

Recd Feb 28, 1946

R. HANKEY - FIELD NOTES ON TULE LAKE - FEBRUARY 2,3, 1943

I arrived at Klamath Falls at 7:40 the morning of February 2. Not being able to locate the car provided to take me to the camp, I took the Greyhound Bus. The entire camp is surrounded by a heavy "man-proof" fence twelve feet or more in height. At intervals along the fence are large watch towers capable of holding at least four men. These towers are visible for a considerable distance and are provided with high-powered search lights. Walking about the camp before sunrise and at night, I noted that at least those search lights near the stockade where the suspected agitators are confined were lit. During the day, these towers ~~must~~ have been manned by soldiers, for I saw smoke coming from one of the chimneys. The high, barbed-wire topped fence, bristling with watch towers, is very impressive.

A short distance from the entrance gate, guarded by armed sentries, I was given a visitors pass by a soldier who telephoned his superior officer to check my statement that I had been invited by Best. I then walked to a WRA office about one-fourth mile away to get another pass which admitted me into the premises of the Camp Tulelake Military Area. Here, a member of the appointed staff offered to drive me to Best's office. Arriving there, (after passing another fence) I went to see Mr. Harry Black, head of Community Management. Mr. Wolter had recommended him to me, and I hoped that he would suggest

some action which would allow me to circumvent the rule that I must enter the colony (that part of camp in which the Japanese are confined) with an armed guard.

Mr. Black was very courteous but said I would not be allowed to enter the colony alone. I must take a soldier with me even into the barracks, or, I might have an evacuee brought to me at the office under armed guard. This was a WRA, not an army policy. He outlined the present situation at Tulelake as follows.

Blacks Statement - Rise of Coordinating Committee

The first committee, the Negotiating Committee or the self-styled Daihosha-kai, in other words, the leaders of the recent strike, had attempted to force the Cooperative Enterprises to accede to certain demands designed to eliminate various "American" functions of the Cooperative: that no more newspapers be sold, that the beauty shops stop operating, and others not mentioned by Black. The members of the Cooperative held a meeting and voted nine to one against obeying these demands. Next a group of these executive members of the Co-op and members from the Civic Organizations (the Block Managers and Black Supervisors) met and felt that they might contribute to the overthrow of the Negotiating Committee.¹ Four of the most influential

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Black is wrong here. It was the Japanese division heads and some Co-op members.

members of the Negotiating Committee who were still at large in the camp held a meeting and came to the conclusion that if the colonists (the evacuees) would hold to the status quo policy, i. e., continue the strike, they would surrender. Meanwhile, they hoped to have selected and established other agitators to take their place, men who would be able to keep the people in line and continue the strike, they

"The members of the Cooperative and of these Community Organizations formed a committee which they called the Coordinating Committee. We (the Administration) felt they were the peoples' representatives. At last they felt strong enough to submit the issue, whether to abandon the strike or maintain the status quo, to a popular referendum. They held a secret ballot after they had built up as much favorable feeling as possible among the people. They won by a narrow margin; ~~8~~ eight thousand votes were cast and the people voted to abandon the status quo by a margin of 800 votes.² So the people decided to go back to work and resume normal operations. Most have gone back to work. However, there is still a guard (of soldiers) at the High School. Japanese are working outside the gates, but must have passes to leave the colony. Those taken

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When I repeated this estimate of the winning margin to my informant "I", he said, "Eight hundred! My foot! It was about 400 and then some blocks didn't vote at all."

back to work are from a list of names submitted by administrative section heads (Caucasians). Every worker is then approved by the Army and by Internal Security."

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I was provoked by Black's insistence that I must be accompanied by an armed guard when I visited my friends. I said nothing, however and decided to see Best and tell him he had brought me to the camp under false pretenses. I waited from eleven o'clock to noon, but he did not come in. While I was waiting Mr. Opler entered Best's outer office and said: "The name's Opler." He wished to accompany me immediately to visit my contacts from Gila. I said I would not go with a soldier and added that I could accomplish little if Opler accompanied me. I suggested that if conditions seemed propitious he might accompany me on the next day. Meanwhile, Mr. Robertson, former head of Leupp, entered his office which is opposite to that of Best's. He remembered talking to me at Gila, and was very cordial. He advised me that I would not do well to try to get the guard rule set aside, but might be able to employ the ruse he uses: get the soldier to stay in the car. He gave me Kurihara's address from memory.

When Best had not arrived by noon I went to lunch. We were served by Japanese waitresses. The lunch, two large wienies, beans and jello was considerably below the standard at Gila. At lunch I met Miss Florence Horn, who has visited Manzanar, Gila and is now at Tule for three

days. She expressed the desire to talk over my work and I told her of the restrictions on what I say.

Immediately after lunch I ~~saw~~ Mr. Best and impressed him with my disapproval of his conduct in bringing me here under such restrictions. I said that it was ~~asinine~~ to think that I could see my friends with a soldier breathing down my neck. Best apologized. Naturally (said he) he could not tell Dr. Thomas about the necessity for the armed guard. He did not say why, but intimated that he did not wish Dr. Thomas to know that matters were still so critical at Tulelake. I did not comment upon the fact that if I saw the situation I would certainly tell Dr. Thomas. Best referred me to Opler, stating that Opler could probably arrange matters.

I returned to Opler. I impressed him with the fact that Mr. Best heartily agreed to my entering the colony ~~with a member of Internal Security~~ who would remain in the car. (This was an ~~exaggeration~~.) Opler telephoned Internal Security and arranged for the ~~excort~~ and the use of a project car.

When the official at the other end of the wire seemed reluctant to give the car, I prompted Opler, saying that I was acting under Best's instructions. Permission was granted. My ~~excort~~ was Mr. Johnson, who proved to be a pleasant, kindly man who did not object to remaining outside in the car reading mystery stories provided by me. I apologized for the boredom which the long waiting must cause him, but he remarked that he was grateful for

this opportunity to get into the colony and observe the Japanese at first hand. He did not know the camp too well, and observing the courtesy I used while asking directions he soon picked up the cue and by the end of the second day was profuse with "If you please" and "Thank you very much" and remarked several times that he didn't see anything so bad about the people. I gathered that he was newly arrived at Tule and had not had much opportunity of seeing the Japanese in camp at first hand.

Mr. Johnson and I went next to yet another office to get a pass which would enable me to go inside the colony. At least eight men were in this office. During the six years I worked in a settlement house I had frequent occasion to contact W. P. A. officials and enter their offices. Some of the offices in my district were filled with petty politicians. Not until I entered this office at Tulalake have I witnessed a similar scene. The overcrowded room, filled with idle, lounging, vapid faced men, some having at least the initiative to leer at me, others wearing an expression which implied that they thought I was a "starry-eyed social worker" brought back unpleasant memories. I received my pass and we approached the gate to the colony which was guarded by four or five soldiers. The soldier in charge knew Mr. Johnson and allowed us to enter without seeing our passes. The Japanese colony was cut off from the Caucasian barracks by another "man-proof" fence.

INTERVIEWS WITH JAPANESE

I paid my first call at the Oda's, knowing that I would be well received. Only Mrs. Oda was at home. She was delighted to see me and ran immediately to get her husband who is block manager and was in his office. When he came he appeared happier and less strained than when I last saw him at Gila. At that time he had been tormented over the decision of segregation and fear that his Caucasian friend, McNeil, would despise him for his decision. At Tulelake he was, however, far more fearful of public opinion than he had been at Gila. He informed me that his block was composed almost entirely of individuals who were in favor of keeping up the status quo. He himself believed in law and order and felt that the evacuees should obey the laws of the United States as long as they were on United States soil. He stated that now he says nothing. If he advised against violence he would get into trouble. So he just agrees with whomever he speaks to without committing himself too much one way or the other. He is now engaged on translating the Japanese printed matter given out by the Negotiating Committee and the Coordinating Committee and promised to forward this material to me within the next ten days. Oda's Japanese accent which was quite pronounced at Gila was stronger than ever. His wife, who is also Kibei, retained her excellent American English. She, with her practical, slightly flippant American ways, makes a much better informant than her husband, who hesitates to reveal any Japanese attitude which does not coincide with his idealistic frame of reference. While Mrs. Oda served me with cocoa and

sweetened puffed rice and presented me with two shell flowers they made the following statements.¹

The Odas' statement - verbatim.

Mr. O: "It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people want power. They say 'We are working for the people.' I heard a lot of rumors. I believe they're working for themselves.

"This new Coordinating Committee is all right."

(I asked how this Coordinating Committee had been elected.)

Mrs. O: "That's what I'd like to know! I think they were elected from each division head."

Mr. O: "Since November we have had another so-called negotiating committee. They took care of all the camp affairs. WRA and the Army did not recognize them as true representatives. They (WRA) think they were not elected properly."

"Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But their demands were more like orders than suggestions."

"Only a few people really know the inside story."

"More than two hundred people were put in the stockade. Seventy or fifty have already been left out. Some were taken before, but on November 26 we had the big search. WE had a very nice soldier come in. Some were good and some bad. The one who came here was really nice."
(Mrs. Oda agreed.)

"Honestly, I'd like this center back to normal conditions, but if I said that to the residents they'd say I'm a dog. Since I took office two-three men came over and threatened some of the block representatives."

"The leaders have no self-control themselves. There was so much excitement. A really clever man doesn't say very much. The rest of the public just follow them. The most clever men are not taking high positions. They are just resting peacefully at home."²

"When they asked me to be Block Manager I refused. I thought it was going to be hard and tough. The people would be stubborn. But one night we had elections and I was elected."

(Here Mrs. Oda digressed to the motives which had caused people to come to Tulalake.)

¹Oda is the "O" of my segregation report who wrote the long article on segregation. He is a graduate of Cal Tech. and has had much education in Japan.

²Hikida independently corroborated this opinion when I saw him in Gila. Said he, "The real leaders in Tulalake are not getting themselves involved in these things."

Mrs. Oda: "If they say 'Yes,' maybe they can't go to Japan. Many have relatives there. The people are forgetting the United States now. They say, 'We are Japanese.' The first time they (the newspaper) said there was trouble here, that was the first we had heard of it."

Mr. Oda: "At the time of demands they told me that the demands were more like saying to them how to run this camp. They took it that way."

Mrs. Oda: "The army fellows are very nice at the post office."
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Next I called on some of the people whom Mr. Kondo and Mary Obata had recommended. Two of the young men were working. At both ~~their~~ homes their parents, who spoke very little English told me where to find them. The parents evidently knew who I was. At the home of Mary's friend the door was opened by a young man. I asked for Tadashi and Noboru Obana and was told that they lived there. The young man continued to stand in the doorway and stared at me. I asked him if he were afraid to let a hakujin in the house. He then opened the door wide and said "Come in, come in." I found I had entered a recreation hall. About fifteen men and boys were present. One man was being given a haircut by another. I sat down on a cot and asked Noboru if he'd like to hear about Gila. Hesitatingly he said to go ahead. A group of boys stood in an irregular circle so that some of their backs were to me. Noboru kept looking over his shoulder at me. As I launched into a description of some of Bennett's late actions which I knew would be interesting, the boys warmed up a bit. One kept kicking at the stove in embarrassment. I talked for about eight minutes and then rose to go, thanking them for allowing me to come in.

One of the boys named "Lefty" asked that I remember him to Mr. Asami. They thanked me for coming and I left.

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Interview with "I".

"I" gave me a long verbatim statement before segregation. In Tule he is esconsed in a barrack with all of his large family about him just as he was in Gila. I saw his wife, son, sister, mother, an old partially paralysed man and another woman in the two large rooms they occupied. "I" seemed to have lost a little of his pre-segregation cockiness. He has gained about fifteen pounds, "from not working" says he. He talked in a soft half-whisper. At Gila he spoke boldly and loudly "and didn't care who heard what he said." Although he did not speak at such length as at Gila, he was somewhat more honest. Whenever I put a point blank question he did not attempt to mitigate or falsify the actions of the people in Tule. He said several times that he did not care about anything now. All he wanted was to be left in peace. "All I'm waiting for is for the war to end. That's all!"

His wife served me and him with excellent tea and a delicious chocolate cake which they had somehow procured for my arrival from Klamath Falls. His wife sent out some cake and tea to my Internal Security escort by her little son. That gentleman responded with four pennies which the boy came in and showed to his father. "I" laughed. "I" impressed me with having taken on most of the mannerisms

of his sister, the violent Mrs. Mizuno. Occasionally he sounded exactly like her.

He asked me if it were true that Gila was going to close soon. I said I didn't know. He added that his sister was expecting to come to Tule soon.

"I's" statement - verbatim.

After we had exchanged amenities I told "I" that one of the chief points I would like to get straight was whether the first negotiating committee had been regarded by the people as their legitimate representatives. He replied as follows:

"That was one of the things that got the Japanese in an uproar. All of the respective people in the block elected them. When the Spanish Consul was here they went and made their requests. But there weren't any representatives who spoke real good English - their terminology sounded more like a demand. It made a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. The army flatly refused to recognize the representatives."

"Then, the first thing that happened, the army started to put people in the stockade. At one time I imagine there must have been from 125 to 150. That is a small estimate. In this block about six out of the block were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai."

