter what he does.

"Mr. Best must recognize the opposition. If the people (elected) have the guts to stand up, O.K. But if mostly issei are elected they will swallow and swallow and just get to be despised.

K. a Hawaiian nisei, 50 years old, has a curious prejudice against the issei, whom he, in general, views as meek individuals who will agree with the administration on any issue, against their better judgment.

"You're not going to find any respectable, well-educated Japanese willing to attempt that position. You'll get a body of people who before evacuation were just nobody."¹

Nakao, a block manager and former Daihyo Sha supporter also expressed the opinion that the election of the proposed body would be very difficult. He, like many individuals of his

¹R. Hankey, Notes, May 14, 1944, p. 2.

conviction, stressed the importance of the group still interned in the stockade. He also did not believe that the Administration would permit the election of any man on their "black list."

"They're going ahead with this Representative Committee, but I personally would really like to see the people in the stockade to be released. In my opinion getting new delegates for the Representative Committee will be pretty tough to operate. People say, 'What's the use? We put up representatives once again and they wouldn't recognize them.'"

"I don't know. You really don't hear people talk about it much. They're just sick of it. Some of the daha people, (those against status quo) they're talking about it. As far as I'm concerned I don't care if they do it or not, as long as they take care of sanitation and family employment. . . .

"In the election we'll have to take down the names of the persons and send them into the project director's office. If the person is on the black list, I know the administration will not O.K. it.

"As block managers we are not to stick our nose into any political affairs. So we are just going to act as chairmen until they get a chairman."¹

Miss Tanaka, although strongly anti-status quo, did not think the election could succeed since so many people were unwilling to elect another body while the stockade matter was still unsettled;

"It doesn't seem as if this representative body ought to go through. I hear so many people say as long as they are obligated to the Daihyo Sha they will refuse to vote until they're released."²

Yamaguchi, an ex-Leupp internee assumed an attitude of extreme indifference:

"I have no idea about it. They've asked me to be one of the representatives, but I won't. I'm not going to be in any political organization. . . .

"Tonight every block is going to have a meeting. I'm going to play baseball, and have a lot of fun. . .

¹ ibid., May 15, 1944, pp. 3-4.

² ibid., May 16, 1944, p. 2.

"The people feel pretty bad. If you do good for the people you get put in the stockade. If you do good for WRA you get called inu. So I'm going to play baseball."¹

Fujimoto took a view which was probably very common among these individuals with no passionate political convictions. The representatives were not really needed. Why elect a body which might plunge the camp into more trouble? The many evacuees who held this view consciously or unconsciously aided the pressure groups who were doing their utmost to bring about the failure of the election.

"Nobody cares a thing about having a representative government. So far as I can see, nobody is going to break their neck trying to work up a few representatives for the block. They just don't care. Things are going along pretty good, so leave well enough alone.

"We haven't any representatives now, just a ward representative. But he's always been in existence. I don't see any call for them (representatives) at all.

"My idea is this: If there's a representative from each ward that's eight people. Then, if any problem or complaint is important enough to merit bringing before the attention of the higher-ups, whoever was interested enough to do so could look up the ward representatives and present his case. But if there is a representative in every block it would be a simple matter to bring up minor items and cause confusion. I think they should leave it that way and save a lot of trouble listening to minor complaints. Things will smooth themselves out. I think having a representative in each block makes it too damn easy for anybody to put up silly complaints."²

Dr. Opler said that several of his informants had expressed the fear that hot heads would gain office and attempt to dominate the body. They would then cause trouble by insisting that demands be made with which the administration could not comply.³ This attitude, quite similar to Fujimoto's, was probably held by many ^{residents} ~~of the Old Japanese~~. It is, moreover, the kind of statement

¹ ibid., May 18, 1944, p. 2.

² ibid., May 13, 1944, p. 6.

³ ibid., p. 2., 1944.

which a Japanese would be likely to make to a member of the administration, feeling that it might not be entirely safe to put emphasis on popular sentiment toward the stockade internees or on general hostility to any proposal put forward by the administration.

Mr. Robertson's informants, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the stockade issue. It is also interesting that Mr. Robertson, on this occasion, made the most accurate prediction of any person on the project, Japanese or Caucasian. Siad he, "I think the results of this election are going to be appalling."¹

RESULTS OF NOMINATION MEETINGS

15 The results of the meetings scheduled for the evening of May 19, were not publicized by the administration. The best data available was given to Dr. Opler by the Civic Organizations, which compiled the results. At the time Opler stated that this report was preliminary and not accurate. However, nothing better was ever released.

- 2
6
- 15 blocks - nominated representatives
 - 44 blocks - no quorum, i.e., no meeting; no representatives
 - 9 blocks - no attempt made to hold meeting
 - 2 blocks - delegates nominated, but rejected by block²

Since these results were presented by the Civic Organizations, a body which would be inclined to co-operate with the administration, there is little likelihood that the failure of the meetings is exaggerated in any way. There is, therefore, no doubt that only 20% of the blocks in the center, responded to the suggestion of the administration.

¹ibid., May 19, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., May 20, p. 5.

Accounts of Meetings

Some very interesting accounts of what transpired in the various blocks were given by informants.

Yamaguchi said:

"I didn't go to the meeting. Eighty-two people were needed for a quorum and only 75 showed up. Then the anti-status quo people went around to get people to come. I went and I was nominated. I absolutely refused the nomination. I don't intend to engage in no politics. Things dragged along and about ten people left. They refused to let me decline the nomination. Then I said that there was no quorum any more, so the nomination was not valid. After a lot more talk the meeting ended. Nobody was nominated.

"Mr. Takahashi worked very hard to get people out and did his best to get nominations.

When asked if this would not make Mr. Takahashi unpopular in his block (block 68) Yamaguchi replied, "He's an old man and is going to die soon anyway."¹

"K", who lives in block 7 stated:

"I didn't attend the meeting. I was home and they came for me. But I refused to attend. I heard they had only twenty people attending. They seem to have appointed me and another gentleman next door. But I flatly refused to accept the nomination. Regardless of what Mr. Best may say, I will absolutely refuse to serve."²

Okamoto, block manager of 59, a very pro-status quo block, did his best to comply with the administrative instructions. He failed.

"I had a meeting. Only 25 or 26 people attended. So I just told them the meeting was adjourned. As you know, the block managers can't stick their nose in politics, so I must be neutral. I did my best but the people feel that way."³

A young married woman living in block 20, a notoriously "tough" block, said that the people in her block had had a

¹ ibid., May 22, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., May 21, 1944, p. 5.

³ ibid., May 23, 1944, p. 3.

meeting but they had said, "No, no, no, no!" No one was nominated.¹

When a resident of block 5 was asked how the nominations had gone, he replied with a quiet smile, "Nobody was nominated," adding significantly, "Of course, this is Reverend Kai's block."²

Dr. Opler collected the following accounts of meetings:

"I heard that block 73 had a long argument. The block manager arrived and was accused of being an inu, for helping in this. He said he had a fight (verbal, it seems) with the "worst radical" in the block. He added that there were others "too radical to listen." Anyway, the group couldn't be handled. There were no nominees."

"In block 9 there were no nominees."

"In block 69 they put up representatives; but they also had an argument. Apparently it was in the blocks which had no nominees they had the worst arguments."

"In block 29 things went OK. There was a nomination. But they had a one hour wait before people came. I think that was usual. They had to go around in the block and get them to come in. In block 16 an anti-status quo man said, 'We had to drag them out of bed to get nominees.' Block 16 is very pro-status quo."³

COLONISTS' REACTIONS TO FAILURE OF ELECTION: EXPLANATIONS

After the resounding failure of the nomination meetings, it was extremely obvious that many colonists, whether they were strong status quo supporters or not, reacted with unconcealed satisfaction. During the week following, when the subject was brought up at informal gatherings, those present vied with each other in boasting of the degree of lack of co-operation in their particular block. The numbers of persons who attended the meetings were compared. A person from a block with lower attendance smiled with smug complacency. He, however, would have to give way if

¹ ibid., May 22, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., May 20, 1944, p. 1.

³ ibid., 1944, p. 6.

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~~The machine did not do the work it was intended~~

From their point of view the administration had failed to replace the Negotiating Committee ~~which was regarded as proof of the fact~~
~~that the camp had not returned to a normal condition~~ which was regarded as proof that the camp had not returned to a normal condition. So long as this ~~an~~ unsettled condition prevailed, the pressure group ^{be lieved} ~~had known that~~ ~~could have~~ that the Washington authorities would listen to their appeals for resegregation.

any person were present from a block where no meeting at all had been held.

Confused!

This attitude was not unanimous. Persons with strong status quo sympathies were disappointed. Byron Akitsuki's sister-in-law who came from block 29, where no nominations had been made, was ashamed. ^{and} ~~When only the writer was present, she~~ said she was worried about the situation. She did not want the men released from the stockade. ¹¹ ~~"It is well known," said she, "that the agitators had been plotting trouble in Tule Lake even on the train coming from Jerome."~~

Members of the pressure groups were elated. ^{direction} ✓ "This is a great victory for the residents."² said Mr. Q. an undemonstrative individual.

Explanations

"K", who had never expressed himself as for or against the status quo gave a very interesting explanation of the failure. Significantly, he stressed that this failure put the status quo election of January 15, 1944 into its true perspective. The majority of the people, said he, had never wished to give way to the administration and break the status quo.

"People are taking the attitude, why should they make a committee when they (administration and Army) refused to recognize them in the first place. If the administration had recognized the boys at that time (November) they would have had success at this time.

"The agitators will certainly claim the credit for this.

"As you know, the Japanese people are, I would say, stubborn. Once they bear a grudge, they very seldom forget. Mr. Best has lost the confidence of the people at that time.

¹ ibid., May 22, 1944, p. 2.

² ibid., May 21, 1944, p. 4.

"The first status quo proved the situation at that time. The difference was so small. That proved that the residents were against the administration. If they had been in favor of the administration, the vote at that time would have been overwhelming."¹

Yamaguchi, who had previously expressed himself as against the release of some of the men in the stockade now swung definitely to the opinion that they should be let out. His statement that the people had rejected the election, not out of loyalty to Kai and Kuratomi, but because they felt WRA had not treated the people fairly, was corroborated by many intelligent colonists.

"If Kai and Kuratomi are released, then maybe they'll have a Negotiating Committee. The Army and WRA made a promise to the Daihyo Sha Kai that they wouldn't arrest any of them. But they did.

"It was unfair to put the representatives in the stockade. It was a dirty deal. That's really what the people feel. Eighty percent of the camp feels this way, not because they support Kai and Kuratomi but because they think WRA treated them bad.

When asked
~~The writer inquired~~ why some blocks had nominated candidates, ~~Sgt~~ Yamaguchi *replied*, (social status),

"In any block there are some young kibe and nisei who have no place in social organizations but they want to get a name somehow and that's maybe why they were candidates. Also there may be a few blocks who are pro-administration.

"I think if it were put in the Newell Star that Mr. Best was going to resign and that they were going to take the fence down, then I think it's going to be peaceful here.

"Mr. Best asked me individually whether the election will be successful or not. I told him give me a job instead. He said, well, as soon as Mr. Black came back he's going to have the election."²

Mr. "F", an issei, said:

"When the people came into camp they were confused. They are still confused. The reason they are refusing to support this proposal is that the old matter (the men in the stockade)

¹ibid., pp. 5-6.

²ibid., May 23, 1944, pp. 2-3.

is not settled. If they were all let out, the election would be proceeding in an entirely different manner. No intelligent able man would accept the nomination. I certainly wouldn't.

He also expressed his low opinion of Mr. Best:

"At Leupp Mr. Best used the outer entrance at all times and came inside the stockade as little as possible. Mr. Robertson always left by the exit which took him through camp, asking if he could get the boys something. This shows he (Robertson) has a Christian heart."¹

The opinion of Mr. Abe a segregee from Manzanar who did not arrive in camp until late February of 1944 is interesting. Abe is an issei and strongly against "radicals" and trouble making." When asked why the election had failed, he said:

"That's very simple. . . The first (representatives) we sent out - they were all put in the stockade. They (the administration) were denouncing them that they were not representative of camp opinion. So they sent out the next one (Second Negotiating Committee). Then, negotiations were going on. Then the administration say, 'You don't represent camp opinion either.' They sent them to the stockade (too). Then there were no representatives."

Then. . . the administration formally requested the camp people to elect representatives. Everybody's opinion was, 'What's the use? Every time we send a representative they are arrested. If we make more representatives, they will only put more people in the stockade.' Everybody said, 'What the heck! We don't want to send anymore people to the stockade.'"²

The Okamoto's, conservative segregees who arrived in camp in October, exhibited the same change of opinion that Yamaguchi did, i.e., the only way to bring peace to the camp was to bring the stockade matter to a satisfactory conclusion. Okamoto also added some interesting current opinions on the activities of the ex-Co-ordinating Committee.

"In my opinion the reason it didn't come out successfully is because some of the people in the center feel that unless the men in the stockade are released, they will continue to back the Daihyo Sha Kai because the men in the stockade are our representatives.

¹ ibid., May 20, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., July 27, 1944, pp. 3-4.

"I told you the last time it was better to have a good strong organization. But the way the people feel right now I think it's better to release the men from the stockade. I feel pretty strong that way. . . .

"Another thing, the Co-ordinating Committee was organized for the purpose of releasing the men and bring the center back to normalcy. But right now, it is in better condition than it was three months ago. The camp seems normal now, but as long as the men are in the stockade people will feel that it is not a normal condition.

"Some of the people say that the Co-ordinating Committee didn't finish their work. They made a statement in the paper that they had completed their work but more than 50 persons are still in there (the stockade). Some of the issei were sent to the internment camp, which made the group mad. . . .

"Unless WRA releases the men in the stockade there is no necessity to organize another committee. If the men are sent to Leupp there is no hope at all to organize another committee. The majority of the people are just watching the administration to see what they do.

"Besides people hesitate to be block delegates. They may go to the stockade if they are."¹

Two Tuleans, both issei, stressed the unpopularity of Mr. Best and the conviction that unless men in the stockade were given a fair hearing, no new representative body would ever be elected.

"I think that Mr. Best and the people in the center don't see eye to eye on almost everything. Anything he (Best) proposes, won't get through. As you know, there are 14 people in the stockade at present (this statement was made August 14). There has been no definite verdict given. There has been no hearing.

