

Ch. II.

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On October 7, less than two weeks after the arrival of the first transferees ^{the administration met} ~~serious difficulties broke out~~ with the coal crew over the termination of three members of the crew. The administration thereupon terminated 43 additional men. The following day ^{these vacant} ~~their~~ positions were thrown open to anyone who would take them but no ^{volunteers} ~~Japanese~~ came forward to take the jobs. Two days later, the administration gave way, rehired the 43 terminated workers and made certain concessions by promising the crew members, coveralls, gloves and a mid-morning snack.¹

what strike?

Details as to what caused this strike or what transpired were almost impossible to obtain. ~~The writer has been informed by Japanese~~ ^{stated striking} that the coal crew was assisted by certain ambitious leaders from Topaz, men who desired to make a place for themselves in the Tule Lake politics. One of the men ^{Yoshiyama} ~~reputed~~ to have taken part in this activity gave ~~the writer~~ the following account. He stated that he had been approached by five men two of whom were coal crew foremen and told that there was a grievance among the coal drivers. A Caucasian in charge caught certain of the coal crew "resting" because of the heat. He stated, "You are getting paid \$16.00 a month and I don't want to see you loafing on your job and resting like this." The Japanese thereupon stated that they were being fed poor food and the work was too difficult. The Caucasian retorted that their food did not concern him; his responsibility was to see that they all worked. However, with the assistance of Mr. Mayeda, the Head of the Civic Organizations, ² the matter was settled and the men who had been fired were allowed to return with full pay.³

¹WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events, p. 1.

³R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 3.

²See p. .

THE PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES OF THE POLITICIANS

The coal crew work stoppage of October 7 and the organizational activities manifested in the far more serious difficulties which were to follow strongly indicate that a considerable amount of individual political activity was initiated by evacuee politicians, would-be leaders, immediately after their entry into camp. In the opening weeks of October, certain men were already attempting to build up their prestige and establish a following. Small meetings were held in the homes of these ambitious persons, meetings to which other men of some political reputation were invited. One small group, headed by an issei who later became fairly prominent in the dominant pressure group, directed its efforts to getting a foothold with the farm workers.¹ These informally organized groups of men desirous of becoming influential and important in the future of the Tule Lake Center disintegrated or were drawn into the camp wide pressure group organized ^{Daihyo Shu Kai which organized} on October 16.

The Old Tulean politicians, however, were not oblivious to the intentions of the new comers. To counteract the political activities of the incoming group, prominent Tuleans hoped to use the Planning Board, a body which had served as an issei advisory council in the pre-segregation group but had been dissolved by Mr. Best at the time of segregation. As an Old Tulean ^{Tsuda} told the writer: "Some of the big shot Old Tuleans had planned that that organization (the Planning Board) was going to be the political boss to rule Tule Lake." These high hopes were also dashed by the unanticipated, spontaneous appearance of the ^{Daihyo Shu Kai} camp wide pressure group.

¹Information from Kuratomi, ibid., April 13, 1945, p. 3.

²From Tsuda, ibid., April 18, 1945, p. 2.

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Tule Lake ReportTHE FARM TRUCK ACCIDENT

Two serious accidents occurred in mid-October. On October 14th a speeding fire truck answering a call turned over. Three firemen were seriously injured. A far more serious accident occurred the next day, an event which proved to be the spark which touched off the accumulation of community grievances and led directly to the convulsion which shook the center in the weeks to follow. The driver of a farm truck carrying 30 passengers to their work on the farm attempted to pass the truck ahead. In passing, the rear wheel dropped onto a soft shoulder. The truck turned over, throwing most of the passengers out upon the ground and pinning five men underneath. Five of the men were seriously injured, one T. Kashima died the following day. The remainder were cut and bruised.¹ The driver of the truck was a young man, 19 years old.

MEETINGS OF THE FARM WORKERS

An accident of this magnitude produced an immediate state of excitement and tension among the camp residents. With a large proportion of the residents already in a state of extreme dissatisfaction with their new found lot at Tule Lake ^{the additional} ~~this~~ tension ^{added by this accident} possessed the potentiality of ~~rising~~ to a dangerous peak of emotional unbalance. The blame, justly or unjustly, was put upon the administration. Almost immediately, the incorrect rumor that the driver of the truck was only 16 years old and that his employment represented deplorable negligence on the part of the WRA for placing the lives of the evacuees in the hands of a minor, spread through the camp.

¹From the report presented by Fenton H. Mahrt, Assistant Chief of Internal Security to R. R. Best, Project Director.

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THE MEETING OF THE FARM GROUP

For some time before this accident the farmers a large proportion of whom were transferees¹ had been in a disgruntled and resentful state of mind. They had requested closed instead of open trucks to transport them to work, but had been given no satisfaction. On the very day of the accident they are said to have been stopped at the gate by the sentry because some of them did not have proper passes. Accordingly some of them did not go to work that morning. An informant stated:

"I heard the workers grumbling, 'Why should we go out of the project to work? If we have to go to all this trouble, why should we work?'"²

However, Mr. Sato, the head foreman was able to induce the men to return to work that afternoon. On the way to work the accident occurred, which put Mr. Sato in a difficult position.

Understandably, ~~the~~ the farm workers were tremendously affected by the accident, feeling themselves in the same danger as their injured friends and co-workers. They held a meeting the same day the accident occurred. Previous to this, the farmers had made a preliminary effort at organization, electing a representative for each crew. These crew representatives and the foremen met in the block 7 mess hall. The farm workers and a large crowd of curious persons gathered outside. Shocked, frightened and angry, their primary concern was self-protection, "unless they were safeguarded they would not go out of the center."³ It has been possible to obtain very little reliable information on what transpired at this or the following farm meetings. The farmers were for the

¹According to Hatano, the Chairman of the Farm Group.

²R. Hankey, Notes, April 30, 1945, p. 2.

³R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 6.

most part simple uneducated people who viewed attempts to get information with an enormous suspicion which it was impossible to break down.

The excited farmers elected a chairman, Mr. Hatano and decided not to return to work until the administration took steps to prevent further accidents and provided adequate compensation for the injured persons. The farmers wished it clearly understood that this work stoppage was not a "strike", for, they reasoned, a strike would give the administration just cause for terminating their employment, an eventuality which they were most anxious to avoid. Their aim was "to refuse to work" until the issue was settled. Furthermore, they decided not to extend the work stoppage to those workers who cared for the hogs and chickens, a decision

dictated partly out of consideration for the animals and probably, to a larger extent, out of consideration of the fact that the animals represented an important part of the camp's food supply.

Certain of the more aggressive farmers as well as the ambitious ~~transferee~~[?] leaders did not fail to perceive that this grave accident and the work stoppage, which jeopardized thousands of dollars worth of mature crops (\$150,000?) offered an unparalleled opportunity to bring pressure on the administration to alleviate the numerous real and fancied grievances of the ~~transferees~~^{residents} and improve the camp facilities. The suggestion was put forward that the issue was too important for the farmers to handle alone and that they should get camp-wide support. How this suggestion was received is not known. Probably sentiment was divided. However, ~~another meeting was held that evening on the day following. At this meeting Reverend Kai of Jerome, Messrs. Takahashi and Kato of Topaz and probably others were invited.~~ ^{these called, and among the participants were} ^{Yoshiyama} ^{powerful leaders and active leaders} The manner in which these "invitations" were extended is questionable. Probably, the more excited and irate farmers, those most desirous of using the accident to create a major incident, took it upon themselves to function as a self appointed committee. In this distinctly unofficial capacity, they invited men who had the reputation of anti-administration leaders and capable orators in the centers from which they had come.¹ Reverend Kai was a Buddhist priest of ~~strong and sincere pro-Japanese views~~ who was held in high esteem by many of the transferees from Jerome. Mr. Takahashi, a much older man, had enjoyed a considerable reputation as a leader in Topaz. ^{Yoshiyama} ^{Kato}

¹This section based on information which Yamatani gave to the FBI. Exerpts from FBI Report on Tule Lake Incident, p. 63.

politically ambitious
 was a young leader of a powerful Topaz, "strong-arm" group.¹ These men were by no means insensible to the opportunity to increase their prestige which this situation presented.²

Very likely this second meeting was held in an extremely emotional atmosphere. The most excited and aggressive farmers and the "invited" leaders probably made fiery, table-pounding speeches, denouncing the carelessness of the administration and calling upon the farmers to behave like "true Japanese."³ For their own protection they were exhorted not to return to work until the administration had provided the compensation to which the injured persons were entitled, and had taken steps to guard against a recurrence. In the face of the emotional state which so serious an accident would produce, it would not be difficult to sway the group to the opinion that the accident should be made a camp-wide issue.⁴ A committee or committees were appointed to take the necessary steps to accomplish this. Rash and reckless sentiments would appeal to and be readily approved by the majority of persons present. The few individuals who might disapprove would be afraid or, realizing their helplessness, would hesitate to speak. If they did speak they would be ignored.

¹ A "strong-arm" group is camp parlance for a loosely organized body of young men given to boisterous, violent, hoodluminous activities. They invariably come into prominence at times of tension and crisis.

² See pp. for a discussion of the temperament of many of the leaders of this period.

³ This exhortation to "behave like a true Japanese" is frequently used by belligerent speakers desirous of urging some action upon their audience. Needless to say, the action proposed may be far removed from genuine Japanese ideology.

⁴ This reconstruction is based on discussions with Nishimoto, Kurihara, and several experienced politicians in Tule Lake. The details come from Kuratomi and Kato, R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 5, 6.

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A resolution was passed, laying the blame for the accident on the WRA, firstly, for employing a minor as a passenger truck driver. (the Japanese believed the driver to be 16 or 18 years old. He was 19.), and secondly, for taking no definite action to prevent the fire truck accident of October 14th. [It was decided "to request and demand for legitimate action from the administration and also to prevent any such happenings in the future." Part of the farmers' resolution read:

"We wish to bring about the solution of various other problems in the center. This problem should be the concern of all the residents of this center. We resolve to make this a center-wide affair and we, the Farm Workers, will not return to our places of employment until our request for such is granted fully."¹

"COOPERATION" OF BLOCK MANAGERS GAINED -- BLOCK MANAGERS MEETING CALLED

In order to raise the incident to the stature of a center-wide affair it was necessary to put the matter before all of the residents. The most convenient mechanism through which this could be accomplished was the Block Managers Central Organization or, The Civic Organizations, as this body was termed at Tule Lake. The Civic Organizations consisted of the seven Ward Representatives, a body formed of a Block Manager from each ward, headed by a Chairman, Assistant Chairman and Secretary.

The great majority of this small group of leading Block Managers consisted of old Tuleans ^{of conservative views}. Yet, when they were approached by several committees of farmers and the newly created farmers' champions, with the proposition that the farm accident be made a camp-wide issue and that a body, representing the entire camp, be elected to handle the matter, they were obliged to take action

¹Translated for the writer by G. Kuratomi, from a resolution passed by the farmers at their second meeting.

whether they desired to or not. The atmosphere of the camp was extremely tense, the people aroused, angry and excited. Moreover, according to Mr. ^{Furukawa} Adachi, a conservative Old Tulean and a prominent member of the Civic Organizations, the Block Managers themselves were of the opinion that action should be taken to improve food and maintenance. Since segregation they had been on the receiving end of innumerable complaints from the disgruntled, irate residents. "They looked forward to improvement; like me, I'd rather eat something better than beans if I could get it."¹ According to Mr. Hatano, Mr. Mayeda, Head of Civic Organizations first referred the farmers to the Planning Board. Since the Planning Board "explained that they were unable to handle it" the farmers returned to the Civic Organizations and asked that block delegates be elected to handle the matter.² Accordingly, a meeting of all the Block Managers was called on October 16. They voted unanimously to hold block elections for the express purpose of electing two representatives from each block, an official representative and an assistant representative. These representatives were to form the body which would undertake action on the farm accident. Unqualified support of the resolution of the Farm Worker's General Meeting was expressed and it was decided to request visits from Dillon S. Myer and the Spanish Consul. The peoples' whole hearted support was asked in taking advantage of this opportunity to improve the living conditions of the center.³ Adachi informed the writer that the Block Managers felt that in this matter they were acting only as an instrument to relay information to the

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 1.

²Ibid., April 30, 1945, p. 3.

³Translated for the writer by G. Kuratomi, from resolution passed at the Block Managers meeting, Oct. 15, 1943.

people and that they were strictly avoiding any implication in politics,¹ an ingenious rationalization indeed.

ELECTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY -- THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The Block Managers called meetings in their respective blocks and the elections were held. Sixty-four representatives

¹R. Hankey, Notes, ibid.

and an equal number of assistant representatives were selected. This body came to be called the Daihyo Sha Kai which translated into English signified "Representative Body." The title was not adopted or selected by the group but was spontaneously taken up by the people.

It is difficult to get conclusive evidence as to how well these block meetings were attended. ^{Furukawa} Adachi, who, as a prominent member of the Civic Organizations was in an excellent position to know what went on, stated that he felt safe in saying that better than sixty percent of the adults in camp attended the meetings. Mrs. ^{Yamashiro} Yamaguchi, an honest informant, stated that in her block (68) the attendance was very large. "Everybody went because they wanted to know what was going on."¹ Large attendance at this time of crisis was to be expected. Important things were transpiring and the curiosity of a fact-starved populace would be sufficient incentive to bring out almost every able bodied resident.

These elections were held under most peculiar conditions. They were characterized by extreme spontaneity, a sense of emergency, and great emotionalism. In most sections of camp, the inhabitants of the blocks had lived together from one to two weeks. They were acquainted only with their fellow block residents who had come from their own centers. They were inclined to select [as their representatives belligerent, vociferous individuals who had gained the reputation of being aggressive opponents of the administration in the centers from which they had come. Little or no thought could ^{have} been given to ^{other} the qualifications of the candidates. If, for example, there were a sufficient number of transferees from Topaz in one block, they would ^{nominally} ~~put up a noted~~ "boiler

¹ ibid.,

a *Topazian* *note* for his *aggressiveness*
~~room speech-maker~~" (does this need a definition? R. H.), and the
 remaining residents, ^a heterogeneous mixture from Jerome, Gila,
 Heart Mountain, ~~Topaz~~, Granada and Tule Lake, ^{might} ~~would~~ have almost
 no chance to get anyone else elected. This does not imply that
 all of the men elected were unbalanced hot-heads or that there was
 any dishonesty or undue pressure used in the elections. Under
 the circumstances it is difficult to see how, in most blocks, the
 people could do anything else but select ~~the most able table~~
~~pounder of their acquaintance~~, an individual whom the administration
 would term an "agitator."

It is probable that in many blocks the people did not even
 vote, since at meetings of this sort a man may get up, speak for a
 friend or acquaintance and secure his appointment by popular acclaim.
 The people are carried away by the oratory of the speaker and applaud
 him vigorously. No one else has the courage or interest to put
 forward another nominee, and the object of the speech receives the
 position "by appointment."

On October 17 the injured farmers formally placed all negotia-
 tions and claims regarding the accident "in the hands of the
 accident committee selected from the colonists" by which they
 meant the Daihyo Sha Kai, signing the following statement:

All negotiations and claims which I may have with W. R. A.
 concerning the accident which happened on October 15, 1943 on the
 Farm Road, I hereby put in the hands of the accident committee
 selected from the colonists which will be my representative.²

This statement was obtained by Kuratomi and several other of
 the newly elected members of the representative body or the Daihyo
Sha Kai. Kuratomi explained to the writer that they obtained

¹Several informants have implied that this happened in their blocks.
 The writer has observed parallels in Gila. cite Oda, Feb. or Mar. '44.

²From a copy of this statement shown to the writer by Kato.

a statement from each farmer as to the extent of his injuries, his name and his age.¹

FIRST MEETING OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

On October 17 the elected or appointed representatives met in the block 16 mess hall and held their first formal meeting. The minutes of this and later sessions were later confiscated by the Internal Security and translated into English by Hyakutaro Mori, vice-president of the Daihyo Sha. Several reliable informants have stated that when it became apparent that the minutes might be confiscated, the Japanese secretary erased portions of the minutes which he thought might incriminate friends. These documents must therefore be employed with circumspection. Fortunately, Mr. Kuratomi checked and corrected these minutes for the writer and Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee, described the first meeting in great detail. With this assistance it was possible to avoid serious errors, trace down some of the insertions and omissions, and obtain an unusually animated picture of at least the first meeting. These minutes will be discussed in detail for, with all their errors and ambiguities, they are very significant documents and reveal the psychological state and the motives and intentions of the body, which were in large part misunderstood by the administration.

This meeting was attended by 64 men, each representing a block, and by others referred to as "non-Daihyo Sha." The latter were representatives of the Motor Pool, the Hog Farm, the Agricultural Division and certain other unidentified persons who attended the meeting on their own invitation. Hyakutaro Mori, one of the *who had been making attempts to organize the farm groups before the* ambitious politicians, *was appointed temporary chairman by accident,* was appointed temporary chairman by

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April 9, 1945, p. 3.

applause.¹ It was then suggested that all non-members leave the floor to facilitate the calling of the roll but this was not done.

Nomination were then made for the post of permanent chairman and Toshio (George) Kuratomi was elected, obtaining exactly half the 58 votes cast: Kuratomi, 29 votes; H. Mori, 20 votes; A. Takahashi, 9 votes. The defeat of Mr. Takahashi should be remarked upon here, for later it was widely rumored that he, a prominent Topaz transferee, coveted and expected to obtain the position of chairman or at least a position on the Negotiating Committee. Several informants have hinted that he carried his jealousy of Messrs. Kai and Kuratomi to the point of betraying the Daihyo Sha to the Administration. Whether he was actually guilty of treacherous informing cannot be determined. However, the minutes of the Daihyo Sha meetings and other documents give considerable evidence that he was uncooperative and strove repeatedly to obtain personal prestige. Moreover, he later became advisor to the body which actively opposed the policies of the Daihyo Sha. Although he was a very prominent member of the "agitating group," he was never arrested by the WRA or the Army. This fact has always been regarded with suspicion by camp residents.

¹On being asked to explain how a person was appointed "by applause" Kato stated that several people would be nominated and the one receiving the greatest applause would be considered the successful candidate. His explanation is ambiguous. What usually happens is that an interested group gets together before a meeting and decides whom they will nominate. The name is then put forward and if the man is capable he almost always receives enough applause to get him the position. It is not, therefore, a method of selecting one or more men from a group of nominees. Rather, it amounts to a forced appointment put through by a clique. The procedure is very common in camp meetings.

Following the election of Mr. Kuratomi, Mr. Mori was selected as vice-chairman, having received the second largest number of votes. It was decided that secretaries need not be Daihyo Sha Kai members and H. Katayama, Tanaka, and S. Komiya were appointed Japanese secretaries while S. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato was appointed English secretary. These men were also selected by applause.

Kuratomi then addressed the body, emphasized that this meeting was of great significance to the colonists and that the members should refrain from rash and inconsiderate words during the discussion. Thereupon Kazama, the ^{secretary} ~~representative~~ of the ^{farm group} ~~Agricultural Division~~, (clarify his position), took the floor and read the farm workers' resolution. Chairman Kuratomi recommended that before this topic was opened for discussion, the body should decide upon some definite policy for the future. Reverend Kai, the representative from block 5, suggested that since time was limited, the body should proceed with some specific agenda. Kuratomi asked if they should begin with the report of the farm incident and Kai recommended that the farm group should present their recommendation. This was accordingly done by Mr. Hatano, chairman of the farm group. The recommendations were: (1) Prosecution of the responsible parties, (2) Termination of minors, (3) Urgency of consultation with the Administration and the Spanish Consul, (4) Report of the consultation with the Administration should be submitted to the Spanish Consul as soon as possible, and (5) Disposition of the case of those injured in the farm accident.

