

## CHAPTER V

### THE CLIMAX OF PUBLIC HOSTILITY TO THE INU

Developemnts from Akashi petition to Hitomi murder - April through June - 1944

#### SYNTHESIS

*Main discussion -  
Motive, suspicion, fear and  
resentment  
How far I know  
Ten 3 p. gory incidents and*

The chief manifestation of the period April through June, 1944 was the gradual increase of general public resentment and hostility toward the real and imaginary inu and administrative collaborators. This attitude developed with increasing strength until <sup>June</sup> ~~May~~, when it assumed the proportions of an obsession. It reached its climax in a veritable tidal wave of gossip about ~~the~~ dogs in general and the particular misdeeds of certain individuals reputed to be dogs. <sup>It</sup> ~~and~~ found overt release in a series of beatings of persons who were suspected of collaboratorist activities. By this time ~~the~~ the hostility had become so enormous and the people so unbalanced that these brutal beatings were regarded by many individuals with sadistic satisfaction. It was felt that the dogs, the Japanese who betrayed their own people, were meeting the fate they deserved.

This abnormal, sadistic attitude was not, of course shared by everyone, although ~~it is not an exaggeration to state that~~ at its height it infected almost everyone to some extent. Even when inu hate raged ~~at its~~ most furiously in June, individuals <sup>still</sup> could be found with the courage to state that these despised persons were only reputed to be dogs and that there was no proof of their guilt. Such individuals, however, were rare and even ~~when~~ <sup>not</sup> they would go so far as to ~~the~~ say that guilty or not, to fall upon ~~a man~~ <sup>an inu</sup> and beat him was reprehensible in itself.

When ~~individuals~~ ~~connected~~ people commented upon the fact that a beaten man might ~~perhaps~~ have been blinded or had his skull fractured the tone was not so much one of regret ~~as of~~ ~~helpless~~ ~~bewilderment~~ or sympathy as of helpless bewilderment.



However, as the weeks pass and the beatings continued, many individuals, even though expressing satisfaction over the beatings, voiced great nervousness and anxiety over what they unconsciously recognized as an abnormal camp attitude. This found expression in such remarks as "Some of the people are going crazy." "This camp gives me the willies." "I wish ~~I~~ we could get out of here."

Near the end of this wave of gossip and violence, hostility focussed to some extent upon the Japanese who held important positions in the Cooperative Enterprises. On July 3, Mr. Hitomi, the General Manager of the Co-op was murdered.

It is debatable if the mention of Hitomi's murder, which will ~~not~~ begin the next chapter should be mentioned here. Since, however, this present chapter will contain frequent reference to gossip about the Co-op, the beating of Hitomi's brother, and the specific gossip about Hitomi, I think it should.

Coincident with this climax of the long-smoldering hatred against the administrative collaborators, the administration made several attempts to initiate the formation of a representative body. These attempts were met with widespread passive resistance, and public satisfaction was great when the attempt failed miserably.





Again, thousands of people  
signed this record petition.

after taking  
control of the  
country.

imposed

government would protest so strongly against the treatment ~~they~~  
~~and~~ people at Tule Lake  
were receiving that the authorities would be forced to make  
the concessions demanded. American <sup>much</sup> false hopes <sup>was</sup> therefore ~~were~~ built  
upon the eagerly anticipated visit of the Spanish Consul.

which would be equivalent to a  
hunger strike by all  
the residents.

simmering resentment over the fact that ~~maxxwere~~ Japanese were still confined in the stockade. This was motivated chiefly out of identification because the men confined were Japanese and had been subjected to long imprisonment without trial. Support because they had been the peoples' representatives had, in actuality, ~~dwindled~~ dwindled to negligible proportions, although this reason for support was also voiced, <sup>by many persons and reiterated constantly</sup> particularly ~~xxx~~ by members of the pressure group. Another significant manifestation of this period was a relatively long-lived rumor that there would soon be another exchange ship. This rumor was probably fanned



did not sign might not be allowed to return to Japan. Argument  
for and against the petition raged. Beatings were reported.

The reason for this turmoil and conflict was that the Resegregation Group ~~unanimously~~ held that only those expatriate or repatriate willing to ~~return to Japan~~ immediately were worthy of resegregation and that anybody who did not wish to ~~return to Japan~~ go to Japan immediately was a fence-sitter and "loyal to America". The fact is that many of the residents, loudly as they denounced the fence-sitters did not want to go to Tule Lake to Japan immediately. They had segregated with the idea that and were, in fact, loyal neither to America nor Japan in a pool they could stay in Tule Lake and make up their minds, depending upon the outcome of the war. ~~They wanted to return to Japan~~ Moreover, they and other individuals did not want to move again, even if the moving entailed only a shift to another section of the camp. Moving was too much trouble, especially since the act guaranteed nothing and was only a concession to the opinions of the ~~press~~ pressure group.

x h g m x h s n t p k b e x m s f k i t o m m k n u n g h x l i e x h x m n g h k x b k e x m s i d e n t x x  
f a z e x t x . f a z e x m i t k k m a m z a k b u s m d e l i a n n a x x

It should also be kept in mind that strict separation of ardent repatriates and expatriates from the other camp residents would have entailed a great deal of separation of families. Many families had come to Tule Lake because the parents had requested repatriation while children remained at Yes-Yes. Others had come because children said No-No and their parents merely accompanied them without requesting repatriation. Naturally, to base resegregation only on the desire to repatriate immediately would be objectionable to such families and also to the nisei No-No who had not







~~Apparently the Consul had been very friendly to the Army and the~~  
~~Why the Consul changed his~~  
~~attitude of friendly attitude towards the committee~~

On November 2, before the warehouse fight, the Consul had been very friendly to the Negotiating Committee. Why he changed his attitude now is not known. Nevertheless, in spite of his ~~that the committee resign,~~ recommendation, camp sentiment was still greatly influenced by the vocal supporters of the Negotiating Committee and the people gave no heed to the Consul's suggestion. When the Consul's recommendation was not followed the Army began to arrest and place in the stockade the members of the Daihyo Sha proper. Previously the Army had taken into custody only the members of the Negotiating Committee and other individuals ~~thought to be~~ dangerous to the peace of the camp.

~~Throughout December~~ <sup>then</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>the</sup>  
The continued arrests and the fear engendered, the complete absence of hope of aid or relief increased the residents' discouragement and sense of futility. On December 30, the stockade ~~its~~ detainees went on a hunger strike which was chiefly motivated by their desire for release. Unanimity could not be maintained, ~~and because of a~~ <sup>and</sup> <sup>because of</sup> a faction which would not hold to the ~~strike~~ strike it was broken after about a week of fasting.

// Again check for correct effort.











The activities of the pressure group

While the great upsurge of overt hostility to the dogs dominated this period, the pressure group, though outwardly extremely quiet and inactive, ~~wasn't doing anything~~ was undergoing ~~much~~ a significant development and was, moreover, taking an active part in ~~the whole thing~~ adding fuel to the fire. Many of the ~~most~~ most vicious ~~stories~~ rumors about the dogs probably had their ~~birth~~ <sup>pressure</sup> origin with this group. ~~Specifically~~, the pressure group was probably responsible for ~~many~~ many of the exaggerated stories of ~~the~~ graft on the part of the directors of the Cooperative Enterprises. Well posted informants also claim that Mr. Kira, one of the <sup>pressure group's</sup> powerful behind the scenes leaders, ~~was~~ engineered most of the beatings of this period. There is some evidence that Kira, an experienced gang leader both in pre-evacuation and Relocation Center life, desired to dominate the Tule Lake Co-op or form a separate Co-op in the Manzanar district where he resided and had his headquarters. If this contention is correct, Kira ~~thinks~~ had good reason to fan hatred against his opponents, a group already disliked by many residents. the incumbent conservative ~~board~~ Co-op Board? Very few of the camp residents, however, ~~had~~ had any suspicion of Kira's machinations at this time. ~~Similarly~~, the leaders of the pressure group constantly repeated to Mr. Robertson, "that they were having great difficulty in holding back their boys from acts of violence". The day before the H. tomi murder they ~~threatened~~ voiced the threat that "from now on there may be more than beatings - there may be murder". Such incautious and <sup>boastful</sup> ~~unbalanced~~ remarks would, of course, be carried through the camp



with the Negotiating ~~IX~~ Committee in a mutual effort to bring the center back to a normal state, which entailed chiefly the resumption of work by the evacuees. Preliminary conferences were successful and the coal and garbage crews returned to work. However, when additional work crews were proposed, ~~then the Army and the Negotiating Committee~~ found themselves in serious disagreement. The Army insisted on cutting ~~the number of some of the crews in~~ half and ~~rehiring only persons~~ <sup>whose past records they had examined</sup> ~~with good~~ <sup>approved</sup> records. The Negotiating Committee insisted that the ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> would not return to work under these conditions. Their long arguments with Colonel Austin on this score led to increasingly ~~poor~~ <sup>poor</sup> relationships which were not improved by the fact that Austin was swinging to the opinion of the WRA authorities that the members of the Negotiating Committee were agitators and troublemakers.

