

Political activities

New and Revised

1958


**The Political
Responsibility
of
Businessmen:**

Its Neglect

The Consequences Thereof

and What Can Be Done About It.

New and revised [ed.] //



By

RAYMOND MOLEY

Contributing Editor Newsweek Magazine

[New York] 1958.

“DO WHAT YOU CAN,

WITH WHAT YOU HAVE,

WHERE YOU ARE”

—THEODORE ROOSEVELT

A NOTE OF EXPLANATION

The first draft of this composition was a speech on political responsibility, delivered two years ago on several occasions to groups of business and professional people. New evidence accumulated, especially after the election of 1956.

I have been up and down this country talking to and with many leaders in American affairs. By the spoken word as well as in what I have written as a journalist, I have tried unremittingly to remind them of their neglected responsibility. I have tried to draw accurately the alarming picture of what is happening in the political life of the nation because of that neglect.

Here, with the poor wit and feeble piety I possess, I amplify that warning and suggest what they can do, if they will, to meet that responsibility.

In the research for and preparation of this composition I am indebted for the assistance of Raymond Moley, Jr.

R.M.

I have paid personally for the printing of this booklet. I shall be happy to send a copy to anyone who will address me at 152 West 42nd Street, New York 36, N. Y.

THE CHALLENGE

NO political event in our time has so astonished the American people as the election of 1948 when the Republican Party snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. I shared in the surprise—shocked and disappointed.

But for me there was rich compensation. No political event ever taught me more.

I had spent thirty years in the atmosphere of politics—teaching, writing, and occasionally practicing the art. Two bits of evidence convinced me that I had gained some professional competence in the subject. I had earned a living at it, and I had made some distinguished enemies.

But 1948 was a test of all I had learned. A year of sober reflection followed. Finally, I was able to put the pieces together.

Hitherto, I had regarded organized labor as a measurable factor in politics. I had regarded it in recent years as being of growing importance. But I had not appraised it as a decisive factor. I had not appreciated the extent of its resources and the efficiency of its methods.

1948—SOMETHING NOVEL AND POWERFUL

Facts which emerged from the fog of conjecture after Dewey's defeat made it clear that the miracle was not Truman's. Nor was it merely the handiwork of unhappy farmers. No! Something had come into the political scene which was novel, powerful, and in many cases decisive: something in Congressional districts and states.

It was the weakness rather than the strength of the Democratic Party that made its victory possible. The party itself had been captured by an ally. Never again were traditional Democrats to be masters in their own household.

In midsummer, political leaders of the CIO-PAC held the belief that Truman was likely to lose. Also, that victory for him was incidental to their major interests. Therefore, they decided to concentrate their efforts on electing as many members of the House and Senate as they could. They bided their time until October, and then they hurled everything they had of money and manpower into selected Congressional districts and states.

Their operation was skillfully

conceived, professionally directed.

Results abundantly justified their strategy. Dewey carried sixteen states and received a respectable number of electoral votes—189. But his party lost nine Senatorships and 74 seats in the House. For the first time a winning candidate for President ran far behind his party's candidates for the House of Representatives. His plurality was 2,135,747. That of Democratic candidates for the House was 2,861,442.

PARTY DECLINE AND DECAY

The impact of the political forces of the unions would have been far less potent except for the corrosion of the two traditional political parties. Over a period of years both had lost the confidence of new and potential voters. Both had failed to attract the leadership essential to vital, dynamic political action.

The Democratic Party was a shell, easy to occupy. The Republican Party was flabby in structure, chaotic in policy, groggy after many defeats—in most areas a soft victim for virile opposition.

The two bastions of strength in the Democratic Party had suffered malignant decay. In the South, factionalism and personal clans had supplanted real party organization. In the North, old political machines with their famous bosses were progressively devitalized by the ministrations of the welfare state. With government pouring

coal into the widow's bin and groceries into the pantries of the unemployed and unemployable, the benign attentions of the boss were no longer necessary. As with Othello, his occupation was gone. A benign government had corrupted all.

Other factors, born of high idealism but nurtured in folly, had eaten away the vitality of party responsibility. The direct primary, non-partisan elections, and the merit system were designed to divorce the voter from his party. They succeeded so well that they created impotent parties and indifferent voters. Discipline and reward, the two essentials of a party, were destroyed.

Republican machines in urban communities that had long operated with little opposition were hard hit. Their candidates, used to running up thumping pluralities, saw their margins diminish or disappear.

Nowhere is the breakup of the old political order more evident than in Pennsylvania, once the very heart-land of organized Republicanism.

In Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and every city over 25,000, Democratic and Democratic-coalition administrations rule. The pattern of registration and voting in Philadelphia in hard, stark statistics shows the Republicans going down steadily since 1948. A decade ago, Pennsylvania Republicans could

raise money readily and win in Philadelphia by 200,000 to 300,000 votes, and state-wide by 400,000 to 500,000. That is all different now. One factor has been the influx of Negroes. In 1920 Negroes comprised only 7.4 per cent of Philadelphia's population, but in 1957 they had reached 24 per cent. This Negro vote was captured by the Democrats.

In 1952 Joseph Clark, Jr. became the first Democratic mayor of the city in 67 years. His success in attaining that office and the Senatorship four years later was due to the activity of such groups as the ADA, the unions, and a considerable "good government" vote.

In 1948 the Republican registration in Philadelphia was 742,230; Democratic, 285,623. Ten years later, in 1958, the Democrats have gone ahead by 50,000—535,000 to 485,000 registered Republicans.

INTO THE VACUUM

Into this field of decadent party organization has broken a formidable force: organized labor, with a union structure ideally suited to engage in politics, and with political arms having the three essentials for successful political action—money, organization, and a driving zest for the things that can be gained in politics.

The rise of this force almost parallels the decline of the power of the city machines.

Ready to broaden its objectives,

to expand its activities, and with plenty of money to do the job, organized labor has moved into a yawning gap in the Democratic Party barricades in urban precincts, wards, and Congressional districts—first in the North, more recently in the West and South.

The background of this revolutionary phenomenon dates back to the early Roosevelt years.

As early as 1935, President Roosevelt and his shrewd political adviser and lieutenant, Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx, noted the decay of the old parties and decided to do something about their own Democratic Party. Flynn summarized their strategy in a conversation I had with him at that time:

"There are two or three million more dedicated Republicans than Democrats in the country. The election of 1932 was not normal. The depression defeated Hoover. To remain in power we must attract some millions of voters who are now indifferent or hostile to both parties. They believe the Republican Party to be dominated by big business and the Democratic Party to be controlled by the conservative South. These millions are mostly in the cities and include racial minorities and labor groups. We must attract them by a leftist program."

