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The Administrative attitude on the farm was stated by Mr. Best, "The time is not appropriate to talk about a farm program of any scale."¹ On Feb. 2nd the Committee recommended an expansion of farm acreage, and if possible, a reclamation of the "League of Nations" tract which had been lost to the colonists because of the farm strike.² Mr. Best expressed himself: "The answer is No." Mr. Yamatani then asked if it would be possible for the Japanese to get a lease of land in the district. Mr. Best replied, "Not now, but perhaps in the future."³

Additional work opportunities were even more strongly stressed by the committee but nothing was accomplished. Akitsuki brought this up in a meeting on January 24, especially asking for a clean up crew of about 30 men. Best stated: ["New projects such as the above-mentioned are not yet in order; until such time that the Center re-establishes itself to its former sound normal stage and all old activities function as usual, such plans should be withheld. However, all such plans will be duly considered."] Akitsuki then suggested that work opportunities should be given the expected arrivals from Manzanar as soon as possible. Mr. Best disagreed and suggested that a thorough analysis should first be made.⁴

On January 29 the Divisional Heads met. Akitsuki explained the progress of the Committee in its various endeavors as follows:

¹Minutes of the meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 20, 1944

²Memorandum Co-ordinating Committee, Feb. 2, 1944.

³Notes, Feb. p. 36.

⁴Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 24, 1944, p. 1.

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"1. Approximately 1000 resumed work since January 13, 1944. In spite of the existing frictions between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 750 persons applied for jobs up to date.

2. [Up to yesterday, 55 persons were released from the stockade and more will be released in the very near future. The Army has definitely stated that release en masse is impossible unless the Center has returned to its normal condition. . .]

3. As decided at the last divisional meeting, the Coordinating Committee presented the suggestion to create new jobs for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities, such as clean-up crew, to the WRA. Project Director has stated definitely that the time is not appropriate to be discussing future plans unless the Center is back to normal and all old activities, functioning as usual. Moreover, the Administration must get Washington's approval prior to the execution of any contemplated plans.

4. Relaxation of the curfew hour up until 9:30 p.m. has been recommended but it was felt inappropriate to life such now; moreover, it was felt that it should be withheld until center completely returns to its normal status.

As the meeting ended it was suggested from the floor that segregation within the center, "the good from the bad, is imperative." The majority of the Divisional Heads were in favor of the segregation of these "scums of the society" but no recommendations were made.¹

The Coordinating Committee renewed its efforts to get more jobs and on Feb. 2, sent a memorandum to Mr. Best, stating that:

["In view of the fact that there are 750 persons on the waiting list, new applicants are aware that their chances of employment are remote, hence a growing impatience is noted among them. We, the Committee, fear the result, lest they be instigated by the pro-status quo group who may aver that this back-to-work movement is beneficial only to those who had worked previously.

In order to relieve this situation, may this Committee again request for your special consideration on this matter of creating new employment opportunities such as general camp cleaning or sawing of kindling wood by acres of 20 to 30."

¹Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 29, 1944, pp. 1, 3.

When this suggestion was brought up in the meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council Mr. Best, and Mr. Black countered with the employment statistics which ^{offered} showed that there were only 165 ^{fewer} ~~less~~ persons employed than there had been before the strike. Said Black, "We don't have to step very far before we have more people working than ever before."¹]

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[In its attempt to get favorable publicity for its efforts in releasing men from the stockade, ^{however} the Coordinating Committee was frustrated by the desire of the Administration that no publicity be given these releases, lest ^{under pressure be put upon} the Coordinating Committee ~~be~~ ^{in delaying who gets} undue pressure. However, the Committee did have some influence on who ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~or was not~~ released. On January 20, at a meeting at which only the Committee, the Project Director, Colonel Austin and Lt. Forbes were present, the Committee ^{had} asked that the proposed list of persons to be released be submitted to them first. They ^{had} ~~also~~ recommended four men for release at that time. The Colonel advised the Committee "to analyze the list and decide which is going to pay the greater dividend- release or continued detention." The Committee was also authorized to ^{perhaps} ~~publish mat-~~ ~~ters pertaining to~~ this release.² However, on January 26, at a meeting with the Advisory Council, Mr. Best "cautioned the Co-ordinating Committee to proceed very slowly in its undertakings and thought it advisable to refrain from publicizing matters pertaining to the releases of the detainees, especially their names, too strongly."³]

¹Notes, Feb., p. 35.

²Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 20, 1944.

³Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee, Jan. 26, 1944, p. 3.

The sub-Co-ordinating Committee or the "fielders" was first brought up in a meeting of the Divisional Heads. It was then described as "a liason body acting between the Co-ordinating Committee and the Divisional Heads and workers to receive all reports, complaints, suggestions, plan etc."¹ Two days later the matter was put before the Advisory Council.

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"This [sub-committee] ^[will] will refer such matters as it may deem necessary to the attention of the Project Director. Mr. Yamatani reiterated that inasmuch as the Committee is still encountering much difficulties with the antagonistic minority of pressure groups, it is definitely imperative that this sub-committee be established immediately to accelerate the progress of this great task.]

"It is urgent, Mr. Akitsuki admitted, due to the lack of a closer collaboration of the evacuee wardens with the Committee."²

At this meeting Black recommended that the Committee prepare a list of 50 names from which Mr. Schmidt on his arrival could select the personnel of this group.

2

On January 28, at the next meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council, Akitsuki put the matter before Schmidt, asking for ["30 men with WRA remuneration for the purpose of performing intelligence work which is to be used only for the advantage and benefit of the colony."]

2

Mr. Black said that the WRA budget had no quota whereby wages of this nature could be paid out. However, Mr. Schmidt gave full approval stating, "There is no reason why it couldn't be done since the other centers have people, such as the ones requested by Mr. Akitsuki, on the payroll. . . Such men could later be added to the police force." [At the same meeting the restriction ^{necessity of} meetings

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within the center was brought up, ^{and} ~~but~~ on Mr. Black's suggestion the

¹Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 22, 1944, p. 2.

²Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 24, 1944, p. 2.

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restriction was deemed unnecessary "since the creation of an intelligence unit should alleviate the task to a certain degree by insinuating within these instigators and spotting and identifying the nature of the meeting and possibly the leaders."¹]

When the organization of this body of "fielders" became known in the colony, it's members were considered spies (inu) and guards for the Coordinating Committee, which was growing progressively more unpopular. A reliable informant stated that the bunch of fellows constantly hanging around the Co-ordinating Committee's office, which was observed by the writer on several occasions, were guards and moreover, the group ran gambling houses which were never raided, while they reported other "non-protected" gambling joints.²

In late January Mr. Best received an anonymous letter:

"proposing the Administration to devise a plan whereby the camp be divided in two, in order to avoid possible flare-up or conflict and to preserve order."

This letter probably came for the pro-Daihyo Sha Group which was still maintaining an underground organization. It was the forerunner of an attempt to gain segregation which culminated three months later in a petition and general camp agitation. Interestingly, the Divisional Heads made a request for segregation on Jan. 29, but from different motives.³ They wished to protect themselves from the "radicals", while the "radicals" were pushing the original Negotiating Committee's segregation proposal.

¹ibid., Jan. 28, 1944.

²Notes, Mar., p. 50. *Kuikaru*.

³See p. 195.

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Mr. Best read the anonymous letter at a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council. Yamatani remarked that "recent trends of the populace shows favorable inclination toward the brighter side. However, one cannot deny that some 'demagogues' are still left in each block." Dr. Opler believed, "that the letter was intended as tactics to sell the idea of dividing the Center now and also the idea of the opposing group's desire to convert this Center into a prisoner-of-war camp." Akitsuki concurred with Opler, adding that the opposition hoped that if the camp were transformed into a prisoner-of-war or internment camp under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, food would be delivered to the gate and the people would receive \$50 monthly without working.¹ Members of this pro-Daihyo Sha group have several times expressed in the writer's presence the wish that the camp should be made into an Internment Center.

The writer was present at one meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council. The dominant tone of the meeting was the repeated attempts of the Committee to get some consideration for their proposals all of which were faced by Administrative attempts to delay action until the camp had become more normal. As soon as the Japanese entered the room an atmosphere of tension prevailed. The members of the Committee seated themselves together along one side of the room and appeared very ill at ease. The Caucasians habitually addressed the Japanese by their first names; the Japanese always addressed the Caucasians by their surnames. The position of chairman was indecisive. Akitsuki was supposed to be chairman but Mr. Black

¹Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Coordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 26, 1944, p. 1.

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usurped the place repeatedly. Most of the talking was done by the Caucasians and consisted of arguments and excuses to put off the Committee's proposals till some later and happier date.

Akitsuki opened the meeting by stating that the Committee recommended that immediate steps be taken to replace them by a body of legitimately elected representatives. Mr. Black asked that this topic be put off until Mr. Best returned to the room. Akitsuki then recommended that the curfew be extended to 9:30 p.m. instead of 7:30. The discussion reached no conclusion and was interrupted by Yamatani, who said, "Some of the blocks have no block managers. This ought to be settled first." Mr. Huycke said he thought the mess hall crews were responsible for this and Yamatani asked, "Can't you stop delivering them coal?" The discussion then swung back to the curfew and it was decided to leave matters as they were until the Internal Security was reorganized.¹

Akitsuki then brought up the suggestions of additional employment and additional farm acreage. On each subject the Caucasians talked at length but counselled waiting. Akitsuki mentioned that the people were suffering from lack of shower facilities but Mr. Best said, "We'll refer that to maintenance."² He also reported that the mess managers were complaining that a member of the appointed personnel, Mr. Foss was abusive to the Japanese, and that they requested his removal. Best replied, "Better look out there. That's requesting removal of

¹Notes, Feb., pp. 33-35.

²ibid., pp. 35, 36.

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appointed personnel." Black, however, promised to take care of it. A month later the writer was told by Akitsuki that nothing had ever been done about Foss.¹

Yamatani then complained: "We had a couple, three-four Caucasian workers come into the garage and the mess. They are new fellows. We thought we'd ask, why these people come in and work when we don't have enough work for the Japanese."

Black: "They had been hired a month back."

Best: "Those are positions which involve responsibility. They will effect evacuee employment. Their being Caucasian will protect you in regard to lost property."

Nakan: (member of Co-ordinating Committee) "One can't count numbers straight. He goes up to 56 and he can't go on. This is at the food warehouse. He sends out things to the messhalls and a lot has to be brought back."

Huycke: "Maybe he's a Heintz man and can't count above 57."²

Akitsuki then brought up the matter of the segregation of the "soums".

Black: "Until we get the Manazantar people here, segregation will be too much of a load for housing. But the organization which succeeds yours can bring about the natural segregation you would like to have. I think it might be done voluntarily - keep like-thinking people together. But housing cannot stand the strain right now."

Black's remarks indicate that at this time the Administration was seriously considering some type of re-segregation as soon as it was convenient. The issue was kept in mind for several weeks but eventually dropped. Hints from Dr. Opler indicates that Washington was not willing to undertake it.

¹ ibid., p. 37.

² ibid.

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Next, Akitsuki reintroduced the subject of the initiation of a referendum vote to replace his body.

(1) ["If we made preparations to replace the committee, the colonists would feel better. That way, everybody is responsible for recommendations in the center."¹]

The Caucasians discussed this proposal but were very reluctant to take the step. They feared that if a referendum were held, radicals might get key positions. The Committee, conscious of their precarious position in colony esteem, wanted to leave "before their welcome was worn out" and wanted "at least to let the colonists know." Opler, more than any other Caucasian present, realized the position of the Committee and attempted to support them, but was unable to accomplish anything. At one point he was curtly reproved by Best.

[Lt. Forbes: "To put it in words of one syllable, do you think you can win it the same way you won the last election."

(2) Akitsuki: "I don't think so. But we want the people to realize that we are not like the Negotiating Committee but are interested in the welfare of every colonist in the center."

Huycke: "If you have an election - we've got a couple of bad wards. I'd say the chances are you'd have a Negotiating Committee selected with about 40% negative point of view. Then, a second point, if you select them now before the Manzanar group comes in, Manzanar will say, 'you're not our representatives.' . . . I think we ought to wait until we're sure the trend is getting better."

Opler pressed the Committee's point of view and suggested that an election might be advisable because of the difficult position of the Committee. He suggested some public announcement, *stating*

~~We should state~~ our hope that the community can get further back to normal before the temporary group come to the point of holding a referendum. Down in the community I feel that there is a growing sentiment that the committee is working for the good of the colony. ~~(No such sentiment voiced by the writer's informants at this time.)~~ I think we should take some responsibility."

¹libid., p. 38.

Black disagreed with Opler and supported Huycke.

①

Black: "If we have a referendum now, we're not going to get the quality of men on the committee we want."

Opler: "The main point is this group is begging to be released. I think that this responsibility lies on us, since we want them to continue."

Opler then suggested that at the very least some small privileges should be granted such as the establishment of a tofu manufacturing plant and the lifting of the curfew. Miss Florence Horn, one of the editor's of Fortune Magazine, who was also present at this meeting, could contain herself no longer at this point. Furious at the complete lack of cooperation being given to the Committee she slipped a note to Mr. Robertson in which she said, "What does the Committee think? The Caucasians are doing all the talking." Robertson then entered the discussion for the first time.

[Robertson: What does the committee feel would be the reaction of the colonists to the fact that the Committee wants to leave. Do you think they'd clamor for a referendum?"]

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Opler: (answers for the committee) "Yes."

Robertson: "The Committee does not entirely approve of this statement from the Administration?"

Akitsuki: ~~(too polite for his own good)~~ "Not exactly."

Lt. Forbes: "I think the opposition would seize on it and demand a vote."

delete date

Akitsuki: "It's not quite democratic. We should leave before our welcome is worn out."

③

Yamatani: (falling in with the dominant idea of the Caucasians) ["It's too early yet. I feel personally there is more to be accomplished before we submit a referendum. We don't want people to think we're doing this because we like it. We want to accomplish something before we retire. When this is all fixed up, let Mr. Best give a big steak dinner for the incoming and outgoing committee."]

The members of the Committee were now asked in turn if they agreed with Yamatani. All but one agreed hesitantly. Shimada stated firmly

that he did think this was the time to retire. Akitsuki grasped at this straw and said, "At least to let the colonists know." ~~However,~~ [the meeting ended with no concessions made by the Administration, and the Co-ordinating Committee remained in its insecure and uncomfortable position of prominence, standing as representatives of the people appointed by a small group, the Divisional Responsible men, and supported by the Army and the Administration].¹

①

The people, having had nothing to do with the selection of the Committee were generally, at this time, regarding the committee with some suspicion but not with hostility. Most of the Japanese were quite ignorant of how the Committee had attained its exalted position and were still holding their judgement in abeyance. "O", a conservative ^{Oda} said, "This new Coordinating Committee is all right." When asked who had elected the Coordinating Committee "O's" wife, a nisei, spoke before her husband could answer, "That's what I'd like to know." Her husband explained, "I think they were elected from each division head."² ^{Machino} "N", a pro-Daihyo Sha man expressed the same opinion, saying that the people would like to know how the Co-ordinating Committee had obtained its position.³ ^{Jakouchi} "I", a Daihyo Sha sympathizer said:

"The committee, they are so-called men with ability. Akitsuki was an official in the Co-op here. I don't think they want political power."

Miss Iwohara, secretary to the Coordinating Committee stated the position of the committee very frankly:

¹ ibid., pp. 38-40

² Notes, Feb., p. 8.

³ ibid., p. 13.

"The members of the committee were selected by the division heads and recognized by the project director. The people have to take it or else. Nobody wanted to take the initiative. The members of the committee have no political ambitions. Before this committee dissolves they want to get another referendum vote and get a real political body elected by the people. The people say that we're inu."¹

Other attitudes expressed at this time show relief that the confusion and hardship of the status quo period had ended. Several informants stressed the fact that it was dangerous to speak ones mind: too many people still felt too strongly on the status quo issue. Work was being resumed quietly but without enthusiasm. Although the people felt that the worst was over, the future was not viewed optimistically. ^{Oda} "O", a block manager, seemed very fearful of public opinion. He remarked that his block was composed almost entirely of individuals who favored keeping to the status quo. He felt differently and believed that the evacuees should obey the laws of the United States as long as they were on United States soil. But he dared say nothing. If he advised against violence he would get into trouble. Consequently, he followed a policy of agreeing with whomever he spoke without committing himself too much one way or the other.

"Honestly, I'd like this center back to normal conditions, but if I said that to the residents, they'd say I'm a dog. Since I took office two three men came over and threatened some of the block representatives."²

Another block manager ~~Friend~~ ^{Nichino} confided that his block was just about 50-50 for and against status quo. He had to watch his step carefully, and tried to keep from being involved in camp affairs.³

^{Takemchi} "I", a young man waiting in Tule for the end of the war remarked:

¹ ibid., p. 25.

² ibid., pp. 7,8,

³ ibid., p. 30.

"A couple of days (after the election) all those desiring of work could report to a place. The only trouble with this is they don't have enough work to go round. So many with large families have no way to get money. Under WRA arrangement, if you don't work, you can't get clothing allowance.

against the
 "I look forward to the end of the war. That's me. There's no future until I see what happens after it ends. . . . In camp here, I believe I can truthfully say there will be one of two things: One, they'll either continue going back to normal and naturally, eventually the Army will relinquish control, or there's only 400 people difference for status quo than against"¹

gengyo-iji
 At this period about 3,400 Japanese were employed. 850 were working in the Administrative and warehouse areas and 1,100 were new assignments made after the breakdown of the status quo.² *Takenuchi* "I" made an amusing statement about the speed with which some of the pro-status quo people returned to work. His block had had some very strong status quo supporters, but "when the status quo broke, those gengyo-iji (status quo) guys were the first to go back to work."³

FURTHER HISTORY OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE-INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT

The Co-ordinating Committee, having failed in its attempt to step out of the picture, carried on in its insecure position. A fortuitous request for an interview from two of the previously interviewed stockade internees gave the Committee another excuse to pursue the crucial issue of stockade release. But its efforts were again met with Administrative mistrust.

The internees who asked for this interview were Shimizu and Kozuma. Shimizu had been the most communicative member

¹Notes, Feb., pp. 12, 13.

²Community Analyst's Letter, Feb. 2, 1944, p. 2.

³Notes, June, 10, 1944, p. 2.

of the group which met the Coordinating Committee in mid-January. Their formal request for an interview follows:

Feb. 4, 1944

Lt. Schaner
Camp Tule Lake

Sir:

We understand that there is a committee working hard toward an amicable settlement of the situation in the Center. Previously several men have met and conferred with this committee on three different occasions. Now we would like to meet this committee so would appreciate it if you would arrange a meeting with them. We will explain the detail of the purpose of this meeting if you would see us at your offices.

This request was granted. The minutes of this interview indicate that a split had taken place among the interned Daihyo Sha Kai members, that a certain number had come to the conclusion that their stubborn stand of non-co-operation was futile. To obtain release from the stockade they were willing to promise to co-operate and refrain from meddling in politics. Shimizu opened the interview with a long speech explaining the position of this group:

[The reason why we asked for this meeting was because we heard many true stories and actual reports of the Center's existing condition at the present time, by many men who recently came into the stockade. We heard about you people who were working so hard for the benefit of the colony and how straightforwardly the Committee had been working in attempting to get the stockade people released.]

When you people called us out last time, we just had to take such a step and say such things because the atmosphere at that time was such that we couldn't very well express ourselves truthfully. Yes, I said things which weren't my true feelings. I've often wondered, if you had only called us in a smaller group or as individuals, things might have worked more smooth and better.

Since Komiya came in, we were able to get a thorough picture of the conditions outside of this stockade and everything became more clear, especially the work of the Committee. We also were convinced of the fact that more and more people were inclining to your side. As we noticed how conditions

within and without the stockade had changed so, we figured that there's no use dragging along as we have and so, we came to this conclusion to meet the Committee again by requesting Lt. Shaner.

After many people were released from the stockade, people in there became very happy.

After seeing you people working so hard for our benefit, I think it is only right and just for us to, at least, cooperate with you. If the WRA or the Army ask for our assurance that we do not meddle in politics again, we will, in every respects, cooperate.

There are cases like this - some young boys have even said that they're willing to take the chance of getting beaten up twice or thrice, if they could only get out into the Center. The reason why their attitude changed even to that extent is because of Komiya. I think his report was very fair.

Among the six men whom you people interviewed last time, only three are left now, Mohri, Inouye, and I. At that meeting I wanted to say more but unfortunately I didn't know what was in Inouye's mind or the other persons' minds that I hesitated from expressing myself too frankly. But as I became more intimate with Mr. Inouye, I was amazed to find that our ideas and feeling were in common. Mr. Mohri - just after the meeting was asked by Mr. Shimada whether his statements were sincere -- Mr. Morri told me later that he just couldn't find an answer to his question. Since that meeting, we wanted to meet again with the Committee but we thought it was no use because sometimes 30, 50 would be released in a day. However, recently we noticed that some were still being picked up, so we decided that we should meet with you people again. [Mr. Kimura, Mr. Kozuma and many others believed that it was just of no use being so stubborn -- there's no limit to it. Army's attitude toward the Negotiating Committee hasn't changed a bit since their December 4 statement. We felt that there's no hope in relying on those Negotiating Committee. At that time we had strong convictions, but since we failed once, we have no intentions of being block representatives again. Many of those men have this same opinion.] Some even went on to say that they felt so sorry toward the block residents whom they represent. But - there is no other way out or any channel within the stockade to convey our present attitude to the Army or to the colonists.¹

Kozuma, the other internee, added:

There were some boys in Barrack A who were rather intimate with me and talked freely. As we exchanged our ideas, I found that their thoughts were not different from mine. Why couldn't we work hand in hand with that certain group who are working

¹Report of the informal meeting of the stockade internees and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 5, 1944 pp. 1. 2.

so hard, we thought. So we brought this story up and talked to Mr. Shimizu and others and came to this conclusion to meet with you again.¹

For several weeks before this desertion of the Negotiating Committee by some of the members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, rumors of dissention had been filtering out of the stockade. The exaggerated flattery which Shimizu offers the Coordinating Committee is noteworthy; there was little basis for his statement: "more and more people were inclining" to the side of the Co-ordinating Committee." It is probable that Shimizu and some other of the interned block representatives felt that the cause of the Negotiating Committee was lost and that if other less implicated people were being released, they might as well abandon martyrdom and get out themselves.