"So until we know definitely how things stand, you know it's impossible to elect another committee. That's why, as they say, anything Mr. Best would say in that sense, it won't hold true."²

Two nisei girls, old residents of Tule, stressed the fear with which a potential representative regarded the position:

¹ ibid., May 23, 1944, p. 4.

² ibid., Aug. 14, 1944, p. 2.

"They were scared because everybody was getting beaten up^{3/} (~~The outbreak of beatings occurred after the election~~). They thought the best thing to do was to sit quiet and take what they (administration) dish out. You're always in constant fear if you take that job."¹

This list of attitudes will be closed with the analysis of Mr. Yamashita an ex-Santa Fe internee and a strong supporter of the pressure groups:

"It is the Japanese way of taking the responsibility. Any responsible person has to resign his position. It shows that the majority of the residents as a whole have no confidence in the administration. It's as if the president of the United States gave an order which was not obeyed by the people. He'd no longer be president.

"Much of it is due to the people still in the stockade. They are taking too much time for settling this little business in the stockade. Mr. Best every day is taking valuable time with the chief consideration of keeping their (administration's) face. They have to spend so much time on the stockade that they are disregarding other things such as watering the roads and improving the mess halls."²

Analysis

Comparing the statements made before and after the failure of the nominations, the most striking phenomenon is the change in emphasis on the importance of the stockade issue. Three good informants, who had never before stressed wholesale release, now advocated it as the only possible method of clearing up the misunderstanding between the administration and the people. The dominant sentiment in camp from May 19 to May 24 was a feeling of triumph and regained self-respect. "We showed them," was the theme underlying most of the statements. It is impossible to say which of the three most frequently expressed reasons for the failure of the nominations was most important: a sentiment of obligation to the men in the stockade; the

¹ ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 4.

² ibid., May 21, 1944, p. 4.

3/ ^{great} The outbreak of beatings did not occur until after this period. Nevertheless one beating preceded it. There may have been more but they did not come to the attention of the authorities.

This conviction was now well established and continued so. Residents who had little respect for the ~~negotiating~~ Negotiating Committee or even called them "agitators" ~~was~~ expressed the opinion that their continued imprisonment would be an error.

The dominant sentiment in camp from May 19 to May 24 was a feeling of triumph and regained self-respect. "We showed them," was the theme underlying most of the statements. ~~It was impossible to find~~
~~of the factors which contributed~~ The three most significant factors which contributed to the failure of the nominations were : a sentiment of obligation to the men in the stockade; the

conviction that it would be impossible to serve as a representative without getting into trouble either with the administration or the people; a general disinclination to co-operate with the unpopular administration and Mr. Best in any way whatever. As has been shown, most informants shared all three. ~~Undoubtedly, the pressure groups felt that the first and third were most salient, salient.~~ Fear or disinclination to be called an inu and dislike for Mr. Best were strong enough to swing the conservative people against the proposition. The arguments which took place in certain blocks and the attempts of certain individuals to go about the block "and compel the people to come in," show that the administration was not without its supporters. However, these individuals were completely overwhelmed and risked great unpopularity and danger by their actions.

The fiasco had one noticeable effect on the public mind: the conviction that the state of non-cooperation between the administration and the people could be resolved only by releasing the stockade internees was now well established and continued so. It should be noted that some of the segees who had little respect for the Negotiating Committee and even the Old Tuleans who might call them agitators, upstarts and Communists still were convinced that their continued imprisonment would be an error. Moreover, although ~~it~~ ^{an attitude} was seldom verbalized, not appearing for meetings was henceforth adopted as a simple and safe method of putting the administration in its place. ^{by the majority of the people} The continuation of this pattern will be taken up in its proper chronological place.

Persons who differed with this attitude either kept quiet about it or suffered public disapproval.

REACTION OF ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Best is said to have taken the matter calmly and philosophically.

On May 25th the following statement appeared in the Newell Star:

FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE BODY POSTPONED STATES BEST

Plans for the formation of the Representative Committee, a permanent intermediary body which was granted approval by the WRA, have been postponed for an indefinite period of time, announced Ray R. Best, project director. The block meetings, which were held Thursday evening to nominate candidates for the block delegates' election as the first step toward formation of the permanent body, did not show sufficient response from the residents.

"The failure of a large number of blocks to hold their meetings and select their nominees serves to defeat the purpose of the organization plan, and indicates that there is not enough popular sentiment in favor of the formation of the Representative Committee to warrant a continued effort to carry out the election at the present time," stated the project director.

He lauded the earnest effort made by the residents of many blocks to launch community representation in accordance with the outlined plan; and stated, "It is obvious that unless the residents are virtually unanimous in their participation in the selection of the Representative Committee, then the committee cannot be truly representative."

In conclusion he expressed the belief that the formation of the representative body should be postponed until a more favorable date "in fairness to the entire community."

WRA TAKES OVER STOCKADE

On May 25 it was announced in the Newell Star, that WRA had taken over complete charge of the stockade. Nothing is known at present on the reasons Washington or the local administration had for doing this.

WRA IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF STOCKADE ADMINISTRATION

The WRA is now in complete charge of the administration of the segregated area within the center, it was announced by Project Director Ray R. Best on Wednesday. This area which has been commonly termed the "stockade" had been established

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by the Army authorities and administered by the Army prior to this time. As stated in the NEWELL STAR last week, releases have been made from the area to the residence section of the center by a WRA committee working with Army officials.

The administration of the segregated area by the WRA as announced by the project director means that complete supervision will be in the hands of the project officials. This will include mess operation and arrangements for medical and other necessary services.

Fifteen of the internees requested legal consul at this time.¹ Getting assistance in this matter took some time. The internees' relatives were, for the most part, quite ignorant of legal matters and did not know to whom to turn. Consulting the project attorney, they felt was out of the question.² K. expressed the following opinion of the stockade situation:

"I hear that Kai is going to be released. But if they let Kai go they must let the rest go. If they did that it would create a much more happy atmosphere."³

PERIOD OF QUIET - MID-APRIL TO MAY 24.

From the date on which the resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee was announced, the general camp attitude was marked by a gradual but unmistakable lessening of tension. There was also a marked change in administrative policy. The food improved remarkably and Mr. Best made several efforts to improve his relationships with the people. Although little actual optimism was voiced by the colonists, the statements of many informants showed overtones of relief. A few of the least pessimistic said, "Now Tule Lake is going to become just like the other centers." Hostile rumor and gossip about the inu lessened. Toward the end of May, some people even complained of being bored.

¹ibid., May 23, 1944, p. 1.

²See pp. For detailed account.

³R. Hankey, Notes, May 21, 1944, p. 6.

A considerable number of disturbing new factors such as the reception of draft notices, and the persistence of some of the old grievances kept minor disturbing currents in motion, but on the whole, the camp progressed toward a semblance of a peaceful community.

STATEMENTS OF INFORMANTS

Some excellent expressions of this phenomenon were made in early May. It is interesting that two of these statements include an appreciation of the improvement in food.

K. said:

"Things have changed a great deal. Mr. Robertson himself is feeling very much relieved. I heard Mr. Provinse had a great deal to do in influencing Mr. Best to change his mind and take advice from the right party (by right party Mr. K probably means Mr. Robertson).¹ I hope Best will continue. Right now things are simmering down pretty fast."²

Nakao said:

"Ever since you left there hasn't been much change. All quiet on the western front. Things are going pretty good except for the reduction of persons working in the family. . .

"I think the Japanese people as a whole made a big mistake at the warehouse. (Nov. 4 incident). If then food had been as it is now, it couldn't have happened. Now we have tofu, all the Japanese food we want, plenty of rice and vegetables."³

Fujimoto said:

"Inu hate has died down. Things are quieting down. People are forgetting Akitsuki. He stays in the background. As long as you don't keep floating something in front of peoples' faces, they forget about it.

"There's no undercurrent of coming explosion. They (the administration) ought to know better than that. The Japanese don't work like that. When the Japanese get really started to boil over, you don't see the warning signs.

"Besides the food has really improved. We have 48,000 pounds of cured ham sitting there in cold storage. In the coming months we are going to average eight eggs per person per week. That's an egg a day!

¹Mr. Provinse visited the project in the latter part of April.

²R. Hankey, Notes, May 14, 1944, p. 1.

³ibid., May 15, 1944, pp. 2, 4.

"The food improvement is remarkable. Up until the end of March all we ever had was corned beef, salt pork, and cabbage - and then repeat it. Besides that all we had was weiners, balony and eggs. There was very little other vegetable except cabbage. But from the beginning of April, things have started to come in. Now we get lettuce, spinach and asparagus. We still get frankfurters and balony, but we also get beef and veal occasionally - lamb and mutton more than beef though.

hog? "Our only squawk is our difficulty in getting pork. I think that's because the quartermaster refuses to send us pork because we have a big hog farm here. And they'll only kill the damn dogs when we're out of all other meat. We don't even get it once a week."

ALTERED ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Co-existent with this gradual lessening of tension, and perhaps to some extent responsible for it was a definite change in administration policy. Mr. Best, in Dr. Opler's words, "Was putting himself out to be agreeable." He had proposed a half-holiday to allow the people to celebrate the Emperor's birthday which fell on a Saturday; he had ordered the big meal of the week to be served on that day (the week's best meal is ordinarily served on Sunday); he threw the first baseball at the game which celebrated the occasion. He had also had the fence which separated ward VII from the rest of the colony which resulted in a surprising amount of happiness on the part of the colonists, particularly those living in VII. Every informant visited in that ward remarked, "The fence has been taken down. It certainly makes us feel better." Another action which was commented on with pleasure by many informants was that permission had been given to take a group of school children outside the boundaries of the fence to visit the pig farm. Many old people remarked, "It makes even us feel better to know that the children got a chance to go out for a while."¹

¹ ibid., May 13, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

Several changes in administrative attitude were observed at the end of March and throughout April. There was a subtle but very important relaxation in safe-guarding Caucasians in the colony. Until the status quo was broken, any Caucasian entering the colony was required to take with him an armed soldier or a member of the Caucasian police force. In early February, even male WRA personnel were still required to take a guard, except the teachers, who went only to the school a few hundred yards of the fence. In March this was no longer required of men; whether it was required of women personnel members is not known. The writer was obliged to take along a guard. Women personnel members almost never went into the colony at this time. By April, however, the restrictions which had been breaking down gradually were greatly relaxed and all that was required to ensure entrance into the colony was a pass from the Police or from Mr. Black. Caucasian women, however, ^{very seldom} ventured beyond the school area - so seldom that in the more distant sections of the colony the writer was frequently pointed out as an oddity by little children who would shout "Hakujin, Obasan, or hakujin no sensei." Very young children were likely to burst into tears if brought to say "Hello," to the hakujin. Even the dogs seemed to sense some difference and would rush out of the barracks to bark until the strange presence disappeared in the distance.

Stockade Releases Procedure

The release of a large number of those men detained in the stockade, may also have had an effect on calming resentment. By May 13 only about 55 men were still confined.

The stockade situation was given the following publicity in the Newell Star of May 18.

ADMINISTRATION RELEASES LATEST STOCKADE FIGURES

"The number of people who have been confined in the stockade area has declined steadily since the WRA set up its program of reviewing evidence on which the men were detained.

The administration revealed, the total number of persons detained in the stockade was 319, although there was never quite this number in the area at any one time. This was because some arrests were made after others had been released.

The total number of men released from the stockade to date is 264. Most of these people were returned to their homes in the center residence area. A small number of aliens were transferred to the Department of Justice.

The number of persons remaining in the area to date is 55. Each case is reviewed by the administration's committee, and the evidence made available from Army files and from the reports of the FBI are carefully studied. Releases have been made on the recommendation of this committee, which works closely with the Army officials.

Releases of from two to five persons are being made almost daily."

However, the men left in the stockade were by no means forgotten. "K" was still dissatisfied over the continued incarceration of the three men from block 9. He also voiced the suspicion that some people had been interned just to keep the remainder of the people in a state of subjection.

"Three issei from block 9 were thrown into the stockade only last month. They didn't raise no trouble but had been complaining against people in that block regarding the distribution of gifts sent from Japan. But they were thrown into the stockade and are still there."¹

On the subject of the block 9 difficulties, Dr. Opler was of the opinion that the trouble was more serious than a mere squabble over the distribution of the gifts:

"That block 9 is an old old squabble. Block 9 has a split vote. It was a majority of anti-status quo with a strong minded minority. After the vote was taken, people entered from the outside and swung it in the pro-status quo direction. Certain families were criticized. There was mess hall discrimination and a fight between two sets of mess hall crews.

¹libid., May 14, 1944, p. 2.

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"This criticism over gift distribution was only one of the things. When last heard from, some anti-status quo people were considering getting out of the block.

"There was a real threat of mess hall trouble. That's the real reason they were put in the stockade."¹

Nakao's sentiments toward the internees had undergone no change:

"As for the (boys in the) stockade - when I sign my name for anything I want to live up to it. We said once they are our true representatives."²

Even Miss Iwohara, ex-secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee said:

"I think they ought to release all of those out of the stockade that have no charge against them. They're so slow. There are many innocent ones in there."³

Re-opening of Leupp Abandoned

Although it was not definitely announced that Leupp was not to be reopened for the incarceration of those of the internees who were American citizens, the fact that no overt steps were taken, contributed negatively to the quieter atmosphere. The relatives of the interned men, however, were still very anxious. Ever since the unconfirmed report that the internees might be sent to Leupp had appeared in an outside newspaper, a steady stream of interested persons kept coming to the administration building in an attempt to get some information.⁴

No informant not intimately connected with an internee, expressed concern over the movement to Leupp. Nor did the ordinary evacuee think that such a movement could provoke any demonstration from the people.

¹ ibid., May 17, 1944, p.1-2.

² ibid., May 15, 1944, p. 4

³ ibid., May 16, 1944, p. 2.

⁴ ibid., May 13, 1944, p. 7.

The first indication that any of the men interned were considering the possibility of appealing to the courts of the United States, appeared at this time. The first rumor was that one of the boys in Leupp who had been kept in the stockade since his arrival on December 6 was considering asking for legal aid. This young man, however, was released in May 21 and took no action.