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"They've got a big farm here. Hogs were slaughtered right and left. I've had hog just twice since I got here. Heck knows where all the chickens go."

Jan. 11 - Vote on Status quo

"That election was held in every block.

"There was one vote that the army wasn't supposed to know anything about. All the Japanese met in their representative blocks and voted whether to go back to normalcy or adopt the status quo permanently or call a general strike.¹ All the time this status quo was on, the

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I could get no corroboration of this statement from other evacuees.

coal crew, the hospital bunch, the garbage and the mess halls were still working. At that time the vote came out that they should adopt the status quo instead of a general strike. They went against the return to normalcy because that would be an insult to the representatives barricaded in the stockade. All their work would be for nothing."

"This other referendum vote - (the secret ballot to which the administration refers) the army more or less called that one. They were supposed to have united the people for the psychological moment to spring that question; whether they wanted to discard the status quo or continue. To help out, the bunch who wanted to discard the status quo kept pulling the people right and left. They said that anybody who was inciting the Japanese to continue the status quo strike and that more or less damned a large majority were only hurting themselves."

"I came here to be left in peace. If they leave me alone I'll leave them alone."

"Anyway, people got wise that the longer they maintained the status quo they were going to yank them and stick them in the stockade. Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on the October checks. Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income."

"Another point of view: the people here are supposed to be loyal to Japan now. Here's an argument some of the bright boys advanced. (These were members of the group who wished to abandon status quo.) They said, in returning to normalcy we'll be drawing salaries. Then on top of that the government have to pay us clothing allowance. That's just that much less money that the U. S. government is going to have to manufacture armaments to beat Japan. I couldn't see it. I know myself that regardless if the Japanese draw this monthly stipended, they'd not make much difference to the U. S. treasury. But it sounds good on the surface and it swayed some of the stubborn people. They had a referendum vote. Two soldiers were present. They took a vote of all persons over eighteen. The soldiers with one Japanese present counted and tallied the votes. There was a majority of 400 voted to return to normalcy."

"A couple of days after that all those desiring of work could report to a place. The only trouble with this is they don't have enough work to go round. So many with large families have no way to get money. Under WRA arrangement, if you don't work, you can't get clothing allowance."

*not quite
true - D&P*

"I's" Prospects

(I asked "I" what he expected would happen in the near future.)

"I look forward to the end of the war. That's me. There's no future until I see what happens after it ends."

"In camp here, I believe I can truthfully say there will be one of two things."

"One: they'll either continue going back to normal and naturally, eventually the army will relinquish control- or there's only 400 people difference for status quo than against.

The Draft

"When I say something's liable to pop, I mean the newspaper account of the War Department Release saying that Nisei are again eligible for selective service. And that report called for ten centers. That includes this one. But, if and when they start to draft the avowedly disloyal group in camp that is going to be the psychological moment for the next riot. That really is going to be a riot if it ever happens."

Coop influence on new Coordinating Committee

"I don't think the Coop itself had much influence. I don't think the Coop had anything to do with forming a committee to bring back normalcy. It was essentially an organization to serve the people in camp. There were no political officials in it at all."

"The first I heard of going back to normalcy, the heads and the former employees of some of the divisions called a meeting. That was the first trend toward normalcy. They held elections for this committee January 11. The committee - they are so-called men with ability. Akitsuki was an official of the Coop here. I don't think they want political power. They were elected by the wards. Each fellow was elected from a ward. There are seven wards each with ten blocks."

Concerning the first negotiating committee - the "agitators"

"The block representatives in camp were already holding office when we were moved in here. The representatives here are elected the first month of every year. Some of these are stuck in the stockade. It was just a case of which representatives seemed most able. After every meeting the representatives always came back and at supper called for silence. They'd get up in front of the mess hall and give a brief summary of what went on before the meeting. They'd take Ayes and Nos for any question then. If there was no time in mess they'd call a special meeting at night. Of course, a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense. They asked for porches for all the apartments. WRA had promised lumber for all the porches. It was never supplied. That's where that request came in. We were promised. That's inefficiency as far as I'm concerned."

"The only thing everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord, and more care in placement

of drivers and an improvement of food, and I think, the request for an investigation of grafting. Grafting started the whole works. It was asinine asking for porches."

"Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical Kibei being a representative."

"The people hiding out had information that was vital for maintaining peace and normalcy in the center. But if they showed their face outside they would be put in the stockade. And, so, naturally, the only thing they could do was hide out. Then also at that time they had a second negotiating committee that wanted us to go on a hunger strike. That didn't last long. Everybody ignored it altogether. They sent people to the block representatives to try to influence people. The blocks were to go on a hunger strike. The people ignored this second negotiating committee."¹

"The army had a house to house search. They said it was to get contraband. They were saying too much in the newspapers about weapons. Personally I think it was to locate these four boys."

(I remarked that a member of the administration had told me that the decision to return to work had been made on a majority of 800 votes.)

"Eight hundred my foot! One block didn't even vote. There were quite a few blank ballots too."

"I spoke to a soldier here when they were making the house to house search. He was a sergeant from Idaho. He had a very low opinion of the WRA. WRA is always pulling boners. They got themselves in hot water and had to call the army."

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the peoples' permission. It was this group who first went around demanding the removal of the American flag, and also demanded that the Coop stop selling newspapers. They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives. Quite a few were Hawaiians. There were many Hawaiians in the trouble-making group."

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This group whom "I" calls the "second negotiating committee" is not to be confused with the Coordinating Committee recognized by the administration. The group "I" mentions was probably a fanatical section of the first negotiating committee.

"There were a large number of Hawaiian boys who were in Hawaii at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese of Hawaii are fisher-folk. These folks were out fishing when it happened. They didn't know anything about it. So when they pulled into the docks the guards just mowed them down. A Jap was a Jap. These guys got fanatical Japanese ideas, such as may have been asked by a goon-squad."

"The majority of the people want to be left alone till after the war. They want to be left alone to be dealt with under any circumstances."

"Another thing that gets my goat is the propaganda of the American Legion, especially in Klamath Falls. They want the army to take over. The army doesn't want it. The American Legion has practically terrorized the people of Klamath Falls, warning them to arm themselves to get ready for any emergency. If the people wanted to get out of this place they'd have done so by stating they were loyal and going outside."

"Putting up all these barbed wire fences and watch towers - that's all a lot of bunk. They're got going to go out and kill anybody. They want to go back to California and temporarily this is home."

(I next asked "I" to criticize my outline of what had occurred at Tulelake which I dictated to him. He made the following comments.)

"The requests might have been couched in dictatorial terms."

(I questioned him as to whether Best had actually promised the people that he would not call in anyone to break the strike without notifying them.)

"Best said he'd stand pat until the people went to work. He just called them (the harvesters) with no warning."

(I asked about terrorist methods used by some of the negotiators.)

"When this came about, it so happened the goon-squad went on the war path. They took Dr. Pedicord in hand. He admits he struck one of the fellows."

"The people gathered in some blocks. In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon-squad got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks. and asked the people to head for the Administration area."

I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barrack. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'are you a Japanese or not?'"

(I asked whether Myer and Best had made promises to to the people when they gathered around the Administration Building. "I" recounted what he had heard from friends.)

"Then Myer and Best came out. Myer got up and talked to the people in public over the public address system. He promised the people the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord. As far as the dismissal of Best, Myer was against that. Myer said Best had done all right."

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"There was no bayonetting done here. There wasn't a soldier with a bayonet on his rifle. The only time they used bayonettes here was a long time ago - during military registration."

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Kurihara

I made my last call on February 2 on Joe Kurihara. He was in a large barrack room with two other men. The barrack was extraordinarily neat and I received an impression of business like order. With its tables holding neatly stacked papers, well-made cots and suspended lights, the room might have been a well-kept army-officers' quarters. One young man was reading a newspaper spread out on a table. Kurihara, a short, slightly bald stocky man was extremely polite - politer than any other individual I met at Tule. He invited me to be seated. I told who I was, told him how much the study had appreciated his paper and stated I was glad to meet a man of his honesty and ability. As best I could, I described the aims of our study. I mentioned that Mr. Robertson had spoken highly of him and we agreed on the sterling quality of Robertson's

character. "That is one man I really respect," said Kurihara.

Sensing that Kurihara would approve of a direct approach I explained that our study in attempting to get a true picture of developments in relocation centers naturally had difficulty in getting data from those individuals who were at the core of activities (borrowing X's term) and that therefore any material from this source was of inestimable value. Anything that he would be kind enough to write for us would be received with gratitude and would be kept confidential.

Kurihara had not known that we had received his article. Fixing me with a steady gaze he asked me point blank why I personally had liked his article. I said that honesty shone out of it and that I admired honesty. I also realized that anyone who would make the statements he did must be very courageous or else crazy. He was pleased. He said that since he had been in Tule he had been watching, thinking, and studying. He would be glad to write an article on Tule Lake but needed time to get the truth and state it properly. I gave him the study's address on a piece of paper. He said he would memorize it and then burn the paper. We shook hands again and I left.

That morning I had committed myself to call on Opler after dinner. I felt extraordinarily tired but elated at the amount of material I had been able to get. I cudgelled my brain as to how I might avoid giving him confidential

information and still remain on friendly terms. I had been given Dr. Pedicord's quarters and it was while I was in his bathroom that I got my inspiration. I decided that I would feign disappointment at my progress and play the part of a discouraged, puzzled, female anthropologist, whose hopes to get information had been frustrated. Since I felt ready to blow my top to the first intelligent listener this was difficult. Yet it worked better than I had anticipated. When I said I had received almost no information he looked very satisfied and said, "Now I know by that statement that you're a good field worker." thereupon he proceeded to show me how vast his knowledge of the situation was.

I saw to it that my remarks on the information I had received agreed substantially with the impressions he had given me in our conversations of the morning and the early afternoon. He asked me if I had been able to get any leads as to who the ring-leaders were. I said "No" which was the truth, forbearing to add that if I did know who they were I would not tell him.

During the course of the evening I asked his advice on the question of interviewing some of the members of the Coordinating Committee. Opler advised strongly against it, saying that they were very busy and besides Akitsuki was a sick man. He added that a meeting of this evacuee Coordinating Committee and the Administrations Advisory Council was to be held the afternoon of the 3. I expressed a strong desire to attend this meeting, but he said it

would be very bad policy if I did. He gave me the following information:

"The Advisory Council was composed of two of the Assistant Project directors: Harry Black, head of Community Management-Paul Robertson, head of Operations-Mr. Lechlitter, the Project Attorney-Mr. Neil Mcneil of the Cooperative, Opler, and Huycke, of Community Activities. This Advisory Council, meeting with the Coordinating Committee had been responsible for the existing though precarious rapport between the colony and the administration.

The following disjointed notes are mostly verbatim and were taken down during the course of the evening.

Evacuee Attitudes toward Soldiers

Hankey: "The evacuees seemed to bear no ill will toward the army."

Opler: "The simplest group will respect the army coming in with jeeps, tanks, etc. That's a Japanese cultural trait. The smartest resent the army and want to see it out. Generally the people feel it's safer if the army were out provided they knew they're wouldn't be a reign of terror again."¹

"Byron² and I were talking about the psychological moment to lift the curfew. He thought that now is the psychological time. It would gain the confidence of the people in the community."

"The army tossed all the Leupp boys into the stockade for a couple of days when they first came here. That was an army decision. The local people could have used them. Some of them were held there until they were under the influence (of the agitators)."

"During the army search it was found that one of the soldiers had taken a watch out of someone's drawer. The party yelled to the Captain. The soldier was frisked and the watch returned."

"I was in headquarters when they brought in two packages of ritz crackers. They were returned. Some people had tremendous stores of sake and rice. (I asked why people would keep rice in their barracks and was told that it was used to make mash for the sake.) In one apartment two of the guys (soldiers) were at odds on the whole procedure. One was throwing things around; the other was practically apologizing for it."

"It was a damn cold morning. Some of the soldiers

¹ I observed no trace of the attitude expressed here during my conversations with evacuees. I told Brown this statement. Said he, "Ye Gods!"

² Opler always calls and addresses Byron Akitsuki, the chairman of the Coordinating Committee, by his first name. This lack of respect was commented upon by Miss Horn.

had sake for themselves. One kept very warm. It was rumored that the whole military camp was supposed to be drunk."

On promises perported to be made by Best and Myer

"That was clever staging by the committee (the Dai-kyo Sho) A meeting was held in Mr. Best's office. The minutes indicate that there were no complete promises made.¹ After the meeting inside there were some speeches. Kuratomi interpreted (the speeches) in Japanese only, what had been decided at the meeting. "Remember what this man has promised." This was followed by a speech by Kai of the Dai Nippon order. Kuratomi was not an independent operator. He was under the influence of Kai."

The Jerome Group

"The Jerome group had a pressure group in the background that Kai had the greatest influence over. They whipped the whole bunch into line. Kai always talks about himself, how he came from San Diego, a marine town, where the sailors spit on orientals."

"It was pathetic. Certain parties could be set on the right track if they were removed from the Kai influence and if they see that it was impossible for him to take the Japanese back to an arrogant tone."