Rev. Kai then suggested that Nishioka, the foreman of the Motor Pool give an explanation of the employment of minors. Nishioka and two other representatives of the Motor Pool section,

Matsunaga and Okamoto alternately related the story of the accident to the assembled body. Their great apprehension lest they be held responsible for the accident ^{by the Japanese} shows through the awkward phrasing of the minutes and is indicative of the tension and fear already existing in camp. ^{Kuratomu stated later that he felt sorry for them} Kato remarked ^{succinctly on the} behavior of these men: ^{Yoshiyama}

"The representatives of the Motor Pool were really scared to death. They apologized and gave condolence."¹

The motor pool employees apologized for the fact that some of the drivers were minors. No doubt they felt partially responsible for this. They stated that they were doing their utmost to bring about a satisfactory disposition of the case and appealed to the Daihyo Sha to give them full support. Mr. Nishioka also explained the WRA regulation on the age of drivers and it was concluded that according to this regulation the employment of a 16 year old boy was a violation. (This discussion did not have much point, for the driver involved in the fatal accident was 19 years old. This fact was not known either to the body or to the colonists.)

Several questions were then asked: whether these regulations were applicable outside the fence; whether the drivers had chauffeur's licences or operator's licences; whether Social Security compensation applied to such cases; whether insurance was provided for. None of the questions were clearly answered and it was suggested from the floor that a committee be selected to clarify the matter. Rev. Kai suggested that instead, the body should proceed with the urgent plans regarding negotiation on the incident.

Kuratomu suggested that instead of attempting to approach the whole issue at this time, the body should select a number of

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 10, 1944, p. 2.

committees to make investigations by departments. Takahashi stated that he wished to make clear the legality of 16 year old drivers and the applicability of accident insurance before going into the matter of appointing committees. Kuratomi replied that he would have the investigating committee go into these questions. The representatives of the Motor Pool were then excused.

Uchida then asked if the foreman of the agricultural division had notified the Administration of the accident within 48 hours of its occurrence. The chief farm foreman, Sato, an old Tulean, whom the writer knows as an extremely cautious individual replied:

"As I was afraid to be taken as if I were taking side of the Administration, I hesitated to go alone to report this matter. I did not, as yet, make any report to the Administration."

In explanation of this matter, Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato told the writer:

"In Poston where they had a similar case, all the accidents had to be reported within 48 hours. Uchida asked if Sato had reported it. Sato stated that he hadn't because if he did go to the Administration, the people would brand him as an inu. Uchida stated that they must make a committee as soon as possible and see if the Administration had made a proper report to Washington and to the United States Employment Compensation."¹

Rev. Kai stated that he questioned Sato's responsibility, since Sato, as a responsible man, had not reported the accident immediately. He repeated Uchida's suggestion that a committee be formed to consult with the Administration and was loudly applauded.²

Rev. Kai then repeated the suggestion already made by Kuratomi that a number of committees be formed to investigate the numerous matters which required improvement. Mohri backed him up saying:

"Improvement of roads, shower rooms, latrines, and also the inside of the mess halls should be taken up with the Administration. We cannot afford to neglect or ignore such important matters as improvement of living conditions at this time."

¹ibid.

²This was done and the committee was notified by the Administration that a report had been made.

Mr. Izumi of Heart Mountain, who was not a member of the Daihyo Sha stood up and remarked that at Heart Mountain \$125 monthly was given to the immediate family of the deceased in a case like that.¹

Ikeda then reported that T. Kashima, one of the farmers injured, was in a very critical condition. The impressive silence which fell, a characteristic so typical of Japanese groups under strong emotional tension, is awkwardly but significantly expressed by the translators: "Silence reigned the meeting."²

This solemn moment was followed by a series of suggestion on the improvement of living condition and center facilities by four different block representatives. One complained that only one ambulance was available for use in the center, another suggested that the public school (Japanese) should be opened, another that the fire department be improved and that the water supply be increased. Hayashi of block 52 stated:

"I have been informed from an authentic source that farm products are being transported to the Army and Navy. I demand that this body take action and investigate fully. If facts are established, we should altogether refuse shipment to the outside."

Now this suggestion was received by the body is not deducible from the minutes, but it later became one of the significant points taken up with the Administration by the Negotiating Committee. Psychologically it is a very interesting point since it betrays the strong nationalistic feeling which many of the segees, as Japanese loyal to Japan, felt obliged to exhibit. The idea of producing food for the American armed forces was most repellent

¹This was obviously an incorrect statement.

²Mr. Kashima had already died, but his death had not yet been announced by the administration.

and, they feared, would get them into serious trouble when they returned to Japan.

Yoshiyama
Kato told the writer that this part of the meeting was marked by extreme confusion.

"Various Daihyo Sha members were comparing Tule Lake with the centers from which they came. A man would get up and yell, 'In Jerome food was like this.' Then another guy would get up and yell, 'In Topaz, housing was like this.'"

A good example of this bombastic type of speech was recorded in the minutes:

Kurihara: Properties owned by the colonists are their assets, which we should prevent loss by fire or theft by all means. Therefore, I recommend that the fire department of this Center be improved, by providing more fire extinguishers, fire hose, and trucks. Even though the population in Heart Mountain is less than this Center, they have more and better fire equipments. For instance, they have 25,000 feet of hose and fire extinguisher in each apartment. Since our bank accounts are frozen and we have no other means of income than our meager salary, we should be provided with all these necessary equipment to prevent fire. I understand that in some blocks, especially Block 59, they have insufficient water supply and they are very much handicapped. I recommend that at least 200 gallons of water per person daily should be allotted.

Takahashi eventually brought a stop to this deluge of comparisons with other centers and moved that the body proceed with the business to be discussed and decide what issues should be presented to the Administration. As explained by *Yoshiyama* Kato:

"This (the complaints) was not getting anywhere. We must select a committee to negotiate with the Administration and close the meeting. Kuratomi said we must set up different committees because one committee cannot handle everything. He suggested various committees such as fire and sanitation, etc."¹

Kuratomi proceeded with the plan for forming the various committees and their names were written on the blackboard by the Vice-chairman Mori: Sanitation and Betterment of Living Condition Committee, Farm Incident Settlement Committee, Hospital Committee,

¹R. Hankey, Notes, ibid., p. 3.

Mess Hall and Food Supply Committee, Education Committee, Negotiating or Central Committee.

From this point on both meeting and minutes become increasingly chaotic. Much of this is due to a hopelessly confused translation. On checking this section with both Kuratomi and Kato it was found that several of Kuratomi's remarks were attributed to a "voice from the floor" while incorrect speeches are attributed to Kuratomi. ^{Joshuyama} Kato, the English secretary of the Daihyo Sha, gave a much more coherent description of this section from his own notes.

"Mr. Wada asked about the (members of the hog and chicken farm) working or not working and said that (in this matter) they were willing to co-operate with the Daihyo Sha majority. Mr. Kubota of block 17 also stated, 'Yes, we should like to know whether to work.'

"Mr. Kodama said, 'The hogs and pigs are living things, so we should act according to common sense.' Mr. Takahashi gave an example of Topaz where he came from. He stated we should just feed them and come home.

"After that the business of the hogs was forgotten" (but it was brought up again later).

unemployment compensation?
"Mr. Hatano the farm chairman, stated that many were unemployed so we should try to get unemployment compensation. Uchida of 37 stated that the most important problem at the moment is the people involved in the accident and the accident itself. We should clarify the problem first."

Kuratomi then brought the body back to the pressing business of arranging for the selection of the committees and also stressed the necessity of forming a Central Committee to co-ordinate the work of the other committees. This body, the proposed Central Committee, later came to be known as the Negotiating Committee and carried on the negotiations with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer. Kuratomi suggested that the committees be selected on a ward basis, i.e., each of the seven wards in camp would have one man on each committee. The members of the Daihyo Sha were to meet in their

respective wards the following morning and each ward was to select one man for each committee, thus forming a committee of seven men.¹ It might be added that this was putting the responsibility of selecting the committees on the shoulders of a very few men, since each ward consisted of nine blocks on the average. In all fairness, however, it should also be mentioned that these committees were intended to be temporary.

The matter of feeding the hogs and chickens was now reintroduced. Although this is a minor matter, the argument which appears to be faithfully reproduced, is most enlightening on the psychological bent of the men present at this meeting. The extreme radicals argued for not feeding them. The more sensible people, realizing that the food would be taken from their own mouths, argued for feeding them, stating "After all, they are living things."

Akiyama: . . . Since the incident occurred in the agricultural department all the farm workers stopped working. Doesn't that create some friction with the farm workers if the hog and chicken farm workers continue to work.

Kuratomi: If certain department employees stop work altogether it will be regarded as a strike. The hogs and chickens should be fed, as we have not decided on a strike. (No reaction from the floor.)

Wada: I wish to make this point clear for the workers of the hog and chicken farm. Whether it is approved by this Committee to continue to work.

Takata: Since the farm workers stopped working, why should they (hog and chicken farm workers) continue to work. That's not co-operation, to my mind.

Voice from the floor: Strike is not declared. Therefore, at least animals should be fed by colonist workers, otherwise we will be short on food stuff, especially in meat and egg.

Kodama: I am sure that upon declaration of a general strike, all divisions and section workers should stop work altogether. Until then, continue work.

¹ ibid., p. 26.

Takata: We did not come to Tule Lake to get jobs. We came here for the purpose of returning to Japan. The center management should be taken care by the Army and the Administration. We have no responsibility as far as management of the Center is concerned. Therefore, why do we not support the farm workers and go into a strike.

Chair: We will bring up the issue to the Administration just as soon as the committee complete its investigation and preparation.

Ikeda: Since the M. P.'s have confiscated our passes for no reason at all it means that we are prohibited from going out of the fence. Why should we continue to work?

Chair: We have absolute confidence that we will win in this consultation with the Administration on this issue. However, we should think about the time of this negotiation. If the hog farm workers should strike at this time and prove to be a failure, we have no excuse to offer those injured.

Uchida: We have never had chicken or pork on our tables and I presume that hogs and chickens do not belong to us. Why should we assume responsibility for anything that doesn't belong to us?

The question of whether the hog and pig farm workers should continue working was eventually put to a vote. It was decided to continue feeding the animals - 58 to 7. In spite of the rash suggestions of the hotheads, the body as a whole was averse to letting the pigs and chickens starve, probably because such action would make the "work stoppage" an unquestionable "strike" and because, though they had as yet received little or no chicken or pork at mess, they did not wish to cut themselves off permanently from this potential supply.

After the meeting was adjourned someone suggested that the farm workers might think the strike had been postponed and might return to work on Monday, Oct. • Kuratomi stated that announcements would be made in the mess halls by the block managers to avoid this.

Analysis of Meeting and Character of Leaders

This meeting was chaotic, erratic, disorganized and emotional

in the following noteworthy statement:

"At the first Daihyo Sha meeting I didn't like the atmosphere myself. They were emotionally more than 100% for Japan. I doubted very much (if) the speakers were 100% or whether they were just acting. The atmosphere at that time was such that there wasn't any chance to speak up if you disagreed. If anybody did speak up -----!"¹

It is not an exaggeration to state that the number of men present who were somewhat unbalanced, frustrated, and who leaned toward megalomania or paranoia was disproportionately large. The accurate picture is one of a body composed of a larger proportion of exhibitionistic, somewhat unbalanced persons than is normally found. Many of the Daihyo Sha members were reasonable people. However, under the emotional stress and tension of this period, normal persons would make statements and commit acts which they would later regret, while unbalanced persons would go almost berserk, a phenomenon for which the minutes supply much evidence.

Some of the members were undoubtedly on the alert for any opportunity to distinguish themselves as public servants. A considerable number had participated in some type of negotiation with the administration in their former centers. Having committed themselves to returning to Japan, they had convinced themselves that publicized "service for the people" was a means of ingratiating themselves with the Japanese government and perhaps receiving recognition or reward when their exchange took place. The hold which this fantastic notion had on some of the would-be leaders was astonishing. A very practical Japanese ^{Furukawa} who had no sympathy with this type of individual, dramatized this attitude by putting himself in his place and speaking in the first person:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 11, 1945, p. 1.

"Since I'm going to Tule Lake, sooner or later I'm going to Japan. In order to go to Japan, if I think about my future, I may want something to go back with me. By entering into political positions like that, I have a feeling that I've done something for the people. That's a feather in my hat. That would be a certain imaginary gift to the government of Japan. I have helped the evacuees during the hardships of camp life."¹

Certainly, not all the members of the Daihyo Sha cherished this notion. Indisputably, a goodly percentage was infected with it. Much later in camp history this attitude was to lead to the development of an organization so radical and spectacularly pro-Japanese as to make the Daihyo Sha appear moderate by comparison.

Under the circumstances, it is surprising that Kuratomi accomplished as much as he did.

Kuratomi, the young chairman, was 29 years old. He was probably selected for this position because of his excellent command of English, his reputation as a leader in Jerome, and the active part he had already taken in the formation of the Daihyo Sha. Intelligent, reserved, dignified, and of scholarly appearance, he possessed a great deal of self-confidence and determination. He showed himself capable of handling the extremely difficult group which selected him as well as could possibly be expected. He was, however, devoted to Rev. Kai and greatly influenced by him. Due chiefly to Kuratomi's efforts, the members were able to come to several concrete decisions: to form committees to investigate the various grievances and put them into shape to present them to the Administration, to contact the Spanish Consul, and to continue to feed the hogs and chickens.

ELECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE - NUCLEUS OF THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE

Very little information is available on how the Central

¹ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, p. 2.

Committee, the body which was later to assume extreme importance as the Negotiating Committee, was selected. In one ward an informant stated that only six or seven people attended the meeting held on the morning of October 18. There were no nominations. The small group present discussed who would be their best ward representative and he received the position. It is not unlikely that the remainder of the men who were later to loom so high in administrative disapproval were selected in the same informal manner. This nucleus of seven men was later augmented in an equally informal manner. As a member of the Central or Negotiating Committee admitted to the writer: *Yoshinaga*

["The Negotiating Committee was more or less given the power to appoint any person as a member of the negotiating Committee. As secretary, I was more or less on it."]

Administrative Actions

The administration knew nothing of this organization proceeding within the colony and faced the loss of the greater part of the mature farm crop which entailed a financial loss of ^{\$150,000.}..... Three days passed during which the colonists made no attempt to negotiate. On October 20, Mr. Best, the Project Director, issued a statement to be read by the Block Managers in the mess halls, pointing out that an immediate report had been sent to the United States Employment Compensation Commission, that no official spokesman for the farm workers had come forward and that the entire farm crop must be harvested. He added the ultimatum that if the farm workers were not interested enough in the settlement of the problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 a.m., October 21, he would request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees.

Ibid., Nov. 10, 1944, p. 4.

Is it true
that there
were
"general"
elections?
On p. 17,
you suggest
that, on the
average,
only 9
people
would
participate
anyway

On the afternoon of Oct. 15, an accident occurred in transporting workers to the farm area. Many workers were injured. Later one worker died from injuries received. Immediately all reports and notices necessary were made to the U. S. Employment Compensation Commission for all the workers injured. The next day no farm workers appeared and none have reported since. To date no official spokesmen of the farm workers have come to discuss the matter with the Administration although the administration is ready and invites such discussion.

It is the administration's intentions to work with the residents in adjusting problems and making Tule Lake as comfortable a place to live as possible.

[In the immediate situation, the entire farm crop needs to be harvested. These are the vegetables that the residents of Tule Lake will be eating this winter. The crop will not be lost. If
 X evacuees do not harvest it; the Army will be asked to. This means that the W.R.A. will have to ask the Army Quartermaster for vegetables for the evacuee's tables this winter. These requisitions must be prepared for 50 days in advance of the period to be used. We would not be in a very good position to expect our demands to be filled if we fail to harvest the splendid crop now available.

X The situation is the responsibility pure and simple of the residents of Tule Lake Center. The administration is ready and willing to discuss and work out on a fair basis any and all difficulties that may arise. If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 A.M. October 21st, it will be necessary for the WRA to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees.]

/s/ R. R. Best

This statement was also printed in the Tulean Dispatch.

According to Dr. Opler, the Community Analyst, Mr. Best, who had been Project Director for only six weeks (check) relied to a great extent on the advice of Mr. Zimmer, the Assistant Project Attorney; Mr. Schmidt, head of Internal Security; and Mr. Cahn, employed in the Finance Division. These men, according to Opler, advised Mr. Best to be stern with the Japanese, be "tough with the 'pressure-boys'", and make no concessions. No member of the Caucasian personnel, not even Dr. Opler had an accurate conception

¹By "loss" Mr. Best meant only the loss of food; the Japanese obtained no money and received no compensation from the sale of the crops.

of the enormous tension in camp or the imminent danger of explosion.

Response of Farm Workers

In response to this ultimatum the farm foremen met with Mr. Kallam, Chief of the Agriculture Division on October 20. The hand written minutes of this meeting have been preserved by the Negotiating Committee and were shown to the writer. They are signed by Mr. Kallam.

Mr. Kallam, Chief of Agriculture Division, addressed a gathering of farm foreman representatives at 11 o'clock Wednesday morning requesting that the Center farmer return to work and harvest the mature crops in order to meet the requisition of the mess divisions. The interpreter for the farm group advised Mr. Kallam that until the negotiations between the farm groups and the W.R.A. officials has been completed the evacuee farmer will not return to work.

The farmer's interpreter, stressed the fact that [we are not striking, but for our own protective precautionary measure we will not go to work until the issue involved has been settled.]

The interpreter, advised Mr. Kallam that any negotiating between the farm crews and the W.R.A. representative must be ironed out with the negotiating group representing them (the farmers). The interpreter also emphasized the fact that the shortage of vegetable for the mess halls is not the responsibility of farmers, but that the full responsibility is with the W.R.A.

In this meeting the farm foremen make it quite clear that they had handed over all negotiations regarding the work stoppage to a "negotiating group" and that the matter was out of their hands.

When this attempt at negotiating directly with the farmers failed, Mr. Best issued the following statement on October 21. This announcement was also made through the block managers.¹

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

In conformity with my statement as published in the Tulean Dispatch of Oct. 21, I invite any representative committee to discuss any problem. Arrangements for such a meeting can be made at my office.

/s/ R. R. Best

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 1.

It was on the strength of this announcement that the negotiating Committee asked for and received an appointment with Mr. Best on October 26 when the first formal negotiations took place.

Reasons for Delay in Negotiations

9. The delay on the part of the negotiators in contacting Mr. Best requires some comment. The work stoppage began on October 15, and no one approached Mr. Best for 13 days. Members of the Negotiating Committee have explained the delay on the grounds that Best had repeatedly made the statement that he would not recognize any representatives. The real reason for this delay, however is clear. The Daihyo Sha Kai meeting of October 17 indicates that the body had undertaken a formidable and time consuming amount of organization and investigation. A "loyal" evacuee informant sent from Tule to Gila on November 8, explained the situation:

"They were not prepared to make their demands. They were trying to figure out the proper approach. They wanted to ask each block's opinion getting their channel work done."¹

THE PLANNING BOARD FIASCO

On October 22 an attempt was made by Mr. Takahashi to obtrude another organization, the almost extinct Planning Board, into the picture. The Planning Board had served as issei advisory board previous to segregation but had been dissolved at the time of segregation. Takahashi first attempted to call the Planning Board together on October 15, the day of the farm accident, but so few persons attended that no meeting could be held. The second attempt of October 22 met with better success. However,

¹ Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 12.

THE PLANNING BOARD FIASCO

On October 22 an attempt was made by a group of influential Old Tuleans prominent among whom were the leading men of the Co-operative Enterprises to obtrude another organization, the almost extinct Planning Board, into the picture. Mr. Yamatani of Poston, who had obtained an important post in the Co-op immediately upon his arrival at Tule Lake supported this movement and Mr. Takahashi, the leader from Topaz took the leading part. Both of these men were also Daihyo Sha Kai members. The Planning Board had served as an issei advisory board previous to segregation but had been dissolved at the time of segregation.