Yamatani then told the two internees that the Committee had attempted to see eight men at this time, "But the Army permitted only you two. They warned us that since we made such a blunder last time, don't repeat the same mistake. So they permitted us to meet you two first and if proved successful, meet the others later." He then added that the Committee had discovered that the six internees ~~internees~~, interviewed in January had not called a meeting of the other internees, as they had stated at the second interview.

"Naturally, we were puzzled when we heard that and didn't know to what extent we could believe or trust your words. Army questioned today's meeting because they knew that our last interview was a bungle."

Shimizu excused himself by saying,

¹ibid., p. 2.

"We can't do things as we wish. After that interview, I asked the Army if they wouldn't stand watch because we wanted to hold a meeting that day during the mess hour. For some reasons it came about that we should, instead of holding a mass meeting, go around to the barracks and report it to them personally. As a result, we held no meeting. Only meeting we had was just among ourselves, that is the six of us."

Shimada assured Shimizu that the Committee understood and added that those internees who had been released "stood up for us more than we thought. Those people are very brave. In fact they are so bold and so out-spoken that sometimes, we feel as if we should suppress them. We are certainly grateful to them."¹ Shimizu then stated that the detainees, due to their long confinement, had changed psychologically. "I think 90% of them have the same attitude as we have." He went on to list some of the unjust imprisonments:

["There are cases which are really pitiful -- boys who are merely 20 or so have been detained in there for three months just because their past records weren't too good or something.

"Since I became captain of the barrack, I met boys who come in to fill coal and do other works. They have told me that they were detained simply because they didn't carry or because they lost their temporary passes. Some of them are really handicapped because of their inability to speak English. Recently I have noticed many fellows like that. There are three boys in particular, who have been in Tule since the inception of this center. I think something should be done for them, even before us. Once when I heard that a young boy dreamt about his mother, I felt so sorry for him. I think it's urgent that such boys be released as soon as possible.

Speaking of a young man named Shingu, Shimada continued:

"Please get him released. There are many other boys like him. Torii, for example -- his younger brother went out but he's still in there and he doesn't even know why he came in. He told me that he wasn't at the Motor Pool at the time of the incident as the Army thinks so. He told me that he was willing to testify strongly and even provide evidence,² a time punch, to establish proof that he was in a mess hall."²]

The subject reverted to why the internees at the last

¹ ibid., pp. 2, 3.

² ibid., pp. 3, 4.

meetings had hesitated to express their true personal sentiments. Shimizu explained:

"No one actually expressed their true personal opinion at that time, I think. But, as I said before, if you had interviewed us individually, I might have told you what I really thought. Even for myself, I didn't know Mr. Inouye very much and didn't have the opportunity to really get acquainted with him so I hesitated. I hate to say this but I didn't trust him at that time and I'm sure he felt the same way toward me. . . .

"If it were private and informal it didn't matter much but since we felt that we were called more-or-less officially, we couldn't very well say as we felt and always had to bear in mind the many who were supposedly supporting Kai-Kuratomi group.

"Even during the hunger strike, I didn't know that some men ate food because I was just sleeping and barely living on water. I couldn't believe that people who weren't so young and people who were supposed to be responsible men did such a thing."¹

Kozuma then mentioned the January meeting between Mr. Robertson and the internees adding,

"At that time, I did say a few words, but as Shimizu said, I couldn't express myself honestly. Mr. Kuratomi acted as chairman and did most of the talking."

"Oh yes, as we came out of the stockade, today, Lieutenant jokingly asked if we came out with Kai-Kuratomi Headquarters-big shot's permission.

Shimizu added:

Even some of the former Negotiating Committee members do not feel as Kai, Kuratomi and some others do. For instance, Mr. Kimura, he had often mentioned that Negotiating Committee should disband and it's not even too late now. Among the Negotiating Committee members, Kobayashi, Yamamoto, and a few others had a sensible point of view. Of course they didn't come out with it because they knew that it'll be useless anyway. Mr. Kimura is in an awkward position since he came from the same center as Kai and Kuratomi.

Akitsuki: Let me say this, as a Committee, we have never, as far as we remember, talked abusively or have criticized the Negotiating Committee. Even if we did, people wouldn't believe it anyway.

¹ibid., p. 4.

Shimizu: Mr. Morri had constantly warned Mr. Kai, but it was all in vain. Kai would immediately jump on him saying, "Are you slipping?" Mr. Morri's viewpoints, I noticed, are very moderate. Recently a group of young fellows yelled out in nasty language to some people who were passing. At this time, Mr. Morri politely cautioned and suppressed their impudence. So you can readily see what kind of a man Mr. Morri is.

Shimada: (Co-Ordinating Committee) We are progressing slowly but surely and are still encountering some obstinate groups. The more obstinate they are the more stockade victims there will be. We certainly do not enjoy seeing such a thing. With the assistance of you men, we hope we can avoid such to a certain extent.

Kozama: We are not asking for your release, but, regardless of our release or continued detention, we are heartily willing to cooperate and help in any way possible from within the stockade. Besides, Army's attitude toward the Negotiating Committee hasn't changed in the least. My personal opinion is that the attitude we took involving 'giri' was certainly meaningless, even in spite of the Army's blunt statement of December 4. To tell you the truth, I don't know for what reason we were all so stubborn.¹

Akitsuiki then asked why at the last meeting the internees had asked that the Negotiating Committee should be released, "even for an hour or two. . . for the purpose of conveying message to the colonists." Shimizu replied that he had done this because he thought it was the kind of a plan to which the Negotiating Committee might accede. (The same request was made by Kuratomi to Robertson on January 16, See p.) Shimada then stated that the internees' request for unconditional release had been denied, adding:

"But, really, what I resent is this - I heard that the Negotiating Committee said that if Akitsuiki, Yamatani, myself and few others were picked up and placed in the stockade, the Negotiating Committee could transform this camp into a peaceful ~~in 24~~ ^{one} within 24 hours. I was indeed disappointed when I heard this. I just gave up hope.

The minutes imply here that Shimizu gave a list of some 16 internees worthy of releasement to the Co-ordinating Committee

¹ ibid., pp. 4, 5.

Shimizu said:

"Let me warrant you that if those people on the list should fail in their promise or commit an offensive act against the will of the people and of course against the peace of the colony, we are willing to assume full responsibility. I am not just saying this to make you feel good. If those people do something when drunk, then please don't blame me. And this I can swear, we did not write that letter as a strategy or just because we wanted to put something over you."

The minutes continue:

"Thereupon the group decided to call together the 16 persons listed in the letter before the Project Director for the purpose of signing any statement which the Project Director or the Army may deem necessary, subsequent, of course, to their approval."¹

This matter was accordingly taken up at the next meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council which was held on February 8. Yamatani formally requested the release of the 18 (the number now given) men "and assured that if these men could be granted release they can be of an invaluable assistance to the Committee's work." Black asked if the Committee were fully convinced of the sincerity and integrity of the two men interviewed or "whether the internees had schemed such a step toward expediency on their part." Yamatani replied that he thought that if the 18 men were interviewed as a group, the Committee would be able to ascertain their sincerity. Some of the members of the Advisory Council, however, did not favor a group interview, stating that "the Committee had bungled in its last attempt of interviewing only six." Yamatani argued that "a man...who is not afraid to express himself in the presence of a group can be of greater help to the Committee's work."

¹ibid., pp. 5, 6.

what did Huycke doubt?

Huycke then questions ^{ad} the psychology of a signed statement, such as the internees had expressed themselves as willing to sign. "Can a Japanese sign a statement like this and really live up to it when he had formerly supported the Negotiating Committee and promised that he will never yield?" (A sample pledge had been drawn up by the Co-ordinating Committee and included a pledge of the undersignees to support the Co-ordinating Committee by working for the good of the colony.) Yamatani said, "Past actions and records will clarify such doubts."

Lt. Forbes remarked that there was no objection from the military point of view, since the Center had been turned back to WRA on January 15; moreover, all releases were being done on the basis of Army clearance."

Speaking for
~~Expressing~~ the Administration's view, Black stated that subsequent to clearance by the Army, the Police Department, and FBI records, the parties named might be considered for release. He added, however that if there were any other charge against a detainee other than mere allegiance to the Negotiating Committee, complications might be encountered in obtaining the releases. Markley, the Report's Officer, criticized the sample pledge as "slightly off-base" and suggested that it should be written from a "broader basis rather than purely to support the Co-ordinating Committee and its work." Otherwise, "it might be thought that the obligation of the detainees will terminate upon dissolution of the Committee."

Turning to other topics Black mentioned that the expected group of segregees from Manzanar should be given proportionate

at Tule
Lake?

employment opportunities. The minutes of this meeting also contain a reference to a contemplated new stockade. The CCC camp had been considered but was abandoned because of lack of space. Leupp and the chicken farm had also been considered, but both sites were thought too expensive. The three end blocks of the newly constructed area were also suggested - "one to be inhabited and the other two to be used as buffers". This would avoid the necessity of sacrificing the nine blocks in ward 7, which was another possibility.¹ The details and development of this new stockade policy are little known. During March, the Administration seriously contemplated opening Leuppe. Washington thought otherwise and in May, 1944, the construction of a new stockade at the extreme west of the project area was begun. It was beyond the administrative residence section and quite out of sight of the camp area in which the Japanese were confined.¹

At the close of the meeting the opposition arising among the residents of block 18 to the proposed clearing of this block for a Civic Center was discussed. A petition had been received by Mr. Best the day of this meeting which stated:

"We, the undersigned people of Block 18 feel that it is unfair and unjust to order us to evacuate. So we absolutely refuse to be moved to a different place; we do not wish to go.

"In order to maintain peace and harmony in a block and center, we desire to remain as a unit here in Block 18."²

¹Minutes of the joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Coordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 8, 1944.

²Community Analyst's Report, "Relationships between Administration and the Center Population," Feb. 10, 1944, p. 3.

Attitude

All the residents of the block signed this petition. The block manager, when asked why the petition had been phrased in such demanding terms explained that the people wanted to petition strongly before "any decision went too far and it would be too late." A Housing Committee which had been formed earlier asked the block to meet with it in the administrative building. The block residents expressed themselves as fearing to hold a meeting in the Administration building. One is quoted as saying, "We'll get picked up and put in the stockade."¹ Black is quoted in the minutes of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council as saying, "The order is definitely an Administrative one, and if oppositions are met 'such people can go into the stockade.'² This statement was possibly included in the minutes in this blunt manner because May Iwohara, secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee was a resident of block 18 and shared the blocks strong resentment to the suggested movement and Black's arbitrary policy.

The proposed movement was explained to the Block Manager of Block 18 at a meeting held February 10. It was also decided to take representatives to the new quarters and show them the advantages which they would receive by moving from Block 18.³ However, this did not settle the issue. Block resistance was so strong, ^{that} eventually the proposed movement had to be abandoned.⁴

¹ ibid., pp. 3, 4.

² Minutes of the joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 8, 1944.

³ Community Analyst's Report, Feb. 10, 1944, p. 4.

⁴ See p. .

(2.) On Feb. 11, the Co-ordinating Committee made formal request to Colonel Austin and Mr. Best that Shimizu and Inouye, the cooperative internees, be released. Their request was granted the following day.

(1) Since this Committee interviewed two stockade detainees, namely, Kozuma and Shimizu, we have discussed and considered seriously the matter, as we deemed that the releasement of such persons will have great influence upon the welfare of the colonists; thus, we have arrived at a conclusion that without any risk on our part, the Committee will profit immensely by their releasement. Since the Committee, after investigation through fielders, has gathered all necessary information that there is a possibility of enlisting the detainees' (who are to be released) assistance for the reestablishment of the Center's normalcy, we feel that such persons' releasement would bring the finishing touches to the work which the Committee could not otherwise undertake. In other words, they will be instrumental in tackling this tough 'bunch'.

We, the Committee, fully recommend Iwao Shimizu and Tatsuo Inouye for releasement and may we request for your special consideration on this matter and if possible, your approval for their release.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

According to the diary of the Co-ordinating Committee, the body engaged in many ^{raised} and ~~voiced~~ activities and put much effort into settling disputes, frictions and colony problems. Problems in certain mess halls, agitating and "general unrest" in certain blocks, housing difficulties, and complaints on unemployment were undertaken. A constant watch was kept for agitation by the fielders, who, according to the diary, must have been very busy. ^{not.} [On February 1, 19 fielders were assigned. Two were assigned to work in ward 7 since "problems" had been reported in blocks, 66, 69, and 70. ~~the~~ Trouble was reported from ward VI on February 3, ^{to which} the next day three fielders were dispatched ~~there~~ and additional "general unrest" was reported ^{the next day. They reported}

ⁱⁿ from blocks 52 and 49. On February 5, B-9, a fielder (the fielders ~~are~~ ^{were} known by numbers) reported that trouble makers were busily plotting the overthrow of the Committee in blocks 53, 54, 27, and 67. The next day three fielders were instructed to work in wards ~~II~~ and ~~VI~~. Fielder B-10 reported a Jeromite plot to control the Farm. On February 7, fielder K-3 reported that block 67 was the headquarters of the pressure group and named Shimonishi as an agitator. On February 10, it was reported that Fujioka, Tamura, Hiramio, Uji, Tanisaka, Shitanishi, Shimonishi and Masuda were involved in an organized plot, were obtaining signatures of the colonists under the pretense of giving them priority on the exchange boat, were attempting to get the release of everyone in the stockade, and were discrediting the Co-ordinating Committee by propaganda.] On February 11, the diary states that the reports of the fielders were not considered satisfactory.¹ These fielders were used throughout the life of the Committee.

The Committee concerned itself energetically with a problem which arose in block 49. The details of this problem are difficult to obtain. Opler says that as far as he can remember it concerned the Co-ordinating Committee's suspicion that the block manager and Daihyo Sha Kai representative of block 49 got along very well and that between them they were running the block against the wishes of the majority of the block residents.²

¹Diary of the Committee

²Notes, July, 17, 1944, p. 3.

Miss Iwchara, who should know the situation better than Dr. Opler, stated that the trouble arose out of the distribution of the Shoyu sauce and other items sent to Tule Lake by the Japanese Red Cross. Block 49 had held a heated meeting on the ways and means of distribution even before the arrival of the shipment. One of the block janitors and a man named Hamanishi began to argue in the boiler room and Hamanishi assaulted the janitor who had to be taken to the hospital for treatment. The remainder of the janitors in the block (or ward) threatened to strike. While all this was going on, the block manager, Mr. Terada, was put into the stockade. 1/ There are indications that the trouble went beyond the disagreement of a few individuals and that certain factions in the block took sides vigorously.

The Co-ordinating Committee began an investigation on February 1, fearing "that the Block 49 incident might serve to flare up and the whole center may be involved." The committee mobilized all fielders in order to gather detailed information. That night Akitsuki contacted Kotoshiro, a Hawaiian born Japanese and leader of the block and attempted to get his assistance. Investigation continued and block delegates from 49 called on the Committee on February 8. On February 12, the Committee sent the following memorandum to Mr. Black, asking that the two factions in the block be separated, and suggesting that the procedure, exchanging the minority in block 49 with a minority from another block, might be applied in other blocks faced with a similar problem.

As we have stated in the memorandum of February 2, 1944, with regard to the problem of Block 49, we have been making extensive investigation directly by contacting block residents and indirectly by residents of neighboring blocks. Since existing friction, subsequent to the segregation, was due to the lack of understanding among residents and lack of opportunities to get acquainted with each other which was due to the Dai-hyo Sha's incident, we, the Committee, feel that it is quite impossible to settle the existing frictions locally. Therefore, we, the Committee, recommend, if possible, since it is minority who are placed involuntarily in the position of 'social outcasts' that the only solution of this matter would be to induce those minority to move elsewhere.

This Committee fully understands the housing facility problem, at the present time, not mentioning the contemplated arrival of the Mangnanar group, which is quite a headache on the part of the Administration, we realize. We were rather hesitant about making this recommendation but whatever vacancies created by this evacuation on the part of minority could be replaced by those in league with the majority of the block. In other words, evacuation would involve the matter of merely exchanging.

We, the Committee, are fully aware of the fact that there are other blocks which are facing the same problem but by proper approach to induce such parties involved to exchange their quarters with those of Block 49, the problem can be solved. Instead of taking majority operations, it is advisable, this

Committee feels, to solve it by local operations; that is, exchanging of minority in block 49 with the minority of other blocks. "After that, let them work it out by themselves."

Co-ordinating Committee

On February 14, the following petition was sent to Mr. Best and Col. Austin from the residents of block 9. A petition was also received from block 46 for Shikazawa.¹ What action was taken in regard to these petitions is not known at present, although Mr. Best stated later in regard to there petitions that no action would be taken, *on petitions.*

SUBJECT: Petition for Release of four Block Residents detailed by the Army

We, the undersigned residents of Block 9, herewith petition you for your special consideration on the release of the following detained by the Army:

TANI, DENTARO	907 - A
NAKA DA, HEIZABURO	906 - A
ISHIMARU, GOICHI	903 - A
OKU, TO SHIAKI	903 - A

We, the block residents of Block 9, feel that [the release - ment of the above-mentioned persons will bring about the solution to the problem of the block. Therefore, please consider this matter for the future maintenance of peace among residents.] ^①

^② [We will assume responsibility to see to it that these parties will not be involved in politics of any kind after their release] ~~II~~

On February 16, the residents of block 7 complained that an Army Patrol had entered the womens' latrine. The Committee sent the following memorandum to Mr. Best and Col. Austin and the Army thereafter desisted from its investigation of the women's latrines:

The Committee has been called attention to the fact by the residents of Block 7 (especially women) that Army Patrols have entered the women's latrine on February 15, 1944 at 9:00 P.M. Three women were taking shower at this time and they were greatly embarrassed when they saw one of the Patrols smiling and looking in.

¹Diary of the Committee, Feb. 10.

This Committee feels that the Patrols entered the latrine in the line of duty, as most latrines are often-times used as meeting places of trouble-makers. However, since we have women fielders assigned to look into women's latrines, Patrols are thereby relieved of such trouble. Insofar as women-gatherings in the latrines are concerned, the situation is well under control. Therefore, we, the Committee, recommend that hereafter Army Patrols should refrain from entering women's latrines, unless it is absolutely necessary.

On February 12, Mr. Best received a letter from the Spanish Consul to which was attached a memorandum from the Department of State which concerned the reunion of internees and their families in Tule Lake. (Letter and memo. not available). The letter was addressed to the "spokesman for residents of the Tule Lake Center". Best thereupon appointed Yamatani and Okamoto, members of the Co-ordinating Committee, as representatives of the Japanese nationals in this matter. The Co-ordinating Committee sent a memorandum to Mr. Best requesting permission to publicize the content of the memorandum from the State Department an attempt to increase the Committee's prestige in the Colony.¹ Permission was granted. The following letter was sent to the Spanish Consul by the two Japanese National Representatives.

Senor F. De Amat
 Consul of Spain
 Spanish Consulate
 San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:

This will acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter dated February 12, 1944 and the attached memorandum from the Department of State in regard to the reunion of internees and his family. As it was addressed 'spokesman for residents of the Tule Lake Center' the letter was received by the Project Director, Mr. R. R. Best, and upon his appointment, the following persons namely: George Yamatani and

¹Memorandum from the Co-ordinating Committee to Mr. Best, Feb. 16, '44

Kumaharu Okamoto, have been appointed as the representatives of Japanese Nationals to receive and duly publicize it to the colonists.

The above-mentioned Japanese Nationals' representatives are Committee members of this Co-ordinating Committee, which has been officially recognized by the Army, as well as the WRA authorities. The formation of this Committee was actuated by the colonists' desire to restore normalcy within the center since the incident of some three months ago. We are happy to inform you that the condition of this Center has greatly improved and light of normalcy, peace, and contentment of Center life are in view.

In the future if there is anything that this Committee could be of service to you, we shall be happy to do so and in the meantime, on behalf of the whole colonists of this Center we beseech you to do your utmost for the betterment and welfare of all Japanese people concerned.

Yours truly,

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

Japanese Nat'l Representa-
tives

George Yamatani

Kumaharu Okamoto

On February 16, Mrs. Tokubaro Sakazaki wrote a letter to
C
Col. Austin, Lt. Shaner and Mr. Best requesting the release
of her husband from the stockade.

I'm the wife of Tokutaro Sakazaki, who has been picked
up by the M.P. on February 4, 1944 around 1:30 P.M., and since
he has not been released up to date I am very much concerned
about his health.

My good husband Tokutaro Sakazaki left Tacoma, Washington,
on May 17, 1942 for the Pinedale Assembly Center and spent two
months there. In the same year on July 19, my husband and I
arrived in this Center. Subsequent to our arrival, (which was
the end of September) my husband applied for a job in the lumber
yard maintenance crew. Since August of last year finally,
he has been at his present occupation as a boiler-man of the
block in which we live. He has been working diligently up to
the time of his arrest and he was in a pleasant mood especially

on that day. Ever since he obtained this pleasant job, he seldom went out of the block, even if he did, it was once or twice to get mail from the Post Office or to buy fish from the Canteen. He always confined himself to his work in the boiler room where he did talk out in a deafening voice and entertained other people. Even on his day-off he would tinker with his tools for making ornaments, etc. This shows the fact that my husband [has done nothing, whatsoever, in the past that may be detrimental to the peace of the block residents, as well as the colonists of the Center.]

I myself without hesitation vouch for his act of non-commitment. If he be given the opportunity of a hearing where by be cleared, I definitely believe that he will be released. His termination for his job is still being withheld and awaiting his safe return everyday, that, I beseech the authorities' special consideration for his releasement by immediate check on all records.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Tsui Sakazaki

When she received no answer she wrote again on February 19.

to who necessary?
The answer may have been delayed by the fact that the letter was written in Japanese and required translation. It is not known if any action was taken.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL VERNE AUSTIN:

LIEUTENANT SHANER:

I wish to know if you have read my letter dated February 16, in which I have ascertained that my husband has always desired a peaceful community and not a sort of a person who would make troubles in the block, which I could swear to you before God, as I know him better than anyone else in the whole world.

