

right for the government to impound them. We expect those who did sign for repatriation or expatriation to be released if they applied prior to the date the government designated."¹

Mr. Abe said:

"If the boys were loyal to this country people think they should be arrested. But if the government tries to conscript those who said "No" there will be trouble."²

On July 27, the confidence of the residents showed itself to be well placed. The case against the young men was dismissed. The following announcement was made in the Newell Star:

27 FREED; DUE PROCESS-OF LAW NOT ACCORIED - JUDGE

Dismissal of the indictment charging 26 Japanese Americans from this center with Selective Service Act violations by U. S. District Judge Louis E. Goodman at Eureka, Calif., who ruled that an internee of this center was not accorded due process of law was reported Tuesday in the Herald and News, Klamath Falls, Ore. daily. (27 were arrested here and taken to Eureka last week. Apparently the court decision covered all 27 and not 26 as this news story states. All 27 men have returned to this center.--Ed. note)

Ruling in one case, Goodman said that the internee was in custody under a presidential citation and "is under the circumstances not a free agent nor is any plea he may make free or voluntary, and hence he is not accorded due process in this very proceeding."

His decision said "it is shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces or prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion."

The judge stated whether an internee's confinement under the presidential order "is lawful or not is beside the question."

"The issue raised by this action is without precedent," the decision pointed out. "It must be resolved in the light of the traditional and historic Anglo-American approach to the time-honored doctrine of due process. It must not give away to over-zealousness in any attempt to reach vial the criminal process those whom we may regard as undesirable citizens."

Assistant U. S. District Attorney Emmett Seawall entered an exception to the decision, keeping open the way for an appeal.

¹ ibid., July 20, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., July 24, 1944, p. 3.

This decision was received with great rejoicing in the center. No verbatim statements were obtained.

VISIT OF THE SPANISH CONSUL

On July 28, Captain Antonio Martin, the vice Spanish Consul visited the project. The prospect of his arrival produced scarcely a ripple of interest among the ordinary resident. The people had come to the conclusion that either the Spanish Consul could not help them or did not desire to help them. No Japanese mentioned the prospect of his arrival to the writer. When the subject was brought up by the writer the following attitudes were given:

An intelligent nisei man who took genuine interest in camp affairs, said:

"This is the idea the people have. Up to now the Spanish Consul hasn't been able to do anything. He hasn't been able to help the nisei. The people have lost interest."¹

Mr. Wakayama, an older nisei said:

"I don't think they have much confidence in him. He is a representative of a small country - especially Spain."²

Mr. Yamashita said:

"People on the whole are very indifferent."³

Mr. Yamashita added that the people had lost confidence in the consul chiefly because he had been unable to do anything about the stockade situation.

In preparation for the visit of the Consul, the administration requested the residents to select delegates to confer with him. Unfortunately, the only detailed account of the meetings at which

¹ibid., July 30, 1944, p. 7.

²ibid., p. 10.

³ibid., July 28, 1944, p. 1.

this request was made, came from Mr. Yamashita, who was an undercover leader and very hostile to the Administration. Mr. Yamashita related how Mr. Black had called a block managers meeting and asked their assistance in electing the representatives. However, according to Yamashita Mr. Black had a sinister motive in mind:

"Whether Mr. Black in his mind tried to utilize this instance as an opportunity to get the people to elect representatives to continue their function as representatives with the WRA, I do not know. But we know that the Administration is very anxious to have such representatives. This wasn't the first time the WRA have tried to form a representative body, since the last representatives who were duly elected by the people were apprehended and put in the stockade."

It should be kept in mind that Mr. Yamashita, an undercover leader working to get the release of the detainees and to push Mr. Best from his position, was not thinking very clearly in this matter. The writer doubts strongly if Mr. Black had any such intention. However, the pressure which Mr. Yamashita, his confederates and their followers, could bring to bear in certain sections of camp was undoubtedly affective in making persons reluctant to serve on this committee, lest they be branded as inu, ready to take up the position of stooges of the Administration and betrayers of the detained Negotiating Committee.

In spite of this pressure, however, most blocks elected men to see the Consul. Mr. Yamashita's somewhat biased account continues:

"In conformity with Mr. Black's request some blocks elected representatives either by election or by popular appointment. However, in some blocks, none of the block people wished to be in the position of sending representatives. So some of the block managers were forced, under these circumstances, to represent their own blocks.

"The other blocks studied the matter very carefully. These blocks felt it a courtesy on the part of the Japanese residents that they should elect representatives to welcome the Spanish

delegate who was considered as the personal representative of the Japanese government. However, with the existing unpleasant circumstances, they really did not wish to elect representatives just to welcome the consul. They do not wish to elect any representatives until such a time that the WRA officials seced from their tyrannical governing power. Still, those blocks 100% felt it is a matter of courtesy to elect a body to welcome the Spanish delegate.

Yamashita went on to say that the colonists resented the fact that De Amat had not come in person but has sent his subordinate, Captain Martin. He closed with the following remark, which as a general camp attitude is more significant than any of his other statements:

"After all, we have had such bitter experiences with WRA in the past and with the former meetings of the Consul which did not accomplish anything."¹

At one of the later meetings at which the delegates were actually chosen, an interesting occurrence took place. Byron Akitsuki's name was mentioned. A man arose and said, "I don't wish to offend Mr. Akitsuki, but I think that representatives who see the Spanish Consul should be living on our side of the fence." "I am living in camp," said Akitsuki and the man apologized.²

The progress of the agenda the committee was preparing appeared in the Newell Star of July 27:

COMMITTEE COMPLETES AGENDA AS CONSUL EXPECTED FRIDAY

Final preparation on behalf of the Japanese nationals was completed this week by the Spokesmen Committee for consultation with Capt. Antonio Martin, vice Spanish Consul, who will arrive in this center tomorrow, it was announced by the Civic Organization. The Civic said that this committee, which consists of two representatives from each ward, agreed to act as a medium of contact between the Japanese nationals and the Spanish Consul. They will serve for a term of three months.

¹ ibid., Aug. 4, 1944, pp. 1-2

² ibid., July 27, 1944, p. 1.

The Civic Organization stated that the committee has compiled an agenda of grievances and inquiries which will be presented to the consul. Among those to be presented are requests and inquiries for hospital facility improvements, progress of negotiation between the two countries on exchange of nationals, and clarification of the status of nisei who renounce their citizenship.

The attitude of the colonists is fairly well pictured by the following three statements:

Miss Doi said:

"According to a man I know, when they were assigned as representatives to see the Spanish Consul one man said it was probably to try to force some kind of committee, since otherwise nobody would want to serve on it. But we really need some kind of a committee here. We need someone who can go to the Administration."¹

Mr. K. said:

"It would seem to me that even if they do stay in office, if the people see anything nasty going on, they can demand their resignation."²

Mr. Okamoto said:

"I think almost every block had a representative. We failed at first there too. But when we saw that the Consul was really coming, people felt they must have a delegate."³

When Captain Martin arrived he did make an attempt to plead the cause of the detainees, who were now near the end of the July hunger strike, with Mr. Best. Mr. Warren gave the writer the following account:

"I hear that Best was very short with the Spanish. The Spanish Consul had asked for the release of the men in the stockade. Best sent him a written message that he could not comply with this request. He could not consider releasing the men in the stockade until the colony was in a normal condition. If the colony became normal, he would consider the Consul's request.

"Just then the word came in that the men in the stockade were all in the hospital. Best said to him that the situation was resolved. The hunger strike was broken."⁴

¹ibid., Aug. 7, 1944, pp. 1-2.

²ibid., p. 3.

³ibid., Aug. 8, 1944, p. 4.

⁴ibid., July 30, 1944 p. 1.

However, after the Consul left the project, the hunger strike was resumed.

As for the grievances brought to Captain Martin at this time, no informant showed any interest in them. It is probable that the Spokesmen Committee compiled the list without much help from the block residents. The following information was released in the Newell Star:

RESULTS OF CONFERENCE WITH CONSUL REVEALED

Committee Presents Requests

Result of the conference held Friday at 1608 between Capt. Antonio Martin, vice Spanish Consul, and the Spokesmen Committee, official elected body representing the Japanese nationals was announced today by the Block Managers' Headquarters. In addition to the Spokesmen Committee, many residents attended the conference.

The Block Managers' Headquarters reported that the Spokesmen Committee presented their list of requests which were accepted by Captain Martin. Among inquiries presented, some were defined as requiring legal interpretations beyond his authority. As to the question of the Denationalization Bill, Martin stated that a complete text of the bill is expected at the Spanish Embassy from the State Department. He acknowledged that if nisei renounce their American citizenships according to the bill, they would be regarded as Japanese nationals.

Persons desiring registration of marriage and birth certificates in this center with the Japanese Government are informed that duplicates of such certificates may be mailed to the Spanish Consul at San Francisco, where one will be retained for their file and another mailed to the Embassy in Washington D. C. Since there are no forms for such certificates, senders are asked to duplicate the copy received from the local government.

Captain Martin presented to the committee a statement received by the Spanish Embassy from the State Department regarding clothing allotments for evacuee. According to this statement all evacuees, whether working or not, are eligible for clothing allowances; therefore, heads of unemployed families are asked to file an application with the Social Welfare Department. However, the Spokesmen Committee pointed out, clothing allowances are included in the public grants and that upon termination of employment, a prompt application for public grants is necessary in order to receive clothing allowances. Persons who refuse employment are denied both clothing allowances and public grants.

The vice consul also requested for a complete report on

the late Yaozo Hitomi case. The committee informed him that they were not authorized to prepare such a report and a general meeting among the center residents could be held in the future to furnish the desired information.

The Japanese section of the paper reported the meeting in much more detail. Mr. Yamashita translated it orally for the writer; adding his own comments which are placed in parenthesis:

"According to the paper the issues were:

1. The hospital. We are not complaining against the management or the treatment, of which the center populace is appreciative. However, the residents have complained against the WRA facilities for the hospital here. They were prepared to meet a maximum of 12,000 people. But now the camp population has increased to 18,685. So naturally we need a bigger space and more doctors and nurses and other equipment. But we are not complaining against the doctors or the present management.

2. Request for improvement of sanitary conditions in camp. All the improvement pertaining to our living.

3. That WRA will recognize and will deal as toward an alien to a person immediately after he renounces his citizenship under this law, recently signed by President Roosevelt.

4. Vital Statistics - If it is necessary to report marriages, births, etc. to the consul, will he please send us the forms.

5. Last and most important as to consequences and causing misunderstanding and rumor, this question was put to the Consul: Who should be in a position to accept the responsibility of the lives of the residents?

1. WRA
2. The police force of the county.
3. The residents themselves.

'This is a question,' the Consul replied, 'That I am not in a position to answer pertaining to the legality of the case.'

(But the rumor of the opinion of the residents on this question is that it was a very unwise question. They suspect this particular question was brought up because of the several attackings and the murder case. The people suspected that to bring up a question like this was an attempt on the part of the representatives to find the attackers or murderers.)

6. The stockade problem.

The consul was met by some of the representatives (some blocks did not send representatives and after bringing up these

matters to him, they finished temporarily. The blocks not represented were convinced there was not any reason for the continuance of their existence after the conference with the consul.

1. These representatives were elected to meet the Consul and to prepare the issues for which the Consul was to render his services.

2. These representatives are said to be elected by the Japanese, not second generation. As long as they were elected with the principal aim to meet the Spanish delegate on this occasion and as the Spanish delegate is supposed to take care of the matters pertaining to Japanese subjects only, they themselves stated that these representatives represented Japanese subjects only.

3. They expressly stated that said representatives had nothing to do with the problems of the second generation.

(Please to note: the present population of Tule Lake is about 5,600 issei and the rest nisei. That shows that they are taking a big responsibility and can be considered very foolish.)

4. Said representatives also stated further that since they are elected by the blocks simply to deal with Japanese subjects, that this organ (the body of reps.) has nothing to do with WRA.

5. nevertheless, the representatives had decided to continue their existence as a body, even though having committed themselves by saying that they represent only the issei and that they dealt only with matters pertaining to Japanese subjects. But still they are going to continue for the next three months in this capacity.

~~This-is-what-it-said-in-the-pap~~

APPEALS BOARD VISITS TULE LAKE

The Appeals Board which reviewed cases of certain residents desiring leave clearance made a brief visit to Tule Lake at the end of July and reviewed 19 cases.¹ This made very little impact on the camp. The only attitude obtained came from Mr. Abe who appeared at one of the hearings in the capacity of guardian for a young girl from Manzanar. According to Abe, this young woman had been sent to Tule Lake through the error of an interpreter when she had had her hearing in Manzanar. When she received

¹Newell Star, Aug. 3, 1944.

notice that she was to be segregated she had gone to the Social Welfare to straighten the matter out but was told that it would be better if she went to Tule and then appealed. Accordingly, she came to Tule with her No-No brother. Since she had changed her answer to Yes-Yes, she wished to return to Manzanar to be with her mother. Abe described an incident at her hearing as follows:

"At the hearing they asked the girl, 'Do you want America or Japan to win the war?' She didn't answer. The whole room was very tense. Then I asked to speak. I stood up and said, 'She's only 20 years old, a young, innocent girl. She knows nothing about worldly affairs, particularly international affairs. She is a citizen of the United States but she is of Japanese blood. While she may wish that this country will win the war, how can she pray that Japan will be beaten? To ask such a question of an innocent girl is too cruel.'

"After the hearing was over the judge asked the stenographer, 'Did you write down every word he said?' The stenographer said she did. The judge said, 'Send it in with the other papers.'

"The final decision in this hearing is up to Washington. We were told we might have to wait about a month to hear."¹

RETURN OF MR. BESIG

Mr. Besig returned to the project in the latter part of July, partly in the capacity of attorney for one of the cases before the Appeals Board and partly to resume his investigation of the stockade situation. On this occasion he was given even less consideration by the administration than on his previous visit. It should be mentioned here that previous to Mr. Besig's visit, Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese who had organized the movement to contact Mr. Besig, had been arrested on charges of sedition and taken from Tule Lake. Later he was given a prison sentence of three or four years. Some details of Besig's second visit were given by Warren:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 8, 1944, p. 3.

"Besig was met at the train in Klamath Falls by Internal Security men. The instructions are that the Internal Security men are not to be out of earshot of him for a moment. Best sent Besig a teletype saying that Besig would be allowed on the project for the purpose of the hearing and for the hearing only.

"I met the wife of one of the stockade internees at the gate who requested that Besig get in touch with her. I didn't know what to do, so I went to Robertson and told him. Robertson went to Leckliter. Leckliter told Robertson that Besig could see nobody for whom Leckliter had not given him a written request. And he wasn't taking any written requests.

"Leckliter said he had received a telegram from Myer saying that Besig was not to be allowed to do anything on the project without the written authority of Baldwin (Director of the ACLU). Baldwin is supposed to have told WRA that this was O. K. according to Leckliter.

"I tried to talk to Besig but the cop kept within four feet of me all the time.¹

Mr. Besig, however, was allowed to see those persons whom he had talked to on his first visit. Warren continued:

"He said he already had enough evidence and within the next few days action will be brought. He said he wasn't discouraged. He said Baldwin hadn't written to him at all about the Tule Lake business. He thinks Baldwin may have sold out to WRA."²

Mr. Besig proceeded with the preparation of the habeas corpus action he intended to take against the WRA. However, before it could be put into motion, the detainees were released. At first this caused some of the detainees and the "Q" pressure group much concern because they believed correctly that once the men were released, their chances of bringing any action against the WRA would be gone. However, there was nothing to be done, since the men could not insist on remaining in the stockade, especially after they had undergone the hunger strike. Mrs. "Q" an active member of the pressure group stated at this time:

¹ ibid., July 30, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., July 31, 1944, p. 1.

"We didn't think they would be let out one by one like this. Some families are telling their boys not to come out. My brother feels this way - that they could be released and that they could still bring suit. But the families think the boys should remain in the stockade."¹

Mrs. "Q" added that the families had been sending registered letters to Mr. Besig since the 8th of August, asking for his advice on this matter but had received no answers. It is probably, however, that it was chiefly the pressure group who wanted the men to remain in the stockade so that the Administration might suffer by the suit and that most of the relatives were glad to have their men home again.

The following letter was written to Mr. Baldwin of the ACLU by Mr. Pitts of the Department of the Interior. Properly it does not belong in this report. Since it may be of use to some other member of the study it is included here.

United States
Department of the Interior
War Relocation Authority
Washington

August 17, 1944

Mr. Roger Baldwin
Director, American Civil Liberties Union
170 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Baldwin:

This is in answer to Mr. Forster's letter of August 8, enclosing a photostatic copy of the August issue of the American Civil Liberties Union News published in San Francisco and asking for any facts or comments that we should care to make in view of the allegations made in the lead article of that issue.