The fulfillment of the Roosevelt-Flynn objective appeared in the newly-created CIO, which from the beginning was encouraged to be

strongly political in its policies.

Roosevelt warmly welcomed this ally. The Wagner Act, which he signed in 1935, gave him immense power over industrial relations through the National Labor Relations Board. The CIO reciprocated with a campaign contribution in 1936 of something like half a million dollars.

GOMPERS TO HILLMAN—AN ABOUT-FACE

For many reasons industrial unionism, as distinguished from craft, trade unionism, tends inevitably to become a political as well as an economic force. Thus, the appearance of the CIO marked a revolutionary break from the firmly-held policy of the Gompers era — that unions avoid entanglements with either political party. Labor had made a 180-degree turn in 40 years, since a cigar-maker with tousled hair named Samuel Gompers headed a fledgling organization, the American Federation of Labor. He was well informed about the labor movements of Continental Europe, including those of revolutionary Marxism, but he believed these to be alien and repugnant in American society. He had seen too much damage done by theorists with ideas imported from the Old World — damage to the interests of labor itself.

Years later, politically-minded CIO leaders — among them Sydney Hillman and Walter Reuther — abandoned the Gompers tradition.

Hillman died within a short time. But Walter Reuther had the advantages of youth, a sharp intelligence, tireless energy, a gift of persuasive speech, and a thorough knowledge of political ideologies, dialectics and methods. He and his brother Victor “grew up” in the labor movement. In the years 1933-35 they visited Europe and Asia studying, so Walter says, trade union methods. Since during those years labor organizations on the Continent were submerged in dictatorships, the brothers’ researches must have been confined to political operations.

Basic in the methodology of European proletarian politics, which the Reuthers witnessed on their pilgrimage, was the penetration of large, soft bodies by small, virile minorities.

It is absurd to believe that a realist such as Walter Reuther would accept Communism as something that might be “sold” in the United States. But there is no doubt about his belief in the basic philosophy of what the British call “democratic socialism.” This has been clearly shown in his demands on employers and in his professed public policies. In 1950 Aneurin Bevan, leader of the left among British socialists, said to me that the only American labor leaders for whom he had any respect were the Reuther brothers.

Upon their return to Detroit, the Reuthers applied methods they

had learned with great success. They built a better vote-trap than the old parties ever had.

Walter's rise was spectacular. First there was the task of building up the UAW. Next he gained undisputed control of the union. Then he moved on to the presidency of the CIO. Finally, in the merger of the AFL and CIO, he attained a strategic position in the political activities of the 15-million-member confederation.

Meanwhile he had directed a campaign by which the UAW seized control of the Democratic Party in Michigan and later attained virtual control of the state government.

KEYS TO POWER

Three major factors contributed to the rising strength of certain unions in politics. These came into play as the political parties lost ground or deteriorated alarmingly in various parts of the country.

First, there was the patronage of a dominant political regime in Washington, with sympathetic laws and kindred spirits in strategic spots such as the NLRB, the various war industry boards, the Department of Labor, and in Congress.

Second, the immense advantage of virtually compulsory union membership in the war industries and dues money pouring into union treasuries;

Third, and most important, the

union shop. This means a controlled treasury of great size and thousands of captive political workers—officers of the unions, shop stewards and members of bargaining units—all of them available for the vital job of getting voters registered and to the polls.

The authors of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Congress that passed it were, among other things, determined to end certain subterfuges of union leaders and protect the general funds of the unions from political exploitation. It extended to labor organizations the prohibitions enacted forty years before to curb corporations. After 1947 it was unlawful "for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure" in connection with any election of any candidate for Federal office, "or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution . . ."

The law further defined "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment . . ."

SEMANTIC BY-PASS

The political leaders of unions responded to this prohibition with the Political Action Committees and the Labor's Leagues for Political Education from the national to the local level. There was no effort to separate the unions from these political agencies. And the same people in most cases officially directed both. For what they pleased to call "political" they collected voluntary contributions from members. "Educational and citizenship" activities, on the other hand, were supported by the general funds of the unions.

The former director at the national level of LLPE has explained the emphasis local Leagues placed on precinct work with headquarters staffed to perform many of the same functions undertaken by local political party headquarters:

"From these offices the local League publishes facts about the candidates it supports, arranges their radio programs, issues posters and flyers, sends out letters and telegrams, and arranges speeches throughout the area it covers. Direct daily contact with the voters is maintained through representatives in union shops and leaders in election precincts. For example, each shop under the jurisdiction of the ILGWU (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) has a political steward who works independently of the shop steward. His duties are: to keep members in-

formed of actions taken by Congress and state legislatures; to encourage members to write to their Congressmen and legislators; to make sure that members and their families register and vote; and finally, to explain issues of the political campaign."

This was part of the PAC and LLPE formula that was followed before the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) was created in 1955 following the merger of the two great labor organizations. It is part of the formula followed since by COPE.

Representatives of the unions told the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections in 1956 that they consider that they may carry on as "educational" activities certain specified activities, and support these out of the general funds of the unions. The Subcommittee's report lists these activities as follows:

"(1) Systematically organize drives for the registration of voters;

"(2) Carry out a systematic program of political education, including organization of schools where political questions are discussed and the compilation and distribution of voting records; and

"(3) Exercise the right of free speech by expressing their views on political questions in print and by means of radio and television and otherwise."

This range of activities makes clear that some unions, even aside

from COPE, simply take over the essential things that candidates and parties are accustomed to do. Thus, instead of making direct contributions to candidates or parties they take over the job of candidates and parties. And they do it far more efficiently and over twelve months of the year.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSFIGURATION

The tremendous victory for the Democratic Party in the Congressional elections of 1948 was evidence of the growing power of the PAC, by that time well in control of the Democratic Party in Michigan. It was also growing evidence of the success attained by the politically-acute Reuther and other labor figures in avoiding the intent of the Taft-Hartley prohibition against the political use of union funds.

The severe rebuff suffered by the unions in Ohio in their efforts to defeat Taft in 1950 merely taught them to be more clever and discreet.

In 1952 the political leaders of the unions were massed in force at the Democratic Convention. Alben Barkley, Vice President of the United States seeking the Presidential nomination, appeared humbly before them, asking their approval. This drumhead board of political review rejected his plea, and in a most humiliating statement he withdrew from the contest.

In his memoirs, ex-President

Truman cynically commented that Barkley should have approached each union boss individually rather than *en banc*. That is what he did so successfully in seeking the Vice Presidency in 1944. Truman did not question the assumption of power by sixteen men. His criticism had to do only with method.

The episode was like an echo from 1944. For there is excellent evidence that President Roosevelt extinguished the Vice Presidential ambition of James F. Byrnes with the expression, "Clear it with Sidney." Meaning Sidney Hillman.

