

*all rewritten**Just improvement*FIRST MEETING OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

On October 17 the elected or appointed representatives met in the block 16 mess hall and held their first formal meeting. The minutes of this and later sessions were later confiscated by the Internal Security and translated into English by Hyakutaro Mori, vice-president of the Daihyo Sha. Several reliable informants have stated that when it became apparent that the minutes might be confiscated, the Japanese secretary erased portions of the minutes which he thought might incriminate friends.¹ These documents must therefore be employed with circumspection. Fortunately, Mr. Kuratomi checked and corrected these minutes for the writer and Mr. *Yoshuyama* Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee, described the first meeting in great detail. With this assistance it was possible to avoid serious errors, trace down some of the insertions and omissions, and obtain an unusually animated picture of at least the first meeting. These minutes will be quoted and discussed in detail for, with all their errors and ambiguities, they are very significant documents and reveal the psychological state and the motives and intentions of the body which were in large part misunderstood by the administration.

This meeting was attended by 64 men, each representing a block, and by others referred to as "non-Daihyo Sha". The latter were representatives of the Motor Pool, the Hog Farm, the Agricultural

¹According to *Yoshuyama* Kato: "Mr. Komiya was working for Mr. Takahashi and we had a suspicion that they had changed many things (in the minutes) to save Mr. Yamatani's and Mr. Takahashi's face. While we were in the stockade the boys wanted to beat him (Komiya) up for co-operating with Mr. Takahashi. But he said he realized Mr. Takahashi's actions were wrong. From December 29, he said he was completely through with Mr. Takahashi and didn't go to Mr. Takahashi's place anymore. But before he was picked up he changed many things in the minutes to save Takahashi and Yamatani. Mr. Mori told us many places which were erased. R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 10, 1944, p. 3.

Division and certain other unidentified persons who attended the meeting on their own invitation. Hyakutaro Mori, the chairman of the Farm Group, was appointed temporary chairman by applause.¹ It was then suggested that all non-members leave the floor to facilitate the calling of the roll but this was not done.

Nomination were then made for the post of permanent chairman and Toshio (George) Kuratomi was elected, obtaining exactly half the 58 votes cast: Kuratomi, 29 votes; H. Mori, 20 votes; A. Takahashi, 9 votes. The defeat of Mr. Takahashi should be remarked upon here, for later it was widely rumored that he, a prominent Topaz transferee, coveted and expected to obtain the position of chairman or at least a position on the Negotiating Committee. Several informants have hinted that he carried his jealousy of Messrs. Kai and Kuratomi to the point of betraying the Daihyo Sha to the Administration. Whether he was actually guilty of treacherous informing cannot be determined. However, the minutes of the Daihyo Sha meetings and other documents give considerable evidence that he was uncooperative and strove repeatedly to obtain personal prestige. Moreover, he later became advisor to the body which actively opposed the policies of the Daihyo Sha. Although he was a very prominent member of the "agitating group", he was never arrested by the WRA or the Army. This fact has always been regarded with suspicion by camp residents.

Yoshijima
¹ On being asked to explain how a person was appointed "by applause" Kato stated that several people would be nominated and the one receiving the greatest applause would be considered the successful candidate. His explanation is ambiguous. What usually happens is that an interested group gets together before a meeting and decides whom they will nominate. The name is then put forward and if the man is capable he almost always receives enough applause to get him the position. It is not, therefore, a method of selecting one or more men from a group of nominees. Rather, it amounts to a forced appointment put through by a clique. The procedure is very common in camp meetings.

Following the election of Mr. Kuratomi, Mr. Mori was selected as vice-chairman, having received the second largest number of votes. It was decided that secretaries need not be Daihyo Sha Kai members and H. Katayama, Tanaka and S. Komiya were appointed Japanese secretaries while S. Yoshiyama was appointed English secretary. These men were also selected by applause.

Kuratomi then addressed the body, emphasized that this meeting was of great significance to the colonists and that the members should refrain from rash and inconsiderate words during the discussion. Thereupon Kazama, the representative of the Agricultural Division, took the floor and read the farm workers' resolution. Chairman Kuratomi recommended that before this topic was opened for discussion, the body should decide upon some definite policy for the future. Reverend Kai, the representative from block 5, suggested that since time was limited, the body should proceed with some specific agenda. Kuratomi asked if they should begin with the report of the farm incident and Kai recommended that the farm group should present their recommendation. This was accordingly done by Mr. Hatano, chairman of the agricultural group. The recommendations were: (1) Prosecution of the responsible parties, (2) Termination of minors, (3) Urgency of consultation with the Administration and the Spanish Consul, (4) Report of the consultation with the Administration should be submitted to the Spanish Consul as soon as possible, and (5) Disposition of the case of those injured in the farm accident.

Rev. Kai then suggested that Nishioka, the foreman of the Motor Pool give an explanation of the employment of minors. Nishioka and two other representatives of the Motor Pool section,

Matsunaga and Okamoto alternately related the story of the accident to the assembled body. Their great apprehension lest they be held responsible for the accident shows through the awkward phrasing of the minutes and is indicative of the tension and fear already existing in camp. ^{Joshiyama} Kato remarked succinctly on the behavior of these men:

"The representatives of the Motor Pool were really scared to death. They apologized and gave condolence."¹

The motor pool employees apologized for the fact that some of the drivers were minors. No doubt they felt partially responsible for this. They stated that they were doing their utmost to bring about a satisfactory disposition of the case and appealed to the Daihyo Sha to give them full support. Mr. Nishioka also explained the WRA regulation on the age of drivers and it was concluded that according to this regulation the employment of a 16 year old boy was a violation. (This discussion did not have much point, for the driver involved in the fatal accident was 18 years old. Apparently, this was not known to the body.)

Several questions were then asked: whether these regulations were applicable outside the fence; whether the drivers had chauffeur's licences or operator's licences; whether Social Security compensation applied to such cases; whether insurance was provided for. None of the questions were clearly answered and it was suggested from the floor that a committee be selected to clarify the matter. Rev. Kai suggested that instead, the body should proceed with the urgent plans regarding negotiation on the incident.

Kuratomu suggested that instead of attempting to approach the whole issue at this time, the body should select a number of committees to make investigations by departments. Takahashi stated

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 10, 1944, p. 2.

that he wished to make clear the legality of 16 year old drivers and the applicability of accident insurance before going into the matter of appointing committees. Kuratomi replied that he would have the investigating committee go into these questions. The representatives of the Motor Pool were then excused.

Uchida then asked if the foreman of the agricultural division had notified the Administration of the accident within 48 hours of its occurrence. The chief farm foreman, Sato, ^{an old Japanese} whom the writer knows as an extremely cautious individual replied:

"As I was afraid to be taken as if I were taking side of the Administration, I hesitated to go alone to report this matter. I did not, as yet, make any report to the Administration."

In explanation of this matter, Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato told the writer:

"In Poston where they had a similar case, all the accidents had to be reported within 48 hours. Uchida asked if Sato had reported it. Sato stated that he hadn't because if he did go to the Administration, the people would brand him as an inu. Uchida stated that they must make a committee as soon as possible and see if the Administration had made a proper report to Washington and to the United States Employment Compensation."¹

Rev. Kai stated that he questioned Sato's responsibility, since Sato, as a responsible man, had not reported the accident immediately. He repeated Uchida's suggestion that a committee be formed to consult with the Administration and was loudly applauded.²

Rev. Kai then repeated the suggestion already made by Kuratomi that a number of committee's be formed to investigate the numerous matters which required improvement. Mohri backed him up saying:

"Improvement of roads, shower rooms, latrines, and also the inside of the mess halls should be taken up with the Administration. We cannot afford to neglect or ignore such important matters as improvement of living conditions at this time."

¹ibid.

²This was done and the committee was notified by the Administration that a report had been made.

Mr. Izumi of Heart Mountain, who was not a member of the Daihyo Sha stood up and remarked that at Heart Mountain \$125 monthly was given to the immediate family of the deceased in a case like that.¹

Ikeda then reported that T. Kashima, one of the farmers injured, was in a very critical condition. The impressive silence which fell, a characteristic so typical of Japanese groups under strong emotional tension, is awkwardly but significantly expressed by the translators: "Silence reigned the meeting."

This solemn moment was followed by a series of suggestions on the improvement of living conditions and center facilities by four different block representatives. One complained that only one ambulance was available for use in the center, another suggested that the public school (Japanese) should be opened, another that the fire department be improved and that the water supply be increased. Hayashi of block 52 stated:

"I have been informed from an authentic source that farm products are being transported to the Army and Navy. I demand that this body take action and investigate fully. If facts are established, we should altogether refuse shipment to the outside."

How this suggestion was received by the body is not deducible from the minutes, but it later became one of the significant points taken up with the Administration by the negotiating Committee. Psychologically it is a very interesting point since it betrays the strong nationalistic feeling which many of the segees, as Japanese loyal to Japan, felt obliged to exhibit. The idea of producing food for the American armed forces was most repellent and, they feared, would get them into serious trouble when they returned to Japan.

¹ ibid., p. 3.

Yoshiyama
Kato told the writer that this part of the meeting was one of extreme confusion.

"Various Daihyo Sha members were comparing Tule Lake with the centers from which they came. A man would get up and yell, 'In Jerome food was like this.' Then another guy would get up and yell, 'In Topaz, housing was like this.'"

A good example of this type of speech was recorded in the minutes:

Kurihara: Properties owned by the colonists are their assets, which we should prevent loss by fire or theft by all means. Therefore, I recommend that the fire department of this Center be improved, by providing more fire extinguishers, fire hose, and trucks. Even though the population in Heart Mountain is less than this Center, they have more and better fire equipments. For instance, they have 25,000 feet of hose and fire extinguisher in each apartment. Since our bank accounts are frozen and we have no other means of income than our meager salary, we should be provided with all these necessary equipment to prevent fire. I understand that in some blocks, especially Block 59, they have insufficient water supply and they are very much handicapped. I recommend that at least 200 gallons of water per person daily should be allotted.

Takahashi eventually brought a stop to this deluge of comparisons with other centers and moved that the body proceed with the business to be discussed and decide what issues should be presented to the Administration. As explained by *Yoshiyama* Kato:

"This (the complaints) was not getting anywhere. We must select a committee to negotiate with the Administration and close the meeting. Kuratomi said we must set up different committees because one committee cannot handle everything. He suggested various committees such as fire and sanitation, etc."¹

Kuratomi proceeded with the plan for forming the various committees and their names were written on the blackboard by the Vice-chairman Mori: Sanitation and Betterment of Living Condition Committee, Farm Incident Settlement Committee, Hospital Committee, Mess Hall and Food Supply Committee, Education Committee, Negotiating or Central Committee.

¹ ibid.

From this point on the meeting appears to have become increasingly chaotic. Much of this is due to a hopelessly confused translation. On checking this section with both Kuratomi and ^{Yoshiyama} Kato it was found that several of Kuratomi's remarks were attributed to a "voice from the floor" while incorrect speeches are attributed to Kuratomi. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, the English secretary of the Daihyo Sha, gave a much more coherent description of this sections from his own notes.

"Mr. Wada asked about the (members of the hog and chicken farm) working or not working and said that (in this matter) they were willing to co-operate with the Daihyo Sha majority. Mr. Kubota of block 17 also stated, 'Yes, we should like to know whether to work.'

"Mr. Kodama said, 'The hogs and pigs are living things, so we should act according to common sense.' Mr. Takahashi gave an example of Topaz where he came from. He stated we should just feed them and come home.

"After that the business of the hogs was forgotten" (but it was brought up again later).

"Mr. Hatano the farm chairman, stated that many were unemployed so we should try to get unemployment compensation. Uchida of 37 stated that the most important problem at the moment is the people involved in the accident and the accident itself. We should clarify the problem first."

Kuratomi then brought the body back to the pressing business of arranging for the selection of the committees and also stressed the necessity of forming a Central Committee to co-ordinate the work of the other committees. This body, the proposed Central Committee, later came to be known as the Negotiating Committee and carried on the negotiations with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer. Kuratomi suggested that the committees be selected on a ward basis, i.e., each of the seven wards in camp would have one man on each committee. The members of the Daihyo Sha were to meet in their respective wards the following morning and each ward was to select

one man for each committee, thus forming a committee of seven men.¹ It might be added that this was putting the responsibility of selecting the committees on the shoulders of a very few men, since each ward had on the average of nine blocks. In all fairness, however, it should also be mentioned that these committees were intended to be temporary.

The matter of feeding the hogs and chickens was now reintroduced. Although this is a minor matter, the argument which appears to be faithfully reproduced, is most enlightening on the psychological bent of the men present at this meeting. The extreme radicals argued for not feeding them. The more sensible people, realizing that after all the food would be taken from their own mouths, argued for feeding them, stating "After all, they are living things."

Akiyama: . . . Since the incident occurred in the agricultural department all the farm workers stopped working. Doesn't that create some friction with the farm workers if the hog and chicken farm workers continue to work.

Kuratom: If certain department employees stop work altogether it will be regarded as a strike. The hogs and chickens should be fed, as we have not decided on a strike. (No reaction from the floor.)

Wada: I wish to make this point clear for the workers of the hog and chicken farm. Whether it is approved by this Committee to continue to work.

Takata: Since the farm workers stopped working, why should they (hog and chicken farm workers) continue to work. That's not co-operation, to my mind.

Voice from the floor: Strike is not declared. Therefore, at least animals should be fed by colonist workers, otherwise we will be short on food stuff, especially in meat and egg.

Kodama: I am sure that upon declaration of a general strike, all divisions and section workers should stop work altogether. Until then, continue work.

Takata: We did not come to Tule Lake to get jobs. We came here for the purpose of returning to Japan. The center management should be taken care by the Army and the Administration. We have

¹ibid.

no responsibility as far as management of the Center is concerned. Therefore, why do we not support the farm workers and go into a strike.

Chair: We will bring up the issue to the Administration just as soon as the committee complete its investigation and preparation.

Ikeda: Since the M. P.'s have confiscated our passes for no reason at all it means that we are prohibited from going out of the fence. Why should we continue to work?

Chair: We have absolutely confidence that we will win in this consultation with the Administration on this issue. However, we should think about the time of this negotiation. If the hog farm workers should strike at this time and prove to be a failure, we have no excuse to offer those injured.

Uchida: We have never had chicken or pork on our tables and I presume that hogs and chickens do not belong to us. Why should we assume responsibility for anything that doesn't belong to us?

The question of whether the hog and pig farm workers should continue working was eventually put to a vote. It was decided to continue feeding the animals - 58 to 7. In spite of the rash suggestions of the hotheads, the body as a whole was averse to letting the pigs and chickens starve, probably because such action would make the "work stoppage" and unquestionable "strike" and because, though they had as yet received no chicken or pork at mess, they did not wish to cut themselves off permanently from this potential supply.

After the meeting was adjourned someone suggested that the farm workers might think the strike had been postponed and might return to work on Monday, Oct. . Kuratomi stated that announcements would be made in the messhalls by the block managers to avoid this.

Analysis of Meeting and Character of Leaders

This meeting appears chaotic, erratic, disorganized and emotional in the extreme. Very few of those present appear to have come with any definite preconceived procedure in mind. Kuratomi

and a few other men who had had some experience in organization at former centers realized that an attempt of this kind entailed a great deal of work and required the organization of committees. It should be noted, however, how hard Kuratomi had to strive to keep the attention of the body centered on the simplest matters of business. He was interrupted constantly by members or non-members who wished to air their suggestions or simply get up and express their grievances in public. Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato gave his frank opinion of this first meeting:

"This meeting was really very confused. Everybody was burned up. They didn't decide what to do before going into a new subject. They didn't really achieve anything except to have the Daihyo Sha meet and decide to elect committees for the accident, hospital, food, sanitation, etc."¹

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To comprehend to some extent the difficulties Kuratomi faced, it must be kept in mind that that was not an ordinary meeting attended by a normal group. Instead it was held under an atmosphere of extraordinary emotional tension and the persons present were, by and large, the most emotional, aggressive, and rash persons in the center. The unavoidably helter-skelter manner by which these men had been selected has already been described. Not having the time for even a modicum of consideration or forethought, the people had selected these men who, in the centers from which they had come, had developed a reputation as exhibitionistic forceful talking, table-pounding individuals, noted for their extreme anti-Administrative attitude. Some had participated in some type of administrative negotiations in their former centers. As a result, the number of men present, who were partly unbalanced, frustrated or who verged on paranoia or megalomania was disproportionately large. Under these circumstances it is surprising

¹ ibid., p. 4.

pro-Japanese attitude. An old Tulean member present described his reaction to the atmosphere in the following noteworthy statement:

"At the first Daihyo Sha meeting I didn't like the atmosphere myself. They were emotionally more than 100% for Japan. I doubted very much (if) the speakers were 100% or whether they were just acting. The atmosphere at that time was such that there wasn't any chance to speak up if you disagreed. If anybody did speak up -----!" 1/

1/ ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, p. 1.

a pro-Japanese attitude. Some of them were undoubtedly on the alert for any opportunity to distinguish themselves in camp as public servants. Having committed themselves to returning to Japan, they had convinced themselves that publicized "service for the people" was a means of ingratiating themselves with the Japanese government and perhaps receiving recognition or regard when their exchange took place. The hold which this fantastic notion had on some of the would-be leaders was astonishing. A very practical Japanese ^{James Conn} who had no sympathy with this type of individual, dramatized this attitude by putting himself in his place and speaking in the first person:

"Since I'm going to Tule Lake, sooner or later I'm going to Japan. In order to go to Japan, if I think about my future, I may want something to go back with me. By entering into political positions like that, I have a feeling that I've done something for the people. That's a feather in my hat. That would be ~~me~~ a certain imaginary gift to the government of Japan. I have helped the evacuees during the hardships of camp life." ^{1/}

Certainly, not all the members of the Daihyo Sha cherished this notion. Indisputably, a goodly percentage was infected with it. Much later in camp history this attitude was to lead to the development of an organization so radical and spectacularly pro-Japanese as to make the Daihyo Sha appear moderate by comparison.

Some of the members of the Daihyo Sha had participated in some type of administrative negotiations in their former centers. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ It is not an exaggeration to state that the number of men present who were slightly unbalanced, definitely frustrated, and who leaned toward paranoia or megalomania was disproportionately large. Under these circumstances it is surprising

^{1/} ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, p. 2.

that Kuratomi accomplished as much as he did.

good (The writer does not intend to describe the body as an association of semi-lunatics. The accurate picture is one of a body composed of a larger proportion of exhibitionistic, somewhat unbalanced persons than is normally found. Many of the Daihyo Sha members were reasonable people. However, under the emotional stress and tension of this period, normal persons would make statements and commit acts which they would later regret, while unbalanced persons would go almost berserk, a phenomenon for which the minutes supply much evidence.

good (Kuratomi, the young chairman, was about 27 years old. (Check this.) He was probably selected for this position because of his excellent command of English and his reputation as a leader in Jerome. Intelligent, reserved, dignified, and of scholarly appearance, he possessed a great deal of self-confidence and determination. He showed himself capable of handling the extremely difficult group which selected him as well as could possibly be expected. He was, however, devoted to Rev. Kai and greatly influenced by him. Due chiefly to Kuratomi's efforts, the members were able to come to several concrete decisions: to form committees to investigate the various grievances and put them into shape to present them to the Administration, to contact the Spanish Consul, and to continue to feed the hogs and chickens.

At this point it would be well to discuss and comment upon Mr. Spicer's contention that Kai, Kuratomi and "the minority leaders (in other centers) with a good deal of experience in center politics got together as soon as they reached Tule Lake and began to develop plans for dominating the majority here with their

program and leadership."¹

good

This hypothesis, that the trouble at Tule Lake was the work of agitators who had formulated plans for dominating the center, was accepted by the higher members of the administrative personnel and did service as the chief explanation of the trouble. However, no evidence supports it. Instead, data indicate repeatedly that the events were the result an exceedingly powerful public sentiment, which, had not Kai and Kuratomi been pushed to the force, would have caught up and used some other leaders. The spontaneity, speed and lack of descretion exhibited cannot be explained by any plot. The fatal accident touched off a vast accumulation of resentments; the actions of the administration in the days following the accident increased these resentments until one of the chief concerns of the leaders became that of restraining the people from rash acts of violence. ^{Kuribara} Mr. K., who was still confined in Leupp at this time, discredits the administrative accusations of plotting absolutely. His opinion is valuable because he is a very intelligent man and has had a unique experience in camp demonstrations of this order:

"That opinion was circulated by the Caucasian people, that the boys from Topaz and Jerome were trying to get hold of the controlling interest and trying to get the people under their control. When those boys had acted, we had quite a discussion in Leupp with Mr. Fredericks. He strongly believed at that time this opinion gotten through the newspapers, that those boys from various centers were trying to get hold of the leadership in the camp. I argued with him that it wasn't so. The only reason the boys from Jerome took the leadership here was because they themselves were leaders in Jerome. When they got here they naturally took leadership again, especially of the Jerome faction...I doubt whether they were trying to get leadership or that the plot was formed before. A thing of that nature happens spontaneously."²

¹ Spicer to Provinse,

² ibid., April, p. 17.

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In short, a much more reasonable supposition is that the first Daihyo Sha Kai meeting created the leaders, some of whom had already gained prestige by their activities with the farm group. This is, moreover, born out and strengthened by many of the events which were to follow.

ELECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE - NUCLEUS OF THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE

Only extremely scanty information is available on how the Central Committee was selected. In one ward an informant stated that only six or seven people attended the meeting held on the morning of October 18. There were no nominations. The small group present discussed who would be their best ward representative and he received the position. It is not unlikely that the remainder of the men who were later to loom so high in administrative disapproval were selected in the same informal manner. This nucleus of seven men was later augmented in an equally informal manner. As a member of the Central or Negotiating Committee *Yoshizawa* admitted to the writer:

"The Negotiating Committee was more or less given the power to appoint any person as a member of the Negotiating Committee. As secretary, I was more or less on it." 1/

agree (In short, a much more reasonable supposition is that the first Daihyo Sha Kai meeting created the leaders, some of whom had already gained some prestige by their activities with the farm group. This is, moreover born out and strengthened by many of the events which were to follow.

Administrative Actions

The administration knew nothing of this organization proceeding within the colony and faced the loss of the greater part of the farm crop. Three days passed during which the colonists made no attempt to negotiate. On October 20, Mr. Best, the Project Director, issued a statement pointing out that an immediate report had been sent to the United States Employment Compensation Commission, that no official spokesman for the farm workers had come forward and that the entire farm crop must be harvested. He added the following ultimatum:

"If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 a.m., October 21, it will be necessary for the WRA to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees."¹

(By "loss" Mr. Best meant only the loss of food; the Japanese obtained no money and received no compensation from the sale of the crops.)

¹Tulean Dispatch, Oct. 21, 1943.

In response to this ultimatum the farm foremen met with Mr. Callum, Chief of the Agriculture Division on October 20. The hand written minutes of this meeting have been preserved by the Negotiating Committee and were shown to the writer. They are signed by Mr. Kallam.

Mr. Callum, Chief of Agriculture Division, addressed a gathering of farm foreman representatives at 11 o'clock Wednesday morning requesting that the Center farmer return to work and harvest the mature crops in order to meet the requisition of the mess divisions. The interpreter for the farm group advised Mr. Callum that until the negotiations between the farm groups and the W.R.A. officials has been completed the evacuee farmer will not return to work.

The farmer's interpreter, stressed the fact that we are not striking, but for our own protective precautionary measure we will not go to work until the issue involved has been settled.

The interpreter, advised Mr. Kallam that any negotiating between the farm crews and the W.R.A. representative must be ironed out with the negotiating group representing them (the farmers). The interpreter also emphasized the fact that the shortage of vegetable for the mess halls is not the responsibility of farmers, but that the full responsibility is with the W.R.A.