My husband has an evil-looking feature and has a very loud voice that even though he is truly conversing pleasantly (to himself) he may have given the impression to others as if he were provoking, thereby, he may have made enemies unintentionally. But I assure you that he has an agreeable disposition. I shall see to it [that upon his releasement, there will be no worry about his ever being involved in any matter which tends to disturb an Army stockade,] for no one knows how long, I, as his wife, could not bear the thought of his mental suffering.

I appeal to you once again to give special consideration on the matter in releasing him as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Tsui Sakazaki

Second Attempt of Committee to Withdraw for General Election -
Appointment of Aizo Takahashi as Advisor to Committee

On February 16, the Committee made a strong attempt to initiate the procedure by which an election might be held and they might withdraw. Their ~~first~~ ^{preliminary} plans ^{for this second attempt} were laid on February 7, when they called in Takahashi for a conference. Evidently Takahashi agreed to act as the head of the Arrangements Committee which was to plan the election which the Co-ordinating Committee so urgently desired, for on February 16, the Co-ordinating Committee sent the following Memorandum to Mr. Best with the attached recommendation and life history of Mr. Takahashi.¹

SUBJECT: Formation of an Arrangement Committee prior to General Election

We, the Co-ordinating Committee, feel that the utmost has been accomplished in the Committee's primary object of restoration of normalcy to the Center by the liquidation of status quo. Since the ice is broken and the way to the colonists has been opened, what would be the next step for this Committee to pursue?

We feel that to be involved in such personal matters as of the mess employees, farm, hospital, internal security, social welfare, would not be advisable for the future interest and plan of this organization. [Viewing great improvement of the Center to normalcy, this body should not, by any means, lose this ripe opportunity of dissolution, which was made public in our previous statement; otherwise, colonists' misunderstanding and misconception toward this Committee will accure. It is imperative that this organization's standpoint be clarified, as announced previously, whereby the Committee may be replaced by election by means of secret votes.] The successor will thereon continue to settle the problems among colonists and simultaneously cooperate fully with the Administration for the betterment, peace, and order of the community.]

Apparently great deal of difficulties will be faced; nevertheless, our step and object should be the formation of a Central Committee. As an immediate step toward the realization of our ultimate object, we wish to recommend a plan whereby

¹See pp. for less recommendable phases of Takahashi's background not mentioned in this statement.

some Arrangement Committee be appointed.

1. Arrangement Committee be headed by Aizo Takahashi, whom we fully recommend as one who could be relied upon for such an undertaking. As to his character and his past, please refer to the attached memorandum.
2. Upon completion of an Arrangement Committee, this Co-ordinating committee, as previously understood as a temporary one, will duly dissolve.
3. Even after the dissolution, it does not mean that this Committee will not assist and cooperate for the betterment of the Center.

This Co-ordinating Committee wishes to make this recommendation as we feel that we should not let pass this opportunity of retirement while the welcome is still afresh. We have no other selfish desire than to maintain peace in the Center by an utmost cooperation with the Administration. Therefore, we are hereby submitting this recommendation.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: In reference to Mr. Aizo Takahashi's Character and Past

Mr. Aizo Takahashi, age 63
 Resident of Palo Alto, California, prior to evacuation
 for 20 years
 Regarded as Leader of Japanese community and held a
 post of President of Japanese Association and Chair-
 man of Language School Board
 Respected by all

Mr. Takahashi is an unusual character among Issei Japanese. He has a quality of a great man. At the time of the Daihyo-Sha's activities, although he was named to fill an important post, he never lost his equilibrium of sense of justice. At that time of the incident many a times he was intimidated because of his non-cooperation with the Negotiating Committee. Nevertheless, he held stubbornly to his own conviction which was justice to all his followers.

His characteristic is such and the following are few of the qualities that we can point out. He feels with the people but does not follow them; he maintains his independence of thought no matter what public opinion may be. He thinks clearly, speaks intelligently, and lives simply. His ethics are of the future, not traditional and of the past nor conventional and of the present. He has no vanity, seeking no praise, he is never offended, he cannot retaliate for he cannot descend to the level of them that love to do harm. He lives in a certain self-sufficient aloofness, so that your praise or blame does not seem to reach him. Yet his isolation is warm and not cold.

He changes his opinion easily when he sees his error. He cares not for consistency which is the fetish of little minds, but for truth, which is the sum of great souls.

Upon such conviction, we, the Committee, recommend him as the most capable leader of the colony. With his assistance, we, the Committee, feel more certain of attainment of its primary object not only the restoration of normalcy to this Center, but also the happiness and contentment of all those concerned. These are the reasons why we recommend him as an official Co-ordinating Committee Adviser upon your approval.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

The "Peace Movement"

This plan, however, was interrupted by the discovery on the part of the Co-ordinating Committee that some members of the Advisory Council had held a consultation with a group who termed themselves "The Minority". This group consisted primarily of status quo supporters and had among its membership many relatives of men interned in the stockade. It is probably that this overt action was instigated by the same group which contacted Mr. Robertson in January. The letter which the group's representative, I. Uchi, sent to Mr. Schmidt, Police Chief, was one^{of}/the first in a long series of attempts to obtain the release of the internees and push the re-segregation issue. Uchi then asked that Mr. McNeil and Mr. Huycke of the Advisory Council be present at the consultation. Lt. Forbes was also present. Although Uchi asked for the consultation as an individual, he proved to be a committee of one and a negotiator for "the minority."¹ (Minutes of this consultation not available.) The Co-ordinating Committee was furious that the Administration had recognized Uchi and this opposition

¹Minutes of the regular joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 18, 1944, p. 1.

body even to this extent. Moreover, the Committee was not informed of this interview and a week passed before they heard of it through Dr. Opler. The Co-ordinating Committee felt that it had been treated in an underhanded manner and almost resigned on the spot.

The only statement available on the aims of this "minority" is the following communication which they addressed to the Chief of Internal Security:

February 8, 1944

TO: Chief of Internal Security

SUBJECT: Conditions, with the view to nullifying the so-called policy of "status quo"

This is an endeavor to attain a successful and amicable settlement of the protracted controversy of the so-called policy of "Status Quo", which is incidental to the Tule Lake disorder.

Primarily, undesirable results are never contemplated or anticipated in the pursuance of an objective. Mistakes are oftentimes expected in the course of action, and unfortunately the enforced opinion of certain quarters here has not been risen thereby, it is felt, no one should be held accountable; but the only reasonable and practicable alternative is to take measures conducive to the peace and order -- to effect a genuine spirit of mutual cooperation with the authorities in maintaining them.

Already the disposition of the colony has assumed an alarming extent of disharmony; it is hoped that the tide be averted before it assumes unmanageable proportions. To this end it is trusted of you, sir, that the authorities will render their fullest consideration and support.

All in all, at the consummation, the fundamental intentions are to salvage the colony without impairment to its integrity; to draw the Tule Lake incident to a final conclusion and to aid this Center, making it a "little less hectic and a little more happy."

To expedite these views the following conditions are suggested:

- A. That the authorities shall assure the*minority no interference pending its temporary reorganization to expedite the adjustment.
- B. That, in the meanwhile, the authorities shall dissolve the Co-ordinating Committee for an indefinite period of time as to permit the former to recognize [a temporary acting committee (in the interest of the minority), whose period of function shall last only until it shall have succeeded or failed to abandon the so-called policy of "status quo".]
- ①
- C. That, in the event of success, whereas the acting committee and the **mentunder detention shall have jointly agreed to annul the policy, the minority shall [be at liberty to cooperate fully with the administration's "back to work program".] That, also, the Co-ordinating Committee shall remain permanently dissolved, and [another shall be elected by the colonists in compliance with the authorities' announcement.]
- ②
- ③
- D. That a two week trial period be granted wherein martial law shall be withdrawn and suspended. If the conduct of the colony shall have been commendable, it is requested that the period of test be extended indefinitely. However, it is agreed, the authorities shall reserve all rights, in the event of riotous disturbances, to intervene and reinstate disciplinary measures. It is also agreed that any violation of regulations or disturbances of the peace be apprehended and brought to justice. The responsibility for the maintenance of the peace and order shall rest on each and every colonists.
- F. That the peaceful conduct of the colony shall be an assurance to warrant the return of the men detained.

*In view of the result of the recent vote, the "status quo" faction is known as the minority.

**The men detained in the Army Stockade of whom the policy is concerned are the former representatives.

NEGOTIATOR OF MINORITY

(signed) Isao Uchi

5307-C

On hearing of this meeting, which appeared to be evidence of Administrative lack of confidence in the Co-ordinating Committee, the Committee sent the following angry and sarcastic memorandum to the Advisory Council:

SUBJECT: Peace movement Headed by I. Uchi of Block 53, Ward 6

Delegation headed by Iwao Uchi 5307 - C, Mrs. June Sasaki 2819 - F, and Mrs. Matsuda for a direct consultation with the Advisory Council members, in order to let known their object of activities and subsequent agreement to meet with this Committee upon Advisory Council's suggestion did not materialize as we anticipated.

Since this Committee through the fielders have been aware of their activity prior to and since the referendum votes, the Committee wishes to inform you of their object of activities for your future reference. Because in view of the greatly improved conditions of this Center, the Committee's work for the immediate future has great connection.

I. Uchi of 5307 - C has been greatly connected with the pro status quo group movement in order to destroy the Committee's work up to date. This movement has been originally headed by one Shimonishi of 6705 - E, who prior to his detainment in the stockade on November 27 has been a confidential messenger of Kai, who was hiding at that time. Shimonishi was released around January 5; the reason of his release is unknown to this Committee. He has been indirectly supervising the movement of his followers and this status quo group and the apparent sending of secret instructions of Kai, which he received, at that time of releasement. His statement is responsible for the rumors that all those detained in the stockade will ultimately be released without condition. There is evidence of his connection with Uchi of Ward 6 and Tamura of Block 28, who is the parent of Mrs. Sasaki. At that time Kai-Kuratomi gave up, it is definitely known that four persons assigned to carry on Dai-hyo Sha activities during the leaders' absence (except one) were residents of Ward 6. These are the contributing factors for the result of the referendum in that ward. As you know, pro status quo overwhelmingly defeated con status quo; specifically 387 against, 700 for status quo, and 67 blank votes.

On January 30, it was reported by the fielders that in Blocks 27, 28, 29, 49, 52, and 53 signatures of several residents were obtained by these parties under pretense that those who sign will have priority on the next exchange boat and partial treatment by the Japanese Government upon return to Japan.

As far as known to this Committee, connection with Tamura and Sasaki are entirely originated by personal feeling -- Jealousy. They, Tamura and Sasaki families, repeatedly claimed that they wanted to see once again the Dai-hyo Sha in power, which will be a satisfaction to their vain prestige. As for Mrs. Matsuda, we, the Committee, refer you to the army for her reputation.

This Committee, as you know, has been formed with the sole purpose of restoration of peace in the Center so that every

colonist will be released from this sickening atmosphere which existed. With that purpose this Committee's work has been straightforward to invite any suggestions or recommendations from anyone regardless of pro or con status quo. Up to date, we have publicized three times by bulletins and several times verbally through many channels to invite them to come for consultation. This Committee feels that if such delegation should be interested in the same accomplishment of object as this Committee, why should and could they have not come to us first for consultation? The fact that these parties did not come to us ~~first/for/consultation~~ even at the suggestion of the Advisory Council, we, the Committee, could not understand and trust their sincerity or their so-called peace movement.

① This Committee has been making extensive study and investigation [through fielders for any plot and movement of this nature to approach the Advisory Council for consultation and the Council granted such opportunity this Committee feels that such grant was due to the lack of understanding of Japanese psychology and our object.] But from the Committee's viewpoint such consultation will tend to bring complete destruction of accomplishment up to date because such opportunity of consultation encourages them. The Committee has been exerting their utmost for our object of restoration of normalcy. [We are fatigued mentally and physically and could no longer invite and increase our burden. The reason why we resent, is that we feel that such frivolous action on the part of the Advisory Council will give an impression that the Committee has been discredited and also noncommitment statement are often interpreted in a wrong sense and in favor of those who are against us.] We have been up-to-date obliged to exhaust our efforts to rectify such rumors spread by misunderstandings.]

②

We, the Committee, have utmost faith in the Project Director, the Advisory Council, and the Army. We believe that we have been given free rein for the solution of the matters of this nature. We also believe that the Advisory Council members had in mind the sole purpose of aid to the Committee that with their commitment-making, no harm could be done but we wish to make it clear to you, at this time, that even though the informal consultation with such parties might tend to the continuation of existing faction among colony.

If the delegations sincerely desire peace and order, but could not cooperate with this Committee, they should at least confine their efforts for the betterment of their own particular ward or block in which they live. The fact of existing conditions in those blocks from which these delegates came are, as you know, considered the worst incompatible ones. Referendum result was: Block 53, Against only 30, for 110; Block 28, against 48, for 87; and Block 45, against 53, for 71.

[This Committee has no intention to ask you to stop altogether such interviews or consultations, however, hereafter,

please bear in mind that such opportunity given to such delegations will give an impression that anyone can consult the Administration directly on this matter, thereby ignoring the Committee's position and curtailing its work.

Perchance that should you find these delegation more fitted for the work than the Committee, we are always ready to wash our hands on the matter anytime.]

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

Two days later the issue was discussed at the regular joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee. Dr. Opler explained to the Committee how Uchi's suggestion had led Police Chief Schmidt to call the consultation. Huycke remarked that Uchi, as a result of the consultation, had been referred to the Co-ordinating Committee but "this evidently did not materialize."¹ Although it is not apparent in the minutes, Akitsuki told the writer that Huycke's attitude at this meeting was offensive. Pointing to the entry in the Committee's diary which says cryptically: "Committee resented. 'Limit of patience on the part of the Advisory Council' hinted by Huycke in an analagous statement,"² Akitsuki explained that at this meeting the Advisory Council had implied that the Co-ordinating Committee was bothering them too much with trifling matters. Huycke had said to Akitsuki, "If I should come home late and my wife accused me of being disloyal to her - if she keeps on doing that - I will truly do something to deceive her. Think it over."³ This attitude made Huycke even more unpopular than before.

¹Minutes of the regular joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 19, '44, p. 1.

²Diary of the Committee, Feb. 18, 1944.

³Notes, March, p. 23.

The minutes do not show that the committee gained anything by their sharp protest of February 16. The incident, however, definitely turned the Committee against the Advisory Council.

The Committee again presented a recommendation to relax the curfew. Best remarked, "such recommendation is permissible if such is the desire of the colonists." The recommendation to prepare for a general election was accepted and the appointment of Mr. Takahashi as head of the Arrangements Committee was approved.

Concerning new arrests and detention in the stockade Mr. Best announced:

"that future pick-ups of people to be detained in the stockade will have to be executed with caution to avoid unjust pick-ups. Pick-ups will be based on definite reasons and performance of some act that is detrimental to the peace and security of this Colony. Pick-ups will channel through the police Department and then through Mr. Leckliter's office. Release shall be based on individual merits and block petitions will not be acted upon."

Best also assured the Committee of the full support and confidence of the Advisory Council and the WRA.

On February 21, the curfew was revoked by Col. Austin with the following notice:

N O T I C E

TO THE RESIDENTS OF TUE LAKE CENTER

Due to the fact that the Center has been returning to normalcy in a satisfactory manner, proclamation #2 is hereby revoked.

Military Patrols within the Center will be maintained until such time, as, in the discretion of the Commanding Officer they may be withdrawn.

The Colonial police are responsible for the maintenance of law and order within the Center.

VERNE AUSTIN,
Lt. Col., CMP.,
Commanding.

The Co-ordinating Committee continued its busy round of activities. Distributing the gifts from the Japanese Red Cross, it encountered some criticism when certain blocks felt they had been treated unfairly. The fielders were kept busy looking for trouble and checking on "incidents" in certain blocks. At 3:00 o.m. on February 22, a man Shimokon ~~phoned~~ ~~the/Committee/offices/~~ (possibly head of evacuee Internal Security) phoned the Committee offices, reporting that he had noticed the letter "R" on the doors of apartments in ward 3. Fielders 13 - 10 were sent to investigate. That evening a fielder reported on the "R", stating that a rumor was rife in block 28 that the curfew had been lifted due to the stiff protest by the Japanese government. The next day, however, it was discovered that the "R" had been drawn on the barrack doors by the Rocky Shimpo delivery boy.¹

On February 22, Nakao, of the Committee and a Committee office messenger delivered a memorandum to Mr. Failing, Supervisor of the motor pool. The memorandum (not available) had to do with the reinstatement of former employees of the motor pool.²

The incident as explained by *M. I. Inohara*, secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee is as follows:

"There were so many boys who weren't placed on the payroll. These boys contended that they had been told to wait until the payroll came. Mr. Failing said they shouldn't have waited and he hired other boys. The boys argued that they had waited till this date. In regard to that, the Co-ordinating Committee recommended to Mr. Failing that they be assigned and that one of them be assigned as foreman of the group as a responsible

¹Co-ordinating Committee Memorandum to Mr. Failing, Feb. 24, 1944.

²Diary of the Committee.

*I don't
get the
relevance
of this
incident*

person. (Member of Divisional Responsible Group). This foreman wasn't called either by Mr. Failing."¹

When the memorandum pleading the cause of these boys was delivered to Mr. Failing he is reported to have said, "Damn, what the hell is this Committee always butting into other peoples' business? What does it stand for? I don't care to know. I can get along without your (Committee's) advice. In fact, I can get along better. I don't take orders from anyone."²

The Committee then sent a sharp memorandum direct to Mr. Failing.

Since we are the Co-ordinating Committee, we cannot reject the request of even a single person. So far, we judged that their requests are within reasons and in view of the 56 people's request, we have no alternative than to convey you their message, and at the same time to give you the picture of the existing condition in the Colony at the present time. By the way, the same memorandum have been submitted to Mr. Best and Mr. Robertson on the same day you received yours.

Since you have attended the meeting of the Advisory Council and this Committee held on January 19, 1944, you should at least recognize this Committee's standpoint as to how it was originated and what accomplishments this Committee, with its untiring cooperation with the WRA, made. At that meeting to which you attended, you were told by Project Director Best that in order to accomplish this great undertaking, utmost cooperation on the part of the Administrative personnel is most essential to which you agreed with the Director. You further agreed to reinstate Ben and for your reference the minutes of the meeting is herewith attached. Please refer to it to refresh your memory.

We regret that you have no understanding of all of the present existing conditions even though the condition of the Center has improved and the curfew law has been revoked. The WRA appointed personnel, as a whole, and the Army fully realized the importance of alertness, lest the condition be reversed as of middle of December. Such could be only prevented with sincere belief and utmost consideration on the part of the party concerned in the handling. As you know, the Motor Pool division is one of the most vital and most important post, inasmuch as your division involves nearly 4/5 of the Community Operations because of transportation. If you recall Mr. Best's statement

¹Notes, July 19, p. 4.

made at a meeting held on January 19, 1944 to which you were present, that Motor Pool has always been a sore spot and that strong men who can control any obstinate pressure groups were wanted in there, you are in a position to realize this condition. Are you aware of the fact that the incident of November 4, 1943 centered in your division which means that utmost consideration must be taken by you with a possibility of recurrence of the past incident in mind.

The statement you have made is evinced by the fact that you are totally ignorant of the existing condition and we, the Committee, note that men in your positions to be ignorant of such importance, should be pitied, rather than reprimanded. Because of this pitiness we do not point out your mismanagement (other divisions are cooperating and conforming to the instructions of Mr. Best and you are not) indirectly of your division, whereby you are totally ignoring, not only the Project Director's instruction and warning but also illustrates the lack of ambition on your part even to take the trouble to understand the Committee's work by ignoring, thereby undermining our work, and insulting us by making such statement for which we greatly resent and we, hereby, expect a satisfactory explanation of your statement.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

On the subject of this disagreement between Mr. Failing and the Committee, Opler said:

"The Co-ordinating Committee was interested in getting more jobs at that time. They were fighting with the Administration all the way. They would come to those meetings and be polite all the time. If they had ceased being polite, Best would have scrapped them. . . They felt themselves slipping."¹

At the regular meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee held the next day, Mr. Best commented on this memorandum and "remarked that such recommendation which deals with any member of the appointed personnel should be addressed to the Project Director instead of directly . . . to the party involved. He reiterated that he and the Advisory Council had the utmost confidence and admiration toward the Co-ordinating Committee. Replying to a question from Yamatani he stated that four persons had been cleared (internees) and would be released upon Lt. Shaner's clearance.

¹Notes, July 17, p.3.

Mr. Takahashi, the New Advisor to the Co-ordinating Committee was introduced and in what, according to Opler was an interminable speech in Japanese, outlined "the work he had been doing ever since the formation of the Co-ordinating Committee and a plan he had been contemplating as a result of his research." (This speech was translated by Akitsuki while the Advisory Council fidgeted.) According to the minutes Takahashi mentioned "that despite the Center's noticeable improvement and despite the released Daihyo Sha's (who are considered leaders) sincere efforts to help in this Committee's undertaking, their hands are tied because of some pressure groups." To solve this difficulty he suggested: "(1) releasement of those considered leaders (also innocent youth) should be made, which will create more favorable atmosphere in the Center. (2) Those people who are 'neutrals' and dominated by the minority of pressure 'demagogues' (because of giri (one's sense of obligation) just because they fully supported the status quo) they are not in a position to speak freely. Then organization of a powerful body will be expedited. [Such releasement should be made on condition that they will boldly interview by the Advisory Council or the Co-ordinating Committee. Also contemplated is a statement to the colonists of the true condition and the true will of the people in the stockade that they are no longer supporting the Negotiating Committee."] That the presentation of this plan did not altogether find favor with the other members of the Co-ordinating Committee is evidenced by the statement appearing in the Committee's diary on Feb. 25:

"Committee regretted Advisor Takahashi's outline as to the way it was presented. Committee decided to pursue original plan, i.e., employment plan first."

The minutes continue:

"Upon question doubted as to the effectiveness of the works of the releases (question put by Advisory Council), B. Akitsuki cited that results of their work have been very successful, especially Shimizu."