I am disturbed over the publication of the article. In the distortion, exaggeration, misinterpretation and omission of facts the article compares with many other attacks that have been made--with entirely different motivations--upon WRA policies by the Hearst press and some other organizations. I am deeply concerned about the possibility that the article will have precisely the same effect in its international implications as those other

attacks. The blazoned charges of "tyranny," "Gestapo methods," "brutality," and "incommunicado" detention will certainly delight the Japanese propaganda machine. They may--although I sincerely pray they will not--result in recriminatory action against the American civilians in Japanese hands.

Even if the charges were wholly true I should regard the publication of the article to be very ill-advised. Certainly there are avenues available to Mr. Besig, through your organization and otherwise, to obtain any remedial action that may be needed without endangering the war effort or the lives of our citizens abroad.

The situation at Tule Lake is an extremely delicate one. I agree fully with Mr. Besig on that score. We have among the Tule Lake evacuees a group of strongly pro-Japanese persons who are willing to go to almost any length to embarrass the Government, provide fuel for Japanese propaganda, and enhance their own future status with the Japanese Government. It was these persons who formed the nucleus for the November incident of last year at Tule Lake. The persons still in Area B, commonly called the stockade, were the most active in the incident. It is these persons whom Mr. Besig interviewed and it is undoubtedly their statements upon which he relied in making most of his charges. He did not attempt to get from us the case histories of the individuals whom he interviewed. He at no time attempted to learn from me what we were doing, or why. As a result of the distorted picture which he received and so sensationally publicized, he has played directly into the hands of these persons.

I should like to point out that even though the more active of the known leaders are still in the stockade, Tule Lake is still turbulent. A leader of the evacuee faction advocating cooperation with the administration and its policies was recently murdered. There have been aggravated assaults on others who have, for one reason or another, been deemed by the rabidly pro-Japanese not to be sufficiently pro-Japanese. Evacuees who have sought leave clearance hearings in order to be removed from the category of "disloyal" and moved to other centers have been threatened as a result of their action. We have given haven in the project hospital to some persons who are in fear of their lives. It is very difficult to ~~see~~ obtain any evidence against the trouble-makers. The unusual situation has, in our judgment, demanded unusual treatment.

In order to prevent further disruption and facilitate the stabilization of the community after the November incident, it was deemed necessary to place several hundred persons in Area B until tranquility was fully restored, evacuee leadership had been given a chance to develop among more responsible persons, and a complete investigation could be made in each individual case. All of these persons were apprehended either because of their connection with the incident itself or because they subsequently engaged in disruptive actions.

The special separation of the trouble-makers was an administrative arrangement to secure peaceful and orderly administration. It was not designed as punishment for an offense. The stockade itself consisted of barracks, a mess hall, and latrine and surrounding grounds formerly used by the Military Police contingent, with a fence around it. Persons placed in the stockade were given food allotments, housing, medical care, and other necessities equal to those furnished evacuees in the rest of the center. The stockade residents were given as complete freedom of movement within the stockade as other evacuees had within the rest of the residential area. Generally speaking, the persons in the stockade were treated simply as if they had been removed to another center. A few additional restrictions, however, were necessary. Control over communications between stockade residents and other evacuees was deemed imperative in order to prevent agitators in the stockade from continuing their efforts to gain leadership in the center and disrupt center administration. It was also considered necessary not to permit family members to join persons in the stockade, since this would have furthered one announced goal of the agitators--to compel the further segregation within the center of what they considered to be the "really" pro-Japanese population. Further, we did not wish to confine women and children unnecessarily within the more restricted area of the stockade.

Since the separation was for the purpose of securing peaceful and orderly administration and was not designed as a penalty for an offense, only such investigation of any particular case was made as was requisite for an administrative determination by the Project Director that the person's separate maintenance in the stockade was in the interest of peaceful and orderly project administration. Nevertheless, after the evacuees had been placed in the stockade, each case was carefully reviewed. An impartial interview was given every stockade resident where there was any reasonable doubt about the need for his separation. A committee of three responsible War Relocation Authority officials reviewed the facts in every case and made recommendations to the Project Director. On the basis of these recommendations and in the light of improved conditions within the center, most of the stockade residents have been permitted to return to the general residential area.

I believe that the foregoing adequately explains our position with respect to the detention of the evacuees still remaining in the stockade. I am sure that Mr. Besig's judgment was warped because of his entire reliance upon the allegations made by the stockade residents whom he interviewed. Our case histories on these same persons clearly show that they are strongly disloyal and that they were the leaders of the strongly pro-Japanese group. It is regrettable that Mr. Besig did not see fit to ascertain from us this information.

Mr. Besig's article also charges brutality on the part of the War Relocation Authority police force, particularly during the November incident. Here again, he made no effort, to my knowledge, to substantiate the charges so made by the evacuees

with whom he talked. The War Relocation Authority made a thorough investigation of these charges some time ago and uncovered absolutely no evidence to substantiate them. The Spanish Consul made a similar investigation with similar results.

The only other subject in the article that requires comment is Mr. Besig's treatment during his stay in the center. I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Best's report on Mr. Besig's visit and of a letter Mr. Best wrote to the Rt. Rev. Edward Parsons, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union. I think it is apparent from this report that Mr. Besig's attitude and actions were anything but impartial and that there was ample reason for the precautions taken by the Project Director. With respect to allegations that sugar was placed in the gasoline tank of Mr. Besig's automobile, we have already written Mr. Besig asking for any evidence that he might have concerning who was responsible. I should be surprised and chagrined if any member of the War Relocation Authority staff was responsible. However, we have ordered a full investigation into the matter.

Sincerely,

Signed: Malcolm E. Pitts
Acting Director

MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS, ATTITUDES AND RUMORS OF LATE JULY AND AUGUST
1944 - THE CAS STAFF WALKOUT

In early August the trouble which had long been brewing between the unpopular Mr. Huycke, the head of Community Activities came to a head and nine of his staff walked out on him. He immediately laid this to "pressure" put on his staff from within the colony, which was quite untrue. His staff had endured his unfortunate personality and eccentric working habits as long as they could and now rose against him. Dr. Opler described the situation:

"The CAS claims the movie issue was badly handled by Huycke. They also resent the fact that he spends almost all of the time in the administration building and turns up in his colony office from $\frac{1}{2}$ hour to 1 hour a day. They think he's responsible for all the bottlenecks. They tend to blame all of the delays caused by lack or by Washington on him.

"Someone has evidently reported to his staff that he is a Jap hater."

It was not necessary to report this fact to Mr. Huycke's staff. They had observed his attitude, listened to his remarks and had drawn their own conclusions.

"They also resented that he reprimanded them for some requisitions he had asked them to make and which they did not present on time."¹

While these factors may have been important in precipitating the open break, the long accumulation of resentment which had developed against Mr. Huycke were far more significant. The writer was acquainted with several of the staff members and had often heard their vituperative denunciations. The following statement made after the so-called walkout is typical:

"Mr. Huycke said after a meeting once, 'Wait and see - soon all the Japs will be wiped off the earth.'

"Right now, we're trying our best to get him out. We told Mr. Black but he didn't listen to us. We were planning a general walkout. We just couldn't stand him anymore.

"He said he wasn't working here to help the Japs. He said he likes the salary. It pays well.

"If we do have a general walkout, we have the backing of the people. About ten people transferred on him during his absence.

"He spends only about 45 minutes a day in our office (the colony CAS office). All of his time is devoted to the personnel Rec. Hall and none to the colony. When we try to explain, the Administrative staff won't listen to us.

"Two or three boys went to talk to him. They just wanted to explain things. He said, 'Now you're threatening me. You'll land in the stockade.'"²

Another staff member said:

"Huycke was listening to the radio one day and he came dashing into our office and said, 'I'm telling you these Japs are going to get beaten. They're going to get wiped out.' I don't want stuff like that thrown in my face. As delicate as the situation is, it's not good. The supervisor (Japanese) just turned green when he heard it.

¹ ibid., Aug. 8, 1944, p. 6.

² ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 4.

"He's always giving you the air that 'I have the power to throw you into the stockade at any time.'"1

The two informants quoted above were very conservative nisei girls. Both despised the "agitators" of the November 1943 period, both were very American in their manners and speech and one was an old Tulean.

Despite their walk-out, Mr. Huycke managed to keep a poorly functioning staff until he left the project on October 15. The workers probably stayed because they needed the jobs. Residents expressed the following views when the CAS was brought into a conversation at this time:

Miss Doi said:

"I just heard from a girl friend yesterday that there was a lot of trouble in the CAS. I heard Mr. Huycke's personal secretary just quit. From all I hear, they say that the system is so bad that until they get a new setup they won't go back to work. They just quit without notice."2

Mr. K. said succinctly and most correctly:

"I think the trouble with Mr. Huycke is mostly that he is disliked."3

Mr. Yamaguchi said:

"One reason they quit was the movie business. If you talk to anybody about Mr. Huycke, they say, 'A-a-ah, that guy!' He's as bad as Mr. Best. He promises things he doesn't do."4

Mr. Fujimoto had no interest in the walkout. He expressed a personal resentment against the CAS section and the special privileges which Mr. Huycke was accustomed to give his workers in a vain effort to gain their liking:

"I hate to see partiality shown to the people. The CAS gets away with murder. The CAS is never denied anything. They

¹ibid., Sept. 14, 1944, p. 5.

²ibid., Aug. 7, 1944, p. 1.

³ibid., p. 2.

⁴ibid., Aug. 11, 1944, p. 1.

have first call. Mess operations (where Fujimoto was employed) can ask for a truck and never get it.

"The large majority of the people can never go out of the fences. But Huycke can take 20 or 30 boys up to Medicien Lake. He's done that three or four times. That creates bad feeling."¹

WARDEN BEATEN

Early in August one of the re-elected wardens was beaten. No details were obtainable from the administration. The news of this beating did not spread through the camp in the manner of the pre-Hitomi murder beatings. K. stated:

"There was another beating in camp. The man was originally a policeman. He was disliked. He was a person of very arrogant character. He was re-elected as policeman for his block. When he accepted the job he got the thrashing. . . Any suspicious characters (inu) are still being very closely watched."²

FUJIMOTO'S REMARKS ON LEAVE CLEARANCE AND RELOCATION

Fujimoto, whose change of mind and decision to leave Tule Lake has already been described,³ wished to delay his departure for several weeks. He related his experience with the head leave officer, Mrs. Kirkman, as follows:

"As I see it, they just want to push you out of here as fast as they can. They wanted me to leave in ten days. They told me I better start packing because yesterday they had cancelled leave clearance for three people because they delayed. Mrs. Kirkman said, 'I think you'll have to leave here on the 4th. It's imperative that you go.'

"I said I was going to see Mr. Wells. Wells was honest with me. He asked me, 'Are you sincere about wanting to go?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'To tell you the truth, you are given a time allowance of 30 days.' So I took the 30 days and am leaving on the 18th. I'd like to get back to Gila."

Fujimoto also expressed his sympathies for those Japanese stuck in Tule Lake who would like to get out.

"The guys I feel sorry for are those who came in here in good faith to wait until they could go back to Japan. Now they

¹ Ibid., Aug. 19, 1944, p. 3.

² Ibid., Aug. 7, 1944, pp. 2, 3.

³ See pp. 434 - 438.

don't like this place or the way it's run or the people in it. They'd like to go out but they're afraid of public opinion (pressure in the camp.)

"One of the boys in my office is a former Tulean. He was considered an agitator at registration time. But in the last month, what with the hunger strike and the Hitomi killing and the pressure groups, he would like to go out. But he's afraid to go out because of what he did before. He thinks he should stick to his former stand. He honestly told me that he'd like to go out. But he's afraid of what the people would think - those people he talked into being super-patriots."

Fujimoto was quite certain that he himself had at long last made the correct decision. He stated: "Even if I have to work as a janitor here (in the U. S.) I'll get along better than if I go to Japan. . . Those guys that are going back to Japan, they think they're going to live off the fat of the land. I bet they won't even be able to get jobs." Fujimoto's sister who had been noted for her pro-Japanese sentiment in Gila had made an even more remarkable about face. Her husband, interned in Santa Fe, was asking her to join him in Crystal City. She was determined not to do this because she believed it would make return to Japan inevitable. "I don't want to go back there and spend my time lugging manure," she said. Her current plan was to remain in Tule Lake, hope that the war would last at least two more years, have her children fed and educated without expense and then go out. By that time, she hoped her oldest son would be able to assist her in supporting the family.¹

ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Despite the unfavorable war news and the fall of Saipan there was no marked increase in relocation during this period. (At least I never could find out that there was.) Many of the younger nisei began to feel anxious, especially if they had no reason to fear the draft. Few, however, had the determination

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 19, 1944, pp. 2, 4-5.

of Fujimoto. Evidences of restlessness came from several informants. Mrs. Yamaguchi, a teacher in the Japanese School stated:

"My students are asking me, 'Sensei (teacher)', they say, 'What would you think if I got leave clearance and got out of here?' They believe all they read in the papers. They say, 'Saipan was taken. This place and that place was taken. Gee whiz, what's going to happen to us.' I really don't blame them."¹

A kibeï man said:

"When the Tojo cabinet fell and Saipan was taken a lot of people thought that Japan was going to lose the war. A lot of people would really like to relocate now, but they're even scared to go to the administration building to ask. That's why I think they should hurry up with re-segregation."²

Miss Nakamura, a very American nisei said:

"They (the issei) are just saturated with the idea of American generosity. They say, 'Don't worry, America isn't going to let us starve. If Japan loses, America is going to take care of us. You just stay here until the end of the war. After you go out then, America will be very generous.'

"I've been working on my mother to let me out. I thought I had her almost talked into it, but now she's against it. She says, 'How can you forsake Japan at a time like this?' When Japan was on a more or less even basis she was just about consenting.

"Every morning everybody listens to the short wave sets. That's all they do nowadays. They even talk about it openly in the hospital.

"I think the older people will never weaken. When Japan loses, they say, 'We must expect some reverses.'

"People are so scared of what their neighbors are going to say. Their folks are very afraid to let the nisei go out. It's more the neighbors than the parents themselves."³

Fujimoto, who had made his decision, made the following analysis:

"I don't think Germany is going to hold up much longer. But the people in camp just refuse to think about it. They just want to be blind to it. Maybe they're afraid to show that they feel it, because they might bring disfavor on themselves. Maybe some just don't want to open their eyes.

"There's another group that says, 'If I'm going to be re-segregated again, I'm going out.' You'd be surprised how many of them there are.

¹July 19, 1944, p. 3.

²Aug. 23, 1944, p. 2.

³Aug. 24, 1944, p. 5.

Anxiety over the progress of the war continued through September and October and the writer believed, though this is said with reservations that it reached its highest peak in late October. On September 17th, Mr. Fujimoto remarked:

"There are two schools of thought right now. One is that Japan is taking an awful beating and we better get out while the getting is good. And you'd be surprised how many of these there are!

"The other is a more or less hard-headed view which is that all the losses and all the defeats that Japan is suffering is all military strategy. You'd be surprised how hard-headed some of these people are. I had one fellow come out and tell me no matter how long the war lasts, Japan is bound to win. Of course, what I thought, I didn't tell him.

"As far as I know, I would say a good 70% are now having their doubts about a victorious country back home. The other 30% are the ones who insist that they're going back there regardless of which side is victorious. And among the 70% you'd be surprised how many are repatriates and expatriates.

"A bunch of kibei were talking the other day about going back to Japan during the war. When you consider that they were all young fellows who came ~~3x~~ from back there within the last seven to ten years, and some more recently - there were seven or eight of them talking - the question was, 'If they go back during the war and go into the Army and give their life for their country, would they still be as anxious to go back right now as after the war.' And I'm telling you, not a damn one of them answered. There's a lot of them like that.

"If an exchange boat came right now there would be very few of them of Army age on it." 1/

Mr. K. a truly sincere expatriate gave his opinion. It bore out Fujimoto's statement on how the 30% who still had faith in ultimate victory for Japan were thinking:

"I won't say much about the young people because ~~in~~ their minds are too flexible. But among those with whom I associate, they are looking forward to very pleasant news. Of course, it might be the feeling of any person when reverses continue. But my opinion is, those persons (who think like me) rejoice that the climax of the war is not far away and are sure it will be a pleasant one.

"To some extent, those who know Japanese history could almost say why they are retreating and they are just teasing the enemy and teasing him right along and dragging him right

into the trap. Of course, there are possibilities that the enemy himself will discover the trap. If they discover the trap, it will be a long drawn out thing." 1/

In late October the news of the American offensives near the Philippines and Formosa caused great concern. Though K., Yamashita and Abe differed enormously on their views of camp politics, all three made statements of the same character. Undoubtedly, the following attitude was widespread.