"The Jerome group was the most prominent in agitating. They were status seeking. The original negotiating committee was composed of people from Jerome. My informants say the Jerome group started organizing before they came."

The Deadlock

"The fellows in hiding laid down the points for the deadlock. The Coordinating Committee broke the deadlock. The army had a meeting of the block managers. They said, "Give us these men. They're the cause of all the trouble. The guys didn't appear. The following Saturday the army searched. The army found one of the five guys."

Hiding Agitators

"These were the five top men on the committee. It was funny how the army would rush in and find their beds still warm. They must have kept a wonderful watch and spotted anyone coming. The committee delivered an ultimatum: They would surrender themselves if every person retained in the stockade were released. As soon as they had the signatures they gave themselves up. They demanded that the army move to the periphery of the project, and that all the WRA employees here before November 4 be removed."

¹The promises which were not kept, say Japanese, were uttered in a speech to the crowd assembled outside the administration building.

(Here I remarked that this sounded like a breach of faith by WRA. Opler said then that WRA had never promised to release the people in the stockade. They had made no promises to the four men. They eventually gave themselves up to join their "martyred bretheren.")

"The people were not released. There were more pickups. While the men were in hiding WRA negotiated with them. The army kept searching and failed. The Daijyosha-Kai produced resolutions which were extremely violent and numerous. Then the people suffered by the army's search. They couldn't go from ward to ward. The army had them from two directions. The army even requisitioned WRA personnel to help identify the men. The soldiers might not know one face from another."

"Their arrogant tone is a reflection of great egocentrism. I heard that the names of some of them were heard over the radio from Tokyo. They told the Japanese in camp, "We created the international incident!"

The funeral of the farm-worker.

"At the funeral the kibe boys were beside themselves. Their faces were contorted; they were shouting. I saw at least twelve completely off the beam. The people around were saying: 'Too excited: bad.'"

Demands of Negotiating Committee

"The group said: (1) We represent the center; the people believe in us. And in the same speech usually (2) we've got to have further segregation. There are two big groups here. By this they meant unconsciously the minority they did not control."

Best and the funeral

"On the matter of holding the funeral in the gymnasium two men who said they represented the widow said to Best, you send an answer to a certain address. But there will be nobody important there. The message will be transmitted."

"The funeral was not stopped. It was the coldest, windiest day we ever had. (Here Opler snickered.) The whole Buddhist Hierarchy was out there. They were almost blown off the platform."

"Best decided against it because he felt they were using it as an occasion for a demonstration. The group we didn't play into the hands of was an unidentified faction. I think the funeral by them would have been all right. When Best sent a message the first address was that of the farmer's widow. They found the house full of mourners. She said she didn't know there was going to be a public funeral. When given the name of Mr. T. she said she didn't know him and didn't want anything to do with it. My informant added that she seemed nervous and under pressure. If Best had let the second group handle the funeral, (the more moderate group) it wouldn't have been handled by a goon-squad."

"At the beginning I was one of the two Caucasians

present. I saw these boys in back (the kibe) and thought they were just going to walk behind the bier. Between the warden's headquarters and the platform they got into a straight line. They were not marching. I got the sense of a drill. It didn't occur to me until the fracas broke out that they were a guard. The photographer, John D. Cook, was acting on his own. Best had told him to go out in his car and not to stick his nose out of the car. He was to act as if he were taking photographs. But he could leave it blank. He was just to act as if he were getting a record. He was to make a threat without making a threat. The photographer parked between the wardens' headquarters. He took many pictures. The fellows took his camera away from him and tossed him in the air. He said they twisted his arms too. But it all happened as I glanced away and glanced right back. He was only tossed once."

Police Commissioners

"The Coordinating Committee is going to recommend men for the police board. The Advisory Council is going to pick three men from these. It is one of our needs for peace."

"The Administration couldn't listen to them as demands. They were really sympathetic to all of them except the dismissal of the staff members. The negotiating committee demanded promises. We said we'd do what we could. They took it as a promise and insisted we'd broken a promise."

"\$275,000 worth of vegetables were spoiling. 300 Japanese were brought in from other centers to harvest them. Food was taken at night because the trucks were busy in the day time."

Talk with Paul Robertson

A Although it was by now nine o'clock at night and I had a headache caused by over-fatigue, I decided to call on Robertson to improve my relationship with him and to ask his opinion on Opler's contention that the ringleading agitators were chiefly from Jerome.

Robertson was very cordial. He said he would be glad to tell me what had transpired but knew little, since he himself had arrived only in the middle of January. He remarked again that he had come to Tule to work in Community Management, that he cared nothing about Operations

and that he was disgusted. He agreed with the impression I had received from my informants - that the present Coordinating Committee did not stand high in evacuee favor and that they were considered inu by many. Emphasizing that he was not sure about anything, he stated that he doubted Opler's contention that the Jerome faction had been dominant. He said he knew the boys from Jerome very well and could not see them playing the part of which the Administration accused them.

He drove me to Dr. Pedicord's empty house which I was ^{to} occupy with Miss Horn. Late in the afternoon I had been unable to light the stove and since the temperature was below freezing, I asked Robertson to light it. He discovered it was out of oil and filled it for us. I occupied the notorious Dr. Pedicord's bed and had a bad night. At six the next morning I got Miss Horn up and we set out for the mess hall together. I assumed she knew the way and followed her lead. She mistook the way and led us to one of the entrances to the colony. Here we were re-directed, but ended up before another gate to the colony. We asked the soldier on guard where the mess hall was and he directed us to an evacuee mess hall. It was quite dark; we could not see where we were going. So quite ignorant that we were breaking one of WRA's iron rules we marched calmly into the Japanese section. After walking more than a city block we came to a mess hall. I asked a Japanese girl outside if this were the mess hall. She said it was, but it wasn't our mess hall. So back we

went to the gate, remarking upon the fact that the soldier had not only let us into the evacuee colony without passes but had directed us to a mess hall. Miss Horn wondered if he thought we were Japanese. After walking for almost three quarters of an hour through the falling snow we reached the mess hall.

At breakfast we sat with two nurses. Miss Horn, as a journalist began to question these ladies. From their answers I concluded that they probably belonged to that group of unpopular Caucasian nurses who, one of my informants told me, ordered the Japanese doctors around as per Dr. Pedicord's instructions. The older of the battle-axes voiced the opinion that all of the good members of the Appointed Staff had left since the trouble in November. Things were in a terrible state. Miss Horn asked her if she had been present during the trouble. "I'll say I was," said the nurse in a hoarse, tragic tone and, turning her back on us as if we were spies trying to pump her, she stalked rapidly from the hall. Miss Horn looked at me and asked, "What's the matter with that old bitch?"

After breakfast I went immediately to the administration building and met my escort, Mr. Johnson. This time we were forced to show our passes to gain entrance to the colony. We went to Yamashiro's address but found that he was not at home. Then, in the hope that I would find Iwohara, a friend of Henry Kondo's, I went to the address his parents had given me - 1608. This proved to be the headquarters of the Coordinating Committee. I entered and found a neat outer office with about a dozen young evacuees standing and

sitting about. I asked for Shig Iwohara and was told that he was working in warehouse 267. His sister May was here, however. I asked to be introduced to May. We entered another office. May was sitting at a desk. At the next desk was Byron Akitsuki, the chairman. He was a slight Japanese of medium height, with the Caucasian features common to many Japanese. He wore hornrimmed glasses, long hair, and had around his neck a white scarf in an ascot tie. He is the type of Japanese who would be called "handsome" by some of the Caucasian ladies at Gila.

May was very cordial, brought a chair and a large wastebasket to use as an ashtray. We chatted about Gila. She asked me to take her regards to Mr. and Mrs. Strickland and Miss Tanaka. I said I would like to meet Mr. Akitsuki but since he was so busy I did not wish to bother him. (He talked constantly to various people who came in.) May was reluctant to discuss the present plans of the committee. I expressed sympathy with the aims of the members and to inspire confidence, began to discuss the state of mind of the administration. She was very interested. She took down a shorthand statement for Akitsuki which I dictated. I said that so far as I had been able to see, the administration's chief concern seemed to be to save face. They did not particularly object to meeting some of the evacuee demands, providing that this could be done with a minimum loss of prestige. This courtesy to Akitsuki later paid excellent dividends, for at the meeting that afternoon, he gave me a copy of all the mimeographed material given by

the committee to the administration.

May Iwohara's Remarks (Secretary to the Coordinating Committee)

"A few people had been going back to work. Then the division heads (evacuees) of each department held a confidential meeting. They selected a committee Friday, January 7, within the division heads. (May consulted a calendar to see that she had given me the correct dates.) Then on Tuesday January 11 they held the referendum vote. The meeting of all the division workers was held on the 8. When they cast a vote as to whether they would go back to work or not, those who wished to go back to work won by an overwhelming majority. On the 11 - when the referendum vote was held it was barely a majority - a 300 odd majority."

"The members of the committee were selected by the division heads and recognized by the project director. The people have to take it or else. Nobody wanted to take the initiative."

"The members of the committee have no political ambitions. Before this committee dissolves they want to get another referendum vote and get a real political body elected by the people."

"The people say that we're inu."

May added that the camp was full of inu and rats.

I asked how a rat differed from an inu. May seemed reluctant to explain but said that a rat was a person who worked against the Japanese - only he was worse than an inu. He was more selfish. He got in the kitchen and ate the food!

Two executive members of the Tule Cooperative Enterprises - Yashimura and Iwamoto

Henry Kondo had asked Masato Kato, Secretary of the Gila Coop to write to Iwamoto for me and explain my purpose in coming to Tulelake. This proved to be one of my most valuable contacts. Iwamoto is a young kibe. He took me into a back room in a Coop barrack and we talked about harmless topics, the Coop at Gila, the staff there, the danger of inu, etc. Then he introduced me to Yashimura

the present Executive Secretary. Yashimura is an intelligent issei. He instituted an animated discussion on the justification of segregation, and the true meaning of loyalty. I then brought up the virtues of a thorough knowledge of anthropology. When this had been exhausted we discussed the pros and cons of the Japanese as an imitative people. Eventually we got around to the present situation at Tulelake and I received excellent clear information.

Yashimura on the Japanese sense of loyalty

"The Japanese word for loyalty has a much deeper meaning than loyalty in this country. It means loyalty to the emperor and the country; we take it much deeper than the Americans take loyalty. That's why when the American government asks any Japanese, 'Are you loyal to this country or not,' it's pretty hard to answer. Yashimura wrote the word for loyalty for me - 忠 The first character means "in the center of", the second means "the heart".

Yashimura on Tulelake

"This is really a matter of two factions. The people followed the first leaders, those who had remained here from the first and some segregationists from other centers joined them too. We perhaps are conservatives and the others are radicals."

"The second group could be called the conservatives. They are opposed to the methods which were employed. And of course we think it very unfortunate that this other group went ahead and started the thing this way."

"Kai, Kuratomi and Kurashige-they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there

was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him. (Kai.) He was honest but misguided. The attitude they had in negotiating these things was bad. Instead of asking courteously what they wanted, they demanded."

"It was done this way. I'm from Minidoka. Quite a few other people came from different parts of the country (segregates) and were mixed up in my block, quite a few from Jerome, Gila, Heart Mountain, Topaz and Poston, and a few that stayed here. They wanted to elect someone to represent our block. I didn't know anybody but from Minidoka. So we had to do something. Naturally, we selected someone from Minidoka. The result is more people from one center got elected. These representatives of the blocks ~~want~~ to meet and elected someone among the representatives to negotiate with the government. Nobody knows exactly who they were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods."

On the first group - the "radicals" demands to the Co-op

"The first group one time sent representatives to the Co-op Board of Directors meeting and asked us to cease selling certain commodities. The question was too large for the Board of Directors to decide. The question was so large that if the Co-op acceded to the request, they might have to close up the Co-op. We refused. We said we would have to take it up with the members of the block - that is the members of the Co-op. The members of the Co-op, 5,000 of them, turned this proposition down."

On promises of the Administration

"They did ignore their promises. But you must consider that a few days after that there was another incident. Probably they would have kept up their promises had they not been scared. I think the big mistake of the Administration was taking the food from the warehouses. Why didn't they take it out in the daytime? (I said that I had been told by a member of the Administration that the trucks were being used in the daytime for other things.) I think that is a very poor excuse."

Beating of Dr. Pedicord

"On the other hand, when the people came to the Administration building they were forced to go. On that day I saw some of the young men drag out Dr. Pedicord. I was about 200 feet away. I didn't know who that old man was. Some saw him dragged and hit by a young fellow. I saw that his head was bald. I felt quite sorry. He couldn't defend himself. I felt they shouldn't do that kind of thing."

"I was looking forward for punishment on those young people. But evidently they (the administration) didn't do anything about it. They should have been punished. That was a great mistake. Later when I saw Mr. Myer he said Pedicord started the fight. If I was there and had any authority I would have stopped them. But with mob psychology they would probably have hit me."

Iwohara: "One fact we must consider: he was very unpopular here."
 Yashimura: "My understanding was that he had been discharged. But he came back."
 Iwohara: "The people admire his courage for that."
 Yashimura: "The Coordinating Committee is made up of Division heads here. So on political basis they are trying to control the camp."