In this meeting the farm foremen make it quite clear that they over all negotiations regarding the "strike" to a "negotiating group" and that the matter is out of their hands.

When this attempt at negotiating directly with the farmers failed, Mr. Best issued the following ^{two} statements ^{20 and} on October 21.

^{Both} This ^{were} announcements ~~is said to have been~~ made through the block managers ^{and the latter, at least, was read in the messhalls.}

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

In conformity with my statement as published in the Tulean Dispatch of Oct. 21, I invite any representative committee to discuss any problem. Arrangements for such a meeting can be made at my office.

/s/ R. R. Best

¹ R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 1.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

October 20, 1943

To be read at dinner October 20 and at breakfast, Oct. 21 by Block Managers and posted in each Block Manager's office and in all mess halls.

On the afternoon of Oct. 15, an accident occurred in transporting workers to the farm area. Many workers were injured. Later one worker died from injuries received. Immediately all reports and notices necessary were made to the U. S. Employment Compensation Commission for all the workers injured. The next day no farm workers appeared and none have reported since. To date no official spokesmen of the farm workers have come to discuss the matter with the Administration although the administration is ready and invites such discussion.

It is the administration's intentions to work with the residents in adjusting problems and making Tule Lake as comfortable a place to live as possible.

In the immediate situation, the entire farm crop needs to be harvested. These are the vegetables that the residents of Tule Lake will be eating this winter. The crop will not be lost. If evacuees do not harvest it; the Army will be asked to. This means that the W.R.A. will have to ask the Army Quartermaster for vegetables for the evacuee's tables this winter. These requisitions must be prepared for 50 days in advance of the period to be used. We would not be in a very good position to expect our demands to be filled if we fail to harvest the splendid crop now available.

The situation is the responsibility pure and simple of the residents of Tule Lake Center. The administration is ready and willing to discuss and work out on a fair basis ~~among~~ any and all difficulties that may arise. If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 A. M. October 21st, it will be necessary for the WRA to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees.

/s/ R. R. Best

Oct 26? It was on the strength of this announcement that the Negotiating Committee asked for and received an appointment with Mr. Best on October 27 when the first formal negotiations took place.

Reasons for Delay in Negotiations

I believe this is correct (The delay on the part of the negotiators in contacting Mr. Best requires some comment. The work stoppage began on October 15, and no one approached Mr. Best for 13 days. Members of the Negotiating Committee have explained the delay on the grounds that Best had repeatedly made the statement that he would not recognize any representatives. The real reason for this delay, however is clear. The Daihyo Sha Kai meeting of October 17 indicates that the body had undertaken a formidable and time consuming amount of organization and investigation. A "loyal" evacuee informant sent from Tule to Gila on November 8, explained the situation:

"They were not prepared to make their demands. They were trying to figure out the proper approach. They wanted to ask each block's opinion getting their channel work done."¹

THE PLANNING BOARD FIASCO

On October 22 an attempt was made by Mr. Takahashi to obtrude another organization, the almost extinct Planning Board, into the picture. The Planning Board had served as an ~~issue~~ ^{issue} advisory board previous to segregation but had been dissolved at the time of segregation. Takahashi first attempted to call the Planning Board together on October 15, the day of the farm accident, but so few persons attended that no meeting could be held. The second attempt of October 22 met with better success. However, due to the fact that so many of the former members of

¹Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 12.

the board had left Tule Lake as non-segregates, the membership had been hastily augmented by appointments made since segregation and probably since the farm accident. It is significant that of the 50 representatives present, at least 27 were already members of the Daihyo Sha.

Takahashi, who was elected temporary chairman pointed out that the Daihyo Sha was to be "temporary in nature" and that "This Planning Board we are trying to set up will be the backbone of everything and will take over the further negotiation with the Administration after the Daihyo Sha has dissolved." His suggestion to reform the Planning Board received almost no support. Member after member arose and spoke in favor of waiting until the Daihyo Sha had settled the current mishap. When the question was put to a vote 36 persons voted to dissolve the Planning Board completely, 8 to discontinue it until the auto mishap was settled and 8 to have it "in actual work now."

Takahashi apparently took this set back with good grace and stated:

"Whether dissolved or not we will support and cooperate 100% with the present Daihyo Sha Kai who have been elected by the people of all the blocks."

Nevertheless, he had not given up hope completely and attempted to revive the issue at the next meeting of the Daihyo Sha. Kuratomi discouraged him quickly, and this move to limit the life of the Daihyo Sha and channel camp control to another organization failed completely.

(Should there be any other comments here?....R. H.)

The minutes of the October 22 meeting of the Planning Board follow:

*No, this is
sufficient*

Planning Board

Place: Block 13 Mess Hall

Time: October 22, 1943

Purpose: To reorganize the Planning Board (temporary name)

Meeting comes to order under the temporary chairman, Mr. K. Okamoto of Block 1318-D

Roll call taken by the temporary chairman:

Block	Representatives	
4	absent	
5	Kawakami	505-C
6	Yoshiyama	604-C
7	Uyeda	702-C
8	Matsuno	815-D
9	Yamamoto	902-D
10	absent	
11	Kawamura	1117-D
12	Yamauchi	1219-A
13	Okamoto	1318-D
14	Yamanaka	1404-C (Kosaka representing)
15	Wada	1518-A
16	Shimada	1616-A
17	Kuwata	1718-D
18	Tokuichi	1818-E
19	Ono	1906-A
20	Mohri	2004-A (Masuda representing)
21	Miyamoto	
22	absent	
23	absent	
24	Kawano	(Hamada representing)
25	Ueda	2515-C&D
26	absent	
27	Tanaka	2714-A
28	Tsutsumi	2802-D
29	Idemoto	2915-A&D
30	Tsuda	3015-C
31	Yamatani	3108-C
32	absent	
33	Tsuda	3303-A (Kushida representing) 3313-B&C
34	Tabata	3403-D
35	Morikawa	3516-C
36	absent	
37	Okada	(Terada representing) 3703-D
38	Kokawa	3816-A
39	Hoshiko	3918-F
40	Fukawa	4019-B

Block	Representatives	
41	Katayama ✓	4118-E
42	Nakagawa ✓	4205-B
43	Nakamura	4305-C
44	Nakashima ✓	4413-A
45	Yabumoto ✓	4519-F
46	Ito ✓	4617-C
47	Takao ✓	4713-D
48	Absent	
49	Absent	
50	Tashima	5012-B
51	Tokunaga	5112-D
52	Hayashi ✓	5213-B
53	Absent	
54	Yabu	5404-A
56	Baba	5604-A
57	Miki ✓	5715-B
58	Takeshita ✓	5813-A
59	Tsuji	5917-C
66	Fukuda	6615-C
67	Absent	
68	Takahashi ✓	6813-A & B
69	Sasajima ✓	6906-B
70	Tsugaya	7006-B
71	Absent	
72	Absent	
73	Absent	
74	Murai	

51 representatives present out of 64 blocks.

Report by Mr. K. Okamoto:

Planning Board was almost liquidated because of the segregation. In spite of the Administration refusing to recognize any group, body, or an organization to negotiate any grievances we found it necessary that in order to have harmony, clearer understanding between the colonists and the Administration we must organize this body. The war representatives met and was decided unanimously the necessities of such organization. We had our first meeting on Friday night of October 15, 1943 at this mess hall but to accomplish anything was almost a complete failure because many block representatives failed to be present. Tonight I am very happy to see so many present.

Yamatani 31

If this Planning Board is to become an official organization we must first elect an official chairman.

Takahashi 68

I believe we should not elect any chairman more than a temporary one for we cannot tell who in this Center is qualified for such position, hence, we should elect a temporary chairman until we make sure who is qualified for such position.

Yamatani Block 31

I think we should elect a temporary chairman for the night in order that we may be able to carry on this significant meeting tonight.

Takahashi Block 68

Yes, above all we should elect a temporary chairman for tonight to carry on this meeting.

Okamoto Block 13

I also am in favor of having a temporary chairman for tonight until we are better acquainted with one another. Because I have sponsored this meeting I will act as a chairman until someone is elected as a temporary chairman. Is there any nomination for a temporary chairman to carry on this meeting tonight?

Mr. Aizo Takahashi of Block 68 and Mr. Okamoto of Block 13 were nominated from the floor.

The nominees were elected by counting the hand. The result being:

Mr. Takahashi - 23 votes

Mr. Okamoto --- 23 votes

Twice the representatives present were requested to elect their temporary chairman but the result was the same.

Okamoto Block 13

Because I am a representative from my block, Block 13, I feel that I am entitled to cast my vote. I shall cast my vote to Mr. Takahashi. (Incidentally Mr. Okamoto sponsored the meeting and is acting as a temporary chairman until the temporary chairman is elected.)

Mr. Aizo Takahashi of Block 68 became the temporary chairman for the night to carry on the meeting. He was granted the power to appoint a vice chairman. He appointed Mr. Okamoto of Block 13. Mr. Okamoto is a former Tulean and was very active member of the Planning Board before the "segregation."

Tsutsumi Block 28

Explain the purpose of the Planning Board and why must we have this organization when we have already elected a Dai hyo sha from each and every block to look into auto mishap and to negotiate and to iron out all our grievances?

Takahashi Block 68 (temporary chairman)

The Daihyo sha that we have elected to look into the situation of the auto mishap that occurred on the 15th of October is merely a temporary in nature and will be automatically dissolved after the main issue has been amicably negotiated with the Administration. This Planning Board we are trying to set up will be the backbone of everything and will take over the further negotiation with the Administration after the Daihyo Sha has dissolved. This will be more or less a permanent organization and will represent all the residence here.

Masuda Block 20

This Planning Board should not plan in advance until the auto mishap is cleared and all the grievances ironed out. We should wait for a while. After all grievances are cleared and the Daihyo Sha Kai resign we can have this organization set up. We can always have this organization set up again if it is the desire of the people.

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Ito Block 46

We believe that the auto mishap of October 15 is a people's problem and it concerns all the people, that is why we have elected a representative from every block to look into the matter, hence, we should wait until everything is clarified.

Shimonishi Block 67

We should wait and not attempt to set up this Planning Board until the accident mishap is clarified.

Kuwata Block 14

We should wait for awhile yet. We should do our best and to give our full cooperation to the Daihyo Shas who are trying to settle the auto mishap of October 15.

Hayashi Block 53

I feel that we should recognize this Planning Board.

Kawamura. Block 11

I see no reason why the Planning Board should be set up now when we already have our Daihyo Sha. We should wait until the auto mishap is clarified and all grievances amicably settled.

Okamoto Block 13

This Planning Board was quite active before the "segregation," but since, it became like a ghost. Many members transferred to the other Centers and the organization was like a ghost, practically out of existence, however we had the Ward representatives meet whenever deemed necessary.

Kawamura Block 11

At any rate as I have stated before, we should wait until the auto mishap is settled.

Hayashi Block 52

We should recognize this organization and be ready to take over as soon as the Daihyo Sha Kai resigns.

Yamamoto Block 9

We should wait or better yet if we dissolve this organization altogether because the representatives who were elected to settle the auto mishap occurring on October 15 are doing a wonderful job while I firmly believe that the Planning Board has not accomplished a thing thus far.

Yamatani Block 31

Planning Board is necessary and should exist.

Takahashi Block 68

I believe the Planning Board can wait until the auto mishap of October 15 is amicably settled.

Shimonishi Block 67

Wait until the auto mishap of October 15 is clearly settled.

Kawamura Block 11

The Planning Board should wait until the auto mishap is settled but in

the meantime the Planning Bd. should be in existence and be prepared for emergency, of course no active part should be taken while the
Daihyo Sha put their resignation.
Das

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Yamamoto Block 9

The Administration has definitely failed to recognize this or any political organization since the "segregation", hence we should wait and see the outcome from the auto mishap. If it is the will of the colonists and also if the Administration is willing to recognize this organization, by all means we should set up this organization, but after the Daihyo Sha put in their resignation.

Yamatani Block 31

Since the "Segregation" the Planning Board was almost completely dissolved but in actuality it was in existence and was doing a minor work. I know the importance of having this Planning Board in actual work but it seems like many present here are opposed to having this organization set up now.

Kawamura Block 11

There is a possibility that another auto mishap may occur in this Center again after this auto mishap of October 15 is amicably settled. If the Daihyo Sha Kai resigns after the auto mishap of October 15, who will take care of the next auto mishap? If we had the Planning Board in existence all these worries will be over for the Planning Board can iron out all grievances with the Administration. This being the reason I wish to make an revision to all the former statement I made tonight. Now I believe that everybody here should recognize and help set up this organization.

Takahashi Block 68

This argument of pro and con cannot go on like this so we should vote on this issue whether to dissolve the Planning Board or not. And if this organization is to be discontinued we should make a resolution to this effect and publish it in the "Tulean Dispatch."

The issue was put forth before the representatives to be voted.

- 1- In having the Planning Board dissolved completely.....36 votes
 - 2- In having the Planning Board discontinued until the auto mishap is settled..... 8 votes
 - 3- In having the Planning Board in actual work now..... 8 votes
- Planning Board has dissolved completely.

Takahashi Block 68

Resolution as to why the Planning Board was dissolved and that all representatives present will support and cooperate fully with the present Daihyo Sha will be printed in the Tulean Dispatch. The resolution will be written by the secretaries present. October 22 will be remembered as the date the Planning Board has dissolved. Whether dissolved or not we will support and cooperate 100% with the present Daihyo Sha Kai who have been elected by the people of all the blocks.

Okamoto Block 13

All the office workers has not been paid any compensation for their wonderful work since September 16. The Administration has been paying the workers until the segregation has commenced, but has ceased paying the workers when the Planning Board showed a sign of dissolving. I sincerely believe that all office workers should be paid for their unselfish and sincere work they have performed. Even the Administration has failed to recognize this organization we were still carrying on this wonderful work. For example we were taking census as to how many elders, youngsters, girls, boys, etc. there are in each block.

Shimonishi Block 67

We should discuss this issue with the block residents.

Okamoto Block 13

At any rate all workers should be paid for some have even resigned their position to work for the good of the residents here.

It was decided that each block take care of their own collections, and bring them to Mr. Okamoto of Block 13. The salary paid to these workers were ¥19.00 plus ¥3.75 clothing allowance. There are four office workers in all. ¥91.00 will take care of these workers. It was decided that the collection of ¥1.50 will be paid by the representatives present tonight or the representatives will return to their Block and collect the sum from the Block residence.

Meeting was adjourned at exactly 11:00 P.M.

Minutes taken by:

Satoshi Yoshiyama
(Secretary)

*This is completely
rewritten.*

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE PUBLIC FUNERAL

When Mr. Kashima's death was announced, two different groups determined independently to give him a public funeral. The first group was composed of his fellow workers, the farm group. The second group was organized on a camp wide basis and was initiated by a decision on the part of the Daihyo Sha to hold a camp wide funeral. *According to informants this decision was put before the blocks* Mr. Kuratomi was made chairman of the Sogi-in or Camp Funeral Committee but both he and Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato stated that the actual work and preparation was done by Mr. Takahashi, who as a friend of the Kashima family and a fellow resident of Topaz was made head of the Jikko-in, the Preparations Committee.

The farm group contacted Mr. Best first, evidently without the knowledge of Takahashi's committee. Little is known of what happened at this interview for none of the persons present have been contacted. However, from the minutes of a meeting held later, it is apparent that this farm group asked Mr. Best's permission to hold the funeral on the outdoor stage in the central firebreak, requested that he or his representative appear at the funeral and that he send a letter of condolence to the widow. Mr. Best refused. He explained his refusal to Kuratomi as follows:

"They didn't ask me, they demanded that I appear at the funeral and speak. They demanded that I transmit a letter of condolence to the widow. I do not recognize demands."^{1 2}

On October 21, Mr. Best sent the following letter to Mr. Tsutomu Tanigawa who had acted as interpreter for the farm workers funeral committee:

In reply to your statement that a public funeral will be held at 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, October 23, at the outdoor stage in the firebreak, you are hereby notified that permission is not granted to hold such a public funeral.

¹ Meeting of the Project Director and the Negotiating Committee, Oct. 26, 1943. See p. 24.

² 1. R. H. Hickey, Notes, Oct. 12, 1944, p. 1.

and appeared by the people. 11

For your information, funerals will be held in the customary locations as they have since the opening of this Center.

According to Mr. ^{Yoshiyama} Kato, a member of the Jikko-11n, Takahashi's committee, he and Takahashi approached Mr. Best with no knowledge of the attempt made by the farm group. ^{Best} He told them that he had already refused the use of the outdoor stage to the first group because they had taken an arrogant demanding attitude. He added, however, that he might allow Takahashi's group to use the High School Auditorium, because "they had come in a nice way." The next day, when Takahashi's committee returned for final permission, Mr. Best stated that he would grant them neither the outdoor stage nor the auditorium. Again he put his refusal in writing in a letter dated October 22 and addressed to ^{Yoshiyama} Kato and Takahashi.

Gentlemen:

"In reply to your request to use the outdoor stage or the high school auditorium for funeral purposes Saturday, October 23, my final answer is that no public funeral will be allowed at this particular time. Permission to use the outdoor stage or the high school auditorium is not granted.

No further discussion on this matter is necessary."

Takahashi became very angry and decided to use the outdoor stage regardless of the consequences.

The position of Mr. Kashima's widow in this matter is peculiar. According to ^{Yoshiyama} Kato she at first approved of the public funeral and felt honored at the respect being shown her husband. When approached by the Administration, however, she is reported as having said that she did not wish a public funeral. A reasonable explanation given by Kuratomi is that she was pleased by the honor shown her husband but, in accordance with proper Japanese behavior, refused out of modesty.¹ ^{Yoshiyama} Kato gave the following detailed account of the proceedings:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 11, 1944, p. 3.

"At (for Mr. Kashima's funeral I was elected on the Jikko-iin (Preparations Committee). Mr. Takahashi was the chairman of that committee. I was just a member. I telegraphed Mr. Ernst, informing him that Kashima had died and did other minor things.

"Since Mr. Takahashi couldn't speak English fluently, he requested me to go to Mr. Best's office to see if we could use the public stage for the funeral. It had been decided at the farm meeting that it should be a Tule Lake funeral, because he had died on the way to work and because he was on duty when he died.

"It is Japanese psychology - that the widow didn't admit that she wanted a public funeral.

"I told Mr. Best the reasons why we wanted to have a public funeral. Mr. Best rejected it. I told him that since he (Mr. Kashima) was riding on the truck which was checked out of the Motor Pool, the Motor Pool people would want to come. Since he was from Topaz, his Topaz friends would want to come. Since he was a farmer, the farmers would want to come and that it had been decided at the meeting (what meeting?) to hold a public funeral.

"At first he said that if we came in a nice way, he'd let us use the stage. But, he said that someone else had come and demanded that he let them use it. He even wrote a statement that the public funeral would be held. But he said we might be able to use the high school auditorium. He said he would consult on this with the Education Department. He told us to come for the answer on the next day and Mr. Takahashi went. Mr. Best told him we couldn't use the auditorium or the stage. Mr. Takahashi was burned up and he said that anyway, he'll hold a public funeral outside.

"It was outside and held publicly. To show it was public, it was published in the Tulean Dispatch. Each block gave money; some people gave flowers; every block brought something to that funeral which showed definitely that it was a public funeral.

"Mrs. Kashima at that time was happy about the public funeral and felt honored; but later, I don't know what made the change in her - she stated that it was a member of the Negotiating Committee which forced her to have a public funeral. No Negotiating Committee had anything to do with having a public funeral.

"I think somebody did come to Mr. Best beforehand and I believe it was the farm group. I thought Mr. Best was very direct with us when we went.

"I heard Mr. Takahashi say, OK or no OK, he was going to have it on the public stage. I thought he was right myself then.

"There were issei on the farm group (which went to see Mr. Best) and I think what they said was misinterpreted. Mayeda and Furakawa were there with them to see Mr. Best."¹

¹ ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 4-5.

Yamaguchi

The reminiscences of Mr. Yamaguchi, a young kibe girl from Gila who attended regularly at the meetings held in her ward (VII) where Mr. Takahashi was most influential, give an interesting picture of how the question of the public funeral was viewed by an intelligent colonist:

"We had a lot of meetings on that (the public funeral). They were block meetings to which everyone could go. I went to all of them.

"I know Mr. Takahashi had a very hard time getting an O.K. for the funeral. And when he did get it, one of the members of the Daihyo Sha demanded to have the auditorium for the funeral. Mr. Best said no. He said to have it in a mess hall. Then I think Mr. Takahashi went back and said (he told us about this in a meeting) he said as he went in the door...First Mr. Best said, "No, that's my last word and I'm not going to say anymore." And Mr. Takahashi said, "I'd like to say one thing more. If I took the whole responsibility, I'd like to have Mr. Best's permission and I would cause no trouble for the Administration and I would not have it in the Auditorium." But he did not tell Mr. Best where he would have it.

"I heard that the Jerome and Topaz boys went and cleaned up the sumo place in the firebreak. I didn't attend the funeral."

This informant added her opinion of Mr. Takahashi's reputation in his ward at this time:

"At that time Mr. Takahashi was already disliked by many. Their firm belief that he was a good leader was shattered. Those meetings ~~were~~ were having with him as chairman.....how could we tell what he was saying was true? We would bring up things to discuss, but he wouldn't give us any answer on what the Daihyo Sha's attitude was toward our requests....."¹

Mr. Best's state of mind at this time has been described by Dr. Opler as one of bewilderment and indecision. Overly sensitive to any request which might be construed as pressure, always inclined to put off a decision whenever possible, he was ill equipped to handle this difficult situation. Moreover, he undoubtedly feared that a large public gathering at this time might have unfortunate consequences. According to a reliable Caucasian informant, Mr. Black

¹ ibid., October 12, pp. 2-3.

has stated that the administration had already prepared a message of condolence and was about to send it when the farm group made its appearance and demanded it. After this courtesy had been demanded it could not be granted since this would be giving way to pressure. Kuratomi expressed his opinion as follows:

"Mr. Best was afraid of another outbreak at that time. We explained that the funeral was considered a scared thing and that there would be no trouble."¹

In any case Best's refusal was interpreted as a discourteous and heartless act by many residents. *The decision to hold the funeral had been compromise, and resentment was* Verbatim statements indicate that many persons had identified themselves with the dead farmer to a greater or less degree and the emotional resentment aroused by what appeared to be lack of consideration and respect to the dead inevitably strengthened the position of the Daihyo Sha Kai. It increased tension, the sense of group persecution, and hostility to the Administration. The Administration also sank appreciably in public esteem by suffering Mr. Takahashi's successful defiance.

In this atmosphere of deliberate effort to use the death of Mr. Kashima as a means of stirring up the people, one should not lose sight of a far more significant emotional factor: that this death affected the people profoundly and that even the most politically minded individuals were moved in part by a sincere desire to express their respect to the dead man by showing him this final honor.

L. Kataoka

A nisei/who later resigned from the Daihyo Sha stated with heartfelt sincerity:

"They figured the people who got hurt represented the whole center. The feeling was very bad when Best refused to let them use the auditorium. They knew they couldn't all get in, but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral, because he represented all of us. . . .

¹ ibid., ~~March~~, p. 63. Dec. 11, 1944, p. 3.