3 Black remarked: ["the Committee's work should not be measured by the number of releases from the stockade. It should be on the basis of employment, diving conditions, decent community atmosphere, etc. Moreover the process of releasing is slow because of Army and FBI clearances. Furthermore extracts from the FBI Washington Office were being forwarded, clearing some of the detainees. In fact, three different reports embracing a number of names had already been received. "]

"After much discussion Akitsuki requested Mr. Black to inquire for the Project Director's permission to make arrangements for an interview with the stockade internees."

1 Akitsuki then "brought up the fact that [in spite of many people on the employment waiting list, because of lack of opportunities, people are losing faith."] Dr. Opler mentioned that his department was making a study of the employment problem and compiling statistics which were intended to aid in the study of employment distribution.

[speaking for the stockade, pointed out the real bottleneck!]
Black added: "The proposed clean up crew was a possibility, however the source by which remuneration can be made is the problem, since such is infeasible only on a \$1.20-a-day-limitation set by Congress. The amount of \$1.20 is calculated by dividing the Expenditures (all Project including everything, even Social Welfare) by the number of people.] As to who is eligible for public assistance, Mr. Black specified that if one is willing to work but unable to find employment possibilities one may apply for public assistance grant which included incidentals and clothing. Application made is subject, of course, to thorough investigation."¹

The next day the Co-ordinating Committee reported on this meeting at the regular meeting of the divisional responsible men. The following significant complaints were brought up:

2 ["Slaughter house employees (upon approval of the body present) took the floor and requested for the body's aid in investigating the reason why they were not recalled to work

¹Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 25, 1944.

despite their long wait for assignments. Mr. Ninomiya, head of Packing Shed and Slaughter House, explained that at the time of back-to-work movement, he had left the Slaughter House matter to Roy Mochizuki's discretion. Thereupon, after prolonged discussion, the Chair requested Mr. Ninomiya to look into the matter with Mochizuki to settle this question amicably". . .

not ~~The head of the Construction Crew complained:~~

"We have requested for 40 more carpenters, however, the request seems to have been bottlenecked at the Placement. Would like to request the Committee to investigate the bottleneck."

On February 27 Mr. Aizo Takahashi, the newly appointed Advisor to the Co-ordinating Committee presented the following interesting memorandum to the Advisory Council. It is probably a translation of his speech. He strongly urged the formation of a Central Body to represent the colony and bluntly stated the truth as to the extent of existing support of the status quo. He re-emphasized the primary plan of the Co-ordinating Committee, obtaining the assistance of the "supporters of the pro-status quo group" in pacifying the colony, a policy which had never found favor with the Administration. The communication is remarkable for its frankness and for the fact that it comes closer to presenting a true picture of the state of affairs in the colony than any heretofore made by the Co-ordinating Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the established ground work prior to the formation of Colonists' Central body

Formation of the colonists' Central body at this time is most appropriate from the standpoint of the Administration and I, Aizo Takahashi, hereby congratulate on your plan of undertaking and I wish to see that it materializes without delay.

It is undeniable that there are still some unrest and opposition existing among the colonists. Formation of such a body could not be accelerated without an established ground work. Otherwise, it will be an apparent failure. With this in consideration, not only myself, but those who have had

① great deal of experience among colonists will all agree. The reasons are: (1) [About 50% of the colonists are still for status quo despite the liquidation of such by the effort of the responsible men of all divisions.] Even now, with the aid of those detained, they are actively trying to support such a movement (pro status quo) to materialize their belief. On the other hand, the other half of the colonists in the Center, who are opposed to such a movement, they [are less organized comparatively, their standing is very unstable, and their belief is not concrete as to the solution of the existing problem; they are reluctant to take active part to the opposition.] as a whole, colonists are suppressed by the activity of the pro status quo. Far-minded intelligent elements are being hesitant about being involved in such an inter-colonists friction and as a result they are assuming laissez faire position as much as they can. Such is the true picture of the existing condition in this Center. If [we disregard such a condition and if we should proceed with the formation of a new central body, those prospective representatives from each block will refuse to assume office; thus, the formation of a central body will become a failure.] (2) Because of the existing obstacles as above-mentioned, it is inevitably going to encounter the great storm that follows to those concerned in the formation, lest they bear such in mind before taking any initiative. I wish to make a suggestion at this time, that is [let the leaders of those more than half of the colonists who support pro status quo take the initiative to pacify their followers, in other words, the conversion of the leaders of status quo and make them see our point in the future. For this reason I have conferred with Mr. R. Best, Project Director some three weeks ago with regard to the releasement of those detained internees on condition that I, myself, will be responsible for their future activities and again I repeat my unchanged opinion, at this time.

Among those released in the past are men who are considered influential leaders. Mr. Iwao Shimizu has been expending his utmost effort for the conversion of the pro status quo group; however, there is a limit to a single person's effort on such a great undertaking. Therefore, my desire is the releasement of some of the detained internees with whom Mr. Shimizu could work together. Then I believe accomplishment would be expedited in reference to the formation of a central body, to which Mr. Shimizu has requested me to convey this message to you. If the Administration should accept our suggestion, I would like to have the Co-ordinating Committee, including myself, interview those detained internees prior to their releasement to assure that upon their releasement they would willingly cooperate with Mr. Shimizu's effort for the educational campaign among the colonists.

(3) My suggestion for the condition of their releasement will be aided with utmost importance. Leaders of those released up-to-date will issue a co-signed statement, to be distributed throughout the Center, that they are supporting

Mr. Shimizu's movement which ultimately supports the work of the Committee. As to the above bid suggestion it is definitely arranged and agreed between Mr. Shimizu and several others who have already been released. By this statement which may be experimental factor as to its effective result, this will be our step toward the formation of such central body.

Now we enter the second step. I wish to see that the, with the exception of the some Negotiating Committee and those who had profound relations with them, majority of the block representatives and others released. I appeal to the Administration since success or failure of the formation of this new central body depend on them. If this is materialized the second step will be made public by those released and I believe, as a result, not only the status quo but also all the colonists, as a whole, will be impressed and recognize our righteous standpoint and thereby, profit by their utmost support. Then the friction in this center and the unsavory atmosphere will gradually be obliterated.

Formation of the new central body must be made with utmost care and determination or the center will be reversed to its former chaotic condition and there will be no one who would take the initiative even for the less constructive undertaking for the restoration of normalcy. That is why our plan should be studied, discussed, and considered before any initiative could be taken.

Secondly, one has to bear in mind that one cannot be too optimistic as to the formation of this new body which will bring peace and normalcy to this center simultaneously, if you consider what I have stated.

The most important thing to consider primarily for the undertaking of restoration of normalcy and perpetual peace is education and the willingness to recognize and cooperate. Such attitude in mind on the part of the colonists is the key to the solution of this vital problem. I have made extensive study and research since January of this year, watching and scrutinizing the psychology of those detained internees. I have arrived at the conclusion that the majority of those detained internees' transcendence of mental attitude is their desire to restore normalcy and peace to the center. I can without hesitation express this belief and trust of those who have the possibility of being released in the near future.

If the Administration should accept my suggestion, I would more than gladly, with comrades hand in hand, expend utmost effort for the realization of this undertaking.

Lastly, the delay, of the third exchange ship between Japan and the United States which was caused by the incident in this Tule Lake Center, is something I regret more than anything. However, upon mutual cooperation of the Administration

and the Colony and if we accomplish restoration of peace and harmony between the concerned, there is a possibility of solution of this problem. All difficult problems could only be solved by the realization and understanding of the root of the point and cooperation for the solution of the problem.

With this belief I hereby submit to you my unreserved opinion.

finis

February 27, 1944

Having secured permission from Mr. Best and Col. Austin, the Committee arranged for a meeting with 14 stockade internees. This meeting was described as "very satisfactory."¹ Twelve internees appeared for the interview. Besides the original members of the Co-ordinating Committee, Mr. Takahashi, and Mr. Shimizu, the previously released co-operative internee, were present. Shimizu made the opening speech:

The names of stockade internees are underlined.

SHIMIZU: (ex-internee) The Co-ordinating Committee has just met with the Project Director and the Colonel and asked them for an interview with you people. Colonel and the Project Director saw no objections to the meeting if the Committee saw fit and could by their meeting and release (if and when) assess their aid in an effort to bring complete and true peace and order to the community. Mr. Best will be leaving for Washington tomorrow and will be there for three weeks, I understand. If he leaves, the Committee's attempt to ask for your release will again be delayed, so the members hurried with this meeting today.

I felt very uncomfortable just because I came out before any one of you. It's almost two weeks since my release and I really felt uneasy lest you people are inclined to think that I double-crossed you.

(At this time all the internees were introduced to the Committee by Mr. Shimizu; whereupon he asked Mr. Shimada to review the condition of the Center)

SHIMADA: I'd like to describe the general camp condition. The atmosphere in the camp has changed considerably. Since things don't progress as we wish, it was just impossible to get you people released at one time. So we felt we should at least get releases which are feasible. So we

first asked for Mr. Shimizu and Mr. Inouye. At the last interview with Kozuma and Shimizu we had promised to interview all of you people, but that didn't materialize as you know, because the Colonel was sick and was later gone and Captain Hartman was at Manzanar.

As Mr. Shimizu said, we just met the Colonel and the Project Director to request for a grant to interview you people. Our work will be so much aided and facilitated if we can only solicit your assistance. Since his release Mr. Shimizu has been working day and night, aiding the Committee and enlightening the colonists. We are doing our best to recommend all justifiable releases. I don't know or I can't say what the outcome will be however, I think this is one step toward prompting just releases. 'Slow but sure' is the slogan we're following. The camp is, at the present time, running comparatively smoothly. We don't hear much of pro or con status quo arguments.

When we feel confident of the Center's condition we have resolved to dissolve your Committee, at which time, we will be succeeded by a central body which will be organized around a nucleus of respectable and sensible people such as Mr. Takahashi here, who is, by the way, going to head the Arrangement Committee which will prepare the way toward this object. Mr. Takahashi has been approved by the Advisory Council and the Project Director. He is working on it very steadily.

TAKAHASHI: I was selected to head the Arrangement Committee which is not as yet organized. Last Friday I met with Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee and at that time I opined that in order to form a true central organization, we must hear the people's voice. I believe there are some in this group to whom we must ask for help. After this Arrangement Committee is formed we can start and work toward this central body. I hope majority of the internees will be released by the authorities. But I'm not making any commitment. Administration is very much cautious in the releasing, lest the condition recurs to its previous status. However, this is a step which will give assurance to the Administration in furthering your releases with confidence.

Another problem confronting us is the youth problem. Some young people in Block 49 said that I was a 'dog', curring¹ favor with the Administration. So I invited those particular boys to come over to see me but they refused 'alibiing' that if they did so they'll be stuck (meaning they might be picked up). So I offered to go over to see them, but they didn't yield to this either. They didn't want me to get too well acquainted with their faces.

¹Note remarkable adoption of English word! R.H.

*Didn't he
speak in Japanese?*

SHIMADA: Since the curfew was lifted, people in the Center have a very pleasant outlook. On Sundays, you can see young and old playing baseball all over the camp. And also about 2,000 Manzanar segregees have come into this Center. I observed that most were old people and young children. I especially noted one lady carrying a small baby on her back, one child in her arms, and something like a diaper in her hands. When I saw such sights, I felt that, all the more, it's our obligation to make and keep this Center as liveable as possible. As long as our stay in here is indefinite, it is our responsibility to protect and give comfort to these women and children.

SHIMIZU: Yes, I felt that it was just vain too stubbornly adhere to the same old policy. Our object was the same, although the means to that end may have differed. It's just no use following the same old road. I told Kimura, Mohri, Kozuma, and Inouye, during my stockade days, that as long as there is a new route opened to reach that goal, why not yield to it and change our course?

YAMANAKA: Yes, the object we're trying to attain is in common. It certainly doesn't make any difference which route we take or to whom we give our support. I am willing to give my sole support to anyone who is working toward this peaceful settlement of the colony.

SHIMIZU: Even if one is willing to work for the peaceful settlement of the Center life, if one is detained in the stockade, there's nothing one can do. When I came back to the Center, I accordingly found the conditions just as Mr. Komiya described it to me.

YAMATANI: Yes, conditions have considerably changed. I was indeed astounded to find that the Administration's attitude grew brighter since the curfew was lifted. Previously Mr. Best didn't seem to even like to hear of Kimura's name, and made a sour expression when he heard of it, but today, Mr. Best himself started to talk about Kimura and told us how he could work for the good of the Community. Mr. Shimizu has been working so hard for us to convey to the colonists the true existing condition of the stockade. We are trying to get all those justifiable ones released.

AKIYAMA: All of our (pointing to the body present) opinions are the same. Mr. Shimizu knows that. It's still the same as I told Mr. Shimizu just before he was released.

TSUCHIYA: Our feeling is the same. Whether Mr. Shimizu says it or I say it, it's just the same because I and the others' opinions are identical.

SHIMADA: You know the letter I showed you (the one you wrote to Lt. Shaner) is causing much difficulty (pointing to Mr. Kozuma).

KOZUMA: Yes, that letter -- I wrote it. I didn't write that with any particular serious intentions. That underlined place in red -- well, at that time, I didn't know how much authority or what responsibility I had and the time was so rushing -- with FBI coming, Shimizu, Naito being pulled in, Komiya, Fujimoto being picked up and all that -- before I knew it I was automatically a leader. So through that letter I was asking Kuratomi whether there's any person whom I can rely on and from whom I can get counsel. That paragraph where I wrote 'I am feverishly looking for little friends who may prove to be big friends, but it is difficult to find such friends. Too often they mislead you with nothing but flattery and turn out to be dogs' -- well, you see, I read two letters that came to Kataoka, written in large prints, as large as that sign 'Lucky Strike means Fine Tobacco' on that carton (he was pointing out to the Luck Strike Carton which was on the table). This letter stressed big dogs and puppies, which just peeved me and burned me up. So I wrote in that letter to Lt. Shaner that 'the dogs bark and howl all night long and that you can even hear that over at the stockade'. I was implicating to George that one shouldn't bother with trifles like that.

Since I last had an interview with you people, my attitude and opinion is still unchanged. I've tried hard not to even talk about politics in the stockade.

SHIMIZU: Just because I was released before any one of you people, I experienced a very trying state of condition. I even felt that I would have been far better off and had suffered less had I stayed in there with the rest of you. When pick-ups were being made, I felt uncomfortable because I wasn't picked up sooner, and now that I'm released before any one of you, I again feel uneasy and worried. I can imagine you people saying 'Damn Shimizu. Got out first and doesn't seem to give a hang about the rest of us.'

IKEDA: Oh yes, last night we were just talking about you (Shimizu). We were saying that you surely must be suffering mentally just because you were released before us.

SHIMIZU: Yes, some young people suspected me more-or-less just because I was released first. However, I soothed their indifference at that time. Then two weeks passed and yet no words of you people's release were heard. Then again these young people began to doubt me again.

KOZUMA: My opinion and feeling is just as I wrote when I wrote for Mr. Okamoto and Mr. Yamanaka. When I'm asked to write letters for others, my opinions and thoughts are unavoidably contained so I've asked them to make a rough draft of it in Japanese first, so that I can make direct translations.

AKITSUKI: Since Shimizu and Mohri were released it's been two weeks. Center has improved immensely. People are desperately trying to get jobs and there are about 1,000 on the waiting list already. Mr. Shimizu is working so hard for us that we felt obligated to, at least, find him a job with remuneration but this he has refused to accept. He felt that it would be unfair. He is doing his work purely from an unselfish voluntary feeling and let me assure you, he certainly hasn't forgotten you stockade people. Please understand that angle.

KOMIYA: When I got out everybody suspected me so I was really glad when I was picked up again. I told everything without hesitation and reservation. I even mentioned that, at first, I kind of doubted the Committee's work but I added how hard and diligently they were working.

SHIMIZU: Project Director feared that group interview may cause some to refrain from expressing themselves freely. So we would like you people to speak frankly and freely today.

NAITO: If it's for the good of the community, I will do my utmost.

TSUCHIYA: As Mr. Shimada mentioned, for the sake of those women and children who are suffering so much, it is my earnest desire to see the center at its normal. I'll do everything to cooperate with the ones who are endeavoring to attain that object.

KOZUMA: I think the Committee knows how I feel about the whole matter through the various letters. I have one thought in mind, that is, to bring back the colony to its normal condition. I know that this Co-ordinating Committee is working ever so hard toward that object and so, regardless of whether I'm released or not if I can give service to you and the community I'm willing to help and cooperate with them in every way possible.

KOMIYA: Of course, it's best to sleep with a blanket over you. I don't want to go into the stockade again. You can't experience stockade life unless you go in there to see for yourself.

AKITSUKI: For the good of the community you should do your utmost upon your releasement.

FUJIMOTO: Mr. Shimada and Mr. Takahashi know my true feeling. In regards to the Center returning to normalcy, my attitude is the same. It hasn't changed in the least. I was called a dog from both sides and was put in a fix. As to the way of bringing the Center to normal (since we had always bore that in our minds, too, although the medium may have varied) we thought it advisable to restore

it through Mr. Robertson instead of Civic Organization which was already target of criticism.

SAITO: I don't think there's any need for my saying anything. However, politics and people are like a wagon's wheels. One cannot be independent of the other. It should work in conjunction, by all means. If an organization is based on such, I am willing to give my fullest support.

AKIYAMA: It doesn't make any difference who it is. I am willing to support any organization which is trying to work for the good of the community.

YAMANAKA: Ikeda and Takeshita, all know how I feel. I shall give my unreserved cooperation to anyone whose endeavor is to restore peace.

IKEDA: Same opinion. I will whole-heartily support and cooperate with you.

KOBAYASHI: I think my attitude is also understood. I am happy to be informed that Center is returning to normal and I'll, without doubt, give my heartiest support to those people.

YOSHIDA: Same feeling as the others. My cooperation and reliance rest upon any such organization which is looking for that common object--restoration of peace and order.

KIMURA: I shall work mutually, no matter to what extent, with such an organization. If possible, if arrangement can be made, I would like to meet Mr. Best so that I may tell him so.

KOBAYASHI: I have a request to make. I feel so sorry for some young boys who are so anxious to get out of the stockade.

SHIMIZU: Co-ordinating committee is working very hard on that angle. Many things have bottlenecked their work and it has been retarded.

FUJIMOTO: Yes, my wife wrote that Mr. Shimizu was working so hard.

KOBAYASHI: We are indeed grateful for the sincere efforts of you people.

TAKAHASHI: Will you please make a statement informing the colonists of your true attitude? (However, it was suggested that such statement should be preferably made subsequent to their releasement.)

AKITSUKI: When the divisional responsible men's body was born, we emphatically resolved to obtain justifiable releases. You people may construe this insertion of the work

① 'justifiable' as a work of cowardice. However we have always based our all undertakings on 'within reasons' principle when dealing with the Administration or otherwise. Even upon your releasement I want you people to understand and realize thoroughly this point of view. That is the only way we can restore perpetual peace.]

KIMURA & KOBAYASHI: ② Your work up till today has evidenced that it is truly not cowardice.]

It should be pointed out that Mr. Shimada's statement to the internees, "The camp is, at the present time, running comparatively smoothly. We don't hear much of pro or con status quo arguments" does not agree entirely with the statement made by Mr. Takahashi to the Administration the day before.

On the strength of this successful meeting the Co-ordinating Committee petitioned Mr. Best for the release of 61 of the internees. On March 1, the Committee requested Mr. Schmidt to expedite the release of 14 of these internees, the 14 who had been called up for the interview of February 28. The Committee appended the following reasons for this request:

The reason for this request is, even though the condition of the Center has improved, especially after the revocation of the curfew restriction, there are still some unrest and opposition existing among the colonists, not only among the opposition but also among the supporters of this Committee for the fact that they cannot forget and are worried about those in the stockade.

The most important thing to consider primarily for the restoration of normalcy and peace in this Center is education of willingness to cooperate. Such attitude in mind on the part of the colonists is the key to the solution of this vital problem. In order to materialize this plan ultimately we, the Committee, wish to have the above-listed persons who are regarded as leaders by the colonists, especially by the opposition, released to take the initiative to pacify their followers. Messrs. Shimizu and Inouye, leaders recently released, have proven to us by their utmost efforts for the conversion of the opposition (credit for the restoration of peace in blocks 49 and 52 are entirely due them). However, there is a limit to their efforts on such a great undertaking, and that is why we wish to have these men released so that Messrs. Shimizu and Inouye could work together. Then their accomplishments

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it clear here.

could be greater.

[As to the above-listed persons, this Committee recommends that they are trustworthy as to their sincerity to help as assured by Mr. Shimizu and then by the interview with them the other day as specified in the attached minutes.]

Your special consideration to expedite the work necessary for their releasement is greatly appreciated.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

On March 3, Byron Akitsuki, the Chairman and Executive Secretary of the Committee handed in his resignation, giving domestic difficulties and his wife's health as a reason.

It is with regret that I hereby submit my resignation, effective immediately, as member and Executive Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee.

I fully realize the responsibility of my duty and work. Up to date, I have expended my utmost effort for the solution of the confronting problems of my duty to the Committee, as well as to my domestic life. Due to my wife's physical condition, my child 22 months, has been deprived of so much parental care and as father, I feel morally responsible for my domestic affair since the health of a child is involved.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincerest thanks and appreciation to all the Advisory Council members for the past numerous favors and full-hearted cooperation in all phases of service to all fellow evacuees. With the belief that you will continue to give whole-hearted support and cooperation to the Co-ordinating Committee for its great undertaking, in order to bring complete normalcy and peace in the Center, I hereby tender my resignation.

Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary of the
Co-ordinating Committee

Whether domestic difficulties were the only reason it is not possible to say. However gossip has it that Akitsuki's wife was ill, that her family refused to help in any way and that one evening he came home from work and found his 22 month old daughter playing in a puddle of icy water. In reference to this resignation Mr. Black stated at a meeting of the Advisory

*why
submit to
explain?*

Council and the Co-ordinating Committee that the efforts expended by Mr. Akitsuki had been greatly appreciated; however, his resignation would be left up to the discretion of the Co-ordinating Committee.¹ The Committee was reluctant to accept his resignation and Yamatani arranged with Mr. Black that some domestic help might be given Akitsuki's family so that he would be relieved of caring for his sick wife and for the baby.²

On March 3 the Committee met with the Advisory Council in the presence of Mr. Spicer, Chief ~~Reports Officer~~ *of County Surgeon* from Washington. Messrs. Huycke and Black asked for the support of the Co-ordinating Committee in the formation of a Young Men's Association. (This probably refers to the Seinen-dan.) It was then announced that abstracts of the F.B.I. reports had been received which would expedite further releases from the stockade. Black stated that the Army and the Administration were attempting to accelerate clearing and releasing as fast as possible. The committee's recommendations for release had been given to Mr. Schmidt. Black informed the Committee that the Advisory Council, Col. Austin and Lt. Forbes had met to discuss the matter of releases and had agreed to establish a committee whose main function would be "to investigate name by name the persons who are suggested for releasement." This committee would include the Chief of Police, the Project Attorney, Lt. Forbes, Lt. Shaner and Captain Hartman. The

¹Minutes of the Regular Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, March 3, 1944.

²Diary of the Committee.

I don't get this

State Department had requested that priority in releases be given to the aliens. It was planned that in most instances internees would be released in the colony but "in few other instances, such persons will be released into an internment camp." The Administration would still welcome recommendations for release from the Committee. Akitsuki thereupon requested that the Committee be given a complete list of the current stockade internees which would indicate citizen or alien status. Black stated that Colonel Austin had been very much impressed with the minutes of the February 8 meeting with the internees. ⁽¹⁾

footnote?

State
what action
what date

When no action was taken by March 9, the Committee sent another memorandum to the Advisory Council, Mr. Schimdt and the Army, re-requesting the release of these men.

SUBJECT: Request for your Attention on the Memo of March 1
(Recommendation for the Releasement of Detained Internees)

Doubtless, the condition of the center has improved and we, the Committee, feel that complete normalcy is still far away as already manifested by the distribution of pamphlets recently in the new area and the vandalism which occurred in the public school building. Such may be a prelude to a possible flare-up of the center, and unless immediate remedial measure is taken, erroneous informations of this nature may continue to be disseminated, which will not only strongly instigate those advocates of status quo but also is bound to deviate many neutrals or those still in perplexing predicament.

The Committee, by past experience, fully appreciates the service of releasees who have been a great factor in contributing toward our cause; because of their position it is possible for them to contact opposition freely. In order to solicit their service, which will expedite our work, the Committee invited leaders of recent releasees to a Zadan-kai on the night of March 8, 1944 as attached minutes specify.

[In view of the sign of possible re-flare-up, the Committee earnestly feels that it could be prevented if detainees whom we have interviewed and recommended were released as soon as possible to work together with those already released. The attached minutes indicate that they have agreed to put

① out a statement stating their clear position.

We request for your special consideration to expedite the releasement of the 14 detainees.] Attached is a list of names of those 14.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

② On March 11 it was reported that Mitsuho Kimura had been released. On March 14 seven additional men, two from the list of 14, four from the list of 61 and one other were released. The same day seven of the releasees made the following statement to the Administration, stressing the prompt organization of a "central organization" by which they probably mean a representative body. [There is little reliable evidence of the use which these releasees made of their freedom. Akitsuki has said that some did their best to help the Co-ordinating Committee and others double-crossed them.]

STATEMENT

③ [Four months have elapsed since the incident broke out at this Center. Though the peace and order have begun to show a sign of gradual recovery, we have no organization as yet, such as that, which would aggregate public opinions. It would be very difficult to expect real peace to prevail, should the situation be left as it is now with the changes of the times.

We examined every aspect of the past incident again and again during the several months in which we were interned. After we were released, we quietly observed the situation of the Center. As a result, we came to a conclusion that a certain centralized organization should be established promptly in order to bring peace.

We hope that our people here will be able to crown with perfection the end of our history of hardship by settling the question in releasing the members of internees and by thus reestablishing an ideal community which is exigent and indispensable for the peaceful Center-life.

Hitoshi Katayama
Reichi (?) Mohri
Sanji Sakamoto
Tatsuo Inouye
Iwao Shimizu
Mitsuho Kimura]

ARRIVAL OF GROUP FROM MANZANAR - CONSIDERATE TREATMENT BY ADMINISTRATION -
REACTION OF OTHER COLONISTS - UNDERGROUND GROUP DISTRIBUTES
PROPAGANDA PAMPHLET

The Administration and the Co-ordinating Committee had made elaborate preparations for the arrival of a large of segregees from Manzanar in the latter part of February. These new arrivals were moved into newly built, unused barracks on the extreme east end of the project. These barracks were in every way superior to those inhabited by the old Tuleans and by the first contingent of segregees. Startingly neat and clean when contrasted to the old barracks, the new were graced with adequate steps, porches, and even small entrance halls. They were a comparatively pleasant light blue in color instead of a dingy rusty black. The latrines, equipped with porcelain tubs and gleaming metal fixtures were in even greater contrast to the dirty, worn and evil smelling latrines in the old quarters.

The Administration and the Co-ordinating Committee were most anxious that this large contingent of newcomers come in on their side and not on the side of the status quo supporters.

Accordingly, fitting welcome ceremonies were prepared in which the Co-ordinating Committee took a prominent part. Consideration for comfort extended even to lighting fires in the barracks of the newcomers so that they need not enter a chilly room.

The Co-ordinating Committee presented the following expression of welcome:

WELCOME MANZANITES!!

You have come here by your own choice to join us. We welcome you as one of our own. We are indeed grateful and happy to receive you. We fully realize that you have gone through many a heart-breaking trials since evacuation of three years ago.

Man is a curious animal, isn't he? He seems to give forth his finest product only when crushed. He loathes poverty, fights diseases, and avoids wounds, tyranny, and oppression. Yet somehow only when these come, do the rarest flowers appear on the human bush.

This world we live in is formed on a laying-up plan. All of us lay up something. It is a great idea to ask oneself, considering any act we are about to perform, not only what will be the immediate pleasure in it, but what sort of product we are laying up for ourselves by it. We are always coming into our inheritance from the past deeds, in making up our minds it is well to take into consideration what happiness dividend that transaction is going to bring us 10 years - 20 years from now.

In order to make success of this Center life we have to keep in mind two things namely: precedent and future - because success implies not only sound reasoning, but also variable factor of how a thing will work, which is found out only by trying it. Hence the surest road to success is to use mixture of precedent and initiative. Just how much of each you will require is matter for your judgment. To go entirely by precedent you become moss-back. Each succeeding generation acts the same way. There is a level of efficiency but no progress. Precedent, however, tends to carry forward the ignorance and injustice of the past. Precedent is the root, independent thinking is the branch of the human tree. Our decision must conform to the sum of human experience. Yet, there must be also the fresh green leaf of present intelligence. In other words our reverence for the past must be continually qualified for the reverence for the future.

None of us know how long will our stay in Tule Lake be. All tuleans have been trying to make it a better place to live

under the circumstance. Yet they have no other desire than to live in peace and happiness for the duration. Our ideal is Utopia. Ideal of Utopia may not be attained, however, we must strive to attain that goal as much as we can for ideal is like a North Star. Sailor never reaches North Star, yet without North Star he cannot come to the port.

We appeal to you, MANZANITES!! Now you are in the same boat with us. Let's make the best of it and lay up for the future happiness.]

Byron Akitsuki, Executive
Secretary of Co-ordinating
Committee

This copy was given to the writer by a young segregee^{Jakenchi's brother}

from Gila who was not a status quo supporter, with the remark, "They (the Co-ordinating Committee) send out pamphlets. It's just a lot of balony. . . That's about Manzanar. That's the kind of thing an inu would write. That's really soft-soaping the people." . . . That paper ought to be signed "Inu Akitsuki."¹

Whether the Manzanar arrivals appreciated their reception is not known. However, the other colonists certainly did not. Even the mildest informants drew resentful contrasts between their own reception and that of the Manzanarites. The mild and conservative Mrs. O^{Odo}, said on March 14:

"There hasn't been any effect from the Manzanar people coming in. [It seems the Administration ~~is~~ afraid of them. They had a riot over there (in Manzanar) you know. They've gotten very good consideration if you ask me. I think Gila had the raw deal. We were the last in here and when it came to work, Gila didn't have any. Manzanar already got work before they came in.] Gila is too quiet. I understand there are quite a number of people still in Manzanar who are coming here."

On the Manzanites opinions of their new quarters, she added:

"The Manzanar people are really crowded. They get three beams and two or three people are supposed to get in that. . . I think

¹Notes, Mar., 1944, pp. 4, 5.

the Manzanar people are trying to get better rooms. They say more people are coming from Gila or Manzanar and from every other center. They can't crowd all those people into three blocks. The camp is so big now that if they make it bigger we're going to have to have trolley cars so they can get from place to place."

Two women, ex-Gilans, expressed themselves as follows:

[Mrs. B: "They got everything!" (Mrs. Jack Takeuchi)]

③ Mrs. A: "My sisters tells me, 'Gosh, they got treated so good they thought something was fishy!'] (Mrs. James Takeuchi)

"N", a status quo supporter said:

② ~~we~~ "They (old segregees) are all glad they're here, but they don't like the things the Administration do^e for them. We've been here six months. We haven't received broom, mops, or soap. Manzanar . . . all received a new mop, broom, a cake of soap each person. What's the difference between those fellows and us?"]

Jobs "Regardless of that they're (Manzanar) still griping out there now. Jobs are scarce; very few people are working. They say food in this center is worse than it was in Manzanar. They say the Project Director in Manzanar was considered one of the top. There is no comparison with Best."¹

Even the very anti-status quo officers of the Co-op resented the considerate treatment given the Manzanar people. Mr. Yoshimura, an issei, hated by the undercover group for his supposedly pro-Administration views, said:

① ["They tried to do everything for Manzanar. When we came in here we were treated like criminals. We were treated dirty. When Manzanar came in they were treated as prince. Even their stoves were started already. They had showers and everything."]

A younger member of the Co-op added:

"But don't you think WRA can't do something if they want to do it!"²

Takeuchi
"I" said:

"The facilities in the new area -- they have everything

¹ ibid., pp. 12, 13.

² ibid., p. 19.

³ ibid., p. 8

porcelain, mirrors over every porcelain fixture. In this area the men's latrine is nothing but a trough; they leak on the floor and the stench is terrific. The sinks are leaking. The plumbing is so bad they're always plugged up."¹

On March 16, the writer asked Mr. Akitsuki if he had any idea how strongly the general camp population had resented the considerate treatment given Manzanar. He said he did not.² This is a significant bit of evidence as to how little the Co-ordinating Committee knew of ordinary community sentiment, for, as the above attitudes show, the earlier arrivals were seething with resentment.

Less than two weeks after the arrival of the Manzanar group, the undercover anti-Co-ordinating Committee faction distributed the following pamphlet in the Manzanar quarter. It was written in excellent scholarly Japanese. There are many noteworthy points in this pamphlet which will be analysed later. Extremely important, however, is the furious denunciation of the executives of the Co-operative. This was the first written expression of this tremendous almost camp-wide antipathy towards the Co-op which was to increase slowly through the coming months and eventually result in the assassination of Mr. Hitomi, the Co-op's Manager. The assertion that the Army was still patrolling the colony was true.

(No title given, Translation)

TRUE PICTURE OF THIS CENTER

For the benefit of the Manzanar people, we hereby submit to you a brief outline, even though incomplete, of the true picture and facts of the pending confusion and present condition of this Center.

¹ ibid., p. 40.

² ibid., p. 23.

*Are we safe
to swallow
Akitsuki's
words?*

*but who
a title*

ROOT OF INCIDENT LIES IN QUESTION OF EVACUEE STATUS

Up to this time, ever since the outbreak of the present war, the definite policy of the WRA was none other than to convert the so-called loyal elements as much as possible. For this undertaking, there is a very intricate interwoven camouflaged policy definitely visible. During the present war, the national policy of the U.S., although most of them (referring to policy) are damnable and disgusting, may still be the policy of the WRA, whereby converting reluctant evacuees to so-called loyal ones.

Since this center became a segregation center, it should be definitely known to all that the management of this Center, which is entrusted to the WRA administration, is not changed, wherein, hypocrisy and inconsistency are clearly noted. They have selected a location, fitted for agriculture, for a segregation center. By mass production of war industry as their sole object, they had intended to slave the evacuees.

[For the love of their native land and recognizing the conflict as a racial war, the evacuees have resorted to repatriation and willingly segregated from the other centers. Among the evacuees, there were many young people in indefinite status because of American citizenship and there was no action taken as to the legislative action of denouncing citizenship. The greatest inconsistency to which the colonists were subjected was forced to keep silence. Non-clarification of the status was the root of all center troubles up to date. The present incident precipitated by the accident occurred in the agricultural department. The fundamental root was the accumulation of resentments on the part of the evacuees for the above-mentioned hypocritical and inconsistent policy on the part of the Administration.]

In order to better condition, some 18 different provisional demands were made, but to our minds, they were only supplementary to the past grievances. Research committee, which was assigned to the hospital and the mess management, discovered great number of embezzlements and high-way robberies, which incensed the colonists' resentment to its peak. Just at this time on November 1, the Director of WRA, Myer, happened to be in the center and seeing this opportunity, the great demonstration was made. For a demonstration of this nature, it was very very orderly and there was no sign of rash and inconsiderate action on the part of the people who took part. They have really displayed the attitude of a great nation. Again on November 3, at the ceremony of Meiji setsu, Reverend Kai, Negotiating Committee, announced that the colonists' demands were fully accepted by the Administration. Upon hearing this, the colonists were elated.

THE INCIDENT

There are still some ambiguous points with regard to the

incident which occurred on the night of November 4. [Because of the incident, the resulting suppressive policy made colonists' life more unbearable. On the other hand, it seems as if it were planned as in a drama. At any rate for a little incident of that nature, they the Army, used even motor trucks and tanks and fired great number of ammunitions. Since then, forced suppression prolonged, until today. During the incident over 200 innocent ones were picked up and every apartment was searched, for which even a mere child of three-years of age was indignant.]

STIFF PROTEST BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Upon hearing of this forced oppression of this center's evacuees, the Imperial Government repeatedly delivered stiff protest, which was considered stronger than an ultimatum. Stipulation was made that unless the army withdrew from the center by January 15, reciprocal retaliation will be made to the American prisoners.

During this time, the Dai-hyo Sha warned each and every colonists to refrain from rash and inconsiderate action and stressed cooperation. On the other hand, they have repeatedly continued consultations with the authorities. All of a sudden on November 11, chairman of the Dai-hyo Sha, Kuratomi, announced tragically that the Army would no longer recognize them; all past negotiations and promises were discarded. Thereupon Dai-hyo Sha obtained signatures of every colonists, proving that the Negotiating committee was supported by all as one means of a protest. The policy of status quo was then adopted and again signatures of every colonist were affixed. However, oppression increased day by day, and leaders were picked up; if one word was uttered, he was picked up.

DARK STREAM OF SINISTER PLOT

Ever since the beginning of the incident, by cool indifferent attitude as if in a neutral position, yet in every way opposing the great tide of the center, thereby regarded as an enigmatic existence, was no other than the executives of the Co-op. Suspicion of the colonists turned into suspicious rumors; moreover, there is a proverbial saying: where there is no substance, there is no shadow. Two cases were investigated by the FBI, implicating culprit WRA personnel and Co-op executives and economical relationship by mutual understanding was brought to light. As the result of the investigation, it was expected that such cases be brought up for court trial, but it never materialized up to date, which explains the fact that there were more profound sinister plot hatching. Since then executives of the Co-op started a vigorous campaign, they [resolved to pacify the colonists' feeling by vile absurd statement that they were expending utmost effort, as if to risk life even, and attempted to dissolve the Dai-hyo Sha Kai by the use of

contemptible publication and speech, inveigling the colonists. On the other hand, those who rallied this campaign with the executives of the Co-op were gamblers, bootleggers, and shameless egoists, or the so-called money makers of the center. To this, the WRA employed, in order to carry out their damnable policy, the 'dogs' hired with excellent salary to assist this movement.

COMPULSORY REFERENDUM

Just then on January 11, the day before the ultimatum from Japan, a very unabstract name, representing the group of shameless scums, called Responsible men of various division was announced. With ready-made Japanese spirit and vile statement in order to camouflage people, they have distributed statement, and without even allowing a minute to consider oneself on the situation, the referendum was taken by bandit-like method. With the cooperation of armed soldiers intervening, thereby, creating abnormal atmosphere, they have accomplished their wish with no regard to the word shame. As the result of the referendum, status quo was broken only by a difference of some 400 votes. However, in reality, some thousand colonists, who resented the forced bandit-like referendum, refrained from casting votes. There were also two or three blocks where ballots were carried away unopened. True result is more than questionable.

At any rate, disregarding Fatherland's stiff protest for the sake of the colonists and disregarding the accomplishment and altruistic spirit created by the former Dai-hyo Sha Kai, the responsible men obliterated their works. It is needless to say, they have no excuses whatsoever for being called 'dogs' or 'betrayers of the Fatherland'.

CONDITION OF THE CENTER AFTER THE REFERENDUM

As was known by the 15th of January, the Army withdrew from the center. However, even now, the armed trucks are patrolling the center, oppressing the colonists as previously. Hypocritical action of the white race is naturally expected, but everyone feels that there is no possibility of cooperation and unification by which the normalcy of the center may be created. The danger is lurking and who knows, may explode once again by a touch of a finger.

[Don't be fooled, Manzanites! Special consideration and hospitality upon your arrival to this center was a plan to use further camouflaged by hypocrisy are definitely pointed out to you that the policy is to enslave you. We can definitely tell you so brothers and sisters from Manzanar. THINK! the true condition of the center and choose your way. With that in mind, then you have come as true Japanese.]

News of the distribution of this pamphlet was brought to the Co-ordinating Committee on March 6. An immediate investigation was instituted. The evacuee members of the colonial police were unaware of it's distribution until notified by the Co-ordinating Committee.¹ The party or parties responsible were never found. The Committee's report on their investigation follows. Pertinent excerpts from the Committee's Diary are included chronologically.

R E P O R T
on
PAMPHLETS DISTRIBUTED
in
New Area

March 5, 1944, Sunday

Upon distribution of pamphlets in the new area, instigating the Manzanarians, the Committee at once mobilized all fielders to locate the source of the pamphlets. In general, the pamphlets resembled the letter which the Committee received on Jan. 19 in the construction of sentences, phrases, use of diction, and especially in the use of diction in compound sentences. The letter bitterly had condemned the Committee's attitude as contemptible betrayers. Comparing and judging the contents of the letter and the pamphlets, it may have been written by some individual, well-educated in Japanese. Naturally we focused our attention to the educators of the Center.

The pamphlets were printed in ditto ink process. The Committee obtained several same type of printing used in the Language Schools. Among these copies the Committee found a copy which was used by Ward 1 school at 408, which was almost identical in handwriting. Identity was especially noted in the Chinese characters (author's individuality in stroke of the pen, in spite of the different type of printing).

March 7, Tuesday

One of the fielders, director of the Language School Board, at once approached Mr. Kano, the teacher of 408, as director of the School, and inquired the party or parties concerned in the school publications for which the fielder was referred by Mr. Kano to one of his Gila friends, Akira Shimizu, 402 - C, who has been assisting with school publications even though he, Shimizu, is not connected with the school. Thereupon, the fielder finally, after many attempts, contacted Shimizu on March 10, who claimed that he had one

Diary of Coordinating Committee, March 6, 1944

of his friends do the writing and the original stencil cutting. As to the party's name, he did not reveal it. However, he promised the fielder to give him until Monday, March 13, before he discloses the party's name.

March 12, Sunday (Excerpt from Diary of Committee)

Ex. Sec. instructed fielders until 5:00 p.m., went to block 9 to 10 also to block 21.

Also worked on blocks 66 and 69. At block 66 found out that one resident in block 17 by the name of Yamashita had 50 reams of paper (at the time of incident or during the incident) and sold such. Such was found to be used in the posters sent out by one Nippon Patriotic Society.

Mr. Inouye of block 38 had just got home from Ward. 6. Reported he had made no noticeable progress on the pamphlet case any more than we had.

March 13, Monday

The fielder called Shimizu, who refused to see him for the reason that he was ill.

March 14, Tuesday

Tokuji Tsutsumi, 2802 - D, called the fielder to his apartment. Tsutsumi, a total stranger to the fielder; no connection with the Language School, former Dai-hyo Sha reputed mean character and agitator in his block, told the fielder "You are making a mountain out of a mole hill, so lay off investigation on this matter, as the school publications have nothing to do with those pamphlets distributed in the Manzanar area." The fielder questioned, "Have the school publications some connections with the pamphlets, distributed in that area?" No reply was given. The fielder claimed that up to date he has never mentioned anything about the pamphlets as he was acting in school board of directors' capacity. Tsutsumi appeared very much stupefied and scurried away.

March 15, Wednesday (Excerpt from Diary of Committee)

Tsutsumi of block 28 stated to (Fujino) fielder dittoed materials that school lesson used in Ward 1 not connected with Manzanar propaganda pamphlets.

Tateishi reported pamphlets distributed again.

Tomishige of Co-op called in regard to pamphlets.

March 17, Friday.

Shimizu personally called the fielder to his apartment. He did not give the party's name as he promised. Instead he advised the fielder to refrain from further investigation in the matter, lest the whole center's confusion is anticipated. He further added that since the Army has withdrawn from the

Center, we, the colonists, have absolute freedom of speech and press, and left.

Akira Shimizu came from Gila Center and associates with many youths who are questionable and some are noted agitators, living with him in the same apartment. As to his connection with Tsutsumi, it is not known.

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

At the regular joint meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council, held March 7, the following significant hints were brought up. Mr. Black explained the future procedure for "pick up" (stockade interments):

"Fact finding Committee has been established with Chief of Police, Chief of Community Management, and Project Attorney as chairmen; its main function is to determine who should and who should not be placed in the stockade by investigating their activities, police, WRA, and Army records, FBI reports, and also upon complaints submitted through various channels. Detainment in the stockade is not made on criminal basis.