This unresolved work stoppage led directly to <sup>a</sup> path of action adopted by the residents which they termed the "status quo." In essence, this term <sup>"status-quo"</sup> implied that the evacuees would not return to work except under their own terms.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

In an attempt to bring order into the situation, a mass meeting was ~~called~~ <sup>was to participate</sup> planned in which both the authorities and the Negotiating committee ~~would take part~~. ~~There~~ At this meeting, the Negotiating Committee planned to justify its actions to the residents. Colonel Austin and Mr. Cozzens of the WRA, ~~believing~~ <sup>believing</sup> that the Negotiating Committee had little public support, planned to discredit them before

by the grapevine would enhance the sinister prestige of the pressure group and cause it to be regarded with great fear. So great was the general hostility to the dogs and the fear of the pressure group that few expressions of disapprobation toward this attitude of the pressure group were voiced. The general sentiment was that if they were responsible for the beatings it was all right because the dogs should be beaten up. It was not until after the murder that this spell was broken and people, shocked back to a sense of reality, began to whisper against the violence of the agitators. By that time, however, the terror with which the ~~group~~ the pressure group was regarded was so great that no Japanese who expected to remain in camp would dare to carry his suspicions to the administration, even if he were able to break with the powerful code of the camp and bring himself to become an informer.



The pressure group also threw all of its influence behind frustrating the administration's attempt to form a representative body. In this they were motivated by the fact that they regarded themselves as the camp's actual, though as yet unrecognized leaders. In their opinion, they had put the Coordinating Committee out of the way. Any new body, recognized by the administration and by the people, would be a potential opponent with whom they would have to deal. They preferred, ~~to explain~~ however, to explain their objection to a representative body by voicing loyalty to the Negotiating Committee and pointing out that the election of ~~xxx~~ a new body would be a betrayal of the "men who had stood up for the people in November". In this attempt they were again assisted out of all proportion ~~to~~ their own efforts by the negativistic attitude of the residents. In the first place, nobody wanted to take the almost impossible job of standing in a position between the administration and the people.

Secondly most residents ~~did not wish~~ preferred ~~to~~ and disappointing the satisfaction of frustrating the administration to the advantage of having a representative body. ~~Thirdly~~ <sup>or said they felt</sup> Thirdly, some residents ~~probably~~ still felt ~~sympathy~~ <sup>for the detained men and believed</sup> that replacing ~~them~~ <sup>the</sup> with another body would constitute a betrayal.

The additional activities of the ~~pressure group~~ leaders of the pressure group were directed at consolidating ~~their strength~~ and increasing their strength and at ~~gaining~~ continuing their efforts to obtain the release of the detainees, ~~in~~ <sup>which</sup> a feat which they believed would give them much prestige. ~~in~~ For the efforts at increasing strength there is little ~~evidence~~ tangible evidence. Informants have stated, however, that Yamashita, Kira and others, ~~exerted~~ <sup>exerted</sup> themselves to induce influential and able men ~~to~~ "come in with them" and share a part of the future power which the Resegregationists expected to control. One of the men so approached was Mr. Tsuda, a member of the Negotiating Committee who had already been released from the stockade. Tsuda ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> a small clique of Kai and Kuratomi supporters, exerted themselves unceasingly in attempting to bring about their leaders' release. When Tsuda refused to join the Resegregation Group and continued ~~in~~ his independent efforts to obtain release he incurred the jealousy and hostility of Yamashita and the other Resegregationists who promptly started a rumor that Tsuda and his group were inu. This rumor found wide acceptance among the residents during the dog-hating period. Nobody, however,

Probably  
this should  
go into  
Chapter VII  
although it  
might not  
belong here  
in synthesis.



tried to beat Tsuda up because he had his own group of  
 followers and was well able to protect himself. The pressure  
 group's attempt to obtain release climaxed in a <sup>successful</sup> appeal to  
 the American Civil Liberties Union. Before legal action was  
 initiated, however, Mr. Best released all of the detainees  
 and this particular ~~group's attempt to obtain release~~ plank  
 of the pressure group became extinct.

Here will come a detailed section emphasizing the general negativistic attitudes of the residents toward any administrative suggestion during this period. The proposed new Representative Body and the Police Commission election are exemplifications.

Since attitudes expressed on the stockade detainees are ~~very~~ significantly tied into this election a detailed discussion of the attitudes of the residents and the pressure group toward this matter will come in here.

The Tsuda-faction might be commented upon and ~~then~~ the reader referred to Chpt. VII for detailed discussion. Great Resegregationist pressure to inhibit the election of new Representative Body to be described.

General camp hatred of Best and liking for Robertson to be touched upon in some detail.

June 16.  
Black's speech at Commencement/when the people booed him for stating that he thought America would win the war to be briefly touched upon.

The two chief matters to be stressed are failure of new Representative Body and the stockade issue which are intimately related - though I don't think they are to a significant degree. causally related. The chief point is the people ~~were~~ were against anything the administration suggested and they used the detained men as an excuse.

The rest of Chpt. V and all of Chpt. VI are an unbroken (I hope) account of the wave of inu hate which is the most important phenomenon of this period.



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## Chapter V

(1)

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### HATRED OF INU RISES AND DOMINATES CAMP

#### Background

The specific surge of public hatred which culminated in a series of beatings and climaxed in murder began late in May of 1944. The fundamental causes and attitudes, however, had a long history; some of them extended back to the first few weeks



by the grapevine and would enhance the ~~sinister~~ sinister prestige of the pressure group and cause it to be regarded with great fear. So great was the general hostility to the dogs <sup>and the fear of the pressure group</sup> ~~however~~, that very few expressions of disapprobation toward this attitude of the pressure group were voiced. The ~~general~~ general sentiment was that if they were responsible for the beatings, as they hinted, it was all right. The dogs should be beaten up. It was not ~~in~~ until after the murder that this spell was broken and people, shocked back to a sense of reality, began to whisper against the violence of the agitators. By that time, however, ~~in~~ ~~the terror~~ ~~with which~~ the terror ~~with which~~ <sup>the pressure group was</sup> ~~they were~~ regarded was so great that no Japanese who expected to remain in the camp would dare to carry his suspicions to the administration, even if he were able to break with the powerful code of the camp and ~~in~~ bring himself to become an informer.

*CCout.*  
*negative*  
*rep. by*  
*informed.*

The pressure group ~~CC~~ also threw all of its influence behind frustrating the administration's attempt to form a representative body. In this they were motivated by ~~the fact that if the camp residents elected and accepted a body, their own cause would be hopelessly inhibited.~~ <sup>they regarded themselves as the camp's actual or potential leaders</sup> ~~the fact that if the camp residents elected and accepted a body, their own cause would be hopelessly inhibited.~~ <sup>the fact that if the camp residents elected and accepted a body, their own cause would be hopelessly inhibited.</sup> ~~in~~ ~~the terror~~ ~~with which~~ ~~they were~~ ~~regarded~~ ~~was~~ ~~so~~ ~~great~~ ~~that~~ ~~no~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~who~~ ~~expected~~ ~~to~~ ~~remain~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~camp~~ ~~would~~ ~~dare~~ ~~to~~ ~~carry~~ ~~his~~ ~~suspicions~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~administration~~ ~~,~~ ~~even~~ ~~if~~ ~~he~~ ~~were~~ ~~able~~ ~~to~~ ~~break~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~powerful~~ ~~code~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~camp~~ ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~bring~~ ~~himself~~ ~~to~~ ~~become~~ ~~an~~ ~~informer~~ ~~.~~

They preferred to explain their stand, however, by voicing loyalty to the Negotiating Committee and pointing out that the election of a new body would be a betrayal of the "men who had stood up for the people in November." In this attempt they were again assisted out of all proportion to their own efforts by the ~~general~~ <sup>negative</sup> attitudes of the residents. In the first place, nobody wanted to take the almost impossible job of standing <sup>in a position</sup> between the administration and the people.



after segregation. The three most significant of these causes were: (1) General hostility to the Japanese staff of the Co-operative Enterprises; (2) General hostility toward the stool-pigeons, the inu or dogs who tattled to the administration; (3) the presence of the small but well-organized, underground pressure group, and the conscious or unconscious support given to the propaganda spread by this group by many of the camp residents. At times, during the eight months of Tule Lake's existence as a segregation center, these factors developed separately and at times they combined to produce both the events and attitudes which preceded the murder.