Yamashita asked the writer if she listened to the short wave broadcasts. When she said she did not, he stated:

"This is election time so the American Office of War Information is under very strict censorship by the Democratic party under the Roosevelt regime. In a lot of things, the American people have been purposely misinformed. I personally cannot understand how the American government, even for a short while, can camouflage the news, misinforming the American people.

"In the Formosa battle and the Philippine battle, you probably heard the American radio make the statement that two-thirds of the Japanese Imperial fleet has been damaged and is gone for good and that the American fleet was damaged very little.

"Of course, we cannot rely fully upon the short wave. One vessel can be sunk with one airplane with one pilot who jumps right onto the vessel and explodes life and everything. What has been done (by the Americans) in the Philippines and Formosa we cannot believe.

"I'm watching with interest how the American government is going to release the news of the Philippines (Y. meant the unpleasant truth)." 2/

On the same day Mr. K. said:

"We hear just the reverse of the American newspapers over the shortwave from Japan. America says it sinks 20 Japanese ships; the Japanese radio says they sank 30 American ships. America says it shot down 125 planes; the Japanese radio says it shot down 125 American planes. I think the Democratic party ought to be afraid that the Republican party will blast Roosevelt's lies.

"I can't understand Roosevelt wanting to be president again, unless he knows that the country is in bad shape and that the next president ~~will~~ may disclose all the things he has done." 3/

1/ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 3/2.

2/ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, Oct. 30, 1944, pp. 3-4.

3/ ibid., p. 4.

Mr. Abe stated:

"Do you think the American public believes the news they are given about the fighting in the Philippines and on Formosa. We hear the opposite things from Japan.

"The Japanese strategy was actually the same as I guessed. In June the Japanese Salt Lake City newspaper said, 'What's the matter with the Japanese Navy?' Then I wrote four pages on the subject of Japanese Pacific strategy as I saw it. I said that a big naval battle would be around Formosa and the Philippines.

"What I would like to know is that if the American Navy won the battle as they claim, why are they sending more American forces to Leyte island?

"Another thing, the recall of Stillwell and the resignation of the ambassador. The papers say it is only (?). My guess is that Stillwell and the American Government advised Chiang Kai Shek to wait until the Navy battle. If they win, American will send its fleet to aid Chiang Kai Shek. After the battle Chiang Kai Shek told Stillwell, 'What's the matter with you? What's your position.'

On general camp sentiment toward the course of the war, Mr. Abe stated:

"Every issei Japanese all blindly believe that Japan will win. So it's out of the question how they feel. Of course the issei Japanese in other camps might have doubts about the outcome of the war. But the issei in this camp all believe final victory is theirs.

"So, what you call fence-sitters - the nisei all don't know why the Japanese war started and how the war future would be. So they might change their mind as the situation changes. But the issei, I don't think.

"Some issei still have property outside. So they want to dispose of that after the war is over and then go back to Japan. That's why they say they don't want to go back on the first exchange ~~stamp~~ boat.

"Those issei who leave camp for the outside are disgusted at the conditions in camp (Tule Lake). Even among the re-segregants there are many who want to live in peace." 1/

During the latter half of September, certain staff members made repeated allusion to the fact that they were being approached by evacuees, younger people in particular, with requests for information on how to get out of camp. Mr. Robertson told how a

1/ ibid., Nov. 9, 1944, pp. 2-3.

boy from Leupp had come to see him and said: "Mr. Robertson, you have always given me good advice in the past. Now I really need it. I want to get out of here; I don't want to go to Japan. I don't want to stay here." The boy added that many other people were beginning to feel this way, even many of the boys from Leupp who were supposed to be pro-Japanese. 1/ Mr. Shallet of Welfare told of a young woman welfare worker who told him she wanted to get out of camp. Her parents wished to go to Japan but she could not face it. Her parents disapproved of her desire to leave camp because of "what people will think." 2/ On September 25th Mr. Robertson remarked that he was receiving an increasing number of inquiries from fence-sitters. Few asked outright about relocation, but dropped hints as to how they might proceed to get leave clearance. 3/ Dr. Opler commented upon this attitude and stated in his report of September 29th that there had been more visitors to the Leave Hearing officer. 4/ How much the pressure caused by the Resegregation Group was responsible for this very slight increase in relocation is debatable. American successes in the Pacific were probably more potent. However, the writer knows of several relocations which were stimulated by threats from the Menzies gang.

~~1/ Ibid., Sept. 13, 1944, p. 1.~~

~~2/ Ibid., p. 2.~~

~~3/ Ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, p. 3.~~

~~4/ Ibid., WRA, Community Analysis, Untitled, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 4.~~

"I think about 8,000 of them really want to go back to Japan. That's not a conservative figure. I should say it would be anywhere between 5,000 and 8,000. Of the 8,000 I think there will be a lot of former Tuleans because a lot of the former Tuleans I've seen were people who refused to register. They applied for repatriation too.

"Also I think a lot of those who moved here from Manzanar and Jerome will want to get out. (The writer believes Fujimoto means 'go to Japan' here.) Manzanar and Jerome has more super-patriots than all the rest of the camp put together."¹

THE RISE OF THE PRO-JAPANESE PRESSURE GROUP

Before proceeding with the discussion of the rise of the most powerful pressure group in the camp's history, it is necessary to clarify the term pressure as it has been used in this report. Enormous pressure can be put upon individuals or groups in camp through an almost universally held attitude which is so strong that coercive measures or propaganda from an interested group of axe-grinders scarcely make it more potent. The idea of not betraying the Negotiating Committee in their need, the attitudes held toward a person who might give overt expression of loyalty to the United States, the bitter hatred of the inu are examples. Other attitudes may be present, which, though strong, can be made much more powerful if proper action is taken by a visible or underground group of leaders. Not appearing to co-operate with or conciliate the administration is an axiom of camp life and can be classed with the first type of pressures. However, when this lack of co-operation reached the point where it greatly inconvenience the residents, the untiring efforts of the underground group were largely responsible. There is yet another type of pressure: that applied by a group which by strong organization and recourse to violence can force a population into

¹ ibid., Aug. 19, 1944, p. 1.

submitting temporarily to a course of action of which the majority do not approve. If this group can loudly lay claim to accepted and admired attitudes which serve to mask its intentions and activities, it can befuddle and intimidate the people over a long period. A group of this character had slowly and cautiously been gathering its strength and laying plans throughout the spring and summer of 1944. It came into the open in August of 1944 with cleverly disguised aims. It reached the climax of its strength in late October and November at which time, even though it suffered from constant internal schisms and jealousies, it almost completely dominated the camp. By this time its rule had become so irking that well-informed, courageous Japanese began to form the rudiments of an opposition. This opposition, however, was largely an individual effort and did not come to the knowledge of the ordinary camp resident. Far more important in effecting camp attitudes was the opposition of a rival pressure group under the leadership of a rival pressure group which contained Rev. Kai, Mr. Kuratomi, Mr. Tsuda and several of the stockade releasees. Open conflict broke out in late November and December and for a brief period it appeared that gang warfare would result. Before this could reach a climax, the Department of Justice made a sudden appearance and began to intern the leaders of the dominant pressure group in large numbers.

 Conclusion must be entered here - when it concludes.

Synthesis of Pre-August Development of the Major Pressure Group

Unfortunately, this group changed its name many times during its long and complex history, and moreover, contained within it

several organizations with different names. The name by which the entire body was most frequently called by the residents was Resegregation Group or in Japanese, Saikakuri?? (Please correct this) and this is the name which will be adopted in this narrative. At it's very beginning, this name was not used, but since resegregation was always one of the group's major aims, this inaccuracy is not serious.

The ultimate germ of the Resegregation Group lay in a group of fanatical status-quo supporters which was probably dominated by segregees from Jerome. This group probably did not number more than 100 people (??) and was undoubtedly laying plans as early as December 1943, and at first it devoted itself to obtaining the release of the stockade detainees, particularly the Negotiating Committee. It made its first attempt in behalf of the detainees in mid-January of 1944 by soliciting the aid of Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations, who had an established reputation for consideration and courtesy toward the Japanese gained at Leupp. With great caution, a member of the group requested that he call on a certain person in block 11. From there he was directed to block 6 where he met a group of strong status-quo supporters. They asked him to intercede in behalf of the detainees and to talk to the detained leaders. Robertson did this. On this occasion Kuratomi promised that if the detainees were released, the Negotiating Committee would resign. He also promised that if two members of the Negotiating Committee were released for a short period of time they would tell the people to hold a new election. When Robertson took the matter up with Mr. Best, Best refused to take any action and

warned Robertson about having anything to do with this group. This incident was the beginning of Robertson's sympathy and championship of the Resegregation Group. Robertson was probably their only friend among the appointed personnel.¹

In late January Mr. Best received a letter which was undoubtedly from members of this group:

"Proposing the Administration to devise a plan whereby the camp be divided in two, in order to avoid possible flare-up or conflict and to preserve order."²

This was the first out-and-out request for resegregation, of splitting the camp into two groups to keep the peace. Resegregation was to become the chief aim of the group and later gave rise to enormous pressure. It gave the group its name.

In mid-February the group made a much bolder bid for recognition: calling themselves the "minority" and stating that they represented the status-quo faction, they sent a letter to Mr. Schmidt, the Head of Internal Security. They requested five things: 1) that the "authorities assure the 'minority' of no interference, pending its temporary recognition to expedite the adjustment; 2) that the authorities dissolve the Co-ordinating Committee temporarily for an indefinite period and recognize a new temporary committee acting in the interest of the minority; 3) that if the experiment proved successful, the Co-ordinating Committee was to be permanently dissolved, the minority was to be free to cooperate with the back to work program, and a new representative body was to be elected by the residents; 4) that martial law be suspended for two weeks and "if the conduct of

¹ See pp. 195-196 of Main Report for detail.

² ibid., p. 204.

the colony shall have been commendable" this withdrawal was to be extended indefinitely; 5) that peaceful conduct in the colony was to warrant the release of the detained men. Representatives of the administration spoke to Mr. Uchi, the signer of this letter, but no other concession was granted.¹ It will be remembered that by granting this group the courtesy of an interview, the administration so estranged the Co-ordinating Committee that they threatened to resign.

In late February when a large contingent of segregees from Manzanar arrived at Tule Lake some part of this Resegregation Group produced a long propaganda pamphlet which it distributed secretly to the new arrivals. The pamphlet was titled "True Picture of this Center" and stressed that "the root of the incident lay in the question of evacuee status." It accused the WRA of trying to convert the so-called loyal elements to loyalty to America, and of perpetrating a "dark stream of sinister plot" against the residents by dissolving the Daihyo Sha and holding compulsory referendum. It stressed "the stiff protest made by the Japanese government" and emphasized one truly significant point: "Non-clarification of status was the root of all center troubles up to date." Although much effort was expended to find the authors and distributors of this pamphlet, they were not apprehended.²

In March 1944, this comparatively small Resegregation Group was augmented and greatly strengthened by the addition of a number of men who entered camp with the Manzanar segregees or who were released from Santa Fe. ~~These men can be termed genuine~~

1 ibid., ^{Main Report} pp. 225-230.

2 ibid., pp. 254-260.

It was also in late March or early April that a clique of agitators from Poston assumed the dominant position in the group. The most influential member of this clique was Mr. Yamashita. Two well informed Japanese gave the writer this information later, when they felt free to speak. It is undoubtedly correct since it fits logically with much other evidence.

"At first the Saikakuri Seigan (Resegregation Group) was dominated by the Poston group. . . Block 32 was the nest of that group." 1/

"Most of the important policies were actually adopted by the people from the Poston clique. Ono, Yamashita and Uchida, they were all tied up with Mr. Yamashita in Poston. That's what gave them so much power." 2/

These men can be termed genuine

1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Mar. 6, 1945, pp. 2-3.

2/ ibid., P. 5.

experienced agitators. Several, like Mr. Wakayama, came from Manzanar; one, and probably more, like Mr. Yamashita, were released internees from Santa Fe. In the Assembly Centers and Relocation Centers in which these men had previously resided they had become noted for their radicalism, for their violent anti-American sentiments and for their consummate ability to involve themselves in any agitating movement. The two individuals mentioned above had had unsavory reputations in pre-evacuation life, having indulged in practices whereby they benefited themselves at the expense of their fellow Japanese. They followed the same pattern in Tule Lake. The writer became well acquainted with both of these men and is convinced that they were not entirely sane. Many of their expressions and actions betray a tendency toward megalomania and paranoia. They, and probably several others of like ilk, were welcomed with open arms by the underground Resegregation Group and soon assumed a powerful behind-the-scenes leadership, which they attempted to conceal from the Administration and, to lesser extent, from the Japanese residents. While these men did not show their hand for many months, the writer, who was a frequent visitor at their homes, noted many indications that they had already taken the lead in the underground activities, having, by virtue of their well established prestige as agitators, forced the previous leaders into minor positions. The writer never received any implication that this displacement was resented, possibly because the group which was active in January and February was not rich in leadership material, having lost their former leaders to the stockade, and because they ~~sadly~~ needed the prestige and **advice** of these noted new-comers.

It should be mentioned that during this period the Resegregation Group's contention that the "loyals" be gotten out of camp was one to which the majority of the camp residents gave overt approval.¹ The group ^{was} not slow to take advantage of this situation and early in April put the camp into a turmoil with a "Resegregation Petition". The technique used on this occasion set the pattern for many of the group's later endeavors and clearly indicated the presence of more experienced and more arrogant leaders. A letter was addressed to Attorney General Biddle and to the Spanish Ambassador requesting that this group be given permission to circulate a petition for the signatures of those "who applied for repatriation or expatriation and who want to be resegregated because of their earnest desire to catch the first chance of the exchange ship." Mr. Biddle referred this letter to Mr. Ickes who sent it to Mr. Myer who passed it on to Mr. Best, thus frustrating the desire of the group who did not wish to deal with Best but with his superiors. Mr. Best himself took no action but passed on the letter to Mr. Black, the head of Community Management. Black gave permission for the circulation of the petition. Although the Resegregation Group denied that it had exerted pressure in gaining the signatures, this was not the truth. The impression given the colonists was unmistakably "sign, if you are a 'true Japanese' and wish to get on the first exchange boat."

Although estimates vary, it is probably that at least 5,000 people signed this petition, many against their better judgment and because it "would do no harm." When Mr. Black became conscious

¹ See pp. 273-275 of Major Report for attitudes expressed during March, 1944.

of the excitement in the center and the use to which the petition had been put, he issued a strong statement, stating that the administration had no intention to carry out further segregation and that no authorization or authenticity had been given to the circulation of the petition.

The reaction in the center was very interesting. Although Black was denounced as a typical WRA employee in that he had not kept to his word, the ordinary citizen resented the attempt of the Resegregation Group to cut the distinction between "loyals" and "disloyals" so fine. Instead of desiring to be part of a noble super-patriotic group who were to be resegregated in isolated splendor, the ordinary resident wished to remain in Tule Lake and have the comparative small number of "fence-sitters" removed. This was, in fact, the beginning of the sullen but helpless murmuring throughout the camp against the "people who were too radical." The Resegregation Group had the people in a tight spot. If they refused to sign or argued against the petition they could and were publicly accused of not being truly loyal to Japan. If they protested too loudly they were called dogs. Few men in camp had the courage or inclination to raise their voices in public and point out that if a person had taken all necessary steps relating to repatriation or ex^{patriation} required by the government of the United States or Japan he need not sign a petition of which he did not approve. However, many informants expressed this sentiment to the writer.¹ This attitude on the part of the great majority of the camp residents was to be expected, and again

¹For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 296A-300 of Major Report. For attitudes of the residents see pp. 308-317.

reveals a fundamental psychological ambivalence. Neither the resegregationists nor the passive bulk of the residents had unequivocally made up their mind to return to Japan. The former were forced to action by a psychological need to reassure themselves, the latter were forced into inaction by their indecision. The bulk of the people did not want to move again merely to take a chimerical step closer to Japan. Much as they denounced the fence-sitters, they were tolerant enough to realize that in their own hearts lay the seeds on indecision. Their aim was to stay in Tule Lake and see the war out.

The pressure group, continued having expressed itself openly in this manner to agitate openly and underground for re-segregation. Constantly they pointed to the thousands of signatures on their petition as proof of their numerical strength. Many months later this desire ^{for re-segregation} was fulfilled in a peculiar manner.