Mr. Black added that the fence, which had been built around Ward 7, "had not been given any further consideration" and that brooms, soap, mop heads, and buckets would be distributed to the segregees who had arrived in the center the year before.¹

On the following day an informal Zadan-kai (table talk) was held in which the men released from the stockade (Sakamoto, Kozaka, Kawano, Tateishi, Katayama, Shimizu, Hoshiko, Mohri, Kawamura, and Inouye) and the Co-ordinating Committee participated. The conversation between Tateishi and Akitsuki on the release of internees and proper publicity for the Committee is significant.

An informal Zadan-kai of the stockade releases and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center was held on March 8, 1944, from 7:45 p.m., at 1608 - A, Co-ordinating Committee office.

Give a better explanation

Releasees present were: Sakamoto, Kozaka, Kawano, Tateishi, Katayama, Shimizu, Hoshiko, Mohri, Kawamura, and Inouye.

Co-ordinating Committee members present were: J. Naydo, I. Namekawa, K. Okamoto, G. Yamatani, M. Shimada, A. Takahashi, and B. Akitsuki.

B. Akitsuki addressed the group, stating that this Zadan-kai was called for the purpose of informally interchanging ideas, criticisms, suggestions, or recommendations, which may immediately or ultimately help in the work and the object of the Committee.

Mr. A. Takahashi, Advisor to the Committee and also head of the Arrangement Committee, described the present incident and its yet pending solution in detailed retrospection -- from the beginning of the incident to his present plan of attaining the set goal by the establishment of a central organization, which he previously had outlined at the joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee on February 25.

Mr. Tateishi, one of the releasees, questioned the present delay in the process of releasement and also suggested that unless the Co-ordinating Committee, with the backing of the releasees, clearly make noteworthy concrete accomplishments, as was promised by the Committee at the time of its inception, true peace of the center and sincere confidence of the colonists will be a matter of question. Inasmuch as the colonists are observing with deliberate and perhaps discriminatory eyes, the accomplishments of the committee, it would be wise if the committee announces its work more publicly. In this way (publication by bulletins preferably) confidence of the colonists could be gained gradually, he believed. B. Akitsuki explained the heavy current which the Committee is befacng in its sincere attempt to obtain justifiable releasements. He also went on to make clear the planks of the platform upon which the Responsible Men of Various Divisions and the Co-ordinating Committee was founded on, emphasizing the fact that it is merely serving as a temporary body, prepared for dissolution immediately upon replacement. He further added that only with the cooperation of the colonists, could release-ment of internees be expedited; in other words, the Committee is looking forward with great high anticipation the help of the releasees, especially those considered leaders, for its effort to restore normalcy in the Center. If ever a sign of complacency is shown on the part of the Administration or those working for the restoration of normalcy, the opposition is bound to take advantage of it, as already manifested by their distribution of propaganda pamphlets in the new Manzanar area. Such may be a prelude to a possible re-flare-up of the center, and unless immediate remedial measure is taken, erroneous informations of this nature may continue to be disseminated. Materials of this nature are inevitably bound to deviate many colonists, who are considered neutrals or those still in a perplexing predicament. At the same time, it will more strongly

instigate those advocates of pro status quo. One of the releasees wanted assurance that, insofar as their work involved intermingling with the pressure groups, they be not misunderstood.

Mr. Inouye mentioned that he has gained some results by careful explanations to those in 'dilemma' and Mr. Mohri stated likewise.

Upon Mr. Tateishi's suggestion to hold another Zadan-kai jointly with some representatives from the new area, immediately upon the releasement of the 14 internees (such as Kozuma, Kimura, Yoshida, Kobayashi, Komiya, etc. recommended by the Committee for releasement sometime ago), Mr. Mohri felt that the suggestion was very favorable. The releasees assembled gave general assent to this suggestion. At this time, Mr. Yamatani mentioned that if those releasees present tonight would put out a joint statement stating their present stand and attitude the trend of public sentiment and the attitude of the neutrals, might and will change to the positive. However, Mr. Shimizu and the others deemed it more advisable to withhold such a statement until the releasement of the above-mentioned 14. A statement embracing a number of names would have more forceful influence upon the colonists' minds, it was pointed out. Releasees stressed that the releasement of the 14 would relieve their already over-burdened work. Inasmuch as the Committee's systematic function of investigation is limited and superficial, aid of the releasees must, by all means, be solicited, as releasees are in such a position to blend untaintingly into the pressure groups. Mr. Sakamoto, releasee, assured the Committee that he will give full support indirectly and directly to the Committee's work. His present position (inasmuch as he is an educator) is such that he cannot outwardly expose himself too conspicuously (that is in this more-or-less political nature). However, he will try to help through education of children, which will indirectly affect the attitude of the parents.

With the body's sincere request for the immediate releasement of the 14, in order to facilitate the realization of normalcy and avoid predomination of the opposition, the Zadan-kai adjourned at 10:40 p.m.

The next joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee was given over chiefly to a discussion on ways and means of preventing a reoccurrence of an act of vandalism committed in the school building by teen age boys. This vandalism was described by one of the teachers as follows:

*A question
the relevance.*

"The 6th of March when the teachers went back to school they found the elementary school had been broken into. A window was broken in my room. I didn't see any fresh marks but when I went back a teacher told me that the building had been entered. It was a queer thing; nothing valuable had been taken. This indicated that children or young boys had done the vandalism.

"The lavatories had writing on the walls; nasty pictures were on the school blackboards. The teachers were told not to disturb anything because Internal Security might want to take fingerprints. It was mostly sex stuff and the broken window over the hall transom indicated it was younger children.

"Last Friday as I went to the school at twelve o'clock to lock my door I saw a crowd of boys standing around outside. Talking to them were three or four WRA policeman (Caucasians). I stepped to the nearest and asked what was going on. He said it was an investigation. "These are the boys who made the entrance. They have confessed."

"Four or five of the boys were about 6th grade age. There were two or three older boys, possible 15."¹

This meeting was attended by a number of appointed personnel who were not members of the Advisory Council: Dr. R. Redicord (who had returned to work, having recovered from the beating he received November 1); Hoffman, Fire Protection Officer from Washington; Owens, Fire Protection Officer; Harkness, Superintendent of the Public Schools; Dr. Gunderson, Principal of the High School; Miss Durkin, Principal of the Elementary School; and B. Mayeda, Mr. Harkness states that "there had been further break-ins in the elementary school, where thermometers were broken, matches set under the thermometers, obscene notes left on the teachers' desks, fountain pens stolen, gold fish stolen, art work done by children mutilated, etc. It was agreed among the teachers present that obscenity had greatly increased and was spreading "even to the girls."

"Since teachers are not going to yield to such sort of things, teachers will be lost and vacancies incurred will

¹Notes, Mar., pp. 46. 47.

not be replaced. Only remedy for such is to carry on project-wide campaign. The matter must be taken up with the parents and the community to solicit their cooperation to attack the problem in the homes."

"Upon question raised by Mr. Yamatani, Mr. Harkness mentioned that school activities by the students show marked lack of enthusiasm, not because the youngsters are not interested, but because of lack of time, which is caused by the children's overburdened public and language school curriculums. Mr. Harkness cited a case where a student wrote a composition stating that due to his attending two schools his studies in both schools have become confused and have slacken. He further brought up the problem confronting the public school with regard to deliberate and inconstant schedule observed by some 'outlaw' schools which have sprung up recently. It appears that these 'outlaw' schools are intentionally changing their schedule in order to confuse and conflict with the public school schedule. He expressed his gratefulness toward the recognized Japanese Board of Education for their hearty cooperation in every respect. . . After prolonged discussion, it was decided that the matter be referred to the Board of Education (Japanese) requesting them to make recommendations. Mr. Harkness suggested that the Board should be officially recognized by WRA.

"Illustrating lack of interest on the part of the children, Dr. Gunderson pointed out that in spite of the student body election next week, comparatively few are running for office. He went on to say that the students are very much concerned and conscious about the occurrence of the recent disturbance, which is caused by a few. In order to take remedial steps, hall patrols have been instituted. Last year, more lost money were turned in a very small amount of pilfering was accounted.

"He pointed out the fact that the home is where the clean-up is needed. Ones who need it the most are the hardest to reach. Upon question raised, Dr. Gunderson reported that approximately 1600 students are enrolled in the high school. . . .

The Chair (Mr. Black) then stated that the pending problem could be solved only through cooperative endeavor of all colonists and the only remedy is crystallization of public sentiment, which may be worked through collaboration with the block managers. The Chair then asked for suggestions regarding this problem. Mr. B. Mayeda of the Civic Organization mentioned that he may be able to convene all ward chairmen, who could in turn convey the information to the parents. . . . Another recommendation suggested by B. Akitsuki was that the Advisory Council should take the matter up with the Japanese Language school instructors. He further brought up the fact that at the Zadan-kai held with the stockade releasees on March 8, Mr. Sakamoto, a releasee and Ward 3 principal of

the language school, assured the Committee that he will expend his efforts for the betterment of the center condition indirectly through education of children, which will ultimately result in the education of the parents. Mr. Huycke recommended that a special committee composed of evacuee members and appointed personnel, connected with the schools, should work in co-ordinating with Dr. Gunderson on this matter.

A proposed clean up week was next discussed. Dr. Pedicord discussed the medical angle.¹

At the meeting of the Divisional Responsible men which was held the next day, the following pertinent points were made:

. . . 2. Farm will begin operations soon. . . "Normalcy of the center condition should, by no means, be interpreted as a true and complete one, as exemplified by the recent propaganda distribution and vandalism."

(Why the Co-ordinating Committee insisted on viewing the vandalism committed by boys under 14 years as a threat to "normalcy" is difficult to see. Probably they wished to emphasize the unrest in the center in any manner possible to bring it to the attention of the Administration.)

The minutes continue:

"Administration should be especially cautious not to take a complacent attitude. . .

"Zadan-kai was held on the night of March 8 with the stockade releasees. Releasees agreed to put out a statement clearing their position, immediately upon the releasement of the 14 internees recommended by the Committee. . .

"Future policy of the Committee was discussed in deliberation, whether replacement of the body should be made again from the various divisions or from the blocks. Suggestion was made that various divisional representatives, as well as representatives selected from wards, should be made. Mr. Ninomiya suggested that a separate body from this organization, represented likewise by all divisions should be organized for the purpose of settling employment problems, complaints, etc. Upon suggestion raised to re-organize this divisional body

¹minutes of the Joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, March 10, 1944.

it was decided that Mr. Black or Mr. Robertson should be asked to attend one of the divisional body's meetings."¹

The paragraph quoted above implies beyond much doubt that the Divisional heads were reluctant to give up completely the power they had acquired in the past months. It is evident that some of the members felt that some means should be taken to see that members of the Divisional Heads group be placed on the proposed representative body to replace the Co-ordinating Committee. This intention and the proposal to organize a separate body "for the purpose of settling employment problems" are interesting for they were revived three and a half months later after the Okamoto shooting.

ATTITUDES OF COLONISTS IN MIDDLE OF MARCH, 1944

By the middle of March the attitudes of the colonists toward the Co-ordinating Committee had crystallized. The majority of informants had changed from an attitude indifference or curiosity as to what the body could accomplish to one of hostility. Few verbalized the reasons for this growth of hard feeling. Data accumulated later indicates that growing hostility toward the Co-operative from which several of the Committee members had been recruited and failure to obtain the release of stockade internees, particularly those interned with little obvious cause, were significant factors. Perhaps more important than either of the above mentioned causes was the fact that pick-ups continued in considerable numbers after the Committee took office. Blame was placed upon the Committee and the

¹Minutes of the regular meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, March 11, 1944.

Co-op) ~~and~~ the Diary of the Committee gives some evidence that this blame was not entirely misplaced. Three men were put in the stockade for agitating against the Co-op and the under-cover groups did not hesitate to make full use of this.¹

Attitudes toward the stockade question

On March 14, 120 persons were still confined in the stockade.² (How many of these had been picked up after Jan. 15 is not known now, but can easily be ascertained if writer is allowed access to records.) While sentiment favoring the release of these internees was not universal, it was very strong, particularly in regard to the "innocent" boys picked up. Even the conservative ^{Oda}"O" expressed themselves in favor of release. Like many persons not intimately connected with the Daihyo Sha organization, they were particularly resentful over the internment of persons in their own block who had not been connected with the pressure group.

"There are still people in the stockade. Some fellows were taken from our block and haven't come back yet. . . . I think if the people were released from the stockade, the people (general population) would like it. In our block there are still four people to come back. . . ."

"They took a person and his three room mates here. Only the room mate was there (at the scene of the trouble) the night of the incident. But his three room mates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't (is not allowed to) live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade."³

^{Nishino}"N", who poses as neutral but is nonetheless delighted with any status-quo victory, said:

"As more and more say in here, we signed our names saying these men (internees) are our true representatives; it isn't

¹Notes, July 20, p. 4.

²Notes, Mar., p. 2.

³ibid., pp. 3, 35, 36.

right to give in. The minority group for status quo says, "If you let people out of the stockade, everything will be all right."

In our block we had a meeting for mutual understanding among the block people not to say anything for or against status quo. I told them, "It's no use talking about status quo and bring disharmony." We had an inspiring talk by Reverend Inouye. We all realize the fact there's no sense bearing a grudge against each other. But there are a few agitators still existing. But they won't talk in public.

③ ["The majority of the people are against status quo but in their heart they don't like to see people in the stockade."]¹

Yoshiro (In spite of the peaceful sentiments expressed above by "N", his block, in which he is block manager, contains two of the most militant pro and anti-status quo factions.)

Kurihara said:

① "I had a friend of mine pulled into the stockade January 10. Best said he saw no charge against him from the request of WRA. He hesitated to release him. I went to Schmidt. The last remark (Schmidt) gave me was ['It's up to the Co-ordinating Committee.....The Japanese are held in the stockade by the Japanese (Co-ordinating Committee).]"²

Dr. Opler criticized the above statement, saying that it was not Schmidt but Captain Hartman (Army) who was telling people with interned friends or relatives to see the Co-ordinating Committee.³ However, *Kurihara* K. is extremely truthful and his statement is trustworthy.

Yamashiro expressed himself:

② ["I don't think the people in the stockade will ever be released."]⁴

Mr. Yoshimura of the Co-op, strongly anti-Daihyo Sha Kai and supporter of the Co-ordinating Committee expressed the view

Notes
1 ibid., p. 11.

2 ibid., p. 50.

3 ibid., p. 52.

4 ibid., p. 18.

of a very small minority.

Mr. Yoshimura was one of the men who fled to the hospital for his life after the murder of Hitomi which took place 3½ months after he made this statement.

① ["I can only tell you my personal opinion. I suppose some of the fellows in the stockade should be ~~let~~ out. A good many didn't mean anything -- not knowing what the consequence was to be. The real agitators -- the leaders were nothing but agitators -- ~~they~~ should be kept there their whole life as far as I'm concerned. ~~They will only object to anything again.~~ They want to start trouble."¹]

Opler's opinion of the situation

Dr. Opler was probably more conscious of the dilemma of the Co-ordinating Committee than any other member of the Appointed Personnel. In March he was disgusted with the situation:

② ["On the subject of releases the Army is telling the Co-ordinating Committee that WRA is holding out. It's a vicious circle. . . There are too many cooks with a hand in the broth, the Army, WRA and the Co-ordinating Committee.] The Army is always calling up Schmidt and badgering him. The logic that the Army and Schmidt go by is: you must have records for release. . . .

what does he mean?

"Releases have been pretty slow. But there was no start till lately because of WRA and Army maneuverings. . . The Army states now that they want to release individuals. I've heard some (Army) say that some individuals will never get out."²

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS

SP- The hostility toward the Co-ordinating Committee which the three informants quoted below had developed within a period of six weeks was startling. In February they had expressed themselves indifferently about the Committee, waiting, it seemed, to see what it could accomplish.³ Now they were furious.

¹ ibid., p. 19.

² ibid., pp. 27, 53.

³ See pp. .

Takenchi

"I"'s brother said:

② ["That bunch is a bunch of inus, and Akitsuki is the biggest inu of them all. He'll probably get his brains beat out one of these days. That Co-ordinating Committee - I don't know who elected them ~~or not~~. Akitsuki - people around here know about him. He used to head the Co-op during the trouble. WRA took rice here. Prior to the search (Nov. 26, 1943) Akitsuki and the big shots got together and sold the WRA rice in the canteen to the people. They did this with rice and oranges. The money they got from that they divided among themselves. . .

what does
he mean?

"They send out pamphlets. It's just a lot of baloney.

"I know of a group that has been trying to get a lawyer or a bookkeeper to audit the Co-op books and investigate into it. We know graft like that is going on. Akitsuki probably got word of it. It was getting hot under the seat so he quit the Co-op."¹

when did he
quit the
Co-op?
This is a
just indicator

Takenchi

"I" himself launched into a listing of men he termed

"inu" as if he had spent considerable time making an investigation of a group plotting against the general welfare of the colony:

"Akitsuki - he's more or less the guiding hand of the Co-ordinating Committee business. William Maeda is head of Civic Organization; he lives in 32 block. And there's Frank Kawai here, of Housing. They're all placed in strategic positions here. They've always been here. (Are old Tuleans) All those fellows are not on the Co-ordinating Committee. But I'm absolutely positive they belong to that group. Joe Nakao, the one who is supposed to be Senior Steward of the camp; Seji Morogka, a sulentype of man - he seems to be Hawaiian born."²

Nishino

"N" who had not expressed himself as hostile to the

Committee in February now said:

① [~~"They~~ (the people) haven't gained much confidence in Akitsuki. They don't thank ~~the~~ (the Co-ordinating Committee) for anything. I'd still like to know how they got in there.] I went back to the paper which said, 'The Army and WRA will recognize the Co-ordinating Committee.'³

¹ Notes; Mar., p. 8.

² ibid., p. 39.

³ ibid., p. 11.

Makino

("N" means that the recommendation of the Army and WRA is sufficient to damn the Committee in his personal judgment.)

Kurihara

"K", who did not say a word against the Committee in February, expressed himself as follows:

① ["The Co-ordinating Committee, I think, is the unconscious tool of either the Army or WRA."]

Appears to be connection between the police committee and the gambling places

"Here is a rumor; there are four big gambling places run by the Judo fellows who guard the Co-ordinating Committee.¹ The other small places are raided, but they just stay away from these boys. They are not closed. . .

Kurihara

Of Akitsuki, "K" said:

② ["There are a couple of men under him. They express themselves better in English than he does and they go over his head in doing things. If he could wriggle out of the Committee all right. But if he waits longer, some day it's going to be too late. He will be blamed regardless of the consequences that follow. If he keeps on and sticks at it, even if he's really for the Japanese, he's going to be branded as a spy and working for WRA."²]

Harry Katataka

"M", a nisei ex-Daihyo Sha member was inclined to give the Committee some credit. However, he realized their efforts were futile:

["They just forced themselves in with the help of WRA and the Army. ~~but~~ I give the Co-ordinating Committee credit for the releases.] Some of us have tried too.

Katataka

"M" was so distressed by the condition of the camp in March that he called on Mr. Robertson to solicit help. He had become acquainted with Robertson while he was interned in Leupp.

"After we find out there's no hope in doing anything (about the stockade situation) I met Mr. Robertson. . .I told him, 'You have the Daihyo Sha's in the stockade. You have a new Negotiating Committee (the Co-ordinating Committee). The

¹These were the "fielders." See pp . Yamatani, Committee member, is also popularly rumored to own large gambling places in camp.

²Notes, Mar., pp. 49, 50, 54, 55.

first one is petered out and the second one got the peoples' consent without any backing at all."

② ["The Co-ordinating Committee did get people out of the stockade and tried to do their share."¹]

At this interview ^{Katoh} "M" proposed the holding of a legitimate election, *as soon as possible.*

Two other informants were willing to give the Co-ordinating Committee credit for having tried. *Yamashiro*

① ["I know the Co-ordinating Committee works hard. I respect them. But I think status quo against status quo will be a big trouble in the future too."²]

The informant quoted above had probably modified his opinion because he was talking to a Caucasian. He is a very cautious individual.

(Oda) "There has been no change in the peoples' attitude toward the Co-ordinating Committee. (The informant implies that the status of the Committee has not improved.) To me they all think in the same way. But they don't do anything about it. I believe they're going to give them a fair chance."³

Dr. Upler was, to some extent at least, conscious of the growing instability of the Committee's position. He said on March 16:

"Best's mistake was not working with the Negotiating Committee (Daihyo Sha Kai) and calling in the Army. I think he sees that now. . . .

The failure of the committee "is partly the fault of not organizing the center."⁴

Attitudes toward the Co-op

Hostility toward the Co-operative was already making itself manifest. There were also strong indications that the

¹ ibid., pp. 65, 66.

² ibid., p. 18.

³ ibid., p. 3.

⁴ ibid., p. 27.

How could they organize the center?

I take it that they resigned from the Co-op when they were chosen on the Committee

Co-operative and the Co-ordinating Committee were being associated in peoples' minds because of the fact that several men on the Committee had previously held prominent positions on the Co-op staff.¹

["The Administration is making use of the people in the Co-op. They are very much hand in hand with the Administration now.

Right now the Co-op is in a sad spot in this camp. The Co-op is charging exceedingly high prices. It isn't necessary for them to charge such high prices. Prices in some cases are so high it seems ridiculous. They have a mop worth 15 cents, even today it could not be more than 25 cents at Woolworths. They are charging 55 cents. For an aluminum teapot which used to cost 25 cents and is probably worth 50 cents now, they are charging \$1.25.

"Fish: the market price at that time (pre-evacuation) was 19 cents a pound. They are selling it at 65 cents a pound. They are simply robbing the Japanese here. The prices of things are so high and the cost of operations is so cheap; rent is cheap; they have such quantity; they pay such little salaries; there is no reason prices should be so high.

"Before the war, shoyu (soy sauce) imported from Japan used to cost \$1.75 cents a gallon. Here, for ordinary shoyu they charge \$2.85 cents a gallon. . . .

"The people in the Co-op had a greater interest ~~in~~ breaking the status quo. It was to their interest. The former secretary of the Co-op is chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee. . . .²

Increasing Sentiment for Re-segregation

I understand what you mean. But how about Segmen?