(We now entered into a discussion of the true meaning of democracy. When we had finished Iwohara made the following significant statement:)

"It's interesting that the people here lack the feeling for democracy. In the educational training of the Co-op here we must avoid the use of the word 'democracy' and use instead 'brotherhood'."

Just after lunch I called on Mary Hashimoto, another friend of Mary Oyata's. Mary was very glad to see me. (We had spoken to each other frequently in Gila when she was working in the Social Service Department.) She and her brother did not have much to say. She said life in Tule was very dull and asked me to take her regards to the girls in Social Service.

At lunch I ate with Miss Horn who told me that she was going to attend the meeting between the Coordinating Committee and the Advisory Board. I thought, "If she can attend, why can't I?" Thereupon I caught Black in the Administration Building and obtained his permission to attend. He told me the meeting would last an hour or an hour and a half. From past experience I doubted this. I therefore determined to make my four remaining important calls between one and two o'clock so as to be ready to leave at 4:30 at which time cars left the project. (the meeting was still going full blast when I was forced to leave at 4:30)

My first after lunch call was on Yamashiro the ex-president of the G. Y. P. A. He, his wife, and a friend were in a neat barrack room. Yamashiro is a short young man of pleasing appearance. His wife, a Gila girl, is very pretty. At the time of the September Mess strike in Gila, Yamashiro had been allowed to come to Gila from Leupp to marry his fiancée. When the strike broke out, Bennett thought Yamashiro was one of the ringleaders and I heard that he was apprehended, questioned and sent back to Leupp.

Yamashiro was very friendly, asked after Spenser and requested that I visit his parents in Gila and tell them that he and his wife were well. He said that he had often wished to write about his experiences and would consider writing them up for the study.

Next I dropped into Mary Hashimoto's home again to ask her if she would be willing to copy the train lists for Dr. Thomas. She said she would think about it. The feeling against inu was still strong that she felt that she had rather wait a couple of weeks and then start the work if things looked better. (A special pass is still required if evacuees wish to leave "the colony").

I next called on Bill Nishino, my block manager's brother. Bill was not in, and his wife went to call him, probably from the latrine. Two or three neighbors opened their door and peered surreptitiously at me as I waited. When I glanced at them, they closed the door hurriedly, but when I turned away they opened them again. Bill came on the run and did what no evacuee had yet done, invited my escort, Mr. Johnson into his house. We were given

doughnuts and cookies to eat. Bill's wife, who was feeding a baby offered to make tea for us, but since our time was short, we declined. Bill is block manager. He told us that his block was just about fifty-fifty for and against status quo. Consequently he had to watch his step carefully. He had tried to keep from being involved in camp affairs. When I asked him how the representatives on the Coordinating Committee had been elected he used Mrs. Oda's exact words, "That's what I'd like to know. Nobody knows."

It was now about five minutes to two. Before going to the meeting I dropped into the warehouse office and asked for Iwohara. A young woman took me into the inner section and we walked the entire length of the large building through narrow aisles of stores, occasionally coming upon one or two evacuees checking supplies or weighing food and putting it into packages. Eventually we located Iwohara with a group which was weighing dried shrimp. He was shy before the others; we shook hands and I told him that the Kondos were well. I was forced to leave almost immediately but promised to return if the meeting allowed.

MEETING OF ADVISORY BOARD AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE

I had little knowledge of the proposed agenda for this meeting. Opler or Black had mentioned that the proposition of lifting the curfew was to be discussed and May Iwohara had impressed me with the fact that the members of the Coordinating Committee were most anxious to step out of the picture. The meeting was held in office 2 in the Administration Building.

When I arrived a half-a-dozen Caucasians were sitting in a semi-circle while two Japanese sat ~~opposite~~. Mr. Black occupied the position of informal chairman and sat behind a small desk in one corner of the room. Soon Akitsuki accompanied by the remaining of the members of his committee and Miss Iwohara entered. Black introduced Miss Horn and me to them.

Akitsuki, whom Opler had said was ill, still wore his white scarf and gloves. While we waited for Best I noted those present. They were: Harry Black, Marvin Opler, Neil McNeil of the Co-op, Mr. Huycke, of the C. A. S. Best, Lechliter (the project attorney) and Robertson came in later. Nine evacuees were present. Byron Akitsuki, Masao Shimada, John Naydo, Iwao Namekawa, George Yamatani, K. Okamoto, Joe Nakan, May Iwohara and one young man whose presence was not explained. Mr. Schmitt the head of Tule's Internal Security was also present as was Lieutenant Forbes, the army's representative.

My first impression was the separation between the evacuees and the members of the staff. The evacuees sat in one corner and along one side of the room. The Caucasians sat in a semi-circle facing them.

Black opened the meeting and then asked Akitsuki to present his points. From this point on it was difficult to say who was chairman. Black would appropriate the chairmanship at times and Akitsuki would keep quiet. Then Akitsuki would continue in his insecure position of chief speaker. As the meeting progressed the Caucasians monopolized more and more of the conversation.

The evacuees were seldom addressed as they were usually they were addressed by their names.

The evacuees were seldom addressed as Mr. Usually they were addressed by their first names. No evacuee called a Caucasian by his first name, nor did any omit Mr.

Akitsuki first reported on the meeting of the Coordinating Committee which had been held the day before. He read a copy of the minutes¹ which stated that nearly four weeks had passed since January 7, when the responsible men of all the divisions had determined to liquidate the status quo. Since then about 1,000 ex-employees had returned to work. The committee recommended that immediate steps be taken to hold a referendum vote and replace their body by legitimate elected representatives.

Black asked that the discussion of this matter be put off till Best returned (he had stepped out).

Akitsuki then brought up the matter of the relaxation of the curfew law, the possibility of placing it at 9:30 instead of 7:30. This had been recommended at a meeting of the evacuee Divisional Heads, held on January 29. There was considerable discussion as to how this should be done and the administrative difficulties involved. Opler who took a very active part in the discussion suggested that the curfew might be lifted ward by ward. This suggestion was discarded because it would cause great confusion. Lieutenant Forbes came to the point and asked Akitsuki directly if the committee thought that they could release the curfew over the entire camp until 9:30, "No" said Akitsuki.

Best: "If we change the curfew, let's change it over the entire center."

Forbes: "That was my point."

Best: "I don't think that from the safety standpoint, anything is going to happen before. If we did it by wards we'd

¹ See Appendix p. 4.

never get through explaining."

Black: "The schools have asked that the curfew be lifted within wards a week ago."

Best: "Let's keep it simple."

Yamatani: "Some of the blocks have no block managers. This ought to be settled first."

Huycke: "I think the mess hall crew is responsible for that."

Yamatani: "Can't you stop delivering them coal?¹ What about mail?"

Huycke: "They go to the Post Office."

Black mentioned the fact that two thousand people were expected shortly - on the 23 of February. If they intended to have a Civic Center in the camp they ought to get it out of the way now or they won't get one later. In making room for these new people there ought to be as little hardship as possible.

Someone remarked that there were four blocks without block managers.

Akitsuki now read from the Coordinating Committee Memorandum of February 2, stating that on January 28 the Committee had submitted a list of six nominees for the Temporary Police Commission to Mr. Schmitt, head of Internal Security. They now asked, however that K. Nakamura, G. Yamatani, and J. Naydo be appointed immediately. They cited the fact that a janitor in block 49 named Matsuoka who was against status quo had been attacked by a man

¹ Would greatly appreciate to hear what "X" has to say about a statement like this. R.H.

named Hamano on the subject of the back to work movement. As a result all the other janitors had refused to work.

Schmitt promised that prompt action would be taken.

Returning to the subject of the curfew it was decided to hold the lifting in obedience until Internal Security had been reorganized. (Best came back at this moment.)

Akitsuki acknowledged the receipt of 15 kegs of soy sauce from the Japanese Red Cross. Best reminded him to be very sure to get all the receipts signed by issei.

Akitsuki: "Mr. Schmitt, do you think we should discuss now the Temporary Police Commissioners?"

Schmitt: "That's already been taken care of."

Akitsuki: "Next is the creation of new employment opportunities." (He read from the January 29 minutes of the meeting of Divisional Heads.)

'As decided in the last divisional meeting, the Coordinating Committee presented the suggestion to create new jobs for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities, such as clean-up crew, to the WRA. Project Director has states definitely that the time is not appropriate to be discussing future plans unless the Center is back to normal and all old activities functioning as usual. Moreover, the Administration must get Washington's approval prior to the execution of any contemplated plan.'

As answer Best cited the January 1 figures on project employment. There were 431 people employed in a section I did not catch, 1,000 in Community Management, 163 in Administrative Management, 1,930 in mess, 233 in the hospital. This made a total of 3,848 on the project payrolls. Black: "That is 165 less than the employment in October prior to the work stoppage. There are now more people working than in October. We Don't have to step very far before we have more people working than ever before."

Akitsuiki: "Would it be too much trouble for you to put out a statement, Mr. Black?"

Best: (To McNeil) "Is it safe to talk about any industry at the moment?"

McNeil: "We have already launched a sewing factory with 20 people. We hope to run it up to 400 people."

Best: "Where is the bottleneck?"

McNeil: "I've wired Richardson in Washington."

The Caucasians now launched into a long discussion of the possibility of starting tofu manufacturing and the warehouses which might be used.

Akitsuiki: "On the question of the expansion of farm acreage. Is it possible to reclaim the League-of-Nations tract?"

Best: "The answer is No. That doesn't mean we won't have a large farm project. It might have been 5,000 acres. But now it will be about 2,500 acres."

Yamatani: "What about the Japanese people getting a lease here."

Best: "Not now, but perhaps in the future." (Someone brought up the fact that there were 8,000 employable persons on the project.)

Opler: "I suggest we discuss this with Mr. Robertson."

Black: "It's not possible to repossess the League of Nations tract. But we can get about 2,500 acres."

Akitsuiki: "Would it be possible to have a hog farm?"

Best: "Hogs yes, chickens no."

(The Caucasians held a long discussion on chicken raising.)

Akitsuiki: "At the meeting last Saturday they brought up the fact that there was suffering from lack of shower facilities."

Black: "We'll refer that to maintenance."

(Here I observed that Best and Yamatani were holding a whispered discussion. They continued to do this at intervals during the meeting.)

Akitsuki: "The mess managers made a complaint that a man named Foster in mess is abusive to the Japanese employees and if, possible, they request his removal!"

Best: "Better look out there. That's requesting a removal of appointed personnel."

Black: "Better just say he doesn't get along. We'll take care of it."

Best: "We'll take care of it."

Yamasaki: "Also we had a couple, three-four~~t~~^{ty} Caucasians workers come into the garage and the mess. They are new fellows. We thought we'd ask, why these people come in and work when we don't have enough work for the Japanese?"

Black: "They had been hired a month back."

Best: "Those are positions which involve responsibility. They will effect evacuee employment. Their being Caucasians will protect you as regards lost property." (not?)

Nakan: (member of committee) "One can't count numbers straight. He goes up to 56 and he can't go on. This is at the food warehouse. He sends out things to the messhalls and a lot has to be brought back."

Huycke: "Maybe he's a Heintz man and can't count above 57." (Laughter)

Akitsuki: "It is also reported that the new applicants for jobs are getting them without applying to the placement office."

Black: "The section heads are making requests for individuals whose qualifications they know already."

Akitsuki: "I called up Placement and they said they didn't know anything about it. Also at the last division head meeting there were some comments made -"

Read the following paragraph:

"Upon question raised relative to the method or plan by which the work of the Committee could be facilitated in their efforts to restore normalcy to the Center, it was suggested from the floor that segregation within the camp, the good from the bad, is imperative. In view of the information revealed that some 'scums' of the society, who were also despised in other Centers, have entered into

this center, the majority was in favor of this suggested segregation. However, recommendations were not made."

Black: "Until we get the Manzanar people here, segregation will be too much of a load for housing. But the organization which succeeds yours can bring about the natural segregation you would like to have. I think it might be done voluntarily - keep like-thinking people together. But housing cannot stand the strain right now" (at great length)

Akitsuiki now read the entire memorandum on the Preparation for Referendum Votes prior to the Replacement of this Committee. This memorandum asked that that preparations be initiated for a referendum vote to replace the present Coordinating Committee.¹

Akitsuiki: "The evacuation of Block 18 for a Civic Center would involve a great deal of work as well as confusion among the colonists. If we make preparations to replace the committee, the colonists would feel better. That way, everybody is responsible for recommendations in the center. We suggest a duly elected body present the evacuation of Block 18."

(An involved discussion as to whether this were the proper time for the committee to step down now took place. I was unable to write all of it down. The gist of the discussion, however, was that the Caucasian were unwilling to hold the election soon.) (Lieutenant Forbes again was the first Caucasian to come to the point.)

Lieutenant Forbes: "To put it in words of one syllable, do you think you can win it the same way you won the last election?"

Akitsuiki: "I don't think so. But we want the people to realize that we are not like the negotiating committee but are interested in the welfare of every colonist in this center."