The dislike which a large number of the transferees developed toward the old Tule Lake residents very soon after their arrival has been described.<sup>1</sup> This dislike was partly based on the rationalization that many of the old Tuleans had chosen to remain in camp, not out of desire to return to Japan, but merely because they did not want to move, that they were fence-sitters and unworthy to share the same camp with the transferees, that because of their convictions they were predisposed to partiality toward the administration and were willing to act as informers.<sup>2</sup> The initial distrust of the Co-operative Enterprises, *which developed soon after segregation already* has also been described.<sup>2</sup> This sprang from several factors: The fact that the Tule Lake Co-operative offered a number of seemingly expensive items for sale, some of which, like mops, pails and brooms, the transferees had been accustomed to receive from the WRA at the projects from which they came. The sale of certain wares which some of the colonists

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1. See pp. \_\_\_\_\_ of the pre-incident discussion.

2. Ibid., p. \_\_\_\_\_

2/ See supra, p. \_\_\_\_\_



considered unnecessary luxuries which tempted them to spend their small resources foolishly was also resented.<sup>1</sup> The large proportion of old Tule Lake residents employed by the Co-op was resented by the unemployed newcomers, and encouraged the popular belief that these men had become so well entrenched in their lucrative positions that they had refused to move from Tule Lake. Many colonists believed that the men holding high positions in the Co-op were making more money by grafting in Tule Lake than they could make if they relocated. The Co-op was also accused of nepotism and an almost fantastic amount of graft.

In early December, when the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai had been interned, and the puzzled and disorganized remnants of the organization were attempting to keep the unhappy people to the status quo, the Co-op earned the abiding hatred of the pro-status quo group <sup>from which the pressure group sprang</sup> by standing strongly against them. Representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai approached the Co-op Board of Directors and demanded that the Co-op cease the selling of "luxury" items so that the economically hard-pressed people would feel less tempted to break the status quo. According to Dr. Opler, the granting of these demands would have brought about the financial ruin of the Co-op. The Board of Directors refused <sup>and gave way to the Daihyo Sha Kai</sup> to take the responsibility for an action of such importance, and put the proposition up to the people. <sup>members of the Co-op</sup> When the vote was held on December 12, the proposal of the Daihyo Sha was defeated by a ratio of 9 to 1, <sup>2</sup> carrying in only five blocks? <sup>just preceding the referendum vote of January 11</sup> The members of the Co-op Board of Directors increased their unpopularity with the <sup>future members of the</sup> pressure group by their ~~strong resistance~~ and <sup>active participation on the anti-status quo side and</sup> by the propaganda they put out before the election. However, in

1. For expression of this attitude in a Daihyo Sha Kai meeting, see p. 19 of Main Report.
2. For a detailed account see pp. 141-149 of Main Report.

Check  
page  
nos.

status quo, the Co-op earned the abiding hatred of the pro-status quo group from which the pressure group sprang by standing strongly against them. Moreover, just preceding the referendum vote of January 11, the members of the Co-op Board of Directors increased their unpopularity with the future members of the pressure group by their active participation on the anti-status quo side and by the anti-status quo propaganda they put out before the election. However, in

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See supra p.



this matter, they did not incur general popular resentment, since many of the colonists were against the status quo.

In late December and early January, when certain Japanese co-operated actively with the administration in a successful attempt to break the status quo, the list of residents bitterly hated by the pro-status quo adherents increased. The Civic Organizations staff, Shimada, Namekawa, Furakawa, Maeda and Naydo, the Co-op officials, Akitsuki, Yamatani, Ikemoto and Hitomi, and certain ex-members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, among whom Yamatani and Takahashi were most prominent, became known as dogs, par excellence, or in camp parlance, "number one inu." This sentiment was held by the pro-status quo supporters from the beginning of the political coup which resulted in the defeat of the status quo. Its growth among the bulk of the people was gradual and culminated in a general hostility which, in the middle of April 1944, was making itself shown by repeated <sup>rumors that</sup> ~~threats of beating up~~ the members of the Co-ordinating Committee, Messrs. Akitsuki, Shimada, Naydo, Namekawa, Yamatani, Okamoto, and their advisor, Mr. Takahashi. <sup>a would be beaten</sup> After the resignation of this body, hostile sentiment against them on the part of the general public declined somewhat. <sup>For about three weeks</sup> ~~From the date of~~ <sup>after</sup> the resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee at the end of April until the Okamoto shooting, which occurred May 24, the camp entered into a period of comparative serenity.

However, even during this <sup>relatively</sup> calm period, the inu were still denounced frequently. In mid-April, <sup>Mr. Oishi</sup> ~~the~~ criticized the Co-op

1. The history of the decline of the Co-ordinating Committee is too long and involved to outline here. The reader is referred to the detailed treatment in the Main Report and for specific expression of the chronological developments of hostility to pp.

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6.  
strongly and remarked that the issei members of the Police Force were suspected of too friendly relations with the administration. At this time he also prophesied that henceforth the residents would no longer direct their ~~work~~ efforts against the administration but would fight among themselves. "Frankly, speaking, . . . if there is any trouble here, the trouble will be against the Japanese only." He added that the only alternative ~~work~~ to this increasingly grave situation would be if the administration would ~~take~~ remove the Yes-Yes and the "American loyalists" from the camp.<sup>1/</sup>

At this period, the first beating in which a man was assaulted at night by mysterious assailants and injured so seriously that he needed hospitalization, took place. Details are not known.

Mr. Kawai, the head of Housing, who had ~~take~~ participated actively in the anti-status quo movement in late December of 1943, was denounced by an informant early in May. <sup>2/</sup> The Civic Organizations was criticised by some residents because it refused to appoint ex-stockade detainees or ex-Daihyo Sha Kai members to offices when they had been selected by the people. <sup>3/</sup> The ex-Coordinating Committee and the Internal Security ~~was~~ also continued to be criticized. The underground pressure group, working unceasingly for the release of the stockade detainees frequently voiced ominous threats against the members of the ~~was~~ disbanded Coordinating Committee, calling

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<sup>1/</sup> R, H. key, Notes, April 12, 1944, (check)

<sup>2.</sup> ibid., p.

<sup>3.</sup> ibid., p.



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them grafters and inu and accusing them of betraying their own people to the administration and the Army. Typical of these vague threats is a conversation which took place at the home of Mr. Yamashita, a leader of the pressure group.

~~Yamashita stated that the Coordinating~~

Yamashita stated:

"The Coordinating Committee kept their positions altogether too long, not knowing they were not wanted. No matter how well educated they were, they didn't know what they were doing."

"I don't think one of them will ever repatriate," added another man present, by which he meant that these Japanese "who had betrayed their own people" would not dare to return to Japan and face their fate when their misdeeds were reported to the Japanese government.

Yamashita then stated with <sup>great determination</sup> ~~an ominous note in his voice~~ that as long as he was alive he would consider it his personal responsibility to denounce these "traitors" to the Japanese authorities. 1/

~~(Mention Okamoto shooting here? Increases Tension.)~~

1. It should be explained that almost every segreguee with any pretensions to education or political prominence believed that on his return to Japan he would be questioned by the governmental authorities as to what went on in the camps. Numerous Japanese put off the settling of scores and waited for "justice in Japan".

# Okamoto Shooting Raises Tension

On May 24 an evacuee named Okamoto was shot ~~down~~ by a sentry and died the next day. ~~While the~~ The Coroner's Jury ~~found that~~ decided that the sentry had ~~shot him in the~~ ~~back~~ killed the Japanese in line of duty. None of the evacuees (and few of the WRA staff) ~~believed~~ thought this verdict just. While the event had no obvious connection with the increasing hatred toward the inu, it brought about a state of tremendous tension in camp and increased the evacuees' sense of injustice, helplessness and frustration.

~~While the~~ The ~~widespread~~ complaints about the inu did not appear in camp until about a week after this ~~breaking~~ fatal shooting.

<sup>R</sup> Kiba, ~~then~~ ~~one of the~~ one of the leaders of the pressure group and reputedly the most vicious and unbalanced, is alleged to have told his henchmen that if the sentry were acquitted by the Court Martial (which did not take place until July) ~~he would~~ ~~and~~ ~~he would~~ ~~pay with his life~~ he would see that a Caucasian paid for this injustice with his life. ~~This~~ ~~was~~ ~~known~~ ~~to~~ ~~him~~ ~~and~~ ~~his~~ ~~followers~~ This <sup>widely known</sup> boast did not become <sup>widely known</sup> but the few evacuees who heard of it were extremely concerned. No one, of course, <sup>or cared</sup> dared/to tell the Caucasian authorities of this threat.



"The Co-ordinating Committee kept their positions altogether too long, not knowing they were not wanted. No matter how well educated they were, they didn't know what they were doing."

"I don't think one of them will ever repatriate," added another man, <sup>present,</sup> by which he meant that <sup>these</sup> Japanese who had "betrayed their own people" would not dare to return to Japan and face their fate when their misdeeds had <sup>were</sup> been reported to the Japanese government.