A great many attitudes expressing hostility to the so-called "loyal" Tuleans who had remained in camp was expressed in March. This is significant in view of the strong movement which gave rise to a petition in the month to follow. The presence of these undecided "loyals" had been a disappointment and an ~~increasing~~ ^{growing} aggravation to the segregees ever since

¹See pp. 261, 262 for attitude already quoted.

²From K., not a Daihyo Sha supporter.

their arrival at Tule Lake.

Takenouchi

"I" expressed himself most vehemently:

① ["100% of the inu are of the loyal bunch. I wouldn't be surprised if kitsuki and that bunch are all loyal.] There is a girl who works at my office. She acts like an inu. This is how I suspect: I told her, 'You know, there's a lot of inu in camp.' And she said, 'Is that so? But it's better not to say anything.' That's how I know. Now the natural reaction would be, 'Who are they?'"¹

many people are regarded as loyal for various circumstances of happenings which they went with her reply.

Said K: *Kuribara*

② ["We have a lot of loyal people here. Probably they are here for the Administration to make use of them.] The Administration didn't have a place to send them till there was room in other camps. at present there are 400 old Tule families here. That probably means about 1600 people."²

whispering

Even the gentle and conservative "O" agreed that the loyal people should be removed from the center:

③ ["I'm sure the removal of the Yes-Yes people would be a good thing."³]

Yamashiro

Y, who did not come to camp until Dec. 6, said:

"About 2000 people in this center want to get out. Why don't they let them out? A month and a half ago I heard 400 families are signed up to get out of here."⁴

she reached her impression that no one can have the center explain how they can get out

Officers of the Co-operative Enterprises, who were popularly accused of being loyal themselves, advocated getting rid of the "loyal" people just as strongly as their pro-status quo opponents. The following conversation was taken down verbatim in the inner business office of the Co-operative:

Iwamoto

④ [IW (kibei) "The mixture of No-Nos and Loyals in here is one of the main causes for trouble. This policy of the WRA was trouble from the beginning. The loyal people are troublesome. Their mistake is not being set. They look both ways."

Ikenoto

IK: (kibei or nisei) I think they just think they are not one of us.

¹ ibid., p. 40.

² ibid., p. 15.

³ ibid., p. 36.

⁴ ibid., pp. 56, 57.

Iwanaka

IW: We don't speak the same language.

Yoshimura

YO: (issei) There are quite a few of the original Tuleans that are still here, six or seven thousands. We call them Weather-watchers. . . .

Iwanaka

IW: Don't you think WRA would like to have more loyal people than disloyal? . . . When I speak of this loyal group I hesitate to express my free opinion. Don't you think the policy of the WRA wants people to say Yes-Yes so they can fill the fighting unit. Then they can put them all in the front line and wipe all the nisei out of America. . .

"Some people say Yes-Yes and then ask for repatriation. If I was in the division (WRA division) I should say, 'He must say No-No before he can repatriate.'"¹

think of "loyal" and "undecided"

Byron Akitsuki agreed that the presence of the loyal people in camp was a disturbing factor. "The people who are undecided are the ones with families and children," he added.²

Attitudes toward an election of colony representatives

In view of the Co-ordinating Committee's frequently expressed desire to retire and give place to a popularly elected body of representatives, the attitudes of the ordinary colonist toward an election are important. Of four statements made three were very pessimistic and one optimistic. Some people were indifferent; others felt that a representative body would be a good thing, but that the election of a capable body was an impossibility because no thinking man would accept the position. Persons like ^{Katatake} "M", a young and idealistic nisei, who urged an immediate election as an escape from the chaotic camp condition were an extremely small minority. Perhaps a good number of individuals would have favored an election, had there been any practical possibility that a responsible and respected body of men would take office.

¹ ibid., pp. 20, 21.

² ibid., p. 24.

Realizing that this was utterly impossible as long as the general cynical attitude continued, they expressed themselves in favor of letting matters drift.

[^{Takenuchi} "I" said:

"I don't think an election would do any good anyhow. What do we want representatives for? They don't do us any good. Let us roam around here and feed us three times a day. We'll wait until the war lasts. Nobody like trouble. If they'll treat us like human beings and not like dogs, nobody starts kicking."¹

[^{Yamashiro} "Y" said:

"Nothing could be done to help this condition. My idea would be to form the Community Council here - but we have no power. If a general election were held in this camp, who's going to be a candidate? I won't. We wouldn't have any power.]

"I think if they give a few things to the people (it would help). "If you pet them, they come to you. If you hit them they despise you.

"I was working in CAS up to February 15. I suggested that they let the people know how WRA thinks. I say, "What's the use?" I'm fighting for the people; but no use. I resign."

[^{Jamashiro} "Y", however, was in favor of electing the block managers:

"The Block Managers were appointed by the Project Director. A general election every six months would be a good idea. The (mess) supervisors and the block managers get together and keep food. By election they would get only six months (in office).² If they don't do right, they could not be elected again."

[^{Nishino} "N" who by later events was shown to have a more typical attitude than "I" or "Y", made the following brief but significant statement in March:

"There has been no attempt to get new representatives for the people. That shows that a majority of people are still back to the status quo."³

[^{Katsoke} "M", a young nisei with a strong sense of social responsibility, went to Mr. Robertson and begged him to further the

¹ ibid., p. 8.

² ibid., p. 18.

³ ibid., p. 13.

(1)

I don't get the meaning of this.

Difficult to follow the reasoning

resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee and institute an immediate election:

["In order to have the camp back to a normal basis, the only way to do is to dispose of the new Co-ordinating Committee and let the blocks elect at least two representatives from each block and then let them be the peoples' representatives. If the colonists were backing them up, they'd get the backing.]

"I told him to get in between and let the representatives do this. This would knock all the stuff off. We would have evidence that the people approve of them."¹

felt "O" a Block manager? If so, mention it.

^{Oda} "O", while admitting that an election of representatives could scarcely meet with success felt that for the good of the colony some means of communication between the Japanese and the Administration must be found. His ideas, however, were vague. All he could suggest was that some better means of communication between the administration and the block managers be found. Civic Organizations was not sufficient.

what's C.O.

^{Oda} "O" is a polite and cautious individual. Had he been a more typical camp resident, the following remarks would have contained several uncomplimentary remarks about the Civic Organizations, which had already brought considerable unpopularity upon itself for its assistance to the Administration in the status quo election.

instead why not get a committee of resident on Civic organizations

"The big trouble in this center is lack of information. I'd like to ask the Administration to give good definite information which will satisfy the residents. If the block manager gets good information it's easy to handle the block affairs. . . .

what's central meeting?

"When we go to central meetings, there are nothing but complaints, asking us to take things to the WRA. . . .But most of the suggestions we send up we send to Civic (Organizations) - right next to the Co-ordinating Committee office. . . .The residents don't know about Civic Organizations. . . .I don't know the inside."

¹ ibid., p. 65.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FUTURE

An attempt to get an expression of informants' attitudes toward their future life in Tule Lake Center brought forth a confused picture. Some people were apathetic; many thought nothing could be done to improve the situation. They stated that if living conditions were made bearable that was all that was necessary; no connection with the Administration, such as a representative body, was needed. A few were perturbed over the unsettled condition and thought that some effort to bring about an avenue of communication with the Administration ought to be made. Several bewailed the factionalism in camp and the presence of so many groups of different mind. Several remarked that all the wise people in camp were deliberately staying out of politics.

On one point, however, almost everyone agreed. Nothing could be accomplished so long as Mr. Best remained director of the project. The mention of his name was greeted with sneers and insults. Only one ~~person~~ Japanese professed a liking for him, Byron Akitsuki, chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee. On the other hand, Mr. Robertson, Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations, had acquired a phenomenal popularity. The remark, "The best thing would be if they kicked Best out and put Robertson in," first began to be heard in March. This wish increased in strength and was repeated countless times in the months that followed. Mr. Robertson's reputation for kindness and courtesy took an ineradicable hold upon the people. Every unpopular act by Mr. Best increased Robertson's popularity.

[9] A tentative generalization, ^{based on} ~~from~~ the statements of ^a ~~the~~ limited number of informants, is that the majority of the people in camp were relieved that the status quo period of discomfort and tension was over; people had gone back to work and were making some money, which was good. The fate of the first Negotiating Committee and the experience of the past five months had ^{however, left many people with} ~~inspired~~ a feeling of insecurity and the conviction that the Administration, particularly the Project Director, was not to be relied upon. Things had improved. It was better to let ^{well enough alone, rather} ~~them slide along as they were~~ rather than initiate any step which might bring on another period of tension and discomfort. ^{A thoughtful} ~~An~~ unorganized minority, however, felt uncomfortable under this passive attitude, ~~and felt that something ought to be done.~~ ^{Let} Some sort of rapport between the colonists and the Administration should be established, ^{but} Fear of being thought pro-Administration and ~~the weight of the general apathy~~ rendered these persons helpless. ~~It is doubtful if they expressed themselves at all to their fellow Japanese.~~ The writer was a safer recipient of such confidences at the opposite extreme was another minority or a cluster of minorities, ~~who were~~ determined that some organization would be formed on their terms. Persons of this way of thought were biding their time, continuing their agitation against the Administration, particularly Mr. Best, and their campaign of discrediting the already very insecure Co-ordinating Committee.]

Expressions of Apathy

^{Takemoto}
 "I"'s brother, stressed a point which was to become increasingly verbalized in the months to come: that nothing

at all could be accomplished as long as Mr. Best remained director of the project.

"I don't see a single thing that could be done. The peoples' confidence is gone. You get one guy like that (Best) in WRA. It doesn't make people hate just him. It's a reflection on all WRA. The guys from Leupp liked Best. They said he was understanding and would make a good Project Director. They said he was Best, the best. Now they say, "Best, my foot."¹

Wishins
"N" hinted at the increasing strength of the undercover groups:

[Since you left, (in February) quite a few people have been willing to go back to work. As far as work is concerned, status quo is cracking. But some minority groups are ~~much~~ *stronger.*² *stronger.*"

Wishins
"N" added a common attitude, that if he were given bearable living conditions he would have no complaint. The following month he proved himself inconsistent, however, when he strongly supported the re-segregation petition and thereby showed that decent food alone would not give him peace. His statement that the WRA should be able to provide food for the mess which the canteens could get to offer for sale is very significant. This was a common attitude and did the Co-op great harm.

"As long as they give us the proper food and decent living, I won't squawk. Why don't we get fresh vegetables? If the canteen can sell fresh vegetables why can't the Army or WRA get them for us. Here in the mess hall you look at the menu and it says chicken. They give us salt pork or canned beef. The system of mess operations isn't too good. When they have certain things on the menu, they should at least send a correction memorandum to each mess saying they will send something in exchange. Now they say they're having roast pork and macaroni will come in.

"We never get fresh vegetables. A week and a half ago they started to come in (Statements made mar. 15, 1944), but they didn't have any for 1½ or two months. All we had was

¹ ibid., p. 7.

² ibid., p. 11.

potatoes or beets. We're getting some lettuce now. Why couldn't we get it when the canteens were selling it?¹

Takenchi

"I" made several important remarks when asked how the situation had altered from February to March:

"Feeling toward the Administration hasn't changed at all. The only thing that has changed is that people in the center have more or less realized that to try to go against the Administration would be hurting themselves. They're getting smarter. . .

Talking about opening up the farm and that would increase work. It's not that they're trying. They're going to have people work or else! . . .

If they tear down the fence, not a person would wander away. This is home, such as it is. It's all we've known since evacuation. . .

Takenchi

"I" who is employed in the mess division offered his particular complaints:

"I got noseey the other day and went through the files. The people in here are supposed to be allowed 45 cents a day for food. We're getting 20 cents a day now, .2063 if I remember right.

"Another very interesting fact was personnel mess here had their figures set at .1190 per meal. But I think it's falsified. When certain foods are delivered to the personnel mess, they seem to be so high and mighty, why nobody condescends to sign for the darn things. And without the signature you can't prove delivery. It seems to me they (WRA) are getting WRA food at cost zero.

"My younger brother works at the personnel mess. He gets supper there. Since he started to work there in one month they've served turkey three times. They had swiss steak too, and sliced pineapple and cottage cheese salad. You can't tell me you can get all that stuff on that amount of money.

"It's pretty disgusting to sit in that damn office and hear them talk about chicken and turkey and we walk back to work ten blocks and sit down to corned beef and salt pork.

"They have two types of corned beef in the butcher shop. One they call dry pack and the other wet pack. The dry pack costs 15¢ a lb. and the wet pack 18¢ a lb. Ever since the

¹ ibid., p. 14.

day I started to work, the personnel mess has never used the dry pack; they're always breaking open barrels to get the wet pack."

"Fresh vegetables started to come in two weeks ago. At the present time exactly 243 cans of string beans #10 and 184 cans of peas are on the shelves. I know because I've looked. That's all there is besides a little canned corn.

who?
"If you give a Japanese rice and vegetables, you can just about cut out anything else. Another thing, the all-seeing fathers here can't see is: a Japanese prefers pork to beef. It never occurs to them."

Several informants stressed the impossibility of bringing about better conditions in the face of the extreme factionalism in camp. This complaint was repeatedly voiced in the months that followed by individuals who did not belong to the underground groups. While they were by no means pro-Administration, the lack of unity in camp distressed them.

Yamashita
"Y" said:

["There's about ten groups in here, status quo, against status quo, people who don't like the Co-ordinating Committee and don't care about the status quo and the gangster group. They are always struggling against themselves. I'd like to go back to Japan in one piece."]

2
"My idea is to have one decent block, so we could have recreation and have a very fine block together. Right now, the WRA has got to do something before I do anything."¹

Iwata
A young man, a nisei, [^]said:

"I don't know personally. There is lots of personal feeling among the Japanese. As far as management of the Tule Lake Camp, all right. But a few among these people; they don't understand each other. They don't try to understand the other person's point of view. If all the people concerned try to give in a little, I don't know, but I think things would be better."²

It was generally agreed that "wise people" men of ability were not mixing in the current political activities. They stayed at home and kept their mouths shut.

¹ ibid., p. 56.

² ibid., p. 6.

(Odo)

["A really clever man doesn't say very much. . . The most clever men are not taking high positions. They are just resting peacefully at home." ¹]

(Yamashiro) "All the wiser people stay back. If, as supervisor of the CAS, if something happened, I'm going to be the first one to get a two-by-four." ²

Reaction to possible draft by Army

The nisei draft which was announced in late January, 1944 was causing considerable conjecture. Whenever an informant expressed himself on the subject he always stated stalwartly that if he were called he would rather go to jail than go into the Army. ³ The writer was frequently asked for her opinion on the possibility of the draft being applied to Tule Lake.

^{Takenuchi} "I" showed a peculiar change in attitude from February to march. In February he had stated ominously:

"When I say something's liable to pop, I mean the newspaper account of the War Department Release saying that nisei are again eligible for selective service. And that report calls for ten centers. That includes this one. But, if and when they start to draft the avowedly disloyal group in camp, that is going to be the psychological mement for the next riot. That really is going to be a riot if it ever happens." ⁴

^{Takenuchi} In march "I" had become more philosophical:

"I got a notice from my selective service. They wanted to know my address and my present draft board. I filled it in. That's what all of us fellows are going to do. We'll fill in everything we get until they tell us to come for a physical. Then we won't report. I figure on staying here as long as I can. There were a few fellows in our camp (Gila) who were yanked during registration trouble. They were sent here. They actually didn't have time to register for repatriation until after the 20th of January . . .

¹ Notes, February, p. 8.

² Notes, March, p. 18.

³ ibid., p. 26.

⁴ ibid., p. 13.

This section should better be incorporated together with other S.S. data

add (via Luff)

"A good ninety percent of the fellows I've talked here, they say they'll string along with the Selective Service Board until they get their notice for physical examination. Then they won't appear. That's how I feel. If I'm going to get yanked, I'm going to string it out as long as I can."¹

Hatred of the Inu

Hatred of the inu, Japanese spies who betray their fellows to the Administration, is an ever present attitude on the projects. The Co-ordinating Committee, the Civic Organizations and the Co-operative, by reason of their co-operative attitude toward the Administration, were termed inu from the very beginning of their stand against the status quo. However, this attitude was not nearly so violent in March as it was destined to become later. Expressions like the following were heard with increasing frequency as the months passed. By May, action began to take the place of verbal denunciation, and on July 3, Mr. Hitomi, business manager of the Co-operative and repeatedly a "number one inu," was murdered.

Review it to say that this was the beginning of a trend!

what kind of accusation?

Kumihara

"The Administration absolutely ought to refuse to listen to them. Any person accused by any so-called inu, if a trial is held and the inu presents the case before them all and shows the person was guilty, then I think it would help to discourage the inu.

(Evidently the informant is so sure that the inu could not bring proof of guilt that the need to do so would do away with spying.)

["I believe the inu are working here with the Administration to a great extent.

"It is known throughout the camp that the inu gave away the Negotiating Committee. They sell their soul for a few pennies. They make my blood boil"²]

¹ ibid., pp. 41. 42

² ibid., pp. 14, 15.

ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN MARCH

It is extremely doubtful if Mr. Best, the Project Director, and those members of his staff in whom he placed most reliance had any conception of the widespread unpopularity of the Co-ordinating Committee. The successful resolution of the work stoppage, the factor most embarrassing to the Administration had produced a misleading atmosphere of confidence and optimism. In Dillon Myer's words, "The worst hump had been passed when the people went back to work."¹ A few members of the appointed personnel attempted to give Mr. Best a true picture of the peoples' attitudes. They were ^{not heeded.} ~~given no attention.~~ Mr. Robertson, who had a better insight into the situation than any other Caucasian staff member, lost the confidence of Mr. Best by attempting to point out the existence of widespread dissatisfaction and by consenting to talk to critics of the Co-ordinating Committee. The advice of Dr. Opler, who was also gradually coming to appreciate the true state of affairs, was likewise ignored. The writer outlined the situation to Dillon Myer on March 19 and stated that the prevailing optimism of the Administration was based on false assumptions and that serious difficulties would be encountered if intelligent attempts to mitigate the growing hostility to the Co-ordinating Committee were not initiated. Myer replied that things were on the right track now and that, except for minor gripes, things were coming along nicely.

Mr. Best's attitude, however, was not entirely due to

¹R. Hankey conversation with Dillon Myer, Notes, March, p. 45.

hardheadedness. Very few of the Japanese who had the courage to tell the whole truth took the trouble to speak to the Administration. Most information from Japanese was gained from spies or from members of the Co-ordinating Committee, who could not be expected to go into detail on their personal unpopularity. Criticism of the Co-ordinating Committee coming from evacuees who were not spies was dismissed as agitation, or, at best, as the opinion of misguided or fanatic individuals. The unfortunate results of this policy of remaining satisfied with a comforting if quite inaccurate view of the state of affairs, become clearly apparent in the developments of the next six months.

The Administrative schism which began when Mr. Robertson consented to talk to Mrs. Matsuda was well developed in March and continued unreconciled in spite of Dillon Myer's admonition that "It is futile to attempt to get relations with the colony when the appointed staff were not able to agree among themselves."¹ Mr. Robertson was attempting to further a policy of contacts with the colony itself. Myer wished this put off until "things were running smoothly." Two factors had great influence in increasing this difference of opinion between Mr. Robertson and Mr. Best. One was the increasing popularity of Mr. Robertson in the colony, evidence of which must have been brought to Mr. Best frequently by his spies. As Mr. Robertson's popularity increased Mr. Best's unpopularity, which was well established before the arrival of Mr. Robertson on the project, also increased. Almost every informant repeated

¹ ibid. p. .

at almost every interview, "We all wish that Mr. Best would resign and that Mr. Robertson would take his place." The second and probably more important factor in widening the break between Mr. Robertson and Best was the fact that Mr. Best continued to place more and more trust in the policies advocated by Mr. Schmidt, head of police. Mr. Best felt that Mr. Schmidt had saved his life in the November 4 incident when he was sure that the Japanese boys were intent on doing him bodily harm or kidnapping him. Mr. Schmidt's ideas on how to run the project were utterly opposed to those of Mr. Robertson. Schmidt believed in force; he strove for the establishment of a large espionage organization and told the writer that he looked forward to the time "when the Japanese themselves would come up and report things going on in the colony." Dr. Opler, who grew more worried and disgusted as the weeks passed, expressed himself as disgusted with Best's tying himself up with the "force and strictness" policy of Schmidt:

"There's a bottleneck on organization now, both in Washington and in the center. When Best went to Washington at New Years he came back with a plan for segregating the tough guys from the others and a lot of threat procedure."

Opler was also concerned at the tactics Schmidt was encouraging among Caucasian members of the police force: Evacuees complained to Opler and to the writer that some of these men were calling on them and attempting to force them to speak by means of threats:

"Internal Security has two men who do investigation. I'm worried. It's put me on the spot. They're pretty bad. They're going to people and trying to force them to talk. . .

"Best says of the people here: 'They're not real people

here. At Minidoka, there were people there."¹

On March 17, Dillon Myer spoke to the Appointed Personnel at Tule and stated:

"I think WRA has passed its worst crisis, assuming we don't have another blow up. I feel more confident about Tule Lake than ever before. Things are on the beam now. Everything's going to be all right. Once I decide I have the right people in the right place, I'll support them. / []

"The Tule Lake incident of Nov. 1, got people in this country and in Congress to understand that we were dealing with a delicate international question. . .

In answer to a question asking how many more segregees were to be brought to Tule, he said:

"I don't know and probably will know how many will be segregated. I don't know whether all of them will be moved to Tule Lake. Our best estimate of those to be segregated now is 3,500 to 3,600 people. Here there is room for only 1,800."²

Myer also stated to the writer that "the release of most of the people in the stockade is being pushed as rapidly as possible. The worst ones are to be taken to Leupp."³

May 4
May
stockade
internees

However, two weeks later Mr. Best, commenting on a news release from Washington that Leupp was to be reopened, stated that no confirmation had been received and that, in any case, such action would not be taken during April. Apparently either the Washington authorities or Mr. Best or both, were unable to make up their minds of the matter of removing the internees.

"REOPENING OF LEUPP NOT CONFIRMED HERE; BEST

(Editor's Note: The text of a news release from Washington is printed here, but project Director Ray R. Best states that

¹ ibid., pp. 27, 28.

² ibid., 32, 33.