Huycke: "If you have an election - we've got a couple of bad wards. I'd say the chances are you'd have a negotiating committee selected with about 40% negative point of view. Then, a second point, if you select them now before the Manzanar group comes in, Manzanar will say, 'You're not our representatives.'" There is a danger of many persons looking at you as being status quo yourselves. I think we ought to wait until we're sure the trend is getting better."

¹ See Appendix *p* for full text.

(Akitsuki asked Opler to discuss the matter.)

Opler suggested that an election might be advisable because of the difficult position of the committee. "We should state our hope that the community can get further back to normal before the temporary group come to the point of holding a referendum. Down in the community I feel that there is a growing sentiment that the committee is working for the good of the colony.¹ We are looking forward to still further strides in the direction of normalcy before calling for a referendum vote. I think we should take some responsibility. The committee thinks of itself as a pro tem group."

Black spoke at great length against a popular vote in the near future. (He is given to long speeches and spoke so fast I could only get his general points.)

"If we have a referendum now, we're not going to get the quality of men on the committee we want."

Opler: "The main point is this group is begging to be released. I think that this responsibility lies on us, since we want them to continue."

He recommended that some small privileges be granted, such as the establishment of a tofu manufacturing and the lifting of the curfew.

Black: (Spoke at length in favor of getting something accomplished.) Miss Horn slipped a note to Robertson which said, "What does the committee think? The Caucasians are doing all the talking."

Robertson: "What does the committee feel would be the reaction of the colonists to the fact that the committee wants to leave. Do you feel they'd clamour for a referendum?"

Opler: (answers for the committee) "Yes."

Robertson: "The committee does not entirely approve of this statement

¹I observed no such sentiment.

from the Administration?"

Akitsuki: "Not exactly."

Opler: "I don't think it should come directly from the Administration - perhaps from the Advisory Council?"

Robertson: "If now is not the time for a referendum we'd better rock along as we are and make no statement until the Manzanar group comes."

Forbes: "I think the opposition would seize on it and demand a vote."

Akitsuki: "It's not quite democratic. We should leave before our welcome is worn out."

Robertson: "Do you feel that a referendum would be fair to the colony with Manzanar coming?"

Akitsuki: "I do not."

Yamatani: "It's too early yet. I feel personally there is more to be accomplished before we submit a referendum. We don't want people to think we're doing this because we like it. We want to accomplish something before we retire. When this is all fixed up, let Mr. Best give a big steak dinner for the incoming and outgoing committee."

The members of the committee were now asked in their turn if they felt as Mr. Yamatani did. They were ill at ease. All but one agreed hesitantly with Yamatani that this was not the right time.

Namekawa: "Personally I take the view of George. Psychologically I agree with Akitsuki. But right now I think Mr. Yamatani is right."

Shimada: (The one member with guts enough to dissent.) "I feel that now is the time!"

Akitsuki: (seizing this straw) "At least to let the colonists know."

Opler: "I think what has been wrong is not so much the state of office - the question is would an exchange of notes bring on a colony referendum."

Huycke: "Would it be fair to the 2,000 people from Manzanar. Besides, we do not yet have official recognition from Washington for community government."

(It was now 4:30 and I was forced to leave to catch my bus.)

APPENDIX - MEMEORANDA OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

1.

MEMORANDUM
CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 1608-A

February 2, 1944

TO: Mr. R. R. Best, Project Director
FROM: Co-ordinating Committee
SUBJECT: Receipt of Red Cross Gift

This will acknowledge receipt of 15 kegs of Kikkoman soy-bean sauce on January 30, 1944, which was part of the gift allotted to the Japanese Nationals of this Center from the Japanese Red Cross.

Upon being appointed by the WRA for the disposition of the gift we, the Committee, selected two Japanese Nationals as representatives from the Committee namely: Okamoto, Kumaharu, and Yamatani, Jirozo, who assumed the responsibility and made arrangements by holding a meeting with the Civic Organization staffs on January 29, 1944. The attached minutes of the meeting will be self-explanatory.

We have already notified the National Red Cross Headquarters, Washington, D. C. of the partial receipt of the gift as shown per attached copy of the letter which was sent on January 31, 1944.

On behalf of the internees, we wish to extend our thanks and appreciation for your service.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

/s/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

Japanese National Representatives:
Okamoto, Kumaharu
Yamatani, Jirozo

MEMORANDUM
CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 1608-A

February 2, 1944

TO: Mr. R. R. Best, Project Director
FROM: Co-ordinating Committee
SUBJECT: Nomination of Temporary Police Commissioners

According to the meeting held on January 28, 1944, the Committee submitted a list of six nominees to Mr. Schmitt of the Police Department. The attached minutes of that meeting will be self-explanatory. Today, however, we have made a recommendation to Mr. Schmitt again, suggesting that K. Nakamura, G. Yamatani, and J. Naydo be nominated and appointed as Police Commissioners because of the pending troublesome condition existing especially in Ward 6. According to the report we received, one Matsulka, a janitor of block 49 (who is against status quo), was attacked by Hamano over the subject of back-to-work movement. As a result, all other fellow janitors, in sympathy with Matsulka, refused to work today. Such occurrences will not only inconvenience the block residents, but will have bad influence on the colonists as a whole. It seems that evacuee police force was notified immediately. However, no action of maintaining order was taken. At this time, the Committee ascertained that it was not the fault on the part of function due to the absence of Police Commissioners. Hence, the Committee arrived at the conclusion that if the Police Commissioners be instituted immediately to formulate plans for prompt execution, it will be beneficial not only to the evacuee police force, but also for the maintenance of order within the Center.

We want to request for the Project Director's approval on this matter so that the plans may be executed immediately. It can also be considered that this is one of the ways of accelerating our step in bringing back normalcy, as well as expediting the election of prominent Commissioners by referendum votes of the colonists.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

/s/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

ba/mi

MEMORANDUM
CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 1608-A

February 2, 1944

TO: Mr. R. R. Best, Project Director
FROM: Co-ordinating Committee
SUBJECT: Creation of New Employment Opportunities

In spite of the existing friction between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 750 persons have applied for jobs up to date. In view of this fact that many are still on the waiting list, new applicants are aware that their chances of employment are remote, hence, a growing impatience is noted among them. We, the Committee, fear the result, least they be instigated by the pro status quo group who may aver that this back-to-work movement is beneficial only to those who had worked previously.

In order to relieve this situation, may this Committee again request for your special consideration on this matter of creating new employment opportunities such as general camp cleaning or sawing of kindling wood by crews of 20 to 30.

Subject: Expansion of Farm Acreage (recommendation)

As a result of the current incident the League-of-Nations tract, which was more than one-half of the Project's farm, has been lost. It is indisputable that the agricultural program is one of the most vital matter, and we, the Committee, upon due deliberation, hereby submit a recommendation for the expansion of farm acreage, not only from the standpoint of employment opportunities for colonists, but for the health as well as economy of the colonists.

As far as we know, League-of-Nations tract has been under the control of Reclamation Department. Is there any possibility of reclaiming the tract for Project use as heretofore?

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

/s/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM
CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE 1608-A

February 2, 1944

TO: M. R. R. Best, Project Director

FROM: Co-ordinating Committee

SUBJECT: Preparation for Referendum Votes prior to the Replacement of this Committee

The dice cast by the responsible men of all divisions on the morning of the 7th of January, with firm determination to liquidate status quo, hurtle the battle cries of back-to-work and restore-to-normalcy. Nearly four weeks have already passed.

In spite of the existing frictions between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 1,000 ex-employees up to date have returned to work and about the same number of new work applicants have been noted. This is one of the illustrations which exemplifies the fact that the condition of this Center has definitely improved.

At this time, in view of many agenda which embody the future plans regarding the management of this Center, we, the Committee, felt and decided that the road was open for the preparation of referendum votes for the purpose of replacing this temporary Committee. By taking such steps, the Committee believed that the prevailing pro and con feelings among the colonists could be eradicated and overcome, since they will be given opportunity to have a voice in the future management of the Center. In this way, their opinions will be centralized for a common purpose. Psychologically, socially, and economically, we think the time has come whereby representations from the colonists be selected democratically. We want to avoid further public misconception that "we are the whole cheese and running the Center as dictated by our own wills."

With this understanding, we, the Committee, would feel more free to work. A recommendation of this nature must be submitted to sooner or later, why not now?

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

/s/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary

MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE DIVISIONAL HEADS OF THE TULE
LAKE CENTER
January 29, 1944

The regular meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center was held on January 29, 1944, at 1608-A, from 2:00 p.m. Chairman B. Akitsuki presided.

Roll was called and is shown per attached sheet.

Minutes of the regular meeting of the Divisional Heads held on January 22, 1944; were read and approved with an addition of the words underlined, "35 workers are yet to be employed in the high school only," in the section of the reports of the divisional heads.

The Chair then reported on the activities of the Co-ordinating Committee as follows:

1. Approximately 1000 resumed work since January 13, 1944. In spite of the existing frictions between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 750 persons applied for jobs up to date.
2. Up to yesterday, 55 persons were released from the stockade and more will be released in the very near future. The army has definitely stated that release en masse is impossible unless the Center has returned to its normal condition.
3. Through the courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross, imon-hin (gifts) have arrived at this Tule Lake Center. Thereupon, all ward chairmen of block managers assembled this morning to discuss the proper ways and means of distribution. It was decided that at least 11 barrels of shoyu (soy-bean sauce) will be allotted to each of the 64 blocks. Inasmuch as leakage of the shoyu must still be accounted for, the allotment is still indefinite. Distribution thereon will be left up to the discretion of the block managers and Issei representatives of the respective blocks.
4. As decided at the last divisional meeting, the Co-ordinating Committee presented the suggestion to create new jobs for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities, such as clean-up crew, to the WRA. Project Director has stated definitely that the time is not appropriate to be discussing future plans unless the Center is back to normal and all old activities functioning as usual. Moreover, the Administration must get Washington's approval prior to the execution of any contemplated plans.
5. Relaxation of the curfew hour up until 9:30 p.m. has been recommended but it was felt inappropriate to lift such now; moreover, it was felt that it should be withheld until center completely returns to its normal status.
6. Mr. Lefler of the WRA Washington office, at the previous meeting of the Advisory Council and the Committee explained in details Prisoner-of-war camps in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. His explanation as well as other informations obtained will be published upon permission granted by the WRA.

Reports of the number of various divisional employees who have returned to work, were given by each respective divisional heads as follows:

Property Control: 77 employees were requested, however, 57 are working at the present time. Among that 13 have been terminated and two did not report to work. There are others among the 77 who will not report to work. Our former force was 120. It was our intentions to reduce the force to 100 after segregation; unfortunately the incident occurred and the plan was left pending.

Garage: No representative.

Maintenance: No representatives. However, Mr. Sakuma of the Janitorial Division requested that the plumbers should return to work as soon as possible otherwise works in the other divisions will be retarded.

Janitor: It appears that all the women's shower room partitions have decayed due to neglect, therefore, I request that steps for the repair of such be taken immediately.

Construction: (Irrigation) There are 11 working. People are scared and will not report to work. There should be 18 on the staff.

Packing Shed: (Marketing) This Monday, 10 will be added to the force.

Procurement: Additional workers was put in and that's about the only change. 50 are working. 40 men will be coming back. Increase will take place gradually. We would like to make a complaint -- and that is, there is a party by the name of Foster in the Meat Shop who is very indifferent and abusive to the Japanese employees and is very much despised by the staff; if possible, we would like to request for his removal.

Mess Management: There are three workers and one secretary. Lack of materials retards the work in this division.

Electrical Crew: There are 17 working today. By the first of next month I think employees will gradually be reinstated.

Furniture Industry: Next week the entire staff will come back. Was informed in a roundabout way, that request for labor has been sent in to the Placement Office either yesterday or day before. 19 men were supposed to have returned; however, there are only 14 back.

Construction: Two Caucasians have left the project and three are now remaining. Japanese employees will be coming back about next month.

Office Service: There's nothing new, except more coal is coming in and I think we will be able to distribute them sufficiently to the colonists.

Hog Farm:

Slaughter House:

Coal Crew:

Plumbing:

After the rejection of the 20, the force has not and will not be increased, I understand. Since there are only 30 boilers, five-man crew is sufficient until such time that new boilers arrive.

Payroll:

Every effort is being made to pass out the checks, and through the cooperation of the Civic organization, checks will be distributed through them; that is, all the unclaimed checks and other checks in general, accumulated during our enforced vacation, clothing allowance vouchers have gone to Portland and it will be distributed upon the arrival of the checks.

Clothing Unit:

15 former crew are back to work.

Farm:

Executive Secretary stated that as soon as preparation is made the employees will be called back. Workers who formerly took care of the equipments have been called back, however.

Housing:

31 are working.

Mr. Yamatani mentioned that 46 trucks are out of commission at the garage. It is urgent that the workers return to work as soon as possible. However, it was suggested from the floor that since there are some Caucasians in there, who are causing friction, the Japanese personnel feel uncomfortable to work. The Co-ordinating Committee was requested to further investigate the matter.

Chair called for recommendations in reference to employment and a suggestion was brought up from the floor as to what is being done about the plaster boards which are being put in the new buildings, inasmuch as Manzanar evacuees will be coming in this February. Mr. Kondo disclosed that negotiation is pending between the WRA and the contractor.