*clm*  
"Not while I'm alive," stated Yamashita, <sup>then stated that as long as he was alive</sup> by which he meant <sup>it his personal responsibility to</sup> that he would consider ~~the denunciation of these "traitors" to~~ the Japanese authorities, ~~his personal responsibility.~~<sup>1</sup>

*Should be mentioned briefly later.*  
The attempt made by the Divisional Responsible Men to form a labor organization after the Okamoto shooting was regarded by the pressure group as a blatant effort to regain a position of political prominence. It did not affect their general position with the people however, since it was not publicized.<sup>2</sup>

*[Brief mention of Okamoto shooting here - Raises ??]*  
*session.*  
The Rise of Gossip about the Inu

*Increase*  
In first two weeks of June, camp conversation was almost monopolized by gossip about the evil doings of the inu. ~~On June 4,~~ Fujimoto's wife and sister spoke with astonishing bitterness. Both of these young women <sup>were</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>had voted anti-status quo and</sup> ~~inclined to disapprove~~ heartily of agitation. Mrs. Fujimoto said that they had thought that when they came to Tule Lake they would be through with inus, but now they found that there were more of them than ever. "Every place

*numerous Japanese*  
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2. Ibid., pp.



you look you can see one." The sister remarked that you couldn't even have a small meeting anywhere but what some inu would go and report it to the administration.<sup>1</sup>

~~On June 8,~~ A similar obsession with the inu was observed in a call on Yamaguchi. His wife and a male friend took part in the conversation.

"What I can't understand," said Yamaguchi, is what these inu think they are getting out of it. They might end up with three or four thousand dollars, but after the war, nobody will have them." The writer ventured the opinion that it was doubtful if any of the inu were making so much money. "No," said Yamaguchi scornfully, "They're probably doing it just for sixteen dollars a week."

Yamaguchi's kibe friend stated, "They have an office now in 701," and added that in his opinion all the people working for the Community Analyst were inu.

~~The same day, "I,"~~ <sup>Mr. Oishi</sup> who, like the two informants quoted above, <sup>disapproved</sup> ~~had no connection with any~~ of the pressure groups, said:

"Having inu around keeps everybody on edge. Everybody suspects everybody else and it has led to a great deal of hard feeling. It keeps the people in a constant state of tension."<sup>2</sup>

During this period, a man named Tateishi also came under great public stigma. He had been detained in the stockade and after his release took a position as advisor to Mr. Best. He was immediately regarded as an inu by the colonists. The ~~Beston~~ pressure group played a considerable part in increasing his evil reputation. In June, he opened an office in block 7 on the door of which he placed a sign "Research Headquarters." It was

1. R. Hankey, Notes, June 4, 1944, p. 3.

2. Ibid., June 8, 1944, p. 3.



11'  
immediately dubbed "Inu headquarters" by the people.

The Beating of Hitomi's Brother

Expressions of extreme hostility to the inu had been current in camp for about two weeks before the first beating *in May* which came to the attention of the authorities occurred. The brother of Yaozo Hitomi, General Manager of the Cooperative Enterprises was assaulted and brutally beaten.

immediately dubbed "Inu headquarters," by the people.

The Beatings

*Depression & extreme  
hard in camp about 2 weeks before the  
occurred. The brother of Y. Ito, H. Ito, etc.*

The first beating of this period which came to the attention of the authorities was that of Hitomi's brother. At first it was rumored that the assailants had mistaken him for his brother Yaozo. Other informants then stated that perhaps it was not a mistake. The clearest explanation of motive came from an informant who stated that Yaozo Hitomi, the manager of the Co-op *and an Old Tulean* was in the habit of giving the most desirable positions at his disposal to relatives and friends from Sacramento and that the brother, a recent transferee, was, soon after his arrival, given the position of Manager of the Sewing Machine Factory. As has been pointed out frequently, one of the transferees' major resentments was that the Old Tuleans had and held good positions while they themselves were unemployed. This flagrant example of nepotism, in which a new arrival received a good position almost as soon as he entered camp just because he was Hitomi's brother, was deeply resented, and certainly contributed to the fact that few expressions of sympathy for the beaten man were heard. However, *M. Oishi* who always strove to be fair, made the following remark:

"Hitomi had a brain concussion. He may be left totally blind. His left eye will be blind, I hear. Hitomi is not to be blamed. He came back from a concentration camp just a little while ago. But his brother is manager of the Co-op. And people had a grievance against the manager of the Co-op. Then this fellow who is innocent gets it."<sup>1</sup>

Beating of Morimoto

The next beating took place a few nights later when Morimoto

1. Ibid., June 17, 1944, p. 2.



Mrs. Fujimoto said:

"I heard that the man in block 35 (Hitomi's brother) can't see. He was attacked after an Engei Kai meeting. He just came out of the Santa Fe Internment camp and as soon as he got into camp he was employed as manager at the Sewing Factory. His brother is Manager of the Co-op." 1/

The Beating of Morimoto

The next beating took place a few nights later when Morimoto

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1. ibid., June 24, 1944, p. 1.

Speaking of Kira but not mentioning his name he said  
"I cannot understand where the administration has its  
eyes not to be conscious of this man." He added that he  
had known "this man" for many years, that ~~he~~ this agitator  
cared neither for the United States or Japan and would  
make trouble wherever he happened to be. ~~XX~~ Oishi criticised  
the administration severely for its ignorance of "the man's"  
activities.

"There are continually things happening that I know  
about. But they are developing through the blindness of  
the administration. They (the administration) should ~~try~~  
be able to stop them." ~~s2s~~ 1/

Oishi was obviously struggling with his conscience.  
He knew that he might be able to ~~stop the~~ keep some persons  
from being beaten if he ~~was~~ informed on Kira, but he  
could not bring himself to be an inu. ~~XX~~ 2/ Consequently,  
he blamed the administration for its "blindness".

1. ibid., June 17, 1944, p. 1; June ~~XX~~ 26, 1944, p. 2.
2. Four months later Oishi was to come to grips with  
Kira when Kira again attempted to start a reign of terror.  
See p. .

*infra*



a warden on the police force, was assaulted. This particular beating was the result of friction between Morimoto and the inhabitants of his block, 54, and was far more widely discussed than that of Hitomi's brother.

Since the November incident, the residents of block 54 had been notorious for the strength of their political views. (Later Block 54 was to become the headquarters of the Resegregation Group.) The block, according to its manager, was split about half and half, for and against the status quo and each section was vociferous and militant.<sup>1</sup> Morimoto, a police warden, and another man residing in the block were strongly anti-status quo in their sympathies. Certain pro-status quo block residents accused them of constant carping criticism and of threatening to report activities of which they disapproved to the administration. From the viewpoint of the pro-status quo people the two men were both domineering and tactless. From the viewpoint of anyone acquainted with the state of the camp, they were very incautious. The dominant trend of camp opinion at this time is clearly indicated by the fact that almost every informant who discussed this beating said that Morimoto had been beaten because he was an inu.

The friction came to a head when Morimoto and his friend criticised the young men in his ward for participating in group morning exercises in the Japanese style, ~~threatening~~ warning the parents of children participating in these activities that they would bring down the wrath of the

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1. After the circulation of the Akashi petition the status quo issue gradually came to be merged with the Resegregation issue. This took several months, however, and at this time informants commonly used the term "status quo" which often implied support of the Akashi petition and membership in the Resegregation Group.

15  
No one appeared to question the possibility that he might have been falsely accused. The fact that people were saying he was inu was sufficient to damn him. In fact, ~~only~~ no informant ever stated during this period that in his opinion a man who had been beaten was not an inu. ~~Tixhanwax haxka~~  
When someone was beaten, it was accepted that he must have done something sufficiently bad to deserve it.

The friction came to a head when Morimoto and his friend criticised the young man in his ward for participating in group morning exercises in the Japanese style, warning the parents of children participating in these activities that they would bring down the wrath of the



Army upon the block. 1/ Thereupon, a group of young men called upon the two issei and remonstrated with them. The argument grew heated and culminated in the boys' locking one of the men in the block ironing room while the other <sup>issei</sup> ~~man~~ to ~~exit the premises~~

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 1. These "morning exercises" or taiso were the first manifestation of a phenomenon which later was to grow enormously under pressure group sponsorship. The exercises were copied after what was purported to be militaristic exercises such as are customary in Japan. During May of 1944 ~~this practice was scattered~~ were done only in certain sections of the camp. Certain of the language schools ~~these exercises were carried on~~ under the auspices of some of the Japanese language schools

~~Thexitradex~~

Widespread Denunciation of Inu, ~~Yes-Yes~~ the Coordinating Committee, the Inu, the Yes-Yes and those Loyal to America

Of great assistance to the pressure group was the widespread antipathy to the Coordinating Committee and an equally widespread ~~toward the Inu~~ <sup>expression of</sup> ~~compulsion to denounce~~ <sup>an ill defined group of residents whose behavior was supposed to be similar to that of the Coordinating Committee, e. g., the Inu or stool-pigeons, the fence-sitters, persons who had been taken over by the Yes-Yes, the fence-sitters, the persons alleged to be "loyal to America!"</sup> ~~This attitude was paradoxical in the~~ These denunciations were usually followed by the statement, "These <sup>Inu, the</sup> Yes-Yes and "loyal" people have to get out of camp." ~~This attitude is paradoxical in the extreme, because most of the people expressing it were fence-sitters themselves and certainly did not wish to be forced to leave Tule Lake. When it is understood, this expression however, that it was a~~ <sup>in my, the</sup> ~~deferring~~ defense mechanism, a means of showing that one was not a fence-sitter, ~~it is not inconsistent.~~ <sup>and a compliance with a behavior pattern in which everyone was taking part, it is not inconsistent.</sup>



call the police. Certain of the block residents decided that matters had gone far enough and petitioned the administration to remove the two men and their families from the block. The administration refused to consider this request. It is also said that residents petitioned Mr. Shimokon, evacuee chief of police, to remove Morimoto from the police force. No attention was given to this attempt at pressure either. Less than a week later, about a dozen men from block 54 were placed in the stockade. A Caucasian member of the police force ~~remarked~~ remarked that "the police were not going to give way to pressure and that they felt capable of protecting individuals in camp who were threatened by trouble-makers."