³ ibid., p. 45.

no confirmation has been received at the center. He indicated also that if any such action is taken he does not anticipate that it will be during the coming month. The number of people involved as stated in the text of the release and the date are apparently incorrect.)

Plans of the WRA to reopen the Leupp Center near Winslow, Arizona, about May 15 were announced recently by Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes. The center is being reopened to take care of those evacuees of Japanese ancestry who have been agitators or troublemakers at the Tule Lake Segregation Center. It will be operated under the administration of the Tule Lake Project Director Ray Best. Approximately 100 men, the majority of them American citizens, who were arrested after taking part in a disturbance in the Tule Lake Center last November 4 will be sent to Leupp. Since the disturbance, they have been confined in a stockade at the Tule Lake Center. Some of the aliens who took part in the disturbance have been transferred to internment camps for enemy aliens under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

The supervising officer of the Leupp Center will be designated by Ray Best, who was the Director of Leupp before being appointed to his present position."

?
1
E. Best
At this time the Administration was making considerable effort to increase evacuee employment, even if it meant hiring persons for whom there was not sufficient work. Opler stated that he had been ordered to hire twenty people on his staff and had one boy working hard on a study of Japanese art and another on the frustrations of center life. By the end of March, however, the Administration had altered this policy and began a forced decrease of the employment rolls.

¹ibid., p. 28.

CONTINUED ACTIVITIES OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

On March 18, the Co-ordinating Committee met with Dillon Myer. Mr. Myer's presence was supposed to be kept a secret from the evacuees, but this did not prevent the news from getting into the colony. The Committee itself requested the interview. This interview is remarkable for the wholehearted support and approbation expressed by the Committee for Mr. Best. The Committee by this time had lost confidence in the Advisory Council and was particularly hostile to Mr. Robertson because he was listening to the opposition groups in the colony. Apparently, they placed full confidence in Mr. Best, stating if he left it would be "a great loss to the colonists, as a whole." The writer was so astonished at this expression, which could not have been further from the true sentiments of the colony, that she questioned Mr. Akitsuki on the point. Said he, "I like Mr. Best."¹

An informal interview with the National WRA Director, D. S. Myer was held on March 18, 1944, at the Project Director's office, from 4:00 p.m. D. S. Myer was introduced to the body assembled by the Project Director, R. R. Best.

Those present were: R. R. Best, Project Director, Harry L. Black, Assistant Project Director, Paul Robertson, Assistant Project Director and Director of Operations, and Williard Schmidt, Chief of Police. Co-ordinating Committee members present were: G. Yamatani, A. Okamoto, M. Shimada, and B. Akitsuki.

Questions presented by the Committee and statements included in the answers given therein by Mr. D. S. Myer were as follows:

1. We wish to ascertain what our standing is; that is, the standing of the Co-ordinating Committee. To what extent has the WRA headquarters in Washington been informed of our purpose and activities up to date?

¹ ibid., p. 53.

Answer: WRA officials are informed of every development, day by day and week by week. Mr. Best was in Washington twice and we went over the whole problem and policy, not only in relation to the general program, but in relation to Tule Lake Center. (Mr. Best, at this time, commented that the standing of the Committee is well-known to the Committee itself, as well as to the Administration, and he jokingly stated that the Committee was just trying to 'test' him. He reiterated that this representative Committee is purely of a temporary nature, until a permanent committee is organized. This body has been doing a very good job and full confidence and faith of the Administration rest in this Committee.) Mr. Myer remarked, "If that is his answer, that is also my answer."

2. With an understanding with the Administration, we have been making arrangements toward the formation of a self-governing body. We wish to inquire of the attitude of the WRA headquarters toward self-government in a center like this.

Answer: WRA is now an agency under the Department of Interior, which has not changed our program in any manner up to date. WRA does discuss any major problems with the Secretary and the Under-Secretary before it moves ahead. WRA has gone over number of problems regarding general policy of the Tule Lake Center. Upon clearance with the ~~general policy of the Tule Lake Center~~ Secretary, which will probably be within a few weeks, WRA is ready to make its decision, therefore, no definite answers could be given now. [If the Secretary agrees, (it is hoped that he will), some plan could be worked out where Tule Lake may have a representative type of election, actually selected in the same capacity as this Committee. It will not be a community government in the same sense as those functioning in the other relocation centers, but as a group representing the Colony to serve as a channel of information and understanding ~~the~~ between the Colony and the Administration and a body representing the point of view of the Colony to present to the Administration, and vice versa.]

3. Will the future policy of this Center be any different in comparison to the other relocation centers?

Answer: Yes, in certain respects it will. Some of the major differences will be: (1) Some differences in self-government, (2) Because of necessity, change in the setup of the Internal Security, until the establishment of confidence that there is no further necessity of a wired fence and extra guards, (3) Difference in the relocation program.

however, there will be opportunities for all those who want to leave the center, provided they haven't been denied leave clearances, and (4) No restrictions relative to the operation of Japanese Language Schools in Tule, notwithstanding, services of public schools are offered.

4. We presume that this Center's employment policy is somewhat different from the other center's. Will you please tell us what employment policy is applied to this center, relative to the population of the center, the status of the center, and the standing of the people?

Answer: Relative to employment policy, there are some differences because of nature of things. In general, employment policy will be the same. The plan is to continue the same policy, same wage scale, same hour scale, continuance of everyday routine jobs, etc. There will be some curtailment in the farm operations because of the past incident. It will be operated on the basis of self-sufficiency. Subsistence particularly within the center to further employment -- every industry to be developed will receive every consideration, just so it remains within the general policy of the WRA ruling. WRA is willing to do everything within reasons if it is sound and if people are willing to work. (Mr. Best stressed the fact that sound employment practice to be based on job analysis of every major job and job classification will be practiced. Sound employment practice does not only mean employment, it means terminations as well.)

5. Persons who are not able to obtain employment -- are they eligible to receive clothing allowances, at least?

Answer: No, unless they need it. If they are not in need they can't get such. Same policy is in effect as in any other centers. People who are actually in need are eligible for public assistance grants and clothing allowances, but again WRA is not going to hand out money unless they can show their urgent needs, because of governmental procedure and commitments to Congress. However, WRA doesn't intend to let anyone go cold or hungry.

6. Will the colonists who have applied for repatriation or expatriation, prior to January 20, 1944, be exempted from Selective Service?

Answer: No answer to this question was given by Mr. Myer, who stated that the Army is the only one who is going to decide.

7. There has been prevailing rumors within the Center that there will be a change in appointed personnel, including the Project Director. At this time, we, the Committee, wish to be informed definitely regarding it, since we cannot afford to lose Mr. Best, which would also be a great loss to the colonists, as a whole.

answer: There is no plan for a change in Project Director. Full confidence is vested in Mr. Best, Mr. Black, Mr. Robertson, and Mr. Wells.

8. Assuming that an incident which occurred in the past re-occurs and the Army controls the Center again, in that event, how will the case be disposed? Will the WRA be allowed to assume authority as an Administration Agency?

Answer: "God only knows. I don't. I only hope there won't be any, which doesn't mean that there isn't going to be trouble. I don't see that there is a real chance of incident of the type that would require the Army to come in. However, if necessary Army will be brought in." At the present time, WRA has an agreement with the Army to be given right to ask for more detailed soldiers and they in turn have agreed to retire as soon as the WRA dismisses them.

Thereupon, the National Director inquired whether there is any possibility of the recurrence of the incident. B. Akitsuki immediately responded, "We are just hoping and praying that it will not happen again." When asked whether the situation in the Colony in comparison to the past two or three months had improved, B. Akitsuki answered, "Greatly".

At this time, Mr. Myer was interested to know what the major problems of the Center were, at present, and what the people have that they have to kick about. B. Akitsuki mentioned the food situation (not enough and the worst quality), and he continued to state that people have been saying that the situation had grown worse, subsequent to the army's stepping out. Mr. R. R. Best immediately answered the problem as follows: that the same food, same source, and same identical requisition through the Quarter Master was being distributed, even during Army's control. The Army didn't provide a bit of food, it merely distributed it. They wanted quick solution therefore, they distributed food on the basis of 300 to a block, regardless of the density of population. When WRA stepped in, they once again calculated distribution on per head--per block basis. Mr. Myer informed the body that he had discussed WRA general policy with Mr. Wells and mentioned the fact that he wanted it understood that WRA is not trying to save money on food, provided it is kept within the limits of the policy, or not more than 45¢ per day on food. However, one must expect the fact that the amount will inevitably fluctuate, regardless. Mr. Best cited an illustration of food situation of the Army.

Colonel had told him that even the Army had failed in their requisition, since the Quarter Master wasn't able to supply certain food.

In an event one has complaints, Mr. Myer advised that specific cases should be submitted to Mr. Best. Since there are important international aspects involving aliens in this matter, WKA wants to live up to its requirements. If there are legitimate 'kicks' at any point, submit all facts, and not just rumors. Consideration will be duly given.

Recommendation of the Committee in regard to employment of priests as Social Workers and Educational Lecturers was remarked by Mr. Myer that WKA has no provisions to compensate ministers, that policy has been thrashed over way back in 1943, he mentioned, and such cannot be changed. He added that such matter must be worked out within the Center.

Mr. Myer went on to say that doubtless there are many who earnestly desire to get friends out of the stockade, but one should be reluctant in making demands, until WKA has a chance to get the inventory taken and get all papers in order, to check the stockade list. He advised that one should withhold making too many recommendations which are inclined to embarrass the administration.

Lastly, Mr. Myer expressed his delight in meeting with this group, and his appreciation for the work done by the Committee, as well as the tremendous progress made since last November. However he cautioned that everyone should be alert. "I still have my fingers crossed", he concluded.

PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH FUNERAL PARLOR IN BLOCK 18 - DEFEAT OF ADMINISTRATION

In the latter part of March, a minor but very interesting conflict took place between the residents of block 18 and the Administration. Since early February the block 18 residents had been resisting the Administration's suggestion that they move out of the block to give place for a civic center. The proposal was initiated entirely by the Administration, and was put forward as a means of increasing the Co-ordinating Committee's prestige in the colony through the accomplishment of this very obvious improvement to the community. Block resistance was so strong that the idea abandoned. The community as a whole was quite indifferent. Most people did not

care whether a Community Center were established or not.

A resident of block 18 stated:

"Also using Block 18 for a Civic Center was brought up to the Co-ordinating Committee to make it an accomplishment to at least make a Civic Center. We (all of the residents of block 18) all signed a petition, including myself, not to move us. Mr. Huycke didn't like my attitude at all. We didn't want to move out. The Block Managers went to Best and Mr. Best said, 'If you don't want to move, we're not going to move you against your will.'"¹

Then, on March 25 fielders reported to the Committee that the Administration was contemplating the establishment of a funeral parlor in block 18. Mr. Akitsuki, fearing a conflict, telephoned Mr. Best, and according to May Iwohara, secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee, Mr. Best said he had not even heard about the proposal.

The next day Messrs. Black, Huycke and Thomas called on the Co-ordinating Committee and asked Akitsuki to convince the block residents to accept the establishment of a funeral parlor. Akitsuki preferring to let the members of the Administration see for themselves, suggested a meeting in the block. The residents were adamant. Mr. Best finally solved the difficulty by deciding to establish the funeral parlor in another section of camp, next to the cemetery. The following account of this issue by Miss Iwohara, a resident of block 18, is very interesting, since it contains a frank picture of the regard in which the Co-ordinating Committee was holding members of the Advisory Council in late March.

"Then on March 25, there was memorandum. They were trying to bring an undertaking joint in the next barrack to put the bodies in there between the wake and the funeral because the hospital was overcrowded. Naturally, you know how the residents would feel. Delegates came and told the block residents they were going to bring the equipment whether you like it

¹Notes, April, p. 26.

or not. We said we would have a demonstration.

"Mr. Akitsuki phoned Mr. Best. Best said he didn't even know about it. He called the Social Welfare Section (to inquire.)

"On Monday Mr. Black and Mr. Huycke and Mr. Thomas came to the Co-ordinating Committee and asked Mr. Akitsuki's opinion and asked him to convince the block 18 residents that it would be for the good of the center and unselfish to allow it. So Mr. Akitsuki said, 'Let's go to block 18.' The three delegates tried to talk the residents into it. Naturally, we didn't want to sleep next to a dead body.

"That day we had an informal meeting with Mr. Best and the delegates went home without his convincing them.

"Mr. Black had said, 'If your not going to move our, we'll bring the M. P.'s out and put you in the stockade.' On the question of the Civic Center, he said he will put you into the stockade if you won't go out.

"Mr. Best said he'd take care of it by putting the undertaking firm next to the cemetery. Best said he wanted to bring the undertaking joint here to 18 because it's so near to Social Welfare.

"When we went to see Mr. Black, Mr. Huycke came over and snooped and asked, 'What have you on the agenda?' He said, 'I don't see why you people want to move out. I don't mind sleeping next to a dead body.' Mr. Akitsuki cited an example, 'In Japan, when a child cried, the mother says, "The ghosts will get you."¹

After the meeting with Black, Huycke and Thomas, Mr. Akitsuki sent the following memorandum to Mr. Best.

Messrs. Black, Huycke, and Thomas invited me to a consultation with the Block 18 manager, Quincy Cook, relative to the use of one of the apartments for a funeral parlor, which the block residents, as well as residents of neighboring blocks, resent bitterly. In view of a possible demonstration of violence, I reported to you over the phone yesterday.

Your delegates stated and made clear their viewpoints and stressed the necessity by enumerating reasons and advantages. However, the block manager, representing the block residents, hinted that it would encounter difficulties to materialize such a plan and due to the fact that the colonists' sentiment is being overburdened by the WRA Administration, the consultation did not bring any favorable result on this proposal. Finally, your delegates suggested for further consultation

¹ibid., pp. 26, 27.

with the block advisory group with the block manager tonight. As far as I know it is anticipated that even a consultation will be of no avail because colonists in that block have stated that they will not concede to such a proposal under any condition. In other words, they do not want a funeral parlow established in that block.

I feel that inasmuch as this is a very delicate, as well as a vital matter, further study should be made, otherwise there is a possibility of the agitators to take advantage of the situation, which may cause a greater problem in the center and as a whole, such may result in a center-wide resentment.

/S/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

PRELIMINARY ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE REPRESENTATIVE BODY

Although actual permission had not yet come from Washington, the Administration in the early part of April felt that preliminary steps might be taken. The proposed election of block delegates, however, was placed almost two months ahead. April 4, the following announcement was made in the Newell Star. It contains a reference to "lack of substantial response to the Administration's invitation to proceed with the formation of the committee" which is not clear. The writer knows of no overtures made to the people at this time. (Will check.)

"BEST FORMULATES PROCEDURE TO SELECT REPRESENTATIVE BODY

May 22 Set For Ward Council Elections, To Select Arrangements Committee May 25

[Definite procedure for the organization of an Arrangements Committee to plan and supervise the establishment of a permanent Representative Committee was released in a memorandum issued today by Ray R. Best, project director.

< This action was decided upon "in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation" on the part of the Administration because of the lack of substantial response to the Administration's invitation to proceed with the formation of the committee. >

An election by secret ballot of Block Delegates to Ward Councils will be held May 22 from 2 to 8 p.m. in each block manager's office, following preliminary block meetings on

May 16, under the pro tem chairmanship of the block manager to nominate five candidates and to choose an Election Board consisting of three to five members. < The board members, who will be excused from their duties on the election date, will prepare lists of eligible voters (all residents 18 years of age and over), preside over the election, and certify the results to the project director through block managers and Civic Organization.

WARD COUNCILS >

The Ward Councils, composed of 18 block delegates from each ward (20 in Ward VI) will meet at 2 p.m. May 25 < at a convenient location to be designated by the respective Ward Representatives of Civic Organization, who will act as chairman pro tem until a permanent chairman is elected. > A secretary will be appointed and a representative and an alternate who must be able to speak and understand both English and Japanese, will then be selected from among themselves to serve on the Arrangements Committee; after which, results of the meeting will be certified to the project director through Civic Organization. The Ward Council will continue to exist for possible consultation by the Arrangements Committee.

The eight members of the Arrangements Committee so selected will meet, with the project director or his designated representative as chairman pro tem, and select its own chairman as the first order of business.

The Arrangements Committee will then prescribe qualifications for voters and for members of the Representative Committee; fix the term of office of members of the Representative Committee; designate the date of election; prescribe the manner of filling future vacancies in its own membership; supervise the election; confer with the project director or his representative on matters related to the election and the inauguration of the Representative Committee.

Members of the Arrangements Committee will be paid at the rate of \$19 per month and the secretary \$16 per month. Other approved members of any necessary sub-committees will be paid at appropriate WRA rates.]

(A detailed report on the procedure is now being prepared and will be distributed to each apartment in the near future. ED. Note)

PETITION TO OBTAIN SIGNATURES OF REPATRIATES - FINAL RESIGNATION OF

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

In early April the camp was suddenly thrown into the greatest excitement it had seen since the strike and the incidents. A group of Daihyo Sha Kai sympathizers addressed

a letter to Attorney General Biddle and to the Spanish Embassy, requesting that they be given permission to circulate a petition for the signatures of those "who applied for repatriation or expatriation and who want to be resegregated because of the earnest desire to catch the first chance of the exchange ship." A man named Akashi signed the letter to Biddle. Akashi was a comparatively unknown individual, who had no reputation for association with the Daihyo Sha. He was apparently used as a tool. (Letter to Biddle not available.)

Mr. Biddle passed this letter to Mr. Ickes, who sent it to Myer who sent it to Best, thus frustrating the desire of the group behind the petition who did not wish to deal with Best but with his superiors. Mr. Best himself took no action, but passed the petition on to Harry Black, head of Community management, and left the project for a leisurely tour of other

*Is it a rule
or custom
to consult
Opler?*

centers. Mr. Black without discussing the matter with Dr. Opler, Community Analyst, decided to allow the circulation of the petition, stating the conditions as follows:

Date 2

Mr. Sanae Akashi
7406-A
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Akashi:

*First indication
of the existence
of committee
what committee?*

This is to confirm my statement to you and your committee during our conference yesterday to the effect that there is no objection on the part of the administration to the proposal that you and your committee make a survey to determine the wishes of residents with respect to further segregation within the center.

The information to be derived from the survey would be as follows:

*A summary
of the far reaching
importance of
the steps.
A brief summary
7 pp 304 -
will be appropriate*

1. Persons and families who have applied for repatriation or expatriation, who wish to return to Japan at the earliest opportunity, and who wish to live in a designated section of the Center among others of like inclination.
2. Persons and families who have not applied for repatriation or expatriation, who have reached no conclusion with respect to an early return to Japan, and who wish to live in a section of the Center not specifically designated for persons and families of the group.

It is understood that the survey is to be made merely on a factual basis with the entire liberty of choice resting with the subject interviewed. The survey committee is to make no attempt to influence the decisions of the residents. It is pointed out that no sound speculation can be made as to any prospect of return to Japan because at present the Japanese government is entertaining no consideration of further exchange.

It is further understood that the survey may be made without commitment on the part of the administration, either stated or implied, that the results of the survey will be made the basis of administrative action beyond that which is already established for housing adjustments through the Housing Office.

Sincerely yours,

Harry L. Black
Asst. Project Director.

The group which undertook the obtaining of signatures, however, apparently stressed the fact that all those who were really sincere in their desire to return to Japan would give proof of this by signing. No copy of an actual petition is available, but the following statement, signed by Mr. Akashi, the wife of Reverend Kai, and sixteen other persons was released.

April 8, 1944 (translation)

It was our expectation that this segregation camp should be administered in the definite treatment and competency as the enemy aliens; however, the same administration as in other camp disappointed us.

On the other hand, ~~it~~ ^{it} is intolerable for us to remain an indifferent spectator on the super-extraordinary occasion in our father land. And we have no egoistic ambition but the only hope for the exchange ship in order to fulfill our duties as the Japanese subjects. However, ⁽¹⁾ [we found many heterogeneous elements who were mingled with us and whom we cannot ideally harmonize with.] Hereupon, ten and several confederates, applied for our resegregation to the high officials in important positions in Washington, stating the following reasons:

1. We are observed by all as the enemy subjects, and, because our every act shall really affect the greatest influence to our father country, we should always have to act carefully so that the honor of Japanese subjects shall not be ashamed. Accordingly, we have to keep away from such a disgraceful behaviors as to fight each other among brother, and we have to sweep away the present discord.
2. Though it is very important for us and our children to be disciplined in proportion to the organization of our father country, it is impossible to expect such an education under these conditions as in the mingle with the objectionable elements.
3. The cooperation and harmonization of those who applied for repatriation or expatriation and who desire earnestly to catch the first chance of the exchange ship will be a help to recover smoothly the exchange ship which is brought to a standstill at present.

Fortunately, W.R.A. is in advocate for our earnest petition. Therefore, [it is necessary for us to ask for the signatures of

①

those who applied for repatriation or expatriation and who want to be re-segregated because of the earnest desire to catch the first chance of the exchange ship. At this time, we, clarifying our belief, induce you to sign on the application for the re-segregation in your own accordance and at your own will.]

No one knows how many persons signed the petition. Moreover, some persons, believing it would influence exchange signed the names of their dependents. Estimates vary from 500 to 6,000 names. Mr. Robertson had been told the petition had 5,000 signatures. [The camp was thrown into a turmoil. In some quarters the rumor spread that those who did not sign might not be allowed to return to Japan. arguments for and against signing the petition raged; beatings were reported.]

but a little of the pressure upon those who refused to sign in order they weren't by dependents. I'm not sure what did this means the residents will from being left out from the boat.

The Administration became extremely alarmed. Mr. Best was contacted but gave no help. Mr. Black, feeling that the petitioners had betrayed him by "going ahead on their own initiative and starting this 'return to Japan' rumpus" issued the following memorandum on April 10, stating that the administration had had no intention of carrying out further segregation and that no authorization or authenticity had been given to the circulation of such a petition. This statement was regarded even by persons who did not sign the petition, as an example of a member of the administration breaking faith and going back on his word.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Civic Organization
Attention: All Block Managers

FROM: Harry L. Black, Assistant Project Director

SUBJECT: Correction of Unauthorized Reports

ibid., p. .