FLEXING THEIR POLITICAL BICEPS

In 1954 the unions clearly indicated their power by winning for the Democratic Party control of both houses of Congress. Twenty-one House seats were switched from Republican to Democratic. Four Democratic seats and one independent seat were won by Republicans. In that net of sixteen there is convincing evidence that the political activity of unions was decisive in ten or twelve. Moreover, the control of the Senate was switched by the victories of Neuberger in Oregon and McNamara in Michigan, both of them decisively backed by union forces and funds.

There were also striking victories in that year and in 1956 and 1957 in elections for state officers.

Now, in 1958, Republicans have lost 13 governorships while gaining only two since 1953. Democrats

have seized control of nine lower houses of state legislatures, a net gain. They have won control of eight state senates, also a net gain. Over the nation there are well over 300 fewer Republican members of state lower houses and almost 150 fewer senators than in 1953. In special elections for the U. S. Senate in 1957 organized labor threw its weight behind Proxmire in Wisconsin and Yarborough in Texas with decisive results.

It is noteworthy that most United States senators elected in 1952, in the Eisenhower sweep, will be up for re-election this year. In seven of the 13 states in which Republicans have lost governorships Republican Senate seats are at stake. This fact coupled with the growing power and skill of the political arms of the unions offers a grim prospect for the Republican Party.

It was perfectly clear in 1956 that the high command in the Democratic National Committee practically turned over the Congressional campaign to the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education.

Results in that year mirrored the determination of union political leaders. For George Meany, head of the merged AFL-CIO, had announced after the establishment of the new giant labor organization:

"The scene of battle is no longer the company plant or the picket line. It has moved into the legislative halls of Congress and the state legislatures."

Walter Reuther's pitch at the last UAW convention in Cleveland was that "labor must fight and win its battles in the halls of state legislatures."

"More and more," commented James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, "the answers to labor's problems are political."

The grim note of discipline was contributed by James L. McDevitt:

"We are going to get the labor leaders who differ publicly with the position of candidates and issues already established by the labor movement . . . We are warning you now, and we are warning all in the future: do not differ with the movement with respect to issues or candidates. We will not stand for it."

The "movement" is the small group which dominates the AFL-CIO COPE.

HOW TO WIN WITH COPE

A manual of directions was issued by COPE in 1956. It is the most attractive, shrewd and effective text book on practical politics that has appeared in my time—250 pages of easy, catchy, colorful prose, illustrated with drawings and photographs.

A second publication of great importance in 1956 was a compilation of so-called "voting records" of every senator and representative in Congress. Issues selected for the

test stretched over the past ten years, and our legislators were judged *Right* or *Wrong* depending upon how the few political union chiefs who run COPE stood on the issues. There were 20 selected issues for senators and 19 for House members. Fifteen million copies of these "records" were distributed to union members and their families.

After the 1956 election COPE's co-director admitted that his organization had supported no Republicans for the Senate and only 20 members of the House.

In the strongly biased report of the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, which dealt with the campaign of 1956, there appears an exceedingly inadequate report of the money used by the unions in that campaign. But by piecing together three categories of expenditures it appears that unions spent \$2,981,175 raised from "voluntary" sources. Eighty per cent of this came from the United Automobile Workers, the Steelworkers, the Ladies Garment Workers, and Railway Labor's Political League. This covered only national, not local, elections. This apparently did not include the far more substantial "education" expenditures taken from the general funds of unions.

CAPTIVE MANPOWER

Notable in the 1956 campaign was the extreme mobility of

COPE's activity. This activity moved over state lines into strategic districts and areas. Moreover, there was specific evidence that the strategy was to strike for Senate and House seats in places where union activity was least expected. States with relatively small populations—such as Oregon, Idaho and Colorado—were won by COPE-approved candidates for the United States Senate. Congressional districts such as the one in Eastern Oregon were easy pickings.

But money was only an incidental explanation of the immense massed power of COPE. It had at its command, and under the stricture laid down by McDevitt, thousands of workers—that indispensable factor in winning elections.

In an article in *Newsweek* in October 1956, I published some figures concerning the manpower which some of the more politically-minded unions were able to throw into the job of mobilizing the vote. These figures were scoffed at in a UAW publication, but I secured them from a reliable source and believe them actually to be on the conservative side.

The UAW had more than 2000 locals, each with an average of ten staff members. If we add to that shop stewards and others who could be commanded to work, the UAW alone was able to throw many, many thousands of workers into the campaign over the coun-

try. The Steelworkers had something like 1200 full-time staff members and 12,000 shop stewards. And it was estimated that over the nation COPE was able to put 100,000 cars into action on election day.

It should be said that the UAW and the Steelworkers have been most active and powerful in political work. But in numerous other unions, both CIO and AFL, COPE in 1956 was able to mobilize many more political workers.

PATTERN AND OBJECTIVES

The progressive steps by which the UAW has made itself the political master of Michigan show a pattern which is beginning to appear in other states. The Michigan Democratic Party is really a UAW Party.

Oregon, as a result of the 1954 and 1956 elections, is now almost completely dominated by the political arms of the unions. Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and other states have been subjected to organized labor's and COPE's political action.

California is another Michigan, in transition.

When in August, 1956 the Republican National Convention assembled in well-ordered splendor in San Francisco the party position in California seemed firm as a rock. Did not the state have a Republican governor and two Republican United States Senators? Did not

the GOP enjoy a measurable majority in the state legislature and have 19 of the 30 state's members of the U. S. House of Representatives? Had not the national Republican ticket swept the state in 1952 with 700,000 to spare? Had it not nominated Senator Knowland in that year on both tickets with the biggest majority ever gathered by a candidate for any office in the United States except a President or Vice President—1,600,000?

The state was proud of its resplendent array of sons in high office. Its Nixon was Vice President; its Warren was Chief Justice; and its Knowland was leader of the Republican Party in the United States Senate.

Back of this luminous facade trenchant forces are eating away Republican supremacy. A flabby, inert Democratic Party has been awakened and beefed up by a powerful ally.

Republican candidates for the U. S. House of Representatives in 1948 received 59.4 per cent of the vote, but in 1952—despite an Eisenhower victory in the state—that percentage had dropped to 54 per cent. And in 1956, while Eisenhower was again sweeping the state, the percentage was to drop to 46.8.

CONQUEST OF THE ELEVENTH

An excellent example of the efficiency of an operation in which

COPE goes in to capture a Congressional seat hitherto held by a Republican is well illustrated by what happened in 1956 in the 11th California district. This district is in the lush valley south of Sacramento and east of Oakland. Its population of 377,000 is about evenly divided between urban and rural, but many of the rural residents are non-farming people. A rich agricultural industry is still predominant, although other types of industry are moving in.