An extraordinary revealing statement of the intentions and motives of this group was made to the writer at this time by Mrs. Matsuda, who, with her husband, was one of the charter members of the organization: The pathological desire to be set off as a chosen group, the fanatical expressions of loyalty to Japan and the indifference to the fate of those residents who might have different convictions are clearly apparent:

"Since we came here we call ourselves the real expatriates and repatriates seeking to go back to Japan and be with her in everything, win or lose, as her subjects. . . . When we came, much to our dismay we find many "loyal" are still here, although they put up a front of expatriation or repatriation. They did it as a means of escaping the draft and leaving the camps since Tule Lake wasn't closed or because they have an opportunity to make money here. . . .

"We do not care which wins or loses. We're going to stick to Japan. . . . We put up a question: those who like to go back to Japan at the first opportunity is the ones who really want to go back. They don't want to stay here and see what happens.

"We might be given a bad place to live. We say to them: 'Would you go?' They said, 'Yes, we'll die there as Japanese.'

"Those guys who won't say 'Yes' to this are the guys who are going to stay here. The other people - they didn't stick up for us in the crisis. It's not our business to worry about them."¹

In late May when the Administration attempted to initiate the election of a representative body, the Resegregation Group put all of the force of its propaganda into an attempt to make it fail. This effort, however, was scarcely necessary because public opinion was already so averse to the idea. K., a very honest informant who was already suspicious of the leaders of the group, hinted to the writer that active agitation was going on:

"There's a party opposing it. . . not because he knows anything about it but because he merely took a dislike to it. . . He may try to cause a little trouble."²

When the administration's attempt failed miserably the Resegregation Group took the greater part of the credit. The general public, however, did not seem to be conscious of these efforts of propaganda, probably because in this case the attitudes of the majority coincided quite closely with those of the pressure group. Nevertheless, the failure of the election greatly strengthened an attitude which previously had been expressed only half-heartedly: that the detainees would have to be released from the stockade if peace and order were ever to come to the colony. The most conservative individuals, some of whom had previously disapproved of release, now stated dogmatically that it was the only way out of the situation.³

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April 9, 1944, p. 11.

²ibid., May 14, 1944, p. 2. K. was probably referring to Wakayama.

³For complete discussion of election see pp. 361-375 of Main Report. For attitudes see pp. 368 - 373.

Mr. Wakayama

After the Okamoto shooting, ^a~~an~~ ~~certain~~ undercover leader of the pressure group made an exceedingly rash and violent threat of what he and his group would do ^{to the Caucasians} if the soldier were acquitted. ~~This man was probably~~ ^{with the} Mr. Wakayama, extremely clever leader of hoodlum young men with their headquarters in the Manzanar district. The threat was never carried out and the bluff probably did Wakayama no good in the eyes of the people. After Mr. Okamoto's funeral another undercover leader of the Resegregation Group, Mr. Yamashita, accused the administration of extreme stinginess because they did not pay more than the usual portion of the funeral expense. The writer found no indication that this particular accusation was taken up by any persons outside of the Resegregation Group.

In the early part of May certain of the blocks and particularly the Ward VI Japanese Language School began the practice of morning exercises in the Japanese fashion.¹ In some blocks these exercises were taken up almost as a fad and both children and adults participated. In other blocks no one participated; it was too much trouble to get up so early in the morning. These exercises were certainly militaristic in nature and certain conservative issei criticized them on this group. They were promptly called dogs, and one man named Morimoto, who was unpopular for many other reasons, was beaten. Thereupon several of the more conservative blocks gave up the exercising. It remained for the Resegregation Group to bring this phenomenon to its full flower.

¹ ibid., pp. 450-453.

It was in May that it became clearly apparent that there were two separate groups working for the release of the detainees. One of these groups was formed around the original nucleus of the Resegregation Group and the other was composed of a group of Reverend Kai and Mr. Kuratomi's friends, in particular, Mr. Tsuda, Mr. Mori and Mr. Kimura. Jealousy and friction between these two groups must have developed much earlier than May for by then it was very apparent. Evidently Mr. Tsuda's group was the first to make a consistent effort to get the detainees released. Meanwhile, the relatives of the detainees formed a group called the Saiban-in, with the aim of obtaining release by combined effort. Tsuda attempted to assist these people for some time, but when his efforts brought no results, the Saiban-in fell more and more under the influence of the Resegregation Group and the Poston clique. Mr. Tsuda explained the matter as follows:

"After I got out of the stockade, I went to see Mr. Best many times, trying to liquidate the stockade. . . But since there was no result, they must have gotten tired. They must have suspected my way of doing things and thought I was supporting Mr. Best's idea instead of holding out for the internees.

"When the idea of hiring a lawyer came up, I went to see Mr. Wakayama. He said it was no use. He said, you know how big the United States government is. If they want to put 100 boys in the stockade, they will do it anyway. The stockade is just a /insignificant thing. It would be foolish to bring in a lawyer. I went to see Mr. Yamashita and he said the same thing.

"As the sole responsible person for bringing in a lawyer, I didn't want to cause any further trouble."

Because he decided not to get a lawyer, Tsuda was called a dog by the Resegregation Group and accused of taking the side of Mr. Best against the detainees. 1/ He continued:

"Right after that this here Saiban-in got in touch with

Mr. Okamoto and Mr. Ishigami and through him they hired Mr. Besig. The results were good? I don't know." 1/

In the latter part of May the writer met Mr. Yamashita and Mr. Tsuda for the first time. Mrs. Matsuda had recommended that the writer call on Mr. Yamashita. At his home she met Mr. Tsuda and several other gentlemen who were apparently holding an informal conference. Many months later, Mr. Tsuda told the writer that on this occasion Yamashita had urged him to join the resegregationists.

"On the day you saw me at Yamashita's house he asked me why I didn't join the Resegregation Group. He said, 'We have 9,000 people here now and great power. If you should be long to a power like that, you can do yourself very nice.'

Tsuda, however, refused to join and later told the writer why:

"I didn't join the Resegregation Group because I figured the group didn't represent the whole center as the Negotiating Committee did. Moreover, I didn't like the idea of not letting all the people in. The first couple of months things were perfectly satisfactory with us." ~~with respect to the Japanese American community in general and the Japanese American community in particular~~

"If I hadn't had a son who was a sansei (third generation Japanese-American) I'd have joined the Hoshi-dan. But my son is all for the American way. My father is issei, 72 years old, and I'm nisei or rather kibei. My father is the typical issei, the stubborn type. My family is just like the camp, issei, nisei and kibei. I can see the picture of the whole camp in my family.

"The way of the Resegregation Group, the Hoshi-dan and their principal, I like it. But their way of doing, excluding the people is the thing I'm opposed to. If I should belong to the Hoshi-dan, my son does not feel the same way I do about it. I couldn't have my son in my house. That's why I can't do it.

"The Resegregation Group kicks about the discrimination and exclusion they had in America, but they're doing it right here in this camp." 2/

1/ ibid., Mar. 6, 1945, pp. 5, 6-7.

2/ ibid., pp. 5, 6.

It was in May also that it became clearly apparent that there were two separate groups working for the release of the detainees. One of these groups was formed around the original nucleus of the Resegregation Group and the other was composed of a group of Rev. Kai and Mr. Kuratomi's friends, in particular, Mr. Tsuda and Mr. Mori and Mr. Kimura. Jealousy and friction between these two groups must have developed earlier than May. However, both co-operated to a certain extent in bringing Mr. Besig of the ACLU to the aid of the detainees. In mid-June, however, soon after Mr. Besig's first visit, certain members of the Resegregation Group began a gossip campaign against the Tsuda faction. Mrs. "Q" accused Tsuda of acting as the stooge of Mr. Best and attempting to convince the detainees to withdraw their appeal to the ACLU.¹ Vicious gossip was spread by the Resegregation Group for many months and eventually led to a temporary retirement of the Tsuda faction.

The Hitomi murder undoubtedly added to the sinister prestige of at least a certain faction in the Resegregation Group. While no evacuee would point the finger, many people suspected that the "boys" of the group were responsible for some of the beatings that preceded the murder. While the pathological craze of beatings raged, the Resegregation Group did all it could to fan public hatred of the inu. When the murder occurred, it was inevitable that the group come under suspicion, especially since certain members had uttered veiled threats of murder only a few days before. Incautious members of the group did not decrease this suspicion by rash remarks. This attitude is very important since

¹ ibid., p. 429.

it explains to a great degree the overpowering fear with which the group was regarded, a fear which was very potent in the strangle-hold which they later gained over the camp. Many persons in camp believed that if they opposed the group openly they too would be murdered, or, if they themselves escaped, vengeance would be taken upon their families.

Development of Aims of the Resegregation Group - January to August 1944

The primary aim of the Resegregation Group, clarification of status as Japanese loyal to Japan, distinct from all other Japanese in the United States, had a history dating back to the attitudes immediately preceding segregation. This dream of Tule Lake as a purely Japanese camp "for people of one mind" has been fully described in the Pre-Incident Report.¹ It was one of the important questions brought up by the first Negotiating Committee. Based upon an imperative need for decision and security rather than nagging uncertainty, it had the psychological support of the great majority of the transferees. However, when the Resegregation Group carried their demands beyond this desire for clarification of status to the point where they advocated the separation of families, and sacrifice and suffering for the sake of Japan, they lost the opportunity of gaining support from the bulk of the people and met with passive resistance.

The first issue behind which the group threw all of its strength was the release of the stockade detainees. Before and after this was accomplished it did all it could to embarrass and inconvenience the administration and to keep up public hostility. The latter effort was scarcely needed, for hatred or scorn of the

¹See pp. of Pre-Incident Report.

administration was a constant element of camp life. Mr. Best was the chief target of the group, since its members and most of the camp residents believed that the removal of Mr. Best and the substitution of a more competent man "who understood the Japanese" was imperative if camp life was to be improved. The group took advantage of every difficulty into which the administration fell, using these situations to increase hostility. Also it fought every administrative measure which would decrease the chaos of camp conditions and bring about a situation where Tule Lake could be said to be functioning normally and peacefully.

In April the resegregates adopted a policy of setting themselves and their followers off as a special group of persons truly loyal to Japan in a noble and unselfish fashion which would distinguish them once and for all from the ignoble fence-sitters. This proved to be a major psychological error if their intent was to gain the support of the camp as a whole. This particular attitude increased in strength and emphasis until it led to the adoption of attitudes and actions of astonishing fanaticism.

Murmuring and suspicion already apparent

Before the Resegregation Group embarked upon its formal debut, voices were already being cautiously raised against it. With the extreme reluctance of the Japanese to betray even the most reprehensible of his fellows to a Caucasian, these complaints were at first given to the writer in a veiled manner. After the formal organization of the group, when the writer had gained more trust, some individuals became so angry they lost their caution and denounced the group violently, even going so far as to mention specific "agitators." On July 24, Mr. Abe, an

intelligent issei who understood the camp situation very well made the following statement. His contention that the "agitators" were following a policy which was 40 or 50 years behind the times in Japan was often repeated during the uncomfortable period to come.

"There is still a handful of agitators. These few agitators think that by making trouble here they're doing good for Japan. That's extremely wrong. The Japanese government wishes us to live in peace until the end of the war.

"The majority of the people here don't know the changes and progress that has been made in Japan. In their heads they have the Japan of 40 or 50 years ago. They don't understand the policy of Japan. They don't understand why Japan has to fight."¹

The writer has no doubt that he was referring to the Resegregation Group.

On August 8th Mr. Abe made another statement on the character of the leaders.

"That old trouble makes them so stubborn. They won't listen. They think

¹R. Hankey, Notes, July 24, 1944, p. 4.

Yamato Damashi is just resisting everything. 1/ They really are not acting according to Yamato Damashi. Some of them are highly educated university graduates. They left Japan 40 years ago. Even with an education they couldn't make themselves any good in the community. They think if they make big trouble in camp and get put in the stockade, they're doing good to Japan and will be accepted as a hero, which is entirely wrong." 2/

A very conservative old Tulean issei who did not dare to say too much, remarked cryptically:

"This gangjyo-iji (status-quo) boys get too much mad. Some time scare with two-by-four." 3/

A young nisei girl said:

"They put on too much pressure. Some language schools do too. The nisei can't break into such hard Japanese all at once. They give it to them so fast."

Her sister interrupted:

"But you can't complain because the nisei do have to learn fast. The etiquette and the tea ceremony schools are all right. They're good for you." 4/

FORMAL DEBUT OF THE SOKOKU KENKYU SEINEN-DAN

By early August of 1944, the germ of a formal organization of young men or seinen had been developing for four months. *Even before* ~~Soon after~~ his arrival from Manzanar, Mr. Wakayama attempted to enlist the support of influential Japanese and get *a similar* ~~the~~ movement under way. *By March he sent a friend to present* ~~He contacted~~ "K" one of the writer's most accurate and honest informants. *to K, and enlist* ~~in March, he~~ *before him and attempted to enlist* his support. "K", also an ex-Manzanite and a man of tremendous potential influence in the camp, would have nothing to do with the idea, not because he did not approve of a young men's organization, but because of his intimate knowledge of the character of Mr. Wakayama. "K" told the writer:

1/ The literal translation of Yamato Damashi is "The Spirit of Great Harmony."

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 8, 1944, p. 2.

3/ ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, p. 2.

4/ ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 3.

"This proposition (forming a young men's association) was brought to me by a friend as coming directly from Mr. Wakayama. This matter was brought to me directly, soon after the Manzanar group came in. I thought he was at the very bottom of it. He proposed the matter under a different form and when the organization he proposed didn't succeed, a new idea was born." 1/

EWither because he could not gain enough support or because the other would-be leaders believed it wisest to wait awhile, Wakayama's plans for the young men's association were set aside and action was not initiated until August 8th. The time was now thought to be propitious. Using Reverend Tsuha as a front, these older men, in actuality the leaders of the Resegregation Group, put their plans into action and the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan was organized. The name means "Organization of Young Men to Study the Culture of the Mother Country."

The reason Reverend Tsuha assumed the position of leader is very interesting. Either Wakayama or Yamashita were more logical incumbents and both were offered the position. Both refused however, being reluctant to suffer the consequences if the administration decided to prosecute the leaders of the new organization. Tsuha, therefore, took over the chief burden of organization and was singularly successful. His prestige and power increased greatly and when he was not arrested, Wakayama and Yamashita regretted their reluctance to accept the position and their consequent loss of power to Tsuha. K. explained:

"The one who really started that organization was Reverend Tsuha. Wakayama was asked to lead the organization but he refused because he said his wife was pregnant. Yamashita was asked to lead it but he said his wife was sickly. So Tsuha took over. The Hoshi-dan was not really the Yamato Shokunin-dan, which was what Wakayama tried to start." 2/

1/ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid., Mar. 6, 1945, p. 2.

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Either because he could not gain enough support or because the other would-be leaders believed it wisest to wait awhile, the plans for the young men's association were set aside and action was not initiated until August 8th. The time was now thought to be propitious. Using Reverend Tsuha as a front, these older men, in actuality the leaders of the Resegregation Group, put their plans into action and the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan was organized. (This means Organization of Young men to Study the Culture of the Mother Country.) Formal invitations were issued and the initial meeting was held the night of August 8th in the high school auditorium, permission having been received through the necessary WRA channels. Approximately 500 young men and some older men and women attended this meeting, dressed in their best suits instead of the usual informal camp garb, and heard a lecture by Reverend Tsuha on the aims of the organization.

The serenity of the occasion, however, was somewhat marred by an extremely undignified act on the part of the WRA. Exactly how the mixup came about or who was responsible was never made clear. Mr. Huycke gave permission for the meeting and either he or Mr. Gunderson neglected to inform Mr. Best of the matter. Since the last hunger strike was in its most agonizing stages, tension among the administrative personnel was at high pitch. Although this precaution was entirely unnecessary, the Army had

¹ ibid., Sept. 19, p. 1.

been put on the alert to guard against any demonstration on the part of the colonists in behalf of the detainees. When therefore, a large group of young men were seen to be bearing down on the high-school auditorium on Tuesday evening, the Internal Security, having no knowledge of the meeting, believed a riot was about to begin. Greatly excited, they tore madly about, strapping on their guns and gasmasks and seeing that the supply of tear gas in their cars was adequate. Five cars and about twenty men descended on the auditorium. Two policemen entered the building and found an orderly meeting in progress with a speaker addressing the group in Japanese. After standing around for about 20 minutes they left, rather abashed. Meanwhile many members of ~~Internal~~ the appointed personnel hearing the emergency calls for the members of Internal Security and seeing the gas masks and guns had gone to the fence as fast as they could. They were disappointed. Some are said to have remarked, "We were just taking a walk because it is such a lovely evening." Mrs. Matsuda, who was present at the meeting, gave the following account of this incident:

"Two Internal Security men came into the auditorium. Five cars were parked outside with four men in each car. The men carried tear gas and pistols. Some of the old ladies thought they had water in the tear gas containers.