A few days later, Mr. Morimoto was severely beaten and is said to have suffered a fractured skull. His assailants were never found.

On the day following, while discussing the beating, Mrs. Yamashita <sup>wife of the pressure group leader</sup> remarked in a tone of humorous disappointment, "He wasn't killed though, was he?"

Mr. Yamashita ignored her statement and gave his considered opinion:

"This is only my feeling on the matter. Knowing the Japanese as a race, knowing them for their courtesy and their good behavior, I say that if anyone is beaten there should be a certain fundamental reason for it.

"I hate to see any Japanese beaten by our countrymen. The fundamental reason for such beatings might be caused by the way this camp is governed.

"If I were head of this camp, I would realize the condition and the attitudes of the people. I would order something to be done and as long as I was convinced that such an

~~and~~ Certain isolated groups of young men had morning exercises. At this period, many residents disapproved of ~~them~~ <sup>and children also</sup>, though they were not as outspoken as Morimoto. Most of the people, however, were indifferent <sup>this practice.</sup>

<sup>afraid to disapprove.</sup>

*This doesn't mean  
note might  
seem - I  
think it should  
be put in my  
own words  
and explained  
or placed  
elsewhere*



order was beneficial for the residents, I would stick to it. Mr. Best is trying to make the camp peaceful by trying to make the Japanese people change from being loyal to Japan to being loyal to America."<sup>1</sup>

On June 17, <sup>Mr. Oishi</sup> expressed himself on the beatings as follows:

"The beatings can be looked at from various angles. The Japanese have grievances against the administration, but they know as a fact that they're helpless. Naturally, the only thing they can think of is how to get back at those who spy on them. I think these beatings will keep going for quite a while. I think there will be at least a half a dozen more. The administration listens to the spies and not to the others. So such things will happen. . . ."

"There is one point you no doubt have noticed. These certain persons here beaten up, you'll find the majority of the people are enjoying it."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>Oishi's</sup> ~~last~~ last statement was basically true. ~~A most peculiar attitude prevailed.~~ Though some informants nervously deplored the beatings, many people, perhaps the majority as <sup>he</sup> stated, discussed them with a kind of morbid satisfaction. Often, however, they would add that they wished the beaten man had been one of the more notorious inu.

<sup>at this time</sup> On June 19, Henry Shiohama, the chief eye-witness of the Okamoto shooting, narrowly escaped a beating when it was rumored that his testimony had been unfavorable to Okamoto and had contributed to the Coroner's Inquest verdict favoring the sentry.<sup>3</sup> ~~This has already been described.~~<sup>3</sup> While this beating did not take place, the informant's story of how a group of irate young men came to see her husband to discuss the matter with him and to decide whether the story told of the young man were true and merited a beating, is a significant hint on the manner in which some of these beatings were arranged.<sup>4</sup> The manner in which beatings were arranged is a

1. Ibid., June 14, 1944, pp. 1-2;  
3. See pp.

2. Ibid., June 16, 1944, pp.1-2.  
4. Ibid., June 19, 1944, pp.1-2.



difficult subject on which to gain information. However, some very frank individuals have admitted that there are at least three different methods. In some cases, an individual in a certain block or ward became so unpopular that a group of his enemies coming upon him in a convenient place spontaneously took advantage of the situation and beat him up. In other instances, the beating may have been arranged as in the case just cited. A gang of young men met, discussed the situation, and determined to teach someone they consider an inu an unforgettable lesson. Other beatings were unmistakably planned with care and were probably engineered by older men who stayed in the background.<sup>1</sup> Such groups were capable of planning and carrying out a series of beatings. "Oishi emphasized the importance of this latter method; stating that he knew it had been employed <sup>the</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>Center.</sup> ~~Manzanara.~~ He added:

"Some of them deserve it and some don't. Like Yamatani, he should have been buried long ago. But some don't deserve it."<sup>2</sup> *Stress Kira - Oishi's hints?*

Mrs. F., an older nisei woman did not approve of the beatings. She wished "that the Japanese people could get along peacefully together." She blamed gossip for the trouble, saying, "People talk and say they're inus. The Hitomi beating was a mistake. They mistook the man for his brother."<sup>3</sup>

Mrs. Fujimoto, a younger nisei woman, hated the "dogs" but was worried about the beatings. Undoubtedly this attitude was common. *Near the end of the beating rage,*  
~~On June 24,~~ she said:

"I heard that the man in block 35 (Hitomi's brother) can't see. He was attacked after an Engei Kai meeting. He just came out of the Santa Fe Internment camp and as soon as

*Please in H. beating should be placed earlier*

~~1. Kira, for instance, was later rumored to have engineered most of the beatings of this period.~~

2. R. Hankey, Notes, October 16, 1944, p. 6.

3. Ibid., June 21, 1944, p. 1.



20

Oishi added that when a wave of beatings such as this hit the camp some innocent persons often suffered with the guilty:

"Some of them deserve it and some don't. Like Yamatani, he should have been buried long ago. But <sup>some</sup> ~~some~~ don't deserve it." 1/

~~Oishi was deeply concerned over the condition into which the camp was falling. He was very well informed on what went on among the activities of the pressure group and probably was more than a little suspicious of Kira's complicity. He was inclined to suspect Kira and his gang of complicity in the beatings.~~

Although Oishi had no pity whatever for a guilty dog, he was deeply concerned over the condition into which the camp was falling. ~~He was very well informed on what went on among the activities of the pressure group and probably was more than a little suspicious of Kira's complicity. He was inclined to suspect Kira and his gang of complicity in the beatings.~~ He was very well informed on what went on among the activities of the pressure group and probably was more than a little suspicious of Kira's complicity. He was inclined to suspect Kira and his gang of complicity in the beatings.

Invent in line

Mrs. F., an older nisei woman did not approve of the beatings. She wished "that the Japanese people could get along peacefully together." She blamed gossip for the trouble, saying "People talk and say they're inus. The Hitomi beating was a mistake. They mistook the man for his brother." 2/

Mrs. Fujimoto, a younger nisei woman, often expressed

1. R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 16, 1944, p. 6.

3/ ibid., June 21, 1944, p. 1.



20 a

hatred of the inu but near the end of the craze began to show great anxiety and nervousness. She stated:

"I think everybody is nervous in here. This place gives me the willies." 1/

*1/2 inch in line.*  
By the latter part of June tension had reached an almost unbearable point. Even in the most conservative homes, the evil doings of the inu and the Co-op officers and ~~discussions of the~~ the recounting of their greusome details of the latest beating were the chief topics of conversation. Much time was spent ~~guessing~~ guessing who would be next. ~~Frequently~~ Frequently  
Frequently ~~disappointment~~/disappointment was expressed that some of the "bigger" dogs ~~hadn't been~~ such as Yamatani or Tateishi had so far escaped. Discussions of imaginary blacklists, which were supposed to contain the names of the "dogs"

(17A)

Another informant, a young woman unconnected with the pressure group commented upon the beatings and stated that the attackers "were too smart to get caught". 1

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1. ibid., July 2, 1944, p. 2.



21.  
hatred of the inu, but near the end of the craze began to show great anxiety and nervousness. She stated:

"I think everybody is nervous in here. This place gives me the willies." 1/

Her ~~husband~~ husband showed a similar nervousness. Although he denounced the inu, the Co-op and the administration, he also railed against the attitudes into which the camp residents had fallen:

"I'm getting sick of the attitude of the people. They are cutting each others throats. . . . Some of the smartest people I know are getting disgusted. . . . They came here and expected to find a cooperative atmosphere. Their remarks add up to something like this: 'It's not a case now of whether I want to go back to the old country. It's a case of whether I can stay here long enough to go back to the old country and still retain my self-respect.'"