DISTURBING FACTORS OF THIS PERIOD

Although a series of potentially disturbing events occurred during this period and the employment cut began to make itself felt, no appreciable resent or trouble resulted. The arrival of approximately 1,700 new segregants from Jerome, Granada, Heart Mountain and Minidoka and the sending of notices to young men to appear for their Army physical examinations were the most important of these occurrences.

Arrival of Additional Segregees

The estimated number of persons who entered camp at this time was given as 700 from Rohwer, 660 from Jerome, 140 from Granada, 125 from Heart Mountain and 59 from Minidoka. No organized effort on the part of the pressure groups to propagandize these new arrivals came to the attention of the administration. However the effort was almost certainly made. The most serious problem with which the administration had to deal was insufficient space. To meet this, the room allotted to each individual in camp was cut to a minimum of 80 square feet and a maximum of 100 square feet. The intent ot make this reduction was announced in the Newell Star long before the arrival of the new segregees.¹

¹Newell Star, April 6, 1944.

Finding sufficient room for the influx of new segregees was and remained one of the administration's major difficulties. At this time Mr. Robertson stated that in his opinion it was the most serious problem in camp.

While there was much muttering and grumbling over the situation, resentment over crowding remained unorganized.

Fujimoto predicted trouble, but none occurred:

"I wonder what's going to happen when all the rest get here. They've got just three blocks and then the vacancies. I think they're going to try to squeeze in 2,000 people. When they start putting them into Rec. Halls and start partitioning off, I wonder what's going to happen."¹

"K" criticized the administration for its policy of bringing the people in in small groups. Each time another group came in, said he, it caused a minor disturbance in camp:

"People coming in a little at a time like that will continue to cause small trouble and unrest during the period of transition. They're easily agitated and will fall in line with the agitators. What I'm looking forward to right now is that those who took the leadership in camp in the last incident were from Rohwer and Jerome. They are going to get a fair number of sympathizers (from the new groups). I'm thinking of watching that end of it."²

The appropriation of recreation barracks for living quarters worked a hardship on the Japanese language schools which had no other available places in which to hold their classes. This matter was eventually adjusted. The executive secretary of the Japanese Board of Education expressed himself as follows:

"When the last contingent came here, housing didn't have enough space to allot to the schools. My opinion is, if the American government wants to move the people, they ought to have the houses first. Once WRA decided one recreation hall was to be used by one block. That rule was absolutely clear. The people have a real need of a recreation place. Now WRA starts to use the Rec. Halls for housing quarters.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Mar./¹³1944, p. 5.

²ibid., May 14, 1944, p. 1.

R. Hankey, Notes, April (15), 1944, p. 28

Markley stated that "announcemnts for the Selective Service Examining Team were to be made on May 2 and 3." (Can not find anything in Newell Star).
Seventy-three boys were to appear. This, I was later told was somewhat inaccurate since a number of the boys called had already left the center.

"I said, 'Of course, having housing quarters is important, but the people choose to use the rec halls for their education. I requested a reasonable amount of space for the schools.'"¹

Nakao gave an interesting account of an incident which illustrates the attitude of the settled population toward the newcomers. Hostility toward Mr. Kawai¹, an Old Tulean and head of Housing, is also expressed:

"Mr. Kawai, the head of Housing; he was No and changed to Yes and wants to be transferred to another center. He called a meeting before the people of Rohwer and Jerome came in. He told them that when Manzanar had come in they had worked overtime and didn't get paid for it. So he told his staff not to work overtime this time.

"He was kicked right back on his face by the staff. They said, 'We are all Japanese. We are going to help those guys even if we do work overtime.'"²

On May 18 the Newell Star published an additional announcement on the necessity for consolidation of housing. The shortage was acute. Twenty recreation halls were appropriated as temporary quarters for the newcomers. Considering the lack of sufficient employment in the center, the appropriation of these recreation halls for living quarters inevitably worked a considerable hardship on the population.

Response and Reaction to Draft Notification

When on May 2 and 3 _____ young men were called to appear for the Army physical examinations (Check number and date), the trouble which the administration had anticipated did not materialize. _____ appeared and twenty-seven "No-nos" did not appear. These young men were questioned by a member of the F.B.I. a short time thereafter. No resentment was expressed over the manner of questioning. From the first, the majority of the

¹ ibid., Aug. 10, 1944, p. 4.

² ibid., May 15, 1944, p. 3.

colonists seemed to think that calling the self-avowed disloyal young men to the services was utterly ridiculous and so manifestly unjust that they would not be punished. However, several No-No-informants stated that they were willing to go to jail rather than go into the Army. The same sentiment was reported second hand from many more. It was rumored in admiring tones that before they were called up to see the F.B.I. representative, that several young men had packed their suitcases and were all ready to proceed to jail.

Yamaguchi, a kibeï No-No, who did not receive any notification gave an excellent expression of the attitude of those who did not appear.

"This is the way I think the Japanese feel. Anyway, it's the way I feel. If I get called for selective service and show up for my physical examination, the Japanese think, if we are loyal to Japan, we are pure Japanese, so we don't have to go. If we go, that means we have some loyalty to the United States of America. If we are going to refuse to go into the Army, we are going to refuse from the beginning.

"I said, 'I'm going to refuse to appear!' Mr. Robertson said, 'That's not wise, George. Take the American way. The physical examination is a federal law. You are going to involve federal law!

"But if I'm going to be a Japanese I'm going to be pure Japanese and not American at all.

"I didn't use to be like this. But now I just see this camp from the Japanese point of view only. As a Japanese, I got to do it this way."¹

Nakao and Fujimoto nisei No-Nos expressed themselves as follows. Note the exaggeration in the numbers of those who did appear for their examinations:

Nakao:

"There were some Yes-Yes guys in this block. I hear they have asked for repatriation. I also heard that only two guys showed up for their physicals."²

¹ibid., May 18, 1944, pp. 2-3.

²ibid., May 15, 1944, p. 3.

Fujimoto:

"I don't think there's going to be anyone here who'll be taken, providing he's a repatriate. Of course the Yes-Yes boys showed up. I think they sent out 82 notices and 17 boys, all Yes-Yes showed up for their examinations. One No-No boy showed up too, but he knew his physical condition and knew he'd be refused.

"All they did was come around and pull you in for a couple of hours of routine questioning. Some boys had their suitcases all packed. They asked, 'Where do we go from here?' They (F.B.I.) said, 'You can go home now.'

"One of the kids is in our division. He got pulled in and asked the same questions he was asked on his military questionnaire. He said, 'I'm a Japanese and a repatriate and disloyal.' He signed a statement then to back up what he said and they turned him loose. He thought sure he'd be sent to Leupp.

"The only guys they are going to send to Leupp are the guys in the stockade and I think they ought to go anyway."¹

One incidence of anger shown toward a young man who did report for his physical examination was reported by a Caucasian. A young Japanese working for her suddenly asked for a three day vacation. When she gave it to him without question he revealed the reason. He could not endure the presence of a co-worker who was one of the eleven (?) boys who appeared for his physical examination.²

Although the young men concerned managed to create an impression of stalwart indifference to their fate, there is no reason to suppose that their relatives looked upon the matter with equal stoicism. One young kibe girl, extremely concerned over the possibility that her eighteen year old brother might be sent to prison poured out the following story of her brother's experiences. Having reached military age, he had just been sent his military questionnaire.

¹ibid., May 13, 1944, pp. 3-4.

²ibid., May 14, 1944, p. 3.

"My brother filled out his Military Registration, saying that he was loyal to Japan and would not serve in the United States Army. Unfortunately he did it with red crayon. So the F.B.I. called him in. He showed my brother the red crayon and my brother said, 'Looks bad, doesn't it.'

(This remark was not intended to be impudent. The boy didn't know what else to say.)

"The F.B.I. man said that my brother could be sent to the penitentiary for six years. My brother said he's been locked up in camp two years and it's not so bad. The man said, 'Why do you want to be repatriated?' My brother said, 'My parents are old and I want to be with them.' The F.B.I. man said, 'Before you get back to Japan all of your relatives will be bombed; you'll have no place to go.' He said my brother was a rare case and he would have to be taken to Sacramento. (for trial)

The twenty-seven boys who failed to appear were indicted and tried late in July. The result of the trial will be discussed in the proper chronological place.

Army Installs Uniform gate procedure

At this period the Army, which still maintained sentries at the gate leading from the colony to the administrative section, decided to install a uniform gate procedure, for those evacuees regularly employed in the administrative section, office workers, warehouse workers, hospital employees, domestics, etc. It was decided that each Japanese who passed through the gate daily must carry an identification tag, a blue card, and a large red numbered button. They were required to wear the button on the left lapel. The buttons were $2\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter by actual measurements and a strikingly brilliant red in color. Certain staff members remarked facetiously that they looked exactly like the emblem of the rising sun. The proper distribution of these three separate items caused those members of the Appointed Staff who worked with many colonists under them

¹ibid., May 16, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

considerable inconvenience and there was a great deal of grumbling while the process lasted. Dr. Opler remarked:

"It's really funny. The buttons are great big red affairs that look like the rising sun. The Army's gotten all messed up on the button situation. They gave them out; we didn't. They're trying to work out a gate procedure. I think they should be issued by the head of each worker's office. I've heard Captain Hartman saying, 'There are too many rules for the Japanese. There's got to be one set of rules for all of them.'"¹

For several days after the institution of this new regulation, Japanese passing through the gates were shouted at, and loudly scolded by the sentries if they did not wear their buttons properly.

As far as most evacuees were concerned, the button matter was accepted as merely another inconvenience and, for some, another humiliation. Many said it was silly. After a few strenuous days for the sentries, most people wore their buttons properly. Fujimoto expressed a common attitude:

"This new business about getting off the colony is a pain in the neck. First they give you a little piece of paper with your name, age, etc., on it. Now they picked these up and give you another paper with a number on it. On Monday everybody will have to go through a turnstile and they'll give you a little button which matches the number on your little piece of blue paper. They'll probably try to stop you and see if your button matches the number.

"It's just downright silly. If a man is going to swipe your button he'll swipe your paper too. I could forge one of these in five minutes, anyway."²

Employment Cut

An employment regulation was established on (get date and data from Newell Star of April or May) which limited to two the number of persons allowed to work in each family. A considerable number of complaints were heard: The following is typical:

¹ibid., May 17, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., May 13, 1944, p. 3.

"Things are going pretty good except for the reduction of persons working in the family. In this block there were eight or nine persons who had more than two persons working. In my opinion the administration is making a big mistake by saying that only two people in each family may work, because there are some families who have as many as ten members and they ought to be allowed to have more people working.

"In our block there is a family of seven with three people working. I told the man, when he came to talk to me, that it was not necessary for his daughter to quit. The administration put a notice in the paper which said that if they don't quit by May 20, they are going to send out termination notices."¹

Widespread Rumor of Coming of Exchange Ship

During May and June, a rumor that the coming of another exchange ship might be expected sprang from some undetermined source and seeped the camp. Some persons were so sure they would be selected for this as yet quite unannounced journey that they made preliminary preparations such as attempting to purchase trunks. The rumor persisted for a long period and did not die down until late July. "I", a nisei, whose intent to go to Japan had never been very strong, said:

"There's a rumor that there's another exchange ship on the way. I won't believe that till I hear it on the radio. If it were true, it would be good for the morale of both sides."²

OLD ISSUES

(for American and for Japan).²

While they gave rise to no spectacular manifestations, several resentments of long standing continued to smolder during this period. Evacuees continued to be suspicious of the inu, the old members of the Co-ordinating Committee, Civic Organizations, or the Co-operative Enterprises, in short, any Old Tulean who held a position of prominence and had taken an active part against the status quo. While no action was taken to precipitate re-segregation, many informants told the writer,

¹ibid., May 15, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., May 13, 1944, p. 4.

that it was by no means a dead issue. "It will come up again~~s~~." A considerable number of complaints against certain of the living conditions continued to be made. Complaints about the food, however, were almost never heard.

Inu

Individuals with status quo sympathies were annoyed on several occasions by a system of connivance between the administration and the Civic Organizations (still strongly Old Tulean in character) by which the appointment of ex-stockade internees was ignored and men of less "dangerous" character were selected for certain positions, *such as Block managers.*

When informants complained that a certain Mr. Kamiya, an ex-stockade internee had been selected as block manager by the residents of block 31, and that his appointment had been delayed for three weeks, the writer questioned Mr. Akitsuki, who had taken a position on the Civic Organizations after his resignation. Akitsuki stated that Civic Organizations hesitated to confirm Kamiya's appointment, since he had been a prominent Daihyo Sha Kai member and had, moreover, continued to incite trouble since his release from the stockade.¹

Nakao, a status quo supporter complained bitterly over this matter, although he was not a resident of 31. He also denounced Mr. Furukawa of the Civic Organization. Furukawa an Old Tulean had taken a very prominent part in the anti-status quo movement. Resentments similar to those expressed by Nakao, were probably felt by many residents.

¹ibid., May 16, 1944, p. 2.

"Mr. Miyake was a ward chairman. (Miyake is also an old Tulean, generally unpopular for his supposed pro-administration view.) This man was here during the time of segregation and had his wife and his father leave for Minidoka while he stayed here himself. It may be he's going out.

"So he told Civic he would like them to get a new block manager for 31. So the block people had a meeting....and elected a new manager. He happened to be Mr. Kamiya, the ex-secretary of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

"So they took it up to Civic. It's been three weeks or a month now and Civic hasn't OK'd him. Mr. Miyake is acting as block manager but he doesn't show his face in the block (because he ~~doesn't dare~~). *is so unpopular with the residents of the block.*
 "That isn't right when the people want Mr. Kamiya as block manager. I think they should have him as block manager.

"Furukawa of Civic is good for nothing. I don't think he's capable of sitting in that office. He sent out a notice through Internal Security that all meetings which are to be held in the blocks should be reported to Internal Security 24 hours beforehand. Previous to this, if the meeting was for more than 50 people we had to take out a fire permit and get an OK from the CAS. This new regulation came through Internal Security signed by Furukawa. If he's thinking of the welfare of the people, he wouldn't do that thing. So today in block managers' meeting we shoved it right back at him." *X*

Complaints over Sanitary Facilities and Screens

Several informants stated that the poor condition of the sanitary facilities was giving rise to a great many complaints. As has been stressed before, the general condition of the latrines in the old section of camp was extremely poor. Comparison with the unusually fine facilities provided for the Manzanar group caused additional resentment. It was decided to take the matter up with the Spanish Consul.