"The funeral didn't come out right. If he (Best had run it normally, I don't think nothing like this (trouble which developed) would have happened."¹

Takemuchi
Fujimoto, a level headed nisei who never hesitated to criticize the Daihyo Sha stated in a letter to the writer:

"Mr. Best, in view of the fact that the crops were yet to be got in and that the farmers had not as yet returned to work, saw fit to refuse the request of the said committee. This, as you can see, was the act that showed the seed for what was to come later."²

Four months later he stated:

"My opinion might be colored. I believe my disfavor to the stand taken by the administration was because of their refusal to allow the people to use the gymnasium. It was generally publicized it would be a camp-wide affair."³

In the following statement, *B. Nishino* Nakao, a supporter of the Daihyo Sha gives voice to a common rumor that Takahashi deliberately strove to discredit Kai and Kuratomi and take the credit for himself:

"I heard that Kai and Kuratomi went to Best and he okeyed the use of the school. Just before the day of the funeral he turned around and said No. Who was the cause of it? They say Takahashi. . . When Best refused the auditorium, the people resented it."⁴

A very interesting attitude toward the funeral and the part played by the Daihyo Sha was given by Mrs. *Yamashiro* Yamaguchi, a supporter of the Daihyo Sha at this period: This young woman is no politician. Yet she understood the objective of the pressure group clearly and approved it. Undoubtedly many of the camp residents shared her opinion:

"Wouldn't it seem strange if they didn't have a public funeral when they made such an issue of it such as the strike? That would be the step any leader would take. . . If it was just the case of the farm workers and Mr. Kashima, for that reason alone, such trouble wouldn't be necessary. But I believe there was a very good reason behind what the Daihyo Sha did."⁵

¹ ibid., March, p. 63.

² Writer's correspondence with "I"

³ Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, pp. 30-31.

⁴ ibid., April, 1944, pp. 21, 22.

⁵ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 2.

"I" an independant individual, not particularly favorable to the Daihyo Sha said:

"My opinion might be colored. I believe my disfavor to the stand taken by the Administration was because of their refusal to allow the people to use the gymnasium. It was generally publicised it would be a camp-wide affair."¹

"M" a member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The funeral didn't come out right. If he'd (Best) run it normally I don't think nothing like this would have happened."²

The refusal to grant the use of the gymnasium added greatly to Mr. Best's unpopularity. It struck irritatingly against the peoples' sense of courtesy due the dead. Even so, condemnation of the decision was not unanimous. The intellectual ^{Oda} O said:

"I didn't go. I said, 'I'm very sorry.' But I didn't feel that very much, because WRA did all they could to compensate the family."³

Denied the use of the gymnasium, the Daihyo Sha determined to use the outdoor pavilion. A great crowd attended. The Administration laid a large part of the attendance to threats from young milita t members or hangers on the Daihyo Sha Kai but it is probable that most of the people came out of respect, sympathy and identification with the deceased. Several Japanese admitted that threats had been employed. ^{Katooka} M, a Daihyo Sha member said:

"There were hoodlums like that. They didn't know any better."⁴

October 23, the day on which the rites were celebrated was an unseasonably cold and windy day. The mourners and spectators were

¹ibid., pp. 30, 31. It is not known whether Mr. Best actually gave permission

²Notes, Mar., p. 61.

³Notes, April, p. 22.

⁴Notes, Mar., p. 61.

most uncomfortable; the Buddhist dignitaries were nearly blown off the platform. *J. Kenechi* "I" who is given to analysis was moved to make the following remark about the funeral:

The Funeral was on a cloudy, windy day. Just the kind of a day that would put the people in mind for a little radical propaganda to be spread. Standing out in the cold, shivering with the corpse in front and the goon squad patrolling behind - it was just right for propaganda. The goon squad was just a radical unit - young radicals from Jerome. The administration made a mistake refusing the gymnasium to be used. Had they permitted the gym to be used, they could have put down a ruling and limited the number of people attending the funeral. Had that happened there would have been a lot less people infected with the spirit of to heck with the administration, and what not."¹

J. Kenechi "I's" reasoning is interesting. Evidently, as far as he is concerned, the regimented action of the "goon squad" did not incur public disapproval but rather added force to the antipathy felt for the Administration at this extremely emotional time.

One informant stated that since the use of the auditorium had been refused it was decided that no Caucasians be allowed to attend the funeral.² Developments indicate that some decision of this kind was made and that it led to the first definitely established act of violence on the part of the colonists. Mr. Best wished to give the Japanese the impression that a record was being taken.³ He, therefore, sent the report's officer, John D. Cook, to the funeral with orders to stay in his car and act as if he were taking photographs. Opler, the Community Analyst, who was one of the two Caucasians present besides Cook, saw a group of young men in the background. He thought they were mourners who intended to walk

¹ibid., April, p. 31.

²ibid., p. 21.

³See Opler's eye-witness account of this funeral, Notes, Feb., pp 20, 21.

behind the bier. These young men formed themselves into a line between the warden's headquarters and the platform. It was now apparent that they were a guard. Cook disregarded Best's purported orders, left the car and took many pictures. The guard which objected to the taking of official pictures descended upon him took his camera by force and tossed him, ~~took his camera by~~ into the air. Opler states decidedly that it was all over in a moment. The camera and films were returned later. The identity of the boys is unknown. Opler says they were kibeï. It is probable that they were younger members or ardent supporters of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

On the day of the funeral the Tulean Dispatch published the report from the U.S. Employment Compensation Commission, stating that the amount of compensation to which the widown and children were entitled was two-thirds of his monthly wage as of the date of the accident, i.e., the widown¹ would receive \$10.66 or \$9.00, depending on the husband's classification.

This sum, the representatives and many of the people thought inadequate. An indication of the scorn which was manifested by some of the colonists appears in the letter written by ^{Jakurichi} "I" on November 18:

"The office then published in the local paper that the "Compensation Law" that governs government employees was applicable in this instance, and that the widown and the son of the before-mentioned deceased was entitled to the grand sum of 60 per cent of whatever he was making in a month. Namely, 60 per cent of the kingly wage of 16 big dollars."¹

Second Meeting of Daihyo Sha

The evening of the day on which the funeral was held, the Daihyo Sha Kai met again. There is some evidence in the minutes of this

¹See Report, Dec. 24, pp. 20, 21.

Second Meeting of the Daihyo Sha - October 23

The evening of the day on which the funeral was held the Daihyo Sha met again. This meeting is almost as confused as the first. Reckless suggestions were hurled at the chairman, who interrupted them from time to time to ask for the report of certain committees.

The translated minutes open with an announcement by Chairman Kuratomi that he had received a written memorandum from the Project Director giving the Daihyo Sha official recognition. Kuratomi informed the writer that this is a false insertion and that the statement could not have been made since he had not yet seen Mr. Best. After roll was taken it was found that 15 block representatives were absent. Kuratomi admonished the body for this lack of interest. He then called for a report from the Sanitation and Betterment of Living Condition Committee. This report is not included in the minutes. At this point the more vociferous members could no longer contain themselves. Representative after representative arose and told the body "what they wanted."

Kawamura: Colonists should be allowed to use electrical appliances such as iron and hotplates regardless of time or place at their free will. Space for living quarters is insufficient and the Administration should be informed of the condition.

Sasaki: I request that cameras be permitted within the Center.

Okamura: Colonists should be paid just as much as the men in the Army.

Yamanaka: Private enterprises are prevailing within the Center. Such should be restricted. Moreover Co-op is handling too many luxuries and food stuff, which not only affects the economy of the colonists but also encourages the WRA to be reluctant in their distribution of food.

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Kurihara: There is no sewing machine in this center....Administration should be consulted to make such provisions without cost.

Nogawa: Tulean Dispatch has reports of the Imperial Headquarters' war news, which should be disseminated.

Uyeno: It is unfair for the Co-op to charge 5¢ for cashing Government checks, such should be stopped.

Saito: Lumber for furnitures are furnished free to the colonists in Poston and it should be practiced here too.

Takeshita: Alteration of living quarters is imperative, especially in Block 59, Alaska and Mexico areas.¹

Kuratomi finally stopped this tide of suggestions and brought the body back to a discussion of the farm problem. Chairman of the Warehouse Committee, Kozaka read his notes. The fact that pork was never served, the suspicion that the products of the hog and chicken farms were being disposed of without the knowledge of the colonists was again brought up by Kuratomi. It was believed that these products were being shipped out of the center to the United States Army and Navy. As loyal Japanese the segregates felt they should not be obliged to furnish food for U. S. armed forces.

Yamanaka, the alternate representative from block 14 made the following speech which received great applause:

"During my stay in Topaz, we received only the best farm products of Tule Lake, which means that despite the Tuleans producing them, they are forced to use only second grade farm products, which is utterly unfair. Just because we are disloyal to America is no reason. We are 100% pro-Japanese, therefore, we should be treated according to the International agreement. At the time of the late Kashima's funeral, the attitude assumed by the Administration was called heartless policy."

Kuratomi then called for a discussion of the hospital problem but the chairman of the committee reported that the investigation had been difficult. Takahashi stated that the Caucasian doctors were too dictatorial; they were making the evacuee doctors' lives

¹ ibid., p. 3.

miserable. This too should be taken up with the Administration.

Kazama, who appears to be highly emotional added:

"What do we care about the evacuee doctors! Their status of whether loyal or disloyal should be cleared. If there are loyal evacuee doctors, we should not have such doctors, even in case of sickness. I prefer death rather than be cared for by loyal doctors. Caucasian doctors are even better." (The floor was in turmoil.)¹

Kai quieted the outburst by saying:

"Kazama's and Takahashi's opinions are evidence of their mutual love for Japan, which I must commend. However, each doctor's status should be decided by his own will and Dr. Hashiba should be retained."

Takahashi went on to urge the retention of all evacuee doctors. He was interrupted by hecklers and Kazama again raised his voice:

"Due to our obligation toward the One and Only (the Emperor)..."

Kai interrupted and rebuked him:

"You have no right to hinder a representative who has a voice in the body. I advise that you refrain from such an act hereafter."²

WRA's refusal to allow Daihyo Sha members to investigate the food situation and the suspicion that graft was going on among the WRA officials was reported. Ideda stated:

"Cost of our daily food is only amounting to 18 to 20 cents. It should be increased to 44¢ as stipulated in the WRA regulation."

Uyeda added:

"Daily allotment of food should be 45¢ and the quality should be improved."

Nakahiro then related his experience as menu maker in Topaz. Kuratomi brought the meeting into line again by calling for the report of the Education Committee. This report is not included in the minutes. Tsuchiya remarked:

¹ ibid., p. 3.

² ibid., p. 4.

"Since we have come here to be repatriated to Japan I do not find the necessity of learning English."

Kuratomí differed:

"A child of five or six could get by without public school education, but high school students should attend public school because of lack of diversified courses offered in Japanese School. Educational problems have been entrusted to educators so we have nothing to worry about."

Near the close of the meeting Takahashi recommended that the Planning Board be Co-ordinated despite the decision to dissolve made on the previous night. Kuratomí disregarded this proposal. He pointed out later that Takahashi's proposal was contrary to the wishes of the Planning Board members.

The difficulties of the Food Committee were dealt with by contacting Mr. Sugimoto who had some reputation for having experience at investigating mess conditions in Poston. Sugimoto was not a member of the Daihyo Sha but was approached by Mr. Saito and asked to take over the chairmanship of the food committee. Sugimoto made the following interesting statement to the writer:

"What I wanted to find out was how bad it was, actually, because comparisons are pretty difficult unless you can show it in figures.

"I went ahead and investigated the actual reception of the food material in the center from the Army quartermaster and the actual consumption of that food by the residents of the camp during the month of September, 1943. By doing that I thought I might be able to throw some light. Of course, what I investigated, the degree of correctness of that report is not known to me as yet. But the FBI, they had an accountant with them (in their mid-November investigation) and he went over my report and worked it over item by item using the same records I used. So the only person who knows how true that report is is he.

"At that time I was anticipating difficulties I might have to face and the possibility that the report might be confiscated. So I had my sister make 20 copies and scattered the report to my friends to keep it for me.

To get the necessary data to make this report, certain young men lifted the desired books from the mess offices. According

Yoshiyama
to Kato, these books are still in the colony but were brought
forth from hiding to show to the FBI.

WRA's refusal to allow Daihyo Sha members to investigate the food situation and the suspicion that graft was going on among WRA officials was reported.

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In spite of the absence of the committee's reports this meeting is extremely interesting. Giving due allowance for a prejudiced translation, the writer is of the opinion that the deluge of reasonable and unreasonable requests, the heckling of more moderate persons by those desirous of making a public display of their loyalty to the Emperor give a fair picture of the general tone of the meeting. Kuratomi's announcement of administrative recognition of the Daihyo Sha is possibly based on a statement from Best that he was willing to meet the committee. From this mass of reports, intelligent and unintelligent suggestions, the Negotiating Committee selected and prepared the agenda for the meeting with Mr. Best which took place on October 26.

There is some evidence that Kai and Kuratomi met Mr. Best informally, previous to or during this time. Opler said:

"On some of the meetings with Best, only Kai and Kuratomi would come up and say, 'We are the representatives of the people.' He'd ask them, 'Who are the representatives of the people?' He'd ask them, 'Who do you represent?' They'd parry away in there (Best's office). On one occasion Kai just stormed out of the room...."¹

October 26 - Meeting of Project Director and Negotiating Committee

The minutes of the October 26 meeting between Best, Zimmer, Black, and ten members of the Negotiating Committee may be censored. Even so they reveal clearly the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee, the relative stress on each point, and the attitude of the

Administration and the Committee.

Mr. Best's attitude and state of mind before beginning this conference should be taken into consideration. There is some evidence that he had already telegraphed the Project Directors of other centers, asking for Japanese volunteers to harvest the crops. (This must be checked.) He was under pressure from Washington to see that the crop, which was valued at several hundred thousands of dollars, was not wasted. A man of little physical courage, he prided himself on never giving way to pressure. During his directorship at Tule Lake, he has summarily vetoed any proposition brought to him which contained even a mild implication of pressure. This held true whether he dealt with Caucasians or Japanese. An interview which he granted to Dr. Melton, Assistant Project Director of Jerome, Mr. Kuratomi and several other prominent Jeromites on October 1, is illuminating. This occurrence was narrated by Mr. Kuratomi and his bias against Mr. Best should be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, Mr. Best's attitude coincides exactly with descriptions related to the writer by Caucasian staff members who approached Mr. Best with suggestions or with requests for advice.

"...Dr. Melton...was kind enough to arrange an introductory meeting for us with Mr. Best. He called upon four or five persons whom he thought would be interested in being introduced to Mr. Best at that time. That was on the first of October.

"I clearly remember what he (Mr. Best) said at that meeting. The impression he gave us then certainly betrayed his ability as a Project Director. Putting up his feet on the desk and talking was all right. I suppose many executives do that. But his attitude toward us was high pressure. He gave us the impression, 'I'm project director here, and I'm running this center. Nobody's going to tell me what to do.'

"The very first thing he said was, 'I don't recognize any representative body. I'm not going to be high pressured by anybody. I'm not going to meet any demands from anybody at any time.'"

The writer asked Mr. Kuratomi if the group from Jerome had been introduced to Mr. Best as a "representative body." He replied that they had not and that Dr. Melton would ^{not} collaborate this fact. He continued:

"Dr. Melton was surprised and I think he was sorry that he had suggested our meeting with Mr. Best. One of the boys was so angry he walked out in the middle of the meeting."¹

It should also be remembered that Mr. Best was being encouraged by Messrs. Zimmer and Cahn to be tough and not give way to the "pressure boys" and that neither he nor any other member of the administration had an accurate conception of the enormous tension in camp or the imminent danger of explosion. To his credit it should be said, however, that he probably was willing to consider any reasonable request, providing it was not vouched as a demand.

As for Mr. Kuratomi, he already hated and despised Mr. Best with the contempt of an intellectual superior. Well educated, ^{suave} speaking far better English than Mr. Best, his scorn is clearly mirrored in many of his remarks. He was and still is absolutely convinced of the justice of the cause he represented.

"I don't think I did wrong and I think I've been fair with the people. . . . From the very beginning I've maintained that anything we have done wasn't any too radical or against our Constitutional rights. As Chairman of the Committee I conducted the job in a correct manner. And the job was difficult because the people didn't understand."²

Nervous, slender to the point of frailty, gentle spoken, full of intellectual arrogance, Kuratomi is far removed from the blustering type of "agitator" whose bombastic remarks enliven the minutes of the Daihyo Sha. It is inconceivable that he would

¹ R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 1.

² ibid., pp. 6, 10.

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?? for not to move. K.H.

attempt a violent act. With the advice of Reverend Kai, whom he respects to the point of devotion, and other older men, he had undoubtedly selected the points to be presented to Mr. Best with great care and had come prepared to get what concessions he could.

Administration and the Committee.

Meeting in Mr. Best's Office at 8:45 a. m., October 26, 1943

Present: R. R. Best Herbert Hoshiko Kobayashi H. Mori
 C. E. Zimmer I. Hayashi Yoshiyama S. Kai
 H. L. Black George Kuratomi Takeda Stenographer
 M. Lucas (rep.) K. Yamamoto Toshida

Best: Who is to be spokesman?

Kuratomi: I am.
 First of all I would like to ask if you would recognize
 us as being the representatives of the Tule Lake evacuee
 residents?

Best: Is that a question?

Kuratomi: Yes.

Best: There is that word "recognize" back again.

Kuratomi: I could put it a different way. We have been asked to
 represent center residents as all cannot come in.

Best: And as such, will I agree to entertain you?

Kuratomi: Yes.

Best: Yes. But that word "recognize". I don't like the word.
 It doesn't mean what is intended.

Kuratomi: I imagine the nature of some of these questions would be
 beyond your authority. If such a question should arise,
 would you be kind enough to forward the question to
 Washington or wherever necessary?

Best: Wherever necessary.

Kuratomi: These are the questions that we have been asked to bring up.

Best: Okay.

Kuratomi: The first of all, the residents of Tule Lake Center wish
 to know the status of the people in here by the American
 Government and by the Japanese Government and what would
 be their status from the standpoint of International Law.

Best: This question should go to the Department of Justice or
 State Department. My. Myer probably should answer that.
 It probably should be sent to the Spanish Consul.

Kuratomi: A supplement to that question - this Center has been design-
 ated as a Center for those persons who have either indicated
 that they are disloyal or cannot abide by the laws of the
 United States Government or people who have expressed a

desire to either be expatriated or repatriated to Japan. It is the wish of the residents to get the clarification of the Center established as soon as possible. Then, there is a strong feeling among the residents to resegregate the residents between the people who have just said "no" to question 28 and the people who have intention for going back to Japan. They wish to know how soon such a question could be answered and how soon such a plan could be worked out.

Best: To further segregate?

Kuratomi: Yes.

Best: That is a good idea and is something that will have to be worked out.

Kuratomi: To go back to the automobile accidents....

Best: Which accidents, the fire truck and the farm truck?

Kuratomi: Yes, the two that we had. The residents wish to have it clearly understood that WRA should take full responsibility in regard to these accidents and the residents wish a public announcement made to that respect. Furthermore, the residents want the Administration to express a regret concerning these accidents.

Best: Okay. What is the next one?

Kuratomi: The Project Director has not expressed his condolence toward the people who have been the victims of the auto accidents and they feel regretful that you have not taken any steps to show your sympathy toward them and they wish to know the steps which the Administration has taken in regard to the people who have been injured or died from the accident. Maybe I could get an answer from you in regard to compensation.

Best: All forms have been properly complied with. The accident is under the United States Employees Compensation Commission. It is not WRA. All forms have been completed and transmitted to that Commission. Does that answer it?

Kuratomi: Yes.
In regard to the late Mr. Kashima's funeral. The attitude taken by the Administration of this Center has been very inhuman and residents wish to know the reason for such an attitude by the Administration. Maybe you could answer me.

Best: I couldn't answer your question because you make a definite charge that myself, as Project Director, is inhuman. Who is to be the judge of that?

Kuratomi: The judge is the rest of the people in the Center. That is the way they feel.

Best: I have no inhuman tendencies....

Kuratom: Maybe I could add something. I imagine you have been approached by residents of this Center to have you or one of your representatives at the funeral to send words of condolence and, if my report is correct, you have refused to do so.

Best: Maybe I could tell you something. They didn't ask me, they demanded that I appear at the funeral and speak. They demanded that I transmit a letter of condolence to the widow. I do not recognize demands.

Kuratom: Shouldn't you think the word "demand" could be interpreted in two different ways?

Best: In my way -- no. Your representatives that came down here didn't come down here with any other interpretation. They said, "you do it that way".

Kuratom: I will have to verify that.

Best: I know. I was right there.

(Kuratom: talked to Takeda in Japanese)

Kuratom: Mr. Takeda is one of the persons who was here. According to his words they never used such a word. It would not be a very proper word to use even if they thought it was the proper thing to do. Here is one of the witnesses saying that they did not make any demands.

Best: They told me to be there. If that isn't a demand, what is it?

(Kuratom: talked to Takeda in Japanese)

Kuratom: What he said was to have you, come, ask you to come.....

Best: It isn't anything to debate. I didn't go. I told the Funeral Committee not to have a public funeral.....

Kuratom: What do you mean by a "public funeral"?

Best: Out in the firebreak, on the outdoor stage or in the highschool auditorium.

Kuratom: Do you think that the people could possibly get into a Rec. Hall or messhall?

Best: I think so.

Kuratom: How could 10,000 people get into a rec hall or mess hall?

Best: I didn't say 10,000 people, I said the people who wanted to go to the funeral.

Kuratomi: How can you make such a statement?

Best: If I told you that there were men forced to go to that funeral would you say it wasn't so.

Kuratomi: Absolutely not (so)

Best: If I told you that certain people when asked where they were going and answered they were going to the store, canteen, or elsewhere were told, "you are going to the funeral", would say that is not so?

Kuratomi: I shall have to get witnesses on those.

Best: We are not before trial. I am just telling you this for your information. I am telling you this, that the widow did not want a public display or a big funeral. I abided by the widow's decision.

Kuratomi: I will check up on that. I do not think your statement is correct. What will you do if that statement is not correct?

Best: What would you do?

Kuratomi: I would apologize to the people. Wouldn't you?

Best: You or none else, are going to tell me what to do in letters. Keep it informal. We will do this without putting me on the spot. I am not going to be put on the spot and you are not going to come here and tell me what to do.....

Kuratomi: I am asking you.

Best: I am going to tell you a few things later. I am not ready yet.

Kuratomi: They wish to have a public report from the hospital about each of these cases of injury and the death. To prevent further occurrence of such accidents what steps is the Administration taking?

Best: I don't know of any way of preventing a fire truck from turning over when a man turns a corner at an excessive rate of speed. Of course they have governors on trucks but fire trucks do not have governors. The person driving that fire truck is no longer a truck driver. He asked to be relieved of driving.....

Kuratomi: I don't know about that.

Best: There is nothing we could do to prevent the accident to the fire truck with an incompetent driver. I understand a warden pointed and he immediately turned, is that correct?

Kuratomí: That part is not on the paper.

Best: That is the report I have. I don't know how to prevent that. I am willing, and would like to have any kind of suggestions if you could tell me how to prevent any of those type of accidents.

Kuratomí: Motor pool drivers should be over 21 years of age.

Best: That is right. That is the order. They should be 21 years old for trucks and passenger car drivers 25 years old.

Kuratomí: The person who turned the farm truck over was only 17 or 18 years old.

Zimmer: 18.

Best: 18, which is the legal age in California.

Black: This has already been published and is in effect. The orders have already been issued. We do not have any drivers now that are not 21 or 25.

Kuratomí: Some of these additional people you have here as drivers don't even seem to know how to use the gear in reverse or the compound. There is quite a complaint in the Motor Pool on that. We feel that if the Motor Pool could more or less control such drivers, that is, if they could fire them or hire them it would remedy this situation. The residents feel that the persons in the Motor Pool Division should be given more authority to supervise, or if not, recommend for the dismissal of the drivers if such a case should come up. The way it is, that is, the system now the Motor Pool has nothing to do with hiring or firing of drivers.