These Old Tuleans and their ambitious allies from other centers had planned to obtain the political control of the camp through this body. They had called a meeting on October 15, the day of the farm accident, but due probably to the great excitement which this event produced, so few persons attended that no meeting could be held. The second attempt of October 22 met with better success. However, due to the fact that so many of the former members of the board had left Tule Lake as non-segregates, the membership had been hastily augmented by very informal appointments made since the farm accident. It is reasonable to suppose that in several of the blocks these appointments were made by the Block Managers. Although the Planning Board was supposed to be composed of issei alone, a number of nisei appeared in this speedily assembled body.¹ Of the 50 representatives present, at least 27 were already members of the Daihyo Sha. This, as explained by Mr. Tsuda, was due to the fact that in many of the blocks, the

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April 9, 1945, p. 3.

transferees had no idea of what the Planning Board was and figured that since they had already elected a representative to the Daihyo Sha, this man might as well represent them in both organizations. Tsuda added significantly: "If the Planning Board had worked fast there would never have been any Daihyo Sha."¹

Takahashi, who was elected temporary chairman pointed out that the Daihyo Sha was to be "temporary in nature" and that "This Planning Board we are trying to set up will be the backbone of everything and will take over the further negotiation with the administration after the Daihyo Sha has dissolved." His suggestion to reform the Planning Board received almost no support. Member after member arose and spoke in favor of waiting until the Daihyo Sha had settled the current mishap. When the question was put to a vote 36 persons voted to dissolve the Planning Board completely, 8 to discontinue it until the auto mishap was settled and 8 to have it "in actual work now."

Takahashi apparently took this set back with good grace and stated:

"Whether dissolved or not we will support and cooperate 100% with the present Daihyo Sha Kai who have been elected by the people of all the blocks."²

Nevertheless, he had not given up hope completely and attempted to revive the issue at the next meeting of the Daihyo Sha. Kuratomi

¹ Ibid., April 18, 1945, p. 3.

² Minutes of Meeting of Planning Board, Oct. 22, 1943.

discouraged him quickly, and Takahashi's move to limit the life of the Daihyo Sha and channel camp control to another organization failed.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE PUBLIC FUNERAL

When Mr. Kashima's death was announced, two different groups determined independently to give him a public funeral. The first group was composed of his fellow workers, the farm group. The second group was organized on a camp-wide basis and was initiated by a decision on the part of the Daihyo Sha to hold a camp-wide funeral. Mr. Kuratomi was made chairman of the Sogi-iin or Camp Funeral Committee but both he and Mr. ^{Joshiyama} Kato stated that the actual work and preparation was done by Mr. Takahashi, who as a friend of the Kashima family and a fellow resident of Topaz was made head of the Jikko-iin, the Preparations Committee.

This is listed as head of the committee.
~~The farm group contacted Mr. Best first, evidently without the knowledge of the Daihyo Sha committee headed by Mr. Takahashi. Little is known of what happened at this interview for none of the persons present have been contacted. However, from the minutes of a meeting held later, it is apparent that this farm group asked Mr. Best's permission to hold the funeral on the outdoor stage in the central firebreak, requested that he or his representative appear at the funeral and that he send a letter of condolence to the widow. Mr. Best refused, ^{later} He explaining his refusal to Kuratomi as follows:~~

"They didn't ask me, they demanded that I appear at the funeral and speak. They demanded that I transmit a letter of condolence to the widow. I do not recognize demands."¹

¹ Meeting of the Project Director and the Negotiating Committee, Oct. 26, 1943. See p. 24. *include footnote*

Mr. Black, Assistant Project Director, admitted in the presence of the writer that the administration had already prepared a message of condolence and was about to send it when this farm group made its appearance and demanded it. After this courtesy had been demanded it could not be granted, explained Black, because this would be giving way to pressure.

Accordingly on October 21, Mr. Best sent the following letter to Mr. Tsutomu Tanigawa who had acted as interpreter for the farm workers funeral committee:

"In reply to your statement that a public funeral will be held at 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, October 23, at the outdoor stage in the firebreak, you are hereby notified that permission is not granted to hold such a public funeral.

"For your information, funerals will be held in the customary locations as they have since the opening of this Center."

According to Mr. ^{Yoshiyama}Kato, a member of the Jikko-in, Takahashi's Preparations Committee, he and Takahashi approached Mr. Best with no knowledge of the attempt made by the farm group. ^{Yoshiyama}Kato explained their reasons for desiring a public funeral to Mr. Best:

"I told him that since he (Mr. Kashima) was riding on the truck which was checked out of the Motor Pool, the Motor Pool people would want to come. Since he was from Topaz, his Topaz friends would want to come. Since he was a farmer, the farmers would want to come and that it had been decided at the meeting (Daihyo Sha) to hold a public funeral."¹

Mr. Best told Takahashi and ^{Yoshiyama}Kato that he had already refused the use of the outdoor stage to the first group because they had taken an arrogant demanding attitude. He added, however, that he might allow Takahashi's group to use the High School Auditorium, because "they had come in a nice way." The next day, when Takahashi's committee returned for final permission, Mr. Best

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, p. 4.

stated that he would grant them neither the outdoor stage nor the auditorium. Again he put his refusal in writing in a letter dated October 22 and addressed to ^{Yoshiyama} Kato and Takahashi.

Gentlemen:

(1) ["In reply to your request to use the outdoor stage or the high school auditorium for funeral purposes Saturday, October 23, my final answer is that no public funeral will be allowed at this particular time. Permission to use the outdoor stage or the high school auditorium is not granted.]

"No further discussion on this matter is necessary."

Takahashi became very angry and decided to use the outdoor stage regardless of the consequences.

The position of Mr. Kashima's widow in this matter is peculiar. According to ^{Yoshiyama} Kato she at first approved of the public funeral and felt honored at the respect being shown her husband. When approached by the Administration, however, she is reported as having said that she did not wish a public funeral. A reasonable explanation given by Kuratomi is that she was pleased by the honor shown her husband but, in accordance with proper Japanese behavior, refused out of modesty.¹

^{Yoshiyama} Kato, as a member of the Jikko-in telegraphed Mr. Ernst, the Project Director of the Topaz center, informing him that Mr. Kashima had died. Mr. Ernst replied with a message of condolence, an action which the evacuees immediately contrasted with the attitude of Mr. Best, to the detriment of the latter. [The fact that a public funeral was to be held was published in the Tulean Dispatch. Donations of money were made by each block and numerous gifts were made by individuals and groups.² It is said that groups

¹ ibid., Dec. 11, 1944, p. 3.

² ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 4-5.

X
R H's notes

of young men from Jerome and Topaz cleaned up the firebreak in preparation for the funeral.¹]

Mr. Best's state of mind at this time has been described by Dr. Opler as one of bewilderment and indecision. Overly sensitive to any request which might be construed as pressure, always inclined to put off a decision whenever possible, he was ill equipped to handle this difficult situation. moreover, he undoubtedly feared that a large public gathering at this time might have unfortunate consequences.

In any case Best's refusal was interpreted as a discourteous and heartless act by many residents. Verbatim statements indicate that many persons had identified themselves with the dead farmer to a greater or less degree and the emotional resentment aroused by what appeared to be lack of consideration and respect to the dead inevitably strengthened the position of the Daihyo Sha Kai. It increased tension, the sense of group persecution and hostility to the administration. The administration also sank appreciably in public esteem by suffering Mr. Takahashi's successful defiance.

In this atmosphere of deliberate effort to use the death of Mr. Kashima as a means of stirring up the people, one should not lose sight of a far more significant emotional factor: that this death affected the people profoundly and that even the most politically minded individuals were moved in part by a sincere desire to express their respect to the dead man by showing him this final honor.

L. Kataoka

A nisei who later resigned from the Daihyo Sha stated with heartfelt sincerity:

¹ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, pp. 2-3.

*who
made
what
deliberate
effort?*

"They figured the people who got hurt represented the whole center. The feeling was very bad when Best refused to let them use the auditorium. They knew they couldn't all get in, but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral, because he represented all of us. . . ."¹

A very interesting attitude toward the funeral and the part played by the Daihyo Sha was given by Mrs. ^{Yoshizawa} Yamaguchi, a supporter of the Daihyo Sha at this period: This young woman is no politician. Yet she understood the objective of the pressure group clearly and approved it. Undoubtedly many of the camp residents shared her opinion:

"Wouldn't it seem strange if they didn't have a public funeral when they made such an issue of it such as the strike? That would be the step any leader would take. . . If it was just the case of the farm workers and Mr. Kashima, for that reason alone, such trouble wouldn't be necessary. But I believe there was a very good reason behind what the Daihyo Sha did."²

October 23, the day on which the rites were celebrated was an unseasonably cold and windy day. The mourners and spectators were most uncomfortable. ~~Reverend Kai, who officiated, and the Buddhist dignitaries~~ were nearly blown off the platform. Mr. ^{Takenuchi} Fujimoto, who is given to analysis made the following remark about the funeral:

"The Funeral was on a cloudy, windy day. Just the kind of a day that would put the people in mind for a little radical propaganda to be spread. Standing out in the cold, shivering with the corpse in front and the goon squad patrolling behind - it was just right for propaganda. The goon squad was just a radical unit - young radicals from Jerome. The administration made a mistake refusing the gymnasium to be used. Had they permitted the gym to be used, they could have put down a ruling and limited the number of people attending the funeral. Had that happened there would have been a lot less people infected with the spirit of to heck with the administration, and what not."³

^{Takenuchi} Fujimoto's reasoning is interesting. Evidently the regimented action of the "goon squad" did not incur public disapproval

¹ ibid., March, 1944, p. 63.

² ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 2.

³ ibid., April, p. 31.

What
pressure
group?

What
goon squad?

but rather added force to the antipathy felt for the administration at this extremely emotional time.

Several informants have stated that since the use of the auditorium had been refused it was decided that no Caucasians be allowed to attend the funeral.¹ Developments indicate that some decision of this kind was made and that it led to the first definitely established act of physical violence on the part of the colonists. Mr. Best wished to give the Japanese the impression that a record was being taken.² He, therefore, sent the report's officer, John D. Cook, to the funeral with orders to stay in his car and act as if he were taking photographs. Opler, the Community Analyst, who was one of the two Caucasians present besides Cook, saw a group of young men in the background. He thought they were mourners who intended to walk behind the bier. These young men formed themselves into a line between the warden's headquarters and the platform. It was now apparent that they were a guard. Cook disregarded Best's purported orders, left the car and took some pictures. The guards who objected to the taking of official pictures descended upon him took his camera by force and tossed him into the air. Opler states decidedly that it was all over in a moment. The camera and films were returned later. The identity of the boys is unknown. It is probable that they were members of the Topaz and Jerome strong arm groups. In fact, ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, the Topaz leader, told the writer he chased Cook three blocks, although he (Kato) was wearing his best suit and overcoat.

On the day of the funeral the Tulean Dispatch published the report from the U.S. Employment Compensation Commission, stating

¹Ibid., p. 21.

²See Opler's eye-witness account of this funeral, Notes, Feb., pp 20-21

[that the amount of compensation to which ^{Kashimae} ~~the~~ widow and children were entitled was two-thirds of his monthly wage as of the date of the accident, i.e., the widow would receive \$10.66 or \$9.00, depending on the husband's classification.]

This sum, the representatives and many of the people thought inadequate. An indication of the scorn which was manifested by some of the colonists appears in the letter written by ^{Sakenchi} Fujimoto on November 18, 1943:

"The office then published in the local paper that the "Compensation Law" that governs government employees was applicable in this instance, and that the widow and the son of the before-mentioned deceased was entitled to the grand sum of 60 per cent of whatever he was making in a month. Namely, 60 per cent of the kingly wage of 16 big dollars."¹

On the night of October 22, over half of the windows in the Housing Office, which was located in the center, were broken. The bank office was also damaged.² The perpetrators of this vandalism were not apprehended. The "strong-arm" groups may have been responsible, although bitterness over the unsatisfactory housing was so general that it is not impossible that a spontaneously organized gang of young men, excited by the events of the past week, committed the act on impulse. It is unlikely that any of the leaders of the Daihyo Sha were implicated.

Second Meeting of the Daihyo Sha - October 23

The evening of the day on which the funeral was held the Daihyo Sha met again. This meeting is almost as confused as the first. Reckless suggestions were hurled at the chairman, who was forced from time to time to cut short bombastic speakers and ask for the report of certain committees.

¹ See Report, Dec. 24, pp. 20, 21.

² WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events.

The translated minutes open with an announcement by Chairman Kuratomi that he had received a written memorandum from the Project Director giving the Daihyo Sha official recognition. Kuratomi informed the writer that this is an erroneous insertion and that the statement could not have been made since he had not yet seen Mr. Best. After roll was taken it was found that 15 block representatives were absent. Kuratomi admonished the body for this lack of interest. He then called for a report from the Sanitation and Betterment of Living Condition Committee. This report is not included in the minutes. At this point the more vociferous members could no longer contain themselves. Representative after representative arose and told the body "what they wanted."

Kawamura: Colonists should be allowed to use electrical appliances such as iron and hotplates regardless of time or place at their free will. Space for living quarters is insufficient and the Administration should be informed of the condition.

Sasaki: I request that cameras be permitted within the Center.

Okamura: Colonists should be paid just as much as the men in the Army.

Yamanaka: Private enterprises are prevailing within the Center. Such should be restricted. moreover Co-op is handling too many luxuries and food stuff, which not only affects the economy of the colonists but also encourages the WRA to be reluctant in their distribution of food.

.

Kurihara: There is no sewing machine in this center. . . Administration should be consulted to make such provisions without cost.

Nogawa: Tulean Dispatch has reports of the Imperial Headquarters' war news, which should be disseminated.

Uyeno: It is unfair for the Co-op to charge 5¢ for cashing Government checks, such should be stopped.

Saito: Lumber for furnitures are furnished free to the colonists in Roston and it should be practiced here too.

Takeshita: Alteration of living quarters is imperative, especially in Block 59, Alaska and Mexico Areas.

Kuratomi finally stopped this tide of suggestions and brought the body back to a discussion of the farm problem. Chairman of the Warehouse Committee, Kozaka read his notes. The fact that pork was never served, the suspicion that the products of the hog and chicken farms were being disposed of without the knowledge of the colonists was again brought up by Kuratomi. It was believed that these products were being shipped out of the center to the United States Army and Navy. As loyal Japanese the segregates felt they should not be obliged to furnish food for U. S. armed forces.

Yamanaka, the alternate representative from block 14 made the following speech which received great applause:

"During my stay in Topaz, we received only the best farm products of Tule Lake, which means that despite the Tuleans producing them, they are forced to use only second grade farm products, which is utterly unfair. Just because we are disloyal to America is no reason. We are 100% pro-Japanese, therefore, we should be treated according to the International agreement. At the time of the late Nashima's funeral, the attitude assumed by the Administration was called heartless policy."

Kuratomi then called for a discussion of the hospital problem but the chairman of the committee reported that the investigation had been difficult. Takahashi stated that the Caucasian doctors were too dictatorial; they were making the evacuee doctors' lives miserable. This too should be taken up with the Administration. Kazama, who appears to be highly emotional added:

"What do we care about the evacuee doctors! Their status of whether loyal or disloyal should be cleared. If there are loyal evacuee doctors, we should not have such doctors, even in case of sickness. I prefer death rather than be cared for by loyal doctors. Caucasian doctors are even better." (The floor was in turmoil.)

Kai quieted the outburst by saying:

"Kazama's and Takahashi's opinions are evidence of their mutual love for Japan, which I must commend. However, each doctor's status should be decided by his own will and Dr. Hashiba should be retained."

Takahashi went on to urge the retention of all evacuee doctors. He was interrupted by hecklers and Kazama again raised his voice:

"Due to our obligation toward the one and only (the Emperor)..."

Kai interrupted and rebuked him:

"You have no right to hinder a representative who has a voice in the body. I advise that you refrain from such an act hereafter."

WRA's refusal to allow Daihyo Sha members to investigate the food situation and the suspicion that graft was going on among the WRA officials was reported. Ikeda stated:

"Cost of our daily food is only amounting to 18 to 20 cents. It should be increased to 44¢ as stipulated in the WRA regulation."

Uyeda added:

"Daily allotment of food should be 45¢ and the quality should be improved."

Nakahiro then related his experience as menu maker in Topaz. Kuratomi brought the meeting into line again by calling for the report of the Education Committee. This report is not included in the minutes. Tsuchiya remarked:

"Since we have come here to be repatriated to Japan I do not find the necessity of learning English."

Kuratomi differed:

"A child of five or six could get by without public school education, but high school students should attend public school because of lack of diversified courses offered in Japanese School. Educational problems have been entrusted to educators so we have nothing to worry about."

Near the close of the meeting Takahashi recommended that the Planning Board be resurrected and reorganized despite the decision to dissolve made on the previous night. Kuratomi disregarded this

proposal. He pointed out later to the writer that Takahashi's proposal was contrary to the wishes of the Planning Board members, which, as far as the minutes show, was true.

The difficulties of the Food Committee were dealt with by contacting Mr. Sugimoto who had some reputation for having experience at investigating mess conditions in Boston. Sugimoto was not a member of the Daihyo Sha but was approached by Mr. Saito, Daihyo Sha Food Committee Chairman, and asked to take over the chairmanship of the food committee. Sugimoto made the following interesting statement to the writer:

"What I wanted to find out was how bad it was, actually, because comparisons are pretty difficult unless you can show it in figures.

"I went ahead and investigated the actual reception of the food material in the center from the Army quartermaster and the actual consumption of that food by the residents of the camp during the month of September, 1943. By doing that I thought I might be able to throw some light. Of course, what I investigated, the degree of correctness of that report is not known to me as yet. But the FBI, they had an accountant with them (in their mid-November investigation) and he went over my report and worked it over item by item using the same records I used. So the only person who knows how true that report is he.

"At that time I was anticipating difficulties I might have to face and the possibility that the report might be confiscated. So I had my sister make 20 copies and scattered the report to my friends to keep it for me.

To get the necessary data to make this report, certain young men lifted the desired books from the mess offices. According to ^{Goshima} Kato, these books are still in the colony but were brought forth from hiding to show to the FBI.

OCTOBER 26 - MEETING OF THE PROJECT DIRECTOR AND THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE

Five days after Mr. Best had issued an announcement inviting any representative committee to discuss any problem with him, the Central Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai telephoned Mr. Best and

asked that they be granted an interview with him.

Ten Japanese, Hoshiko, Hayashi, Kuratomi, Yamamoto, Kobayashi, ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, Takeda, Toshida, Mori, and Kai were present. Messrs. Zimmer and Black, the Assistant Project Directors were present in addition to Mr. Best. The committee had prepared an agenda of issues based on the suggestions made at the two meetings of the Representative Body and the reports of the various committees. To consolidate their position as leaders, it was imperative that these men on the Negotiating Committee take some tangible concessions from the administration back to the people.

The minutes of this meeting may have been censored by the WRA. Even so they reveal clearly the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee, the relative stress on each point, and the attitude of the Administration and the Committee.

Mr. Best's attitude and state of mind before beginning this conference should be taken into consideration. There is some evidence that he had already telegraphed the Project Directors of other centers on October 24th, asking for Japanese volunteers to harvest the crops.¹ He was under pressure from Washington to see that the crop, which was valued at several hundred thousands of dollars, was not wasted.

Mr. Best had met Mr. Kuratomi once before under inauspicious circumstances. On October 1st, shortly after Kuratomi's arrival from Jerome, Dr. Melton, the Assistant Project Director of Jerome who had accompanied the transferees as escort, arranged an interview between Mr. Best and a group of prominent Jerome transferees. Kuratomi and Kai were present. According to Kuratomi, Mr. Best's

¹WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events.

first remark was, "I don't recognize any representative body. I'm not going to be pressured by anybody. I'm not going to meet any demands from anybody at any time." This remark was made despite the fact that the Jeromites had not been introduced as a body of representatives. Kuratomi stated:

"Dr. Melton was surprised and I think he was sorry that he had suggested our meeting with Mr. Best. One of the boys was so angry he walked out in the middle of the meeting."¹ (This was probably Reverend Kai.)

As a result of this interview Kuratomi already disliked Mr. Best cordially. Well educated, suave, speaking far better English than Mr. Best, his scorn is clearly mirrored in many of his remarks. He was and still is absolutely convinced of the justice of the cause he represented.