Leroy Johnson, the Republican incumbent, was in many ways a good Congressman but he was also a poor fence-mender and a weak campaigner. Even people within his own ranks showed signs of disaffection. All of this made a perfect theater of operations for the union leaders.

As a candidate Democrats selected John J. McFall, a lawyer with war service, experience in minor elective offices and, judging by his biography, a passion for joining clubs and societies.

An on-the-scene observer thus

describes what happened:

“COPE organizers came into the district well in advance of the 1956 primary, made sure that all union members and their wives and families were properly registered. Then (with check-off lists) they saw to it that these people got out and voted in the primary. These COPE workers continued to work in the period between the primary and election.

“They received propaganda from national headquarters and blanketed the district with it. They took McFall in hand and coached him in the art of making speeches and in writing statements and letters. Following the minute specifications in the COPE ‘How to Win’ manual they organized every precinct down to the smallest detail. On election day the cars rolled, the baby-sitters sat, the poll-watchers watched, the telephone-workers telephoned and when the returns were in, the 11th district had been COPEtivated—organized labor had another Congressman on its list of favorites.”

MEN, NOT LAWS

THE LEGAL STATUS QUO

At this point I want to stress, with all emphasis, that I am not attacking unions for their interest in politics. Labor leaders and members who desire to spend their money and time in this activity have the right to create a political

organization to promote legally their interest in government. So far as the efficiency of COPE and other political labor groups is concerned, I tender them my ardent professional admiration.

My purpose in describing the present concentration of political

power is to raise three vital questions—questions pertinent to all Americans, in unions as well as outside unions.

My first question has to do with the use of the general funds of the unions, which are the property of all dues-paying members, for patently political purposes under the guise of “education” and “citizenship.”

In the first place the impact of such large sums as are available for such political action is inimical to the electoral process. This is a fact abundantly proved in American political history and has been recognized by state and Federal legislation limiting and regulating political expenditures. Abuses in the early years of the 20th century gave rise to the law of 1907 prohibiting corporations from making contributions in connection with any Federal election. That law said that the officers or directors of a corporation would violate stockholders’ rights in using company money in politics. The Corrupt Practices Act, revised by the Taft-Hartley legislation, merely placed labor unions along with corporations under the same prohibition. We have seen how this has been circumvented by the political chiefs of organized labor.

Early in 1957 the Supreme Court reinstated a Federal indictment of the United Auto Workers for violation of the Corrupt Practices Act in using the general funds of the

union, collected in dues and assessments from its members, for certain broadcasts in support of candidates in the 1954 campaign. These were addressed to the general public.

Justice Frankfurter points out in the Court’s opinion that the 1907 law was designed to prevent abuses which involved “the integrity of our electoral process, and, no less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of the process.” The UAW case “raises issues not less than basic to a democratic society.”

To sustain this judgment Frankfurter notes the fact that World War II conditions “enormously stimulated” the power of organized labor and soon “aroused consciousness of its power outside the ranks.” The powerful unions, he continues, were believed to be pursuing a course similar to that of the corporations 40 years before and “with the same untoward consequences.”

This, Frankfurter explains, was shown by “the enormous financial outlays” said to have been made by some unions in the national elections of 1944. It was a result of these conditions that there was included in the Taft-Hartley Act a prohibition on unions as well as corporations. It should be noted that this prohibition concerned not only “contributions” but “expenditures.”

The argument before the Supreme Court was most interesting

when Mr. Justice Frankfurter pursued UAW lawyer Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. with a series of exceedingly searching questions.

Rauh revealed that there was no real difference between a corporation's spending its money "in connection with a Federal election" on political propaganda and a labor organization's doing so. In fact, it seems to be the settled policy of Reuther and other spokesmen for the UAW that, since they consider the law to be unconstitutional because it is a limitation on freedom of speech, they cannot seriously object to the use of corporation money for political activities.

Their determination is to use the dues of members not only for the legitimate purposes of bargaining, but for politics. "One cannot draw a line," said Rauh, "between bargaining and politics."

This sort of money cannot be raised by voluntary subscriptions. Rauh admitted this in answer to a question by Mr. Justice Reed:

"Well, sir, a union man thinks he has paid, when he has paid his dues, he thinks he has paid for bargaining, for legislation and for political activity. He doesn't feel that he should pay a second time for political activity."

Had Rauh been perfectly frank he would have admitted that union members—being citizens of their communities, of their state, and of the nation as well as workers—would prefer to keep their political

decisions and their political activity in their own possession. But since the payment of dues and assessments is compulsory, they are dependent upon the union for their jobs and livelihood.

Thus the root of these unions' immense and growing political power is the union shop.

Although a Detroit jury terminated the case by an acquittal, fundamental issues remain. One is the unions' claim that they can, by the subterfuge of calling their political appeals by the name "education," expend their general funds in what has been traditionally regarded as politics.

The issue which Congress cannot dodge forever is this use of general funds under compulsory unionism. If unions may carry on these political activities under the name "education" and with general funds, the same permission could be granted to corporations. The point involved is the same in both cases—that is, whether an individual's money can be used without his consent for a political purpose to which he is opposed. Such permission should be denied to both corporations and unions, not only because of moral and legal implications, but because the alternative would result in utter chaos.

COMPULSORY UNIONISM AND THE RAILROADS

In a famous case, decided in May, 1956, that of the Railway

Employes Department, AFL, et al. v. Hanson, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, made it very clear that the employing corporation is not required under a union shop contract to contravene the terms of the Railway Labor Act. The pertinent Douglas language follows:

“The only conditions to union membership authorized by No. 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act are the payment of periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments . . . The financial support required relates, therefore, to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. No more precise allocation of union overhead to individual members seems to us necessary . . . If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decisions in that case.”

This position was supported by the Supreme Court of Texas in July, 1956 in the Sandsberry and Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. International Association of Machinists right-to-work case. And in a more recent case in Georgia, decided in June, 1957, (Looper v. Georgia Southern and Florida Railway), the Supreme Court of that state declared that no one can constitutionally be

compelled to contribute money to support “ideas, politics and candidates which he opposes.”

A most important struggle on these questions has involved the Santa Fe Railway in its negotiations with 15 non-operating railroad unions. The Santa Fe hit upon a device which would make a union shop agreement possible, provided that the fees, dues and assessments collected shall cover only the costs of collective bargaining. The company held that, while it disagreed in principle with the whole idea of compulsory membership, it would go so far as to agree to a contract under certain terms:

“No employee should be discharged for failure to pay for expenses attendant upon political, ideological, fraternal, social or insurance activities in which the organization may engage. It is clearly wrong to discharge people who do not wish to pay for political or ideological campaigns with which they are not in sympathy.”