Mr. Yamatani mentioned that according to Mr. Thomas the new buildings will not be completed until the first part of March; therefore, it will not be ready for occupancy until the WRA accepts the completed building.

It was suggested from the floor that repairing tools for plumbers should be requested. It was suggested by Mr. Yoshida that request for such may be settled by Mr. Best who should contact the Area Engineers.

Upon question raised relative to the method or plan by which the work of the Committee could be facilitated in their efforts to restore normalcy to the Center, it was suggested from the floor that segregation within the camp, the good from the bad, is imperative. In view of the information revealed that some 'scums' of the society, who were also despised in the other Centers, have entered into this Center, the majority was in favor of this suggested segregation. However, recommendations were not made.

Upon motion made, seconded, and carried, the meeting adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Byron Akitsuki
Executive Secretary of the
Co-ordinating Committee

ATTENDANCE

| | | | |
|--------------|--------|--------------|--------|
| M. Shimada | 1606-A | M. Kojo | 5403-A |
| I. Namekawa | 3017-D | C. Mizumoto | 5405-E |
| J. Naydo | 4207-D | S. Morishima | 6703-E |
| Y. Yamatani | 3107-C | Ninomiya | 7117-A |
| K. Okamoto | 1318-D | Kitaura | 3918-B |
| J. Nakao | 4713-B | | |
| B. Akitsuki | 2904-B | | |
| J. Nishida | 602-C | | |
| S. Saito | 1302-A | | |
| K. Kosaka | 1405-D | | |
| S. Ikemoto | 2916-D | | |
| Fukushima | 3702-A | | |
| K. Watamura | 3704-A | | |
| M. Hori | 3713-D | | |
| J. Okamoto | 2214-C | | |
| Y. Konda | 3405-D | | |
| T. Ikemoto | 3502-B | | |
| H. Sakuma | | | |
| Muralka | 1217-A | | |
| R. Kondo | 2004-B | | |
| Kurahara | 4013-A | | |
| T. Miyaki | 4303-D | | |
| H. Nishimoto | 4311-E | | |
| K. Mitani | 4402-A | | |
| E. Yoshida | 4402-D | | |
| O. Itani | 4406-D | | |

Rossie Hankey
February 5, 1944

OUTLINE OF EVENTS AT TULELAKE - OCTOBER 1943 THROUGH JANUARY 1944

On October a serious accident took place at Tulelake. A truck, driven by young man 17 or 18 years old, transporting over a score of farm workers tumbled over. Several of the occupants were severely injured; one died as a result of his injuries. According to an informant who overheard Mr. Zimmer speaking of the accident, the boy was driving at a speed of 30 to 35 miles an hour on a new highway which had just been completed by the Harco construction company. He attempted to overtake another car. In the process the left rear tire of the truck passed onto a soft shoulder. The driver became excited, allowed two of the tires to run onto the soft ground and the truck turned over.

Evacuee sentiment immediately turned against the youthful and supposedly reckless driver and particularly against WRA for placing an inexperienced boy in a position of such responsibility. ~~Stating that~~ *demanding* ~~the~~ assurance of safe transportation and adequate compensation in the event of injury. The farm crews refused to return to work.

The administration published the "compensation law" in the Tulelake paper, which stated that the rules governing compensation to government employees were applicable in this case and therefore the dead man's dependents were entitled to sixty percent of his earnings, i. e., sixty percent of sixteen dollars a month.

On October 20 Mr. Zimmer, the Assistant Project Director with jurisdiction over the farm, asked all the farmer's to return to work. His request was ignored. The administration then asked the striking evacuees to send their representatives to discuss the matter. The representatives refused to meet the administration at this time. According to one informant:

This secretive removal of food was publicised by the Negotiating Committee. It stirred up tremendous public resentment. Although the people were not quite sure, they inferred that the food was being given to the despised harvesters. The administration later admitted this fact. A staff member told me that the food was taken out at night ^{because} ~~because~~ the trucks were needed for other work during the day.¹

All informants agree that this administrative action was resented more bitterly than any other. Anger was at high pitch. At this propitious moment the Dai-hyo Sha, or Negotiating Committee announced its existence to the administration and stated that it was now ready to present the peoples' grievances. The first meeting between this committee and the administration took place on October 26.²

At this meeting the committee made certain demands. Evacuees and appointed staff members differ as to the exact nature of these demands. Spicer implies that the basic political feature of the committee's program was the clarification of the segregants' status: they wanted status for all segregants as Japanese nationals, they wanted further segregation, namely the placement in a separate camp of all persons who although not loyal to the United States did not want to return to Japan, they had worked out a program of Japanization.³ It is possible

6.

that in his letter Mr. Spicer was listing only the demands of a political nature. If he thought that these were the significant demands of the committee, he was misinformed.¹ Careful checking of the statements of evacuees - evacuees who are sympathetic or unsympathetic to the negotiating committee, shows that the significant requests; those which received whole-hearted support from the general camp population, were substantially those listed by my informant "I":

"The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center; (2) that the food in camp be improved; (3) that certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged; (4) that Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer be discharged." (The third demand was stressed by several informants as the most significant of all.)

Lumber for porches, which the evacuees state WRA had promised them, was also demanded.

All data on hand shows that the first four demands listed above were supported and approved by most of the people. No informant mentioned any of the demands listed by Mr. Spicer. When they were mentioned, ^{they} scoffed at them, indicating that they were the requests of a radical minority. This indicates that these demands of a political nature were not considered important by the majority of evacuees.

Requests other than these are condemned by some informants as the silly demands of the radical members of the negotiating committee. "I", an intelligent ^{man} ~~person~~ individual stated an attitude which was corroborated by half a dozen people:

"Of course, a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense.... The only thing everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord, more care in the placement of drivers and an improvement of food, and, I think, the request for an investigation

¹By Opler, I suspect.

of grafting. Grafting started the whole works."

Reasons for Dr. Pedicord's unpopularity were set forth in great detail by Marvin Opler, the Community Analyst, in a report dated July 6, 1943. In this report Opler states that Pedicord referred to Japanese-American patients and physicians as "Japs", that he let the people know they need not expect any coo'ding, that his dictatorial attitude forced the evacuee doctors to seek transfer and resettlement, that he practiced a policy of "economy at any price".¹

Accusations made by my informants in November include: that Pedicord had anti-Japanese ^Wviews, that he was incompetent and negligent of his duties, that he refused to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients who later died,² that he did not order sufficient medicine for hospital equipment, that he hired Caucasian quacks one of whom caused a child to be stillborn by giving too much serum, that he cut the hospital staff so severely that it couldn't run efficiently, that he made the Caucasian nurses section heads and permitted them to give orders to the evacuee doctors (even though one evacuee doctor had a license to practice in California), that he cut down the allowance of baby food although there was sufficient in the warehouse, that one night while a Caucasian doctor was on duty a severely burned evacuee child was allowed to go without treatment from 11:00 p. m. to 7:00 a. m. when it was finally treated by a Japanese doctor coming on duty; the child died.²

Perhaps the most important grievance brought up at this meeting was the removal of food from the warehouse. Best was not able to explain this matter to the satisfaction of the committee. However, he did consent to call Dillon Myer ~~and the Spanish Consul~~ and the Spanish Consul and allow the people to put their grievances before them.

Before proceeding with the narrative it is proper here to discuss the manner in which the Dai-ryo ~~she~~ was selected and the character of the men who composed it. The selection and character of this committee are two more of the salient points on which the general evacuee population and the administrative staff hold entirely different opinions. These different views are responsible for much of the misunderstanding and conflict which arose later.

The administration's concept, probably gained from Marvin Opler and his informants, is that the committee was dominated by radicals - men who were extremely pro-Japanese. These men, it is contended, had been minority leaders in their original centers and had begun developing their plans for dominating the center as soon as they arrived in Tule. Opler informed me that Kai and Kuratomi were the ringleaders, that Kai was a fanatic and that Kuratomi was completely under his influence. Both men are former Jerome ~~Sanctuary~~ residents.

Spicer in his letter pictures the administration's view vividly. All of Opler's remarks showed him to be in accord. "They (the leading committee members) had been sizing up the situation from the moment they entered Tule, learned the current gripes quickly, and, according to Opler, had a good grasp of the foci of dissatisfaction by the time the trouble started." Spicer states further that these leaders controlled a gang, a goon squad which employed terrorist methods, and that they operated "much as the gang which put into motion the Poston Strike." They attempted to create what looked like mass-action by

Violent Threats

Opler told me that this radical group, dominated by Kai and Kuratomi manipulated the selection of the committee, selecting men whom they chose from the body of elected representatives. That some manipulation may have taken place was admitted by Mr. Yashimura, the issai replacing Akitsuki temporarily as Secretary of the Cooperative.

The factor which the Administration did not know or chose to ignore was that the majority of evacuees considered and still consider these men their representatives, that while the actions of a radical fringe are condemned, the leaders were respected and thought to be working for the general good.

The committee was selected from a group of men who had been elected in each block. It should be remembered that when the segregants from other centers entered Tululake in early October they were spread throughout the blocks. Consequently many blocks had an heterogeneous population, consisting of original Tuleans and persons from Poston, Minidoka, Topaz, Jerome and Gila and Heart Mountain. One of the clearest pictures of the situations was given by Mr. Yashimura.

"It was done this way. I'm from Minidoka. Quite a few other people came from different parts of the country and we were mixed up in my block; quite a few from Jerome, Gila, Heart Mountain, Topaz and Poston, and a few that stayed here. They wanted to elect someone to represent our block. I didn't know anybody but from Minidoka. So we had to do something. Naturally we selected someone from Minidoka. The result is more people from one center got elected."

"The representatives of the blocks went on to meet and elected someone among the representatives to negotiate with the government. Nobody knew exactly who they were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods."

The assurance that these men were their elected representatives and that they received general public support is ex-

pressed in the following verbatim statements and many others which it was not possible for me to write down:

"K" a loyal essential worker sent from Tule to Gila on November 3 said:

"Most of the people were behind it.....These representatives were selected by the people, one for each ward."

"I" a segregant from Gila, an intelligent observer said:

"That (the Administration's refusal to recognize the representatives) was one of the things that got the Japanese in an uproar. All of the respective people in the blocks elected them".

Another expression of public support came from Mr. Yashimura:

"The people followed the first leaders, those who had remained here from the first and some segregees from other centers joined them too."

"I" gives an interesting description of how the Committee put matters before the people:

"After every meeting the representatives always came back and at supper called for silence. They'd get up in front of the mess hall and give a brief summary of what went on before the meeting. They'd take Ayes and Nos for any question then. If there was no time in mess they'd call a special meeting at night."

My inquiries brought forth no evidence that Kai was hated or was regarded as a fanatic. Mr. Yashimura, who was the only evacuee who suggested that the committee might have been selected in an underhand manner and that it contained a preponderance of Jerome members stated:

"Kai, Kuratomi and they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him. He was honest but misguided."

When I repeated this sentiment to Gler, omitting the names, he scoffed at me. He held that Kai and the others were hated

and despised. However, the people who inform to Opler had different motives than those who spoke to me.

This, therefore was the situation before Dillon Myer's arrival: a strong pressure group selected from elected representatives was in control. Feeling, after the successful demonstration of the public funeral, that it had considerable power and had the support of the people, it was ready to negotiate. The Administration believed that this group was a strongly organized minority of politically minded pro-Japanese radicals, who *had* seized power illegally and by threats of violence had forced the people to its will.

When Mr. Myer arrived the Administration refused to recognize these men as representatives and refused them audience. The committee determined to force recognition from the Administration. The committee sent word to every mess hall that on November 1 Mrs. Myer was going to give a speech and the people were to come to the Administration building to hear it. They were to be as orderly as possible and carry no weapons. The youthful radicals took it upon themselves to be sure that a sufficiently large crowd would appear. "I" makes the following revealing statement:

"When this came out, it so happened the goon-squad went on

the war path.....The people gathered in some blocks. In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon-squad got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the Administrative area. I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barracks. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese, or not?'

By these various means a large crowd of evacuees was induced to come to the Administration Building. Many went out of curiosity. Faced with this exhibition of "public trust in the Representatives," Myer and Best decided to see the committee. The committee was determined that certain of the Caucasians should be in the Administration Building to hear their statement.¹ A group of young men came to take Dr. Pedicord to the Administration Building. He cursed them and struck one, whereupon they fell upon him and beat him severely. Mr. Yashimura happened to witness this beating and describes as follows:

"When the people came to the Administration Building they were forced to go. On that day I saw some of the young men drag out Dr. Pedicord. I was about 200 feet away. I didn't know who that old man was. I saw him dragged and hit by a young fellow. I saw that his head was bald. I felt quite sorry. He couldn't defend himself. I felt they shouldn't do that kind of thing."

What transpired at the meeting between Mr. Myer and the committee and what Myer said to the assembled crowd afterwards is another subject on which members of the Administration and evacuees are utterly in disagreement with the exception of a Caucasian who was present. I am informed that he states that he heard the promises.