"I don't think I did wrong and I think I've been fair with the people. . . . From the very beginning I've maintained that anything we have done wasn't any too radical or against our Constitutional rights. As Chairman of the Committee I conducted the job in a correct manner. And the job was difficult because the people didn't understand."²

Nervous, gentle spoken, full of intellectual arrogance, Kuratomi is far removed from the blustering type of "agitator" whose bombastic remarks enliven the minutes of the Daihyo Sha. With the advice of Reverend Kai, whom he respected to the point of devotion, and other older men, he had undoubtedly selected the points to be presented to Mr. Best with great care and had come prepared to get what concessions he could. He stated frankly to the writer:

"Our biggest cause was to straighten out the farm accident. Although that was just an excuse, because there were so many things in camp that needed to be improved. . . . This talk with Mr. Best was to be the first of a series of reports (on the condition of the colony)."³

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 1.

²Ibid., pp. 6, 10.

³Ibid., April 9, 1945, p. 3.

This meeting was far more like a contest between two adversaries than like a conference. To begin with Mr. Best holding to his attitude of October 1st, refused to recognize the Negotiating Committee as representatives of the Tule Lake residents. Kuratomi then implied that some of the questions to be asked might be above Best's authority and asked that in such cases they be referred to Washington. After these opening gambits the meeting rapidly developed into a quarrel over Best's supposedly inhuman attitude in regard to the funeral. Both sides hurled accusations freely. A semblance of propriety was restored while discussing the request that the evacuees at Tule Lake wished to raise only enough food for their own consumption. Mr. Best, although he had not "recognized" the committee, accepted this request on its face value and in the presence of the Committee canceled a telegram to Gila ordering beef. "We will have to wait 50 days before we get any." According to Opler, this gesture was a bluff; Best merely pretended to cancel the telegram.

From this point on, matters proceeded with relative smoothness. However, near the end of the meeting Kuratomi remarked that in the event of a strike he imagined that the administration would see that some quick solution was made. Best retorted: "A strike isn't the way to deal with me." That the Negotiating Committee was already placing reliance on an appeal above Mr. Best was shown not only by the remark made early in the meeting but also near the end when Kuratomi asked if it would be necessary to refer some of the questions to Mr. Myer. Best agreed that it would be necessary and added that he would like Myer to confer with the committee when he arrived on the project within a few days.

Neither side was acting entirely above board. The Negotiating Committee retained their trump card to lay before Director Myer: the "proof" of graft among the Caucasian personnel. Mr. Best stated at the beginning of the meeting that he did not "recognize" the Committee, yet said at the end:

["There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here for.....I don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together.....We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again."]

The Negotiating Committee based their requests on four major topics: (1) the question of the status of the evacuees under International law under which they included a request for re-segregation; (2) the settlement of the farm incident which included many minor points; (3) a request for community government; (4) a multitude of requests for the betterment of colony living conditions. Some of the points were brought up as requests for clarification, others as requests springing from the desires of the colonists and one request for an investigation as to why the food was so poor and what was happening to the products of the hog and chicken farms.

It will be interesting to consider these points one by one and the Project Director's decision on each. The points will then be compared with the considerable number of statements made by Japanese not closely connected with the Daihyo Sha Kai, and an attempt made to show how closely the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee paralleled the desires of the ordinary colonist at this time.

Status of Residents under International Law - Further Segregation

This is a major point which stands by itself. Kuratomi stated

that the residents wished to know their status under International Law. Mr. Best referred him to the Department of Justice, Mr. Myer, and the Spanish Consul. Supplementary to this, Kuratomi stated that the residents strongly desired resegregation. Mr. Best agreed that this would be a good idea.

status under International Law had long been a matter of some concern to the evacuees. Its clarification, however, had little significance in the November crisis. Removal of the "fence-sitters" on the other hand, was an urgent issue, as has been shown by the attitudes quoted previously.¹

Farm Accident

Kuratomi opened the discussion of this issue with a demand on the part of the colonists that WRA announce that it would take full responsibility "in regard to these accidents" and express regret concerning them. The people, he added, wished to know what steps had been taken toward compensation. Mr. Best answered that all forms of the United States Employees' Compensation had been completed and transmitted to that Commission.

Kuratomi then bluntly asked the reason for the inhuman attitude of the Administration in regard to the funeral. Best denied he had inhuman tendencies. Kuratomi countered with the fact that he had refused to go or send a representative to the funeral and give a speech of condolence. The discussion rapidly disintegrated into a quarrel in which Mr. Best contended that he had been ordered to go to the funeral and that he would never accede to demands. Kuratomi denied that any demand had been made. Best then stated that the people had been forced to go to the funeral. Kuratomi denied this also.

¹See pp. 7-11 of "Pre-incident Attitudes."

This undignified squabbling indulged in by both men gained Kuratomi nothing and evoked from Mr. Best only the extreme stubbornness with which he customarily reacted when faced by "pressure." By stressing Mr. Best's inhumanity, Kuratomi was perhaps attempting to relate Mr. Best's inconsiderateness concerning the public funeral with the violence shown the photographer. He succeeded only, however, in irritating Mr. Best almost to the point of incoherency. Best stated:

"You or none else are going to tell me what to do. . . We will do this without putting me on the spot. I am not going to be put on the spot and you are not going to come here and tell me what to do. . ."

Farm Acreage

Kuratomi stated that it was the desire of the people that they farm no more acreage than was necessary for the needs of the colony. This was a fairly strong camp sentiment. Best inquired if this meant that they wanted no more beef from Gila. Kuratomi agreed. Best, in the presence of the committee, canceled a shipment of beef expected from Gila, stating that 50 days must elapse before any beef could be procured through the Army Quartermaster. Kuratomi, apparently unperturbed, asked for a farm committee; Best stated that he was wholeheartedly in favor of the formation of such a body. He also assured the Committee that food had never been sent to the Army or Navy.

Public Schools and Flag Raising Ceremony

On request Mr. Black explained the proposed plan for the public schools and in answer to a direct question, stated that there would be no flag raising ceremony and that attendance would not be compulsory. On this matter Kuratomi told the writer that Reverend Kai believed that education in English was beneficial to

the children. Some of the camp residents, however, were concerned over the possibility that their children might be forced to submit to compulsory indoctrination in Americanism. When questioned by the writer as to the significance of the flag raising ceremony, Kuratomi explained that it was motivated by a desire to see that no disrespect be shown to the American flag. Previous to this rumors had seeped out of camp that the American flag raised inside the camp had been torn down. Kuratomi denied this, explaining to the writer:

"The American flag in the center was brought down by one of the boy scouts. He felt that the flag of any nation should command that much respect. He feared that some rude boys would get hold of it and trample on it. He took it down. There was a rumor, however, that somebody might tear it down."¹

Kuratomi added that he knew where the flag was and that it was in a safe place.

Community Government

This was another major issue as far as the Negotiating Committee was concerned. Kuratomi stated that the people wanted a center organization to govern and take care of the center residents and negotiate with the Administration. The organization of this body was to be left entirely to the center residents. Best agreed that he too desired this, but that it must be a completely representative body. Mr. Black made it quite clear that there could not be such a thing as self-government, and asked that the present committee serve as an advisory committee to the Administration. Kuratomi again used the term "central governing body" and was corrected by Black. Kuratomi then stated the center desired that Block Managers be put under the supervision of this proposed Central

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 11, 1944, p. 4.

Committee. It was explained that under WRA regulations this could not be done.

It is doubtful if the desire for a "central organization" was a matter of primary interest to the evacuees as a whole at this time. This point probably reflects the interests of the leaders. When questioned by the writer as to why the committee wished to bring the Block Managers under the Central Committee, Kuratomi explained that in this manner the Block Managers could be kept in their proper place as absolutely unpolitical figureheads, go-betweens between the Administration and the people.

"We intended to keep them as figureheads. . .if something came up that the Central Committee felt it was not their (block managers) duty, the Central Committee could tell them that the problem should be under the Central Committee."¹

This matter appears to be a political maneuver to keep the block managers out of the political picture. The Negotiating Committee was taking no chances in permitting the development of a rival organization. Mr. Adachi, an old Tulean who held a prominent position among the block managers at this time, gave the writer his frank opinion of this maneuver:

"I think they wanted to control the block managers at that time. We told them we didn't want anything to do with that. We were willing to co-operate in the work and help them for the benefit of the people, but we wanted to stay neutral."²

Food Question

Kuratomi stated that the residents doubted that they were getting their full share of poultry and eggs from the farm. Zimmer explained that since June 22 no hogs had been slaughtered and that all the proceeds from the hog and poultry farms were going to mess management. Best intimated that if the workers at these

¹ibid.

²ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, p. 4.

farms should stop working he would have to sell these products off the project. Kuratomi then asked for an investigation into mess hall distribution. Best referred him to the mess department.

Later in the meeting Kuratomi complained that the food was very poor, that the children were not getting sufficient milk and that eggs were never served. Best, replied that the lack of milk was probably the fault of Mess Management, that eggs were on the menu every day, and suggested the employment of a Japanese head steward under Mr. Peck.

In view of the tremendous public resentment over poor food, the rumors prevalent among evacuees and Caucasians that food was being sold off the project, either to the Army and Navy or to the black market, this referring of the food question to the mess department on the part of Mr. Best cannot be considered wise. His answering the charge that eggs are never served by saying that they are on the menu shows ignorance of Mess conditions. Reliable evacuee informants repeatedly state that what is put on the menu and what is served are two different things. These questions on food were vital. By passing them off lightly a valuable opportunity to decrease the ill will of the colonists was disregarded.

Internal Security

Mr. Best brought up this subject himself, a reflection of his own concern over the unsatisfactory state of the Japanese Internal Security after segregation. According to Kuratomi, the Japanese force was supposed to consist of 140 members and it had been reduced by segregation to 78, a fraction over half.¹ After segregation, the position of warden had become increasingly

¹Ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 2.

unpopular and anyone who accepted it was in danger of being regarded as an inu (dog), or stool-pigeon, a person willing to work for the administration and against his own people.¹ The reduction of the Japanese police force to half-its necessary strength was a matter of great concern to Mr. Best since the camp could not possibly be adequately policed without the assistance of the evacuees.

Latrine Facilities

Kuratomi asked for the improvement of latrine facilities. Best explained the difficulties of improving these and remarked that the next housing adjustment would relieve the situation. Kuratomi complained that the hot and cold water could not be mixed and Best stated that he wanted to improve all such conditions.

Lots around barracks - Porches

Best stated that if proper plans were made and Washington's approval is gained, porches could probably be built for about \$20,000. This statement was interpreted by the committee as a promise from Mr. Best that their porches would be built, and was publicized as such. When the porches were not built this was regarded as a breach of faith by the Japanese.

Mail Delivery

Kuratomi stated that the residents felt that mail should be delivered to each unit, and not to the block managers. Best said he would try to work it out.

TB Patients released in center

Kuratomi stated that tuberculosis patients were being sent to

¹From an interview with H. Tsuda, Head of the Japanese Internal Security, H. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 11, 1945, pp. 1, 5.

the blocks. These should be segregated and sent back home. (Add explanation from X.) Best said this should be referred to the medical staff.

Inadequate preparation to receive segregees

KuratomI asked who was responsible for the inadequate preparation for the segregees entering Tule. Best replied that he must blame the Congress of the United States.

Disappearance of WRA material

KuratomI stated that in the past the disappearance of articles such as saws, hammers, and axes had been blamed on evacuees. If this should happen in Tule, he asked that the administration investigate thoroughly before they make an accusation. Best assured him that an investigation would be held.

Summary

Reviewing the answers given by Mr. Best it appears that the Negotiating Committee had reason to feel optimistic over the general results of this meeting. Mr. Best agreed wholeheartedly on the matter of cultivating farm acreage only for the needs of the colony and was almost enthusiastic over the formation of a farm committee and a representative body from the colony, stating, however, that this could not be a self-governing body. The Negotiating Committee was asked to serve in an advisory capacity to the administration in forming this body. Best stated that he "would do what he could" in the matter of porches, latrines and the mail, and agreed that segregation "would be a good idea." One request, on a minimum age of truck drivers, was shown to be already in effect. The Committee was assured that attendance at the American schools would not be compulsory. Two questions were

referred to a higher authority and the Congress of the United States was conveniently blamed for the inconveniences of segregation. The impossibility of placing block managers under the supervision of the proposed Representative Body was adequately explained. The complaints about the mess, however, were pushed aside with a vague suggestion that the head of the Mess Division be consulted. This muddled mess situation was (aside from the emotional hostility engendered by the farmer's death) the most important issue brought up by the Committee. Sugimoto's food committee was busily gathering evidence of graft to lay before Director Myer.

Colonists' Views on Demands of Negotiating Committee

[Judging by evacuees' statements ~~and letters~~ ^{mostly} of this period the points brought up by the negotiating Committee were a fairly accurate mirror of public sentiment. Only on the matter of the creation of a "permanent governing body" can the committee be accused of jumping ahead of the wishes of the people. This does not mean that the people were against the formation of such a body but that there is no evidence that the people considered it a crying need or desired to make it one of the salient items requested of Mr. Best. With this one exception it can be said that every issue put before Mr. Best at this October 26 meeting had an appreciable amount of public support; this does not imply, however, that support of each point was camp-wide. According to informant's statements, the institution of proper precautions to prevent the recurrence of accidents, improvement of general living conditions and the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord were the most emphatic desires of the people.

This last issue was
~~It is interesting that no mention of the grievances against~~
~~Dr. Pedicord was made by Kuratomi at this meeting,~~ *although it later*
~~brought forward dramatically at the conference with Dillon Myer,~~
~~held on November 1.~~ *around great injustice.*
 Kuratomi explained ~~to the writer~~ that the committee believed at this time that their chief efforts should be directed to the attempt to straighten out the farm accident. They intended to bring up the matter of Dr. Pedicord later. The report of the hospital committee was not yet complete.¹ Moreover, after this October 26th meeting, additional pressure was put on the Negotiating Committee by the Japanese doctors and nurses at the hospital to get rid of Pedicord.

Some idea of what demands the people thought most important may be gained from the following statements made by individuals not connected with the Daihyo Sha. From Mr. *Takemichi* Fujimoto:

"The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. (2) That the food in camp be improved. (3) That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged. (4) That Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer, in view of his anti-Japanese views and actions, be discharged. That he was incompetent and negligent of his duties. That because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients in the past (a Japanese doctor had recommended transfusions) these patients all died. . . .²

"They asked for porches for all the apartments. WRA had promised lumber for all the porches. It was never supplied. That's where that request came in. We were promised. That's inefficiency as far as I'm concerned.

"The only thing that everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord, and more care in placement of drivers, and an improvement of food, and I think, the request for an investigation of grafting. Grafting started the whole works."³

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April 9, 1945, p. 3.

²Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

³Notes, Feb. pp. 13, 14.

From an old Tulean nisei:

"I don't know how much they demanded for the widow and children But the people figured it (60% of monthly wage) was not enough Then at the same time they made demands for porches and for the latrine to be better taken care of and other things. They also asked for Dr. Pedicord to be taken out of the hospital. There were several other requests they threw in with the farmer's case."¹

The policy of the Negotiating Committee at this meeting has never been criticized by the evacuees. The general attitude at this time was that these men had been put up as representatives; whatever they chose to do "for the benefit of the people" was all right.]

MR. BEST TERMINATED FARM WORKERS -- CALLS IN "LOYAL" EVACUEES TO BREAK THE "STRIKE"

The day following this meeting, Mr. Best terminated the farmers as of October 19. This was a most discrediting situation for the Negotiating Committee, since the farmers had put complete confidence in them and placed the handling of the incident entirely in their hands. Mr. Best also telegraphed Charles F. Ernst, Project Director at the Topaz Center and W. Wade Head of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake.² Having taken this action he left the project for San Francisco, where, it is said, he was to confer with Dillon Myer. The termination notice was worded as follows:

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

²The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943) contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a "strike" at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no "strike" or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake have had meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers."

In Poston, the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90¢ to \$1 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of Oct. 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, 1943, pp. 2, 10.

FARM WORKERS NOTICE

Due to failure of Farm Workers to report for work they have been terminated as of October 19. In order to get the payroll out on time, arrangements have been made for these workers to return their badges to the Timekeeper's Office at 717, from now until noon of Saturday.

Failure to return the badges will automatically bring a charge of 50¢ to all Farm Workers who have not turned in their badges at this time, and the payroll will be delayed.

Signature: R. R. Best

This action was a staggering blow to the Negotiating Committee and to the striking farmers. The Negotiating Committee had assumed the full burden of responsibility of managing the strike and gaining the concessions desired from the Administration and had had a meeting with Mr. Best at which they had appeared to have considerable advantage. The day after the meeting the farmers, who were relying on them, were terminated, and "loyal evacuees" were called for who would break the strike which was their major if not their only bargaining point. The anger of the committee and the people at what they called "this double-cross" is easy to appreciate. The situation is betrayed clearly in the following statement made by Kuratomi:

"Naturally, after we had had the meeting with Mr. Best we made reports to the representatives and to the farm group in particular. That such a statement came out the following day threw suspicion on Administrative sincerity. (and put the Negotiating Committee in a very bad light. R. R.) Our immediate feeling was a distrust of Mr. Best."¹

"Distrust" is a mild word to use to describe the sentiments of the Negotiating Committee after this action by Mr. Best.

MEETING OF FARM COMMITTEE AND ASSISTANT PROJECT DIRECTOR ZIMMER

Faced now with the loss of their jobs and the complete frustration of their aims, the farmers sent a committee to discuss the

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 6.

matter with Mr. Zimmer on October 29. They told Mr. Zimmer that they had given Mr. Kallum, the farm supervisor, the "definite interpretation" that their stoppage of work was not to be considered a "strike", and since they had not gone on a strike they did not see why they should be terminated. They pointed out that there was so much contrast between the report the Negotiating Committee had brought back to them from its October 26 conference with Mr. Best and the action of termination that they "were very much disappointed about this action." They requested that the administration retract the termination by noon of the following day, threatening, "if this problem cannot be settled, concerning the graveness of the situation, we will again have to turn the matter into the peoples' hands." In spite of the boldness of this threat, the farmers' great desire to keep their jobs is clearly indicated by the almost pathetic statement: "It's possible that all of us should return to work. We don't believe any of us would have any objection to returning to work."¹

The farmers gained nothing at all from this meeting, for the next day Mr. Zimmer released the following statement:

[Due to Administrative Instruction 27, Revised, dated August 4, 1943, it is impossible for me to reverse the decision regarding the turning in of badges which was received by the former farm workers on October 28, 1943.]

ARRIVAL OF JAPANESE TO HARVEST CROPS -- REMOVAL OF FOOD FOR THEIR USE FROM PROJECT WAREHOUSES

The first contingent of "strike-breaking" farm workers arrived in Tule Lake October 30. The residents had no doubt been informed of their coming through letters from other centers. Statements

¹From a translation of these minutes given orally to the writer by Mr. Kuratomi. ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 2.

of informants indicate that the people never for a moment blamed the Negotiating Committee for this blow. All resentment, and resentment now rose to phenomenal heights, was heaped upon "double-crossing" Mr. Best and the "double-crossing loyal Japanese" who, being Japanese, "should have known better." So great was this resentment that when, on October 31, Japanese Motor Pool employees were ordered to service trucks to transport the "loyal" farmers from Klamath Falls to the farm, they refused, giving as excuse that they had received no requisition for the trucks. The trucks were eventually taken out by Caucasians, who, it is said, were followed by obscene remarks from the Japanese as they drove away.¹

L. Katoka

A member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" if the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."²

Jakenchi

Mr. Fujimoto, who relocated from Tule in September, 1944 said:

"Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting. . . I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."³

Yamashiro

Mrs. Yamaguchi said:

"At that time I thought, 'If those people from the other centers really understood the situation in here they wouldn't dare come.' Even if Mr. Best did want them to come, they didn't have to. I didn't blame Mr. Best at all. Those Japanese who did come should know better."⁴

¹From abridged FBI Report on the Tule Lake Incident, p. 96.

²Notes, Mar., p. 52.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 13. Notes, April p. 30. See also Notes, Feb, p14

⁴ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 1.