The Santa Fe formula could answer the “free rider” argument on which unions base their case for compulsory unionism. It would seem that this proposal could break new ground in the battle to protect the political rights of union members and to protect the nation against the building up of a vast political machine, the muscle of which is contributed by captive treasuries, officers and shop stew-

ards to be used in political action.

STATISM, ENEMY OF LABOR

My second question has to do with the character of the political program promoted by the AFL-CIO COPE. That program is only partially concerned with specific industrial relations such as those described in the Federal law defining the purposes of a "labor organization"—grievances concerning employment, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.

Two-thirds of the issues before Congress on the basis of which COPE appraised members in its publication of voting records dealt with broad national issues. And in these it rated as "approved," measures toward greater intervention by government in economic and social life. Also, the preferred intervention is by Federal rather than state and local authority. In short, the trend they support is toward Federal statism.

Since in a decentralized government socialism cannot prevail, Federal centralization is essential to and a contributing factor toward a collectivist society. This is not only revealed in the Reutherian philosophy but is implicit in the demand for more and more Federal power.

This is not a wise course and it is inimical to the long-range interests of the unions themselves and

to the members as private citizens. History is replete with proof.

TREND TOWARD CLASS PARTIES

The third peril, again to union members as well as all other Americans, is the trend toward class parties and class government.

While the political program of the AFL-CIO COPE is designed to appeal to groups other than union members—because its propaganda extends without limit—the fact is that the organization itself is composed of members of a single economic group. Thus it is essentially a special-interest or class organization. When it, in fact, becomes the Democratic Party, as it has in some states and localities, we have a class party. For this to prevail over the nation would mark a profound change in our political patterns and customs.

Whatever may have been the weaknesses of our traditional parties, they did seek to represent all groups. They assumed the existence, and dedicated themselves to the ideal of a classless society. That was their glory and good.

Moreover, the political ideal which I have always regarded as quite specially American is political action upon a broader base than mere economic status and rewards. This ideal of America is not that of a rich pasture inhabited only by herds of bovine, munching men and women. Nor a place where birds of a feather stick together to

get collectively what they can from other flocks of another feather.

Our world is not a predatory, materialistic, godless pig-pen. And politics should be something more than a naked struggle for power.

A trend, in itself, toward class parties is no subject for legal restrictions or regulation. Wisely, the makers of the American Constitu-

tion left the creation of parties to voluntary action. Nor under present leadership is the program of AFL-CIO likely to be broadened from within the unions to any revolutionary extent. It can be neutralized, however, by a general revival of interest in politics across the nation and in every part of our society.

TOWARD TRUE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

A CONCERT OF INTERESTS

In my references to the political responsibility of businessmen I make no appeal for a businessmen's government as such. The tragic fate that has befallen the Republican Party in so many campaigns is in no small part due to the opposition's reminder of the days at the turn of the century when the party was in an altogether unwholesome manner dominated by emerging big business interests.

Today, true representative government is endangered by the overwhelming strength of another single interest, represented by the privileged position of certain powerful leaders. These men, as we have seen, operate with captive union treasuries and manpower in a nation-wide machine which is rapidly getting sufficient strength ultimately to establish what could amount to a government by, and for, a single interest group. This, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his UAW opinion, raises a

question similar to that presented by the big-business domination of the Republican Party a half century ago.

I have already noted the difficulty of enacting legislation under a government in which representation of a single interest has excessive influence. The corrective for excessive power by one interest in our republic is a balancing of that interest by others, as well as enforcement of legislation curbing inequities rooted in privilege or monopolistic power. Indeed, the essential principle of the American Constitution is to guard against tyranny by a balance of power. This idea as applied to the representative character of the government was well delineated by Madison in *The Federalist*: "It is essential to such a government," he wrote, "that it be derived from the great body of the society not from an inconsiderable portion, or a favored class of it."

I shall presently show the nature

and infinitely diversified interests of that "great body of our society."

My appeal to business management is certainly not because I favor a party distinct, or a faction. That would be self-defeating folly. There are already too many people who are willing to lead some of us, but pathetically few to lead all of us.

The business group, rich in managerial talent and deriving its living by making and selling goods to all sorts of people, is flagrantly derelict in its political responsibility. It fails to give of its skills to the organization of the diverse elements that make up the great majority of citizens, to awaken all Americans to the fact that only through wide representation of all groups—workers, farmers, small businessmen, and many others—can liberty be preserved.

THE FORGOTTEN MAJORITY

The great majority of American citizens who are without leadership has never been better described in the terms of an individual than by William Graham Sumner seventy-five years ago:

"The Forgotten Man is delving away in patient industry, supporting his family, paying his taxes, casting his vote, supporting the church and the school, reading his newspaper, and cheering for the politician of his admiration, but he is the only one for whom there is no provision in the great scramble

and the big divide . . . He works, he votes, generally he prays—but he always pays—yes, above all he pays . . . He keeps production going on . . . He is strongly patriotic . . . He gives no trouble . . . He excites no admiration . . . He is not in any way a hero . . . or a problem . . . nor notorious . . . nor an object of sentiment . . . nor a burden . . . nor the object of a job . . . nor one over whom sentimental economists and statesmen can parade their fine sentiments . . . Therefore he is forgotten."

This is from the famous essay titled "The Forgotten Man," a phrase which I, with a clear conception of its context, inserted in a speech by Presidential Candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt early in 1932. It elicited a warm response and made the campaign understandable throughout the nation. Unfortunately, the New Deal of which it was the slogan dissolved two or three years later into a motley confederation of minorities. The forgotten man was again forgotten.

His cause cries out for leadership now for he pays for our political follies, he owns most of the property in America, he is the solid center of our economy, and he cherishes a government and laws which would give him the assurance of a good, self-sustained, measurably independent existence. He is concerned with liberty in the true sense of that word, for what-

ever confines liberty shackles him. To him conservatism means a capacity to move in the spirit of the past, quickened by dynamic striving for progress, and conditioned by a just and firm assurance of the right to enjoy the fruits of individual effort.

The social ties of this man are with the community, the essential unit in our society, not with a union (although he is a majority of all union members), or a chamber of commerce, or an employers' association. A far-away centralized government is the community's enemy, an overgrown bureaucracy its rival, and national special interests, its despoiler.

I deliberately avoid the term "middle class" in speaking of this majority. That is because the term "class" is alien to American society by tradition and in fact. Stratification is no characteristic of the American population, either in history or now. The fluidity of our society is proved by the hundreds of thousands who are constantly moving from one income group to another.