Best: That is an Administrative Instruction. The Employment Division hires or fires people. Each section does make the recommendation but the actual termination is through the Employment Division. That is an Administrative Instruction and cannot be changed, but we could recommend that it be changed in Washington. However, that is a mere detail and is something that will have to be worked out. Termination through the Employment Division is merely a mechanical detail of the operation of termination. It is an instruction that we didn't write or have anything to do with and it couldn't be changed here. It wouldn't make any difference where the termination is processed, a man would be terminated for inefficiency regardless of who does it.

Kuratomí: The mechanism of some of these automobiles is not adequate to transport people or haul goods and those automobiles should not be put into operation, especially the one that tipped over. Defects were found in the truck.

Best: Of what nature?

Kuratom: I did not bring the statement but I have a statement submitted from the garage in that respect. There were nine or ten items.

Best: Just for my own information, what was the matter?

(Mr. Yoshiyama talked in Japanese to the spokesman)

Kuratom: Shall I have him go after it?

Best: No, that is not necessary now, but I would like to know just what it was.

Kuratom: Going back to the farm, It is the feeling and it is the determination of the people that we should not farm any more than the acreage to feed the Center residents.

Best: Have you thought that through?

Kuratom: Yes.

Best: In other words you don't want to ship anything out and you don't want anything shipped in?

Kuratom: That is up to the Government.

Best: No. The reason that other people are raising crops is so that they can ship us what we can't raise and we ship out what they can't raise. We are getting carloads of beef from Gila. The Government is going to feed you, certainly, but if you don't use what is raised here and exchanged with other centers it will have to be requisitioned from the Quartermaster and you will have to take what comes. Have you thought that through? I am very much interested in that because I have something here this morning that I will show you in a few minutes.

Kuratom: That is what we want, only raise enough for the residents of this Center.

Best: Have you discussed this to the point that you don't want beef that is raised in Gila? You would rather get it through the Quartermaster rather than get it from Gila?

Kuratom: Yes.

Best: You don't want to get any other than through the Government?

Kuratom: No.
The reason we came here is because we cannot comply with or abide by the laws of the United States.

Best: That is the reason this Center was established. That is the reason I am trying to find out some of these things. I think you should think that through further because a carload of beef from Gila will be ours if you want it. If

we go through the Quartermaster we will have to take what comes. Is that what you want?

Kuratomi: Yes.

Best: Mr. Zimmer take this (telegram) and cancel it right now. We will have to wait 50 days before we get any.

Kuratomi: We would like to have a committee to decide how much we want to raise.

Best: That is one thing I would like to do. We have got all winter to plan that. I would like you to have an agricultural committee so that we can plan what acreage we want. If we are not going to farm I want to know; if we are going to farm I want to sit down and decide how many ~~acres~~ acres we want to take care of. I presume there will be about 20,000 people here. Don't you think so.

Kuratomi: Yes.

Best: I want a good agricultural committee to sit down and plan, to see how much land we need, what crops we want to raise. If we are going to raise chickens, how many? and to plan in advance. I want you to think about that. We can raise chickens and hogs. We cannot raise cattle. We can raise chickens, hogs, and turkeys and we can raise farm crops and we will want to figure them for 20,000 people. That is what we have to think about and I don't want to wait until next spring when we don't have time. We are going to be here and I want to get this planning done because we want to raise the crop--that is if you want the crop.

Kuratomi: Since it is evident that the acreage of the farm could be cut down there will be unemployment cause so that it is the wish of the residents that these people should be given some other employment and if such is impossible then be given assurance of their well being such as clothing, and of course the food and shelter is provided by the government, and a little spending money besides. Also, is there any truth to the report that the farm products here have been sent to the Army or the Navy?

Best: No truth to it. No farm products have been sent to the Army or Navy.

Kuratomi: Never has?

Best: Never has.

Kuratomi: In regard to the public school here. Under what plan has it been operated and under what plan does it plan to open here.

Best: Probably Mr. Black can tell you. The plan is to open school just as soon as we possibly can. You know what we

are faced with here. The segregation movement, people coming in and people going out.

(Rev. Kai and H. Mori joined the group)

We thought we would have to use the recreation halls for additional residents however we didn't have to. We had to use the high school for processing. I don't know how soon they can start, possibly next month.

Black: There is still some construction work to be completed before school can begin.

Best: On the high school?

Black: On the high school?

Kuratomi: Let me ask you this question. Would there be a flag ceremony in the morning?

Black: There will not be. It is planned to have a flag over the Administrative area here and not in the colony area. We have a number of teachers here as you know who have been doing other kinds of work of and are ready to start teaching as soon as construction is finished. There are some stoves to be installed, some painting to be done and installation of desks, tables, and chairs. The school census has been underway for several days but still is not completed and we have to wait for the results from the census to know how many classes are required, how many teachers will be needed and what the division of classes will be. We hope to be able to start elementary schools about November 1 and every preparation is made to open just as quickly as facilities are available. High school teachers will be used in the elementary schools and elementary schools will be ~~used~~ opened first. Later when more facilities are available we will open the high school but not at the same time as the elementary schools. Because there are more children to go to school than there are facilities it is planned to operate on a platoon system. Part will go in the forenoon and part in the afternoon. The students that live the nearest will go to school in the morning and in the afternoon the ones who live further away will come for their session so we can start at 8:30 to 12:00 and from 1:00 to 5:30 and get pretty good school operation. Does that answer your question?

Kuratomi: Yes.

Black: As facilities are available, either by using rec halls or vacant apartments we can make a transfer of elementary schools to those facilities and use the high school for high school classes on a staggered system. The schools will be open for everyone who wants to go to school but it is not required. It is a service rendered to the community and is agreeable to all the people but will not be forced on them.

Best: It is not compulsory.

Black: No, it is not compulsory.

Kuratomu; The people want a center organization to govern and take care of the welfare of the center residents and this center organization would have every right and power to negotiate with the Administration, that is, with you or with the other personnel if such case should arise. It is the feeling and the request of the residents that the whole set-up should be left to the free will of the center residents and that they wish to have you more or less recognize such a group in the center.

Best: Just so that you be sure to get complete representation. I don't want it out of one block. I want complete representation. That is being worked on. We had to wait until all were here or it would not be a fair representation. I want you to have a working committee to go to the Community Activities section to devise some kind of a program so that you can have an election to get the proper representation. Are you set up to do that already? I don't care how big the representation is just so it is not bigger than this group here. We can't work with a bigger committee than this and get anything done.

Black: May I ask a question?

Best: Yes.

Black: We would have to have suggestions from the people on that plan. I believe that any workable scheme depends on working between members of the colony and of the administration. I have in mind to submit to the colony a proposal something like this: That an advisory council be composed which will be almost entirely selected by the people within a geographical area. In order to keep a committee of a workable size it should be composed of a chairman ~~of the~~ ~~ward/committee~~ and representatives from each of the 7 wards. The chairman of the ward committee might be one of the Block Managers or it might be any other person who residents of the ward would select. Certain groups such as the PTA, Red Cross, YMCA, religious organizations, catholic and protestant churches, and such other project-wide organizations as we have had would give us a representation but would not be a geographical one, but rather would represent the interests of the whole project. We are having a meeting of the Community Management staff this afternoon in order to discuss that a little further and then find out if you have this committee or another committee to represent the people in the development of such a plan. May I ask if this committee is specifically for the farm situation or whether it is an over-all committee. Could I have an answer to that?

Best: He is asking whether this committee is a general or over-all committee or whether it is a specific committee for the farm situation.

Kuratom: The farm problem became so big for the farm group that they asked for center-wide support to work out some agreeable solution of center wide problems in connection with the farm problem. Therefore, an election was held in each of the 64 blocks and each block sent in a representative elected by the people and they came to a meeting and decided on some of the questions for the clarification for the colonists. They chose a committee and we happen to be the committee to negotiate with the administration. What I was saying a while ago is this, that if somethings come up the committee would bring it to your attention. The idea is that some of these people who have been here all the time and some have come in have different ideas, such as some people wish to go out on relocation or people who came in here with a plain "no" answer and the people who have a definite mind to go back to Japan when the opportunity arises. The ideas among those groups are definitely not the same. There will always be friction of some sort unless resegregation is carried out. I think it would be easier for you to run the center if such a program was put into effect.

Best: Much easier. One of the things we are going to discuss when the director is here is further segregation.

Kuratom: That is about the biggest problem right now.

Best: That is one of things that will be taken up with the Director first.

Kuratom: We should have a center organization eventually. Since this is such a large center and the problems concerned are so varied it is evident that it will be necessary to have different committees to work in particular divisions. It is the idea that these committees or representative groups be allowed to work in cooperation with the administration. Would it be possible to recognize such an organization in this Center?

Best: We are anxious to have that organization.

Black: We are anxious to have an organization to advise and counsel the administration for the over-all promotion of well being and welfare of the community but I want to make it quite clear that there cannot be such a thing as self-government. I am asking that in lieu of self-government your committee and all of its personnel serve as an advisory committee to the administration or the project director so he may know what things you wish to have done. Does that make sense?

Kuratomi: Very logical. It is the feeling and request from the residents that these working committees be paid under WRA wages.

Best: They have always been.

Black: Block Managers, wardens, public welfare, etc. are paid by WRA.

Best: All committees under Community Activities.

Kuratomi: Offices should be set up in some central location in the colony.

Best: Don't worry about offices. We will have office space for every activity that we need. Definitely we will have that.

Kuratomi: So that the central governing body from the Center residents could get into direct contact with the administration to discuss all negotiations?

Best: Yes.

Black: I don't like the use of the expression "central governing body". Should use the expression Center Committee or council.

Kuratomi: It is perfectly agreeable with you to go ahead with the organization and submit the full plans to you?

Best: That is what we are here for.

Kuratomi: It is the feeling of the residents that the Block Managers be put under supervision of the Center Committee. That is the way the residents want it.

Best: That would be right back to Community Government. We have to get away from that. We have no choice in the matter. Those are our instructions.

Kuratomi: What capacity are the Block Manager's working under right now. Each Block Manager has a different interpretation of his powers, etc.

Black: They transmit to the people information that we feel is for their benefit and we have used that means in many instances to combat rumors that are not true. If the people want something done they tell the Block manager. The block managers notify the people that their freight has arrived and letters are distributed through the Block Managers. Through the Block Managers come complaints and reports to the Administration. Part of this work probably would be better served by the Center Committee. The main function of the Block Managers is the transmission and exchange of information with the administration.

Best: We discuss the problem and lay our problems right out on the table for the Block Managers to discuss. We have no secrets. It is our desire to give them information as far as the administration is concerned.

Kuratomi: What difference would there be if the Block Managers took orders from the Center Committee who represent the residents.

Best: We don't want to try to get around the instruction that has been handed down to us. By reason that this is a segregation center we can't have self-government. I want to keep in the clear on that. The Block Managers might be on your committee though.

Zimmer: Since the planning board and the City Council dissolved during registration the Block Managers have been the clearing house for grievances.

Kuratomi: The people have a right to ask for re-election of the Block Managers. The reason I say that is this: Since this is a segregation the language of Japan has become predominant. Some of the Block Managers can't understand Japanese. They cannot transmit your instructions to the colony because they cannot interpret in the Japanese language.

Best: I have thought there probably will be a complete change of Block Managers.

Black: Many people are not settled down. We have got to go through the process of having new people integrate with the community. It is better all around to have Block Managers who have been residents of Tule Lake before until the new people familiarize themselves and get settled down.

Kuratomi: In regard to the hog and poultry farm out there. There are quite a few doubts and questions among the residents in getting their share of the pork and eggs.

Best: We can settle that quickly.

Zimmer: Since the 22nd of June there hasn't been a hog slaughtered from the farm. Every egg comes into the Mess Management warehouse and from there it goes to the colonists. Everything from the hog and poultry farm goes to Mess Management. We have nothing to do with it from then on. We deliver it to them. What they do with it from then on, I don't know.

Kuratomi: The people here haven't seen any pork.

Zimmer: Haven't seen any since June 22 because we have not slaughtered since then.

Kuratomi: They say there is 190,000 pounds of hogs on hand. Residents who have been here all the time tell us they haven't seen that much pork at any time even if it was divided among

16,000 people. Will you be kind enough to check this with Mess Management as to what basis these eggs and pork and other products are distributed to each mess hall.

Best: We can find that out.

Zimmer: (Statement omitted on copy)

Best: Everything from the hog or poultry farm is all going down to your mess and no place else. I can't tell you what happened in the past because I didn't arrive until August 1. We all have to live here and I want to make it just as liveable as possible. All the hogs and poultry are coming into the Mess Management warehouses. Now, if you have a tie up and have no one out to the farm to work of course I am going to have to dispose of the produce. If you don't have a work crew out there we will just have to find a buyer and sell it.

Kuratomi: As far as I know they are working out there.

Best: I mean if you should stop working I couldn't give you any of the crop.

Black: With all the produce raised it doesn't begin to meet the requirements of the center. We still have to buy more all the time.

Kuratomi: Will you please be kind enough to investigate this from the day you came here to the present date as to what basis farm products have been distributed to each mess hall.

Best: That is a matter of record and should be easy enough to do.

Kuratomi: We would like to have you make a report to the people.

Best: I think you have plenty of people working in the Mess Division who can tell you.

Kuratomi: Just want a verification.

Best: I know we haven't shipped any out. We have to ship in all the time.

Kuratomi: This has come up often. The people would like to have latrinal facilities improved. If you come down to these block and could see the conditions.....

Best: We can see they are crowded but with the addition of the 10 blocks that is starting today, 3750 people will be moved out of those blocks and will relieve the pressure and size of the blocks, and there won't be nearly so many people using these facilities. We can't buy some of the fixtures and materials that is going into the new blocks. We want to improve conditions in the wash houses and the men's rooms. As soon as I came here that was one of the things we talked about but we can't buy things like we used to.

But I want to try to make this place just as liveable as possible. This condition may be due to the fact that some of the blocks are over populated. There may be more men and there may be more women. However, the next adjustment in housing will relieve that.

Kuratom: Can't even wash our faces in the morning. The hot water and the cold water won't operate. It is either too hot or too cold. No basins to accomodate the water.

Best: You mean you can't mix the hot and the cold water.

Kuratom: Yes, that's it.

Best: That is purely a matter of local adjustment and I want to improve all such conditions.

Kuratom: What about the lots around the barracks?

Best: I am very much interested in that. I am getting kind of touchy about that. I don't want all those porches. They look terrible. We will have to have a committee to sit down and make plans. I think we can probably do this whole thing for about \$20,000. We will have to plan it and work it out. We can't just go up to the people and say your porch looks terrible, tear them off. When we get a plan that all can agree on then we have to send it to Washington office for approval by the WPB. We have to have approval to buy lumber, approval to buy nails, roofing, etc. When we get that we can tell the people this is what we want to do.

Black: In that connection, there are rumors to the effect that we will tear the porches down and not replace them. That is definitely not true.

Kuratom: The residents feel that since it was possible for the people at other relocation centers to receive first class mail delivered to the individual units and since we are using the U. S. postage stamp that delivery of mail should be to each unit instead of to the Block Managers. Some of the mail which might be very important are missing. The people would like to get letters delivered to each unit.

Best: That is a matter of adjustment later. Lots of cities this size don't have mail delivered to the door. But that is nothing. We will try to work that out as soon as possible. The people will get their mail even if it is still delivered to the Block Managers. That is what we will have to do next winter--work out details.

Kuratom: The food is very poor in this center. Especially food given to children. There is not nearly enough of some things such as milk and other essentials. They are not getting enough in quantity. The last two or three days some mess halls did not give out any milk.

Best: That is probably the fault of Mess Management.

Black: Had a report yesterday that mess hall 16 or 44 failed to have their quota of canned milk delivered for infants and children. Mr. Peck explained that it had been a clerical error and that an allocation of milk would be made from another mess hall.

Kuratom: That must have been in two or three blocks.

Black: I just heard about one block.

Kuratom: This is a known fact--that there are slightly tuberculosis patients being sent back to the blocks. They should be segregated and sent back home.

Best: Any matters pertaining to TB patients are referred to the medical staff.

Kuratom: I think that the project director should check into these matters.

Best: I understand that there are two buildings--919 and 913--housing TB patients. We know all about that. That is where they take arrested cases. That is what you are talking about isn't it? 919 and 913?

Kuratom: Yes, that's it. Now, going back to food again--the food in this Center is very poor.

Best: When did it get poor? Just since you people came here? There hasn't been any radical change.

Kuratom: The food is lots worse than when I got there.

Best: The quality or the preparation?

Kuratom: The quality.

Best: Meat or staples?

Kuratom: Especially breakfast. We get hotcakes and things of that nature but have never had eggs. Not once.

Best: Eggs are on the menu every day.

Kuratom: But we never have them.

Best: 7000 people have been here 15 or 16 months. Do they find it bad too?

Kuratom: The people that were here have no way of knowing how the other centers were treated. When we compared notes they couldn't believe that other centers were treated so much nicer than this Center. Food is the major problem of every individual.

Best: I will tell you this so that you can make a big complaint about the food. When the Spanish Counsel comes again, you holler about the food. He said he has never had any complaints about the food. So when he comes you complain about it to him. Now is your chance.

Kuratom1: At any rate the fact that the food is not distributed according to the menu is a foregone conclusion. I wish you would check this matter with Mr. Peck and verify it.

Best: Some places I have been and I have seen it work very satisfactorily is to appoint a Japanese head steward. Let him handle it. I haven't had time to get into details of some of these things but I am very much interest in Mess Management. I can see no reason why we couldn't have a Japanese head steward there to correlate with Mr. Peck. We are bound by very strict rules. We can spend just so much. We can requisition just so much and the quartermaster buys it. It is our fault when we don't distribute it right or when we don't cook it right. I don't like to see food spoiled there in the kitchen or in the warehouse. I would like to get into this thing myself. If you have someone in your organization, some good Japanese head steward, that can function as such, he could handle such things.

Kuratom1: I think all of us agree that the preparation was not adequate to meet the onrushing work of the incoming into this Center when segregation took place. We wish to know whose responsibility it was.

Best: I would say it was the Congress of the United States. They demanded and ordered segregation. The Tule Lake Center was selected as the place. We had all of these trains coming in and going out and I don't believe that you or I or anybody else could have done better with what we had. We didn't have time. I didn't get here until the first of August. Other centers knew all about it before the first of August, but Tule Lake had no preparations made and had no plans. Other Centers moved out one to three trains. We moved 14 trains out and received trains from every center. I believe there were 18 or 19 trains in.

Black: 19.

Best: I guess we will just have to blame Congress. I don't want to blame you and I don't want to take the blame. I guess the blame rests on Congress

Kuratom1: In the event any strike or any other incident should take place within the Center and if the residents should fail to solve it and there is any likelihood that it couldn't be mastered, then I imagine that the WRA or administration would take steps to see that some quick solution be made.

Best: Well, the WRA is not going to call a strike and the WRA couldn't make a solution when you call a strike when we don't know what is going to prevent it. A strike isn't

the way to deal with me. We don't need a strike and I can't tell you what will happen. If you want to find out what will happen, have a strike and find out. I am not going to call a strike and I can't tell you there will be a speedy solution when I don't know what it is about. Possibly I don't understand you.

Kuratom1: I think you do all right. The residents wish to know if we have been treated according to the Geneva Conference.

Best: I imagine so. I don't know anything about that. But Japan didn't even sign the Geneva Conference. We are taking all of our orders from the Washington office which is in contact with the State Department. The State Department would know all about the Geneva Conference. I am taking my order from Mr. Myer who is in daily contact with the State Department and I would presume and would say that they are following the provisions of the Geneva Conference. I will tell you this. You are not prisoners of war or anything like that if that is one of the questions. You are not here as prisoners of war.

Kuratom1: Our status might change later.

Best: I couldn't tell about that.

Kuratom1: In the past--it hasn't occurred here yet--but in other relocation centers when some articles belonging to the WRA disappeared we, the residents of those centers, took the blame without any investigation. That has been done in the past. If such a thing should happen in this center I wish the Administration would investigate thoroughly before making any accusations.

Best: What articles do you mean?

Kuratom1: In other centers such things as saws, hammers, and various other things. At Jerome at one time someone stole 38 brand new double edged axes. Without making a proper investigation, Mr. Cook, Chief of Internal Security at that center, made accusations that evacuees were to blame for losing such items. I have heard that in other centers similar cases have taken place and evacuees were blamed and the administration made reports to that effect.

Best: We don't blame anyone around here without an investigation. I don't like to put those things in the paper anyhow. I can assure you that you will have an investigation.

Kuratom1: Some of these questions it will be necessary for you to Mr. Myer?

Best: That is right. He will be here on this Center next Monday and Tuesday. I would like, as a matter of fact, to have a transcript of this for him to read so he can see how we are ~~planning~~ proceeding. If it is at all possible I would like to arrange so that we can sit down and talk with him.]

Kuratom1: This is something I haven't clearly stated in the beginning. People going out to the farm realize that this problem is too big to handle have made resolution to abide by the will of the residents and refrain from working until final words are received from you here or WRA office in Washington. We will wait until then.

Best: About what? What are we going to do with the crops?

Kuratom1: No, these questions.

Best: In other words you are going to tie all of the questions and the answers to the questions into the harvesting of the crop.

Kuratom1: No, the thing is.....

(Rev. Kai talked in Japanese to Kuratom1)

Kuratom1: The residents of this center are not clear as to the need of 3900 acres of farm. They have had various reports that the crops are being sent to the Army or Navy.

Best: No. None of it has been sent to the Army or Navy. Some of the crops have been sent to other relocation centers in the past. We get crops from them that we can't raise and we sent them things they can't raise. It is worked on the basis of exchanging of commodities, with other centers. Now, with this being a segregation center, it is your unanimous consent that you will not ship to any other center. That is the way I get it. Is that right?

Kuratom1: Yes.

Best: That is your choice. Nothing shipped out and by the same token there will be nothing brought in from other quarters. We will have to get all our food through the Quartermaster. The only thing I am concerned about is that it takes us 50 days to get our requisitions in. We are going to be short on some vegetables until they can be picked up, as long as we have our own crop out here and won't use it. I am going to sell this crop. There is a food shortage. There is a war on. We are going to salvage this food. I am going to sell it to the government. We will never see any of the money. I am going to sell the crop to save it. The crop is going to be harvested. We will work out this winter what to farm and what size you want, if any. And I don't want to wait until next spring to do that.

(Kuratom1 to Kai in Japanese)

Kuratom1: I am sure the people will be satisfied with the statement you have just made.

Best: You get a good agricultural committee. I don't want someone who doesn't know agriculture. Get yourselves some farmers.

I assume you still want the hog and poultry farm, the pork, the chickens and the eggs. You are still going to carry that on, aren't you?

Kuratomi: Never said such a thing.

Best: You want that don't you. You better meet to talk about that.

Kuratomi: We are still working on that.

Best: I want to know. We can raise more hogs and we have quarters for 25,000 chickens.

Zimmer: 21,000.

Kuratomi: We will raise that if given assurance that they will be used for center consumption.

Best: I will guarantee it. That is what they are for. There is no question about that.

Zimmer: We have a quota of what we can slaughter in points on hogs. We can't slaughter more than what a ration book would be per person per week. We are duty bound to slaughter so many pigs according to the population. You are a little better off in here than on the outside because you have 15,000 ration books and on the outside you would have only 10,000 ration books.

Kuratomi: Are you finished?

Zimmer: Yes that's all.

Kuratomi: Then, have you any plan whereby center residents would not suffer any financial setback in the future. From the way I see it, it appears that each and every person who wished to work cannot find employment. Have you plans made to care for those people?