Fujimoto gave a vivid description of certain sanitary annoyances:

"There are a lot of complaints over the sanitary facilities. There are lots of complaints over the duck boards in the shower room. They are very slippery and are dangerous. Also there is no place to wash our urinals. In any of the latrines there is no such place. They're squawking like everything.

X Ibid., May 15, 1944, pp. 3,4.

|| A Ward Chairman was a Block manager selected to represent his Ward in the Civic Organizations.

"It's not a very pleasant thing to be brushing your teeth in the morning and have somebody come along and wash out a urinal beside you.

"There doesn't seem to be any such thing as a sanitation committee here. At least we ought to have something for the mess hall employees and things like that."¹

Said Nakao:

"In block managers' meeting today the main factors we are requesting through the Spanish Consul is better sanitary condition. Have you heard about Manzanar?....

"We have no screens here. That is one more point we will ask the Spanish Consul. Some of the Old Tuleans took our screens. Some people who went out took their screens with them."²

FATAL SHOOTING OF SHOICHI OKAMOTO

On Thursday the 24th of May this period of comparative quiet was abruptly ended by the shooting of a Japanese by one of the military police sentries. Shoichi Okamoto, employed in the construction section drove from the project to get lumber which was to be used in construction work and was shot when he returned to the project through the old main entrance. The shooting was witnessed by 15 Japanese and one member of the WRA appointed personnel. The following account is taken from the Coroner's Inquest.

Okamoto was driving his truck to get lumber piled across the highway from the old main gate. He was accompanied by Shiohama, a swamper. Both men carried all necessary identification papers and badges. On leaving the camp, the sentry could see Shiohama's badge but not Okamoto's, because of the high sidedoor of the truck. It is claimed that the sentry asked to see Okamoto's badge in a disagreeable fashion. Okamoto showed his badge, was allowed to

¹ibid., May 13, 1944, pp. 5-6.

²ibid., May 15, 1944, pp. 2, 4.

pass, and after a few minutes returned with his truck load of lumber. On halting at the gate Okamoto stopped the truck and "showed his pass up high." "Don't get fresh," said the sentry, and ordered Okamoto off the truck, commanding Shiohama to drive. Okamoto did not get off the truck immediately and Shiohama remonstrated that he could not drive because he did not have a driver's license. At the sentry's second command, Okamoto got off of the truck, lighting his pipe. Witnesses stated that the soldier began to curse and said, "You and your WRA friends are trying to run this camp."

The sentry cocked his gun and went to the side of the truck where Okamoto was standing. He thereupon ordered Okamoto to go to the back of the truck which would have been outside of the gate. Okamoto hesitated. (His hesitation may have been due to fear of being "shot while trying to escape, say Japanese. On the other hand it may have been a reaction to the commands of the sentry.) The sentry shoved Okamoto with his rifle butt. Okamoto raised his arm. The sentry stepped back a pace and from a distance of three or four feet shot Okamoto through the abdomen. Most witnesses agree that Okamoto raised his arm to ward off the blow. The sentry cursed, swung his rifle in the general direction of the witnesses, the heavy equipment crew standing near by and said, "You people get the hell out of here." The Japanese fled.

The sentry, named Goe, reputed by gossip to be a Chinese, a Hindu or an American Indian, was placed under arrest and an Investigation Board was appointed by Lt. Col. Austin.

Okamoto was hospitalized as soon as possible. According to some eye-witnesses, the sentry would not allow any of the Japanese present to take the truck to call a doctor and a

Japanese ran to call an ambulance on foot.

An operation was performed by Dr. Hashiba, assisted by the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Sleath. Two blood transfusions were administered. Okamoto died the next day May 25, at 12:10 AM. The results of the autopsy performed were described by the doctors at the inquest:

"In the right chest area was this hole which was about one centimeter in diameter and this was a flesh wound that connected to the man's insides. There were some large rents that had been torn through the man's liver and his stomach had been shattered so that when it was first seen at the operation, it was not possible to recognize the pieces as a stomach. The portion of his liver on the left-hand side of the body as I stated before had had his internal contents pushed out through the cavity so it was sticking out and draped on the outside of his body, and this particular material was covered with sticky contents, a portion of which we recognized as spaghetti."¹

IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SHOOTING ON THE COLONISTS

The immediate reaction of the colonists was shock. This was closely followed by an understandable reluctance to pass through the sentry guarded gates on the part of those whose work required that they do so. Many evacuees did not come to work on Friday morning and Okamoto's fellow workers, the construction crew, held a meeting and decided not to come at all. Many meetings were held in the colony. Hostility toward the soldiers who, in the days immediately after the shooting continued to come into the colony and trade at the Co-op stores grew rapidly. The sight of a soldier's uniform was an offense to the over-wrought people.

ACTIVITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION

The night of May 24, no women teachers were allowed to enter the colony to hold their high school classes.² This prohibition,

¹

p. 5.

²R. Hankey, Notes, May 24, 1944, p. 1.

however, was withdrawn the next day. The primary objective of the administration appears to have been an effort to keep the blame for the tragedy from falling on the WRA. An immediate announcement was prepared to be read in the mess halls at the noon meal on Friday, May 25.

The announcement issued in the name of Mr. Best follows:

"I regret very much that one of the center residents was shot yesterday afternoon by a military police sentry and that he died at the center hospital early this morning. Everything was done by the medical staff at the hospital to save his life and a great many people stood ready to give their blood. An investigation is being made by the military and proper disciplinary action will follow. The WRA was in no way responsible for the shooting, and I want you all to know that we regret that it happened. No further statement can be made at this time pending investigation by the Board, but as soon as the facts are available they will be given to the residents in full detail."¹

The same afternoon Mr. Best, Mr. Black, and Mr. Robertson called on the bereaved family. Okamoto was survived by his widowed mother, an older brother and two younger brothers and two sisters. On the appearance of the Caucasians, the entire family is said to have broken down completely.² Several other members of the WRA personnel, in particular teachers who had Okamoto's younger brothers or sisters in their classes also called on the family. One Caucasian who had just lost his own son called, taking a picture of his dead son with him. Okamoto's mother kissed the picture and dragged out her Shoichi's clothes to show the visitor.³

Mr. Best also placed two automobiles at the disposal of the family and a special car was sent to Heart Mountain to bring

¹Report of the Investigation Committee on the Shoichi Okamoto Incident, July 3, 1944, p. 8.

²R. Hankey, Notes, May 25, 1944, p. 4.

³ibid., May 27, 1944, p. 6.

relatives to the funeral. Employment compensation papers were immediately filed.

The colonists' fear of passing the sentries at the gate was also promptly dealt with by stationing both Caucasian and Japanese members of the WRA police department at the gates. Three days after the shooting the attitude of the sentries had changed remarkably. They no longer shouted and bullied evacuees passing through the gates because of misplaced badges, nor were their rifles in evidence. On the afternoon of May 27, they remained within the sentry box. This policy had an immediate calming effect. After they were assured adequate protection, the members of the construction crew met and on the afternoon of May 25 and decided to return to work.

IMMEDIATE ATTITUDES OF INFORMANTS

The reactions of informants seen immediately after the news of Okamoto's death was announced varied from controlled but deeply felt anger to almost hysterical rage. Some people advised their friends and neighbors to keep cool until the true facts were announced. After all, said they, Okamoto might have been at fault. A statement released by Secretary Ickes on the morning of May 25 (?) which absolved Okamoto from blame, created some satisfaction but was also regarded as proof that the soldier would be considered guilty

Insert statement here if it can be procured.

K. an older nisei and World War veteran was so moved that when discussing the occurrence with the writer he almost broke down. On May 25, after the announcement had been made in the mess halls he said:

"I heard quite a lot of criticism about it, but one thing surprises me: the people are very calm. There is quite a lot of resentment, but they are not excited. The people are saying, 'Let's be cool and know more about it before we take any action. We must not make any rash judgment until we know the facts completely.' The colony itself is taking it calmly.

"You might find hot heads may start to agitate. But we must be fair. Mr. Best is not responsible.

"We had an announcement here at noon in English and Japanese. As I say, they were very calm. The Japanese could take it. They'll take it more than any other race.

"From the information that has been gathered, of course, I don't know it looks as if the soldier used too rash judgment in using his gun."¹

A young nisei girl contacted at the same time also said that the people were pretty calm but that they were talking a great deal and had had a meeting that morning. "They do not as yet know who was right, but think the soldier was too quick with his gun."²

Fujimoto's wife, a nisei said:

"The people are angry about it. But we heard over the radio that Secretary Ickes said that it was the soldier's fault, that he (the soldier) was going to hit him (Okamoto) on the head. That made the people feel better.

"They were all angry around here but nobody knew what it was all about. Some were saying, 'Well, maybe he got fresh.' But now ever Secretary Ickes blames that M. P."³

Another young nisei girl, a friend of the writer, was almost in tears. She felt that the announcement made at the mess hall sounded as if WRA were trying to avoid responsibility.

"It was Mr. Best's fault for bringing in the Military in the first place. They're meeting in there (Civic Organization's Office) now."

She also stated that she was convinced that even if the soldier were convicted he would be freed soon after. She had

¹ibid., May 25, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., pp. 2-3.

³ibid., p. 3.

heard that the soldier who did the shooting at Topaz was seen stationed at Gila the next year. "Don't you think the WRA ought to give the man's family some compensation," she added.

A young man told Mr. Robertson that the colony was going to demand that Mr. Best resign. "How can they do that?" asked Robertson, "Mr. Best had nothing to do with this." Well," replied the young man, "If it weren't for Mr. Best, the military wouldn't be in control and this wouldn't have happened."¹

Late in the afternoon of May 25 Mr. Best called a brief staff meeting. He stated that the incident was very regrettable and that the staff was apt to be confronted with a situation similar to that of November 4 when the newspapers had presented distorted reports which took a long time to repress. "This might be the spark which would start another incident." He reassured the staff that the absence of evacuees from their jobs during the day had not been a strike; the people were waiting to be reassured that there was no danger in their coming through the gates. The next day, members of the police force, both Caucasian and Japanese were to be stationed at gate 3. Patrol cars were to move among the workers on the farms and a patrol car was assigned to follow the garbage detail. He asked for the co-operation of the staff and assured them that they would be adequately protected.

He announced also that a Board of Inquiry had been appointed by the military and that WRA headquarters had requested that WRA be represented on this board by a member of its personnel. Mr. Black was to fill this position. He closed with the statement

¹ibid., p. 2.

that it would be the policy of the administration to release all information to the colony as soon as it was released by the Military.

Mr. Markley, the reports officer, then read a statement which warned the staff not to discuss the shooting, to refrain from personal comment and to keep in mind that it "was the right of 'these people' to express themselves as long as the expression did not result in violence."¹

On leaving the meeting the following remark was overheard, coming from one of the male staff members, "Proper disciplinary action will be taken, Huh! They're convicting the boy before he's heard."² Mr. Best was also criticized by some staff members "for telling them nothing."

As for the meeting of the Board of Inquiry which took place the evening of May 25, no information was ever released.

The evening of May 25 Dr. Opler expressed himself as very pleased with the manner in which Best had so far handled the difficult situation. Opler also stated that it was he who had advised Best to give the Okamotos the two automobiles for their use and to place WRA members of Internal Security at the gate.

The Coroner's Inquest also took place the evening of May 25. When the decision of the jury that the sentry had shot Okamoto "while in line of duty" was released in the newspapers the next day, it caused a great deal of resentment. Many persons at first considered it the final verdict, confusing it with the Court Martial.

¹ibid., pp. 5-6.

²ibid., p. 6.

On May 26, the Newell Star released an account of the shooting, a statement by Mr. Best and a statement by Okamoto's elder brother. The account of the shooting stressed that Col. Austin had ordered the sentry placed under arrest and appointed a Board of Investigation and that "these steps were being taken by the military who are solely responsible for the investigation of the facts in the case." Mr. Best's statement was a repetition of the announcement he had made in the mess halls with the additional information that every effort had been made to save Okamoto's life. Okamoto's brother asked for an unbiased investigation of the circumstances surrounding the shooting and full justice meted, "although he hoped that there would be no undue disturbance within the center over the affair."

EVACUEE ATTITUDES EXPRESSED MAY 27 and 28.

Compiling attitudes during this period was a difficult and delicate task. Five contacts were attempted. One man, K., found the subject too painful to discuss. However, at three homes, family members and friends were present and it was possible to note a considerable number of opinions and reactions.

Yamaguchi, a kibeï was contacted in the presence of his kibeï wife and a kibeï male friend. He stressed that WRA's 'attempt to avoid responsibility' was having a very bad effect on the people. "They think if WRA's not responsible that's bad. Who is responsible?" He stated that he had a good deal of business to transact in the Administrative Quarters but he was not going to risk going through the gates. His wife remarked that the sight of soldiers patrolling the camp with machine guns was offensive. Neither Yamaguchi nor his wife anticipated that the

people would make any demonstration. "What can we do?" he said bitterly, "We're only Japs. All we can do is take it." He added that he had heard that only a few days ago an issei had been hit on the head by a soldier when going out of gate 3. He had not understood English and had not obeyed some order made by the soldier.¹

At a large family group visited on May 28, the shooting was discussed at length. Everyone present agreed that the soldiers should stay out of camp. Every time the people see them they feel worse. Trouble might occur, the men agreed, but "everything would depend on the verdict." "If the soldier was acquitted," said a young kibeï, "the best thing WRA could do to avoid trouble would be to tear down the fence. Then trouble might not start. It would be all right to have the military at the main gate, but at the other gates - No." Those present were indignant about some of the accounts which had appeared in the newspapers. "Some papers said that Okamoto had tried ju-jitsu on the soldier." One young man present asked the writer if she thought it possible that the soldier might be given a heavy sentence and then sent some place else and released. When told that this was a difficult question to answer he asked another, "If the soldier were given a heavy sentence and sent away to serve a light one, would the soldiers here at Tule Lake know about that or would they think he had received the heavy sentence?"²

Fujimoto, a nisei friend of long standing had no hesitation about speaking of the shooting or of its effect upon the people.