"They stood there. The reception committee was at the door, but they didn't talk to them. They just came in. They watched about 20 or 30 minutes, all the while the speech went on. Their expressions were just dumbfounded. They looked from corner to corner. Then they left.

"Then two Japanese wardens came after them. They said, 'You didn't have a permit.' The members of the reception committee said he did have a permit. They argued a little. Then the warden went away and didn't come back."¹

¹ ibid., Aug. 14, p. 1.

The overtly expressed aims of this Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan were to prepare themselves to be useful citizens of Japan after their expatriation. To this end, they resolved to devote themselves to a study of the Japanese language, Japanese history and culture, and - what was rarely mentioned to the writer since she was an American - the study of Japanese political ideology.

The formal and accepted aims of the group were beautifully inscribed upon a scroll by Reverend Matsuda and were translated orally to the writer as follows:

"Ever since the Japanese and American governments have gone to war, the second generation (nisei) have had their legal and civil rights taken away. They have decided that the way to proceed is to leave their American citizenship and to cling to their mother country. We feel we should stand with the country of our racial and cultural heritage. Legally we have expressed that.

We have decided that this is the time to organize this club to study the culture of our mother country. To aid her is our aim. Our mother country is one of the most cultured countries in the world. From her we have a strong racial and cultural heritage.

We are ^{low-}abiding and will have nothing to do with center politics. We aim only to train our characters and bodies."

It should be noted that this statement holds renunciation of citizenship as one of the aims of the organization's members. It was coincident with this formal opening that the Resegregation Group's members first began their propaganda for renunciation and continued to heckle the department of Justice by mail, requesting to know how soon they might apply. The statement abjuring any interest in center politics is also noteworthy. This was, of course, partly a sop to the administration. It was also a necessity to gain members, for many Japanese at this time would never had joined the organization had they not been repeatedly assured that its aim was non-political. Politics spelt trouble and the stockade.

Mrs. Matsuda also happily described her emotions over the manner in which this first meeting had impressed the group:

"We had it all prepared. Everybody was satisfied with the meeting. They never felt so good since they came into camp. They had a feeling that all the bad things that have happened since they came here have been washed away."¹

Great satisfaction was expressed also by Mr. and Mrs. Yamashita: Although Mr. Yamashita would admit no connection with the organization he was remarkably well informed on its aims. Moreover, his pleasure at the success of the opening meeting could not be concealed.

"They are promoting their welfare among themselves whereby they can strengthen their mother country."

Mrs. Yamashita added:

"They are like the boy scouts. Their motto is, 'Be prepared (for life in Japan)'"²

The attitude of the administration toward this organization is not known. Mr. Robertson, however was not deceived and told the writer he was sure that the organization would institute pressure for resegregation as soon as it got under way. He was perfectly correct. In fact, the undercover leaders had already been pressuring for resegregation for many months. It is possible that Mr. Best was somewhat inhibited by a desire not to bring the American Civil Liberties Union down on his head again. He is reported to have said in Mr. Besig's presence that he would not object to the formation of any non-political organization within the colony. Had he forbidden the group to hold public meetings it is certain that they would ^{have} ^dcomplaints to the American Civil Liberties Union and again brought undesirable publicity to

¹ibid. Aug. 14, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., Aug. 15, 1944, p. 1.

Tule Lake. The Administration did make a serious attempt to discover who the actual leaders were. Dr. Opler held to the idea that Tsuha was behind it. In actuality there were a great many people behind it. Pulling the strings in the background and acting as advisors were the issei leaders, some of them sincere, law-abiding men, who believed in the expressed ideals of the organization, some chronic agitators bent on raising their prestige with the Japanese government and satisfying their psychological need for power. Among the latter undoubtedly was Mr. Wakayama, an American citizen by virtue of his service in the first World War. In less important positions were some of the original strong status-quo people who labored diligently to accomplish the hack-work needed for so large an undertaking. Mr. and Mrs. Matsuda, with whom the writer was very well acquainted may be classed with this group. Mrs. Matsuda, interestingly enough, flared up when informed that the Administration believed that Tsuha was "behind the organization." Why, my husband has been doing all the work," she said.

The Resegregationists devoted themselves to two other projects at this time. One was to gain the support of the important stockade detainees, the members of the first Negotiating Committee who were released at this time. Reverend Kai was offered a position as a senior advisor and Kuratomi was offered the leadership of the Seinen-dan, the young men's organization. Both offers, however, were refused, due to a hostility between Kai and Kuratomi and the important leaders of the resegregationists and possibly, to the fact that neither man wished to become a mere cog in an organization directed by other men with whose aims they were not

entirely in sympathy. This conflict will be described in detail later. It should be mentioned here that both Kai and Kuratomi were nominally members of the Saikakuri Seigan or Resegregation Group. While they were both still confined in the stockade, Kai's wife signed the March petition for him; Miss Terada signed for Mr. Kuratomi. Mr. Kuratomi explained his and Reverend Kai's position in this matter as follows:

"As to the reason why we did not join the Hoshi-dan (Kuratomi means here why they did not take an active part) was because of our position in dealing with the WRA. We didn't only represent one group in camp, because the Daihyo Sha represented the whole camp and we had not disbanded officially. As a result we had to publish a paper thanking the people. I think, if my observation isn't wrong, they did have a feeling we should give the Resegregation Group some kind of official thanks and make some kind of statement that everybody in camp should support that organization. People in that organization came to my place and begged me to go to see Mr. Tachibana and Mr. Wakayama, saying that my acquaintanceship with them will be a great advantage for me." 1/

~~entirely in sympathy. This conflict will be described in detail later.~~ With the second project the Resegregationists had better success. This was to gain the sympathy and ear of the Project Attorney, Allen Campbell. Campbell confessed himself to be somewhat impressed with the honesty of and frankness of the men who called on him and soon Mr. Yamashita became an almost daily visitor at the Legal Office, pleading the cases of the various people who came to him for aid. Yamashita, at this time, did have a great deal of influence with a certain portion of the camp's population and this influence he kept up by appearing to help them out of difficulties. The writer seldom called at his home without finding some suppliant there, asking for advice or assistance.

PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOKOKU KENKYU SEINEN-DAN

For several months the attitude of the ordinary camp resident toward this new organization varied a great deal. Some moderate people appeared to give it little thought; many thought that the aims expressed were worthwhile, but did not join because they suspected but would not say openly that the organization's aim was basically political. From the beginning it was called "very exclusive" which was not meant as a compliment. Some moderates like the writer's friend, Mr. Okamoto, were quite taken in by the aims and joined. Americanized nisei shunned the group and made fun of the seinen when they began their strenuous morning exercises. These uncomplimentary remarks, however, had to be made only in the presence of trusted friends. For several months there was no widespread disapproval. It is very probable that for some time most of the residents did not know who was behind the organization, and following the camp's primary rule of

existence, "don't stick your nose into trouble," stay away from it. It should be remembered that the organization did not attempt to get the support of the entire camp. From the beginning, an attitude of dedication was maintained; those really loyal to Japan were to be the privileged. The leaders preferred to have a comparatively small, well-knit organization which they could later use as a tool and a threat to hold over the head of the administration. The writer has very little information as to how the campaigning for membership was done. If a person was known for his Americanized views, however, it is most unlikely that he was approached.

Had the writer's contacts been limited to the great bulk of the residents who keep their noses out of political matters, she would not have become conscious of the hidden antipathy toward the organization until the end of September. However, among the writer's informants were two able and honest older men who had been respected leaders in the centers from which they had come. These men knew the underground leaders of the Resegregationists well, and suspected their aims from the beginning. These men watched the manouvering of the organization carefully and as the group grew in boldness and showed its true political nature more and more, the writer was kept well informed. Such trust is almost never placed in a Caucasian. Much later, when these men dared to speak openly against the pressure of the resegregationists, one was beaten and the other's life was threatened. Also among the opponents of the Resegregationists must be listed the Kai, Kuratomi, Tsuda faction. This group, however, kept very quiet and did not take any overt action until late November.

The following attitudes, a mixture of instinctive disapproval coupled with an admission that the aims of the group were worthwhile and that they were accomplishing some wholesome things was probably very widespread during August and September of 1944. When a group of nisei girls were asked for their opinion on the Sokoku Seinen-dan one said emphatically:

"I say this new seinen-dan is far away from me. They're far away from me."

An older nisei woman gave her opinion. When she refers to the attitude she is probably comparing the first less well organized pressure activities of spring and summer with the character building aims of the organized boy's group.

"But now they have reasoned things out more. At first they were very unreasonable. But now they've worked out some good things. Like these zoot-suiters, for instance. They say they're going to have a heck of a time when they go back to Japan. They say we must train them and I think that's right. That's all you can do with those boys."

However, when the subject turned to Mrs. Matsuda who lived in this block a cautious hush fell on the group. "We have to be careful what we say," said the girls, "Because she goes around and listens under your windows. You know they call her Madame Chiang Kai Shek here." The girls made no effort to hide their dislike of the dictatorial and pressuring Mrs. Matsuda.¹

Many other informants contacted at this time were non-committal or merely stated that from what they heard of the group, they were trying to do a good thing. K., however, expressed his frank scepticism of the aims:

"I wasn't invited Saturday Evening. I didn't even know it was taking place. But last night a man came to tell me all about

¹ ibid., Sept. 14, 1944, pp. 2, 5.

it and he's very strong for it. I don't ~~xxx~~ know the true motive behind it. But my personal opinion is: I don't care to take any interest in it.

"I think the man behind it is looking for publicity too much. I've known for a long time what's in his mind (Wakayama)." 1/

Mr. Abe/ also spoke against the leaders of the organization but in veiled terms:

"I told the members that it's not a very good name because if they are going to study the Japan of 70 years ago, that's wrong. Seventy years ago Japan was only an island Empire. Now it has assumed the leadership of millions of Asiatic peoples. The people become so stubborn. The Administration is responsible for it. They try to control them by making them fight each other." 2/

Mr. Fujimoto made some very bitter statements at this time. Much later the writer learned through mutual friends that Fujimoto had been threatened by the Manzanar Gang who were controlled by Wakayama. He was to give them extra sugar or they would get him coming home from work some night. Fujimoto, though he was an old friend of the writer's, never revealed this. Instead, he got out of camp.

"The one thing that decided me on going out was the attitude of the people in camp. They're not my idea of what I thought a Japanese should be. I'm very disappointed. This business of dog eat dog and if they don't get what they want all they know what to do is agitate for it.

"As far as I can remember, I've had a half way sort of pride in the fact that the Japanese people were more or less of an intellectual ~~people~~ group. When they start to conduct themselves like skid-row bums, that's too bad. Just because they became repatriates and were in a camp that was basically Japanese, they didn't have to get all uppish and conduct themselves in the manner that they did." 3/

Mr. Yamaguchi, a young kibe, was also among those persons who distrusted the Resegregation Group from the first. He said of the Sokoku Seinen-dan in an impressed tone:

"It's big. It's well organized. It's good and strong."

1/ ibid., Aug. 14, 1944, p. 4.

2/ ibid., Aug. 31, 1944, pp. 1-2.

3/ ibid., Sept. 17, 1944, pp. 3-4.

Do you know who's behind it? "

When the writer said she did not know, Mr. Yamaguchi said he had been trying very hard to find out who was really behind the organization, but had been unable to do so. He added:

"They're not very well trained yet. If they get too much power and can't control it, they might do something. A lot of people are against it, but they don't say anything.

"When they have those exercises a lot of people say, 'Crimey! If you have a little baby or a sick person, it wakes them up.' Also, the secret way they do things makes people suspect." 1/

Mr. Kuratomi, who had just been released from the stockade was very non-committal. It was obvious, however, that he did not approve of the organization. He contrasted the present state of the camp with that of November, when he had assumed a position of prominence.

"When resegregation started out - all right. We had to have a clear status. Being that there were so many fence-sitters, the people who came were forced into a position that looked queer at the time.

"However, some of the people who are running the resegregation group are more or less doing it for their own general benefit." 2/

After the Sokoku Kenkyu held its second meeting on September 8th, at which Mr. Yamashita was the chief speaker, Mr. K. looked on them a little more kindly, stating:

"I didn't go because we all had to wear a suit. But hearing from those who attended, it looks to me as if they are changing their policy a little and swinging more to the viewpoint of the public. They're not going to adhere so strongly to the idea of wanting to be resegregated. They're going to consider everybody to be considered as Japanese and are going to train them to live up to the traditions of the Japanese people.

"If that is true, I think that is a wise change. If they try to force the people to think as they think, they will invite criticism." 3/

K's optimism was short-lived. If Mr. Yamashita gave this impression, it was a false one.

It should be mentioned here that behind the impulse to study

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- 1/ ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 8.
2/ ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, p. 8.
3/ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 1.

Japan and Japanese culture stood not only the overtly expressed practical need to learn about Japan if one intended to live ones life there, but the concealed need to give proof of ones intention to be Japanese. To enter whole-heartedly into a study of things Japanese was to meet a defense against being considered an American and coming within reach of the specter of forced entry into American life. The great majority of the people in camp, and certainly almost all of the issei, approved of the expressed aims of the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan. Had the leaders not attempted to set the group off as superior "true Japanese", had they devoted themselves to education and not attempted to grasp political power, they might have been given almost campwide support. The organization would have attracted the truly able camp leaders and it might have gained a strength and power which would have resisted all the pressure which the authorities later saw fit to bring against it.

RESEGREGATION GROUP'S PRESSURE FOR RESEGREGATION - THE GREAT RESEGREGATION RUMOR • REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

As has been shown the idea of resegregation had been forcibly impressed upon the people in April 1944 and propaganda was continued steadily thereafter. The majority of the people did not take kindly to the idea. A less overt propaganda campaign was initiated by the Resegregation Group throughout August, but was no more successful in winning converts. It did, however, assist in the rise of a rumor which was widely believed: that resegregation was about to be initiated by the WRA. This rumor was of unusually long duration. It began late in July and did not decrease until mid-September. Eventually it died down, partly because nothing happened and partly because certain of the leaders of the Resegregation Group were notified by the Administration that there was to be no resegregation. It was also during this period that the first attitudes toward renunciation of citizenship were

expressed. The Resegregation Group looked upon this Bill almost as if had been passed for their personal convenience. Unfortunately, few of the writer's non-resegregationist informants would express themselves on the subject at this time. The general impression gained from their statements was, "The people are waiting."

In July, persons who were not members of the Resegregation Group were still expressing the old attitude that resegregation would be a good thing, providing it meant getting what they considered the relatively small number of people who were "still loyal to America" out of the camp. One of the Japanese dentists expressed himself as follows:

"A great deal of the problem would be solved if (WRA) would make up a train list of all the people eligible for leave clearance and have a train movement to move them out. You can't have a camp like this, half democratic and half force. You have to have discipline: set the thing out clearly, understand it and appreciate it.

"We have a lot of draft dodgers here and a lot who have committed themselves just enough so they can get a place to stay and see which side is going to win. It's that sort of cowardly bunch who should be kicked out. Then, there's the group whom the lackadaisical attitude of the WRA allowed to stay here from the beginning. They should be kicked out too." 1/

Mr. Okamoto, an extremely conservative kibe i, wrote to the writer:

"I hear rumors from time to time that there are many loyal persons who should relocate or go to another camp still in this center. If ~~peace~~ peace and order is to be maintained, WRA should take immediate steps to remove such persons. Unless complete segregation of segregees (takes place) in this center, we shall not see any hope for peace. By means of removing such persons, I believe WRA will have a little more easier time to enforce the laws and carry out administrative policy efficiently as a real segregation camp. It seems to me that all the trouble that we have had in the past is due to entangled rumors, administrative policy and other misunderstanding." 2/

The two attitudes expressed above are very typical of the public acceptance of part of the propaganda disseminated by the

1/ ibid., July 12, 1944, p. 6.