Marx dogmatically assumed a middle class, but was vague about what it meant in terms of such a society as ours. He disposed of this factual imponderable by planning its extinction. Statism as advocated by so many Americans, however, would actually create classes. That is the malignant blemish in their policies. Socialists spurn the notion

of an organized and prevailing majority because, as one of them has said, it "would prefer to have all conflicts cease." He continued by bewailing the tendency of so many to talk too much about "the essential unity of the interests of the workers and their employers." The Irishman, Seán O'Faoláin, aptly expressed the frustration of the radical: "Between England and the revolution there will always stand an army of bowler hats."

In non-material terms, this majority preserves the hallowed traditions of the past and maintains the integrity of the community. It constitutes most of the vast membership of churches. It supports and directs locally controlled schools.

It is at the heart of what is commonly called the good life, whereas collectivism is preoccupied with the goods of life.

Under adequate leadership the power of the members of this majority must be irresistible. They are the indispensable citizens. The preservation of liberty depends upon the effective organization of their potential. Their leadership should be of their own people. They must not hire somebody to care for their political interests.

TRADE, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

A paradox faces us in the fact that, considering America's great affinity for group action in multitudinous fields of interest, the

majority of which I speak should be so impotent in political life and so commonly the spoils and victim of virile political minorities.

I find the names of nearly two thousand trade associations represented in a national association of associations. They serve, in varying degrees of usefulness, the social and material interests of their members. Washington and state capitals teem with their representatives. They appear in great numbers before elected lawmakers and appointed law administrators in support of or opposition to this or that. With a few notable exceptions, however, they seem to miss the fact that the major focus of influence is where lawmakers are elected.

Trade, professional and occupational associations experience growing concern in laws and their administrators, but rarely do they concern themselves with creating the climate among members and voters which so decisively affects the nature of those laws and the manner in which they are executed. There are exceptions. The National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce U. S. A., and a number of state business associations are already reminding their members of their political responsibilities. Also, certain farm organizations, however far apart they may be in ideology, do concern themselves to a greater and greater degree in political action

at the grassroots.

Corporations and other business concerns look to their trade associations for guidance in many things but, partly in fear of political activity and partly because of indifference, fail to realize that the very climate in which they do business is likely to be pregnant with political influences inimical to their interests. Here again, however, there are shining exceptions.

The net is that a vast potential exists in our civilization which might well contribute to the creation of truly popular government.

CALLING ALL LEADERS

A profound, imperative, moral obligation rests upon those within this conservative majority who are privileged to have the skills to provide citizen leadership essential to influence and organize others. I mean specifically:

Men and women engaged in management, not only in business but in many other fields of enterprise. Farmers are included in this group because today everyone in agriculture must, in order to succeed, know how to manage men, machines and other property.

Men and women engaged in selling goods and services. There are millions who are selling Americans what they need as well as a lot that they don't need. Only in selling good government have they been impotent, ineffective, neglectful.

All whose callings involve con-

tinuous communication with others — lawyers, leaders among organized agricultural interests, teachers, doctors, writers for the press, and many others.

I stress particularly housewives whose opportunities lie in greater leisure and whose virtues in political leadership have proved to be of great value — patience, idealism and willingness to work at those tiresome tasks essential to political life.

THE INDISPENSABLE CITIZEN

The response that will reward political action by citizen leaders, with citizens and for citizens now bereft of effective leadership, is based on something much more substantial than faith. It rests upon the common-sense, the material and the spiritual interests that have moved the great majority of citizens to do their civic duty when leadership has appeared. It appears when the majority's interests and responsibilities have been explained and their sense of duty and conscience have been aroused.

The proof of this is in a good many instances in which citizens capable of leadership have organized citizens' movements and have materially changed the political climate of their communities, cities or states. Space permits mention of only three of these:

The head and founder of a medium-sized manufacturing company in a very large Midwestern

city mobilized the interest of a small number of fellow businessmen in his Congressional district to defeat a man who they believed had misrepresented them in Congress. This small group pooled brains, energy and money to form a much larger group which applied effective managerial methods in recruiting volunteers, in publicizing a better candidate, and in getting out a sympathetic vote for him. A large majority for the incumbent in 1944 was turned into a whacking majority for the new man in 1946. This group then extended its influence and methods into other Congressional districts and also into campaigns for the state legislature. The organization still operates. There isn't much that is secret about it but it has never taken a name and it shuns public notice for itself.

In 1950, William Green, head of the AFL, declared in a speech in Ohio: "Cost what it may, let it be what it will, we're going to bring about the defeat of Senator Taft."

This challenge, backed as it came to be with copious money, advertising, and the importation of plenty of professional workers, brought citizen groups into being in many parts of Ohio. In the campaign that followed many business and professional men and women experienced their first taste of practical politics. The result is a matter of history. The group in Cleveland still carries on in a manner which has professional tone and effectiveness.

Another citizens' organization is the Republican Associates of Los Angeles. Its paying membership includes many important business and professional men and women. It operates on a year-around basis with research, volunteer training, and the formulation of programs and policies designed to promote the election of better candidates.

It happens that these three examples for the most part favor Republican candidates. But the idea they represent has its embodi-

ment in various Democratic communities in the South where the choice of candidates is within one party.

Strewn through the political history of recent years are the efforts of citizen groups that failed because of lack of preparation and also because they started too late. The formula for success in such movements is simple and adaptable to local conditions, but it is specific and rests on tested principles of strategy and tactics.

STRATEGY

DON'T SPREAD TOO THIN

Almost every mail brings to me, as a journalist, ideas and literature from someone or some group that proposes a national organization to promote the conservative cause and to stimulate political action. This is, perhaps, a manifestation of Americans to think big and in national terms about everything. Their minds run to setting up a national organization, with offices in Washington turning out propaganda and chapters in every state and hamlet. The faint memory of the Liberty League of the 1930's suggests the futility of such plans. In that instance it happened, as it is likely to happen again to similar overambitious schemes, that to give such organization a habitation and a name with big publicity was merely to give the New Dealers a broad target for devastating per-

sonal attacks upon the founders and members.

There will also be many organizations such as Citizens for Roosevelt (or other Presidential candidates), or the Willkie Clubs. These efforts are useful in getting some people to vote for something rather than nothing. But they encourage the idea that the rest of the tickets are of slight importance. They tend to minimize the importance of other candidates, notably legislators. Indeed such an organization as "Democrats for (a Republican presidential candidate)" or "Republicans for (a Democratic candidate)" is an open hint to vote only for the Presidential candidate, forsaking all others.

So far as newly formed national political groups are concerned, their ambitions are likely to spread perilously thin their means and energy,

which in any event are likely to be meager.

I certainly believe that the general gospel of political responsibility, together with some guidance for action, is needed. But that should be a major part of the responsibilities of established national trade, professional and farmers' organizations.

Another temptation to spread too thin is the urge to extend the activities of citizens' groups beyond senators, congressmen and state legislators to many other candidates for office; or to propagate the idea of good government in the abstract; or to over-expand geographically with limited means.