Best: There are instructions to govern all that and people that need clothing grants we have that. There is so much money appropriated to operate this Center. We don't know exactly what the census is going to be or how many constitute a family. We haven't even got the school census broken down to exact figures. It takes time to get what the local situation is.

Black: I want to point out that people who haven't a work opportunity should be entitled to Public Assistance grants. They would need to qualify by an investigation of need.

Best: Yes, that is a detail of operation. There are instructions, there are rules that apply to this center. If they do not fit, they will be adjusted to fit but we can't do anything until we know what the census will be. It takes a little

time to work these things out. There is no ulterior motive along the line to work any hardship on anyone. We want to start making this center just as liveable as we possibly can. I intend to see to that. I am here only because you are. You are not here because I am. I am here to carry out the Director's wishes clear up to the top and I want you to know that I am here to make this just as decent a place as we can possibly make it. I want to ask you, what is your attitude, what is your thinking on Internal Security.

KuratomI: We have been approached by Mr. Tsuda on that. Think we should wait until a representative committee is set up. Then it could be worked out for everybody.

Best: We will do what you want. If you want a good Internal Security you can have it. Suit yourselves. If you want law and order you can have it. You can have trials and sentences and punish those who violate laws. You can have a jail if you want it. We will do what you want. I want you to talk about that.

(KuratomI to Kai in Japanese)

KuratomI: That is about all we have at this time. The minor details can be worked out with the committee.

Best: That is fine.

KuratomI: I want to mention to you that from time to time you have promised people certain things as they come in to talk with you and we have talked with Dr. Opler and he feels the same, that to gain the confidence of the residents is the quickest solution to local problems.

Best: I want that.

KuratomI: I am sure you could get it very easily if you fulfill your promises. Everybody is looking up to that. Such as the erection of uniform porches.

Best: That isn't a promise.

KuratomI: You promised.

Best: No I didn't promise. That is my personal desire and I want a committee to sit down with an engineer's drawing and a plan to see how many porches it takes. See what goes into them. That is my desire but not a promise. I will see that it will be given every consideration and see what we can get first, that is a promise.

KuratomI: If you are going to build new one the old proches could be taken off.

Zimmer: That will have to be the responsibility of your committee, to work out a plan. We couldn't just go down there and

tear them off. If we did that then we would be in bad. If we all get together on the detail for the new porches, if we can get a new one, and explain it to the people then the old ones could be taken off, but you can't just go to your neighbor and tell him his porch looks like the devil, take it off. What would he tell you.

(Kuratomi to Kai in Japanese)

Best: If we want to get together here and want to get in touch with your committee, can I contact you.

Kuratomi: You can contact Rev. Kai (503-B) on anything.

Best: I have a lot of things to take care of so you contact Miss Lucas when I am not here and she can tell you when I can meet with you here. I have got to go to San Francisco tomorrow night. I am coming back with the Director. I won't be here for a few days. Any other time get in touch with Miss Lucas.

Kuratomi: One more thing. It appears to me that the people who come in here as interpreters more or less give you a wrong interpretation from time to time, such as "demand" which we don't like. I want you to know we are just as anxious to work for the benefit of the colonists as you say you are.

Best: You will find that I aim to.

Kuratomi: That is a promise. Don't make it a broken one.

Best: There is not one thing we can't do if we sit in here and talk it over.

Kuratomi: I am going to see that you carry that out.

Best: Getting back to Internal Security. I am very much interested in that. I wish you would do some thinking on that.

Kuratomi: We have a plan but we have to submit it to the people.

Best: Internal Security can be as good as the people want it. I want you to think that through. It is just what you make it. If you want lots of law and order you will get it. If you don't well that is your business, not mine.

Kuratomi: That covers everything. We will send in a committee as soon as we get it worked out.

Best: I will be right here. There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here for. If you make it possible for me to do it we can get together and solve our problems. There is no reason why

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we should get off on the wrong foot. I don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together. We can work these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let things magnify and get worse. We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again.

This meeting was far more like a contest between two adversaries than like a conference. To begin with Mr. Best refused to recognize the Negotiating Committee as representatives of the Tule Lake residents. Kuratomi then implied that some of the questions to be asked might be above Best's authority and asked that in such cases they be referred to Washington. After these opening gambits the meeting rapidly developed into a quarrel over Best's supposedly inhuman attitude in regard to the funeral. Both sides hurled accusations freely. A semblance of propriety was restored while discussing the request that the evacuees at Tule Lake wished to raise only enough food for their own consumption. Mr. Best, although he had not "recognized" the committee, accepted this request on its face value and in the presence of the Committee canceled a telegram to Gila ordering beef. "We will have to wait 50 days before we get any." According to Opler, this gesture was a bluff; Best merely pretended to send the telegram.

From this point on, matters preceeded with relative smoothness. However, near the end of the meeting Kuratomi remarked that in the event of a strike he imagined that the administration would see that some quick solution was made. Best retorted: "A strike isn't the way to deal with me." That the Negotiating Committee was already placing reliance on an appeal above Mr. Best was shown not only by the remark made early in the meeting but also near the end when Kuratomi asked if it would be necessary to refer some of the questions to Mr. Myer. Best agreed that it would be necessary and added that he would like Myer to confer with the committee.

Neither side was acting entirely above board. The Negotiating Committee retained their trump card to lay before Director Myer: the "proof" of graft among the Caucasian personnel. Mr. Best stated at the beginning of the meeting that he did not "recognize" the Committee, yet said at the end:

"There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here forI don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together.....We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again."

The Negotiating Committee based their requests on four major topics: (1) the question of the status of the evacuees under International law under which they included a request for re-segregation; (2) the settlement of the farm incident which included many minor points; (3) a request for community government; (4) a multitude of requests for the betterment of colony living conditions. Some of the points were brought up as requests for clarification, others as requests springing from the desires of the colonists and one request for an investigation as to why the food was so poor and what was happening to the products of the hog and chicken farms.

It will be interesting to consider these points one by one and the Project Director's decision on each. The points will then be compared with the considerable number of statements made by Japanese not closely connected with the Daihyo Sha Kai, and an attempt made to show how closely the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee paralleled the desires of the ordinary colonist at this time.

Status of Residents under International Law- Further Segregation

This is a major point which stands by itself. Kuratomi stated that the residents wished to know their status under International

law. Mr. Best referred him to the Department of Justice, Mr. Myer, and the Spanish Consul. Supplementary to this, Kuratomi stated that the residents strongly desired resegregation. Mr. Best agreed that this would be a good idea.

probably so (Status under International law had long been a matter of some concern to the evacuees. Its clarification, however, had little significance in the November crisis. Removal of the "fence-sitters" on the other hand, was an urgent issue, as has been shown by the attitudes quoted previously. 1/

Farm Accident

Kuratomi opened the discussion of this issue with a demand on the part of the colonists that WRA announce that it would take full responsibility "in regard to these accidents" and express regret concerning them. The people, he added, wished to know what steps had been taken toward compensation. Mr. Best answered that all forms of the United States Employees' Compensation had been completed and transmitted to that Commission.

Kuratomi then bluntly asked the reason for the inhuman ~~xxxxx~~ attitude of the Administration in regard to the funeral. Best denied he had inhuman tendencies. Kuratomi countered with the fact that he had refused to go or send a representative to the funeral and give a speech of condolence. The discussion rapidly disintegrated into a quarrel in which Mr. Best contended that he had been ordered to go to the funeral and that he would never accede to demands. Kuratomi denied these accusations. Best then stated that people had been forced to go to the funeral. Kuratomi denied this also.

This undignified squabbling indulged in by both men gained Kuratomi nothing and evoked from Mr. Best only the extreme stubbornness with ~~xxxx~~ which he customarily reacted when ~~xxxx~~ faced by "pressure."

1/ See pp. 7-11 of "pre-incident Attitudes."

By stressing Mr. Best's inhumanity, Kuratomi was probably attempting to relate Mr. Best's inconsiderateness concerning the public funeral with the violence shown the photographer. He succeeded only, however, in irritating Mr. Best almost to the point of incoherency. Best's angry reaction has been repeated to the writer in substance many times by appointed personnel members who approached him with an issue which he interpreted as tinged with pressure:

"You or none else are going to tell me what to do. . . We will do this without putting me on the spot. I am not going to be put on the spot and you are not going to come here and tell me what to do. . ."

Farm Acreage

Kuratomi stated that it was the desire of the people that they farm no more acreage than was necessary for the needs of the colony. This was a fairly strong camp sentiment. Best inquired if this meant that they wanted no more beef from Gila. Kuratomi agreed. Best immediately canceled a shipment of beef expected from Gila, stating that 50 days must elapse before any beef could be procured through the Army Quartermaster. Kuratomi, apparently unperturbed, asked for a farm committee; Best stated that he was wholeheartedly in favor of the formation of such a body. He also assured the Committee that food had never been sent to the Army or Navy.

Public Schools and Flag Raising Ceremony

On request Mr. Black explained the proposed plan for the public schools and in answer to a direct question, stated that there would be no flag raising ceremony and that attendance would not be compulsory. On this matter Kuratomi told the writer that Reverend Kai believed that education in English was beneficial to the children. Some of the camp residents, however, were concerned over the possibility that their children might be forced to submit to compulsory indoctrination in Americanism. When questioned as to the significance of the flag raising ceremony, Kuratomi explained that it was motivated by a desire to see

that no disrespect was shown to the American flag. Previous to this rumors had seeped out of camp that the American flag raised inside the camp had been torn down. Kuratomi denied this, explaining to the writer:

"The American flag in the center was brought down by one of the boy scouts. He felt that the flag of any nation should command that much respect. He feared that some rude boys would get hold of it and trample on it. He took it down. There was a rumor, however, that somebody might tear it down." 1/

Kuratomi added that he knew where the flag was and that it was in a safe place.

Community Government

This is another major issue as far as the Negotiating Committee was concerned. Kuratomi stated that the people wanted a center organization to govern and take care of the center residents and negotiate with the Administration. The organization of this body was to be left entirely to the center residents. Best agreed that he too desired this, but that it must be a completely representative body. Mr. Black made it quite clear that there could not be such a thing as self-government, and asked that the present committee serve as an advisory committee to the Administration. Kuratomi again used the term "central governing body" and was corrected by Black. Kuratomi then stated the center desired that Block Managers be put under the supervision of this proposed Central Committee. It was explained that under WRA regulations this could not be done.

It is doubtful if the desire for a "central organization" was a matter of primary interest to the evacuees as a whole at this time. This point probably reflects the interests of the leaders. When questioned as to why the committee wished to bring the Block Managers under the Central Committee, Kuratomi explained that in this manner the Block Managers could be kept in their proper place as absolutely unpolitical figureheads, go-betweens between the Administration and the people.

*agreed
good
account*

"We intended to keep them as figureheads. . . if something came up that the Central Committee felt it was not their (block managers) duty, the Central Committee could tell them that the problem should be under the Central Committee." 1/

This matter appears to be a political maneuver to keep the block managers out of the political picture. The Negotiating Committee was taking no chances in permitting the development of a rival organization. *Tsurukawa* Mr. Adachi, an old Tulean who held a prominent position among the block managers at this time, gave the writer his frank opinion of this maneuver:

"I think they wanted to control the block managers at that time. We told them we didn't want anything to do with that. We were willing to co-operate in the work and help them for the benefit of the people, but we wanted to stay neutral." 2/

Food Question

Kuretomi stated that the residents doubted that they were getting their full share of poultry and eggs from the farm. Zimmer explained that since June 22 no hogs had been slaughtered and that all the proceeds from the hog and poultry farms were going to mess management. Best intimated

1/ ibid.

2/ ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, p. 4.

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that if the workers at these farms should stop working he would have to sell these products off the project. Kuratomi then asked for an investigation into mess hall distribution. Best referred him to the mess department.

Later Kuratomi complained that the food was very poor, that the children were not getting sufficient milk and that eggs were never served. Best, replied that the lack of milk was probably the fault of Mess Management, that eggs were on the menu every day, and suggested the employment of a Japanese head steward under Mr. Peck.

In view of the tremendous public resentment over poor food, the rumors prevalent among evacuees and Caucasians that food was being sold off the project, either to the Army and Navy or to the black market, this referring of the food question to the mess department on the part of Mr. Best cannot be considered wise. Answering the charge that eggs are never served by saying that they are on the menu shows ignorance of Mess conditions. Reliable evacuee informants repeatedly state that what is put on the menu and what is served are two different things. These questions on food were vital. By passing them off lightly a valuable opportunity to decrease the ill will of the colonists was disregarded.

Latrine Facilities

Kuratomi asked for the improvement of latrinal facilities. Best explained the difficulties of improving these and remarked that the next housing adjustment would relieve the situation. Kuratomi complained that the hot and cold water cannot be mixed and Best stated that he wants to improve all such conditions.

Lots around barracks - porches

Best stated that if proper plans were made and Washington's

Internal Security

Mr. Best brought up this subject himself, a reflection of his own concern over the unsatisfactory state of the Japanese Internal Security after segregation. According to Kuratomi, the Japanese force was supposed to consist of 140 members and it had been reduced by segregation to 78, a fraction over half. 1/

Mr. Tsuda, who was Japanese head of Internal Security at this time, explained the concern of Mr. Best and the WRA and the attitude of the ~~expatriate~~ Japanese:

"I know one thing - Mr. Best was more or less disappointed about the Japanese side of the function of Internal Security, ~~which in fact was~~ . . . At that time the Japanese Internal Security was in a more or less precarious situation. Maybe the WRA wanted the Japanese to stand off the Japanese wardens organization as they expected, but as far as we're concerned, we were Japanese just as much as any other people in this center. Thereupon, we could not comply everything with the WRA at that time.

"Because we were receiving specific orders from the WRA and pursuing that would make our situation more or less in a dangerous capacity with the people, Internal Security was not on a sound basis. I don't think the WRA itself knew what they wanted to do about Internal Security at that time. . . .

"The wardens department wasn't a very popular organization right after segregation was completed. Now, up to segregation in Tule Lake, the wardens' position or function was a very different job, simply because we had the peoples' understanding. But after segregation the largest number of people didn't understand our position. The new people thought the wardens' organization was an inu joint." 2/

1/ ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, pp. 1, 5.

Jan 1941

Jan 1941. The first of the winter
floods came. The water was
very high and the wind was
very strong. The water was
very muddy and the wind was
very strong.

Jan 1941. The second of the winter
floods came. The water was
very high and the wind was
very strong. The water was
very muddy and the wind was
very strong.

Jan 1941. The third of the winter
floods came. The water was
very high and the wind was
very strong. The water was
very muddy and the wind was
very strong.

Jan 1941. The fourth of the winter
floods came. The water was
very high and the wind was
very strong. The water was
very muddy and the wind was
very strong.

Jan 1941. The fifth of the winter
floods came. The water was
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Internal Security

Mr. Best brought up this subject himself, a reflection of his own concern over the unsatisfactory state of the Japanese Internal Security after segregation. According to Kuratomi, the Japanese force was supposed to consist of 140 members and it had been reduced by segregation to 78, a fraction over half.¹

I am pretty sure I can get additional information on this subject from Tsuda. R. H.

Latrine Facilities

Kuratomi asked for the improvement of latrinal facilities. Best explained the difficulties of improving these and remarked that the next housing adjustment would relieve the situation. Kuratomi complained that the hot and cold water could not be mixed and Best stated that he wanted to improve all such conditions.

Lots around barracks - Porches

Best stated that if proper plans were made and Washington's

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 26, 1944, p. 2.

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approval is gained, porches could probably be built for about \$20,000.

Mail Delivery

Kuratomi stated that the residents felt that mail should be delivered to each unit, and not to the block managers. Best said he will try to work it out.

TB Patients released in center

Kuratomi stated that tuberculosis patients were being sent to the blocks. These should be segregated and sent back home. (Exactly what he means is not clear.) Best said this should be referred to the medical staff.

Inadequate preparation to receive segregees

Kuratomi asked who was responsible for the inadequate preparation for the segregees entering Tule. Best replied that he will have to blame the Congress of the United States.

Disappearance of WRA material

Kuratomi stated that in the past the disappearance of articles such as saws, hammers, and axes had been blamed on evacuees. If this should happen in Tule, he asked that the administration investigate thoroughly before they make an accusation. Best assured him that an investigation would be held.

Summary

Reviewing the answers given by Mr. Best it appears that the Negotiating Committee had reason to feel optimistic over the general results of this meeting. Mr. Best agreed wholeheartedly on the matter of cultivating farm acreage only for the needs of the colony and was almost enthusiastic over the formation of a farm committee and a representative body from the colony, stating, however, that this could not be a self-governing body. The Negotiating Committee was

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asked to serve in an advisory capacity to the Administration in forming this body. Best stated that he "would do what he could" in the matter of porches, latrines and the mail, and agreed that segregation "would be a good idea." One request, on the age of truck drivers, was shown to be already in effect. The Committee was assured that attendance at the American schools would not be compulsory. Two questions were referred to a higher authority and the Congress of the United States was conveniently blamed for the inconveniences of segregation. The impossibility of placing block managers under the supervision of the proposed Representative Body was adequately explained. The complaints about the mess, however, were pushed aside with a vague suggestion that the head of the Mess Division be consulted. This muddled mess situation was (aside from the emotional hostility engendered by the farmer's death) the most important issue brought up by the Committee. Sub-committees of the Daihyo Sha were busily gathering evidence of graft to lay before Director Myer.

Colonists' Views on Demands of Negotiating Committee

It is doubtful if the Negotiating Committee's stress on clarification of status and community government was at this time an entirely accurate reflection of the sentiments of most of the colonists. Undoubtedly many of those segragees who truly intended to return to Japan wished this question of status cleared up. As the months passed this desire to know where they stood increased steadily in strength and became a major issue. However, from November through December very few informants who were not members of the Daihyo Sha Kai mention status or community government. Instead proper precaution to prevent the recurrence of accidents, improvement of living conditions and the dismissal of Doctor Pedicord are most emphatically stressed. More-

Judging by evacuees' statements and letters of this period the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee were a fairly accurate mirror of public sentiment. Only on the matter of the creation of a "permanent governing body" can the committee be accused of jumping ahead of the wishes of the people. This does not mean that the people were against the formation of such a body but that there is no evidence that the people considered it a crying need or desired to make it one of the salient items requested of Mr. Best. With this one exception it can be said that every issue put before Mr. Best at this October 26 meeting had an appreciable amount of public support; this does not imply, however, that support of each point was camp-wide. According to data, the institution of proper precautions to prevent the recurrence of accidents, improvement of general living conditions and the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord were the most emphatic desires of the people.

The policy of the Negotiating Committee at this meeting has never been criticized by the evacuees. These men had been put up as representatives: whatever they chose to do "for the benefit of the people" was all right.

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over, it is very doubtful if the Committee ever put the question of the reduction of farm acreage before the people. Apparently, on some issues the Negotiating Committee acted as it saw fit. This policy, however, was not criticized by the colonists. These men had been put up as representatives; whatever they chose to do "for the benefit of the people" was all right. Some idea of what demands the people thought most important may be gained from the following statements.

From "I": *Takenuchi*

"The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. (2) That the food in camp be improved. (3) That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged. (4) That Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer, in view of his anti-Japanese views and actions, be discharged. That he was incompetent and negligent of his duties. That because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients in the past (a Japanese doctor had recommended transfusions) these patients all died.¹

"They asked for porches for all the apartments. WRA had promised lumber for all the porches. It was never supplied. That's where that request came in. We were promised. That's inefficiency as far as I'm concerned.

"The only thing that everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord, and more care in placement of drivers, and an improvement of food, and I think, the request for an investigation of grafting. Grafting started the whole works."²

From "K": *Kurikawa*

"I don't know how much they demanded for the widow and children But the people figured it (60% of monthly wage) was not enough Then at the same time they made demands for porches and for the latrine to be better taken care of and other things. They also asked for Dr. Pedicord to be taken out of the hospital. There were several other requests they threw in with the farmer's case."³

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

²Notes, Feb. pp. 13, 14.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

On October 27, Mr. Best terminated the farm workers as of October 19, and telegraphed Charles F. Ernst, Project Director at the Topaz Center and W. Wade, Head of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake.¹ Having taken this action he left the project for San Francisco, where, it is said, he was to confer with Dillon Myer. The termination notice was worded as follows:

FARM WORKERS NOTICE

Due to failure of Farm Workers to report for work they have been terminated as of October 19. In order to get the payroll out on time, arrangements have been made for these workers to return their badges to the Timekeeper's Office at 717, from now until noon of Saturday.

Failure to return the badges will automatically bring a charge of 50¢ to all Farm Workers who have not turned in their badges at this time, and the payroll will be delayed.

Signature: R. R. Best

This action was a staggering blow to the Negotiating Committee and to the striking farmers. The Negotiating Committee had assumed the full burden of responsibility of managing the strike and gaining the concessions desired from the Administration and had had a meeting with Mr. Best at which they had appeared to have

¹The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943) contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a "strike" at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no "strike" or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake have had meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers."

In Poston, the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90 cents to \$1.00 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of October 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, 1943, pp. 2, 10.

considerable advantage. The day after the meeting the farmers, who were relying on them, were terminated, a most discrediting situation for them, and "loyal evacuees" were called ~~for who would~~ ^{in to} break the strike which was their major if not their only bargaining point. The anger of the committee and the people at what they called "this double-cross" is easy to appreciate. The situation is betrayed clearly in the following statement made by Kuratomi:

"Then, the Administration was very anxious to terminate the farm workers. We spoke against that. We thought we had been able to convince Mr. Best that if the termination was to take place, it would be gradual."

"Naturally, after we had had the meeting with Mr. Best we made reports to the representatives and to the farm group in particular. That such a statement came out the following day threw suspicion on Administrative sincerity. (and put the Negotiating Committee in a very bad light. R. H.) Our immediate feeling was a distrust of Mr. Best."¹

"Distrust" is a mild word to use to describe the sentiments of the Negotiating Committee after this action by Mr. Best.

Faced now with the loss of their positions and the complete frustration of their aims, the Farm Committee met with Mr. Zimmer, the Assistant Project Director on October 29. What transpired at the meeting is not known though the statement made by Mr. Zimmer implies that the farmers attempted to get him to reverse the decision on the turning in of their badges.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Farm Committee met with the Assistant Project Director at approximately 3:00 P.M., October 29, 1943 and discussed various subjects relating to the farm. These subjects will be discussed further with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer on either Monday or Tuesday, November 1 or 2.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 6.

The minutes of this meeting were translated orally for the writer by Kuratomi. Exerpts follow:

"Mr. Kallum, the supervisor, has the interpretation that the stoppage of work was not considered a strike. It's possible that all of us should return to work. I don't believe any of us would have any objection to returning to work.

"However, on the 28th, it was announced that the farm group had been terminated. The farm group has been requested to turn in their badges. But there has been so much contrast between what the Negotiating Committee had reported and this action, that we are very much disappointed about this action. Since we did not stage a strike, we see no reason why we should be terminated. Mr. Zimmer should know very well what transpired during the conference.

"With the foregoing reasons, we request that by tomorrow, Saturday noon, (Oct. 30), we want the Administration to retract the announcement of the previous day and at the same time nullify our termination from work. If this problem cannot be settled, concerning the graveness of the situation, we will again have to turn the matter to the peoples' hands."¹

Much of the farmers' anger, sense of injury, and fear, shows through Mr. Kuratomi's formal phrases. Termination had been their chief worry from the beginning and they had tried very hard to avoid it by insisting that the work stoppage was not a "strike." Now what they feared had come to pass. The statement: "I don't believe any of us would have any objection to returning to work," is almost pathetic.

In any case, this meeting gained the farmers nothing at all. The next day Mr. Zimmer released the following statement:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Farm Committee met with the Assistant Project Director at approximately 3:00 P.M., October 29, 1943 and discussed various subjects relating to the farm. These subjects will be discussed further with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer on either Monday or Tuesday, November 1 or 2.