2/ ibid., July 24, 1944, p. 5.

pressure group, a propaganda which was acceptable to most of the camp's population because it coincided with the original emotional reaction of the transferees when, in October of 1943, they found that Tule Lake was not the ideal, homogeneous camp containing "people of one mind," which they had expected it to be. Here is the same expression from Mr. Wakayama, one of the most important undercover leaders of the Resegregation Group:

"I told Mr. Best: First you have to expedite the release of those who have declared themselves loyal to the United States. . . . There are many people here whose status is not clear. They are uncertain. Some haven't answered the questionnaire. Some came here because of family ties. They should be sent out. It's pitiful (to separate families) but it can't be helped. You have to have another resegregation here." 1/

The Resegregation Rumor

The rumor that WRA was planning a resegregation raged throughout all of August. Some people were influenced to the extent that they began to plan how they would pack their things. It caused great anguish of mind. In the first place, nobody knew who would be resegregated, the people "loyal to America" or the people "loyal to Japan." The significant point is, nobody expressed a liking for the idea of leaving camp except the ardent supporters or the leaders of the Resegregation Group. The writer first picked up the rumor on July 31, when two nisei girls told her there was a big rumor in camp that the resegregants were to be sent to Poston. 2/ From then on the rumor followed the common path of a folk phenomenon: the places to which the ressegregates were to be sent changed until utterly fantastic possibilities were being accepted; imaginary reports in the newspapers or from the radio were accepted and spread as truth. Some residents stated defiantly that they were going to hold by their decision to return to Japan even if it meant being sent to

1/ ibid., July 30, 1944, p. 9.

2/ ibid., July 31, 1944, p. 1.

Alaska; some swung to the other extreme and said that they would relocate rather than be forced to move again.

Poston appears to have been the first center decided upon.

Mr. Okamoto stated on August 8:

"The last two weeks everybody is saying we might be resegregated again. First they said Poston, then Alaska."

His wife added:

"They told me that they had heard it over the radios and seen in the Examiner that the people are going to be sent to Jerome. It is the people loyal to Japan who are going to be moved." 1/

On August 10 the two elderly issei women who cleaned the writer's room remained standing in uneasy silence after they had finished their work. Sensing that they had something on their minds, the writer began a conversation. One said, "Miss Hankey, all the people are talking about having to go to Jerome. Is that true?" The writer said she did not believe so. The women were very relaxed. One added: "People heard it over the radio and our blocks are very upset. Children were crying." The other said, "I have moved four times already and I don't want to move again. Jerome is bad, they say, too much rain." 2/

Mr. Yamaguchi appeared to be very unconcerned over the prospect that he might be forced to move again. When he left the room, however, his wife explained that he was just pretending. She didn't want to move; neither did her mother. "In fact, nobody wants to move again." She said she had heard that the climate of Jerome was so bad that they were going to move the American soldiers who were supposed to be hospitalized there to Tule Lake and move the Japanese to Jerome.

"They say they announced it over the radio. I think they're going to have trouble if they try to move us." 3/

1/ ibid., Aug. 8, 1944, p. 4.

2/ ibid., Aug. 10, 1944, p. 1.

3/ ibid., Aug. 11, 1944, p. 1.

On August 10th, Mrs. Fujimoto said:

"They're even talking about sending people to Alaska. Do you think that's true?"

Mrs. Fujimoto did not want to go to Alaska or anywhere else.

By mid-August a fairly strong reaction against the idea of resegregation began to arise among the more conservative elements in the population. This was most apparent among the old Tuleans who had always been regarded by as a bunch of fence-sitters by the transferees. The old cry, "We are all Japanese. Why can't we live peaceably together here," began to be raised. Before the Resegregation Group finished its career this attitude became the unrecognized slogan of at least 85 % of the camp's population. On August 14th, a conservative old Tulean issei stated:

"The people that remained and came here did so for only one definite purpose. That is to go back to Japan. There shouldn't be any resegregation. But if a group of people came up and demanded it, it might be best to give in." 1/

Another old Tulean issei stated:

"I feel everybody here should be considered Japanese. There should be the same policy." 2/

An old Tulean nisei girl said:

"There are some people in camp who are so eager to go to Japan they're willing to jump right into the ocean. . . The segregates are always wishing to get the support of the Tule Lakers in order to make more trouble." 3/

As far as this young woman was concerned, she hoped the resegregants would jump in the ocean.

Another girl of the same conservative view hoped that there would be resegregation and that the trouble-makers would get out:

"I do hope they do have resegregation. Also the camp is too large. The people do not know each other. It's a very minority group that would like to run the camp. The men in that group are very dominating and narrow minded. They were nobodies on the outside."

1/ ibid., Aug. 14, 1944, p. 3.

2/ ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, p. 2.

3/ ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 2.

Now they want to be something. Outside they were janitors or people who worked on farms." 1/

Mr. Fujimoto remarked:

"There's another group that says, 'If I'm going to be re-segregated again, I'm going to get out.' You'd be surprised how many of them there are. . . . What I'd like to know is what they (WRA) will consider most important (in determining who is to be re-segregated). They'll probably ask one or two very silly questions again." 2/

Meanwhile the rumor went merrily on. On August 21 K. expressed an opinion which is an almost inevitable accompaniment of a widespread camp rumor, i. e., that the administration had started the rumor for some purpose of its own.

"I know this is rumor - but to some extent the people want to be certain about it. There is talk going around camp that people will be sent out to Poston, Jerome or Alaska. Many are taking it as just rumors.

"The Japanese here reasoned it out for themselves. They're saying this: 'The administration has started these rumors in order to stop the Japanese that are asking for re-segregation. If they are told that they will be sent to an unpleasant spot like Jerome or Poston, then those who have contemplated being re-segregated will change their minds.

But those boys say their minds are made up. They are 100% for segregation. They'll gladly go. If it's a rumor, all right. If the administration sends them to an uncomfortable camp, O. K. too. I'd gladly like to go to Alaska. I've always wanted to see Alaska."

K. then made one of the first unsolicited statements coming from a Japanese on the renunciation of citizenship:

"If ~~the~~ Washington brings forth a questionnaire, whether they wish to become American citizens or Japanese - that will clear the issue. I thought they were going to answer questionnaires around the first of next month." 3/

A few days later a kibe i made another reference to the renunciation Bill, again hoping that it would serve to clear the air in camp:

"First they say they're going to have re-segregation. Then they say they're not. I think ~~maybe~~ it may be a rumor. The denationalization

1/ ibid., p. 3.

2/ ibid., Aug. 19, 1944, p. 3.

3/ ibid., Aug. 21, 1944, p. 1.

law should be coming along next month." 1/

Administrative Decision against Resegregation

On August 23rd Mr. Best returned from a conference in San Francisco, bringing the news that WRA had abandoned all thought of resegregation. Dr. Opler and Mr. Robertson believed that this information should be publicized immediately, but Mr. Best thought it best "to keep it under cover for awhile." Dr. Opler, however, had already informed his staff, so the news of the decision began to filter through the colony immediately. 2/

Four days later, Mrs. Matsuda of the Resegregation Group had already heard the news. She indicated that her group was not going to take it lying down, stating that the group now hoped that the Renunciation of Citizenship Bill, which she hoped would pass in September, would force the WRA to take some action. She said:

"We can't stay here living together like this. The school situation is bad enough as it is. (She meant that the children were not being given sufficient instruction in things Japanese.) Some people were getting all ready to move. They had even planned who they would give their apartments to.

"We figure something will have to be done some time in September. That's when the denunciation bill will come through.

"If we stay here as we are, another trouble is going to come up. I don't know whether it will be as big as the first trouble. We've been tolerant enough about the school here." 3/

About two weeks were required for the resegregation rumor to die down. On August 30th, a young nisei girl expressed great concern over it.

"It's about resegregation. There are rumors all around. People say they heard it over the radio. All my friends say they heard it. They say it will be in October and November and that we are going to Boston or Hawaii. Everybody is talking about it. The people really believe it.

"I don't see why they should do it (resegregation). In what way could they do it? We're all supposed to be disloyal.

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- 2/ 1/ ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 6.
 3/ 2/ ibid., Aug. 28, 1944, pp. 1-2.
 3/ 3/ ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, pp. 1, 4.

1/ ibid. Aug. 23, 1944, p. 2

"A lot of people say, 'Everything for Japan.' I am for Japan, naturally, but I don't exactly hate America.

"I was certain there was going to be resegregation. You see, at first segregation was a rumor. We wondered and wondered. Then it came true. Then people began to say that Tule Lake was going to be the segregation center. Still, it wasn't official. Now we feel that when a story goes around like that, it's likely to be true." 1/

On September 4th, K. said:

"Resegregation rumors are quieting down, it seems. But I heard about it again today. A man came to see me and he was worried." 2/

A nisei girl said on the same day:

"I heard even more resegregation rumors last week. There are also rumors about the Yes-Yes people relocating. I heard 30 left last week. I think that those are the people who had hearings (by the Appeal Board). But ~~X~~ there are still some in here like my girl friend who want to go out. I think there are still a great many who want to go out." 3/

On the day following another nisei girl said that the people were worrying about resegregation as much as ever. Topaz, Jerome, Alaska and Hawaii were being mentioned. The fact that Mr. Best was reported to have visited Manzanar and Topaz had caused some people to come to the conclusion that these centers were to be used as secondary segregation centers since all who wished to come to Tule Lake could not find room there. The informant added:

"I can't understand why some people want to be resegregated so much. After all, we all came here because we wanted to go to Japan. These 'people' will try to start some trouble if there is no resegregation." 4/

On September 5th as Mr. Currie was presiding at a meeting of the Cooperative's Board of Directors, the chairman closed the meeting, looked Currie in the eye and asked bluntly, "Is there going to be any resegregation?" 5/

After the middle of September the rumor was heard no longer.

1/ ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, pp. 1, 4.

2/ ibid., Sept. 4, 1944, p. 2.

3/ ibid., p. 3.

4/ ibid., Sept. 5, 1944, p. 1.

5/ ibid., p. 2.

Dr. Opler suspected strongly that there was actually something behind the resegregation rumor and that resegregation was being seriously by the authorities in Washington. Whether this is so, the writer does not know.

Administrative Conference with Resegregation Group

On August 30 Mr. Black called in certain prominent members of the Resegregation Group and announced to them that there would be no resegregation. The spokesman for the group forcefully emphasized that this was a great mistake and called the decision another of the stupidities of the WRA. Thereupon, Mr. Black, never a very stable individual, lost his temper and told the group to go to hell. At this time the representatives were also given a letter from Dillon Myer dated July 14. The two weeks delay in the presentation of this letter aroused a great deal of ire among the ~~members~~ leaders of the Resegregation Group. The letter follows:

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

July 14, 1944

Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

Gentlemen:

Reference is made to your letter of June 7 and to your earlier communication of April 24, concerning resegregation. The policies under which the Tule Lake segregation center is operated have been carefully studied, both by Washington officials and by the Project Director at Tule Lake, and the policies presently in force are considered fair and equitable.

Mr. Best, Project Director, will be glad to take up with representatives of the residents of Tule Lake, any specific problems relating to the administration of the Project. If necessary, Mr. Best will take such questions up with Washington, where you may be assured of considerate attention. I am sure Mr. Best will be glad to discuss with you the questions of resegregation in which your communication refers.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer
Director.

Both the results of the conference and the delay in the delivery of the letter were resented by the Resegregation Group to a high degree. Mr. Black's loss of temper was regarded with superior amusement as the type of action to be expected from a man of his caliber. Mr. Yamashita said:

"Nobody will respect Black anymore. And nobody is to blame for it but himself." 1/

The matter of the delayed letter was handled by writing a long explanatory reply to Mr. Myer, pointing out the carelessness of Mr. Best and suggesting that hereafter Mr. Myer deal with the Resegregation Group directly. As Mrs. Matsuda put it, "From now on we are not going to deal with Mr. Best or Mr. Myer. We will go higher."

Mr. Campbell, the Project Attorney, who always treated Mr. Yamashita ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ and the other members of the Resegregation Group courteously, was regarded highly by them. Mr. Yamashita stated:

"Mr. Campbell is altogether different from Mr. Isckliter. He told me he has come here by appointment of the WRA to earn the salary of WRA, but he is also here to help the people individually. I have gone to see him on several occasions and each time he gave me a very good impression that he was really willing to help the evacuees. He is not like Mr. Isckliter, who was always looking for compensation for the help he gave." 2/

On his part, Mr. Campbell told the writer that he had been impressed by the honesty and straight-forwardness of those members of the Resegregation Group with whom he had come in contact. 3/ It should be emphasized here that whatever may be said about the motives of certain of the leaders of the pressure group, the sincerity and good faith of the greater part of the members is not to be doubted. They were convinced that having made up their minds to return to Japan, it was obligatory on them to prepare themselves to be of use in that country by proper study and, on the part of the

1/ ibid., Sept. 7, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid.

3/ ibid., Sept. 5, 1944, p. 3.

young men, by physical exercise. Granting their desire to return to Japan, the concept was entirely logical. The fact that these people were misled by their leaders and became the ignorant force which eventually ^{brought} terror and much misery upon the camp does not detract from their sincerity or their faith in the implicit justice of their cause.

The preoccupation of the Resegregation Group with the renunciation of citizenship which they believed to be imminent was expressed by both Mr. Yamashita and Mrs. Matsuda at this time. Mr. Yamashita stated:

"We don't know how far this will go. But certainly those who wish for immediate repatriation to Japan and at the same time don't wish to be inducted into the service or relocate, wish to renounce their citizenship. We don't know how many will renounce their citizenship."

Mr. Yamashita then asked the writer if renunciation of citizenship would also be permitted in other centers for those persons who had repatriated but had been unable to come to Tule Lake. 1/

On the same day Mrs. Matsuda informed the writer that the administration had received a letter from Washington relative to the renunciation of citizenship and had passed it on to the Resegregation Group. The latter portion of the letter stated, "We cannot predict the date when the regulations will go into effect." Despite this somewhat disappointing letter, Mr. Matsuda was happy and proud, because the Resegregation Group had been permitted to establish an office in block 5 4 and had procured the services of a secretary and stenographer. He stated:

"We are being misunderstood by the administration and some people. We don't want to force people to go out; we just want to be separate from those who really don't want to go back to Japan." 2/

1/ ibid., Sept. 7, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid., p. 5.

The writer came to know Mr. Matsuda very well and believes that the above statement is sincere. Mr. Matsuda was a quiet, reasonable fellow; it is unlikely that he had any part in a deliberate, conscious attempt to terrorize the camp population. Later, it was even rumored by more radical members, that he might be ejected from the group. He probably put ~~an~~ more hard work and honest effort into his work for the Resegregation Group than any other member. His sincerity and steadiness commanded respect.

K., who had nothing to do with the pressure group, also made a statement on renunciation of citizenship at this time:

"Everything is quiet except for the fact that people are waiting for action on the renunciation of citizenship. If there are people who will renounce their citizenship merely to escape the draft, it would be a good thing if the government sent them first to Japan - then they'll get drafted there.

"When it comes to a final showdown, I think most of them will turn it down (refuse to renounce). And those who really renounce their citizenship are truly at heart Japanese. Roughly 60% of the camp here are citizens. I think if 50% (of the citizens) renounce their citizenship, they'll be doing good. It may be less." Y/

This happened to be one of the very few times when one of K's predictions proved incorrect.

ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD NO RESEGREGATION DECISION

The administration made no immediate announcement concerning the fact that there would be no resegregation to anyone but the Resegregation Group. The writer, conscious of the extreme anxiety which the rumor was causing many of the residents, asked Mr. Campbell why this was not done. Mr. Campbell stated that it was the policy of the administration "not to dignify a rumor by recognizing it and that denying this rumor would entail denying any other minor rumor which came up in the future." 2/ When the people heard the truth, however, all showed signs of happiness and relief, except

1/ ibid., Sept. 4, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Sept. 5, 1944, p. 3.

the members of the Resegregation Group. K. stated:

"If that intent of the administration were announced, it would make a great many people feel better."

He warned, however, that if those persons who really desired to go to Japan were kept in the camp with the others, it was eventually going to lead to serious agitation.

"But as things look now, the agitation will not receive strong support. There are a great many people who signed the resegregation petition (of April) because they wanted to remain in camp."

K. added that he believed 4,000 was a very generous estimate of those people who really wished to return to Japan." 1/

Two nisei girls were very glad when they heard the news.

"Now we don't have to pack up and move again," they said. 2/

Mr. Abe pointed out frankly that only the Resegregation Group were really in favor of resegregation. He also stressed that many of the people who had signed the April petition did not wish to carry their signature as far as leaving the center.

"Some people were hoping it would come through, especially the stubborn people. ('Stubborn people' is Abe's polite term for the agitators.) But I always thought it was a rumor. I know what a job it would be, transporting all those people during war time.

"As I have said before, the administration wanted to see just how the camp people felt, so they created the rumor first. In Manzanar, the project director used to deny false rumors, but here -never!

"I don't think there are more than a few hundred people in camp who would be willing to transfer to another camp.

"Lots of people are saying that they would like to change their minds on the petition (of April). Lots of people didn't know what they were signing, they say. It was written in very poor Japanese." 3/

Miss Tanaka stated:

"I'd really like to see some of those super-patriots get out of camp." 4/

1/ ibid., Aug. 28, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid., Aug. 31, 1944, p. 1.