¹ibid., May 28, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., p. 4.

His reaction to the nervous strain was quite American. He made several cynical humorous remarks at which all present laughed immoderately.

"Best has called a center-wide holiday on the day of the funeral. (A half-holiday was actually called.) They are also going to have a wake at the high-school. That's a darn good idea. It would be more or less ironical to give the fellow a military burial - being as he's a repatriate and a No-No.

"A lot of how this goes is going to depend on how WRA handles it between now and the time the verdict is released. If WRA can prove to the people that they are sincere in their belief that the man who was shot was of no fault, and that they did their best to get justice, then things might quiet down. But if they exonerate the man completely, there's going to be a blow-off. They'll have to build a double fence around the administration section.

"The smartest thing WRA could do is to start impressing the people now that the Military is more concerned than WRA. After all, the man was a soldier. Under these conditions it comes under the jurisdiction of the War Department.

"When the announcement was made in our mess everybody took it as a matter of course. Knowing the Military of Japan, they know how it was. The local and civilian authorities have to step into the background.

"The smartest thing to do would be to give the man twenty years and send him to jail. Send him to jail anyway and pardon him after three or four years.

"After all, he (Okamoto) was unarmed. If I were the sentry and had two rifles and automatic pistols I wouldn't shoot him. I'd bat him on the head with the rifle.

On Mr. Best's visit to the Okamoto family and his decision to grant permission for a public funeral, Fujimoto said:

"He's learned a lot. He had to. He's more sensible with the people now. The Japanese people are appreciative of that, especially when it's an order given by the Project Director. It will mean more than any 500 or 600 words he can say.

"On the other hand, there are people who talk like this: 'Well, we can't expect justice from the Army here inasmuch as we are disloyal Japs and their enemies. If that's the case and the man is exonerated, all we can do is learn his name and remember it until after the war and see which side wins.' They want to bring it up at the peace conference.

"Another faction says: 'You won't hear anymore about this until after the war.' By that time they hope the people will have forgotten about it. Personally, I think if they drag it out and hope people will forget, I think there will be a lot less ruckus if they just come right out with it, even if he is exonerated.

"You look at it this way. This is what affects people now. If that can happen and the man is exonerated, that will give the M. P.'s the impression that the lives of the Japs in here are not worth a hell of a lot. That's just asking for more shooting. Heck, I might walk through that gate next morning and the guy will take a shot at me. I'm dead. That's not going to help me any.

"I feel this way. He's gone. I can't bring him back to life.

"I heard that Austin had sent a special car to Heart Mountain to bring his relatives in for the funeral. That's the least they could do.

"It all depends on what the verdict is.

"The newspaper stories try to give the impression that the man misinterpreted the sentry's orders.

"There's one thing they're going to have to look out for. What will Japan do about this? They're liable to figure that ten Americans are worth one Jap. Pretty soon each side will be seeing who can kill them (prisoners or internees) off faster."

Fujimoto concluded with the remark that the lid might blow off the camp in two hours. If that happened the safest place for Caucasians would be inside the colony, at a Japanese friend's home.¹

Another nisei, "M", about 28 years old, was far more excited than Fujimoto. "M" was at this time employed on Dr. Opler's staff and had been busily gathering eye-witness accounts of the shooting. From these accounts he had prepared a report which he entitled, "Murder at Tule Lake." He also stressed the peoples' "hostility to the uniform." "Everytime they see a soldier driving through camp in their armored cars it makes their blood boil."

¹ibid., May 27, 1944, pp. 5-6.

He was convinced that if the soldier were not punished promptly and justly, the results "would be terrible." According to data "M" had gathered, the sentry, Goe, had been rude to evacuees passing through the gate for some time. The Japanese had commented on the difference between his attitude and that of the sentry who preceded him and had come to the conclusion that Goe "had it in for the Japs." On one occasion (it was said) he had shouted at an issei because the man had his badge on the wrong side of his jacket. The issei, not understanding, had attempted to pass, whereupon Goe had hit him on the back of the head with the butt of his pistol. "M" had prepared an account of the shooting from eye-witness reports which he allowed the writer to read. The gist of it is presented here from memory. The chief significance of this account is that it is probably the version which was spread through camp and believed by the majority of the colonists. It will be noted that it agrees substantially with the statement given to the Spanish Consul by the Investigating Committee.

"When Okamoto approached the gate, driving the truck, the sentry waved at him. Okamoto interpreted this as a signal to stop. The soldier then approached him, cursed at him and ordered him to get out of the truck. Okamoto got out of the truck reluctantly. The soldier then ordered him to walk outside the fence. Okamoto did so hesitantly and the soldier made as if to strike him with the butt of his rifle. Okamoto raised his arms and the soldier shot him in the stomach at the range of three feet. Okamoto screamed and fell to the ground writhing and clutching his stomach. The soldier reloaded his rifle and lighted a cigarette. The other Japanese present looked on amazed. Then the soldier said, "Get the hell out of here or I'll shoot you too." The men ran to the hospital to get the ambulance. While they were gone another truck (a lumber truck) drew up to the gate. Seeing that the man on the ground was a Japanese one of the men in this truck attempted to get out. The soldier shouted at him, "Get back! Get the hell out of here."¹

¹ ibid., pp.12-

Comment

From the above statements it may be implied that a considerable proportion of the colonists were of the opinion that serious trouble might arise almost instantly, particularly if the soldier were exonerated. "It all depends on the verdict," was a general conclusion. Some criticized WRA's obvious attempt to evade all responsibility, while "I", always practical, praised this administrative move as good policy. In spite of the fact that personnel from the Internal Security had been stationed at the gates, several informants stated that they were going to keep away from gates, since, as they expressed it, "If WRA is not responsible for us, what's to keep the sentries from shooting us down too?" An understandable hostility to the soldiers, aggravated by their continued appearance inside the fence, was expressed by most people. Moreover, the suspicion that the sentry would be given a sentence which he would not be forced to serve, appeared to be fairly common. If "I"'s account of attitudes is reliable, as the writer believes it to be, some of the colonists were already predicting two days after Okamoto's death and that the soldier would be acquitted that the Army would not release this information until such a time as feeling had died down in camp.

ATTITUDES OF THE CAUCASIAN PERSONNEL

Many of the members of the appointed personnel were almost as angry and disturbed than the Japanese. The details of the shooting, particularly the fact that Okamoto had been shot down at a range of three feet were repeated with exclamations of horror and disgust. From Mr. Best down, the majority of the staff members appeared to be deeply moved and sincerely regretful.

Only a few remarked that Okamoto may have been impudent to the sentry. Many of the teachers who had to pass through the gate on their way to school expressed a hostility to the soldiers very similar to that of the evacuees. The only genuinely inconsiderate remark overheard was made by a not too well balanced staff member employed in the hospital. She stated.

"When Okamoto was brought in the Japanese standing around were just praying for him to die and don't kid yourself." When another person present expressed sympathy for the soldiers, the same informant said: "Don't give them any sympathy. They had all made up their minds that if this fellow is found guilty, they'd all start shooting up a few Japs. Then they (the military authorities) couldn't do anything to the whole company."¹ Later the writer herself heard a soldier make the same threat.

When a week passed with no sign of uprising from the colony the majority of the staff relaxed considerably and after the funeral little tension was apparent.

DIVISIONAL RESPONSIBLE MEN ATTEMPT TO FORM WORKERS' ORGANIZATION

A few days after the shooting a very interesting attempt to reenter the political scene was made by the supposedly disbanded Divisional Responsible Men. This group had led in breaking the status quo in December and January. Ex-Co-ordinating Committee members took the leading part in this activity, in fact, K. Okamoto, an ex-member, was chairman of the meeting. The group conceived the idea of forming a workers' organization "for the protection and security of the workers." The proposed body was purported to be entirely unpolitical in character.

¹ibid., -May-27, -pp-2-3, -6.

¹ibid., June 1, 1944, p. 2.

The divisional workers themselves were not consulted.

Mr. Kondo on behalf of the Construction crew and Mr. Nishioka, head of the Motor Pool reported that they had consulted Mr. Best and requested a guarantee of safety to all evacuees passing through the gates. Mr. Best had replied that a "guarantee" might not be possible but he would do his best.

Thereupon, Mr. Yamatani "in view of the present incident and in view of the lack of a central representative body" pointed out "the pressing need for a workers' organization for the protection and security of the workers." Some persons suggested that the organization of this body be withheld until the divisional workers had been consulted, however, it was decided that this was not necessary. A temporary committee was appointed to lay the matter before Mr. Best.

When this committee interviewed Mr. Best he chose to regard their project as political in nature and refused them permission to form such a body if they expected it to be recognized by the administration. Toward informal workers' representative bodies he had no objection. From the minutes of this interview it is apparent that Mr. Best realized the unpopularity of the members of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Divisional Responsible Men, stating that their attempt to form even a temporary body might divide the colony again. Considering the temper of the people at this time, his refusal to grant recognition was wise. The minutes state that "as a whole, the recommendations (of the Divisional Responsible Men) were accepted and put into practice, such as the stationing of the Colonial Police at the entrance of the Gate." This suggestion, it should be noted, did not

originate with the Divisional Responsible Men, but was put into practice the day after the shooting on the recommendation of the Construction Crew Workers with the support of several members of the administration.

Considering the dislike and suspicion with which Yamatani, Akitsuki, Okamoto and Takahashi were regarded by most colonists at this time, it is difficult to understand how they dared risk placing themselves in any position of public prominence. It is possible, of course, that they were not conscious of the extent of their unpopularity, or if they were, that they considered the opinions of the ordinary colonists of little consequence. This group and the prominent officers of the Co-operative Enterprises have been described by Caucasians and Japanese who know them well as feeling themselves superior to the "rest of the dumb Japs." Perhaps they looked upon their unsavory reputations as the inevitable result of their prominence in the colony.

In any case, the group was injured and angry at Mr. Best's refusal. Miss Tanaka described their indignation:

"Because of this shooting they wanted to make some sort of a labor organization to protect the workers. Mr. Best said he was really distressed over the incident but politics should not be involved in the funeral; it should be a purely religious matter, purely a matter of paying tribute to the deceased.

"Mr. Shimada, Mr. Yamatani, and Mr. Akitsuki say, 'No matter how hard we work and how much we try to do for the people we are always called inu. So we might as well leave the place alone and let it burn up.'"¹

In reference to the attitude of the people she quoted a saying in Japanese which is similar to the English expression, "They bite the hand that feeds them."

¹ibid., June 15, 1944, pp. 1, 4.

THE OKAMOTO FUNERAL

The arrangements for Shoichi Okamoto's funeral were undertaken by the ward chairmen. A funeral committee of block managers and representatives of the Construction and Motor Pool department handled the details. The entire center is said to have contributed to the funeral expenses, a certain part of which, as is usual, were borne by WRA. A wake service was held in the high school on May 30, the evening preceding the funeral and some 1,200 people are said to have attended.

The day of the funeral, May 31, was unpleasantly cold and a drizzling rain fell intermittently. The funeral was held on the outdoor stage. The report made to the Spanish Consul states that 6,000 persons attended, but Mr. Robertson estimated the number as nearer 4,000. The administration wished some photographs of the occasion but was dubious as to how this might be received by the people. Mr. Hucyke was given the task because he was thought to be well known in the colony. The photographs were taken without incident. Mr. Best and other high ranking members of the appointed personnel attended. The description of the funeral and the text of Mr. Best's speech as reported in the Newell Star follows:

RESIDENTS PAY SOLEMN TRIBUTE AT FINAL RITES FOR OKAMOTO

Outdoor funeral Attended by 9000

Nine thousand people stood bareheaded for hours in a chill wind and a drizzle of rain Wednesday afternoon to pay lasting tribute to the memory of Shoichi James Okamoto, martyred victim of a shooting which Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes termed "completely unwarranted and without provocation on the part of the victim."

Thousands came from all parts of the center, in spite of the cold discomfort, to stand with bowed heads in tribute to the deceased. At the same time they were expressing a protest

against the hate and intolerance engendered by this war. Men and women, young and old, mothers with babies in their arms, thus offered sympathy to the bereaved family. Every person present was moved by sorrow.

Mr. Asamitsu Okutake was the chairman for the service. Mr. Iwao Namekawa gave a graphic testimonial on the history of the late Shoichi Okamoto, an account of the making a true Japanese who had had the best of life still before him. Words of condolence on behalf of the center residents was given by Mr. Kazumi Kawaoka.

In deep silence broken by the wind, the Rev. Senzo Sasaki conducted the final rites assisted by all other Buddhist reverends in the center. Incense offerings were made by various organizations, departments, and ward representatives.

MESSAGE

Project Director Ray R. Best extended a memorial address in behalf of the administration. He said, "I wish to express regret that this unhappy event has occurred. I have already assured the young man's family on behalf of the administration that all in our power will be done to assist them in their hour of grief.

"The community is to be commended for the help that it has given the bereaved family and for the public expression of sympathy. The spirit shown during the past few days gives me confidence that we have learned to live under the difficult and complex conditions that prevail in this center."

REACTIONS TO MR. BEST'S SPEECH AND THE FUNERAL

Undoubtedly Mr. Best's speech which he delivered with sincere and honest feeling was a gesture of extreme significance in dissipating resentment toward the WRA. The fact that the project director appeared in person, making a speech which happily fit into the colonists's concept of good taste, impressed some persons deeply. Less emotional individuals praised it as a first rate political gesture. Enemies of Mr. Best or persons who bore him a grudge of long standing were not impressed but they were not able to affect the general good effect materially. Immediately after the speech, Best received a number of letters of appreciation. The dignified funeral, the presence of high ranking members of the appointed personnel and the respect

shown the deceased by granting the half holiday were also appreciated.

The day after the funeral two nisei girls gave a glowing account of the funeral. "At least 5,000 people were there; Mr. Best made a speech and the flowers were wonderful. . . It went off very well." The second girl remarked, "He was lucky to have such a nice funeral," and then stopped in embarrassment. The first girl then added, "It is going to be bad though if the soldier is acquitted. The people are just waiting to hear."¹

K. was deeply impressed:

"I felt happy that he came and made that talk. Not to do it would have made the people suspicious. I felt very good about it. Undoubtedly he created a better feeling by coming than by staying away.