~~the~~ WRA provided food for the ~~the~~ harvesters from the warehouses where the residents' food was stored, removing it by night. Thirty-two thousand pounds of food were taken out by members of the appointed personnel on the night of October 29.¹ Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day, but it is also very possible that the WRA hesitated to remove the food by day for fear of arousing additional resentment. However, evacuee espionage against the administration was functioning at high pitch and it was immediately noted that the trucks were driven to the warehouse, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven off the project. The next morning, Japanese employed in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never received catsup at mess.² While, this removal of food was not the basic cause for resentment it proved to be an excellent vehicle for expressions of bitterness against the administration.

A nisei member of the Daihyo Sha said: *L. Catotoku*

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"³

Takenuchi

Fujimoto stated in a letter to the writer:

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."⁴

¹WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events.

²Report, Dec. 24, 1943, pp. 13, 21.

³R. Hankey, Notes, Mar. 1944, p. 62.

⁴Report, Dec. 24, 1943, pp. 13, 14.

As soon as this removal of food became known a group of young men, some of whom were Daihyo Sha members set to watching the warehouses and the motor pool at night. Although Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, one of the leaders of this group has assured the writer that "we were ready to beat up any Caucasian we caught trying to take food," the writer is inclined to think that the young fellows had no formulated plan and perhaps, hoped, by their very presence alone, to forestall another administrative attempt to feed the harvesters. Caucasians residing in this area have remarked that they heard the boys talking and laughing as they snooped about the area in the night. Some of these young men considered themselves to be very tough indeed and had engaged in rowdy and violent activities in the centers from which they had come. Their temperament may be judged from the following description of a small gang of boys in Poston who went to Tule Lake prepared to cause trouble. The writer knows that at least one of this Poston group was prominent in the group watching the warehouses.

"It might be true that some small groups pledged among the members to cause some trouble when they arrived at Tule Lake. For instance, I remember a group of about seven kibeï who pledged to cause trouble at Tule Lake when they left Poston. They prepared knives at the Machine Shop before segregation. One of them bought a pistol for twenty-five dollars and took it to Tule Lake. I don't think the pistol was confiscated when they arrived at the segregation center. Nonetheless, I don't think there were any more than two or three such groups among the Poston contingents."¹

OCTOBER 28 MEETING OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

On October 28 the Daihyo Sha Kai held its next meeting. This meeting again was not too well attended, seven men being absent. The Committee made a report on their interview with Mr. Best

¹Communication from "X", November, 1944.

which, except for a certain tone which made the Committee sound exceedingly arrogant and Mr. Best exceedingly meek, was fundamentally accurate.¹ Under the circumstances, Kuratomi, as chairman, would be inclined to put the conference with Mr. Best in as favorable a light as possible. He was obliged to get concessions or admit failure.

The expected 50 day wait for food supplies was fully explained. In concluding the report, Kuratomi stated that no record of this interview had been kept and that the Project Director had promised to send a written memo "with regard to the demands." He then stated that he had recommended the cultivation of only 700 acres of farm land, adding:

"There is no necessity of tilling the remaining balance of 3200 acres of land. . . Since we have pledged our loyalty to Japan, our acts today will have a great significance on the day when peace once again returns."

Takahashi then asked:

"I wonder if 700 acres of farmland to work are sufficient for the colonists of this size?"

Said Kuratomi:

"According to Project Director Best, the maximum limit of acreage is 700 acres for the colonists' subsistence. This problem will be fully discussed upon the arrival of Myer."

The question of resegregation of those persons who were "loyal" to America from those who were "disloyal" was then brought up. A member queried:

"Did the Negotiating Committee ever demand the WRA, resegregation of disloyal and loyal?"

Kuratomi stated that they had. Apparently there are some insertions in the minutes at this point. It is not clear what

¹Fourth Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center,
pp. 1 - 4.

questions were raised. It is likely, however, that many of the members did not understand exactly what Kuratomi meant by re-segregation. Kuratomi repeatedly insisted to the writer that he had never advocated actual re-segregation but only a clarification of status so that those individuals who had stayed in Tule Lake with no intention of returning to Japan might be moved out of the center. His object, he stated, was unification, a camp of people of like sentiments toward Japan.¹

The extremely important matter of the termination of the farm workers was then brought up.

Komiya: Administration requested the return of badges after the farm incident. However, very few people assembled.

Chair: Has the termination been given to them?

Komiya: Not yet.

Chair: The point we must keep in mind is that since the farm employees have not been formally discharged, there is no need of returning the badges. Because this is not a strike, they have no right to terminate farm employees without due reason.

The puzzling matter of status was again introduced:

Voice from the floor: How will we distinguish the disloyal from the loyal?

Voice from the floor: Utmost care and consideration should be taken.

Chair: Due to the administration's lack of understanding of Japanese psychology, many tragical incidents may result. We have to remember that we are Japanese and are for the greater and righteous things. That's why we are discussing this for the purpose of unification.

Tsuda: There are several colonists who have rejected the registration² and there are others who registered 'yes', who at the time of re-segregation stubbornly remained and are still with us. If we should demand re-segregation of colonists how should we present the problem?

¹Kuratomi's stand on this matter was to assume much significance almost a year later when he differed sharply with a group which advocated out-and-out resegregation of a group "truly loyal to Japan" as against Kuratomi's ideal of a camp unified by the ejection of a comparatively small group of individuals "loyal to America."

²There were, in fact, at this time over 1,000 persons in Tule Lake who had refused to register at the time of Military Registration.

Chair: I have no plan as to the ways and means. Because of this war-time condition, one should not pursue the policy for his own selfishness and should clearly pledge his allegiance to Japan immediately.

Tsuda's statement is an excellent expression of the resentment over the predicament of sharing the camp with persons who had pledged their loyalty to America or had refused to make a statement of loyalty. Kuratomi's inability to explain how this much needed process was to be carried on is not surprising in view of the fact that over a year later the administration was still puzzling over whether or not some sort of re-segregation should take place and if so, how it should be done.

The Chair then proceeded with the plan for the election of the various divisional committees and plans for the function of the farm department, farm produce, chicken and hog farm, food supply, motor pool, hospital, betterment of living condition, internal security, and education. He mentioned that Best had agreed to give the colonists free reign in managing the Internal Security Department.

Kozaka: Wouldn't it be misunderstood if a central body is formed at this time without first consulting the colonists?

Chair: No, Daihyo Sha Kai was elected from each block by election and this body was formed by that representative body so there is no inconsistency.

Kozaka: I make a recommendation that the block representatives consult the colonists first before further going into the discussion of a plan for the further formation of divisional committees.

Chair: Of course, it should be that way. We cannot decide by ourselves.

Kai suggested that this plan for the election of permanent committees be put before the colonists at a mass meeting.

Takahashi put this into the form of a motion and it was approved

unanimously. Kai stated: "We will have the approval of the colonists upon recommendation of each block and request their support." He added:

"As the chair reported tonight, I am sure WRA will co-operate with this body. If in case they do not, then the Negotiating Committee will see to it that they concede to our demands."

Hatano thanked the Negotiating Committee on behalf of the farm department committee for their effort.

Takahashi recommended that the block representatives elect fitting persons for the various posts and that the final decision should be given to the Daihyo Sha Kai. A written recommendation should be conveyed to the colonists. This was unanimously approved.

Comment on Meeting

Although the Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha had suffered a severe set-back, the termination of the farm workers and their replacement by Japanese harvesters from other centers, the minutes of this meeting show that they had not lost hope or even become markedly discouraged. Kuratomi informed the writer later, that, during this period, he was still optimistic and was certain that the difficulties could be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the residents. Probably, he and the body were gambling heavily on the premise that they would have more success with Dillon Myer than with Best. Kuratomi's statements regarding the termination of the farm workers reveal that he had considerable hope that the committee would be able to carry its point with the administration: "Because this is not a strike they have no right to terminate farm employees without due reason." Preliminary plans were made to proceed with the election of the various permanent

Harvesters
had not
yet
arrived!

divisional committees and it was moved that this matter be submitted to the residents at a mass meeting.

ARRIVAL OF DILLON MYER - ACTIONS OF DAIHYO SHA KAI

Two days later Dillon Myer arrived on the project. The Negotiating Committee ^{approached Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Myer} asked for a meeting with ~~him~~ ^{Mr. Myer} but was refused. ^{They were told} Instead, he stated that he would meet with the Farm Group on November 2.¹ By ignoring the Negotiating Committee completely the administration probably hoped to complete the process of discrediting the body, a process which it fallaciously thought had been begun by the termination of the farm workers.

But the Negotiating Committee could not afford to let this opportunity pass. If it did not achieve "recognition" from Director Myer its chances for future success were poor indeed. Kuratomi described the situation as follows:

"So when Mr. Myer came we felt we had to show that we had support so that Mr. Myer could see with his own eyes the support we had. That was our paramount intention."²

The plan which the committee conceived and carried out was a small masterpiece of political strategy. [On November 1, ~~Daihyo~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ representatives announced at the noon mess that ~~Dillon~~ Myer would meet with the Negotiating Committee that afternoon, and ~~that~~ ^{all residents} he would speak to the people. ~~The~~ people were exhorted to attend as a gesture of support to their representatives.] A very fine description of the proceedings and the temper of the people in ward VII, which was very pro-Daihyo Sha was given by Mrs. Yamaguchi, an accurate informant:

"It was announced in the mess that Mr. Myer was here and that the representatives of the Daihyo Sha would see him on matters that the residents of the colony wanted determined such as the hospital. I think the hospital was the biggest problem then.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 3. According to Kuratomi
²Ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, p. 6.

"They said they didn't care whether we were young or old. They wanted us to go and they told us that we would not be permitted to come home when we wanted to.

"About ten minutes after we came home from lunch, everyone of us got ready and formed a line in front of the mess hall and we walked to the administration building. When we reached there, the place was packed with people from other blocks.

"It seemed some blocks didn't take the trouble to really get serious and the residents went of their own will. Every one of us went from block 68. I think a lot went from curiosity."¹

At a previous interview, when discussing the support given the Daihyo Sha at this time, Mr. Yamaguchi who weighs less than a hundred pounds said with flashing eyes, "When we went to the administration building on November 1, we marched!"

W.R. [After lunch, a veritable multitude streamed to the administration building. The crowd may have numbered 10,000. Most of these *people* knew that the demonstration was *intended as* a gesture of support to the Negotiating Committee, *and they were justified for this reason.* Curiosity and fear of criticism if they absented themselves were *for others* ~~also~~ important motives. It is justifiable to conclude that the temper of the people must have been very high. No amount of oratory or "pressure" would have gotten them out in such numbers to face a possible recurrence of the Manzanar fatalities, if tension and resentment against the administration had not been so strong. The Daihyo Sha was taking no chances, however. When the people had left the camp area, certain young men, members of a committee appointed by Daihyo Sha leaders "to keep order" *any efforts made by individuals* blocked the crowds' return to the *camp*. *One* stated that he saw these young men "keeping the people there." *When individuals* A group would attempt to leave the mass and return to the *camp*, and the "guards" would draw together *plenty of them* Discouraged by this act, the people would return.

¹ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 2.

① [The demonstration was perpetrated entirely without warning. ^{None of} ~~no one~~ on the administrative personnel had the least inkling that it was contemplated. ~~The~~ ^{Evanes} Japanese overran the entire administration area, ~~the administration building was completely surrounded.~~ ^{the} Many of the appointed personnel were panic stricken. The fears of those who had always expected the worst of the Japanese appeared about to be realized.

~~which the crowd was gathering and~~
 Ten or twelve young men entered the hospital, which was situated between the administrative area and the colony, and went ~~into Dr. Pedicord's reception room.~~ ^{pushed their way} ~~His Japanese secretary cried out, "Dr. Pedicord! Come here quick."~~ ^{when evanes} Pedicord left his office, ~~and~~ ^{evanes} approached the boys, ~~according to Japanese informants,~~ ^{the boys} he called them offensive names. One of ~~them~~ ^{Pedicord's eye} snatched off his glasses and ~~Dr. Pedicord struck him.~~ ^{the doctor} The group then ~~attacked him,~~ ^{fell upon Pedicord and} beating him severely. According to the WRA report, they carried him outside of the building, ~~put him on the ground and were about to continue~~ ^{and then} ~~the beating when Miss Curran, a nurse and others~~ ^{but desisted when} ~~Thereupon the gang dispersed.~~ ^{employees} ¹

This was the first incident in which the Negotiating Committee was unable to control the "hot-heads" and the "strong-arm actionists" as they are called. To keep these violently inclined individuals in line was one of the most difficult tasks of the leaders. Their failure on this occasion did not aid their negotiations with Dillon Myer.

② [Completely surrounded by thousands of ~~Japanese~~ ^{evanes}, and virtually imprisoned in the administration building, Dillon Myer consented to see the ~~Committee.~~ ^{Negotiating} According to Caucasian witnesses, the

¹John Bigelow, "Report on the Beating of Dr. Reece M. Pedicord, Chief Medical Officer, at the Tule Lake Center," Nov. 1, 1943.

members of the committee approached the building "as if they knew exactly what they were doing and had everything well planned," and saw to it that a public address system was set up. Meanwhile, ~~Japanese~~ ^{Evacuees} were stationed at the doors of the administration building to see that no Caucasian left. According to a statement made by Reverend Kai, these young men took this task upon themselves on their own initiative and ~~that~~ the Negotiating Committee ^{not only} had no voice in the matter, ^{but} ~~The Committee, stated Kai,~~ ^{of disapproval} did not approve.¹ This is very likely true, and is ^{an} ~~another~~ example of the leaders' difficulty in controlling the "strong-arm" boys.

In addition to Mr. Myer and Mr. Best, Mr. Cozzens, the Regional Director of the WRA, Mr. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director, Mr. Schmidt, the Chief of Internal Security, Mr. Cahn who was employed in the finance division and Dr. Webber an ex-missionary employed in the Relocation division were present at this conference. The Negotiating Committee had increased from 10 to 17 members. The augmentation of the committee was viewed with suspicion by the administration, however, in consideration of the very incomplete integration and organization of the Daihyo Sha at this time, the informal personnel of this "Negotiating Committee" is quite understandable. Anybody was brought along whose presence was thought needful. Seven men were members of the Central Committee of the Daihyo Sha: Messrs. Nakao, Hoshiko, Kai, Yamamoto, Uchida, Kobayashi, Mori and Hayashi. Mr. Kato was the English Secretary of the Daihyo Sha; he was probably brought along because he spoke English well and could take notes of the English discussion. Kodama and Hatano were representatives of the farm group;

¹From excerpts from FBI Report on Tule Lake Incident, p. 47.

Takeda represented the Agricultural division, and Nogawa, the Hospital Committee. Inouye and Kimura were champion judo men of the fourth or highest rank who probably were brought along in case any of the young hot heads got out of hand.¹ Probably they were also considered the nominal leaders of the young men who took charge of the crowd and kept people from returning to the camp when the long wait for the speech from Dillon Myer became too arduous. The writer has no proof that the judo men formed the nucleus of this group of young men, but has been told by well informed Japanese that this is usually the case in such demonstrations in the camps.²

Throughout this meeting Kuratomi was much more aggressive than at the first meeting. He attempted repeatedly to get definite answers to his questions, realizing well that even one definite concession on the part of the Administration would bulk larger in establishing the prestige of the Negotiating Committee than any number of vague promises to "look into things." When presentation of the problems and arguments failed, he repeatedly called the Caucasians' attention to the great mass of demonstrators waiting outside. He failed, however, to obtain anything significant to which he could point as an indisputable accomplishment. It is also noteworthy that he attempted to direct himself to Director Myer over Mr. Best's head, a technique which was followed thereafter ~~although-Myer-frequently-tee~~ by the later pressure groups. Mr. Best would not allow this, although Myer frequently took over the argument when it threatened to get out of hand. The

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 18, 1945, pp. 2-3.

²Information from "X".

meeting at no time degenerated into the squabbles which marked that of October 26.

Both parties, Caucasians and Japanese must have been under tremendous tension. The meeting began most inauspiciously for the Negotiating Committee, for while the Japanese and Caucasians were assembling in Mr. Best's office Mr. Best received a telephone call from the hospital, informing him of the assault on Dr. Pedicord. He asked Kuratomi what was going on at the hospital and Kuratomi replied that he did not know. Best thereupon informed Kuratomi that Dr. Pedicord was being badly beaten up. The Negotiating Committee immediately sent over some men to stop it. Mitsuho Kimura, the judo champion was one of these sent.

Kuratomi began the discussion cautiously by asking for the notes of the first meeting. He had good reason for this, for he wished to refer to them to carry the major point of this consultation, the extremely important matter of the farm workers' dismissal. Best replied that the notes had not been prepared.¹ Kuratomi then stated that it was unfortunate that matters had come to this point. "We do not want to commit any riots or conduct ourselves in a disorderly manner. The people outside are here to express their dissatisfaction and anger about the Center administration." Mr. Best asked if Kuratomi intended to bring charges on the whole or on some specific thing. Kuratomi replied that he was not sure if the matter should be called a "charge". The Committee had been asked to bring up the peoples' "grievances, requests and demands" so that Mr. Myer could get an all over picture of how ill administered the Center was. Best asked that everything be directed to

¹The writer has seen this same excuse offered to other pressure groups when the minutes had been transcribed. It is possible that Mr. Best was not telling the truth.

him and not to Mr. Myer. ^{[He} Kuratomi then stated that, should the administration continue its ^{mis)} ~~past~~ treatment of the ^{Japanese,} ~~Japanese,~~ the affair could be reported to the Japanese Government. He added that he believed American democratic principles were at stake and that if the conditions prevailing were allowed to continue, "the democratic quality of the united States will be greatly injured." He accused Mr. Best of failing to keep faith with the Negotiating Committee and of inhumanity in regard to the funeral of Mr. Kashima.] The discussion was interrupted to wait for a report from the hospital that order had been restored.

Kuratomi then brought up the same questions of evacuee status under International Law and the possibility of making Tule Lake a center only for those persons who wished to return to Japan which he had put on October 27. He received no more satisfaction than at the October 27 meeting although he tried very hard to pin Myer down. Myer would not admit that there was even a possibility of making Tule Lake a center only for Japanese who wished to return to Japan. Since the question of the status of the residents of Tule Lake continued to be a major source of irritation to the Japanese for well over a year and was later to break out again with tremendous force in the winter of 1944-1945, it would be well to quote this discussion between Myer and Kuratomi:

Kuratomi: In regard to the second question. The residents would have this Center designated for all those who have intention of going back to Japan sooner or later. Would there be some solution to that?

Myer: Can't give you a final answer to that. It will have to be worked out on the basis of what is feasible from the standpoint of what is available in the way of a physical program to work that out. This is something that you and we, the WRA, have to work out. If it is not satisfactory the problem is studied more carefully.

Kuratomi: It is a possibility?

Myer: There is a possibility to anything that lies within the scope of my domain to decide. Nothing more than that.

Kuratomi: You wouldn't stay there is a possibility?

Myer: No. Because I don't want to imply any promises that I can't carry out. I want to be very careful to have the policies understood. I don't commit myself if I can't produce. I don't want to do that until we can study the problem. We have to know how many people are involved - who should stay here and who can go somewhere else and a lot of other things have to be considered.

Kuratomi: Have you taken into note the friction between the people who have expressed their desire to go back to Japan and those who are still loyal to this country. There are still quite a lot in this Center at the present time.

Myer: Certainly. Those who are considered loyal to this country will still have an opportunity to be considered for movement elsewhere. No question about that.

Kuratomi: How soon do you think the process of segregation can be completed?

Myer: I don't think it possible to estimate. Things are in a state of flux. We will have to get a program in order. I haven't been here long enough to know what the situation is. You people haven't given me an opportunity to talk to the people who have the records.

Kuratomi: Can you give us an answer before you leave?

Myer: I don't know if I can give an answer before I leave. It may take quite some time to study the situation. When you are dealing with thousands of people, in order not to do an injustice to the people it takes time to work out a procedure.

Kuratomi next brought up the vital matter of the termination of the farmers as of October 19, stating that the farmers were furious over being terminated without warning since they had Mr. Kallum's signature that they were not striking. Kuratomi betrayed his position by stating: "When we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was published

that they were terminated as of October 19." He referred to Mr. Best's statement that he was willing to talk things over with the farm committee. Best explained that in making that statement he had been discussing the next years' crop and added that the committee had stated on October 26 that they were not interested in harvesting the crop and that from that time on there was no farm. "But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz," complained Kuratomi.