The Administration insists that no promises were made during

¹ This information is given repeatedly by evacuees. Whether the committee intended that every member of the Appointed Staff be present, teachers included, is not clear. I suspect the committee wished certain absent members there, and for that reason the young men went after Dr. Pedicord.

the consultation and points to the minutes of the meeting as proof.

Concerning the evacuee contention that Myer made promises to the people, which were later broken, Opler said:

"That was clever staging by the committee. After the meeting there were some speeches. Kuratomi interpreted in Japanese only and told what had been decided at the meeting. 'Remember what this man has promised', he said. This was followed by a speech by Kai of the Dai Nippon order."

Evacuees are equally insistent that Myer made the promises. (My informants all understand English well.) They state that Myer promised that Dr. Pedicord would go and admitted that he had struck a Japanese before he was attacked. Myer also is said to have promised that no more food would be taken from the warehouse and that he would investigate the reports of chiseling.

In my confidential talk with the two officials of the Cooperative who had little sympathy with the first negotiating committee I remarked upon this divergence of opinion and asked them if promises had actually been made or if this widely held evacuee idea was the result of lies on the part of the negotiating committee.

Mr. Yashisura said:

"They did ignore their promises. But you must consider that a few days after that there was another incident. (The November 4 riot which brought in the army.) Probably they would have kept up their promises if they had not been scared."

This brief remark is very important. Mr. Yashisura puts his finger on one of the salient factors responsible for the appointed staff's policy. If the members of the Administration had not been so "scared" it is likely that the course of events would have been quite different. Opler remarked several times

that during this time and on November 4 the staff members were in a state of panic-funk, he called it.

Of the meeting in the Administration Building which preceded the speeches made by Myer and Best my informant "K", whose sister took the shorthand notes on the meeting says:¹

"Mr. Myer said, 'You people are new here. It takes time to organize things. So until then you must be patient.' It was a smooth talk he gave us."

"We asked Mr. Myer (about the food being taken from the warehouse). He asked them to ask Mr. Best. Best told the boys, 'It's none of your business because we haven't issued those things out to you yet. Besides we're feeding you properly.' They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble."²

Passing from the controvertial question of whether promises were or were not made, let us consider what is known to have occurred on November 1.

(1) Myer and Best, after having refused to see the committee on the grounds that they were not the people's representatives, changed their minds. when faced by the large crowd of people who surrounded the Administration Building. (2) Dr. Pedicord was attacked and severely beaten by a group of young men sent to fetch him to the meeting. (3) At the meeting and in the speeches which followed it, Myer or Best either promised that they would accede to some of the demands or as members of the administration insist, they said they would do what they could. (4) The Dai-hyo Sha had scored a pronounced victory. They had forced the Administration to receive them as the people's representative body. With remarkable sagacity they had shown the political foresight to wait until the administration had committed

¹ I am at present negotiating to see if I can get this young woman to write an account of this meeting. She is in another center but I can reach her through her brother.

² Note well. All evacuee informants agree.

acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA. (5) They lost no time in publicizing the fact that they had received assurances from WRA that their demands would be met.

From November 1 to November 4 the Dai-kyo Sha was at the summit of its power. However, the more level-headed members realized the danger of such outbursts as that which resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control the over-enthusiastic, belligerent kibe. A mimeographed sheet was distributed which stated that no resident should take arbitrary action, that no meetings of more than 4 or 5 people should be held, that people should practice self discipline and that no destructive action should be taken against WRA buildings or equipment.¹

I have no data on the results of evacuee meetings with the Spanish Consul or attitudes toward these meetings.

In neglecting to apprehend the assailants of Dr. Pedicord and punish them the Administration overlooked a valuable opportunity to assert its authority in a manner which would have gained evacuee approval. The statements Myer is reported to have made, indicate that he thought the attack was justified since Pedicord had struck the first blow. This was not the attitude of considerable number of the Japanese. Several informants state that in spite of his great unpopularity the people heartily disapproved of the beating of Dr. Pedicord. They expected that stern action would be taken by the Administration and that the attackers would be apprehended and severely punished. This was

¹ From a letter received by Sakoda. Informants in Tule corroborated these orders. I hope that they are among the documents being translated by Dda.

not done. There is no indication that WRA made a serious effort to find them.

The Administration now committed what, to the evacuees, was its greatest error. On November 4 a semi-truck was sent to the warehouse again at night for more supplies. With or without the sanction of the Dai-hyo Sha, Japanese guards had been stationed in their vicinity to see that no more food was removed. The Japanese guards attacked the Caucasian drivers; a fight took place in which several were injured; at least one Caucasian was beaten severely. WRA called in the army to restore order.¹

On the morning of the 5, when the evacuees reported for work they were met by soldiers who ordered them back to their quarters. Some people gathered and the army used tear gas bombs to disperse them. The army now took charge. A curfew beginning at 7:30 was strictly enforced. Suspected persons were taken from camp and confined in a stockade, located outside of the Japanese quarters and near the appointed staff apartment. However, the men who were considered the leaders could not be found.

¹ An appointed staff member transferred from Tule to Gila remarked at dinner that "many things went on which have not come out." He had his hand on his doorknob while one of the Caucasian members of Internal Security was being beaten outside his door. He could not make up his mind whether to go out and get beaten also or whether to save himself. He stated that a sack of knives made from old auto springs was taken from the Japanese. Also a group of Japanese rioters were forced to stand for three hours with their hands in the air.

It is interesting that all of the lurid accounts of brutality shown toward evacuees come from Caucasians. Gila for some time has seethed with grisly tales. If the stories are true it is almost certain that they would have been to me by "I".

The same phenomenon was apparent at Gila during the Kira shooting when all stories of the soldier's inconsiderate treatment of the wounded boy came from members of the appointed staff. None were born out by the very complete data I was able to obtain.

It should be pointed out that the obvious attempt of WRA to discredit the army may be responsible for some of the Tule tales. See Opler's remarks on p. of notes. These are mild examples.

Between 100 and 200 persons who were suspected of being agitators by WAA were arrested and confined by the army.¹ Evacuees insist that many innocent persons were among them.

Opler's remarks and Spicer's letter indicate that fear among the members of the appointed staff was extreme. Best was convinced that a plan was afoot to kidnap him. Best, Zimmer and Cahn had gone to the motor pool to get the keys for the trucks which were to remove the food. It was also rumored among the staff that one of the Japanese had twice attempted to run down Best's child with a truck. Opler discounts both the attempt to kidnap Best and the truck incident.

Under army control compulsory idleness was imposed on most of the evacuees. Only the hospital employees, the mess, and garbage crews continued to work. For several days after November 4 no coal was brought in. This caused considerable discomfort but a supposedly reliable coal crew was soon organized and permitted to begin work in November 6 or 7.

The agitators still free in camp continued to exert the people to an attitude of resistance. Meanwhile the soldiers made numerous unsuccessful attempts to capture them. Among these attempts was ^{a meeting} at which the army asked the block managers to give up the hiding agitators. What the block managers said is not recorded.

Opler criticized the army for placing all the arrivals from Leupp in the stockade for a period after arrival at Tule. Opler thought the men would have been of great assistance to the Administration at this time. (This matter is not clear. I neglected to ask just when the men from Leupp had arrived.)

¹ See pp. for interesting statement of leader of this crew.

As the days and weeks passed, and the deadlock continued, the Dai-hyo Sha gradually lost prestige. With no work, the knowledge that they would receive no money and no clothing allowance, idle and bored, disgusted with the unintelligent suggestions of the more radical members of the representatives, some of the inhabitants withdrew their support from the committee. The primary demands listed on page were still considered just, but a conviction that the committee had been too arrogant, had made demands instead of courteous requests grew. It is very significant, however, that the five leaders at large were not betrayed. It is doubtful that they could have remained at large, if the great mass of evacuees had turned against them.

The following attitudes voiced during November and on February 2 and 3 show the common feeling. All are verbatim.

"Most of the people were behind it. I think they demanded too many things at one time."

"Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But their demands were more like orders than suggestions."

From "I" who was definitely sympathetic to the committee:

"But there wasn't any representative who spoke real good English. Their terminology sounded more like a demand. It was a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. Their requests might have been couched in dictatorial terms."

"Of course a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense.....Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibel being a representative....."

"Then also at that time they had a second negotiating committee that wanted us to go on a hunger strike.¹ That didn't

¹ "I" refers here, I believe, to the radical remnant of the first committee still free in camp. Johnson, my escort, informed me that the people confined in the stockade did go on a hunger strike which lasted about a week.

last long. Everybody ignored it altogether. They snub people to the block representatives to try to influence people. The blocks were to go on a hunger strike. The people ignored this second negotiating committee."

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the people's permission. It was this group who first went around demanding the removal of the American flag, and also demanded that the Co-op stop selling newspapers. They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives. Quite a few were Hawaiians. There were many Hawaiians in the trouble-making group."

Many informants repeated these sentiments.

On November 26 the army instituted a camp-wide search for the leaders in which every barrack was entered and searched. The search was held ostensibly to look for contraband, hidden weapons, intoxicating liquor and rice from which sake could be made. WRA personell was enlisted in this search, female teachers being required to accompany the soldiers and search women. Some complied unwillingly.¹

Only one of the five leaders was apprehended. None of my informants accused the soldiers of brutality or even of discourtesy. They took the attitude that soldiers are just like other people; some are good and some are bad. Many of the evacuees are conscious of the cordial dislike existing between WRA and the army. Said "I":

"I spoke to a soldier here when they were making the house to house search. He was a sergeant from Idaho. He had a very low opinion of the WRA. WRA is always pulling boners. They got themselves in hot water and had to call the army."

Opler states that one soldier stole a watch, that he saw one who had confiscated two packages of ritz crackers and that it was rumored that the whole military camp got drunk on confiscated sake.

1

See letter in files.

The unapprehended members of the committee now took a step which eventually contributed to their loss of control, since it stimulated the rise of a counter group of evacuees - of a conservative character. They sent a message to the Cooperative Enterprises, demanding that they discontinue activities which the committee considered un-Japanese. The chief demand was that the Co-op stop selling American newspapers and magazines. It was also asked that the beauty shops be closed. The members of the Tulalake Cooperative were able men, level-headed, and decidedly conservative. They refused to be bullied. (The Tulalake Co-op I am informed by Masato Kato, secretary of the Gila Co-op has always been the model Cooperative of the projects.) The Board of Directors voted on this suggestion; only one member supported it. The Board then stated that it could not be responsible for so grave a decision and that the matter must be put to the members. The 5,000 members voted and defeated the proposition by a large majority.

It is possible that this significant indication of public disapproval of radical actions strengthened the influential conservatives of Tule, many of them old residents, in their resolve to break the onerous deadlock, bring order to the center and secure at least some of the requests made at the first negotiations.

Meanwhile, the unapprehended leaders were still making demands. According to Opler they stated that if all members of WRA who held positions before November 4 were transferred, if the soldiers were moved out, and if all those detained in the stockade were released, they would give themselves up. None

of these demands were met. Eventually the four men gave themselves up, having accomplished nothing, except perhaps, strengthened the organization of an underground group which would carry on for them.¹

On January 5, the Dai-hyo Sha held a general meeting at which 100 people were present, including members of the Dai-hyo Sha and the Japanese heads of divisions and sections. This meeting, however, was indefinitely postponed because of the absence of one responsible man, who was arrested soon after.

Thereupon, the Division and Section heads called a meeting the next day at which individuals employed in Construction, Receiving Warehouse, Mess Management, Clothing Unit, Maintenance, Administrative Management, and the Coal Crew were present. The question of whether they should return to work was discussed at great length. When votes were taken 32 voted to return to work, 1 voted against, and 7 did not vote.

The group then decided to consult the Dai-hyo Sha and went to Mr. Kozuma's apartment¹ but he had been picked up by the army. The group then appealed to the army for permission to use the High School Auditorium for another meeting. Colonel Austin suggested that the meeting be held at the personnel mess hall, January 7, and that all Division Heads and Section Heads be present.

At this time the group resolved that "as a vital preliminary measure in liquidating the status quo the colonists should return to work immediately" and that each evacuee division and section head would confer on this matter with the evacuees

¹

I do not have the exact date for this voluntary surrender.

concerned at meetings which were to be held in various places on the following day, January 8. The voting went strongly against continuing the strike.²

The vote was put to the people on January 11. The people voted in the mess halls with soldiers present. About 8,000 votes were cast. The proposition to return to work was carried by a majority of approximately 400 votes. Evacuee informants state that many persons did not vote; there were many blank ballots; two blocks did not vote at all.

Evacuee and appointed staff members concur on one point; that this proposition succeeded only because the people had been worked up to the proper psychological pitch. Of one interesting piece of propaganda used by the pro-workers group, the administration appears to be ignorant. "I" says:

"The people here are supposed to be loyal to Japan now. Here's the argument some of the bright boys advanced. They said, in returning to normalcy we'll be drawing salaries. Then on top of that the government have to pay us clothing allowance. That's just that much less money that the U.S. government is going to have to manufacture armaments to beat Japan. I couldn't see it. I know myself that regardless if the Japanese draw this monthly stipend, they'd not make much difference to the U.S. treasury. But it sounds good on the surface and it swayed some of the Stubborn people."