"The trouble is they expect you to act like a damn radical and go out and kill every hakujin (Caucasian) on the other side of the fence and when you don't act like that you're inu!" 2/

He then stated that he had decided to relocate. Much later, ~~another~~ an informant who was a friend ~~stated~~ of his stated that ~~he~~ <sup>Fujimoto</sup> had gotten out of camp because Kira's gang had threatened ~~he~~ to beat him if Fujimoto didn't ~~give them~~ see that they got extra sugar from the mess. 3

By the latter part of June tension had reached an almost unbearable point. Even <sup>in</sup> the most conservative homes, the evil doings of the inu and the Co-op officers and the recounting of the greusome details of the latest beating were the chief topics of conversation. Much time was spent guessing who would be next. Frequently disappointment was expressed that some of the "bigger

1/ ibid.,

2/ ibid., June 25, 1944, p. 1.

3/ Super, Fujimoto worked in mess operations.

## Chapter V

### Rise of June hints

~~14 - O. K. hints about May -~~  
~~15 - hints about~~

18 - Place I wish to ~~show~~ ~~later~~ p. 22.

~~20 - O. K. hints and~~

22 + I wish + p. group - "people use up"

~~25 - Young People and~~

26 - Cont. Crew and P. Group, hints



She pointed out that the people in the block thought that it was very peculiar that Mr. Komiya, who was only a minor officer in the Daihyo Sha Kai was sent to Santa Fe while Mr. Takahashi, who had been a very active leader went scot free. It will be remembered that Takahashi had long been accused of informing on his fellow members of the Daihyo Sha.

*How  
cryptic  
pattern  
statement*

"Both my husband and I think there's going to be a lot of trouble here since these 13 men were sent to Santa Fe. Mr. Komiya in this block was sent. He was just secretary to Mr. Takahashi. It's very mysterious. It's funny that he was sent to Santa Fe and Mr. Takahashi wasn't even arrested. I

dogs", such as Yamatani or Tateishi had so far escaped.  
Discussions of imaginary blacklists, which were supposed  
to contain the names of the "dogs"



in order of their guilt, were common. Whispered hints that one of the assaults might end in murder were heard occasionally. The ordinary camp resident himself did not make threats of murder, nor did he know who was <sup>m</sup>compiling the hypothetical lists. But even though he might disapprove of the beatings, he joined wholeheartedly in the gossip and every new story of a particularly dastardly action on the part of a "dog" was enthusiastically passed along. Whenever a person was beaten, the news spread rapidly and the details of the story and of the victim's misdeeds which had caused the beating were enlarged and distorted in the manner of a folk tale. Many persons, especially nisei women, expressed shock and disapprovation. But the most unusual reaction expressed to a new beating was, "Well, I see another dog got what was coming to him."

✓ 1.

Attempted Hammer Murder

While the residents were in this overwrought state, a deranged evacuee attacked his room-mate with a hammer, ~~which~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>hand</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>attacked</sup> ~~injured~~ <sup>him</sup>. ~~Which~~ ~~then~~ ~~injured~~ ~~man~~ ~~was~~ ~~There~~ ~~was~~ ~~no~~ ~~evidence~~ ~~whatever~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~injured~~ ~~man~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~an~~ ~~inu~~, yet, ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~inu~~ ~~obsession~~ ~~was~~ ~~by~~ ~~now~~ ~~so~~ ~~universal~~ ~~that~~ ~~some~~ ~~people~~ ~~began~~ ~~to~~ ~~believe~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~man~~ ~~must~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~an~~ ~~inu~~. Two days after this beating the Matsuda's hinted that the attacker might have considered his room-mate an inu. It should be remembered that the Matsudas, as members of the pressure group, vociferously spread the most exaggerated of the inu rumors and thereby added to the nervous tension in camp. Shortly thereafter a young nisei woman, ~~unconnected~~ with the pressure group ~~stated~~ stated:

"People are saying that even this beating was an inu beating. The old man found out that his friend was acting like an inu. " 1/

~~Commenting upon this and other beatings, the informant added that the attackers were "too smart to get caught".~~

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1/ ibid., July 2, 1944, p. 2.



he got into camp he was employed as manager at the Sewing Factory. His brother is manager of the Co-op.

"I think everybody is nervous in here. This place gives me the willies."<sup>1</sup>

(work for others)

#### Attempted hammer Murder

~~While camp in this state.~~  
On June 22, a deranged evacuee attacked his room-mate with a hammer. While this attack had no connection with the feeling against the inu, it increased the tension in camp.

Several informants remarked that the attacker "must have been crazy, because he went to the warden's office and gave himself up." The Matsuda's hinted that the attacker may have considered his room-mate an inu. It should be remembered that the Matsuda's, as members of the pressure group, vociferously spread the most exaggerated of the inu rumors and thereby increased the nervous tension in camp.

On July 2, a nisei woman commented on this and the other beatings stating that the attackers were "too smart to get caught."

She added:

"The man who did turn himself over was crazy. That's why he gave himself up. People are saying that even this beating was an inu beating. The old man had found out that his friend was acting like an inu."<sup>2</sup>

#### Beating of Kurihara

On June 29, a resident of block 74 named Kurihara was beaten. According to rumor, he had come from Heart Mountain and was reputed to be a close friend of Mr. Tateishi, one of the "number one" inu. He was also said to have been a member of the Daihyo Sha Kai.<sup>3</sup>

1. Ibid., June 24, 1944, p. 1.
2. Ibid., July 2, 1944, p. 2.
3. Ibid., June 30, 1944, p. 2.



21

Yamashita blamed the administration for the beatings, saying, "The fundamental cause for such beatings might be ~~caused by~~ the way this camp is governed." Immediately after the beatings of Hitomi's brother and Morimoto Yamashita was elated and stated cryptically that ~~the~~ in the very near future the time ~~might come when~~ might come when the ~~camp~~ camp residents would arise and put an end to the increasingly unbearable situation. 1/ Undoubtedly, he ~~presented~~ pictured himself leading the Resegregation Group along a path of action which neither the distraught and excited residents nor the administration, which was obviously unable to do anything about the situation, could resist. The ~~excessive~~ egocentricity ~~of~~ and sense of self-importance of ~~these leaders~~ many of the leaders of the pressure group ~~was so~~ was so exaggerated that it is difficult to picture. ~~From this it can be seen that the meeting of the leaders~~ One excellent exemplification took place at Yamashita's ~~his~~ apartment. A group of pressure group leaders were present. ~~and~~ Yamashita, with manifest conviction ~~informed~~ stated, "All of these men present are going to be very influential people in Japan (after the war)." <sup>2</sup> He asked that a complete copy of the publications of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study be sent to him, ~~concluding/finally,~~ <sup>with dignity</sup> "The Rockefeller Foundation can afford it, I am sure." 2/

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1. ibid., June 14, 1944, p. 2.
  2. ibid., May 21, 1944, p. 6.



Informants contacted spoke of the matter casually. Beatings had become such common occurrences that they aroused noticeably less interest and excitement. On the Kurihara beating, "Y"'s wife said:

*my husband*  
"People are telling ~~George~~ that the man who was beaten didn't know why he was beaten. ~~But~~ some say there was a good reason for it."<sup>1</sup>

*inherent in this form*  
*he said,*  
*hunted, meaningfully -*  
"Oishi" remarked that he had heard that Kurihara had been very unpopular in his block. ~~The writer~~ *When* asked ~~him~~ why only third-rate inu were being beaten up, *he said,* "You should know," ~~said "he."~~ "The big ones are too well guarded. But the guard will slip up some time."<sup>2</sup>

Wave of Gossip about the Co-operative Enterprises

*Land shy and shy and the other side of it*  
After the beatings of Hitomi's brother and Morimoto, gossip about the misdeeds of the Japanese employed in high positions of the Co-op increased. *sh stories of graft become more fantastic.* ~~Fantastic stories of graft swept the camp.~~ Almost every resident appeared to take part in relating the stories and it is probable that a good proportion of the gossip was believed. It is almost certain that some of these tales originated with the undercover pressure group who had hated the Co-op's Board of Directors bitterly ever since they stood against the luxury issue in December and helped break the status quo in January. Nevertheless, no matter what their source, the stories were eagerly accepted and repeated by the great majority of the camp residents. ~~June 19,~~ *wife of* Mrs. Matsuda, *leader,* a member of the pressure group, related a ~~wild~~ story about Mr. Hitomi, the General Manager of the Co-op. She said that the Manzanar group had not wished to get mixed up with the unsavory men heading the Tule Co-op and had determined to form a separate

1. Ibid., p. 1.

2. Ibid., July 2, 1944, p. 2.

29.

enterprise. Thereupon, Mr. Hitomi had approached the Manznar group with a large sum of money to bribe them to enter the Tule Lake Co-op. This sum, a member of the Mana~~an~~anar group had kept pinned to his wall "to show to Mr. Robertson when he came". Later, informants ~~in the know~~ <sup>one</sup> stated that it was not the Manzanar Group proper which was anxious to start a separate Co-op but that it was Mr. Kira, <sup>one of</sup> the undercover leaders of the pressure group who was desirous of increasing his prestige in this manner and brought pressure for the separate Co-op so that he might dominate it. Mrs. Yamashita revealed that the man ~~was~~ whom Hitomi ~~is~~ was alleged to have attempted to bribe was Kira. There is little doubt that Kira had such ambitions at this time and there is also little doubt that the pressure group leaders supported him in spreading gossip about Hitomi and the Co-op. 1/