"The Japanese people thought sure he would send Mr. Black or Mr. Robertson and that Mr. Best wouldn't come. They were surprised. He has regained some confidence. Coming in and speaking showed courage.

"I've heard that the boy (Okamoto) was a very good boy. Many times as he was going in and out of the gate he noticed the boys with him making sarcastic remarks. He expressed his opinion in this way: he told the boys not to be sarcastic. The soldiers were on duty and were performing the duty as they were told. 'If you continue to antagonize the soldiers,' he said, 'something may happen.' Then he had to get it himself.

"Sometimes I wonder if there's a God in the world.

"It's the reflection on the United States Army. The Military Police should be the model for the Army. Here they are acting, how should I say, rather rudely."²

Yamaguchi, a kibel, was not impressed by Mr. Best's gesture. He implied that many people, especially the issei, understood "why Mr. Best had made such a fine speech."

"He's good now, but think what happened last time (farm accident). He's learned. . . Now he has confidence in their behaving peacefully.

¹ibid., June 1, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., June 3, 1944, p. 1.

"I was glad the light (public address system) didn't go off. Last time he spoke it did go off and he felt very bad.

At the same interview Yamaguchi asked if it were true that Robertson was going to be project director. He also remarked, "If there is trouble, I won't mind. I'll get a kick out of watching it."¹

Fujimoto, while not particularly moved by Mr. Best's gesture, gave Mr. Best credit for the manner in which he had conducted himself:

"I will have to give the man credit. He really has done his best. I didn't go to the funeral myself. But he attended the funeral and called the half holiday. Reading the speech, it didn't seem much different than the notice he sent to the mess halls. I thought it was a darn good idea as far as he was concerned. If that was the full text of the speech I think he's pretty smart. He said just enough, no more. He didn't lay it on too thick.

"He's more popular now than he has been since the beginning of the camp.

"Regardless of why he did it, the fact stands that he did do it. That's what you have to give the man credit for. It couldn't all have been prompted through selfishness. I don't believe a man who wrote that speech could be entirely selfish. He could have stayed at home and let one of his stooges come down."

At this time Fujimoto no longer believed that the shooting would cause trouble in camp. Yet he still stressed the importance of the verdict. "All the goon squad members are resting peacefully in the stockade. If the verdict is bad, things may change." He also remarked upon the change of attitude of the sentries at the gate:

"We've got some nice boys at the gate now. There used to be some guys who'd make you step out, drive the truck through the gate and then get back in. They're pretty good now."²

¹ ibid., pp. 2, 3.

² ibid., June 4, 1944, pp. 4, 5.

Okamoto, a conservative individual admired the speech but was not moved by it:

"He (Mr. Best) was thinking of the future of the center, particularly of the safety and security. I said to myself, 'He's quite a diplomat.' He made a very intelligent speech. If he had made the wrong kind of speech, it would have meant more trouble. He chose his words very carefully."

Speaking of this period at a later date Okamoto said:

"There was unrest, particularly among the young boys. They were quite excited. But there was nothing they could do. If they start trouble, something will happen. I know lots of people had good experience in the last incident. They don't want any more trouble. If they start trouble, the same thing will happen."¹

Mr. Yamashita an ex-Santa Fe internee and a leader of the underground pressure group was most cynical about the administration's police during the funeral. Note his illogical statements on the funeral expenses:

"As you know, the shooting took place in such a manner that it was liable to cause almost any kind of trouble with grave consequence. But with the experience of the past, residents of this center kept themselves very quiet, knowing themselves how serious a matter it was. The administration has done a very marvelous way of taking the matter very cautiously, trying to calm the feelings of the residents.

"The question of sincereness and sympathy to the family, in my opinion, on the part of the Administration is doubtful. But they have worked in a very very wise way to prevent some incident which might occur. Leaving the funeral to be a camp funeral was done very excellently and that I appreciate and admire. The administration was wise in persuading the residents to perform the public funeral. That was one of the reasons which should be considered important in calming down the feelings of the people. Mr. Best was very wise in making the funeral so big. It made people feel very good, with the expense of the residents.

"If this was a public funeral, which the administration sincerely recognized it, it should have paid part of the funeral expense from the government or the administration.

¹ ibid., June 20, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

"The committee who represented the funeral was more or less pulled in as tools of Mr. Best. If I had been a man on that responsible committee to perform the funeral I would certainly have discussed the matter with Mr. Best, so at least a certain part of the funeral would have been paid by the administration. This time they paid exactly the same amount as for any other funeral, \$173.00.

"Enough for the coffin," interjected his wife.¹

The following letter written by Okamoto on June 5 is an interesting, if involved expression of public sentiment. In complicated phrases, Okamoto expresses the confusion of the more thoughtful colonists over general WRA policy and particularly on the important point of which body, WRA or the Army, was responsible for their protection. In keeping with all other informants at this time, he remarks that "the colony is eagerly waiting with great expectation for the official announcement of the truth."

Generally speaking, the attitude and sentiment of the colony toward shooting incident is very quiet and does not make sharp and strong criticism in comparison to the last year's incident. It seems to give me a hint that on account of the past experienced troublesome period, the colonists are acting much more sensibly and observing the present existing condition with the eyes of great interest.

As far as I can observe the present existing public sentiment, I (think) there will be no public disturbance or see the slightest tendency of trouble and pressure group. However, it appears to me that the colonists have received considerable shock and a tendency of great anger toward thoughtless cruel barbaric in-human being attitude of the military police.

Okamoto went on to say that at the last regular ward meeting a Block Manager had "brought up the sincere hope" that the WRA would hereafter take proper measures to ensure the safety of the evacuees. Okamoto also stated that since the November incident the authority of the center had been complicated and confused: "To the best of my knowledge we seem to have two authorities,

¹ ibid., June 14, 1944, p. 1.

WRA and the Army." Since Mr. Best had stated that the WRA was not responsible, "the colony naturally thinks the Army will take the fullest measurement for responsibility of shooting."

"The most significant part which is miscomprehended and contradict our minds is whether the Army has authority or not within the barbed wire fence . . . From time to time I hear the people saying that the Army has no authority within the barbed wire fence whatever, and WRA has the fullest power to control the entire center. The people feel the Army is supposed not to stay in the boundary of WRA. This sounds very reasonable but we do not know what degree is the truth. . .

"The colony sincerely hope that either one of them must take responsibility, otherwise we will have no authority to conform (to) and to protect our safety and security.

"With the most prudent attitude and the greatest interest, the colony is observing the progress of the present affairs and those false communication and broadcasting over radio deeply degrade the public morale and extremely irritate the public sentiment and anger. As the most typical characteristic of the Orient races, especially, Japanese has a great tendency toward excitement, irritation and judge things sentimentally. In consideration of these facts I sincerely hope that the authority take thorough steps for the investigation and the justice will be done for a better solution. Also I have confidence that the colony is eagerly waiting with great expectation for the official announcement of the truth."

Agitation after the Funeral

Immediately after the funeral a certain Mr. Kira, who was at this time working behind the scene in the Resegregation Group made a rash threat in the presence of a group of his followers, stating that if the sentry who shot Okamoto were acquitted, some Caucasian would pay for this with his life. The threat leaked out and caused some concern among the residents. The administration knew nothing of this particular attempt to use the Okamoto shooting as an incentive to make trouble and, so far as the writer knows, never heard of the threat. When the soldier was exonerated by the Court Martial, more than a month after the funeral, and the threat was not carried out, Mr. Kira is reputed to have lost face.

Administrative Attitudes

Once the ordeal of the funeral speech was over and the complimentary and grateful letters from some evacuees were received, Mr. Best lost much of the anxiety under which he had suffered since the shooting. He decided to allow the Okamoto family to read the report of the Coroner's Inquest so that they might see for themselves the testimony which had resulted in the verdict that the soldier had shot "in line of duty." Mr. Best remarked that the chief Japanese witness had become badly confused at the trial and had given conflicting and confused testimony. Mr. Best invited the family to his office to read the report and stated that he would let them study it all day if they cared to. He had been much impressed by the character and intelligence of the Okamoto family and felt that it was largely due to their attitude and the voluntary statement made by Okamoto's brother that agitation had been held to a minimum. He realized, however, that a Court Martial verdict of acquittal might cause serious trouble in camp.

Many of the members of the appointed staff were leaning to the opinion that the soldier would be acquitted. This attitude was strengthened by a young woman employee in the Statistics Section who spread the story that she had sent the Court Martial acquittal verdict to Washington. Since the Court Martial had not yet been held, this was obviously false. The young woman may have seen a report on the Board of Inquiry meeting of May 25. However, her story carried weight with many staff members and caused much concern over what the Japanese might do when this "news" reached them.¹

¹ibid., June 4, 1944, pp. 1-2.

What effect allowing the family to read the report of the Coroner's Inquest had is not known. However, either from this report or from other Japanese witnesses, a rumor spread in the camp and almost resulted in the beating of Mr. Shiohama, whose testimony had been unfavorable to Okamoto. This rumor which appeared in mid-June held that Shiohama had testified that Okamoto had attempted to strike the soldier. A group of young men met and discussed beating up the witness. These self appointed vigilantes, however, were not themselves convinced of the truth of the rumor. The wife of one young man said, "They cannot believe that a Japanese would do such a thing."¹ The young witness was not beaten.

Early in June an intoxicated evacuee, said to be a quiet good-natured fellow when sober, attacked a soldier with a meat cleaver. The soldier was generally reputed to be a decent fellow and the act was quite unprovoked. The soldier was not injured seriously and the attacker was given a jail sentence. No informant expressed any resentment over this incident although Fujimoto feared that it might stimulate a camp-wide search for sake stills which might annoy the people.² (The evacuee was rumored to have become intoxicated on "boot-leg sake.") No such search was made at this time.

COMMITTEE ORGANIZED ON REQUEST OF SPANISH EMBASSY

Early in June the Spanish Embassy requested the administration that a committee of Tule Lake representative residents prepare a complete report on the Okamoto shooting which report, it was understood, would be used by the Spanish Consul in his

¹ibid., June 19, 1944, pp. 1-2.

²ibid., June 9, 1944, p. 1.

report to the Japanese government. The Consul's request was announced at a meeting by Mr. Black. The colonists' reactions were mixed. Most persons were indifferent, believing that nothing much would come of it. However, members of the pressure group were definitely hostile to the suggestion, suspecting that this proposed committee might be used by the administration as evidence that a "representative" committee did exist at Tule Lake, an eventuality which the pressure group, still stalwartly supporting the interned Negotiating Committee, wished to avoid at all costs. The fact that the proposal was announced by a member of the administration added fuel to this suspicion.

A meeting was held June 12 and committee members elected from each ward. Some block meetings were held previous to this date. The reaction to one was observed. While calling at Fujimoto's home, his sister came in and asked him if he were going to the meeting. "No," he replied, "I don't go to any of those meetings."¹

On June 14, Yamaguchi who was not a member of the pressure group, related that Mr. Black had suggested the formation of a group of issei to comply with the request of the Spanish Consul. He implied that since the suggestion had come from the administration the people were looking askance at the whole thing. He said there was a rumor that the ex-members of the Co-ordinating Committee were taking a prominent part in the formation of the committee, and that people feared it might turn out to be an extension of the Co-ordinating Committee.² On June 19,

¹ibid., June 10, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., June 14, 1944, pp. 2-3.

Mrs. Matsuda, an active agitator voiced the same sentiment. She said that the people were very angry "at the administration's move to put a selected group on the Committee to see the Spanish Consul." They blamed Mr. Black for this.¹ Dr. Opler corroborated this suspicion and clarified the part of the ex-Coordinating Committee members:

"The committee to meet the Spanish Consul has been set up from the wards. The trouble is they have set up a sub-committee and very prominent on the list are the names, Yamatani, Akitsuki, and Okamoto. I don't like those guys on it. It looks as if Akitsuki is sticking out his neck again.

"The Spanish Consul wants to meet with a spokesman group. Maybe he's a little afraid for his own safety."²

Better informed and less prejudiced Japanese, like "K", took a more reasonable view of the matter and stated that the committee had been formed of responsible and trustworthy men. "K" gave an amusing description of how the ex-Coordinating Committee member's attempt to regain prominence had been received at the meeting:

"Yamatani, Akitsuki, and Okamoto were told right to their faces that the people didn't want them. . . Mr. Yamatani proposed before a certain body that if they would consent to allow him to negotiate with the Spanish Consul, he would do it gladly. He was told right then. . .

"They (ex-Coordinating Committee members) are conscious of what is going on, but they are looking for personal glory. They may want to tell the Japanese government that they represented Tule Lake and met the Spanish Consul to right the wrongs they have already committed. . .

"The negotiations are to be conducted by men who are already elected. They are prominent people whom the people trust."³

Mrs. "F", an intelligent older nisei, also expressed her confidence in the group which was selected. They had been

¹ibid., June 19, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., June 15, 1944, p. 6.

³ibid., June 17, 1944, p. 1.

elected and it was all right. She added, however, that the men elected had taken the job unwillingly and that some of them wanted to resign. "It is all because of the men in the stockade. The camp will never be at peace until that is settled."¹

A few days later Yamaguchi stated that nobody was taking the Spanish Consul Committee very seriously. In fact, said he, nobody trusted the Spanish Consul anymore, even though he was supposed to look after the Japanese. "Everybody thinks the Okamoto case is a washout. Since everybody is saying that the chief Japanese witness said that Okamoto tried to attack the soldier, there is no chance for a verdict of guilty. After all, if Okamoto did attack the sentry, the sentry had a right to shoot him."²

Okamoto, a conservative block manager either did not know of the attempt of some of the ex-Coordinating Committee members to get a prominent place on the Spanish Consul Committee or he chose not to mention it. He also expressed the opinion that the establishment of the Investigation Committee would have a calming effect on the people.

"I attended this meeting. As you know, the Japanese government has a great interest in this case. They have requested the Spanish Consul to make a detailed report and he has asked for a committee to make the detailed report to him. So, since the members of the Co-ordinating Committee had resigned, there were no representatives for the people. So, since nobody had responsibility, they suggested that each block send a spokesman who was a Japanese national.

"Then, June 4th (?) we had an election. Some blocks elected a man and some blocks just send an observer to the meeting. All were Japanese nationals, mostly issei.

¹ ibid., June 21, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., June 23, 1944, p. 1.