3/ ibid.

4/ ibid., Sept. 1, 1944, p. 1.

In early September of 1944, K. told the writer that rumors were about that everything was not going well between the leading spirits behind the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan. This type of rumor persisted throughout the life of the organization and had a sound basis. But in spite of constant jealousy and disagreement on policy, the organization continued to grow in strength, supported by the loyalty of its members and their childlike trust in the leaders.

"I did hear that something wasn't functioning pleasantly and that they were not making much progress - that they were trying to put too many restrictions and demands on the applicants who felt that if such is the case they didn't want to participate. . . They (the leaders) may agitate and cause a little trouble. . .

"I don't want to predict, but as long as things go on in this way and people are not being satisfied and the Sokoku Kenkyu people do not get their wish, trouble will continue to brew." 1/

That K. was quite correct in his contention that trouble was brewing was evidenced by the remarks of two of the recently released stockade detainees who had become enthusiastic supporters of the new Seinen-dan. Mr. Uchida, who accepted the position of dansho, or leader of the organization, stated:

"Only resegregation can straighten out this trouble. We don't want trouble here, but I'm sure it's coming if there is no resegregation. . . These fellows who said No-Yes or No-No and do not repatriate fooled this country and fooled the government. They should make up their minds. We must have resegregation or there will never be any peace. WRA did not do segregation right.

"Those people who say they want to go to Japan after the war - that's out too. They should want to go whenever the repatriate boat comes. If they segregate us, I think that way it would be peaceful. They can't refuse to go." 2/

Mr. Kato, another detainee who preferred to work behind the scenes rather than take a prominent office like Mr. Uchida, agreed whole-heartedly with Mr. Uchida.

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Mrs. Yamaguchi, a non-resegregationist, also stated that

1/ ibid., Sept. 4, 1944, p. 1; Sept. 8, 1944, p. 2.
2/ ibid., Sept. 8, 1944, p. 1; Sept. 11, 1944, p. 2.

resegregation was still an important issue in camp:

"People are still talking a lot about resegregation. We don't know what will happen to us the next day." 1/

OPEN BREAK BETWEEN KAI-KURATOMI FACTION AND THE RESEGREGATION GROUP --
THE INDICTMENT THREAT -- THE ATTEMPT TO BRING BACK MEMBERS OF THE
NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FROM SANTA FE

Unmistakeable hostility between the Tsuda-Mori faction and the leaders of the Resegregation Group on the score of competition in the attempt to obtain the release of the stockade detainees had been in existence for several months. Almost immediately after the release of the detainees, this hostility culminated in an open break between the leaders of the Resegregation Group and Reverend Kai and Mr. Kuratomi. The latter two men joined forces with Tsuda and Mori, taking with them their supporters among whom were Mitsuho Kimura, a judo black belt man and the greater number of the released detainees. Only four of the detainees went over ~~to~~ to the Resegregation Group, most prominent among them being Uchida and Kato. Tsuda had previously brought upon himself the strong resentment of the Resegregation Group because he had refused to sign their resegregation petition in April. For many months the Resegregation Group had flooded the camp with rumors that Tsuda and Mori were dogs and, whether this was true or not, it was widely accepted throughout the camp. Even K. was strongly inclined to believe it. He hinted at a group of dogs in camp and when the writer questioned him further, he said:

"The men I referred to were Ysuda and Mori (and one other, possibly Shimizu or Kimura). We don't know whether they are working for the people or for the administration. If it is found that they are working for the administration it will go with them just as it

1/ ibid., p. 7.

has gone with the dogs." 1/

Mr. Robertson who had the closest contact with the Resegregation Group of any member of the WRA personnel, told the writer that he did not believe that Tsuda was a dog but that he had been working with all his might for the release of the detainees every since his own release from the stockade. Both he and the writer agreed that the gossip spread by the Resegregation Group was caused by jealousy. 2/ For this friendliness with Mr. Tsuda the Resegregation Group lost their confidence in Mr. Robertson and Mrs. Matsuda told the writer on several occasions that they did not trust Robertson any more. On August 11, Dr. Opler remarked that Tsuda had come to see him and had been very worried. The hunger strike was in progress and Tsuda felt that he was on the spot and feared violence from the detainees' relatives. 3/

The fundamental but never expressed reason for the split between the two factions was jealousy over the control of the camp. A minor cause was conflict over the attempt to get those members of the Negotiating Committee who had been sent to Santa Fe back to Tule Lake. Kai and Kuratomi competed on one hand with Kato, who had gone over to the Resegregation Group. The issue which brought about the open split was the refusal of the leaders of the Resegregation Group to give Messers. Kai, Kuratomi and Tsuda financial support when the ^{moder} ~~Alturas~~ county authorities threatened to indict them for conspiracy to murder Mr. Hitomi. A basically different viewpoint on resegregation also existed between the two factions: Kai and Kuratomi held to their original idea of October and November 1943 - to clarify the status of the center residents

1/ ibid., July 31, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., p. 4.

3/ ibid., Aug. 11, 1944, p. 2.

and get those people loyal to America out of camp; the Resegregationists wished to set themselves apart from all those who did not hold to their stringent concept of what loyalty to Japan implied and, if necessary, leave Tule Lake for a new location which met their standards.

When Reverend Kai and Mr. Kuratomi were released from the stockade they did not, in the opinion of the Resegregation Group, show sufficient gratitude for the effort which had been expended to get their release. Whether they ever expressed oral thanks is not known, but in the opinion of Mrs. Matsuda they should have issued a public statement of gratitude. Instead, they released the following statement, which, it will be noted, thanks the "justice-loving residents" and not the Resegregationists.

OUR GRATITUDE AND WISHES

TO THE RESIDENTS OF TULE LAKE CENTER

Without any warning or announced reason, the United States Army with tanks, armored cars, machine guns, etc. was called into the residential area of this colony at the request of the W. R. A. administration on the night of November 4, 1943.

In order to ease tension and to re-establish normalcy in the colony, the representatives of the residents undertook the task of negotiating with the Army officials. However, the Army abandoned and severed all relation with said representatives, and subsequently started the oppressive and unlawful arrests. Under the unrest and the handicap of strict orders prohibiting meetings and mass congregation, the residents, nevertheless, strove to bring this unfortunate incident to an amicable end. The result was further arrests, and the number of persons arrested reached well over 300. There was no hope whatsoever of finding a solution to this ever-darkening situation at the time.

Previously, the Japanese government had sent a formal note of protest dealing with the Tule Lake incident. It seems that the authorities reaching a state of confusion, realized their blunders. The gradual release of the stockade occupants was effected, and on August 12, 1944, the last of the 14 occupants was released unconditionally. During our long confinement we had two hunger strikes, never being fearful of fighting for a just cause and always upholding our virtues as true Japanese.

Now that we are back in the colony, we solemnly pledge ourselves,

however insignificant our efforts may be, to our fundamental objective of establishing a constructive and peaceful community here at Tule Lake. In order that this Incident which became international in significance and scope, come to a formal conclusion, we will give our most earnest efforts in uniting the families of the Issei sent to Santa Fe Detention Station in connection with this affair. Hereafter, too, we sincerely hope that every resident of this center, manifesting the traditional high ideals of our race will cooperate and work in unison for the peaceful functioning of this center.

Furthermore, in conclusion, we wish to express our most heartfelt gratitude to all the justice-loving residents who had given us such diligent and sacrificial support.

Respectfully yours,

Tetsuo Abe	Tomio Kazama	Isamu Sugimoto
Takeo Hamamoto	Yoshio Kobayashi	Isamu Uchida
Shigeo Ishigami	Yukio Kobayashi	Mikio Yamamoto
Shizuo Kai	Toshio Kurekomi	Tokio Yamane
		Satoshi Yoshiyama

Now the other detainees felt about this letter is not known, but Mr. Kato resented very much that he was not consulted about the document nor even asked to sign his name. His name and probably those of other detainees was put on the document without his knowledge. The statement made so little impression on the people that the writer did not even hear of it until two months later when it was given to her by Mrs. Fujimoto. Mrs. Fujimoto thought it of no importance whatever and looked upon it as one of the futile things done by "those guys."

The Threat of Indictment

The events of this matter will be related in chronological sequence. On September 7th, 1944, the writer received the following dramatic letter from Mr. Wakayama:

September 5, 1944

"I am in receipt of your letter dated the first and its contents noted.

"Shall be glad to see you some afternoon between the hours of 1:30 and 5:00 p. m. at my office. Please tell my office girl or assistant to come and call me at my home if I am not there when you come.

This letter was composed at a meeting at which all of the detainees were present except Uchida and Kato. Uchida had to attend judo practice; Kato was busy making preparations for his marriage. According to Kuratomi, both men sent messages, stating that they were willing to comply with any decision made by the other detainees. Later, however, Kato told the writer that he had not been consulted or asked to sign his name. The writer is inclined to believe Kuratomi on this matter.

The statement made so little impression on the people that the writer did not even hear of it until two months later when it was given to her by Mrs. Fujimoto. Mrs. Fujimoto thought it was of no importance whatever and looked upon it as one of the futile things done by "those guys".

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"Shall be glad to see you some afternoon between the hours of 1:30 and 5:00 p. m. at my office. Please tell my office girl or assistant to come and call me at my home if I am not there when you come.

"I was called in by the Internal Security Police yesterday with my baby in my arm in their car - remained in the car over 30 minutes in front of their office near the stockade - and was brought back without any explanation or purpose of such act. Overheard their conversation that they will take me last night but they did not come.

"Few persons were questioned and detained from 1:30 to midnite, I was informed."

The writer was surprised by the friendly and polite tone of this letter because the first note she had received from Mr. Wakayama had been blunt to the point of insult. Sensing that something had occurred which had upset the notorious Mr. Wakayama greatly, the writer called upon him immediately. He poured out the following, somewhat incoherent story. The tale becomes clearer when it is remembered that Wakayama ~~xxxxxx~~ himself was not questioned by the Internal Security but gained his information from a Japanese who was, and that the interjections about his power over the Japanese police were attempts to reassure himself that he could cause the administration great trouble if they proceeded with any action against him. Incidentally, the colonial police were very much afraid of him.

"The same day I was taken a man from block 77 was taken in. He was an old man 60 years old. A friend of his was also taken in.

"The Japanese Colonial Police Chief came to see me when they organized the Colonial Police Department. He told me he had made an arrangement with the Caucasian Internal Security officers that there wouldn't be any pickups unless they contacted the Colonial Police force first. He said with that understanding we had consented to run the Police Department. I said, 'It's a good idea.' He said if they (the administration) breaks it's promise they will all resign." 1/

"So when this man was taken in I sent a friend to the Japanese Police Department. They said they knew about it and they were protesting.

"Their answer (of the Caucasian Internal Security) was this: the Internal Security said, if we keep them over night we'll

1/ If this is true it is very interesting that the Japanese Chief of Police should contact Mr. Wakayama and explain his position to him before accepting the office.

notify you. But when we have to question someone we will not notify you.

"I haven't heard any more about it. I don't think the Japanese Police Department is very happy about this event.

"If I'm taken I told them to call the Japanese Police Chief and demand the resignation of all the policemen.

"It seemed to me that the protest has worked. This man who was taken in was released at 11:30 p. m. and I asked him what had happened. I said, 'Did they question you?' He said that the person who questioned him was an outsider.

"This man (the Japanese questioned) said that a couple of months ago he attended a 7th year anniversary party given by his wife for her deceased husband. About ten or fifteen people were there.

"The questioner said, 'You people, before going into the house, gathered outside and were talking about murdering seven men besides Hitomi. You had an organization called the Blood Brothers Association and you signed your names in blood. I have the evidence here. 'You're crazy,' said my friend.

"He (the questioner) said, 'I've got everything you said at that party.' My friend said, 'We didn't say anything.' He said it was childish. My friend was then sent into another room and kept there from 1:30 p. m. until midnight.

"I said, 'There must be somebody reporting things. Have you any suspicions?' He said, 'Yes.'"^{1/}

The facts behind this recital were that Mr. White, an investigator ^{from} ~~for~~ Alturas County had come to the project to conduct a thorough investigation of the Hitomi murder. Many individuals were questioned. Wakayama was probably taken to the Internal Security office "with his baby in his arms", partly to frighten him and partly to keep him from causing trouble while the investigation was proceeding. The questioning over the Blood Brothers Association is interesting because at this time and later there were vague rumors in the camp about a certain fanatical group who had signed their names in blood. Wakayama's threat to force the resignation of the entire Colonial Police if he were inconvenienced, is the most significant part of the story.

^{1/} ibid., Sept. 7, 1944, p. 3.

It is probably a bluff but reveals clearly his exaggerated opinion of his own importance and power and his pattern of action. Later it was shown on several occasions that the Colonial Police were very much afraid of him.

On the next day George Kuratomi was picked up and questioned. When released, he was told, "To tell Mrs. Matsuda to get ready to be arrested for conspiracy." The writer picked up this information from Mrs. Matsuda who was very excited and stated that Reverend Kai, herself, and Messrs. Kuratomi, Tsuda, Ono, Oesto and one other man were to be arrested for conspiring to murder Hitomi. Mrs. Matsuda was busy packing the articles she planned to take to jail with her and said, "I'm going to take my baby with me too." 1/

On September 12, Mr. Robertson called on the writer; he was greatly shaken by the news of the proposed indictments. The action seemed ridiculous to him. He stated:

"They are telling the colony that the administration has nothing to do with this. They say that the United States ~~with~~ District Attorney and the County District Attorney have instigated this, but I don't believe it. As I remember, when Laderer (the district attorney) was here, he looked at the body and said, 'Well, he's murdered - if you get any dope let me know.'" RX

Mr. Robertson was strongly inclined to the opinion that the threat of indictment was intended to frighten some evacuee into turning state's evidence. He also said that one of the men questioned had admitted that he knew who killed Hitomi but would never tell. 2/

On the same day Mrs. Matsuda informed the writer that the district attorney had told George Kuratomi that if he came back to camp and gathered as much information as possible on the murder, he himself would be shown leniency. George is

1/ ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 10.

2/ ibid., Sept. 12, 1944, p. 1.

supposed to have replied, "Of course, I'll do anything I can to help you sir." Mrs. Matsuda, who was putting on a fine show of bravado, remarked that she was having two dresses made for herself and that she intended to buy herself a new hat to go to jail in. "Don't be silly," said her husband. She added that if this group of people were indicted it would be an advantage for the Japanese government, since it would be one more example of American injustice and persecution toward the Japanese which Japan might make use of after the war. Mr. Matsuda, however, appeared more disturbed over the fact that Mr. Huyoke had refused the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan ~~the~~ the use of a recreational hall for an office than over his wife's imminent arrest. Mr. Huyoke refused the hall on the ground that the organization did not intend to use it for recreational purposes. This was untrue, said Mrs. Matsuda, because the organization planned social events and track meets. They now had 800 members and expected the organization to grow to

1000.¹ The following letter was mailed to Mr. Besig of the American Civil Liberties Union, asking for assistance and advice in the matter of the indictment:

September 12, 1944

Mr. Ernest Besig
Director of Northern California
A. C. L. U.
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Besig:

At this time please accept our belated gratitude for the most humane and understanding interest in our behalf concerning the stockade problem. There has been two weeks since complete releasement of the stockade and we the residents are very happy of liquidation of the stockade and its problems. Once again, wish to thank you for your kind attitude in behalf

1/ ibid., pp. 2-3.

P Because of this indictment a serious disagreement took place between Mr. Kuratomi and the Resegregation Group leaders. When it appeared as if the indictment were imminent, Kuratomi decided to initiate action which would bring a lawyer to the aid of the accused. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to Mr. Besig, explaining that indictment was threatened and requesting that Mr. Besig secure the services of the best available criminal lawyer. This letter Kuratomi induced all the threatened people to sign. But because of the hostility to Mr. Tsuda, the developments were very interesting.

"When I got the signatures, I went to Mr. Ono's place last. Mr. Ono was surprised to see that I had Mrs. Matsuda's signature and very hesitatingly, he signed the letter. On the way home I stopped at Mr. Uchida's place. There I was told that Ono had boasted to Mr. Uchida that under no circumstances would he sign any statement if it caused him to be linked with Mr. Tsuda. So right then I felt that tomorrow morning somebody was going to come to my place.

(Kuratomi meant that he knew then that the anti-Tsuda people would get together and figure out some way of getting Tsuda out of the picture.)

"The next morning at 7:00 A. M. the Saiban-in came. They were rather peeved because I didn't consult them before I went around and got the signatures. To get rid of them I threatened them, saying, 'This is an indictment for murder and you may be involved as the backers of murderers and you gentlemen may be put on the spot. Then they wanted to retract everything and scammed out of here as fast as possible. They told me to tear up the letter of September 11 with the signatures on it, so I wouldn't have their signatures alongside of Mr. Tsuda's.