The argument continued for 11 pages, Kuratomi battling valiantly for some concession. He pointed out that Best had refused to see any Negotiating Body, referring to his first conversation with Mr. Best on October 1.¹ Said Mr. Best: "I definitely told you ... that I would make no public statement at that time. You are the only ones I told it to."

Kuratomi then pointed out that the farmers had been terminated at a date prior to the time Mr. Best's statement asking for representatives to come forward had been made. Best ignored this and told him to get along to the rest of the questions. Kuratomi in turn ignored this request, stayed with the point, and informed Best that the question was very serious and that he could not guarantee the reaction of the people outside if he were to report Best's answer to them. Myer interrupted here and stated that nothing could be done. The argument continued at great length, Kuratomi contending that it was not a matter of money but a matter of principle. Myer eventually settled the question by advising that the administration's statement be retracted with the understanding that the terminations were still valid and that the terminated farmers would not be put back on the payroll. In this way

¹See p. .

the farmers would have the privilege asked by Kuratomi, of knowing they were going to be terminated before they were terminated, a dubious victory to say the least.

Kuratomi told the writer later that his chief concern in this matter was that the farmers had become so enraged that if some concession were not made to them they could not be kept under control. Considering the temper of the people at this time this was probably not exaggeration.¹

"There was an effort on our part to try to minimize the grievance toward the administration and we had to have some ground to appeal to the farm group to be more patient. If Mr. Best made some concession, we could defend the practice (termination) at that time."²

At this point Mr. Best asked how long the demonstration outside was going to be carried on. Kuratomi said that it was not a demonstration. "What would you call it?" asked Best. Kuratomi replied, "There has been no trouble at all. They (the people) are waiting for the answers to these questions." Myer requested that the discussion move along since his time was limited and he had a lot of business to take care of.

Kuratomi then asked if any Japanese loyal to America were coming to harvest the crop. (He must have known that this was the case, since the first contingent of farm workers had arrived the day before.) Myer replied for Best:

"May I answer that? [We are going to take care of the harvesting of the crop outside and I have no comment to make now. You folks did not want to do it so we arranged to have it done outside and I cannot make any comment.] In view of the decision

¹So says "X".

²R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 26, 1944, p. 3.

we will have to keep that as a separate issue. I am sorry."¹

Staying with his attempt to get an admission of the presence of the "loyal" harvesters, Kuratomi then asked why merchandise had been taken from the warehouse on the past two nights, and added that because of this, one mess hall did not receive its proper share of food. Mr. Best attempted to avoid the question saying:

"Let's get along. I will set down for the records that we will meet with any mess hall committee on those things. We haven't any records here and can't discuss those things at this time. If you want to get into details it takes time George."

Kuratomi, however, was not to be lured away from the point under discussion. He stated:

"We can't make such a report. They (the people) want a definite answer and I doubt if that answer will do."

[Best: It is our property and we are accountable for that property. We can do what we want to with it.

Kuratomi: Because of the fact that some merchandise was taken out of this Center some mess halls suffered a shortage.

⑤ Best: I would want to get into that thoroughly. I would want to find out exactly what was supposed to be delivered and was not and what mess halls were short. I want to know that.

Kuratomi: When you do find out what happened will you take proper action?

Best: What would be proper action. Maybe I don't know what the proper action is. I certainly will see that all staple commodities as far as the Quartermaster can supply will be kept here. I will see that the mess department keeps those things in here and supplies them to the mess halls.

¹It was undoubtedly to this statement that Mr. Cozzens referred when he was quoted in the Pacific Citizen of Nov. 6: ["Cozzens said that a committee of the assemblage then...asked what was to be done about the crops which the Tule Lake residents had refused to harvest...Cozzens said that the Japanese Committee was told 'It was none of their business' what would be done about the crops.'"]

③ It will be noted that Dillon Myer's statement was by no means so rude. However, Japanese in Tule Lake read this article in the Pacific Citizen and believed that this statement had been made by Cozzens. It caused a tremendous increase in the resentment which was already at high pitch.

Kuratomi: I am not satisfied with your answer as yet. We have to make a definite statement as to why this food was taken out and why the mess halls suffered.

① Myer: Mr. Best gave you his answer. I am sorry but there will be no report why the food was taken out. I don't feel that it is necessary to report every movement made. If you request an investigation regarding such a case and if it is proven that they were short, proper action will be taken. . . I am sorry to say we cannot be in a position to report to the community on every movement of trucks.]

[Kuratomi was forced to leave both of these important points *except these negative replies.* with no answer at all. *His statement of* ~~He did not exaggerate their importance to~~ *was by no means an exaggeration* the WRA officials, although he avoided indicating why they meant so much to the farmers and the residents. Months later, Mr. Best continued to be denounced by the residents for bringing in the "loyal" farm workers and for feeding them "food belonging to us."]

Kuratomi next launched into a denunciation of Dr. Pedicord's work at the hospital. He listed a number of incidents at the hospital stating that Pedicord had let two appendicitis patients wait until it was almost too late and that a child was stillborn because the mother had been given morphine injections improperly.

"There are many cases such as that to prove the inefficiency and indifference of Caucasian doctors in this hospital. It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this center and more or less see people die from day to day they cannot stand to see such a thing exist."

Kuratomi added that it had been decided the night before to ask for the resignation of "each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feel so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had a big practice and lots of responsibility." Adachi, the Block Manager of block 16 then told a pitiful story of how his nephew had died due to purported neglect on the part of Dr. Marks. Myer promised to go into the complaints thoroughly. "A judge never

makes a decision until he gets both sides." Thereupon, Kuratomi stated:

"This is not a complaint. We don't get anywhere with complaints. Consequently, it is turning into demands. The people want the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses and we want a definite answer today.

[Myer: That is impossible because I have been on the project only 6 or 7 hours and haven't even had a chance to look around.

Kuratomi: Let me say this much. This has been a request from the evacuee doctors and nurses. . . I don't want to see any violence. . . unless you remove those people from the hospital. . . I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors. I don't want to see any violence take place but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

Myer: I have never taken any action under threat or duress.

Kuratomi: It is not a threat; it is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

Myer: I realize what exists. Someone is responsible for that. The people are pretty well whipped up. I am sure the tension would be much greater if I made concessions without going into the facts. . . I am very sorry that is the situation. In view of what happened at the hospital today I cannot take action until we investigate the matter. That is final.]

Kuratomi: Do you want us to make the statement just as you said it?

Myer: You may state it as you wish. I hope you will give them the facts. Tell the people that I am here. I hope to go quietly about my work looking into the problems of the Center with the evacuees and the administrative staff. . . We hope to get a completely representative group of the Tule Lake Center to come up here to discuss their problems. You folks are serving in a temporary capacity until a truly representative committee has been chosen. . . I am sorry but I will not make any commitments that require action of removal of any personnel without seeing the other side.

Here, Adachi, the conservative Block Manager felt obliged to clarify his position, making the following significant statement:

"I don't belong on this committee. I am so grieved at the loss of my nephew that I wanted to speak to you so you can look into the matter. However, I am not being a party to any demands. I worked under Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverly and I don't want to make any trouble. I just wanted you to know the facts. I will be glad to be excused. I feel out of place here."

*Shirrell
Coverly*

This is an interesting section of the conference since Kuratomi put on his strongest pressure here, holding the "uncontrollable anger" of the people over Myer's head while Myer refused to be swayed into making an immediate concession. (Pedicord was, however, removed three days later, but subsequently reinstated.) Kuratomi was quite right when he stated that he could not stop the people from swarming into the hospital and attacking the doctors. In the opinion of the writer, he exaggerated the possibility of more violence but he did not exaggerate the tension in camp or the temper of the people. If he could have wrung a concession from Myer on this matter, it would have released some of the tension and, as he did not say, would have increased the prestige of the Negotiating Committee in the eyes of the people. Adachi's statement is very interesting. Although he admitted to the writer that at this time he and the other Block Managers generally approved the attempt of the Daihyo Sha to improve the living conditions of the camp, he was most anxious that he not be considered one of the "agitators" by the administration. Many residents must have shared this mixed attitude of "it's fine as long as it doesn't do us any harm." Six weeks later Adachi was to play a considerable role in opposing the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee.

Mr. Sugimoto then presented the report of the food committee. Stating that since coming into Tule Lake, the segregants felt that the food was qualitatively and quantitatively below that of the other centers. He stated that the evacuees in September had been fed at the cost of 24¢ per person per day although Dillon Myer had signed an administrative instruction naming (31¢) per person as the

*Elsewhere
it has repeatedly
been said 44 or 45¢*

proper amount. He also stated that the Caucasian personnel was getting far more than its share of rationed goods; moreover, they received the choicest cuts of meat. Myer stated that if it were true that the people were not getting the proper food it would be corrected immediately.

KuratomI then briefly went back over the points presented at the October 27 meeting, the uniform porches, improvement of the latrines, and dust control of the roads. Best said these matters were under consideration. KuratomI brought up the absence of brooms, buckets, mops, closet space, and the recognition of a Central Organization. He gained no more satisfaction than at the first meeting. He then presented a statement "from the residents" demanding the removal of Mr. Best, the Project Director; Mr. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director; Mr. Schmidt, head of Internal Security; Mr. Kallum, head of the Agricultural Division; Mr. Peck, the chief steward; Mr. Kirkman of the Warehouse Section and all of the Caucasian doctors and nurses. Myer made a long speech at this point, stressing that he had absolute confidence in Best and making no direct answer to this demand for removals.

"All I have to say further is this. I am glad to have had the opportunity to meet with you. I want to say that I have absolute confidence in Mr. Best, or I wouldn't have placed him here. I placed him here. I placed him here because I felt that he had understanding, courage, and would know how to work with you people in working out your problems. I still think that.

"As far as personalities are concerned, I came up here to go over with him problems in relation to personnel or any other problems he might have. I am going to accept his recommendations and will probably make a few of my own. I want to make it quite clear that Mr. Best is in charge, and that we can't operate on the basis of demands, but only on the basis of sitting down and talking things over.

"There is only one agency I know of who operates on the basis of demands. We don't operate that way. I want to repeat. The War Relocation Authority has been in operation for a year and a half. We have gone through a good many trials and tribulations and troubles. We have been investigated twice by the United States Congress, as regarding the population and problems of these people. They have said things about your problems which I haven't agreed with. . .

"We hope we can work with you. If we can't I presume there will be someone else working with you. I don't know who that would be. I am sure that you are not interested in having trouble. . .

"When you have any suggestions, bring them to Mr. Best. Don't bring them in the way of demands. That embarrasses him and it embarrasses you. We can't meet demands. We are operating under the United States Government and have to follow certain policies. We are willing to investigate charges and are willing to take action if we find they are based on facts.

"I am much obliged to you for coming in. I am sure that you will want to operate on that kind of basis and if you don't, there will have to be some other kind of basis worked out. I am not here to make threats. I don't make threats. We stand on what we are trying to do. We think our program has been pretty sound so far, and that the evacuees generally understand that.

"I think you have some differences of opinion in this center. While I don't know how many people you represent, I doubt that you represent all of them. I hardly think that you represent everybody's point of view. It is difficult to represent everybody's point of view when there are 15,000 people here. I hope that I can have an opportunity to devote my time and attention to the problems represented here within the next 24 hours or so and I want to get at some facts and I am sure that is what you want me to do."

Later, several informants criticized the Negotiating Committee's request for removal of the Appointed Personnel. Whether this request actually sprang from the people is open to doubt. However, all of the gentlemen concerned were very unpopular in the colony and their removal would have been received with general satisfaction.

Concerning these latter proposals, Kuratomi made the following explanation to the writer:

"We felt that if a request were made to get rid of Mr. Best, Mr. Myer would investigate the matter. If he were investigated and remained, we could tell the people that an investigation had been made and that his position is vindicated. . . Kirkman was thrown out of Santa Anita. He was caught in some kind of scandal there.

"The request to remove the Caucasian staff from the hospital came from the hospital employees. I don't think they'd like me to say that, but it's the truth. One point I want to make clear was their feeling that if the Caucasian doctors and nurses are human enough to realize the problem before them and are willing to work for the benefit of the people, it would have been all right."¹

Analysis of Meeting

~~As~~ As far as actual accomplishment in negotiations is concerned, the committee did not gain ~~very~~ much more by this meeting than by that of October 27. Myer, however, did promise to investigate the food situation, ^{than} ~~which~~ ^{had} ~~Best~~ ^{calm} ~~at~~ the first meeting, had ~~passed off~~ ^{noted} ~~completely~~. It should be ~~mentioned here~~ that neither Mr. Myer nor Mr. Best made any specific promises to the committee except to investigate the complaints. This is important because later both men, particularly Mr. Best, were accused of making promises which they did not keep. The withholding of the termination notice which was finally granted the committee, might have satisfied the farm workers' "principles" but it could not mitigate the fact that ~~they had been removed from the payroll and could not, according to WPA regulations, get another job for thirty days.~~ ^{be eligible for other jobs, which were scarce under any circumstances, for thirty days} ~~Moreover, jobs were scarce at Tule Lake.~~ Myer also promised to investigate the hospital situation. ~~Psychologically, however, the~~ ^{did, however, seems have} committee ~~had~~ strengthened its position with the administration.

In spite of the attempts to explain the presence of the great crowd by "pressure" or "terrorization" Myer could not fail to realize that he had an aroused populace to deal with and that this populace "supported" the committee. The actions of the administration in the two days that followed indicate that to some extent at least the administration was convinced that they would have to deal with the committee ~~as representatives~~ and consider ^{its} ~~their~~ requests.

¹ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 6-7.

in spite of
these
conditions
don't
it
"representatives".]

The conference lasted for two and a half hours. During this
~~While the negotiations proceeded,~~ *where found* the great crowd of ~~Japanese~~ *Americans*
 stood quietly around the administration building ~~for two and a~~
~~half hours. Informants frequently state that their most vivid~~
~~memory of this event is how tired they became. "I was never so~~
~~tired in my life," said several nisei girls. A young man, Tokyo~~
 Yamane, acted as announcer and from time to time advised the crowd
 to be patient ~~as~~ *while* the negotiations were proceeding.¹

When the meeting ended, Dillon Myer, at the request of Kuratomi
 made a very short address to the people. This address was preceded
 by a report from Kuratomi on the progress of the negotiations and
 was followed by a speech by Reverend Kai. ~~According to Dr. Webber,~~
~~who speaks Japanese fluently,~~ Kuratomi's attitude in his speech
 to the people was much more conciliatory than ~~that~~ *his* attitude he had
 assumed in the meeting. ~~"In his speech he made no threats and~~ *He*
~~expressed~~ *expressed* ~~his~~ *his* ~~tenor seemed to be that he hoped~~ *the* ~~something could be accomplished~~ *conclude*

Kuratomi outlined the speeches he and Reverend Kai made at
 this time to the writer:

"I made a very short speech. I said we had an opportunity
 to negotiate not only with Mr. Best but also with Mr. Myer. I
 just briefly summed up the points. In the majority of cases
 Mr. Myer promised he'd conduct a thorough investigation and said
 we'd be notified. In general, the requests brought up were
 received in a harmonious manner. In due times, I was positive,
 everything would be ironed out. The recognition of a centralized
 committee was important to the people. I mentioned that and also
 about the food and the hospital.

~~re~~ "Mr. Myer spoke then. Then Reverend Kai spoke last. He
 restrained the people from going into any unreasonable acts and to
 always maintain their true virtue as real Japanese. The negotia-
 tions were well conducted. At the last he said, 'This is the end
 for the time being,' and told the people to disperse."³

¹From excerpts from FBI Report on Tule Lake Incident, p. 47.

²*ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

³*ibid.*, R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 26, 1944, pp. 3-4.

Dr. Webber gave a more detailed account of Reverend Kai's speech:

② ["We have been here a long time. A great many things have been discussed and no conclusions have been reached. We will have to enter into further negotiations in the future. You people must remember that you are Japanese and must act as Japanese to hold together for the sake of the Empire and the Emperor."]

According to Webber this speech was delivered in a very passionate tone of voice.¹

③ [At the conclusion of Kai's speech, Yamane called on the people to bow. This they did in unison, according to Kuratomi, "not only in gratitude to Reverend Kai but also as a gesture of gratitude to Mr. Myer."]

[The report of Myer's speech ^{as} printed in the Tulean Dispatch of November 2 appears accurate:]

DELEGATES CONFER

Myer Addresses Local Residents at Ad. Area.

① Presenting the requests, suggestions, and demands of the colonists, seven representatives of the residents met with National Director Dillon S. Myer and Project Director Raymond R. Best yesterday afternoon.

During the conference which lasted over two hours, practically the entire population showed their support by surrounding the administration building area during the entire afternoon.

④ [At the end of the negotiations Myer addressed the local residents over the public address system and stated that he has met with the people's delegates to discuss their representations. Expressing utmost confidence in Director Best, Myer concluded by asking residents to cooperate with the administration in settling all problems.]

George Kuratomi, a member of the representative group, gave a brief report of the proceedings with the WRA officials.

In conclusion Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and not create violence harmful to the Japanese interests.

¹FBI Report, ibid.

The seven representatives will meet today and tomorrow with the national director and the project director to discuss further the points brought out in yesterday's initial conference.

Many informants have stated that they were anxious to hear what Mr. Myer had to say and admit that they were disappointed with his long-awaited speech. He gave no indication that any of their grievances would be improved or that any concessions would be made. He made no promises. Mrs. Yamaguchi expressed the reaction of the people: "The ordinary people were disappointed. they expected more to come out of it."¹

Nevertheless, the successful demonstration and the capitulation of the administration in granting the Negotiating Committee this long interview added greatly to that body's prestige with the residents. Public support of the Daihyo Sha reached its highest point around November 1. While support could by no means be called unanimous, there was probably not an evacuee in camp at this time who did not feel that if the Negotiating Committee could successfully carry out its policy of wringing some concessions from the administration which would improve the general camp life, settle the farm "work stoppage" and get rid of Dr. Pedicord, would be quite willing to stand by and approve.

Undoubtedly, this meeting of November 1 may be considered a victory for the Daihyo Sha as far as their hold on the residents was concerned. The committee had forced the administration to receive them as the peoples' representatives. With sagacity and political foresight the leaders had avoided major errors, while the administration had committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, e.g., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the

funeral, calling in the harvest workers to break the "strike" and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

Most intelligent informants state that they believe that the few days after the November 1 demonstration up to the entrance of the Army on November 4 marked the high point of camp unification and public support of the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee. The committee appeared to be making progress, it had been "recognized", the demonstration had been staged successfully except for the beating of Pedicord which, after all, was received with great satisfaction by almost everyone. In other words, the Negotiating Committee was looked upon as a successful group of leaders who had made noteworthy accomplishments without bringing any undue inconvenience upon the people. After November 4th when life became increasingly uncomfortable, support dwindled slowly but progressively.

The Controversial "Promises"

[The committee lost no time in publicizing the fact that negotiations were proceeding favorably and that Mr. Best had made them certain concessions, *on the way of promises of future reports.* ~~The minutes of the October 26 and November 1 meeting show that a goodly number of the committee's requests had been promised consideration, and that they had every right to consider that they had been given permission to establish a representative body. Moreover, A few days after November 1, Mr. Best announced that Dr. Pedicord would be dismissed, a decision which was not ~~carried out~~ *human* carried out. He also stated that he wished to erect uniform porches if Washington gave permission. It is doubtful~~

that the more intelligent leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai deliberately deceived the people on this matter of promises. Probably, the less responsible members, with the assistance of self-appointed gossips spread incorrect rumors through camp that specific promises had been made. When events made it impossible for Mr. Best to keep to any of the statements made at the meetings, ~~this body of~~ ^{his} actual and imaginary broken promises ^{were gently modified and were} pointed to repeatedly by the residents as evidence of the "double-crossing" character of Mr. Best.] the overwhelming majority of people, whether they were Daihyo Sha supporters or not, considered him a cheat and a liar, an opinion to which they held for his entire career as project director at Tule Lake.