"Then they elected officers, president, etc. This committee is just temporary and they decided to disband after the completion of the investigation. Some of the people suggested at the meeting that they might remain as permanent Japanese spokesmen for the people, but I believe in the present situation, they hesitate to elect permanent delegates.

"They named eight men for the committee. There were no Co-ordinating Committee members on that. This committee was recognized officially by the approval of Mr. Best.

"Everybody is afraid of the future and they didn't want it to be permanent."

"It seems to me that very few people know about the details of how this was done (Okamoto shooting). They can't get the true facts. Besides they're afraid of the stockade. It's no use to fight against the administration. Everybody just keeps their mouth shut and quiet. . . .

"And besides that, the Investigating Committee has been established and the people also believe WRA and the Army are taking care of it. The committee just started their investigation last week."¹

A very interesting account of the sentiment of the underground resegregation group on this matter was given by Yamashita, an ex-Santa Fe internee from Poston and a leader of the pressure group. The opinions and suspicions he voiced were shared by the pressure group, which was determined to have no body in Tule Lake which could even vaguely replace the interned Negotiating Committee - the "real representatives." It is possible that some of the colonists shared a part of Yamashita's views even though they may not have been active members of the pressure group. Yamaguchi's remarks give some evidence of this.²

The fact that the Spanish Consul on his previous visits to Tule Lake had given the supporters of the Negotiating Committee no assistance on the stockade issue had caused this group and many of the residents to lose confidence in him. The

¹ ibid., June 20, 1944, pp. 1-2.

² See pp. .

fact that a visit of the Spanish Consul had never been followed by any noticeable improvement in the lot of the inhabitants of Tule Lake, had probably caused many non-status quo people to regard his efforts with indifference. However, many people felt that out of courtesy to their only contact with the Japanese government, a committee should be formed.

Yamashita gave a detailed description of the suspicion and dislike with which the activities of the ex-Co-ordinating Committee were regarded by the supporters of the stockade internees and stressed the fundamental distrust felt toward the suggestion because it was made by Mr. Black, a member of the administration. For the voiced suspicion that the administration wished to trick the Japanese into forming a "representative body" out of this Investigating Committee, there appears to be no evidence whatever. The pique, felt over the fact that Captain Martin, DeAmat's subordinate, was sent to Tule Lake instead of DeAmat himself, is interesting.

"People on the whole are very indifferent.

"I do feel this way, and after all the Japanese people are not foolish and dumb, and I don't want to consider the Japanese race as dumb. They have to accept within a certain extent being in the enclosure, but they can't be fooled all the time. . .

"The Consul de Amat was visiting here the latter part of 1943. . . (He) was requested strongly by the people. . . to liquidate the stockade. . . but the Consul was not successful in meeting the wishes of the people on that particular point.

"The Co-ordinating Committee, which was, as you know, more or less appointed by the administration in whom the public had no trust whatever, dogmatically requested a visit of the Consul again. Consul Amat -- we suppose that he knew that the Co-ordinating Committee wasn't a real representative body, because he knew they weren't real representatives elected by the people of the camp, ever since the stockade isolated the-people-of-the camp; -e- place was opened by the administration to confine what

is known as trouble makers of the camp for "said to be" severance purposes. And therefore, we supposed that Consul Amat knew that we don't have real representatives here in this camp.

"He replied to the letter sent by the Co-ordinating Committee in April, 'I am not sure which one are the real representatives in the camp. Therefore please, if necessary, elect representatives whereby I, the Consul, can interview them.'"

"On May, 22, when Mr. Okamoto was shot, at that time the people of the camp wholeheartedly hoped for the immediate visit of the Consul. On the following day of that happening, the rumor in the camp was that the shooting of Mr. Okamoto, even though he was second generation caused immediate attention of the Japanese government which requested the Spanish Embassy to make a thorough investigation of the facts. We don't know where we got that information but that was the rumor all over camp."¹

Mr. Yamashita went on to explain that Mr. Black had called a special meeting of the Block Managers, "with the assistance of the Co-ordinating Committee"¹ and asked the Block Managers to assist in the choosing of representatives to prepare the report for the Spanish Consul. But "the people were not told that this was to be a written report and that the Consul did not intend to come immediately." Yamashita therefore was convinced that Mr. Black was plotting to use these representatives "to for a representative body for the Japanese which is needed so badly in this camp from the point of view of the Administration. They wished to form it for all time."

There was, apparently, no grounds at all for Yamashita's suspicion of Black's motives. However, it reflects the extreme anti-administrative attitude of this leader of the Resegregation Group.

Synthesis of Okamoto Shooting:

The first reaction of the colony to the shooting of Okamoto was a confusion of shock, anger, sorrow, and fear of passing

¹This may have been pure rumor or may have been based on a short-wave broadcast.

²"Assistance" by the Co-ordinating Committee is very doubtful.

through the sentry guarded gates and meeting a like fate. For several weeks after the occurrence even the sight of an Army uniform was a source of irritation. This reaction was quickly dealt with by the administration which stationed Caucasian and Japanese members of the WRA police force at the gates, prevailed upon Colonel Austin to place selected sentries at the gate and to forbid soldiers to enter the camp as they previously had been accustomed to do. About a month after the shooting, hostility toward the soldiers was no longer voiced. On the whole the reaction of the colonists was one of quiet and dignity. Part of this constraint was no doubt due to respect for the dead. Another factor was the consciousness of the futility of protest by an unarmed people against the Army.

The administration realized the gravity of the occurrence instantly and embarked on a policy which was entirely successful in avoiding additional trouble for themselves or for the colony. The facts were announced honestly and promptly; reasonable persons were given no cause to lay any guilt on WRA; kindness, consideration and courtesy were shown the bereaved family, which in no instance, passed the bounds of good taste; the evacuees' fear of passing through the gates was given immediate consideration; Mr. Best gave permission to hold a public funeral, called a half-holiday on the day, and attended himself, delivering an unmistakably sincere speech which impressed many of the colonists deeply; the soldiers were forbidden to enter the colony proper after the funeral.

The Divisional Responsible Men, who formally disbanded at the end of April 1944 made an attempt to re-instate themselves

in a position of prominence by forming an organization to protect the workers of the project. Three ex-members of the Co-ordinating Committee placed this proposition before Mr. Best but were refused recognition. Although the proposed body disavowed all political ambition, Mr. Best believed the formation of this body would be interpreted as a political move.

The attempt of the pressure groups to lay blame on Mr. Best and the unorganized criticisms voiced by Mr. Best's enemies had little effect on the general populace; most people were of the opinion that Mr. Best had all that could be expected of him under the circumstances. Some criticism was heard over WRA's attempt to evade responsibility, but this never reached serious proportions. For several weeks after the shooting, many informants feared that trouble might be precipitated, but no factor strong enough to bring about any demonstration made its appearance. During this period the most frequent remark made by the Japanese was: "It all depends on the verdict." Over a month passed before the Court Martial was held, and as the weeks passed, this statement was made more and more rarely. Probably cynical opinions, such as those which were volunteered as early as two days after the shooting: that the soldier would be released or that he would be given a sentence which he would not be obliged to serve, slowly gained the ascendancy. The hopelessness of gaining redress from or taking revenge upon the Army was apparent to all. Much is expressed in the following terse statement made by a Japanese, "What can we do? WE're only Japs?" When the verdict of acquittal was released early in July, over a month after the shooting, it caused little surprise

and there were no repercussions. It was, however, overshadowed by the excitement aroused by the murder of Mr. Hitomi.

The request of the Spanish Embassy that an investigation be made by a representative group of Japanese citizens and that a report be prepared made very little impression on the colony. The fact that the announcement was made through the administration and that certain ex-members of the Co-ordinating Committee attempted unsuccessfully to attain prominent positions on the investigation committee aroused great suspicion on the part of the chief pressure group. The greater proportion of the colonists, however, appear to have regarded the committee and its report as harmless but futile. When the report was given to the Consul in mid-July it aroused scarcely any interest.

MINOR EVENTS AND ATTITUDES OF JUNE, 1944

During June the unrest, discontent, and hatred which culminated in the murder of Yaozo Hitomi, the general manager of the Co-operative Enterprises developed in an interwoven sequence of events which merits separate treatment. To interrupt the narration of this development with socially significant but unrelated details, would mar the picture and confuse the reader. These unrelated events and attitudes will therefore be presented first.

Ward Chairmen Attempt to By-Pass Mr. Huycke

Early in June the ward chairmen made an attempt to escape from the need of dealing with Mr. Huycke who, as head of Community Activities, had long been a source of aggravation to most of the colonists who had contact with him. Mr. Huycke's unpopularity, which appears to have begun when he was in charge of housing at

the time when the transferees entered camp, remained with him when he became head of the Community Activities Section. Most informants disliked him; many despised him. He was, moreover, almost universally disliked by the Appointed Personnel. With his immediate superior, Mr. Black, he appeared to be on excellent terms. Mr. Huycke accomplished very little in providing recreation for the evacuees. This, however, does not entirely account for his unpopularity. His habit of promising much and doing little, and the fact that he unsuccessfully attempted to pose as an admirer of the Japanese, telling them that he was a "Jap-lover" and not a "Jap-hater" were contributory causes. The general scorn and disgust with which he was regarded by most of the Japanese who came in contact with him, spread to many who did not know him personally.

In this particular instance, the ward chairmen, noting that little attention was paid to requests or complaints which they made to Mr. Huycke, decided that he was deliberately withholding them from Mr. Best. They thereupon called on Mr. Best and requested that the Community Activities section be taken over by Mr. Best personally. Mr. Best refused them, although he is reported to have admitted that Mr. Huycke was slow in channeling things to him but "he would do his best." An account by Miss Iwohara, who developed a strong dislike to Mr. Huycke when he was on the Advisory Council and she was Secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee follows:

"The ward chairmen tried to get Mr. Huycke out. They found out that most of the peoples' complaints which were supposed to be channeled to Mr. Best were just going to Mr. Huycke who bottlenecked them. So the ward chairmen thought that Community Organizations ought to be put under direct supervision of the Project Director.

"So the ward chairmen got together one morning and called on Mr. Huycke. Mr. Huycke said Mr. Provinse had suggested the same thing, but that Mr. Best had been against the idea because he thought it would be disadvantageous.

"So the group of ward chairmen got together the next day and got an interview with Mr. Best. When they made this statement to Mr. Best, Mr. Best said that the plan of putting Community Organizations under the Project Director had been devised by himself, but when he sent the plan to Washington, Washington did not approve. So now we know that Mr. Huycke was lying. Mr. Best said there seemed to be a clash of personalities and he admitted that Mr. Huycke was slow in channeling things to him but that he would do his best."¹

Several months later Mr. Huycke's Japanese Community Activities staff rose in revolt and almost left him in a body. At this time they addressed an appeal to the Washington office. Mr. Huycke chose to regard this phenomenon as the result of pressure put on his staff by pro-Japanese groups.

Stockade Developments

Attitudes favoring the release of the men still kept in the stockade continued to be expressed by persons who were not attached to the pressure groups working actively for their release. On June 15, a young nisei girl, stated that the Daihyo Sha Kai had had a great deal of support in November and added that the people were becoming more and more angry over the continued imprisonment and innocent people in the stockade. She was sure that if Kai and Kuratomi were released they would not attempt to make trouble. She was so moved when speaking of the imprisoned men that her eyes filled with tears.² On June 20, the conservative Mr. Okamoto, who several months before had not advocated release, made the following statement.

"Unless they release the men from the stockade I don't think there is any hope to organize a Central Committee. . .

When asked how strong a part giri played in the peoples'

¹R. Hankey, Notes, June 15, 1944, pp. 5, 6.

²ibid., p. 1.

sentiment toward the internees, Okamoto said:

"Suppose those former Negotiating Committee in the stockade. Suppose right now we elect another representative from each block and organize a Central Committee. In that case we double-cross them (the men in the stockade). We admit that they had criminal intention. That means giri. That's why, for the benefit of them we cannot do it right now, unless the WRA releases them men. That is the Japanese point of view right now. I wish the WRA would release those men."¹

An interesting account of food trouble in the stockade was given by Fujimoto who was in an excellent position to get information since he was employed in a responsible position in the Mess Operations:

"I got Hayward to crack down on the stockade boys the other day. They thought they were going to run Mess Operations. They wanted us to give them their ration daily instead of weekly. I'll be damned if I'll weigh out 37 pounds of rice every day and $4\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of sugar.

"Sugimoto, one of the public agitators number 1, sent a letter to the Spanish Consul, telling him the boys in the stockade were getting only 14¢ a day for food. I told Hayward to tell Best that the stockade is getting food on the same scale as the colony. If the Spanish Consul thinks that's not food enough, have him come in and look at the books.

"Confidentially, I've been giving those boys a break. I knew their only pleasure was eating so I've even advanced them sugar on their next week's ration. But not anymore. Since Sugimoto started to make trouble, I've not advanced, and they've been without sugar since Thursday and won't get any till Tuesday."²

The above account is noteworthy since the hunger strike which the detainees initiated some months later was rumored to have had its source in a disagreement between the internees and the administration on food.

GROWTH OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN POSTON GROUP AND MR. TSUDA

During April and May, the leadership of the pressure group which had sponsored the petition in March had fallen more and more

¹ibid., June 20, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., June 4, 1944, p. 6.

into the hands of a clique from Poston led by Mr. Yamashita, whose bitterly anti-administrative statements have already been quoted on several occasions. Mr. Kira, the man who is reputed to have made the threat against Caucasians after the Okamoto shooting was also tied in with this group, although he kept himself well in the background. The administration had no knowledge of the ascendancy of the Poston clique nor did they know that Yamashita was one of the top leaders.

One of the chief intentions of this group during this time, besides furthering propaganda for resegregation, was to join forces with the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai and together, form an organization which would control the camp. To further this ambition, they continued to agitate for the release of the detainees.

Sometime in May, however, they came into conflict with another faction also devoting itself to the release of the detainees. This faction was headed by Mr. Tsuda, the ex-warden who took a prominent part in negotiating with the Army in the early part of November 1943.¹ Tsuda, being a very good friend of Kuratomi's was in a position of some advantage. However, he refused to sign the Resegregation Group's petition and by so doing incurred their immediate suspicion and later hostility. Yamashita made an attempt to bring Tsuda within the fold of the Resegregation Group, but Tsuda refused. Tsuda stated:

"In May, Mr. Yamashita asked me why I didn't join the Resegregation Group. He said, 'We have 9000 people here now and great power. If you should belong to a power like that you can do yourself very nice.'²

¹See pp. .