On January 15 it was announced that the army and WRA would recognize as the Coordinating Committee, k.e., that group which might now negotiate with the Administration the following men: Byron Akitsuki, Masao Shimada, John Naydo, Iwao Mamekawa, George Yamatani, K. Okamoto, and Joe Natan. Mr. Akitsuki had been the Executive Secretary to the Co-operative; he left this position and accepted the chairmanship.

¹ He, I take it, was the responsible member of Dai-hyo Sha who had absented himself from the meeting of Jan. 5.

² See page ___ for complete data.

³ This number varies with informants. Mr Black said it was 800, May Iwobara who is secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee says it was less than 400. Most evacuees say 400 odd.

The evacuee population doesn't know how these men attained their places on the committee and assume that they were placed there arbitrarily by the Administration and the army. This was admitted by Black and Opler.

I shall include here the Division Heads mimeographed statements to the people explaining and justifying their actions.

STATEMENT

The responsible men of the various divisions and sections, after discussion and due deliberation at several meetings held, arrived at a conclusion that the continuation of the Dai-hyo Shas' policy of "status quo" not only was and is unable to restore normality in this center, but have failed vainly in their attempt to release the "justifiable" colonists detained. Being unable to disregard the inconveniences and sufferings of the residents of this Project, we, hereby, have resolved to take the initial step in order to reestablish normalcy in this center by requesting all those various section and division workers to resume their respective jobs immediately and at the same time try to expend our utmost efforts for the release of those "justifiable" colonists detained.

Herewith, we, the responsible men of various divisions and sections, make public our beliefs on the supplementary report. We, hereby, submit to all these colonists, 18 years of age or over, by secret ballot for your approval or rejection on the question of status quo.

WHAT IS THIS SO-CALLED "STATUS QUO"

Immediately after the incident of November 4, 1943, the Army took control of this Center.

The authority with which the Dai-hyo Sha should logically negotiate has officially announced that they no longer recognize the Dai-hyo Sha as the representative of the colonists. In the meanwhile, several executive members of the Dai-hyo Sha were detained by the Army.

It became evident that the Dai-hyo Sha has utterly failed in their negotiation.

During the course of the situation, a notice urging the colonists to undergo a hunger strike was issued under the name of the "Second Negotiation Committee". The Dai-hyo Sha of Ward 7 acting upon this notice had its meeting. They concluded that the hunger strike was an unwise act. Thereupon they decided to maintain "status quo" until the arrival of the Spanish Consul to this Center. They proposed this at the next meeting of the Dai-hyo Sha where it was formally accepted as its policy. This was the inception of this so-called "status quo".

Upon the arrival of the Spanish Consul, an attempt for negotiation was made; but again the Dai-hyo Sha failed in their purpose. However, they continued to maintain "status quo".

In spite of the fact that they have conclusively failed in their principal and initial purpose of bettering the condition of the Center, they have not endeavored in the release of already detained, but they were wholly unable to check the increasing number of persons being detained each day.

The great number of residents have come to believe as a fact that the so-called status quo as adopted by the Dai-hyo Sha is no longer effective in bringing the hope of every colonists---the betterment of our livelihood--and it is certainly not even possible to bring back normality to this Center.

At present increasing number of families are suffering economically and they are requesting for relief through the Social Welfare department and the Spanish Consulate. C'est dommage! Every colonist in this Center has no other desire than to exist as a true Japanese.

Every colonist in this Center should keep in one's mind that such a self-imposed suffering in itself does not reflect upon one's loyalty to his country.

At the present time, the Dai-hyo Sha is existing in name only. It has utterly failed to accomplish its aim.

By "status quo", the Dai-hyo sha, itself, defeated its fundamental purpose!!!

FACTS ABOUT THE DAI-HYO SHA

The whole colony is very anxious to know what position the dai-hyo Sha are assuming after they were arrested by the Army. The following statement is the real facts of their status quo:

(1) The Dai-hyo Sha commenced the negotiation of improvement in Center life. However, at the present time, the Dai-hyo Sha have now come to doubt whether or not their capacity as colonists' representatives is still existing. As a result, majority of Dai-hyo Sha have denied their capacity and tendered resignations.

(2) The colonists who were disillusioned and tired of maintaining so called "Status Quo", attended the general meeting of Dai-hyo Sha of January 5, 1944, with great expectation. There were nearly 200 attendants at the meeting, including Dai-hyo Sha and the responsible head of all divisions and sections. However, despite their expectation, the meeting was indefinitely postponed without any object accomplished for a simple reason that only one responsible man was not present at the occasion. Moreover, that person (absentee at that time) was arrested shortly after, and the possibility of holding another meeting is gone forever. The sentiment of the colonists has grown even more miserable.

(3) The Dai-hyo Sha are not negotiating with the Army to release those people detained. Nor are they pushing forward the proposals that they previously rendered. As a consequence, 16,000 colonists have been driven into a more inconvenient and sadder condition.

(4) The group of division heads and section heads made a visit, after they held their meeting, with the Dai-hyo Sha in order to have their resolution approved. Notwithstanding, they could not find any party who would speak with responsibility. The Dai-hyo Sha did not seem to exist any longer.

(5) In spite of the fact that the function of the Dai-hyo Sha has ceased to exist since its executive staff was arrested, the Dai-hyo Sha have not only held on to their positions, but still are disturbing the security and order of the 16,000 colonists, under mere nominal existence, and are thus evading their responsibilities. This is quite contrary to the real Japanese spirit.

THE MOTIVE AND COURSE OF EVENTS
OF THE MEETING OF
DIVISION AND SECTION HEADS

The other day a few young men, who believed that the abnormal policy of maintaining so-called status quo was disturbing the welfare of the colonists, applied for work to the Army. Mr. Smith, Head of the Receiving Warehouse, informed the exemployees of this fact, and urged them to come back to work, lest they be replaced.

The exemployees who had been worried over their jobs in the future, thought that the policy of maintaining status quo was now ceasing to exist and that the policy was not thorough-going anyway.

Thereupon, a meeting was called by Division Heads and Section Heads, January 6, 1944, at 708, and was attended by those people who were responsible for Construction, Receiving Warehouse, Mess Management, Clothing Unit, Maintenance, Administrative Management, and Coal Crew. The question of whether they should go back to work as the only means to return the center to normalcy. Votes were taken on the resumption of work, and the result was 32 affirmatives against 1 negative, and 7 abstentions.

Furthermore, they found it necessary to hold the general meeting of all ex-employees at 1:00 p.m., January 8, at the High School Auditorium in order to hear their opinions.

Then, the group decided to consult the negotiation committee, and went over to Mr. Kozuma's apartment, but Mr. Kozuma had been picked up, and Mr. Kataoka had resigned. Consequently, the group had to hold another general meeting of ex-employees and appealed to the Army for the permission to use the High School Auditorium for the occasion.

However, Colonel Austin suggested that a meeting be held by all the Division and Section Heads, and the meeting was held, as was suggested, at Personnel Mess Hall, January 7, 1944. After a full discussion, the Division and Section Heads present, passed the following resolution.

RESOLUTION

BE IT RESOLVED THAT, as a vital preliminary measure in liquidating this so-called status quo as maintained by the Dai-ryo Sha and in order to bring forth normal condition to this colony in the very immediate future, every colonists, respectful and peace-loving residents, should return to work immediately.

FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED THAT, as an initial step, each evacuation division and section heads will confer on this matter to

the colonists concerned in each division and section at meetings to be held at various places on January 8, 1944, from 1:30 p.m.

The above resolution was put into effect by holding the meeting at the stipulated time and place. Secret votes were taken after full discussion on whether they would resume their work or not, and the result was as follows:

| DIVISION | YES | NO | BLANK |
|---|--------------------------------|----|-------|
| Construction | 104 | 28 | 0 |
| Packing Shed | 103 | 34 | 0 |
| Coal Crew | Unanimously Yes | | |
| Maintenance | Referendum preferred (Working) | | |
| Co-op | Working | | |
| Civic Organization | 83 | 21 | |
| Transportation & Supply | Refused to vote | | |
| Mess Management Mess Warehouse | 63 | 23 | 3 |
| Mess Workers | Referendum preferred (Working) | | |
| Ad. Mgmt. (Timekeeper, Payroll, Placement, Hse. Property Control, Evacue Property) | 144 | 39 | 17 |
| Housing, Warden, Clothing, Recreation, Social Welfare Comp. Mgmt., Education | 133 | 23 | 1 |
| Hospital | Working | | |
| Furniture Industry | 11 | 11 | |
| Some night had general election at mess hall. | | | |

Now that the intention of the exemployees was made clear by the majority of affirmative votes, the division and section heads resolved at the meeting held the very next day, to present this resolution to all the colonists, and by secret ballots, determine the acceptance of the resolution by the center.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

It is our duty to materialize an equitable distribution of employment because it is the principal source of income for most of the colonists residing in this center. After restoring this center back to normal condition, a plan can be worked out in which there will be employment possibility for the greatest number of residents.

RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITION WILL AID IN THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED PERSONS

The return of the colony to normal condition will create a favorable atmosphere where the justifiable release of detained colonists will become a greater possibility.

It is an unwise contention that if the status quo is liquidated, the persons detained will be deemed as guilty. If the status quo is maintained, there will be no possibility whatsoever for negotiation for their release with either the WRA or the Army. Not only that, but also it has become evident that the longer the status quo is maintained, the more colonists would be looking out of the stockade.

CONCLUSION:

We believe that the true picture of the present condition of this center has been presented by these reports. We, the residents of this center, are in a position to regain future amicable settlements only by restoring immediately a normal and pleasant condition in this center. We believe that it is to the best interests of every colonist to restore this center to order, study and plan our post-war life in the various fields.

COLONISTS! Think of the future! Let us understand and realize the big issue we are now facing.

Do you want a liveable and a pleasant colony or do you still want an uncomfortable and miserable center?

With a deep sense of responsibility, let us vote carefully and certainly wisely!!!

LET'S VOTE: "AGAINST STATUS QUO" !

51.

CAMP TULSLAKE
Tule Lake, California

15 January 1944

As a result of the election of January 11,
1944 the army and the WRA recognize the Co-
ordinating Committee composed of:

Dyron Akitsuki
Masao Shimada
John Haydo
Iwao Hasekawa
George Yamatahi
K. Okamoto
J. Hakan

until such time as the colonists by secret ballot
elect a committee to deal with the Administration
on all policies pertaining to the colony.

/s/ Verne Austin
Verne Austin
Lt. Col., CMP
Commanding

/s/ R.A. Best
R.A. Best
Project Director

These revealing documents merit careful consideration. The Dai-hyo Gha is accused primarily of failure - failure to negotiate properly, failure to effect the release of the persons confined in the stockade, failure to check additional arrest, and most important of all, failure to bring in effect any "betterment of livelihood" for the people of the center. The reference to the peoples' economic suffering is significant as is the statement, "Such self-imposed suffering does not reflect one's loyalty to his country." The implication on page ____ that the release of those kept in the stockade cannot be expected until the camp returns to normal conditions is also worthy of note.

The tone of the documents is certainly neither meek nor conciliatory; There is an unmistakable implication that this new committee hopes to continue the colonists' attempt to obtain a "betterment of livelihood."

In the first two weeks of its existence the Co-ordinating Committee may be credited with two overt accomplishments: approximately 1,000 people returned to work and 55 individuals were released from the stockade. Nevertheless, its position in the minds of the evacuee public was still at the beginning of February, most precarious. Those evacuees of more generous turn of mind, regarded the committee as puppets, those who had voted against returning to work (almost half the Camp's population) considered them inu. The members of the committee proposed to meet this opposition by (1) resigning immediately

in order to make place for a legitimately elected body of peoples' representatives; (2) procuring fulfillment of some of the peoples' most pressing desires and relieving some of the aggravating limitations which had been imposed by the army and were still being continued by WRA after army control had ostensibly been removed. At a meeting held February 3 these propositions were put to the Administrative Body whose function it is to negotiate with evacuees, the Advisory Council. Under the second point the Co-ordinating Committee proposed that the Administration increase employment opportunities, that, if possible, the 7:30 curfew be lifted till 9:30 over certain sections of the camp, that Mr. Foster, a Caucasian employed in the meat shop be removed because he was "indifferent and abusive to the Japanese employees and was very much despised by the staff", that the farm acreage be increased, and that three temporary police commissioners, K. Nakamura, G. Yamatani, and J. Haydo be appointed immediately to undertake the maintenance of order in the center. Prompt action was promised only for the last request.

The first and most important request, that the people be allowed to vote for a representative was refused because the Administration feared that agitators and trouble makers might be elected to about 40% of the offices, the community was not yet considered quiet enough to lift the curfew, an investigation of Mr. Foster was promised, but was accompanied by a stern remark from Mr. Best about demanding the removal of appointed personnel, eventual increase of the

farm acreage was promised but nothing palpable was offered by the Administration.¹

It remains to be seen whether the co-ordinating Committee can exist under the tremendous pressure of adverse public opinion which ranges from cynicism to hostility, when it is given so little tangible support from the Administration.

¹ See notes on meeting, pp. of notes.