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1. Information about Kira's machinations is not confined to evacuee informants. Noyes, the Project Attorney, stated that a high ranking Co-op officer came to the Caucasian police before relocating and stated that Kira had threatened him and other Co-op Board members with violence on numerous occasions because they would not follow his dictates.



enterprise. (This part of the story is almost certainly true and corresponds with the general stand-offish and somewhat superior attitude taken by the large group which came to Tule from Manzanar in late February). Mrs. Matsuda continued the story, saying that *Shenryon* Mr. Hitomi had approached the Manzanar group with a large sum of money to bribe them to enter the Tule Lake Co-op. This sum, a member of the Manzanar group, probably Mr. Kira, had kept pinned to his wall "to show to Mr. Robertson when he came."<sup>1</sup> ~~The writer does not believe Mr. Robertson was ever shown this "evidence."~~

On June 21, Mrs. "F", an older nisei woman said:

"People say that the Co-op men are making big money for themselves. They say that whenever a Co-op man leaves here (relocates) he takes a big pile of money away with him. If the Co-op would make a statement every month, showing where the money goes, maybe the people wouldn't feel so bad."<sup>2</sup>

On June 25, Fujimoto said:

"Take the 'well organized Co-op' for instance. (This statement was meant sarcastically). Heretofore there has been a rumor that quite a few of the boys high up in the Co-op very nicely relocated with a big wad of dough. That's a very nice thing to do to the poor Japs in here.

"They claim it is the policy of all good Co-ops to pay off when their working capital is tripled - then the dividend can be paid. But inasmuch as the people are stuck here for the duration, I don't think that's necessary. Instead of paying off, what do they do? Build a new soda water factory and other things, and you can't tell me they're going to be able to pay that off in one summer.

"The Co-op has from 150 to 200 cases of Troco Margarine. I'd like to know where they get it because that stuff is on the point list."

At this point in the conversation, Fujimoto's sister told how she had been in a Co-op store the day before when Akitsuki, the ex-Co-op secretary and ex-chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee,

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1. Ibid., June 19, 1944, p. 1.

2. Ibid., June 21, 1944, p. 1.



entered:

"I was in the Co-op yesterday when Akitsuki came in. You know - we all turned the back to him. Everyone of us. You could see how it was - public inu number one."

Fujimoto continued with a story about Yamatani who, immediately after segregation, had obtained the managership of the Co-op's fish market but was reputed to be very influential "on the inside," had then become a member of the Co-ordinating Committee and since the resignation of that body had taken over the positions of Police Commissioner and manager of the Co-op's tofu factory.

"Yamatani tried to gyp us out of about 100 cakes of tofu the other day. The tofu is sent to the messes in tubs of about 50 cakes each. Each mess called up and complained that they were from five to ten cakes short. I went to see Yamatani about it. He said, 'Of course, it's possible that the fellows in the mess took them (the tofu) home with them.' He finally promised that the Co-op would make the loss good."

As a final indictment of the Co-op, he added:

"It wouldn't surprise me a bit if Mr. Best wasn't getting a little from the Co-op. Inasmuch as there have been three dividends passed up for lack of funds. That starts to smell."<sup>1</sup>

It should be noted that Fujimoto and his family, who appeared to believe that many stories of the Co-op graft were true, are intelligent nisei and at this time had no sympathy whatever with the "agitators" or the pressure group. Fujimoto, in fact, was already planning to relocate.

The bitterness of the attitudes expressed by his family, and by several other informants who had no connection with the pressure groups or who were hostile to the "trouble-makers" made it quite evident at this time that hostility toward the Co-op's Board of

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1. Ibid., June 25, 1944, pp. 1-3.



directors was widespread throughout the camp.

The same day, an interesting attitude on the part of the young Japanese teachers, teaching in the Caucasian school, was reported. At one of their meetings, Miss Hobby, their supervisor, instituted a discussion on Co-operatives. Immediately, she was deluged by critical remarks and sneers at the expense of the Tule Lake Co-operative. She then suggested that the teachers get their complaints in order and invite Mr. Runcorn, the Supervisor of the Co-op, to address them and answer their complaints. This, the teachers, young Japanese of superior intelligence and considerable American background, absolutely refused to do. They were not moved by Miss Hobby's argument that they were teachers and had a duty as "leaders of the community." One said, "We start this and it'll be two-by-fours for us."<sup>1</sup>

Another informant, a Mr. Abe, who was extremely critical of any agitation or violence, stated on June 27:


"The information I get from all over say that there are a few of the managers of the Co-op who have a close relationship with the WRA officials. They are getting graft out of the Co-op (both appointed personnel and evacuees). The first thing I heard when I came to this camp was, 'If you say anything against the Co-op here you'll be arrested.' As long as the Co-op is carried on this way, someday another big trouble will happen."<sup>2</sup>

On June 30, a gentle, kibe woman recounted the following gossip:

"There is a certain man working in the shoestore, an old Tulean. He is the man right under the Caucasian head. He told me that the man who worked before him (before Mr. Best came to Tule Lake) had taken so many thousands of dollars of the profits. We don't profit anything here. The project director sent him out of here (with the money)."<sup>3</sup>

1. Ibid., June 26, 1944, p. 1.
2. Ibid., June 27, 1944, p. 4.
3. Ibid., June 30, 1944, p. 1.

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These pages belong to Hankey's  
Chapter V -- Inu hatred.  
Should be included in Revised  
Chapter VI where the pressure  
tactics of the pressure group  
will be described.



Mrs. K., a nisei, remarked that she had heard that some people had said that when Hitomi's brother was beaten, the beaters had really been after Hitomi himself. But, said she, they thought the ~~bh~~ought the brother ought to be beaten up too. "The Co-op is getting more and more unpopular," she added. "Several people have told me, 'If you say anything against the Co-op anywhere, you're going to be put in the stockade.'" 1/ Mr. Abe, an issei who was extremely critical of any agitation or violence made the same complaint:

"The information I get from all over say that there are a few of the managers of the Co-op who have a close relationship with the WRA officials. They are getting graft out of the Co-op/ (both appointed personnel and evacuees). The first think I heard when I came to this camp was, 'If you say anything against the Co-op here you'll be arrested.' As long as the Co-op is carried on this way, some day another big trouble will happen." 2/

The specific accusation that ~~the~~ anyone who spoke against the Co-op would be arrested and put in the stockade was made by half-a-dozen informants in the two weeks prior to Hitomi's death.

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1. ibid., July 2, 1944, p. 1.
  2. ibid., June 27, 1944, p. 4.

INCREASING ARROGANCE OF PRESSURE GROUP

In late June two events occurred which exemplify the increasing arrogance of the pressure group ~~and their~~ toward the administration. A considerable number of men were fired from the coal crew and ~~17~~ <sup>19</sup> 15 issei ~~members of the Daihyo Shan Kai~~ members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, who had been confined in the stockade since November or December 1943, were sent to Santa Fe. On both occasions, the pressure group let it be known ~~through~~ to the administration that ~~this news was going to~~ "the people" were going to cause serious trouble, and that they were having difficulty "restraining their boys".

As far as the terminated members of the coal crew were concerned, Mr. Robertson stated that the termination was necessary and justifiable since the men did little work and spent most of their time loafing. In spite of the contentions of the pressure group, the people viewed the termination with indifference. Several informants stated that if the boys were loafing they ~~ought~~ ought to be laid off.

~~Issei Stockade~~Issei Stockade Internees sent to Santa Fe

On June 28, the removal of 15 of the issei confined in the stockade, a movement which the administration had been considering for some time, was finally accomplished. The pressure group again made ominous threats of what "the people would do," going so far as to hint to Mr. Robertson that "so far ~~has~~ there had only been beatings. Now there might be murder." But while friends and



acquaintances of the ~~interne~~ men interned were angry, no overt protest came from the residents.

It was not possible to obtain a general picture of how the removal of these men was regarded by the colonists. Only one informant, Mrs. Yamaguchi, was contacted before the Hitomi murder made visits impossible. ~~While she~~  
~~voted against us in the state assembly~~ Mr. Komiya, one of the men interned lived ~~in~~ had lived in her block.

Any one 7th 34

The Coal Crew ~~Layoff~~ Terminations and Behavior of Pressure  
GROUP

Japanese

In late June a large number of ~~men~~/employed on the Coal Crew were terminated. According to Mr. Robertson who was in charge of Operations, ~~this~~ the termination was necessary and justifiable, since the men did little work and spent most of their time loafing. The men laid off were pretty tough fellows and appear to have had good contacts with the pressure group. The pressure group immediately began to ~~threaten to~~ repeat their oft-expressed threat that there would be ~~trouble~~ and "trouble in camp" and that they were having difficulty "restraining the boys". The residents on the whole viewed the matter with complete indifference. A few informants stated that if the boys were loafing they ought to be laid off.