²R. Hankey, Notes, March 6, 1945, p. 6.

Tsuda, however, refused to join stating that since he had a sansei (third generation) son, he could not see himself holding to the rigorous repatriation views of the Resegregation Group.

Another cause of the hostility was the fact that both the Poston Group and Tsuda were working for release of the detainees and the Poston Group at least, desired the political prestige that they imagined this feat would give them with the residents. That Mr. Tsuda worked hard and worked independently did not please them. They thereupon began a gossip campaign against Mr. Tsuda, stressing that he was an inu and a collaborator with the administration. Mr. Tsuda's reputation did not assist him, for he was said to have run professional gambling joints before evacuation and in Tule Lake. The propaganda gained considerable acceptance in camp, and Tsuda and the men working with him were denounced as dogs by many persons who had no affiliation with the Resegregation Group. The first indication of this intrigue was brought to the attention of the writer by a statement made by Mrs. Matsuda, an ardent Resegregationist:

"Now the boys in the stockade are getting mad at Mr. Tsuda. When Mr. Tsuda came out of the stockade, they thought he would be able to do something for them. But he hasn't been able to do a thing. So they are getting made at him now."¹

According to Tsuda, he was the first person working for release to advocate hiring a lawyer for the detainees:

"After I got out of the stockade (in April) I went to see Mr. Best many times, trying to liquidate the stockade. When the idea of hiring a lawyer came up, I went to see Mr. Kira. He said it was no use. He said, you know how big the United States Government is. If they want to put 100 boys in the stockade, they will do it anyway. The stockade is just an insignificant thing. It would be foolish to bring in a lawyer.

"I went to see Mr. Yamashita and he said the same thing.

¹ibid., June 19, 1944, p. 1.

"As the sole responsible person for bringing in a lawyer, I didn't want to cause any further trouble."¹

Shortly before this, the relatives of the interned men had formed an organization to cooperate in the cause of release. This body was called the Saiban-1in and appears to have worked both with Mr. Tsuda and with the Poston Group. When Mr. Tsuda did not take steps to hire a lawyer, a man from Heart Mountain, named Okamoto took over the issue and contacted the American Civil Liberties Union. The Poston Group cooperated actively. In this matter Mrs. Matsuda again accused Tsuda of having played the part of an inu, stating that he had attempted to persuade the boys in the stockade to withdraw their appeal to the American Civil Liberties Union in order to protect Mr. Best. This matter will be discussed in greater detail later.

Rumors

Two interesting rumors were current during June. The rumor that an announcement of an exchange ship would be made continued and grew stronger. It was also widely rumored that the administration was planning to grant the colonists certain privileges. The latter notion may have been stimulated by the consideration shown by the administration at the time of the Okamoto shooting. Nothing came of either rumor.

On June 3, two nisei girls asked if there were any truth in the rumor that an exchange ship was coming soon. In the weeks that followed the question was asked at almost every contact the writer had with Japanese. On June 23, Yamaguchi said:

¹ibid., March 6, 1945, p. 7.

"I think the next transport might come the end of this year or the beginning of the next. That would make the people feel better.

His wife added:

"I bet the camp is going to be in an uproar if it does come."

Yamaguchi concluded:

"It has to come, otherwise the morale is going down. The Japanese government must realize that."¹

The stimulating factors for this rumor are unknown. One staff member stated that the Examiner had printed a statement that Japan was making out another repatriation list asking for college graduates and persons who owned property in Japan.

On June 8, "K" reported that rumors were flourishing that the fence was going to be taken down some time in July and that colonists would be allowed to make excursions to the nearby hills. He had heard that the janitors would be allowed to go out first; "their names are even being put down." He stated that even if only the janitors were allowed to go, the people would feel better, "because then they would feel that someday maybe they could go too." "K" had considerable faith in these rumors, and stated that they were already beginning to make the people feel better.²

The writer checked these rumors with Mr. Robertson and was told that the administration was not even remotely entertaining any such ideas.

Attitudes on Mr. Best

On June 23 Yamaguchi informed the writer that he had been told by a friend that a group of young men had written to

¹ibid., June 23, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., June 8, 1944, p. 2.

Mr. Ickes, telling him that he should fire Best. Yamaguchi's informant had stated that he himself had signed this letter. Whether this communication was sponsored by a pressure group is not known. Early in June another young man, like Yamaguchi, an ex-Leupp internee remarked that he had heard that Mr. Robertson had been demoted because he did not get on with Mr. Best and because he got on too well with the Japanese.¹ Mrs. "F" an older nisei woman stated that she was sure that matters could never go well in camp as long as Mr. Best remained in his position of Project Director. The people didn't trust him. Moreover, they knew that he was afraid of them. "If only Mr. Robertson could be the Project Director."² Although more informants cannot be quoted it was quite apparent that by the end of June Mr. Best had almost completely lost the respect he had gained with some people because of his considerate action at the time of the Okamoto funeral.

Status and the Pressure Groups

Little is known of the activities of the pressure groups during the month of June. The relatives of the internees went forward with their preparations to appeal to the Civil Liberties Union for assistance in the stockade matter. Undoubtedly, the Poston group also did all it could to increase the unpopularity of Mr. Best, whose presence as Project Director was regarded as one of their chief obstacles. There were, however, few overt signs that this group was active. The following remark was made on status by Yamashita the ex-Santa Fe internee who was an underground leader of the Poston group:

¹ibid., June 8, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., June 21, 1944, p. 2.

"If the administration treated us as loyal Japanese, loyal to Japan, they would have no trouble at all. But they still think we are loyal to America. They should treat us like prisoners of war in a certain sense. They should treat us according to the Geneva convention and International Law. Our mind is clear now; we are disloyal.

On the abortive attempt of the Divisional Responsible Men to establish an organization, Mr. Yamashita said:

"If any little representative organization or any little gathering of people now having close approach to Mr. Best, they are not hastening making the camp better, but they are prolonging the trouble. They are petit politicians."

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ALLIED SUCCESSES IN EUROPE

One extremely interesting change of attitude toward the war was manifested by Fujimoto one of the writer's oldest acquaintances and frankest informants. A No-No and a repatriate had expressed bitter resentment over the treatment he, as a Japanese-American had received in this country since the outbreak of the war. On one occasion in September, 1943, before he was segregated from Gila, he had told the Writer that he hoped that Japan would win the war just so the Caucasians would realize they weren't as good as they thought they were. After nine months residence in Tule Lake, he had changed his mind. The manner in which he led up to his declaration was very interesting. At the beginning of the conversation he complained over the sorry state of the attitude of the inhabitants of Tule Lake:

"I'm getting sick of the attitude of the people. They are cutting each other's throats."¹

He then launched into a denunciation of the Co-op which will be quoted in the discussion of the Hitomi Killing. He continued:

¹A remarkably prophetic statement, considering it was made seven days before Hitomi's murder.

"When I came here I expected to find quite a different atmosphere. When the people realized they were here for the same reason, I expected that they would be willing to help a guy when he needed it. Instead, now if you've got five dollars they'll think of how they can get it away from you.

"Some of the smartest people I know are getting disgusted. These are real intelligent people. They came here and expected to find a cooperative atmosphere and they're pretty well disgusted. Their remarks add up to something like this: 'It's not a case now of whether I want to go back to the old country. It's a case of whether I can stay here long enough to go back to the old country and still retain my self-respect.

"The trouble is they expect you to act like a damn radical and go out and kill every hakujin on the other side of the fence and when you don't act like that you are an inu.

After this introduction, Fujimoto stated dramatically,

"To tell you the truth, I'm considering relocation."

"The only reason I'd consider relocation is that I've got a pretty good thing coming up. As you should know by this time, the majority of nisei came in here because they didn't want to go into the Army. That's one of the main reasons why the nisei are here, 98% of them, myself included. I couldn't see fit to pack a gun for something I didn't see my way clear to. If they had treated us differently, I would have volunteered. Now, seeing as how they're deferring people over 26, I think I might take a chance.

"You see, if the war lasts three more years, I'll be 33. Then I get deported to Japan. It'll take me ten years to get on my feet. It seems to me Germany is going to pull a flopperoo. I wouldn't want to be here when that happens. I don't care if Japan has 17 kinds of Yamato Damashi, she isn't going to be able to buck fighting three big nations.

"Believe it or not, a fellow told me the other day that Japan was going to have a decisive victory and that the war would be over in seven days! A girl told me the other day, 'You're so thoroughly Americanized, I don't believe you belong here.'

"My coming here was in itself a defense mechanism. It was another retaliatory action to get even with the way I'd been treated previously. On the other hand, I feel that in retaliating I not only hurt the government, but eventually, I'll hurt myself more."

"The only people Japan actually wants are those she can use immediately after the war, diplomats and persons with Engineering Degrees. I've been telling people, if Japan should lose the war, there's a very good chance of her doing right now, and if we were to relocate and were placed on the

same standard of living as the negro in this country, we'd still be able to have a better standard of living than the poor people in Japan. Besides, when the Japanese went to the south, they were never treated as the negroes were."

Fujimoto assured the writer that the camp life and the unfavorable war news appeared to be affecting some of the older peoples' minds:

"A lot of the old men are getting goofier and goofier. They stand around in the latrines and mutter to themselves. I think they're losing their minds."

When the writer asked Fujimoto what the possible effect of the news of a Japanese victory in the Pacific might have on the camp's population, he said:

"I'd hate to see it happen. In spite of the fact that the Internal Security is on the lookout for short wave broadcasts, if the local broadcasts were to confirm the victory and the shortwave broadcasts were to exaggerate it, I don't think there'd be no holding the pressure gang in here."

"when asked what the effect of a pronounced Allied victory might be, he guessed:

"I've often wondered. If there were a very decisive victory, I think there'd be ~~no holding the~~ a great breakdown in morale. Especially among certain people who have decided that Japan couldn't lose. With the breakdown in morale there would come a time when some of them would try in some way to avenge the defeat of Japan. When that happens, they'd better start building more fences."¹

The next day a sincere repatriate was asked how the course of the war was affecting the colonists. He said:

"Those persons who will change their minds now are no good to either country. These boys who fluctuate are no good. You'll find there are many of that kind. You know, only half of the people here are registered to go to Japan. They just want to wait and see how it turns out. If Japan wins they want to go to Japan and if the United States wins, they want to stay here. It's disgraceful. It makes me ashamed of the Japanese race, especially the issei.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, June 25, 1944, pp. 1-3.

"But if America didn't evacuate the second generation, then probably most of them would have sworn to support the United States, and would have fought in this war. Now they're willing to go out whether they're despised or not.

"I've talked to many of them. They say, 'I'm going back to Japan.' Then I ask, 'Then why aren't you studying?'

"They're not studying. They're just fooling around and gambling and having a good time."

This informant remarked at this interview that he had just had a long argument with an issei friend over some of Japan's policies. He had felt that some of Japan's policies were not above criticism.

"If I go to Japan and speak as I've spoken today I'll be thrown in jail. There is no question of that. I think the country should be improved in several ways. But if I weren't in love with Japan I wouldn't criticize here. Yet, if I did talk like I talked today, (in Japan) I should be thrown in jail."

He added that this was the one thing that caused him concern over his decision to expatriate. Since childhood, he had been honest and outspoken and he feared that he will be too inclined to speak frankly when he arrives in Japan.¹

Yamaguchi, a kibe, when discussing the war situation, said:

"I think more people will ask for relocation, especially the nisei. But the majority of the residents won't give up. I think there are a lot of people, even if we lose Kyushu, Manila and Singapore -- we won't give up. The bombings don't mean nothing. But there will be a lot of people who'll say, 'Well, the Allies are winning; let's go out.'"²

SOME ADMINISTRATIVE ATTITUDES

A meeting of the Community Management Division held on June 20, betrayed some significant administrative attitudes.

The meeting opened with the announcement that Mr. Huycke head of Community Activities, had been raised to a P4 rating.

¹ibid., June 26, 1944, pp. 1-2.

²ibid., June 23, 1944, p. 2.

It will be remembered that at the beginning of June, Mr. Huycke had become so unpopular with the evacuees that the ward chairman had attempted unsuccessfully to get from under his jurisdiction.

Mr. Bagley, the Head of Welfare gave a short speech in which he stated that his section had a case load of 2,200 to 3,000 cases per month. One possible means of reducing this load was being contemplated: to take employment from single persons or couples and give it to the heads of families of four. "It costs less to have a single person on welfare than a family of four." In other centers, said Mr. Bagley, families in possession of a cash sum of \$500 were still allowed to become Welfare cases, it being assumed that they might employ this case surplus for relocation. This surplus was not allowed at Tule Lake. Moreover, Tule Lake was the only center which suffered from an employment shortage. Mr. Bagley stated, in addition, that his department was busily employed on the problem of stimulating relocation. They had initiated a study of 50 families of Tule Lake residents who according to the records had not applied for repatriation. However, when they began on the study they found that 43 of these 50 families had actually applied. None of those interviewed were open to any persuasion.

When Mr. Bagley had finished his speech Mr. Black opened the floor for questions. A teacher inquired if there were any positions which were not filled. Mr. Black said there were many openings for clerical workers and that it was very difficult to get teachers for the nursery school although many of the evacuee girls were qualified for the work. If any applicant

for work was offered a job and refused it, he was not eligible for welfare. The great majority of the unemployed persons were in the unskilled labor groups.

The questions now turned to the subject of the stockade. Many of the staff members, particularly the teachers, were extremely curious over the policy of the administration in regard to the internees, over the treatment they received and over the process of internment and release. A member of the police force asked Mr. Bagley what could be done for four internees who had broken their glasses. Bagley explained a complicated process for procuring glasses but was interrupted by a staff member who suggested that in consideration of the limited view in the stockade, the internees had seen just about all they could see and had no need for glasses. This remark caused some laughter. Mr. Black then announced that a number of the aliens in the stockade were soon to be removed to Santa Fe, from where, in course of time, they might go to Crystal City to join their families. This, stated Black, would be very nice because at Crystal City they might lead a really normal family life. (When this was carried out it was