¹ ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 2.

Due to Administrative Instruction 27, Revised, dated August 4, 1943, it is impossible for me to reverse the decision regarding the turning in of badges which was received by the former farm workers on October 28, 1943.

Signed: C. E. Zimmer

 Information on what took place at this meeting should not be too difficult to get. I've also got to find out why the matter of the badges was considered so important. R. H.

Reactions of the People

much better

The first contingent of "strike-breaking" farm workers arrived in Tule October 30. However, the residents had been informed of their coming through letters. Statements of informants indicate that the people never for a moment blamed the Negotiating Committee for this blow. All resentment, and resentment rose to phenomenal heights, was heaped upon "double-crossing" Mr. Best and the "double-crossing" "loyal Japanese" who, being Japanese, "should have known better."

A member of the Daihyo Sha said: *h. Katataka*

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."¹

Nishino
 Mr. Nakao, a nisei block manager said:

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. Those fellows staying behind were supposed to be loyal to this country. On the cauliflowers that were sent in they'd write, "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough."²

¹Notes, Mar., p. 52.

²Notes, April, 1944, p. 21. This colorful story is probably folklore. It is not likely that the harvesters, feeling themselves in a precarious position, would taunt the segregees as "disloyal." Communication from "X".

Sakenchi

Mr. Fujimoto, who relocated from Tule in September, 1944 said:

"Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting. ¹ I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."

Yamaguchi
Mrs. Yamaguchi said:

"At that time I thought, 'If those people from the other centers really understood the situation in here they wouldn't dare come.' Even if Mr. Best did want them to come, they didn't have to. I didn't blame Mr. Best at all. Those Japanese who did come should know better." ²

D. Egi
A very conservative old Tulean nisei girl said:

"That (bringing in the harvesters) was another mistake (on the part of the Administration), don't you think? We were angry against the people who came in more than anything. We thought now the Administration would think there are Japanese people willing to work against us. It made the break (between the Administration and the people) greater." ³

Y. Nishikawa
Another very conservative nisei girl from Gila said:

"I didn't think there was anything wrong with harvesting the crop. But even among my nisei friends - they got mad and said it was a big difference. There were loyal and there were disloyal." ⁴

It is interesting that few informants will admit that they were hostile to the harvesters because they were breaking the strike. *Yoshiyama*
Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee and a very frank young man, was approached by the writer and asked for the truth behind the peoples' sentiments. He stated without hesitation:

"Since we believed the people left behind in the other centers were loyal Americans, naturally we did not like loyal American Japanese breaking our strike. That was the main thing. We didn't care about the food. We felt that since we were in camp the government was responsible for seeing that we were well fed. Of course, the harvests of this center were being sent to

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 13. Notes, April p. 30. See also Notes, Feb, p. 14

²Ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 1.

³Ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 2.

⁴Ibid., Aug. 30, 1944, p. 2.

the other centers. We were opposed to that because we didn't want to feed the loyal American Japanese. It was like feeding the United States Army or Navy."

Yoshiyama
Kato related another attempt of the part of the committee to inconvenience the ^{"loyal"} harvesters:

"And then at that time the carpenter crew started going out to the farm. They went there to build little shacks for the convenience of the harvesters. We were definitely opposed to that. Three of us went to all the carpenter foreman to stop it at once. We said, 'All right, let them harvest it. But for goodness' sakes, we don't have to build shacks and put them in comfortable living while the farmers are on strike.'"¹

Since these shacks being built for the harvesters were probably outhouses, the language used by ^{*Yoshiyama*} Kato on this occasion was undoubtedly more picturesque than he recounted to the writer.

The WRA provided food for these harvesters from the warehouses where the residents' food was stored, removing it by night. Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day, but it is ~~also~~ very possible that the WRA hesitated to remove the food by day for fear of arousing additional resentment. However, evacuee espionage against the Administration was functioning at high pitch and ~~it was immediately noted that the trucks were driven to the warehouse, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven off the project.~~ ^{*the removal of food was and reported immediately.*}

good
The next morning, Japanese employed in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never received catsup at mess.² While, as ^{*Yoshiyama*} Kato has admitted, this removal of food was not the basic cause for resentment it proved to be an excellent vehicle for expressions of bitterness against the Administration.

¹ ibid., Dec. 12, 1944, p. 5.

² Report, Dec. 24, 1943, pp. 13, 21.

A nisei member of the Daihyo Sha said: *L. Katsuka*

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"¹

Takenaka
Fujimoto stated in a letter to the writer:

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."²

area
As soon as this removal of food became known a group of young men, some of whom were Daihyo Sha members set to watching the warehouses and the motor pool at night. Although Mr. *Yoshiyama* Kato, one of the leaders of this group has assured the writer that "we were ready to beat up any Caucasian we caught trying to take food," the writer is inclined to think that the young fellows had no formulated plan and perhaps, hoped, by their very presence alone, to forestall another Administrative attempt to feed the harvesters. Caucasians residing in this area have remarked that they heard the boys talking and laughing as they snooped about the area in the night. Some of these young men considered themselves to be very tough indeed and had engaged in rowdy activities in the centers from which they had come. *a particularly tough bunch had come from Topaz.* Their temperament may be judged from the following description of a small gang of boys in Poston who went to Tule Lake prepared to cause trouble. The writer knows that at least one of this Poston group was prominent in the group watching the warehouses.

"It might be true that some small groups pledged among the members to cause some trouble when they arrived at Tule Lake. For instance, I remember a group of about seven kibel who pledged

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Mar. 1944, p. 62.

²Report, Dec. 24, 1943, pp. 13, 14.

to cause trouble at Tule Lake when they left Poston. They prepared knives at the Machine Shop before segregation. One of them bought a pistol for twenty-five dollars and took it to Tule Lake. I don't think the pistol was confiscated when they arrived at the segregation center. Nonetheless, I don't think there were any more than two or three such groups among the Poston contingents."¹

¹Communication from "X", November, 1944.

From a letter in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4:

" . . . on November 1 the representatives made the following demands to Director Myer and Director Best: (1) to supply each block with brooms, buckets, mops, and other necessary items. (2) Swindlings by the appointed personnel in the Subsistence Department were charged. They requested to remove these crooked Caucasians. (3) To discharge the Caucasian employees from the hospital. They also charged that the money appropriated for medicines had been swindled by the Caucasians. (4) All the better grade agricultural products have been packed in the shed and sent to the outside. Formerly the residents had thought that these were being sent to other relocation centers. Lately they have been informed that most of these had been sent to the Army. They argued that they should not be producing for the United States Army.

October 27 Best telegraphed Charles F. Ernst, Project Director at the Topaz Center and , of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake.¹

The following day he terminated the striking farm workers as of October 19, "due to failure to report for work."²

The first contingent of farm workers arrived in Tule October 30.

It was commonly believed that Best had stated that he would take no action in regard to the strike without notification. Many colonists were convinced that Best had broken his word. The harvesters were regarded as strikebreaking double-crossers. Resentment increased.

¹ The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943), contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a "strike" at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no "strike" or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake have had meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers".

In Poston the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90 cents to \$1.00 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of October 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, October 27, pp 2, 10.
² Tulean Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1943

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Kataoka

"H", member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."¹

Nishino

"N" said:

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. Those fellows staying behind were supposed to be loyal to this country. On the cauliflowers that were sent in they'd write, "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough."²

Jakuchu

"I" said:

Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting.³ .I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."³

Food for these unpopular harvest workers was taken by night from the warehouse which held the colonists' food. Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day.⁴ Evacuees noted the fact that trucks were driven to the warehouses, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven off the project. The next morning Japanese employed

¹ Notes, Mar., p. 52

² Notes, April 1944, p. 21

³ Report, Dec. 24, p. 13 . Notes, April p. 30. See also Notes, Feb., p. 14

⁴ Notes, Feb., p. 21

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in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never receive catsup at mess.¹ The fact that the food at Tule Lake was, in general, below the standards to which the colonists had been accustomed at other centers, and the well founded suspicion that graft existed among the A. P. members of the Mess Division added to the conviction of injustice. All informants agree that this removal of food was resented most bitterly.

Says "M": *Kataska*

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"²

Says "I": *Sakemuchi*

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."³

When the news spread, and the Negotiation Committee saw that it was widely publicized, it no doubt angered persons who had hitherto been indifferent or neutral. When Mr. Best was approached on the matter he is reputed to have said:

"It's none of your business because we haven't issued these things out to you yet, and besides we're feeding you people properly."⁴

The informant added, "They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble."

¹ Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 21

² Notes, Mar., p. 62.

³ Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 13. 14.

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Whether Mr. Best actually made this statement is not known. However, the people, shocked by the farm accident, feeling a common insult in the Administration's refusal to allow a public funeral, were now pushed one step further into resentment by knowing that food, some of which consisted of "luxuries" they never received themselves, was being given to the strike breakers while they themselves continued to get only their miserable fare. The harvesters, it is said, added insult to injury by their attitude: *Nishino*

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. . . . On the cauliflowers that were sent in, they'd write: "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough. . . . They didn't trust the Administration at all about handling the food problem. Maybe they were putting money in their own pockets." ¹

Oct 27²
On October 28 the Daihyo Sha Kai held its fourth meeting. (The minutes of the third meeting are not available) This meeting again was not too well attended, seven men being absent. The removal of food from the warehouses had evidently not yet been noted, for no mention is made in the minutes. The Committee made a report on their interview with Mr. Best which, except for a certain tone which made the Committee sound exceedingly arrogant and Mr. Best exceedingly meek, was fundamentally accurate. ² The expected 50 day wait for food supplies was fully explained. In concluding the report, Kuratomi stated that no record of this interview had been kept and that the Project Director had promised to send a written memo "with regard to the demands." He then recommended that a representative body be formed at once. The following

¹ Notes, April, p. 21.

² Fourth Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, pp. 1 - 4.

remarks were made on resegregation:

Question from the floor: Did the Negotiating Committee ever demand the WRA, resegregation of disloyal and loyal?

Chair: We have. Because we have the information by which we can distinguish the loyal from the disloyal.

Question from the floor: Regardless of their present address whether within or without the Center, they are all same Japanese. Disloyal or loyal status should not make any difference as far as Japanese are concerned.

stated that he had recommended the cultivation of only 700 acres of farm land, adding:

"There is no necessity of tilling the remaining balance of 3200 acres of land.....Since we have pledged our loyalty to Japan, our acts today will have a great significance on the day when peace once again returns."

Takahashi then asked:

"I wonder if 700 acres of farmland to work are sufficient for the colonists of this size?"

Said Kuratomi:

"According to Project Director Best, the maximum limit of acreage is 700 acres for the colonists' subsistence. This problem will be fully discussed upon the arrival of Myer."

The question of resegregation of those persons who were "Loyal" to America from those who were "disloyal" was then brought up. A member queried:

"Did the Negotiating Committee ever demand the WRA, resegregation of disloyal and loyal?"

Kuratomi stated that they had. Apparently there are some insertions in the minutes at this point. What questions were raised are not known. It is likely, however, that many of the members did not understand exactly what Kuratomi meant by re-segregation. Kuratomi insisted to the writer that he had never advocated actual re-segregation but only a clarification of status so that those individuals who had stayed in Tule Lake with no intention of returning to Japan might be moved out of the center. His object, he stated, was unification, a camp of people of like sentiments toward Japan.¹

¹ Kuratomi's stand on this matter was to assume much significance almost a year later when he differed sharply with a group which advocated out-and-out resegregation of a group "truly loyal to Japan" as against Kuratomi's ideal of a camp unified by the ejection of a comparatively small group of individuals "loyal to America."

The extremely important matter of the termination of the farm workers was then brought up.

Komiya: Administration requested the return of badges after the farm incident. However, very few people assembled.

Chair: Has the termination been given to them?

Komiya: Not yet.

Chair: The point we must keep in mind is that since the farm employees have not been formally discharged, there is no need of returning the badges. Because this is not a strike, they have no right to terminate farm employees without due reason.

The puzzling matter of status was again introduced;

Voice from the floor: How will we distinguish the disloyal from the loyal?

Voice from the floor: Utmost care and consideration should be taken.

Chair: Due to the Administration's lack of understanding of Japanese psychology, many tragical incidents may result. We have to remember that we are Japanese and are for the greater and righteous things. That's why we are discussing this for the purpose of unification.

Tsuda: There are several colonists who have rejected the registration¹ and there are others who registered 'yes', who at the time of re-segregation stubbornly remained and are still with us. If we should demand re-segregation of colonists how should we present the problem?

Chair: I have no plan as to the ways and means. Because of this war-time condition, one should not pursue the policy for his own selfishness and should clearly pledge his allegiance to Japan immediately.

Tsuda's statement is an excellent expression of the resentment over the predicament of sharing the camp with persons who had pledged their loyalty to America or had refused to make a statement of loyalty. Kuratomi's inability to explain how this much needed process was to be carried on is not surprising in view of the fact that over a year later the Administration was still

¹There were, in fact, at this time over 1,000 persons in Tule Lake who had refused to register at the time of Military Registration.

puzzling over whether or not some sort of re-segregation should take place and if so, how it should be done.

The Chair then proceeded with the plan for the election of the various divisional committees and plans for the function of the farm department, farm produce, chicken and hog farm, food supply, motor pool, hospital, betterment of living condition, internal security, and education. He mentioned that Best had agreed to give the colonists free reign in managing the Internal Security Department.

Kozaka: Wouldn't it be misunderstood if a central body is formed at this time without first consulting the colonists?

Chair: No, Diahyo Sha Kai was elected from each block by election and this body was formed by that representative body so there is no inconsistency.

Kozaka: I make a recommendation that the block representatives consult the colonists first before further going into the discussion of a plan for the further formation of divisional committees.

Chair: Of course, it should be that way. We cannot decide by ourselves.

Kai suggested that this plan for the election of permanent committees be put before the colonists at a mass meeting.

Takahashi put this into the form of a motion and it was approved unanimously. Kai stated: "We will have the approval of the colonists upon recommendation of each block and request their support." He added:

"As the chair reported tonight, I am sure WRA will co-operate with this body. If in case they do not, then the Negotiating Committee will see to it that they concede to our demands."

Hatano thanked the Negotiating Committee on behalf of the farm department committee for their effort.

Takahashi recommended that the block representatives elect fitting persons for the various posts and that the final decision

should be given to the Daihyo Sha Kai. A written recommendation should be conveyed to the colonists. This was unanimously approved.

ARRIVAL OF DILLON MYER - ACTIONS OF DAIHYO SHA KAI

Two days later Dillon Myer arrived on the project. The Negotiating Committee asked for a meeting with him but was refused. Instead, he stated that he would meet with the Farm Group on November 2.¹ By ignoring the Negotiating Committee completely the Administration probably hoped to complete the process of discreditment which it fallaciously thought had been begun by the termination of the farm workers. But the Negotiating Committee could not afford to let this opportunity pass. If it did not achieve "recognition" from Director Myer it's chances for future success were dark indeed. Kuratomi, explaining that the committee had after its October 27 interview with Mr. Best "made reports to the representatives and the farm group," described the situation as follows:

"So when Mr. Myer came we felt we had to show that we had support so that Mr. Myer could see with his own eyes the support we had. That was our paramount intention."²

The plan which the committee conceived and carried out was a small masterpiece of political strategy. On November 1, representatives announced at the noon mess that Dillon Myer would meet with the Negotiating Committee that afternoon and that he would speak to the people. The people were exhorted to attend as a gesture of support to their representatives. A very fine description of the proceedings and the temper of the people in ward VII,

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 3.

²ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, p. 6.

which was very pro-Daihyo Sha was given by Mrs. Yamaguchi, an extremely accurate informant:

"It was announced in the mess that Mr. Myer was here and that the representatives of the Daihyo Sha would see him on matters that the residents of the colony wanted determined such as the hospital. I think the hospital was the biggest problem then.

"They said they didn't care whether we were young or old. They wanted us to go and they told us that we would not be permitted to come home when we wanted to.

"About ten minutes after we came home from lunch, everyone of us got ready and formed a line in front of the mess hall and we walked to the Administration building. When we reached there, the place was packed with people from other blocks.

"It seemed some blocks didn't take the trouble to really get serious and the residents went of their own will. Every one of us went from block 68. I think a lot went from curiosity."¹

At a previous interview, when discussing the support given the Daihyo Sha at this time, Mr. Yamaguchi who weighs less than a hundred pounds said with flashing eyes, "When we went to the Administration building on November 1, we marched!"

A young nisei man, an old Tulean, made the following statement:

"So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall. They asked everybody to come to the Administration Building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be as quiet as possible."²

It is very likely that orders like these were given. The Negotiating Committee realized very well that even an appearance of violence would harm its cause.

^{Nishino}
Mr. Nakao stated:

"The first thing we heard was about Mr. Myer. He is coming and we would appreciate your cooperation in coming to the Administration building. I said to myself, 'Things should be straightened out. Find out the true dope of how things are standing.'"³

^{Iwahara}
Miss Ikeda, a young nisei very much opposed to agitating or

¹ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 2.

²Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 13.

³R. Hankey, Notes, April 1944, p. 20

trouble-making said:

"When all the people marched to the Ad. Building, it wasn't a riot or anything."¹

It is possible that some were ignorant of the purpose. No doubt there were many others as described by you.

It is interesting that some informants desire to give the impression that they knew nothing about what was going on and that they went to the Administration only because they heard that Mr. Myer was going to speak. They assiduously avoid giving the impression that they knew the gathering was called to show public support of the Negotiating Committee. It is almost impossible that they could have been in a state of such blissful ignorance and their verbatim statements must be viewed as attempts to escape responsibility for ^{participating in demonstration} attending the gathering. These individuals are moderate people who probably knew very well why the meeting was called but prefer to state that they attended out of curiosity or because they were afraid. That many were afraid of incurring public stigma if they did not attend there is no doubt.

An intelligent young nisei girl said:

not reliable

"Half of the people didn't know what was going on. They were just dragged with the group. They were more or less forced. There were unauthorized commands. They told us Mr. Myer was going to speak to the colony so the people just went."²

A very interesting conversation between three girls on the subject of November 1 was recorded. These girls are very American in manner and hold a bitter grudge against the Negotiating Committee for bringing trouble, gloom and disgrace upon the camp. One of the girls was an old Tulean.

Miss Ikeda: All I know is that we were told, 'Everybody go up there!' If they can't get what they want they said they were going to do something drastic.

¹ibid., Aug. 30, 1944, p. 2.

²ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 3.

this could have happened easily
Miss Watanabe: They told me if I didn't go they were going to kick me out of our block. We had roll call in our block. My mother said I was sick.

Miss Ikeda: The other group (Daihyo Sha) just stood up in the mess hall and told us to go. When we went up there and then wanted to go home, they wouldn't let us.

Miss Watanabe: They had guys guarding the gates.

Miss Ikeda: They pushed me up in the front line. It just burned me up. We didn't know what was going on.

Miss Watanabe: They announced it at the mess hall and said, 'If you're Japanese, you'll go.'

Some one might have stolen it. I don't agree. correct
 Since Miss Watanabe was 18 years old it is most unlikely that anyone threatened to "kick her out of the block" if she did not attend. Her statement is probably a reflection of the widespread public fear of appearing to be a dissenter. That her mother explained that she was ill is natural. The mother undoubtedly feared that something violent might occur at the Administration building and wished to keep the girl safe at home. The statement, "If you're Japanese, you'll go" was undoubtedly used over and over again by the Negotiating Committee. It is a favorite and powerful argument. Mr. ^{Takenuchi} Fujimoto mentioned it again in his statement:

"The people gathered in some of the blocks (to go to the Administration building in a group). In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon squad got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the Administration area. Is it tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barrack. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese or not?'"¹

^{Takenuchi}
 It is very doubtful if the group whom Fujimoto calls "goon squad" engaged in any overt terrorization. To tour the blocks in trucks and say, "Let's go, let's go." was sufficient. However, hot-headed young men with the reputations of toughs undoubtedly

¹ ibid., Feb. 1944, p. .

were attracted to this activity and it is probable that in some blocks they used strong language. When ^{Takemichi} Fujimoto refers to being shot he means being shot by the Army. His letters to the writer at this period show him to have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Daihyo Sha's aims. He is not of the temperament to risk his skin, however.

Mr. ^{Abe} Muraoka, an issei old Tulean provided himself with an excellent excuse for not attending the demonstration:

"At November 1, my wife was very sick. I can't go out then. I can't understand the trouble. I stay in home. I had to take care of my two kids. I had no time."¹

agree A veritable multitude streamed to the Administration building ^{the noon meal} after lunch. The crowd may have numbered 14,000. Most of the people knew that the demonstration was a gesture of support to the Negotiating Committee. Curiosity and fear of criticism if they absented themselves were also important motives. It is justifiable to conclude that the temper of the people must have been very high. No amount of oratory or "pressure" would have gotten them out in such numbers to face a possible recurrence of the Manzanar fatalities if tension and resentment against the Administration had not been so strong. The Daihyo Sha was taking no chances, however. When the people had left the camp area, certain young men surrounded the entire group. Opler stated that he saw these young men "keeping the people there." A group would attempt to leave the mass and return to the camp and the "guards" would draw together. Discouraged ~~by this act~~, the group would return.

Don't you agree?

This demonstration was perpetrated entirely without warning. No one on the Administrative personnel had the least inkling that it was contemplated.

¹ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, p. 1.

The Japanese overran the entire Administrative area; the Administration building was completely surrounded. Many of the appointed personnel were panic stricken. The fears of those who had always expected the worst of the Japanese appeared about to be realized. Some feared rape for their wives and children. As the masses of people streamed past the hospital, Dr. Pedicord came out of the building and, using insulting language, ordered the group about the hospital to disperse. Four or five of the hoodlum group followed him into the hospital and into his office. According to a statement by Dillon Myer he struck the first blow; they turned upon him and beat him severely. The variation in the versions of this occurrence are legion. Opler says Pedicord changed his own version every time he was interviewed.¹ Two Japanese informants said that the boys went to get Pedicord to ask him to come to the conference.² However, Opler says that the nurses, who were eye-witnesses, testified that Pedicord came out of the hospital and ordered the boys out.³ This is corroborated by ^{Katoka} M., a Daihyo Sha informant, who added:

"He came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and make a stink!"⁴

This was the first incident in which the Negotiating Committee was unable to control the "hot-heads" and the "strong-arm actionists" as they are called. To keep these violently inclined individuals in line was one of the most difficult tasks of the leaders. Their

¹Notes, Mar., p. 59.

²Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 22.

³Notes, Mar., p. 59.

⁴ibid., pp. 61. 62.

failure on this occasion certainly did not aid their negotiations with Dillon Myer.

Completely surrounded by thousands of Japanese, and virtually imprisoned in the Administration building, Dillon Myer consented to see the committee. According to Caucasian witnesses, the members of the committee approached the building "as if they knew exactly what they were doing and had everything well planned," and saw to it that a public address system was set up. Meanwhile, Japanese were stationed at the doors of the Administration building to see that no Caucasian left. This was probably a precautionary measure to see that no more Caucasians were injured. — ?

MEETING IN MR. BEST'S OFFICE AT 1:30 P.M. NOVEMBER 1, 1943

Present:

Dillon S. Myer	Isamu Sugimoto	Herbert Hoshiko	Y. Kobayashi
R. B. Cozzens	Geroge Kuratomi	Hijino Takada	Fred. H. Mori
R. R. Best	Mits Kimura	Shizuo Kai	Ichiro Hayashi
C. E. Zimmer	Matsunaka Nakao	Kaichi Yamamoto	
S. Cahn	Satoshi Yoshiyama	Harry Nogawa	
Willard E. Schmidt	Sanpei Kodama	Isamu Uchida	
M. Lucas (Reporter)	Masao Hatano	T. Inouye	
Dr. P. A. Webber			

The following took place while the committee was assembling for a meeting in Mr. Best's Office at 1:30 P.M. November 1.