WHERE LAWMAKERS ARE MADE

The area to be covered should depend upon circumstances to be sensibly appraised in each individual case. It may be as wide as a Congressional district or a city, or as narrow as a city block or a county, township or apartment house. An infinitely wise bit was Theodore Roosevelt's advice, "Do what you can, with what you have, where you are."

I do not underestimate the importance to business or occupational groups of intelligent lobbyists in Washington and state capitals who bespeak their interests to lawmakers and also keep their employers at home well informed. These are not enough now

when so much of the political power of the political arms of unions is concentrated at the local level. Recently I asked a friend who had served several terms in Congress what I should say in some speeches to businessmen.

"Tell them" he replied, "that when they or their representatives come before a Congressional Committee supporting or opposing some pending measure, that despite the validity of their argument and the excellence of their way of expressing it, the mind of the committee member constantly goes back to his basic problem as a political office holder. 'What,' he says to himself, 'can this individual or organization do for me in the next election? What did he do for me in the last election? What is he or his organization doing now for me back home to defend me against the efforts of my enemies and rivals?' He always knows when Meany, or Reuther or some other leader of COPE is there that his question answers itself, 'They have done and are doing and can do plenty. If I vote their way they will not forget. They will not leave me, naked to mine enemies, at home.'"

The most vital spot to concentrate your energy is not where laws are made but where lawmakers are made.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL CONTACT

Americans have the best means of communication in the world.

Immense sums are used to carry persuasion by means of the printed word, the radio and television. We are likely to believe that this kind of appeal is final and conclusive in selling candidates and in moving voters. The national committees have in the past two or three decades spent a considerable amount of their funds in mass communication.

But the believer in this form of political campaigning should remember that when he goes out to scatter his seed half of it will be wasted on the already convinced and immovable opposition, and that another large portion will fall among the weeds and brambles of the unheeding who are either too young or too indifferent to vote at all. When good and fertile ground is reached, the voters there are already sympathetic or convinced. What they require is the prodding necessary to get them out to vote.

I cannot, nor indeed can anyone, evaluate the amount spent for politics in mass media in relation to the result. Appeals to the public over the airways or by the printed word are like strategic bombing. They may weaken the defenses and prepare the way. The soldier on foot must win the ultimate victory.

All generalized appeals are secondary to personal contacts. Efficient political machines have acted upon this principle for many years. Elections are won on the doorsteps, in the highways and byways, over

the farmer's fence, and wherever men and women gather for work, recreation and worship.

Until the vote is actually cast you have not finished the job. The vote is the pay-off.

CITIZEN ACTION MUST BE MILITANT

Seven years ago I wrote this:

"Business and professional men are altogether too prone to limit their political action to applauding the speeches and writings of others, to heated private denunciations of the opposition, and to occasional small contributions to their favored organizations and parties. They don't like to declare themselves publicly in an election campaign. They are like members of a religion who will kneel down for their faith but will not stand up for it. A passion for political anonymity pervades a large majority of our people. Often it is shrouded in protestations of independence, neutrality, or open-mindedness. Essentially, it is based on the fear of losing friends or business, of endangering a job, or of hard work.

"The fight cannot be won by the timid and noncommittal. People must forego convenience, and security from criticism. They must get into politics personally, directly, and actively. They must be for someone and against someone, despite the consequences. Citizen action must be militant."*

**How to Keep Our Liberty*, Knopf, 1952, Now out of print.

The trend of events since has greatly underlined this comment. Time is running out, and it will be perilously shortened by citizens' diversions in mere thumping the tub of publicity about generalities on good government and issues, and in bewailing the trend to statism and centralized government.

INSIDE OR OUTSIDE A PARTY?

A citizens' group must decide at the outset whether its members will enter one of the parties and mingle their efforts with the regulars therein or act outside as an auxiliary. Since such a group has no legal status, it must support a candidate or candidates legally and officially selected by a party. Its choice is whether to work with or only for a party candidate. That choice must be made on the basis of several circumstances easily appraised by the members of the organizing group: the character and public repute of the regular party organization, the personal preferences of the members of the group (who may well be of more than one party), the preference of the party organizations themselves, and the problem of those voters who call themselves "independent" and distrust all parties and politicians.

Heaven knows I would be the last to discourage direct party membership by all good citizens, since party organizations every-

where need the infusion of new and virile blood. But there are many practical reasons why I lean to the idea of auxiliaries. There were never in our time more astute party leaders than Franklin D. Roosevelt and Flynn, whose course I have already noted. They preferred close allies and auxiliaries outside the party, since they knew that there were millions, whose heterogeneity was a palpable fact, who could never be recruited into their party. They knew that winning elections depended upon sympathetic votes, not the size of the party.

As it happened, the party was ultimately the prisoner of an auxiliary membership.

But while Roosevelt and Flynn lived they got the votes.

I want to add here a comment about the cruelly misused, but in many of its connotations hallowed, word "independent." Hypocrisy, it has been said, is the homage that vice pays to virtue. Political "independence" is rarely a mark of discrimination and self-reliance. The term too often connotes a contemptuous and irrational attitude toward the true purpose of parties and politics in a government of free men. Too often the word "independent" hides a timorous evasion of an open assertion of political faith, or a lack of the capacity to choose among the alternatives offered by party candidates.

People are, in fact, not "inde-

pendent" at all, for their interests and convictions do rest with one or another of the choices offered them as voters. But these unattached people have votes and need leadership. If by the device of an auxiliary they can be induced to vote, they are rescued from civic impotence.

LIVING WITH THE REGULARS

The auxiliary group exists to help party candidates succeed. Its members should not presume to dictate to the regulars, nor try to reform them. If there are honors to be enjoyed and flowers to be gathered in the arid fields of practical politics, the regulars should be allowed them. Hell hath no music like a politician playing second fiddle.

I wrote this bit of advice to the beginner in politics who might look down a long nose at the humble art of the regular: "The recasting of the traditional codes of professional politics can wait for a more leisurely and propitious time. His cooperation is needed now and needed badly. His reform can wait."

The more I have learned of practical local politics, the more respect I have entertained for the hardy perennials who scorn delights and live laborious nights to attend the grimy and ill-furnished district club, to walk the streets, haunt the saloons, pray or rejoice at the wakes, pore over registration

lists, stuff the envelopes, and lick the stamps; who give the platforms to often unappreciative candidates, and whose public notice is usually limited to the slings and arrows of the so-called "independent" press. These people, bear in mind, have proved their willingness to toil on through years of party defeat and disaster. Once you see at first hand how difficult it is to induce the best candidate material to offer itself for the chance of election, and how niggardly the so-called "best" people are with their time and money, your admiration is aroused for these dedicated few.