On the matter of the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord and the Caucasian appointed staff at the hospital the accusations of the people had good basis. On November 4 Mr. Best released the following letter. Later, Dr. Pedicord was reinstated at Tule Lake and continued in his work there for some time before his transfer to the Gila Relocation Center.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

November 4, 1943

To whom it may concern:

Immediately following the incident at the hospital wherein Dr. Pedicord was beaten by some unknown group of men, Director Myer and Dr. Pedicord agreed that doctors on the appointed staff and the appointed staff of nurses were to be removed from further duty at the hospital. Federal regulations require that a hospital administrator must be responsible for government property and narcotics. In accordance therewith Nurse Shipps has been detailed as hospital administrator. There are no facts to the rumor that Dr. Pedicord will return to the Tule Lake hospital.

/s/ R. R. Best
Project Director.

ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1

no 4P. [On November 2nd the appointed personnel held a meeting in the recreation hall at which a petition was circulated for a fence between the administrative and the evacuee areas. Director Myer was asked to attend. Several of the appointed personnel made speeches expressing their extreme state of insecurity. Some staff members resigned.¹ On the same day members of the Appointed Personnel, prominent among whom were those members of the hospital staff who were staunch supporters of Dr. Pedicord and the most anti-Japanese persons on the project, held a meeting at the town of Tule Lake. Dillon Myer again was asked to attend and did so unwillingly. The tenor of this meeting was described by a rather emotional Caucasian. The irate members of the WRA personnel demanded military protection, (two soldiers to each person,) machine guns and tanks. Myer stated that he was against a show of violence for 'violence bred violence.' He voiced the opinion that the members of the personnel were 'justifiably scared but insisted that adequate military protection was quietly in operation.'

"The leader of (the nurses) shook with fear and rage that such an appeasement policy dare to be breached. Each small town orator got up and stalked and posed. . (and) stormed about his individual bravery."

The personnel present at this meeting also demanded that a fence be erected between ~~the Japanese~~ ^{Japanese} and Caucasian quarters. Immediately after Mr. Myer's departure, the construction of a high barbed-wire topped fence, separating the ~~Japanese~~ ^{Japanese} section of camp from the Caucasian section (the Administration Buildings, living quarters and warehouses) was begun. Sentries were stationed at the gates and ~~for the remainder of the camp's existence (this~~

¹WRA, Tule Lake Incident Sequence of Events, p. 5.

~~may have to be changed)~~ ^{Excess} ~~Japanese~~ had to procure passes to be allowed entrance into the "Caucasian Area."] ~~Needless to say, the presence of this fence was always resented by the Japanese.~~

The state of mind of the administration immediately after November 1 was one of indecision, tension and fear which in some individuals amounted to hysteria. As far as men in higher positions were concerned, the lurid and exaggerated accounts of the "Jap riots at Tule Lake" were most disturbing. Newspaper reporters, put off with innocuous statements, interviewed the Caucasians employed in construction work who lived outside of the project and built up fantastic stories based on the statements of these ill-informed persons. The Japanese also were justifiably angered by these accounts which described them as "blood-thirsty Japs" but to them

Is Hay? *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

[Faint stamp: "copy to the..."]

[no page 85-93]

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this was only one of a large list of aggravations. To Dillon Myer and Mr. Best this publicity was a matter of appalling seriousness. In fact, the injury to public relations was probably the most severe blow dealt to WRA in all its history. Every Administrative action and every event or disturbance which followed November 1 was always considered first from the viewpoint of what effect it would have if the matter got into the newspapers. Extreme caution was observed to see that news did not leak out. The importance of this fear on the mind of Mr. Best and its effect on his future policy as Project Director at Tule Lake cannot be over-emphasized.

Yet, despite the pressure and annoyance the November 1 demonstration and the organization in the colony aroused among the higher members of the personnel, the administration was not unsympathetic to many of the Negotiating Committee's demands or requests. Dr. Opler expressed this attitude well, although it is doubtful if the administration was quite as "sympathetic" as he implies.

"The administration couldn't listen to them as demands. They were really sympathetic to all of them (the demands) except the dismissal of the staff members. The Negotiating Committee demanded promises. We said we'd do what we could. They took it as a promise and insisted we'd broken a promise."¹

*where & when
is this
assumption
made?*

The Administration was correct in assuming that the Daihyo Sha did not have complete public support. However, it greatly underestimated the extent of the lack of support. Its greatest oversight was ignorance of the fact that the great mass of the people felt they had elected these representatives and that the people would always support actively or passively any group that stood stalwartly against the unpopular Administration, even if it used threats or employed violence. The public support of some of the demands was tremendous. The deeds of the Administration, no matter what their character, would be received with more or less opprobrium if for no other reason than that they sprang

1. R. Hankey, Notes, February, 1944, p. 21.

from this hated source.

The Administration's ignorance of the extent of public support of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and which of the committee's policies were approved or disapproved, was due to the fact that they knew practically nothing of what was going on in the center. Tension was so great at this time that even if any Caucasian had had the curiosity or courage to investigate the situation, he could have found out almost nothing. Even the most eager Japanese inu or stool-pigeon would not have dared to give information. It is interesting that several of the men who turned stool-pigeon two months later were at this time vociferous members of the Daihyo Sha Kai. On the other hand, Kuratomi has told the writer that on several occasions he tried to impress Dr. Opler with the gravity of the situation, and give him a clear picture of the overwrought state of the residents. Mr. Tsuda also remarked that he had to pull Dr. Opler into the Internal Security office during Mr. Kashima's funeral and warn him to get out of camp. Tsuda stated that he was unable to understand how Dr. Opler could fail to perceive the seriousness of the situation. The extremely deceptive quietness of an emotionally tense Japanese group and the reluctance of the Caucasian personnel to believe what they probably considered the exaggerated statements of "agitators" must therefore also be taken into consideration as a partial explanation of the administration's lack of perspective at this time.

November 2 Meeting of Daihyo Sha Kai

On November 2, the Daihyo Sha met again. The chief task before the body was the determination of the method of selecting the permanent committees and the permanent representative body which was to head up the proposed community organization. The permanent representative body continued to be called "The Negotiating Committee" in the minutes. The committees considered necessary

9 were Hospital Investigation Committee, Farm Department, Motor Pool, Warehouse, Mess Hall and Management, Police, Betterment of Living Condition, Education, Personal, Fire, Administration. These suggestions, however, were considered tentative and were to be referred to the people at a mass meeting.

The first question raised was how this permanent Negotiating Committee and the sub-committees were to be selected. The minutes are very confused and the discussion is difficult to follow. Kuratomi explained the plan accepted to the writer:

"Each block was to recommend suitable persons to the various committees. After the recommendation sheets were in, the Daihyo Sha was to elect a selection committee to make the final recommendation to the various committees. The committee members thus chosen were to be subject to the final approval of the administration and the people."

7 Kuratomi made the recommendation for a mass meeting and also advised that written personal histories should be attached to the names of the recommendees. Kai suggested that a written report of the decision of the Recommendation or Selection Committee be distributed in the blocks the next day and that the Daihyo Sha also be given the privilege of making recommendations to the committees. These suggestions were approved. The ways and means of recommendation were to be left to each ward (or block?). Both the persons making recommendation and those individuals recommended for positions were to be 21 years old or older. By Monday, November , it was hoped that the permanent committee would be selected and work on the farm would be resumed. The meeting closed with the decision that the Daihyo Sha organize the celebration of Meiji Setsu, the birthday of the Emperor Meiji which fell on the next day.

The tone of this meeting is very optimistic. There is no indication whatever that the leaders, headed by Kai and Kuratomi had any other intention but to push through the election of the permanent body which they had received

Best's and Myer's permission to organize. Once this body was in existence it would be very difficult for the Administration not to "recognize" it. The impression gained is that the negotiators felt they had gained recognition and that by and large, they had a fairly clear field before them. Had there been no further incident, this group of leaders might have kept control of the camp for some time. The more level-headed leaders were not unaware of the danger of such outbursts as that which resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control the over-enthusiastic belligerent, strong-arm group. Announcements, such as those described by Mr. Nakao, were made in the mess halls:

"The Block Representatives would come back to the block and state that the young fellows - those in their teens and up to 22 - ~~says they~~ were too hot tempered and they would like them to be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back to the block and said for the young people not to take matters into their own hands. This was right after the farm accident in October."¹

As for the Administration, in spite of the hysteria of certain individuals, the men in the higher positions thought that the crisis had passed. Opler is reported to have said on the night of November 3 that there wasn't going to be any trouble.²

*what
another?* Committee meets with Spanish Consul

On November 3 the Spanish Consul F. de Amat arrived on the project to investigate the November 1 disturbance. He came at the request of the farm group made through a letter signed by Kuratomi. Senor de Amat was accompanied by H.A. Benninghoff, a representative from the State Department. He met with a group of 20 Japanese representatives, among whom were Mr. Horiuchi and Reverend Kai. Mr. Kuratomi acted as spokesman for the evacuees.

The minutes of this meeting are very revealing since the Japanese spoke much more frankly to the Spanish Consul ~~says~~ than they did to Mr. Myer or Mr.

1. R. Hankey, Notes, March, 1944, p. 12.

2. According to Harkness, Superintendent of Schools, in informal conversation with the writer.

Best.

The first point brought up by Kuratomi concerned the presence of the "loyal" Japanese in the center, the voluntary segregees who came to Tule Lake with their relatives. He stated that there were two to four thousand such persons in the Center, which is probably a very good estimate. He requested that Washington be asked to make definite announcement at some specific future date that Tule Lake would be designated as a center for only those persons who intended to go back to Japan. Mr. Benninghoff, the representative of the State Department, stated that it was possible that this might be done in the future and asked Kuratomi what he would do about those persons who were loyal to Japan but did not wish to repatriate. Kuratomi suggested that a separate camp might be set up for such individuals.

Kuratomi then brought up the question of producing food only for the residents of Tule Lake and suggested that the farmers who lost employment when this policy was carried out might be employed in other divisions, e.g., carpenters, block beautification, road improvement and latrine facilities. De Amat pointed out that by producing more food than Tule Lake could consume, the residents were actually helping themselves in that they could then exchange goods with other centers. Kuratomi admitted that this was true but argued that since induction into the centers was compulsory "if the people did not wish to work beyond a certain point, the government will be more or less looking after the welfare of the people in here. The food will automatically be coming in here, regardless of the work they would perform. That is true, isn't it?" De Amat admitted this was true.

Kuratomi then asked if the people in Tule Lake could be considered Japanese nationals regardless of whether they had Japanese citizenship or not. "That would have to go through congressional proceedings, wouldn't it?" Benninghoff

replied that this would be very difficult if not impossible. Kuratomi added that there were some requests that the Japanese government be asked to grant the nisei in Tule Lake Japanese citizenship. De Amat pointed out that Kuratomi could not take the responsibility for all of the nisei in the center on this matter. Kuratomi admitted this, whereupon Mr. Horiuchi added that Japan had a nationality law of 1924 which extended citizenship to anyone who stayed in Japan 24 hours. The nisei in camp, he stated, wished the Spanish Consul to request the Japanese government to amend this nationality law and grant citizenship to them, since by their actions they had manifested loyalty to Japan. De Amat replied that he would have to consult with his Embassy on this matter.

Kuratomi then launched into a rather confused statement criticizing the Caucasian personnel at Tule Lake. The present personnel did not understand Japanese psychology.¹

"We understand our position and we know the circumstances under which we are put here, so we are not here to cause any responsible riots or disturbances so long as sincerity from the administrative personnel is shown to us and put on type, black and white, and if their attitude would give us the feeling that they are sincere in their words."

Footnote:

¹ This is one of Kuratomi's favorite expressions.

Concerning Dr. Pedicord, Kuratomi listed four cases/^{of} purported negligence, two of which resulted in death. The Japanese doctors and nurses and the residents, stated Kuratomi, believed Pedicord incapable. Moreover, they considered the Caucasian nurses hostile to the Japanese.² They wished all the Caucasian doctors and nurses removed from the hospital "to protect the safety of the Japanese evacuees."

Kuratomi was about to go into a discussion of the mess problem when Mr. Horiuchi interrupted with another question concerning Japanese citizenship.

2. The writer is acquainted with some of these nurses. Some are among the most bigoted, anti-Japanese persons she has ever come into contact with.

Horiuchi wished to know if Japanese in the United States Army could be given dual citizenship by the Japanese government and be given a choice of staying in the United States Army or leaving it. Mr. Benninghoff stated that when young men in the Army were inducted they had an opportunity to make their choice. Mr. Horiuchi replied:

"That's previous to the treatment accorded to the families. Many were inducted before the war began, believing that if they served this country, their parents and their brothers and sisters would be given humane treatment as citizens of this country, as human beings. But after the war broke out, their parents and relatives were thrown into centers like Poston, where Indians couldn't even live. . ."

Mr. Benninghoff asked if the boys themselves wished to leave the Army or if this were only the desire of their relatives. Kuratomi stated that many were held against their will and many had changed their minds. De Amat agreed with Kuratomi, saying, "A lot of boys are in the army and their fathers are in Santa Fe" . . . Said Benninghoff, "I don't dispute that at all. In fact, I don't dispute anything." De Amat promised to ask for information from his Embassy. At this point Mr. Benninghoff left the conference.

Kuratomi then reintroduced the matter of Dr. Pedicord. De Amat asked an interesting question:

was
"Where/he before? You see, we go to the administration and hear one side - that he is a saint - and we come here and hear something different - that he's a devil. There is a way of knowing his past history, the way he has worked--"

De Amat asked if the main cause of the disturbance of November 1 was dissatisfaction with the hospital. Kuratomi said that was one cause and the mess was another.

De Amat: You know that I am here to help you. Why haven't you come to me before instead of going on a strike.

Kuratomi: The reason is we have come here very lately; we have been here only a month. It was very fortunate for us to have Mr. Myer visit us and we thought he could take our grievances first to see if they would take proper action to rectify some of the wrong doings.

De Amat: But up to that moment you resorted to violence --

Kuratomi: That wasn't done by the residents. There were two or three - some of the hotheads. That was not the produce or part of the program at all.

Kuratomi then brought up the unemployment condition at Tule Lake and suggested that more persons could be employed in mess, that the policy of having men clean the women's latrines was ridiculous and women should take over this work, that 500 additional carpenters could be employed and that block caretakers and block mothers to care for small children would also help to alleviate the unemployment situation. De Amat took careful note of the suggestions and promised to take them to the administration. He also agreed to ask the administration if the recreation halls could be used for the proposed Language Schools since the camp was so crowded that this was the only space available. Kuratomi also stated that the residents would like to have clothing allowances whether they were working or not. De Amat objected here, saying that none of the centers gave clothing allowances to persons not employed. He added: "The administration is feeling pretty sour and we don't want to have any more trouble than is necessary and so wait until some of these things improve."

Evidently De Amat believed that there was a fair chance that the administration would concur with the residents' demand that Pedicord and the remainder of the Caucasian hospital staff be dismissed, for he asked Kuratomi if there were enough Japanese nurses in camp to replace the Caucasian nurses. De Amat also stated that Tule Lake would not have enough doctors and asked if he should request that some be sent from Santa Fe.

Kuratomi then accused the project personnel of graft and ran into a little difficulty because De Amat did not have sufficient command of American slang to understand the word. When the word was defined, he made no comment. He was then asked if Mr. Kashima's widow could claim additional compensation

through the Japanese government after the war. De Amat stated that she could.

The very important food problem was then brought up. It is interesting that the Spanish Consul paid far more attention to Mr. Sugimoto's report than did Director Myer and he appeared to make a diligent attempt to understand the accusations brought forward. Due to the questions put by the Consul, these minutes contain the clearest account of Sugimoto's complicated investigation of the WRA mess situation. Sugimoto pointed out that 31¢ per person per day was the 1944 WRA basic subsistence budget; this was the sum remaining from 45¢ with a deduction of 14¢ to cover the produce produced by the Japanese at the farm. Basing his investigation on the month of September 1943, he found that the total expenditure, including the vegetables produced within the center was 27¢. De Amat asked him if he could prove this and Sugimoto replied that he could since he had all the records. Said De Amat: "That will be very useful and very good material to work on." The next item brought up by Sugimoto was the OPA point system. He stated that he had found that the WRA at Tule Lake had purchased enough meat to feed 14,700 people during the month of September 1943 and that in that month there were less than 14,000 people in the center. For this reason the evacuees should have been expected to receive their full point quota of meat. However, according to the records, the Japanese were short-rationed 95,000 points which the Caucasian personnel was over-rationed 34,000 points. "They don't share it in a brotherly way, do they?" commented the Consul. Sugimoto then stated that his investigation showed that the evacuees had been short-rationed 7,325 points on processed food for the month of September, adding,

"Now, when you go over to Washington and look through the books in the WRA office in Washington, they probably have a book with beautiful figures - only that does not prove that these things are actually so."

De Amat: I'm going to have that in writing. . . . You have everything here?
(Noting sheet)

Sugimoto: Every point I am reading here now, I have figures to prove. . . There is the matter of menu making - it is in practice all through the relocation centers . . . Many instances, the chefs in the kitchens cannot follow that menu for the simple reason that --

De Amat: That there is no such food --

Sugimoto: No such materials come with the menu. That point has been stressed by the people working in the kitchen time and again to the administrative personnel. The way we understand that, the effectiveness of that menu, the copy of it goes to Washington, the main WRA office, and that remains there of what is being fed to the evacuees in the centers. In other words, the menu itself is a misrepresentation.

De Amat: Because you don't eat that?

Sugimoto's complaint that the menus very frequently did not coincide with the food served was quite justified not only for Tule Lake but for the other centers. It was not at all uncommon to have the menu for the day read, roast beef, or roast pork, while the evacuees were fed hash or bologna.

Kuratomi: If we look through the record, the mortality rate, the rate the chickens die at the chicken farm, the rate is over a thousand per month and there are 22,000 chickens in this farm. . . Whether the chickens die voluntarily or involuntarily, forced to die or do on their own accord. Lately we have been watching where the chickens have been going. We find that the chickens have been going to the personnel mess hall. According to Mr. Best, everything that is raised in the farms here, including chickens and hogs, should be given to the evacuees. . .

De Amat asked how many persons ate in the personnel mess and on being told that there were from 150 to 180 he pointed out that that number of people could not possibly eat a thousand chickens even if they ate from breakfast to dinner.

Sugimoto: Food is disappearing. There must be some loophole, but the point we are trying to prove is that food is disappearing and that we are not getting it.

Mr. Kuratomi then told the Consul that Mr. Best had promised to talk things over with the committee, that he had furthermore promised that he would cooperate with them to the fullest extent so that some of the complaints and suggestions were fulfilled, and that he would request standard porches for each barrack and to improve the latrine conditions.

"So we have to wait to see whether he is sincere or not. In case he should fail to keep his promise maybe we will have to call you in and have your presence in this center again. Will that be all right with you?

De Amat: Yes, that is why I am here -- to protect the interests of the Japanese people. When I read in the papers that you strike, I get very upset, because I want you to do all you can and I want to do all I can to help you.

Kuratomi then told the story of how Mr. Best refused to grant permission to hold a public funeral and of Mr. Best's attitude on October 1 when Kuratomi and several other men from Jerome had gone to see him to hold an informal discussion. De Amat's reaction was very interesting:

De Amat: Who do you think would be a good director here?

Kuratomi: That's hard to say--

De Amat: Who? Who do you think among the other centers.

Kuratomi: For this place. We will find you a man. I think Mr. Robertson.¹ If Mr. Best should not want to cooperate with us and if he should keep his hostile attitude we will contact you again.

[In closing the conference, Consul De Amat made the following encouraging remark:

"I enjoyed talking with you. Everything was very reasonable, which is an exception. Frequently I have complaints that have no foundation but everything we have talked about today makes quite a lot of sense and I am hopeful that part of it will be arranged, not all of it, but part of it."