She pointed out that the people in the block thought that it was very peculiar that Mr. Komiya, who was only a minor officer in the Daihyo Sha Kai was being sent to Santa Fe while Mr. Takahashi, who had been a very active leader went scot free. All indications pointed to the fact that Takahashi had informed to the administration and consequently was never arrested.

"Both my husband and I think there's going to be a lot of trouble here since these 13 men were sent to Santa Fe. Mr. Komiya in this block was sent. He was just secretary to Mr. Takahashi. It's very mysterious. It's funny that he was sent to Santa Fe and Mr. Takahashi wasn't even arrested. I

3. A  
Because of the ~~present~~ <sup>ever present</sup> danger of arrest and confinement  
in the stockade, the group was forced to remain underground  
and ~~carefully~~ the members carefully concealed their  
identity from the administration. They carried on their  
activities with great caution, working either anonymously  
or using only one person as spokesman, <sup>a person</sup> whose arrest would not  
weaken them numerically.

First overt act of group

In mid-January of 1944 this group made its first overt  
attempt to bring about the release of the detainees by  
soliciting the aid of Mr. Robertson, an Assistant Project  
Director, whom they contacted because of ~~xxxxxx~~ the reputation  
of confidence and trust-worthiness he had gained in his  
previous position of Director of the Leupp Internment Camp.

With great caution, a member of the group requested that  
Robertson call at a certain address in block 11. From there  
he was directed to ~~xxxx~~ <sup>the</sup> Matsuda's home in Block 6 where he met  
x and talked with <sup>a half dozen</sup> members of the undercover group. They asked  
him to intercede in ~~xxxxxx~~ behalf of the detainees and  
talk to the detained leaders. Robertson ~~xxxxxx~~ complied  
and talked to a group of detainees among whom were Kuratomi.  
Kuratomi promised that if ~~xxxxxx~~ a few of the Negotiating  
Committee were released, they would bring the camp back to order.  
Robertson took the matter up with Best but Best would not  
hear of it. 1 >

The <sup>home</sup>  
~~xxxx~~ Matsudas, at whose ~~home~~ <sup>home</sup> the undercover group  
met with Mr. Robertson, were at this time very active in the  
undercover group. They continued to hold an important position  
in the pressure group throughout its ~~xxxxxx~~ development, in



INSERTION

Later, informants in the know stated that it was not the Manzanar Group proper which was anxious to start a separate Co-op but that it was Mr. Kira who was desirous of increasing his prestige in this manner and brought ~~pressure~~ ~~this pressure~~ ~~on to bear~~ pressure for the separate Co-op so that he might ~~dominate~~ dominate it. Mrs. Yamashita revealed that the man whom Hitomi was alleged to have attempted to bribe was Kira. There is little doubt that Kira had such ambitions at this time, and there is also little doubt that the pressure group, of which he was one of the behind the scenes leaders, supported him by spreading gossip about Hitomi and the Co-op. 1/

"The people are very upset about the people being sent to Santa Fe. Many people say that they have been fooled: they aren't going to be sent to Japan first, just because they were sent to Santa Fe."

"I don't know. The people here just shut up. With Mr. **Takahashi** here, nobody trusts him." 1/

Mrs. Yamaguchi implied that the people in her block did not dare to express themselves frankly on the matter of the transfer to Santa Fe for fear that Mr. Takahashi would <sup>also</sup> report them to the administration. Two nights after ~~this moment~~ <sup>the men</sup> left for Santa Fe, Mr. Takahashi was <sup>beaten</sup> ~~assaulted~~ by ~~mythical~~ unknown assailants but was not injured seriously.



26

Informants contacted spoke of the matter casually. Beatings had become such common occurrences that they aroused noticeably less interest. ~~Yamaguchi's wife~~ Mrs. Yamaguchi remarked on the Kurihara beating that some people were saying that ~~Mr. Kurihara~~ Kurihara did not know why he had been beaten up. Others, she said, meaningfully, "say there was a good reason for it", i. e., Kurihara was an inu.

Oishi remarked that he had heard that Kurihara had been very unpopular in his block. When asked why only third-rate inu were being beaten up while number one inu went untouched, he said, "You should know. The big ones are too well guarded. But the guard will slip up some time." Oishi, like many other residents eagerly awaited the day when ~~one of the~~ ~~one of the~~ one of the more notorious inu would get their just deserts.

#### Attitude of Leaders of the Pressure Group

The leaders of the pressure group viewed the beatings and the great increase in tension in camp with a satisfaction which came close to elation. They interpreted the beatings and unrest as ~~proof that the government was not rising and that~~ ~~direct~~ resulting directly from enormous administrative ineptitude and frequently voiced the opinion that if things continued to get worse Mr. Best would be forced to resign. ~~This, in the opinion of the pressure group, was the only way to~~ His place, they hoped, would be filled by Mr. Robertson who was at this time very sympathetic to them. Robertson visited the Yamashitas and the Matsudas frequently, and believed that resegregation would do no harm and might bring an end to the discord in camp. M.  
r.





SUGGESTION ON CHAPTER V "SUPPRESSION" P. HANKEY

p. 1. line 11. The initial fear and bewilderment occasioned by the entrance of the Army which was followed by increasing economic hardship, and boredom through lack of employment might be mentioned here. Very important also, was the growing fear of internment which hit many people who had no connection with the DHS whatever. (See attitude, Sept. 14, p. 14) and also pick-up of 90 men, Hawaiian kibe and people without identification cards. (See also Nishimoto, SJ, Nov. 26, p. 2.) (See comment on p. 20.)

Two other important factors which might be touched upon here or enlarged later are:

1: The complete befuddlement of the people with the appearance of of Negotiating Committee after the other. (See comment on p. 24 A.)

2. The breakdown in confidence in the Spanish Consuls exemplified by comparison of the earlier statements made in the Tulean Dispatch and the attitudes expressed at the meetings (pp. 32-33).

~~xpxxxxxxxxxx~~

p. 1, line 11. The initial great fear and bewilderment, and then the growing economic hardship, boredom and anxiety over being picked up which ~~finished~~ latter fear affected ~~far more~~ than many more people than the active DHS leaders or supporters might be briefly mentioned to set the tone for this chapter. Also appearance of No. 1 after No. 1 Breakdown of confidence in Span. C..

p. 5. line 23. Tsuda's statement "We stressed that point" was addressed to me, emphasizing how he had explained the matter to the Army. Since the quotation is introduced as Tsuda talking to the Army this sentence is a little confusing.

p. 7. First Paragraph. This sentence is confusing. One does not know whether the Japanese govt. or the evacuees asked the consul to investigate the "reasons for the Army's action", etc.

p. 10- line 1. This statement by Kuratomi will not be clear to the reader without further explanation, I fear.

p. 19 - line 13. ~~Insure~~ I suggest that this be changed to ~~female members~~ "female members of the WRA personnel accompanying the soldiers to search the women." From what little I know about this business (and I know some of the women who participated in the search) ~~xxxxxxx~~ the Army asked women to go with them who they ~~xx~~ knew would have little objection. I doubt if any pressure was put on women to participate in this search and as it is written now there is some implication of this.

p. 20, line 11. This would be a good place to insert a few sentences on residents' attitudes. Note the 90 Hawaiian kibe i picked up, many of whom, informants state, had nothing to do with the DHS at all. The fear instilled in the residents by this pick-up must have been great. As far as our data goes it is the first big pick-up. This pick up would also increase resentment.

p. 22. lines 14-16. Kuratomi said this statement was never made by him, Kai or anyone else. Since the only informant is Opler I think it should be deleted.

lines 19-20. Though I may have said so I doubt if the chief motive was to irritate the Army. ~~They had~~ The NC hoped that perhaps if their ~~point~~ activities were clearly presented to the FBI, the FBI would investigate the situation, at Tule Lake and might take action against grafters, or even present their case in a different light to the administration or the Army.

p. 24 A. The colonists, incidentally, were confused as could be by these mushrooming Negotiating Committees. During the month of November the ordinary resident had to cope with the appearance of the DHS executive committee (Nov. 4) the radical self styled "Second Negotiating Committee" which recommended a hunger strike on November 14, the Renraku-iin, and now the "Acting Negotiating Committee" consisting of unapprehended members of the NC and men appointed by Kai. These developments certainly didn't sooth anybody.  
 @ statement ~~attitudes~~ describing the confusion and uncertainty might be inserted here to prepare the reader to appreciate why the DHS leaders were in such a pickle.

p. 36. lines 1-6 from bottom. This should really be enlarged since it does not begin to give an idea of the confusion, misery, discouragement and boredom of the residents during this period.



p. 40. Unless residents' attitudes relating to the DHS are included in next chapter they ought to be given some place here.