Mr. Best received a telephone call reporting the incident at the hospital.

Mr. Best: What is going on at the hospital, George?

Kuratomi: I don't know.

Mr. Best: They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord, they are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up and they are going from one ward to another destroying property.

Kuratomi: We will stop it.

Mr. Best: They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. That will have to be stopped right away.

Committee sent some men over to hospital.

14? It will be noted that 17 Japanese were present as compared to the 10 negotiators of the October 26th meeting. This augmentation of the committee caused the administration much suspicion; however, in consideration of the very incomplete integration and organization of the Daihyo Sha at his time, the informal personnel of this "Negotiating Committee" is quite understandable. Anybody was brought along whose presence was thought needful. Seven ~~men~~ men were members of the Central Committee of the Daihyo Sha: Messers. Nakao, Hoshiko, Kai, Yamamoto, Uchida, Kobayashi, ~~Mori~~ ^{Mori was vice chairman} and Hayashi. Mr. Yoshiyama was the English Secretary of the Daihyo Sha; he was probably brought along because he spoke English well and could take notes of the English discussion. Kodama and Hatano were representatives of the farm group; Takeda represented the Agricultural division, and Nogawa, the Hospital Committee. Inouye and Kimura were champion judo men who undoubtedly were brought along in case the presence of first rate fighters might be needed and because of their influence with the judo men, who formed the greater number of the young men assigned to keep order. Kumatomi would not admit to the writer that this young men's committee had been formed, explaining Kimura and Inouye's presence as follows:

"There was fear on the part of some men. We'd heard from other sources, . . . that some young men may get out of hand. So they recommended that we have some young men to be prepared in case of disturbance."

During the course of the meeting it was Mits Kimura who left to stop the beating of Dr. Pedicord. 1/

The minutes continue:

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Mr. Best: They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. That will have to be stopped right away.

Committee sent some men ~~xx~~ over to hospital.

Kuratomis: I would like to ask about the notes of the meeting we held the other day. Is that ready?

Best: It will be ready. I have been away and Miss Lucas had a lot of work to do. Will get it as soon as it is prepared. Didn't you have a copy?

Kuratomis: Yes, but some questions were not answered and we are rather anxious to get it.

Best: I told you that as soon as I got back I intended to meet with you and discuss every point in question, and we would go to work on that, which I will do.

Kuratomis: It is very unfortunate that it has come to this point. However, there are some things being brought up. The residents have asked that these be transmitted to you. Here are some of the things. First of all we want you to know that we understand our position and status in here. We do not want to commit any riots or conduct ourselves in a disorderly manner. The people outside are here to express their dissatisfaction and anger about the Center administration.

Best: Just on the whole or do you charge on some specific thing?

Kuratomis: I do not know if you can call it a charge. I will explain those things later. [We have been asked to bring up their grievances, requests and demands to you (I don't know whether you like the word "demand" but nevertheless that is the words that has been used to us personally) so that you may be able to get an over-all picture of how ill administered this Center is. This has been directed to Mr. Myer.]

Best: I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me. It is very unfortunate that Mr. Myer is visiting here during a time like this. I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me and we will leave Mr. Myer out of it. I am here and I want you to put it all to me direct.

Kuratomis: I will be frank with you. I know how unfortunate it is that this had to happen when Mr. Myer was present. Why this came up today will be explained later. [Among other things we want to ask you today that we be treated humanely from this Government, this Government of the United States. If the administration should continue to treat us as it has been in the past, it is the feeling of the residents that we can report the whole affair to the Japanese Government through the Spanish Consul. These are not accusations or threats, they are facts to prove the things which we are bringing up now.]

Best: You will make specific charges, I presume.

Kuratomis: Yes, later. We believe the American democratic principles are at stake. The Congress of the United States should have an appropriation sufficient to care for the welfare and well being of the center residents. However, they have been insufficient and there have been mismanagements permitted by Caucasian personnel to greatly jeopardize the true intentions of the United States Government toward Japanese evacuees in the Center. If such conditions are allowed to continue to exist the democratic quality of the United States will be greatly injured. [The Caucasian personnel at this Center, with few exceptions, are known to be hostile to Japanese evacuees. Mr. Best has failed to keep faith with us. He has failed to keep faith with us within two days after promising to cooperate with us for the improvement of the center living conditions. By his deed and acts he has lost complete faith with the center residents. What Mr. Best says today is not to be applied for tomorrow. His inhumane treatment can be best illustrated by one incident which occurred very recently at this center. As all of us know, some 29 persons were injured in a recent auto mishap and the residents still feel that the WRA has been responsible for the accident. Mr. Best as Project Director seemed very indifferent. He showed no concern over the accident apparently because not once has he expressed his regrets. When Mr. Kashima died, as a result of the accident, the Center residents decided to make his funeral a center-wide affair. Mr. Best refused to grant the residents the use of the outdoor stage or the auditorium, the reason being that Mrs. Kashima, widow of the deceased, did not wish such an affair. He refused to send a representative to the funeral for the same reason. When Mr. Ernst, project director at Topaz can send a telegram of condolence, why couldn't Mr. Best do the same inasmuch as he is right here. If further verification is necessary we are prepared to call in Mrs. Kashima.] Deploable conditions at the hospital have caused the ire of the center residents. It is a wonder beyond our imagination how the residents of this center in the past let such conditions exist at the base hospital. The residents feel that the WRA should be held responsible for the ability and efficiency of the Caucasian doctors and nurses sent to this center.

Best: They haven't stopped over at the hospital. Dr. Pedicord has been beaten very severely and is asking for military police. What would you boys do in a case like that.

Kuratomis: I don't know.

Best: What would you think about it?

Kuratomis: Maybe if I read some more you can see some of the reasons.

Myer: I think we need to know about this now.

Kuratomis: Some of the reasons?

Myer: Not the reasons. We need to know who is going to be responsible for stopping this situation at the hospital right now.

Kuratomis: Some of the boys have gone over to stop it now. They came of their own accord. We didn't know they were going to do that. I think they will stop everything if we shall continue to talk this over.

Myer: No question of talking it over now. We can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's life be jeopardized.

Best: Something has got to be done right now.

Kuratomis: Shall we wait?

Best: Yes, we will wait till it is stopped over there. That has got to stop.

Kuratomis: Will send some more boys over.

(waited for report from hospital)

Kuratomis: Here are some questions I would like to ask that were not answered in the last conference, namely: What would be the status of these Center residents by the American Government and by the Japanese Government from the interpretation of International Law? Then, there is a demand from the Center residents that this Center should be designated for all those persons who have intention of going back to Japan when the opportunity presents itself. Can you answer me those questions, Mr. Best?

Best: Will you read those questions again, George?

Kuratomis: (Reread questions)

Best: If you mean are you considered as prisoners of war, I can answer that. You are not prisoners of war.

Kuratomis: We are called "segregants". Is there any other name applicable to the status of the center residents other than the word "segregant"?

Best: If there is I don't know it.

Kuratomis: Mr. Myer?

Myer: Evacuees. We simply called this Center the Tule Lake Center because it is not a relocation center. It is, as you know, for those people who want to return to Japan and other people who will not indicate full loyalty to the American Government. It is not an internment camp, such as the Department of Justice has jurisdiction over. It is not a prisoner of war camp. We expect, if it is

agreeable to you people to carry on a peaceable operation at this center and carry out the same policies, insofar as they can apply, as in other relocation centers. That is our intention if it is feasible. The events today indicate that we may have some difficulty in doing that.

Kuratom: In regard to the second question. The residents would have this center designated for all those who have intention of going back to Japan sooner or later. Would there be some solution to that?

Myer: Can't give you a final answer to that. It will have to be worked out on the basis of what is feasible from the standpoint of what is available in the way of a physical program to work that out. This is something that you and we, the WRA, have to work out. If it is not satisfactory the problem is studied more carefully.

Kuratom: It is a possibility?

Myer: There is a possibility to anything that lies within the scope of my domain to decide. Nothing more than that.

Kuratom: You wouldn't stay there is a possibility?

Myer: No. Because I don't want to imply any promises that I can't carry out. I want to be very careful to have the policies understood. I don't commit myself if I can't produce. I don't want to do that until we can study the problem. We have to know how many people are involved - who should stay here and who can go somewhere else and a lot of other things have to be considered.

Kuratom: Have you taken into note the friction between the people who have expressed their desire to go back to Japan and those who are still loyal to this country. There are still quite a lot in this Center at the present time.

Myer: Certainly. Those who are considered loyal to this country will still have an opportunity to be considered for movement elsewhere. No question about that.

Kuratom: How soon do you think the process of segregation can be completed?

Myer: I don't think it possible to estimate. Things are in a state of flux. We will have to get a program in order. I haven't been here long enough to know what the situation is. You people haven't given me an opportunity to talk to the people who have the records.

Kuratom: Can you give us an answer before you leave?

Myer: I don't know if I can give an answer before I leave. It may take quite some time to study the situation. When you are dealing with thousands of people, in order not to do an injustice to the people it takes time to work out a procedure.

Kuratomis: Here is a question I would like to ask. [It was announced the day after our conference with Mr. Best that all the farmers were terminated as of October 16 or 19, I am not sure about the date. (19th confirmed) and consequently the farmers are very furious over the fact that they were more or less terminated without previous warning so to speak, because there has been a statement that has Mr. Kallam's signature to the effect that these farmers did not go on strike. They merely stopped work until negotiations were completed. When we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was already published that they were terminated as of October 19 so the farm committee came to see Mr. Zimmer and tried to talk with him so that misunderstandings would be clarified. However, unfortunately for everyone concerned, the farmers request to return to work was refused by Mr. Zimmer because, he stated, an Administrative Instruction No. 29, was that it, Mr. Zimmer?]

Zimmer: 27

Kuratomis: Cannot be altered. That was the statement wasn't it, Mr. Zimmer?

Zimmer: Right.

Kuratomis: The people who worked in the packing sheds were terminated because there was no work for them. That statement is natural, however, they were given termination without at least a week's advance warning. Consequently, they are very much dissatisfied and if my memory is correct Mr. Best promised during our conference that he would talk things over with the farm committee which would be chosen from the people to talk and plan for the future farm at this Center.

Best: For next year, why don't you add.

Kuratomis: Now the question is what was the reason for terminating the entire farm workers without advance notice?

Best: You want that answered now?

Kuratomis: Sure.

Best: You were given every notice that if you did not go to work we would have to dispose of the crop. Your committee sitting in this room stated that you were not interested in harvesting this crop. Isn't that right?

Kuratomis: That is true.

Best: When you represented all the farmers?

Kuratomis: That is right.

Best: There isn't any farm now and there wasn't any farm from that time on.

Kuratomis: But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz. If a person committed an offense then he was subject to termination on the moment. Otherwise they got a week's notice. However, these farmers weren't given a week's notice.

Cahn: [We don't have to give a week's notice for termination. On this project it has been the custom to give a week's notice if the administration terminated a person because there wasn't enough work to do or if the evacuee was terminating. Either way. It is sort of a gentleman's agreement but is not a regulation. When people are away from work without an excused absence he can be terminated without notice. A penalty of an additional day for each day of unexcused absence can be imposed. However, this additional penalty was not imposed. It could have been. They were terminated for refusal to work.

Kuratomis: Mr. Kallam's statement mentioned the fact that this stoppage of work was not to be considered a strike.

Cahn: It wasn't considered a strike. If it had been a strike there would have been a conclusion to be reached between the evacuees and the administration and they would have been carried on the payroll until the issue was settled. This was not a strike. There was no issue at stake. They just did not go to work. No one came to see anyone to say why they weren't at work. If you refuse to work you can be terminated and penalized an additional day for each day you don't show up. Of course there are many factors that can keep a person from working - illness or other emergencies at home and there is the possibility that there would not be an opportunity to report the absence. We will wait five days for notice. We waited the five days. In this case did not penalize for special reasons. These people were terminated as of the date Mr. Best indicated there would be no harvesting on the farm.]

Kuratomis: Of course there is this point too. That in the past Mr. Best repeatedly stated he would not recognize any representatives of any committee or any organization.

Best: What! I never said that.

Kuratomis: That has been said. A statement was published in the Tulean Dispatch that I would and wanted to meet with a representative committee but they never came.

Kuratomis: After the statement was published the committee realized that you do entertain or receive representatives of any committee. Therefore they came to get assurance that the statement was correct and reported to the Center representatives. Until that time no one came to see you for the reason just mentioned. I have enough people here to verify the fact that you wouldn't see a committee before that.

Best: George, are you still referring to our first conversation?

Kuratoml: One of them.

Best: Are you referring to the statement I made to you the first time you were in here?

Kuratoml: Yes. Would you like to repeat it? Do you remember what you said?

Best: Now I understand. That is where they got it. I definitely told you the very first time that you arrived that I would make no public statement at that time. You are the only ones I told it to. You know why I said it.

Kuratoml: Don't know what your intentions were behind saying that.

(short discussion in Japanese)

Kuratoml: The members of the farm committee said that the first time they found out that you accept representatives of any group was known to them on the 21st of October. Therefore, he feels that if the crews are to be terminated on the 19th they were, in a sense, terminated prior to the time they found out that you do recognize representative committees. They couldn't negotiate with you because of the statement they already had and didn't feel they could come unless some official announcement could be made from you that you do accept representative committees. They didn't come because they didn't want to be penalized for something they did not intend. That is the answer for not coming to see you before that date.

Best: Get along to the rest of the questions. I can't do anything about it because they didn't come in. We tried to have people come out in the open about it. Couldn't get anyone to come in. I asked them to, but nobody came up here. At the time you came up here they didn't want any farm. Get on to the next question.

Kuratoml: I think that everybody agrees that the Caucasian staff does not understand the Japanese. All these representatives here would agree to the statement right now that this whole incident started from the fact that the administrative personnel, as a whole, do not know the psychology of Japanese people, that is you mention these things more or less from the standpoint of laws, rules and regulations of the WRA or any other agency. We desire to transmit your interpretations or your answers to the people and I am sure that the people will not be satisfied with your answers because that is something a little different as far as psychology is concerned. I for one know that if we are to make such a report as this to the people outside we, as a committee, cannot very well guarantee what the reaction might be of the people waiting outside. I want you to give me an answer to this question in regard to the farm situation that I can transmit to the people outside.

Myer: I want to say this about the farm question. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Best on this problem. He had crops to be harvested. I authorized him to wait a few days, which he did, to see whether or not folks would go to work. We took the chance of having the crops frozen. No one came to discuss the situation or to negotiate with him for several days as I understand it. When you folks said you didn't want the crops I had Mr. Best make arrangements for getting it harvested. Such arrangements were made only as far as this particular crop is concerned. Mr. Best has indicated he is ready to talk about future crops next year. He had to look ahead. He did that on the authority of the national director, I want you to know that. From the standpoint of public relations and from the standpoint of future needs we had to go ahead and get it done. That is all there is to say on it.

Kuratomis: At any rate, we here as a representative committee, feel that since this was brought up it has become a problem not only among the farmers but it has become a problem for the concern of every single individual on the Center. Therefore, as soon as this conference with you gentlemen is completed we will make a report to the public to that effect. However, are you prepared to meet the representatives from the packing shed and from the farm crew at a later date to discuss minor problems with them.

Best: We will meet with any group, George, at any time and discuss any problems. I have assured you of that before.

Kuratomis: (Kuratomis to Kai in Japanese) (Others in Japanese)

Kuratomis: It is the unanimous opinion of the representatives that if you are willing and prepared to make such an agreement or such arrangements with the farm group or packing shed crews at a later date to discuss minor problems with them that this will be worked out.

Best: We discussed this with you the other day. I thought you understood it.

Myer: May I make another statement?

Best: Surely, go ahead.

Myer: [It is my understanding and I think I do understand the situation, George, that your committee discussed this with Mr. Best before and indicated that you did not want the crops harvested, that you did not want to raise vegetables to be shipped out and did not want anything shipped in. There is a food shortage and there are people dependent upon that crop. Mr. Best understood me and I understand Mr. Best. We took action to have the crop harvested. I want that made clear on the record.

Kuratomis: The people in the Center felt that they would harvest the crops necessary for this Center.

- Best: You said you didn't want the crop. You said no. Definitely no.
- Kuratom1: If you will look back on the record you will find that we said this: The people of this Center are willing to harvest and raise a crop for this Center.
- Best: I said we would work with you to get a good agricultural committee to start working this winter so we would know what plans to make for next year. This is exactly what I said.]
- Kuratom1: Will you meet with the farm crew with the status that they are designated?
- Best: We will meet them regardless of their status. Status doesn't mean anything to me. I will discuss any problem at any time with your group or any other group.
- Kuratom1: Then the people here - I want you to get this straight Mr. Best - the people here in this Center were notified of the conference we had with you and an announcement came out the very following day. The people want that statement retracted. It is not so much from the standpoint of money but the principle involved, of having an announcement made the day following after we had such an agreeable conference with you. If the statement is retracted we could make a report to the people. If we make a report as it is now the people will not be satisfied. I don't expect you can understand that from a Japanese psychological standpoint. I assure you that I am trying to make you understand what I am talking about because it carries very heavy weight.
- Best: Can we speak frankly?
- Kuratom1: Of course Mr. Best. I am speaking frankly.
- Best: To use terms that I can understand, if I do not retract the statement you will lose face; if I do retract it, I will lose face. Is that it?
- Kuratom1: I was not thinking about that necessarily. When we represent any body, we talk for the people we represent. We have to work for the benefit and feeling of the people and we are thinking about them. What I want you to understand is that if you should agree to this about retracting this statement which came out the day you were not here then the people's feeling would calm down. I want you to understand that feeling.
- Best: Wasn't that a true statement I put in the paper? That is what you are talking about isn't it?
- Kuratom1: The statement to the effect that farm workers were terminated as of October 19.

- Best: I didn't publish anything like that.
- Kuratomi: It had your signature on it but it came out the day you were not here.
- Cahn: He is talking about the statement regarding the badges.
- Best: Oh, I thought he was talking about something different.
- Cahn: As a result of termination we asked them to turn in their badges by a certain date or pay 50¢ if they didn't turn them in.
- Myer: May I ask a question? I am a little confused. It is not quite clear what statement it is that Mr. Best made that you would like to have retracted.
- Kuratomi: The statement that came out about badges.
- Best: About badges? I don't know what you are talking about. I will have to see that.
- Myer: May I make a suggestion? I certainly don't see any objection to holding that up until you have had a chance for negotiation.
- Best: That never came to me evidently. It probably was sent out by the payroll section or the employment office.
- Cahn: The statement probably was not interpreted correctly. It has been the policy of the placement office since the beginning of this project to turn in the badges upon termination or pay 50¢. We were running close to the end of the payroll period and the termination slips had to be prepared and processed so we asked that the badges be turned in by a certain date or the 50¢ be paid.
- Kuratomi: I think Mr. Myer has the right idea.
- Myer: I want to make it clear. It doesn't make any change in policy if the badges are held until you have had a chance to meet with the farm committee.
- Kuratomi: If you had talked with the committee and then put the notice out that would make sense. I don't know if you get my feeling. I am trying to explain it the best I can. The fact that the notice came out before the farm committee had a chance to talk with you angered the people. I am not talking for myself, I am talking for the people.
- Myer: May I make another comment. I am sure Mr. Best understands and I understand that you felt you were representing the whole group, including the farm group.

Kuratomis: The farm workers felt that the problem was a little bit too big for them to decide so naturally they brought the problem to the center committee which was chosen from one person from each block. After the center committee discussed this with the residents they decided that they didn't want to harvest a crop beyond center consumption. Therefore we made that statement when we came over here. However, after the conference we had with you, Mr. Best, it was decided to turn the farm problem back to the sub-committee which represented the farm people to talk and discuss with you the minor problems as they came up. If they had talked with you before the notice came out it would have been no problem. If you could retract that statement until after the farm group talks with you there will be no problem.

Best: We are not going to delay the payroll.

Kuratomis: That is the point I am trying to emphasize. I am trying to tell you what the Japanese psychology viewpoint is. Some minor things seem important to you. It is not the standpoint of money that they want the statement retracted but from the standpoint of principle.

Best: I certainly have no objection to leaving the point on badges until after we talk the whole matter over.

Kuratomis: Termination date and badges?

Myer: The termination date is a very definite thing. I am sorry we can't do anything about that but we can hold off on the badges until the matter is talked over further.

Kuratomis: Here is the thing I want you to understand. We are not so much concerned about the pay. If the workers had been terminated on the 19th or 20th it would make no difference if the workers had talked with Mr. Best first and knew what the date was. The farm workers would have had knowledge of the procedure after the meeting so that they would not have felt so bad. That the announcement came before the farm committee talked to Mr. Best caused this problem from the farm crew. That is the point I am trying to emphasize; I am not telling you to change the date. It could be the 19th, 23rd, or 25th or anything for that matter.

Myer: Let me make this clear. We cannot put the people back on the payroll when there isn't any work to do at the moment. We can wait on the matter of badges until we have a chance to look at the problem together but I can't under our government procedure put people back on the payroll when they are not on the job.

Kuratomis: You don't understand. They don't want to be put back on the payroll when they aren't on the job. As long as they were terminated on the 19th that would be all right if they had known it before they were terminated. They don't care what date it was if they had known before.

- Myer: That stands. I have already indicated that I think it perfectly all right to hold the badges and let this be the last of that phase of the story until we get a chance to talk to the farm committee.
- Kuratom: Then the statement will be retracted until after we have had a chance to talk it over.
- Cozzens: It means that the badges will be held up but they will still be removed from the payroll as of the 19th.
- Myer: It means just that, and they can't be put back.
- Kuratom: I am not talking about when they were terminated. My point is, as I said time and time again we are objecting from a Japanese psychological standpoint. If this announcement to the effect that they were to be terminated on the 19th were to be held up we don't care if they were terminated on the 20th or any other date. The only thing was that if the farm committee which was working on this case had a chance to talk with you and you named the date and then the notice came out after they met with you there would be no problem. I don't know if you get what I mean.
- Best: You can't do that on any employment. It is the practice to terminate people when they stop working in any business. You might not get to talk to a person for a long time after he quit working. It is a mechanical detail of employment. If a man never came to talk to you then they would be on the payroll forever. It just can't be done that way.
- Kuratom: Are you planning to continue such a practice in the future.
- Best: I am probably all mixed up on the point you are trying to make. But I will tell you this - we have a very established employment procedure, however, we are going - as I told you the other day - to have a better employment procedure. Mr. Cahn is very much interested in that and is working on that now. If there is anything in our present employment practices that doesn't meet with your approval, suggestions will be considered.
- Kuratom: That is not what I am talking about. It is the principle of it that is involved not the terminating procedure. I am talking about the principle.
- Myer: When you are talking about the future is it as to whether the people will have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Best in the future before terminating.
- Kuratom: That is still another point. If the farm committee had met with Mr. Best and had understood that these workers were being terminated on the 19th there would be no problem. Instead of that when it came out these people didn't know anything about it. That is what I am trying to get at. I don't think you quite understand my point.

Zimmer: Here is what George means. If this statement were retracted till the farm committee were to meet then you don't care what kind of a statement comes out, but to have it come out before the meeting they think advantage was taken of the committee. Is that the idea George?

Kuratomis: That is the point, yes. It is a very important point too.

Best: There isn't anything very difficult about solving that problem in the future.

Zimmer: Nothing difficult about solving it now. It stands whether it is retracted or not, but if that statement could be retracted until this committee met with Mr. Best and then came out it would be okay?

Kuratomis: That is the right idea.