"Fifteen minutes later they came back and asked me to give them a copy of the letter so they could hire a lawyer. I gave them a copy of the letter. They did this to leave Tsuda's name out of it.

"Then they came back with my letter and asked me to sign it too. I said, 'I may be a fool, but I'm not going to sign that letter that I just typed out. So I typed out another letter and sent it to Mr. Besig with my name, Kai and Tsuda.' 1/

1/ ibid., Mar. 6, 1945, p. 4.

Mrs. Matsuda told the writer a rather different version of this story. Her rather disjointed tale contains several interesting attitudes which bear no relation to the indictment: the idea of making "outcasts" of persons who did not behave as the leaders thought they should, the resentment of the group because they were not shown adequate gratitude for their efforts in

behalf of the detainees, the accusation that Kai and Kuratomi foolishly tried to organize the "whole center" in November 1943.

"Well, we've been hearing bad things about George (Kuratomi). It seems the people in his block are trying to kick him out. (The writer doubts this.)

"In a way, Reverend Kai and George are outcasts now.

"We gave them full cooperation. We thought we owed them giri. When they came out of the stockade they didn't live up to their purpose and giri and cooperation. They were independent. They took steps to tie up with Tsuda.

"When there were those indictment rumors. . . Tsuda, Kai and Kuratomi spread the rumors and tried to get the Resegregation Group to put up the money for Tsuda. They said they would put up the money for Tsuda if he really needed it, but he wasn't a member. Of course, the Resegregation Group didn't do this in a meeting, but that was what was in the air. (This implies that the matter was settled by the leaders.)

"Tsuda didn't take any action with us. He wasn't Japanese.

"We knew the indictment was fishy anyway. (The letter to Mr. Besig belies this statement.) He wanted our financial support. Certain people who have done a lot to get Mr. Besig here went to Kuratomi and said, 'You and Reverend Kai are members of the Resegregation Group. And we're sorry because if you take action with Mr. Tsuda, we cannot support you.' George and Reverend Kai said, 'You folks are too darn narrow-minded.' So George and Kai are outcasts.

"Besides they should have published a statement as soon as they got out, thanking the people for their support and for the money. But they didn't give a word of thanks. Instead of thanking the Saiban-in-kai (the group which called the A.C.L.U.) they didn't even think of this. In a lot of instances, they didn't live up to Japanese manners.

"They think we took the wrong action and they believe everything Tsuda says. Even Reverend Kai - none of his congregation got to see him. They say he's too darn conceited.

"We think November 4th was these boys' fault. They tried to organize the whole center when they didn't even know what kind of people the center was composed of. If one of them was elected to a position, one of the others would be jealous and would inu. They should have considered these things. They were too ambitious. Of course, we always say that WRA caused the riot. . . But if these boys hadn't been too ambitious. . .

"The least they should say is to say to the people: 'Due to our carelessness and youth we were sorry to cause such a disturbance among you.' Out of courtesy Reverend Kai should

have done that. Of course, we can't outspoke and ask him to do it. But he ought to. He didn't live up to our expectation.

"If they had stayed quiet it would have been all right; but they took sides right away with Tsuda." 1/

When Kuratomi heard this version of his actions, he said:

"We asked no one for material aid in hiring a lawyer. Our feeling was that since six or seven people were to be indicted for the same charge against the same man, and all were Japanese in my eyes and lived within the compound, I felt it was only natural and just to ask everybody to write and hire a lawyer if necessary."

Mr. Tsuda who was present at this interview, added rather indignantly:

"I don't have to ask anybody to give me aid or lawyer's fees. I'll do it myself."

Said Mr. Kuratomi:

"And if I remember correctly, most of the 500 dollars came from Mr. Tsuda anyway." 2/

As for the matter of not showing sufficient gratitude to the Saiban-in, Kuratomi told his side of the story:

"After we came out of the stockade they had this what do you call committee for the law suit - the Saiban-in - and furthermore, the responsibility rested not with them but with the detainees in the stockade. If things went OK, they'd get the credit, but if they didn't go OK they'd get no blame. Then, as a result of the threat of a law suit from the ACU, WRA turned us loose.

"After we were released all of us detainees had a meeting with the Saiban-in and thanked them honestly, it was quite an amicable meeting. Regarding the 500 dollars collected for the law suit it was not so much a part of the Resegregation Group, it came more from the earliest efforts of the Saiban-in." 3/

In any case, Kuratomi sent off his letter which was also signed by Kai and Tsuda and Mr. Matsuda and Mr. One sent off the letter they had enveigled out of Kuratomi after making a few minor changes. The letter mailed by Mr. Matsuda follows:

1/ ibid., Oct. 9, 1944, pp. 3-4.

2/ ibid., Mar. 6, 1945, p. 4.

3/ ibid., p. 3.

September 12, 1944

Mr. Ernest Besig
Director of Northern California
A. C. L. U.
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Besig;

At this time please accept our belated gratitude for the most humane and understanding interest in our behalf concerning the stockade problem. There has been two weeks since complete releasement of the stockade and we the residents are very happy of liquidation of the stockade and its problems. (This "we the residents" statement was not used by Kuratomi.) Once again, we wish to thank you for your kind attitude in behalf

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of both internees and residents in general.

However, we were informed that sometime next week the Grand Jury of Modoc County will indict about half a dozen evacuees on charges of murder and conspiracy to murder, which occurred July 2, 1944 while the stockade was still in existence. And we are not in receipt of summons or subpoena as yet but we should expect it any day.

You are familiar with the condition of the camp. Some of us were taken to the Modoc County Jail for preliminary findings of the fact pertaining to the murder. We feel that there may be a deliberate attempt on some individuals to conspire against us. Of course, we are positive that any so-called "evidence" compiled about us is based upon rumors and not the basic facts of the case. We are anxious to clear ourselves of any and such disgraceful charges directed toward us. There are entirely too many idle talk floating about in the center and such talks may greatly injure many perfectly innocent residents. We are suspicious that there is a link between Mr. Best's stockade complex and the murder investigation which eventually brought us into the murder picture. For this reason we earnestly request your visit.

Also would it be possible, therefore for you through your association to acquire us the best available criminal lawyer to fight this case in our behalf. We are at a loss as to our preparations for this case. Will you suggest our attorney to visit us so that he may be better supplied with the facts?

Again we wish to thank you deeply for your sincere efforts. We are waiting for your favorable reply.

Very truly yours,

Kozue Matsuda
Gentaro Ono

Mr. Tetsunori Oseto was arrested today, Sept. 12, A. M. again. He has requested for your assistance in the same manner as above.

K. M.

After showing the writer this letter Mrs. Matsuda said several times that "the people were certainly behind them on this matter. ^{1/} This was not entirely an exaggeration, since no Japanese expressed himself in favor of this indictment.

It was because of this indictment that the disagreement took place between Reverend Kai and Mr. Kuratomi and the Resegregation Group leaders. When it appeared as if the indictment was imminent, Kai and Kuratomi approached the pressure group leaders and asked for

^{1/} ibid., p. 6.

funds to hire a lawyer on behalf of those threatened. The group was willing to put up the money for Kai and Kuratomi, because they were dues paying members of the Resegregation Group but refused to assist Tsuda, giving as reason the fact that he was not a member. Kai and Kuratomi then stated that if no help were given Tsuda, they would not accept help either. This resulted in an open break ^{disagreement} between the two parties. Vicious gossip was probably spread by both factions, but the writer picked up more which sprang from the Resegregation Group and blackened the reputations of Kai, Kuratomi, and Tsuda. The ordinary camp resident was inclined to believe or at least to repeat both streams of propaganda. Kai was called a Communist. All three men were called gamblers and drinkers and were accused of having a gang of boys under their control whom they were leading into lawless action. The chief topic of gossip against the Resegregation Group was the constant rumor that the leaders could not get along together and were on the verge of splitting up. This latter rumor was spread not only by the Kai-Kuratomi faction but also by a group of independent people who had strongly suspected the motives of the Resegregation Group from the beginning of their activities. The writer, with her close connection with the Resegregation Group, repeatedly found evidence that this jealous squabbling between the leaders was going on.

The most detailed story of the disagreement over the indictment came from Mrs. Matsuda. The rather disjointed tale contains several other interesting attitudes: the idea of making "outcasts" of persons who do not concur to the wishes of the organization, the resentment of the group because they were not shown adequate gratitude for their efforts on

have done that. Of course, we can't outspoke and ask him to do it. But he ought to. He didn't live up to our expectation.

"If they had stayed quiet it would have been allright; but they took sides right away with Tsuda." 1/

The general facts of this story were corroborated by several other informants. Mr. Kato also stated that Mrs. Kai had incurred the resentment of the Resegregation Group before the stockade detainees were released because she had been curt and rude to a delegation of relatives working for release when they had called at her home. 2/

Probably before and certainly after this split, the Kai-Kuratomi faction began to augment and organize their group of followers. This was done with great secrecy and caution. The Resegregation Group, however, saw to it that rumors of the consolidation of this "dangerous group" reached the ears of the administration. It was supposed to be called the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan and many residents believed in its existence. Mr. K. said:

"Kai, Kuratomi, Mori and Tsuda are behind the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan. I've been hearing that they've been organizing it. ~~Seinen-dan~~ Ten days ago they claimed they had 100 members." 3/

Whether this group was ever formally organized is not known. That Kai and Kuratomi headed a strong informal organization there can be no doubt. It is also very probable that during this period and up to December when the Department of Justice arrived on the scene, the administration looked favorably upon the antipathy between the two groups, hoping that they would inhibit each other and that neither would grow too strong.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

At the time when he was threatened with indictment, Mr.

1/ ibid., Oct. 9, 1944, pp. 3-4.

2/ ibid., Oct. 24, 1944, p. 1.

3/ ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 5.

Kuratomi expressed his views as follows:

"I have seen the statement myself, accusing me of murder and conspiracy of murder and asking the county grand jury to indict me. One thing, I am more or less on the lookout for a frameup. I'm playing safe and am going to have a lawyer come in and go over the situation. If they try to connect me with this, I'm going to have a real disillusionment in American democracy

"At the Modoc County Jail I made this statement: 'It would be very hard to apprehend the murderer in this camp. There is no cooperation between the Caucasian personnel and the Japanese. The chief reason is the great fence ~~guy~~ that Mr. Best has put up at government expense.'" 1/

No indictments were ever made. Nor was the writer ever able to get any information on why the action had been contemplated or why it was suddenly dropped. Kuratomi carried on a correspondence with Mr. Besig and sent him 500 dollars as a retainer. By September 29th the matter was closed, for by that time it was apparent that the authorities did not intend to take any action.

Parts of the correspondence can be inserted here if it is thought advisable. It is interesting chiefly for Besig's advice as to the ~~unlawful~~ "lawless enforcement of the law" which WRA permitted the district attorney to engage in. R. H.

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No indictments were ever made. Nor was the writer ever able to get ~~xx~~ any information on why the action had been contemplated or why it was suddenly dropped.

The news that the indictments were about to be made did not spread through the camp as rapidly as might be expected. Most informants voiced the opinion that they believed the persons accused had nothing to do with the murder. No one appeared very much disturbed that a possible injustice might be done. A few conservatives, who lived in the same block as one of the accused, seemed relieved to think that the authorities had thrown a scare into the Resegregation Group. K. stated:

"I think they (the authorities) are just trying to get something on somebody. . . . They may use third degree methods if they cannot get information any other way just so they can find somebody and say they did it." 2/

Yamaguchi was quite curious over the rumor of arrests, but stated that the people didn't know what it was all about. 3/ Several other informants showed the same reaction, expressed no opinion, but wanted to know the details of the accusation and who was going to be taken. Mr. Okamoto said:

"I don't think that Kai and Kuratomi could have been

1/ ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 7, 11.

2/ ibid., Sept. 8, 1944, p. 2.

3/ ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 7.

connected with that murder case." 1/

On September 19, when the news had been abroad for almost two weeks, Mr. K. said:

"The people are paying no attention to it. They are letting it go from one ear to the other. I think they'll make fools of themselves if they arrest those men." 2/

A week later he stated:

"If they (Kai, Kuratomi and Tsuda) are arrested as the ones who engineered the murder, I think the administration will make a laughing stock out of themselves." 3/

Mr. Yamashita, who must have been one of the men who refused Kuratomi the money for an attorney, made the following interesting statement:

"I think Mr. Kuratomi spread out the rumor and everybody got worried very much. I told them if they are indicted they will have plenty of time. First of all they will be given a summons. Even if they are indicted they will be released immediately. After they are released, they can sue against raderer and the administration for indicting innocent people.

"If I were in their position I would not have hired a lawyer because I know from my wise thinking that they will not send out a summons." 4/

The Project to Return the Issei Negotiating Committee Members from Santa Fe.

On the release of the nisei stockade detainees in late August, their first expressed path of action was to obtain the return of the men who had been sent to Santa Fe in July and, having thus brought back all the members of the Negotiating Committee to Tule Lake, proceed to resign. Their chief contention was that since they, as nisei, had been released unconditionally, the internment of the issei members of the Negotiating Committee implied that they had committed a wrong for which they were being

¹ Ibid., Sept. 16, 1944, p. 2.
^{2/} Ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 1.
^{3/} Ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, p. 2.
^{4/} Ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, p. 3.

punished. The nisei members remaining in Tule Lake could not resign without completely clearing the names of the interned issei. To do so would be to show a reprehensible lack of obligation or giri.

In this matter, however, the factional split also made its appearance. Kei and Kuratomi and some of the released men worked as a committee and Kato worked separately as a representative of the Resegregation Group. Kuratomi announced his intention of devoting himself to this cause soon after his release from the stockade, stating that the people in camp were very anxious to have the men sent to Santa Fe. This was an exaggeration.

"Our (nisei) release is unconditional. They (issei) were sent to Santa Fe just because they were aliens. How could their return to Tule Lake be expedited?

"Mr. Best promised us in front of Wayne Collins (A. C. L. U. attorney) that he's willing to make any recommendations pertaining to these issei returning to the camp.

"The people have a very firm idea that the issei sent to Santa Fe are just as innocent as the nisei released outright. I know one or two families have received letters that the Justice Department is willing to return them."

Kuratomi ended by saying that if this matter were not cleared up there would be no peace in camp. 1/

Mr. Kato who was now an enthusiastic member of the Resegregation Group expressed similar sentiments:

"We (Negotiating Committee) will not resign even if we go back to Japan unless the 26 men are returned from Santa Fe. If they return our job is over and we will present our mass resignation at once. If we resign now the people will regard us as cowards and our names will be dirt.

"If Mr. Best does not see me (on this matter) the camp will be in an uproar." 2/

If either of these men really believed that the residents would make any trouble if the men did not come back from Santa

1/ ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 7-8.

2/ ibid., Sept. 28, 1944, p. 4.

Fe, they were very much mistaken.

Mr. Best's attitude toward the return of the internees was obtained from Mr. Robertson. Kato contacted Robertson and asked him to sound out Best on the matter. Best told Robertson that there was absolutely no chance for the return of the men. Moreover, the men in Santa Fe did not wish to return to Tule Lake but preferred to join their families in Crystal City. This happened to be true, although Mr. Robertson implied to the writer that the men in Santa Fe had been told that their chances of exchange to Japan would be improved by their transfer to Crystal City. 1/ In a later conversation Robertson stated that Best had informed Kai, Kuratomi and the others that WRA had had nothing to do with the transfer to Santa Fe and that the men had been removed entirely by the Department of Justice. Thereupon, the committee showed Best a letter from the Department of Justice, which stated that in the case of at least one of the men, they were willing to allow his return to Tule Lake. 2/ On October 4th Mr. Best granted the committee of ex-stockade detainees an interview, seeing all of them but Mr. Kato who, for a reason which was never explained, was forced to have an interview alone. The only account of this interview came from Mrs. Matsuda:

"Amy (Sugimoto), Reverend Kai and George (Kuratomi) went to see Mr. Best. . . They had received their answer from the ~~xxxxx~~ Justice Department. This letter said that they (the Justice Dept.) didn't care. They said it was the WRA office in Washington who was opposing it. If they could get the consent of the project director it was all right (to send them back).

"Mr. Best started out by saying that he couldn't do anything about it. They showed him the letter. He said he hadn't known about this. He said he would have to copy the letter and consult Mr. Myer."

According to Mrs. Matsuda, Mr. Best also showed the committee a letter from Santa Fe which said that seven of the issei sent

1/ ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, p. 8.

2/ ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, p. 4.