The contrast between the attitude which De Amat showed to the committee and that shown by Mr. Best is indeed striking. It is evident that the Consul was impressed with the general tone of the requests and complaints and exhibited a remarkably sympathetic attitude. He acted as if he intended to take action on the food situation and asked significant questions about a possible successor to Mr. Best. The questions put by Horiuchi concerning the status of Japanese nationals, the possibility that Japan might grant the nisei in Tule Lake Japanese citizenship and the possibility of getting Japanese out of the United States Army into Tule Lake all indicate the attitude of mind prevailing among a certain

1. Mr. Robertson was at this time director of Leupp.

part of the population at this time. It is small wonder that Kuratomi, speaking of this meeting told the writer, "That was one of the most amicable meetings we ever had. . . He (De Amat) asked us, 'Is it all right for me to leave?' I told him frankly that everything was under control. Then when he came back again (on November 9) he was rather peeved with us."¹

November 4 Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai

On the night of November 4, the Daihyo Sha Kai met again to proceed with the important matter of the organization of a permanent representative group.² Kuratomi, when asked to clarify the extremely confused minutes explained to the writer that the election of the seven or eight proposed permanent committees was the main object. This action was still to be approved by the administration and the people. The people were at liberty to reject any nominee or any committee or to add additional committees if they chose. Once these committees were functioning, it was the intent of the Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha to resign. "The entire body of the Daihyo Sha intended to resign and be replaced." [Previous to this meeting the residents of each block had handed in *their* a list of suggested persons for each committee and it was the task of the "Selection Committee" of the Daihyo Sha to select the permanent committeemen from these lists. These selections were subject to the approval of the body of the Daihyo Sha. "The only thing left to do ^{*said Kuratomi*} was to bring this up to the administration for their approval. We also intended to have the mass meeting and explain this to the people."³]

Matters did not run at all smoothly and the body wrestled with the problem and argued for six hours, from eight in the evening until two in the morning.

1. R. Hankey, Notes, September 18, 1944, p. 7.

2. It is interesting that according to Kuratomi, considerable consideration was given to the Poston method of organization at the time of the Poston strike. (Find out who was responsible for this - Nomura? Sugimoto?)

3. R. Hankey, Notes, September 18, 1944, pp. 8-9.

Since much of the discussion is very interesting, this meeting will be described in detail.

Discussion of the business on hand was begun by Yamatani who reported that in Ward I there had been no recommendations at all for the Selection Committee and suggested that the Daihyo Sha appoint a committee of nine men.¹ Takahashi criticized this method of selection and suggested instead that the Selection Committee be composed of men who represented each center.

Kuratomi asked for suggestions as to a practical procedure to follow in the selection. A man named Yamagata suggested that the Selection Committee be chosen from people with technical abilities. Thereupon, Mr. Yamamoto, a strong supporter of Mr. Takahashi, jumped the gun and nominated Takahashi to the Selection Committee. An anonymous person suggested that the Committee be selected by wards. Uchida then spoke up in favor of Takahashi's suggestion that the Committee be picked according to Centers, recommending that one or two persons be chosen from each center. Kuratomi disagreed, stating that since there were segregees from eight different centers this would result in some unfairness.

Yamatani resumed the argument to select the committees on a ward basis, pointing out that Poston had three camps and that block 31 had recommended 43 persons for one committee "because they only had one day to study and select those recommendees."² Mohri thereupon suggested that the Selection Committee be selected from each center and that nine or ten additional men from the Daihyo Sha Kai be put upon the committee. This suggestion was accepted by the body.

Having at length decided to have a negotiating committee composed jointly of representatives from each center and nine men from the Daihyo Sha, the body

1. Kuratomi says he thinks this was Ward IV, not Ward I.

2. This was true, said Kuratomi - Some blocks recommended 3 to 5 men for each committee.

next discussed how many men should represent each center. However, before this discussion got under way Mr. Mohri, a Daihyo Sha member, who had fallen asleep, woke up and remarked, "One out of the whole center"? Kuratomi answered:

Chair: We are discussing about the 4th plan which is your recommendation, wasn't it?

Mohri did not reply.

The discussion then continued in very confused fashion. Eventually the matter was put to a vote and decided as follows:

Two persons from each center - 36
One person from each center - 17
Two persons from each center and three from Poston - 14

This matter having been decided, the persons from the same center were instructed to get together and select the personnel of the Selection Committee.

At this moment [the meeting was interrupted dramatically by the entrance of Yoshio Kobayashi, a young police warden who reported that Caucasians were transporting food supplies to the outside by trucks. Mr. Tsuda, the chief warden instructed him to return, take the license number of the trucks, keep note of the food stuff being taken out and report to the supervisor at once. According to the minutes:

"He further advised Kobayashi not to go alone but stop at the Internal Security and pick up three or four night patrols to go along with him and he further warned to refrain from taking rash actions by all means. Kobayashi bowed and went out. Upon hearing this conversation several youths followed Kobayashi."

This matter, which was dismissed so casually, eventually brought about the ruin of the Daihyo Sha's plans and will be discussed in detail shortly. Kuratomi told the writer later:

"If I'd known anything like November 4th would have happened I'd have sent Mr. Tsuda down. I didn't think it was such a bad condition. Mr. Tsuda felt about the same as I did."¹

1. R. Hankey, Notes, December 26, 1944, p. 3.

The meeting continued and the Selection Committee of 15 persons was chosen. Topaz, Tule Lake, Poston, Gila, Heart Mountain, Jerome, Rohwer and Manzanar were represented. Granada and Minidoka were not.

Since it was now past 11:30, Mr. Takahashi suggested that the selection of the remainder of the committeemen (the Daihyo Sha representatives) be put off until the next meeting. Reverend Kai objected, stating that for the sake of the Project Director and the colonists, the task should be completed even if it took all night. At this moment another young man ran into the meeting and reported that the Army had entered the Center. The minutes state: "Noise of guns and machine guns, which broke the tranquillity of a cold dark night, increased." Kai instructed certain young men to order the boys to disperse before any injury occurred.

The questioning of continuing the meeting until the selections were concluded was put to a vote and it was unanimously agreed to continue. The task before the Selection Committee was tremendous. Many blocks had recommended a great many people, on a special form provided by the Daihyo Sha, listing the name of the committee, the men recommended, a brief history of the men, and their block. Each position had from 150 to 200 potential candidates and a stack of papers eight inches high awaited the committee.¹

The minutes continue dramatically:

"It was now 1:30 A.M. and the thundering roar of the tanks, armored trucks, and jeeps rumbled near the block 15 Mess Hall."

The minutes state that the Selection Committee surrounded Kai and that he personally selected the new permanent body "by acting quickly as a machine."
[The writer doubts this.] In any case, the selections were completed by 2:00 A.M. and the meeting was adjourned, the minutes ending with the ominous remark:

1. Ibid., January 2, 1945, p. 4.

"Sound of the guns were no longer audible, however the rumbling of the Army trucks and tanks was heard."

The writer has been informed that on this night, the Diahyo Sha also selected a very important body, their future Executive Board. This action does not appear in any part of the minutes. This board was intended to be the chief "governing body" of the future, dependent, of course, on the approval of the people. It was composed of five men: Ichiro Hayashi, Nogawa, Yukio Tanaka, Mitsuo Kimura, and H. Tsuda. These men were later to take on the important task of negotiating with the Army, an activity which resulted in their eventual detention in the stockade.¹ Needless to say, the appearance of this "new committee" caused the Army and the WRA considerable bewilderment.

The Warehouse Incident - Army Takes Over

While the Daihyo Sha was struggling with this difficult task of selecting permanent committees, events were transpiring which radically altered the situation and rendered all their efforts in vain. [As has been previously mentioned, a group of young ~~fellows~~ ^{men} had been guarding the warehouse area to see that no more food was taken away for the harvesters. Whether these young men had taken up these duties at the behest of the Daihyo Sha is not known. The administration has always contended that the guarding of the warehouses and the resulting trouble was the work of the Daihyo Sha. That Kai and Kuratomi were actually implicated, the writer doubts strongly. On the other hand, a young member of the Negotiating Committee has told the writer that he was in charge of the warehouse guard, a group of reckless fellows who, he stated, were very hard to control. This young man later became a member of a faction which opposed Kai and Kuratomi and it is not unlikely that this group of young men took this

1. Ibid., January 11, 1945, p. 3.

adventure upon themselves much against the better judgment of certain of the Daihyo Sha leaders. Some of them were judo boys, feeling their oats and eager for action. A member of the Daihyo Sha, described the boys in this group as "dumb and irresponsible."¹ The writer knows several of the boys who were present. They considered themselves very tough and, by and large, were better supplied with brawn than brains.

Q *but it is known that they*
~~These warehouse guards~~ had a fair amount of organization. Certain of the motor pool employees were closely connected with them and were prepared to give immediate notice if any trucks were taken out at night. ~~(The motor pool at this time was located very near Mr. Best's residence.)~~ About 9:50 p.m. Mr. Best sent four members of the personnel to get the keys for three trucks. The ~~Japanese~~ ^{Swedish} workers at the motor pool, believing that these trucks were to be used to take more food to the "loyal" harvesters, refused to give them the keys. The Caucasians left, ~~and~~ ^{and} returned with several men from Internal Security. ~~They~~ took out the trucks. At some place between the administration building and the warehouse area a fight broke out between the Caucasians and the young ~~Japanese~~ ^{Swedish} guarding the warehouse. The ~~writer~~ is of the opinion that complete trust cannot be put in any of the extremely variable accounts as to how this fight began or what occurred. Fenton Mahrt, Assistant Internal Security Chief, testified that he and two other officers saw about 20 Japanese standing in groups of two or three around the warehouses. Kobayashi, the ~~young~~ warden who had brought the news of the "attempt to remove food" to the Daihyo Sha Kai meeting, drove up to the administration parking area. According to ~~Mahrt's~~ ^{account}, Kobayashi and ~~the other~~ ^{Swedish} Japanese attacked him.² According to another Caucasian in the fight, he himself "lit into the Japanese" after they called

1. R. Hankey, Notes, July 30, 1944, pp. 5-6.
2. Abridged FBI report, pp. 9-10.

*1 of Caucasian
Assistant Internal
Security Chief,*

him "dirty names."¹ Whoever may have started the fight, a score or more of the warehouse guards fought with five Caucasians, ^{and one Caucasian} Mr. Borbeck, a member of Internal Security was very badly beaten. Shouts of "Get Best" are purported to have been heard.² Mr. Schmidt, Head of Internal Security, ^{and Mr. Best's independence} called the Army for help.³ Then Mr. Best ~~called the Army~~. The Army answered the call, marched in with guns and tanks, and with the assistance of Internal Security arrested 18 young men in the warehouse and closely adjoining personnel residence area and in that part of the camp adjoining that area. All but nine of these young men were released the same night. Almost all of them came from Topaz.⁴ Several ~~Japanese~~ were severely injured.

The above is all that is known to have occurred. On every other detail there is contradiction and disagreement. Almost every account, whether related by a Caucasian or a ~~Japanese~~, ^{differs in detail}.

Among these important controversial points are the use for which the trucks were intended, the contention of some of the members of the appointed personnel that the ~~Japanese~~ ^{intended} to kidnap Mr. Best and the question of whether or not certain of the ~~Japanese~~ ^{arrested} were brutally beaten in the statistics office by members of Internal Security before being turned over to the Army.] Mr. Spicer in his letter to Provinse and Dillon Myer in an interview with the writer stated that the trucks taken out were not intended to transport food from the warehouse but were to be used to transport more harvesters.⁵ Other members of the administration, among them Dr. Opler, believe that the trucks were being sent for food, as do almost all the Japanese.

1. According to Caucasian informant relating the story a member of Internal Security told in the mess hall the next morning.
2. WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events, p. 5.
3. So Schmidt stated to the writer.
4. WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events, p. 5.
5. Ibid. Spicer to Provinse, November 14, 1943

According to Mr. Spicer it was generally believed by the appointed personnel that the Japanese intended to kidnap Mr. Best. Spicer himself said, "Frankly, I am doubtful."¹ One of the writer's Japanese informants took a leading part in the November 4 fracas and had little hesitation in admitting that he and his bunch were there to stop the food from being taken out and intended to make trouble if necessary. When asked, however, if the boys had any intent to kidnap Mr. Best, he said, "Hell, no, what would we want him for?"²

The matter of the beatings in the Statistics office is befogged by numerous conflicting accounts. Schmidt and Mahrt, who are chiefly accused by the evacuees, insist that the Japanese were injured during the fight and were taken into the office to have their wounds dressed.³ Several reliable Caucasian informants tell stories which contradict this, stating that on the morning of November 5 the walls of the Statistics Office were spattered with blood and hair in a manner which could only result from a beating. There was also a bloody baseball bat in the corner of the room.⁴ (The Statistics Office is so situated that unlike most of the other rooms in the administration building it cannot be seen from the outside.) Dr. Fujii told the writer that he had treated Kobayashi for a slight head injury after the fight and before he was taken into custody. Three days later Dr. Fujii was called to treat some of the men in custody and saw Kobayashi with his face tremendously swollen and bandages on his arms and legs. He also saw a boy with a broken arm and one with a great gash in his head which required eight stitches. Fujii, who made his statement very carefully, is certain that Kobayashi was taken into custody with only a slight head injury.⁵

1. Ibid.

2. R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 5-6.

3. So Schmidt stated to the writer in informal conversation.

4. R. Hankey, Notes, February 1944, p. 35.

5. Ibid., April 1944, pp. 34, 35.

It is very difficult to give a picture of the panic and confusion which prevailed at this time merely by listing the details of what occurred and what is purported to have occurred. An extraordinarily vivid description of the night of November 4th was given to the writer by one of the nisei nurses' aides who was on duty in the hospital at that time. This girl was anti-Daihyo Sha and very hostile to the "kibei" and the trouble-makers. She is an honest and intelligent informant and her verbatim story expresses the atmosphere of this confused night excellently:

"That night a man walked in with blood gushing from his face. He was the canteen watchman. We put him on a table. Then another man walked in. He had a flesh wound in his head from a bullet. Then some soldiers walked in and told us to stand where we were. Then we were sent around the wards to quiet the patients.

"Then an awful banging came on the doors. We had to open the doors. Oh boy - those soldiers were scared, I tell you. They were actually shivering. They even went around looking under the beds. The poor patients didn't know what was going on.

"Then they started bringing in the boys who had been hurt. All of the boys had to hold up their hands all the time. They brought in Tokio Yamane. He had to hold up his hands all the time and meanwhile the soldiers would poke him in the back with a gun.

"The soldiers - maybe it was the psychological effect - they seemed so glad. They'd laugh and say, 'Huh, you Japs, we'll shoot you.' Then they'd laugh and laugh. It seemed so childish.

"Tokio Yamane wasn't hurt when they brought him in. It was later that they brought in the boys who had had their arms twisted. One boy had his ribs fractured. Their heads were all bashed up. They were such young kids.

"Some motor pool boys came in too. We pretended they were hospital boys so they wouldn't be arrested. We put them to washing dishes.

"We were terminated later as of November 4 so we never got paid for all the time we worked overtime then.

"When they brought in those boys they didn't look as if they had fought man to man. They looked beaten."¹

First Impact of Army Rule on the Residents

[The Army, under the leadership of Lt. Col. Austin, now took over full control of the camp. On the morning of November 5, when the Japanese working in the administrative area reported for work, they were stopped by a cordon of soldiers

1. Ibid., August 24, 1944, p. 3.

stationed at intervals of a few yards and told to return to their barracks. The large majority of these people were probably ignorant of the events of the preceding night.

A large number of ~~these~~ informants state that they did not hear the guns or tanks and had no idea that anything untoward had occurred until they attempted to go to work the next day. This is very possible since those Japanese nearest the scene of the fight live over one-quarter mile away. However, persons living in that section of the camp nearest the Administration building knew that some violence was afoot.

Since about a thousand people worked ~~in the~~ outside ^{perimeter} of the colony at that time, the crowd soon grew very large. It was augmented by curious persons and by the parents or relatives of the young women employed in the hospital who had not been allowed to return to their homes that night. The soldiers threw tear gas at the crowd, ^{in spite of the fact that there was no evidence of violence.} ~~That the crowd had any violent intent whatever is most unlikely.~~

The scene is described by an evacuee:

"The next morning, everybody like usual went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everybody was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the Army started throwing tear gas at them and told them to go home."¹

This experience of being the targets for tear gas was resented so bitterly that even ten months later, the eyes of otherwise meek Tuleans would flash with indignation when the subject was brought up. It appears that since the crowd had had no more dangerous motive than curiosity or the desire to go to work the barrage of tear gas was looked upon with the extreme and natural resentment of the innocent unjustly accused and attacked. Mr. Sato, who was so meek and timid when interviewed by the writer that he dared answer only in the most uninformative

1. Report, December 24, 1943, p. 14

monosyllables grew suddenly animated when asked how he felt about the morning of November 5. He said furiously:

"We weren't angry because they put the men in the stockade. We got mad because the Army came in that night with sub-machine guns and tear gas. We were all willing to go to work but they wouldn't let us go. They took our civil rights away. That's what made us mad."¹

The resentment expressed because they were not allowed to go to work, though all were willing, is also significant. Under Army control, compulsory idleness was imposed on most of the evacuees, bringing with it the stoppage of the monthly 12 to 19 dollar stipend. Only the block managers, the hospital employees, and the mess crews continued to work. This sudden work stoppage for the majority of the center's residents was their first taste of hardship due to the strike and the cutting off of their salary checks was later to become the most unbearable of the inconveniences of Army rule.

Daihyo Sha Kai Takes Action to Quiet the People

The same day the Daihyo Sha Kai, which appears to have had complete control of the Tulean Dispatch during this period, published an account of the warehouse disturbance and a stern exhortation to keep order.

COOPERATION ASKED.

Army Occupied Administration Area, Following Incident

"By a minor incident last night the center administration area was temporarily occupied by the army, who maintained a strict guard of the camp.

The Administration area was completely cut off from the rest of the center by patrolling M.P.'s. Number of tear gas bombs were thrown at residents standing by the zone limit.

Barb wire fences are being built southwest of the hospital area to keep the residents away from the Ad. area.

However, the facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees."

1. August 14, 1944, p. 3.

Residents Asked To Stay Calm, Com. Pass Resolutions

"Trust in the actions of the resident's delegates, and do not take any individual actions," exclaimed the committee of seven representatives chosen to settle Thursday night's incident.¹ Five resolutions were passed by the committee affecting the colonists' conduct during the following week.

"Young men are asked to be sensible and prudent due to the present situation, and residents are asked to refrain from spreading unfounded rumors, and congregating in more than five in a group. That the WRA properties within the center should not be damaged or destroyed, was emphasized by the committee resolutions.

"The resolutions were agreed upon by the representatives to bring about a peaceful conclusion, and violators of the rules will be punished by due action of the entire populace warned the committee. The delegates also stated that the infractors of these rules are working against the peace, harmony and the well being of the entire camp."

Center Residents Pass Regulations

The following regulations governing the conduct of the residents during the ensuing period have been made by the seven representatives delegated by the residents and their delegates:²

1. Trust the actions of this committee and do not take any individual actions.
2. Do not congregate in groups of more than five in the open.
3. Do not spread any unfounded rumors.
4. Young men! Be sensible and prudent about everything that you do.
5. Do not destroy anything in the center. Leave the entire camp and its facilities as it has been in the past.

Any persons who willfully violate these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace harmony and well being of the entire camp.

EDITORIAL

Let's Back Up Our Delegates

Residents! Let us show our faith in our representatives by obeying their regulations!

We have delegated our representatives to negotiate for us and act for us; they were not selected just as figureheads.

The merits of this wise step taken by our delegates can be readily seen by every thinking resident. The measures that they had taken in the form of these regulations was not a measure to show their authority; they had taken this step to protect us.

1. As explained by Kuratomi: "That was the Negotiating Committee. Nogawa was on it too. Volunteers were added to bring things to a favorable solution. Anyone who had an empty hand was asked to help it. The men were able volunteers who held some important position in the coming permanent body (chosen at the Nov. 4 meeting). They weren't delegated. We had to do it in an arbitrary manner." R. Hankey, Notes Jan. 2, 1945, p. 4.

The rash and hasty actions of a few who because of bitterness or anger take things into their own hands without stopping to think is not doing the community any good. They are just jeopardizing the welfare of all of their fellow residents.

Fellow residents! Let us take steps to punish any person who may disregard these rules!¹

1. All of the above quotations from Tulean Dispatch, November 5, 1943.