Best: No reason why it can't be done that way.

Myer: I want you to understand they will not be put back on the payroll.

Kuratomis: That is clear now.

Webber: Couldn't you put it to the effect that it was a misunderstanding?

Cahn: That is not so. It was not a misunderstanding. The regulations provide that persons are automatically terminated 5 days after they do not report for work. An additional day of penalty can be added for each day over that. The penalty was not given. The Project Director has the right to remove the prejudice if sufficient reason is given for not having worked.

Myer: Just say for the record that you will withhold the statement until after Mr. Best has had a conference with the committee.

Cahn: I just want it understood that it was not a misunderstanding.

(received report from hospital at this point)

Best: They are still having trouble at the hospital. What are you going to do about it?

Myer: Let us stop this discussion until that sort of thing is stopped. We can't go on under that kind of a situation.

(Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee go to check up on hospital situation). (Reported under control)

Kuratomis: We are sorry about the interruptions.

Best: How much longer are they going to carry on the demonstration outside.

Kuratom1: It is not a demonstration.

Best: What would you call it?

Kuratom1: There has been no trouble at all. They are waiting for the answers to these questions.

(returned with report from hospital that situation under control)

Myer: Couldn't we move right along. My time is limited and we are going to have a lot of business to take care of.

Kuratom1: Are any Japanese persons, that is loyal Japanese persons, coming to harvest the crop here?

Myer: May I answer that? We are going to take care of the harvesting of the crop outside and I have no comment to make now. You folks did not want to do it so we arranged to have it done outside and I cannot make any comment. In view of the decision we will have to keep that as a separate issue. I am sorry.

Kuratom1: The last two nights there has been merchandise taken out of the warehouse from this Center. Do you know the reason?

Best: We might take merchandise out any time. We are accountable for it and we can ship it out or we can ship it in any time we want to.

Kuratom1: We are interested in the merchandise taken out because of the fact that one mess hall couldn't receive their share of the goods that were to be distributed.

Best: Let's get along. I will set down for the records that we will meet with any mess hall committee on those things. We haven't any records here and can't discuss those things at this time. If you want to get into details it takes time George.

Kuratom1: We can't make such a report. They want a definite report and I doubt if that answer will do.

Best: It is our property and we are accountable for that property. We can do what we want to with it.

Kuratom1: Because of the fact that some merchandise was taken out of this Center some mess halls suffered a shortage.

Best: I would want to get into that thoroughly. I would want to find out exactly what was supposed to be delivered and was not and what mess halls were short. I want to know that.

Kuratom1: When you do find out what happened will you take proper action?

- Best: What would be proper action. Maybe I don't know what the proper action is. I certainly will see that all staple commodities as far as the Quartermaster can supply will be kept here. I will see that the mess department keeps those things in here and supplies them to the mess halls.
- Kuratomis: I am not satisfied with your answer as yet. We have to make a definite statement as to why this food was taken out and why the mess halls suffered.
- Myer: Mr. Best gave you his answer. I am sorry but there will be no report why the food was taken out. I don't feel that it is necessary to report every movement made. If you request an investigation regarding such a case and if it is proven that they were short, proper action will be taken. We will have to wait and see the results of an investigation. I am sorry to say we cannot be in position to report to the community on every movement of trucks. The residents are supposed to have food and if they don't get any investigations will be made. We don't have time to go into all those details now. Proper action will be taken as far as we can do that, George.
- Kuratomis: There are incidents in the hospital too. Dr. Pedicord made two appendicitis patients wait until it was almost too late and this has happened in the last week's time. One person is suffering from meningitis. This man took some of the children out on a picnic some place and one of the children struck his eye with a stick. He couldn't bear the pain, consequently he went to the hospital and the Caucasian doctor over there said it was nothing serious and no need for him to worry and for him to go on home. It pained so he insisted on being examined. It was of no avail. He had to pick one of the evacuee doctors over there to examine him but these doctors, as you know, are subordinate to the Caucasian doctors and have very little authority, almost no authority in fact, and they have to get every little detail from the Caucasians. The chief doctor tried to see if any case of meningitis was apparent but before he got to it they told him to stop such an examination so he went back and he still couldn't bear the pain. Then he came back to the hospital again, and the doctors do not know whether this man will survive. Another case here in the hospital. One mother went over there because she had a baby and the doctor, without taking proper precautions, gave her a couple of morphine injections. As a result the baby came out dead. It was a stillborn baby. [There are many cases such as that to prove the inefficiency and indifference of Caucasian doctors in this hospital. It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this center and more or less see people die from day to day they cannot stand to see such a thing exist. So it was decided last night to ask the resignation of each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feel so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had big practices and lots of

of responsibility. It has been said that some of the Caucasian doctors employed here don't even have licenses to practice medicine. Dr. Pedicord allows only one ambulance to be in operation on Sunday for 18,000 people. He takes the keys to the other ambulances and has forbidden the ambulances to be driven. You must be aware of the complications which might arise from such an instance. We feel that the request and demands from the hospital evacuee staff to move the Caucasian doctors and nurses from the hospital should be done as soon as possible for the well being of the people in this center.]

Myer: Are you through?

Kuratomis: Yes.

Myer: In the very first place we are willing to have any suggestions that you folks have. You can sit down and talk it over with Mr. Best. As I told you before we can't operate on the basis of demands. We are willing to take criticisms from your group and check and investigate them and take action accordingly. We are always willing to have criticisms and suggestions but not demands.

Kuratomis: There are the criticisms by the evacuee nurses and doctors.

Myer: We will be very glad to check into it. In view of what has happened over at the hospital today it will have to be checked very thoroughly and will take some time. It will have to be checked and investigated.

Kuratomis: Whatever might have taken place over there and to Dr. Pedicord in particular might be justified, and some of the boys couldn't wait until the conference was over.

Myer: We are not going to argue about that now.

Kuratomis: We have a man here who can tell you what happened in his family.

Furakawa: I am Block Manager of Block 16. Sunday night at 7:00 o'clock I had a report from my sister-in-law requesting an ambulance because her child was burned with hot water. I rushed to the phone which is only 35 or 40 feet away and an ambulance came and he was taken directly to the hospital and given some kind of a treatment on the outside and bandaged and put in a room and left there until morning without being seen by another doctor and when questioned by the nurses about his welfare was told by a Caucasian doctor, Dr. Marks, that it wasn't anything serious. A Japanese doctor was called in and there were four looking on when they injected plasma, or whatever it is called. They could find only one container of it, which is not sufficient to save a child. They worked desperately but he died this morning at 2:00 o'clock. If the burn was as serious as that why didn't the Caucasian doctor take care of him between 7:15 at night until early in the morning when the Japanese doctors took over.

Myer: I am certainly sorry about the baby.

Furakawa: It should be the responsibility or the WRA of Dr. Pedicord to take full blame for what happened as far as I can see.

Committee: That's right.

Myer: We will go into the matter thoroughly. This case and any other case you may have will be investigated thoroughly. We can't do it in the face of demands. I think you folks are interested in having a peaceful center. The WRA is interested in giving it to you. But we can't operate on the basis of demands and scenes of the type we have here today. We just can't operate like that. Generally speaking, the record has been pretty good on medical service. We will go into that matter, however, just as soon as we can get to it. We can't go into it today. I am no judge of that particular type of thing. I will be glad to have all the facts and I am not going to make any commitment until I get them. A judge never makes a decision until he gets both sides.

Kuratom: This is not a complaint. We don't get anywhere with complaints. Consequently, it is turning into demands. The people want the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses and we want a definite answer today.

Myer: That is impossible because I have been on the project only 6 or 7 hours and haven't even had a chance to look around.

Kuratom: Let me say this much. This has been a request from the evacuee doctors and nurses that you arrange to have all the Caucasian doctors and nurses removed from this hospital for the reason that they don't want them and the people have the same feeling. Let me say this, Mr. Myer, I don't want to see any violence, however, unless you don't remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such a time as an investigation has been held I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors. I don't want to see any violence take place but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

Myer: I have never taken any action under threat or duress.

Kuratom: It is not a threat, it is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

Myer: I realize what exists. Someone is responsible for that. The people are pretty well whipped up. I am sure the tension would be much greater if I made concessions without going into the facts. I cannot make concessions without going into the facts of the matter. I am very sorry that is the situation. In view of what has happened at the hospital today I cannot take action until we investigate the matter. That is final.

Kuratomi: Do you want us to make the statement just as you said it.

Myer: You may state it as you wish. I hope you will give them the facts. Tell the people that I am here. I hope to go quietly about my work looking into the problems of the Center with the evacuees and the administrative staff. This is my first trip since the segregation movements started. The movements are not yet complete. We hope to get a completely representative group of the Tule Lake Center to come up here to discuss their problems. You folks are serving in a temporary capacity until a truly representative committee has been chosen. On matters of immediate concern we will go into the matter. I am sorry but I will not make any commitments that require action of removal of any personnel without seeing the other side.

Furakawa: I don't belong on this committee. I am so grieved at the loss of my nephew that I wanted to speak to you so you can look into the matter. However, I am not being a party to any demands. I worked under Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverley and I don't want to make any trouble. I just wanted you to know the facts. I will be glad to be excused. I feel out of place here.

Kuratomi: Remember what I said. This is not my personal feeling or personal opinion. We are here to represent the people and so speak for the people and you might see this thing actually take place, I cannot say.

Myer: I don't think you or any members of this committee have any ulterior intentions and I certainly don't think you want anyone here asking me to make a commitment on ten minutes' notice on a matter as grave as you have presented. I just couldn't do it.

Kuratomi: How soon can you make it.

Myer: I will give you an answer just as soon as I can. First I have to get the facts together. If I can find time while I am here I will, but I can't promise you that I can get all the facts together in that time.

Kuratomi: Let me ask then that these Caucasian nurses and doctors refrain from coming into the hospital for the time being. This is not a demand but a reasonable request. I don't think it is going to hurt anybody. We are asking you to do this because we don't want any violence.

Myer: I am not ready to do that under the circumstances. I have to get all the information together and know all the facts. I am sorry I can't commit myself now. We will go into the matter and give it further consideration.

Kuratomi: Mr. Peck who is the head of Mess Management in this center is responsible for making allotments of food to each mess hall.

The goods were never brought in according to the menus. Many items such as milk and eggs are absolutely necessary to the growth of children. Before I go into this Mess Management statement and its facts and figures, Mr. Sugimoto can present it for further clarification.

Sugimoto: These are the findings the food investigation committee gave me. This was necessitated by the fact that when we came in, the segregants felt that the food was qualitatively and quantitatively below that of the other centers. They waited a few days but the food continued to be worse than it was in September so with the records existing right here in the Tule Lake Center these facts were investigated. During the month of September the cost of food per person per day was 27¢ a day including the food products produced within this center. I think you signed the administrative instruction, Mr. Myer, regarding 31¢ per person for whatever food products were consumed over and above the food produced at this center. But the way this food was computed in September it was all in one, with the amount of 27¢ per person per day including the food produced here. The average cost of subsistence on October 3 which was an average day one record was available and at that time the average was found to be 27¢ per person per day including the food produced here. Going back to the above statement, during the month of September vegetables and eggs and farm produce raised in this Center was well over \$11,000 and this is equivalent to about 3¢ per person per day. That included in the 27¢ makes the cost per person per day about 24¢. The commodities brought and shipped in from the outside by WRA are figured according to the OPA meat ration system to feed 14,700 persons. By computing the points at 95,359 it was short rationed to the evacuees and over rationed to the Caucasian personnel mess hall, which is in operation here, to the extent of 34,133 points, so there was enough shipped in to be distributed to the people in this center but was evidently over rationed to the project employees and 168,000 points of processed food was bought and shipped into this project where only 127,000 points were needed but the funny part of it is that it was over rationed to the extent of 7325 points to the Caucasian mess hall and under rationed to the evacuee mess halls according to the existing records in the warehouse. And another item, between the time of September 17 and September 30, there is a record of 1880 pounds of beef being dumped for reason of being unfit for human consumption, and we thought this beef was to be Government inspected. [Investigation reveals that the Caucasian mess hall not only gets some of the project meat but takes the choicest part of it. They get the cuts such as T-bone, rib steaks and tenderloin steaks. That part goes to the personnel mess hall and the evacuee mess halls get what is left. All of these items are contributing factors about which these evacuees in this camp are complaining, because they are not getting their proper share of food that comes into the project.]

Myer:

Let me say that if it proves to be true that you are not getting the food that you are supposed to be getting, that will be corrected immediately. Furthermore, proper action will be taken to have someone operate it. I know there are problems in mess management. We are investigating them. It will be necessary to go into the matter thoroughly. If you have any facts that will help Mr. Cahn or Mr. Best they will be delighted to have them. Let me say it is the responsibility of the WRA to provide the proper food. If the evacuee mess halls are not getting the points because someone else is, that will be corrected. I hope we can get this matter taken care of quickly. I am just as much interested in it as you are. I want to say one thing, that the developments within the last week or two within this center may affect the immediate supply as it will take some time to get some of the products of the type that is proposed in other centers. That will have to be taken into consideration in looking out for immediate needs. I want to repeat it is the policy to trade with other centers to provide food in the quantity and quality necessary. Without that we will have to wait and get what food is available from the Quartermaster. I am sure that Mr. Best and Mr. Cahn are just as interested in getting those facts because we have a record to take care of. We will be pleased to have any information that we can so that we can get into it and get this straightened out soon.

Kuratomi:

If we are called in to clarify these problems we will be glad to furnish any information we have and follow along as food is the concern of all the people. We are not asking for the impossible. We are not asking for things that can't be had outside.

Myer:

There is no argument about that between us. We are not going into that now. Do you want to say anything Mr. Best or Mr. Cahn?

Mr. Cahn:

All these things we will clarify, when going into detail. We have been working on it for several weeks - checking ration points, taking inventory and renting space in Klamath Falls. We had our own inspection of meat in the last 30 days. We had a Government inspector - for the first time - inspecting all meat the vegetables that came into this center. It is true they did not approve all the meat, but the meat that was rejected was sent back to the point of origin.

Kuratomi:

Going on to the question. As a request from the colonists, we want you to promise us that uniform porches and latrinal service improvements be made at once; dust control of the road should be attempted immediately. This has been more or less of a repetition. We have asked you for them before.

Best:

We agreed on that the other day.

Kuratomi:

What later attempts have been made?

- Best: We agreed that you would have a committee and we would try to devise a standard porch and try to compute the total number of porches from that figure and prepare an estimate of what the entire program would cost, and if approval could be secured for lumber, nails, and other materials going in there from the WPB. We said that we would consider it. We told you that the other day.
- Kuratomi: [Many units are still without brooms, buckets, mops, and other essentials. They still lack privacy, because the walls are up on one side only. The women cannot dress without being seen. There are still no closets. We are still waiting for buckets and brooms. <This is my personal matter. I am not going to wait until the administration furnishes me with all these essentials. I am going to keep a record of it. If Mr. Myer wants to see all this, he can come down.> It is a mess and I don't see how the people in responsible positions could be so indifferent to the welfare of the colonists. It is a request from the center residents that at all times, six ambulances should be in operation. This will be more or less of a repetition. Nevertheless, I will bring it up. The center residents want you to recognize a Central Organization to report for the colonists on all matters concerning the welfare of the residents. They also want you to recognize various committees which will work with the administration on some of the functionings of the center. They also want you to promise that the hospital be supervised more humanely and that the Japanese doctors in this center be given equal authority as those of the Caucasian doctors. As you all know, employment in this Center is very grave and the people want unemployment compensations made available to all the workers who find no employment, just as soon as possible.] Going back a little, what steps are being taken to furnish each unit with sufficient essentials?
- Best: I couldn't tell you. I don't know.
- Cahn: We had a quantity of brooms on hand and issued those. We didn't have the buckets; we couldn't buy them, but I do think that Mr. Black has gone into the matter and has issued the brooms we had on hand; we had 20,000 at the time. I don't know if Pete Zimmer could tell you more about the buckets.
- Kuratomi: There is an order out from the Civic Organization to all block managers, saying that no buckets, etc., were to be issued to the residents.
- Cahn: I repeat, the instruction was to issue all brooms on hand. As I said, we had 20,000 in stock. We had no buckets and we couldn't buy any today any place. They are just not for sale.
- Kuratomi: What do you want us to do?
- Cahn: As I say, Mr. Black is working on that problem, and also on what you can use in place of it.

Kuratomis: Well, who is responsible for putting us in these centers?

Best: Let's not go into that now.

Cahn: I am only discussing the problem as it arose at that time. Orders were given to issue them. I know that the problem has not been dropped and that they are working on it.

Kuratomis: We have been told to leave the brooms and buckets in Jerome because they would be re-issued here, but nothing has been done about it. I certainly think that the administration should do everything within its power to acquire these for us, because I don't see how you gentlemen could be so indifferent. I wish you were in our position.

Cahn: The assumption that we have been indifferent is not so. The problem was approached by the Community Management Division here immediately. I know they have taken steps to secure the necessary items for cleanliness and sanitation.

Kuratomis: [About these units: They have only plaster boards on one side. You could hear people talking and you have to whisper all day long, and the embarrassment to us is beyond words. Many are without closets and the women cannot change their clothes without being seen from the outside. No attempts are being made to rectify these conditions. I believe it is about time something should be done, at least to show that the administration is sincere about the welfare of the residents here.

Zimmer: Do you realize that all partitions that are put in during the day, disappear by night?

Kuratomis: Let me ask you this. Suppose you are put in a unit with nothing there; wouldn't you do something like that?]

Zimmer: But can't you see that we can't gain on it at all? Housing tells us that this unit could be partitioned today. The partition is put in, but by tomorrow, it's not there. It's gone. Somebody else has it. I would much rather they took material that is not put up. When they keep taking those partitions, we can't gain on our work. Do you realize what I mean? Over in block 66, we partitioned nine buildings. Only two partitions were left in a week.

Kuratomis: About this Central Organization or committees to work with the administration. I am sure that Mr. Best is in agreement with this.

Best: I told you that if there is a fair representation of everybody, then that is what we wanted to work with. The quicker the better. Mr. Black was instructed to work through you or any committees you send to him to devise such a meeting.

Kuratomis: I am sorry that you gentlemen had to sit such a long time but I think Mr. Myer or any other gentleman has heard all the grievances, and dissatisfaction of the Center residents that came to a boiling point today. There is a statement here from the residents demanding the removal of Mr. Best as Project Director; Mr. Zimmer as Assistant Project Director; Mr. Schmidt who is head of the Internal Security Division, for letting over 20 tons of goods pass without stopping it at once; Mr. Kallum, head of the Agricultural Division who is directly responsible for the termination of the farm workers; Mr. Peck, who is responsible for the management of all the mess division; Mr. Kirkman, of the Warehouse Division, who allowed 20 tons of food to be taken out of the warehouse; all the Caucasian doctors - five of them - and all the nurses to be dismissed from this center administration. This is just about all that we have on hand, and there are many minor points that could be brought up which would take days to clarify. Consequently, I feel that the committees should be entrusted with the responsibility of working out minor details. The last statement just made in my statement is a statement as requested by the center residents. I would like to emphasize that and repeat it. This is a request not among the representatives here, but from the center residents, to have these persons removed from the center administration.

Myer: Have you finished?

Kuratomis: Yes.

Myer: All I have to say further is this. I am glad to have had the opportunity to meet with you. I want to say that I have absolute confidence in Mr. Best, or I wouldn't have placed him here. I placed him here because I felt that he had understanding, courage, and would know how to work with you people in working out your problems. I still think that. As far as personalities are concerned, I came up here to go over with him problems in relation to personnel or any other problems that he might have. I am going to accept his recommendations and will probably make a few of my own. I want to make it quite clear that Mr. Best is in charge, and that we can't operate on the basis of demands, but only on the basis of sitting down and talking things over. There is only one agency I know of who operates on the basis of demands. We don't operate that way. I want to repeat. The War Relocation Authority has been in operation for a year and a half. We have gone through a good many trials and tribulations and troubles. We have been investigated twice by the United States Congress, as regarding the population and problems of these people. They have said things about your problems which I haven't agreed with. We have tried to get together on facts and have tried to do it within the limits of the policies and our particular administration. We hope we can work with you. If we can't I presume there will be someone else working with you. I don't know who that would be. I am sure you are not interested in having

trouble. When I went into this position I knew there would be some trouble and I was prepared for it. I am still prepared for it. When you have any suggestions, bring them to Mr. Best. Don't bring them in the way of demands. That embarrasses him and it embarrasses you. We can't meet demands. We are operating under the United States Government and have to follow certain policies. (We are willing to investigate charges and are willing to take action if we find they are based on facts.) I am much obliged to you for coming in. I am sure that you will want to operate on that kind of basis and if you don't, there will have to be some other kind of basis worked out. I am not here to make threats. I don't make threats. We stand on what we are trying to do. We think our program has been pretty sound so far, and that the evacuees generally understand that. I think you have some difference of opinion in this center. While I don't know how many people you represent, I doubt that you represent all of them. I hardly think that you represent everybody's point of view. It is difficult to represent everybody's point of view when there are 15,000 people here. I hope that I can have an opportunity to devote my time and attention to the problems represented here within the next 24 hours or so and I want to get at some facts and I am sure that is what you want me to do.

Kuratomi: This case was just brought up. In block 34 I don't know which corner, there has been an evacuee picked up by an Army jeep and this man was inside a box. Around 50, rather stout, and he wore a beige hat, and I wonder if there is some way for you to check it up.

Best: You say an Army jeep?

Kuratomi: Yes. He was picked up, I imagine.

Best: When?

Kuratomi: Just now. These people saw it: Kiyohara, Saito, Nakano.

Best: I can call the army up and ask them.

(upon later questioning, Mr. Kuratomi was unable to furnish the name of the man in question)

Myer: We will be glad to look into that. We are taking so much time I feel we should get around and get the job done. We will check with the Army and will report the facts to you.

Kuratomi: I would like to say, in a concluding statement, that as we have already stated, we are not here for trouble and we don't expect to have any unnecessary commotions and we are sincere and feel that the rights of the evacuees here are being jeopardized and sometimes trampled upon, and I feel that you are a man of character and will see justice as it is and try to rectify some of the wrongs that might have

been committed by some of the Caucasian personnel. We are depending on you and would like to say that we would like to get these answers or questions clarified for answer, just as soon as possible, because the people are waiting and the sooner these problems will be dissolved and we will have a peaceful center that much quicker.

Myer: First, gentlemen, it will not be possible to give you answers to all these questions this afternoon. Thank you very much for the compliment. We will try to operate on the basis of justice and I want to repeat that I don't want any misunderstanding on that. Mr. Best has checked with me on policy every time. People do things that we don't always know about, both among the evacuees and the administrative staff. I am much obliged to you and I hope that you will remember that we cannot operate on the basis of demands and the sooner we understand that the better we will be getting along. We will operate on that basis of sitting down with you folks as we have this afternoon.

Kuratom: Will it be all right for us to report to the people?

Best: You are reporting to your people. I don't know what you want to say to your people.

Kuratom: Mr. Myer, will you say a few words?

Myer: I would be glad to say hello to your folks, if you want me to. I will tell them in summary what I have told you. I will be very glad to tell them.

Discussion of November 1 Meeting

It will be noted that the Negotiating Committee had augmented itself by the addition of the heads of the various committees and Mr. Hatano, the Farm Representative.

(Get duties of men present here.)

Throughout this meeting Kuratom was much more aggressive than at the first meeting. He attempted repeatedly to get definite answers to his questions, realizing well that even one definite concession on the part of the Administration would bulk larger in establishing the prestige of the Negotiating Committee than any number of vague promises to "look into things." When presentation of the problems and arguments failed, he repeatedly called the Caucasians' attention to the great mass of demonstrators waiting