Their labors, quite unrequited for the most part, over many years and in many states and localities have kept party government alive. And there is no alternative to party government in a free society.

THE HOME FIRES BURNING

It is not enough to elect good men and women to legislative office in Washington or at the state capital. The legislator's main job is where laws are made and where official policies are determined. Your congressman or legislator is entitled to tell you what Edmund Burke said to his unhappy constituents in Bristol: "I could hardly serve you as I have done, and court you too . . . I canvassed you through your affairs, and not your persons." These words tragically fell upon deaf ears, and Bristol attained the sinister fame of losing

the service of the greatest exponent of constitutional liberty of his century.

But courting must be done, and the second most important thing an auxiliary group can do is to acquaint the home folks of the value of their representative. Also, they can aid the representative by providing the information he needs

concerning the problems and opinions of his constituents.

Few legislators are so assured of reelection as to be unworried by rivals on the prowl among the voters at home, nor are they able to dissipate the misrepresentations thus disseminated. There should be a home guard at work in the long months between elections.

TACTICS

AN AUXILIARY IS BORN*

“An institution,” said Emerson, “is the lengthened shadow of one man.” For the work at hand, someone must take the first step—a business or professional man or woman, a farmer, or a wage earner. This leader should consider relevant circumstances: what area to cover, what political conditions prevail there, what potentials for an organization in manpower and money exist, and in general which party offers the best channel for conservative efforts.

He should call a meeting of not more than half a dozen people whom he knows well and whom he considers would be reliable and energetic in the proposed movement. This meeting must come at once to specifics. Are the members of the group ready and willing and

I am indebted for this brief description of the formation of a group, for the pyramid graph which illustrates it, and for many of the practical suggestions which follow to Rus Walton of Los Altos, California.

able to assume leadership in what may be an arduous undertaking? The leader should outline what he knows of the relevant circumstances mentioned above. Discussion will follow, and a plan developed. Another meeting and successive meetings will be necessary, but the initiation of further action should not lag or fall into long discussion of details.

At this stage the area to be considered and the party to be supported should be assessed with some care. The acquaintance of each person present with political leaders and other people of influence in the area should be noted. In every area there is an essential pattern of influence, consisting of the people and methods by which community concerns of all kinds are activated—whether in hospital drives, or civic betterment, or in politics. To build upon this pattern is the best assurance of an auxiliary's success.

Then each person present should

be pledged to bring to another, larger meeting three or four others who, he believes, can be counted upon for vital participation. By the time the larger meeting is held, the person who initiated the idea should be prepared to present a fairly definite plan of organization and action.

If the group up to this point is composed of business executives, pledges should be made to recruit more workers from the companies or groups concerned—junior executives, younger members of the professions, wage earners, etc. By this time the overall chairman should be selected, who may be the originator of the movement or someone else. There must, for the time being, be a central clearing point—either a participant's office or preferably elsewhere, with telephone service and perhaps a secretary.

When executives from a number of companies are involved in this movement, liaison people should be selected to act between the companies and the organization. To use time and money from a corporation in a Federal primary or election is unlawful. But these liaison people as well as all the rest of the business executives are free to act on their own time, money, and responsibility, and each one knows his own company sufficiently well to find useful volunteers there.

Meanwhile, the top leaders must make agreeable contacts with the

regular leaders of the party which the movement intends to support, either in close integration or by coordinated work. This is most important, because no suspicions must be aroused among the regulars that a group is getting organized for political action which may be inimical to their status and resources.

Meanwhile, the top group should also plan a budget and assign the job of collection to the members of the group. A good lawyer should be added to this top group to watch with the greatest care all matters of money, time and resources. For the activities which I describe should not be on company time. Utter disaster could follow any irregularity.

Further, the top group should select a paid manager who must be full-time and capable of performing a number of essential functions. Such talent is not easy to find. Since in many political movements in the past this job has been given to newspapermen or public relations men, a word of warning is in order. Because few newspaper or public relations people have learned the art of management, there is some danger in making such a selection. Most newspapermen who have managerial talent have already been promoted to editorships or "front office" work. Public relations work deals to a large degree with the printed word or contacts with the press, etc.

Managerial talent is of the essence. Perhaps the best choice would be a very promising business executive who could be given a leave of absence by his company.

THE MANAGER AND SUPERVISER

The manager must be capable of a considerable number of vital but quite dissimilar functions. He must maintain the interest and activity of the people above him, from the chairman down. He must, with their aid, recruit volunteers and assign them work. He must see that they have some training in practical politics. For this task he might well utilize a regular party official experienced in precinct work. He must, perhaps through a company public relations man, also given a leave of absence for the purpose, prepare and have the essential literature produced. He must work in harmony with the candidate, the candidate's manager, and the regular organization people. He must deal with the press and satisfy it with the smallest possible amount of news about the operations of the organization. This manager, at least for a limited period of time, would correspond to the "constituency agent" in Britain who provides the year-around center of party activity.

Since some may question whether a junior business executive is capable of such variegated political

activity, I suggest that the man who reorganized the Conservative Party after its decline and disaster in 1945 was Lord Woolton, whose experience had been in the chain store business. He was successful in selling goods, then in the war as food administrator, and finally in building the organization which returned his party to power.

Sometime, I hope, training schools for political workers will be established in this country.

"TOIL, SWEAT, AND VOLUNTEERS"

The foregoing title was coined by Alice Ruth Miller, a devoted professional manager of the women's auxiliary of the Republican organization in New York County. Hard work and loyalty and enthusiasm are what indispensable volunteers contribute. They are almost literally the foot-soldiers of political work. They do the essential routine office work, go from doorbell to doorbell along the streets to which they are assigned, keep eternal track of sympathetic voters, and get them to register and vote. These people will find, however, that politics is not all routine drudgery. They will realize that politics is a world of keen interest, an exciting business that touches all sorts of individuals and their activities and interests.

I cannot emphasize too strongly how important it is that the top

STRUCTURE FOR AUXILIARY GROUP



people in the organization make themselves known to and work with the volunteers. This association means a lot to the volunteers. The Cleveland organization which I have mentioned required each of the top businessmen to work in a precinct, thus establishing person-to-person contact with the volunteers and the voters.

The interest of volunteers is essential between elections, because the next campaign begins the day after victory or defeat. Letters of appreciation from the chairman are in order. Parties of various sorts should be held, and dinners to soften the hurt of defeat or to express the joy of victory.

Volunteers are important for another reason: from their ranks should come future leaders and candidates for office.

Beyond these basic suggestions and those that follow I need not supply details. I assume the capacity of such leaders as I mention to adapt their tactics to the special circumstances that confront them.

The main job is to arouse the interest of voters in a candidate, to make known his virtues and the weaknesses of the opposition, and to get the sympathetic voters to the polls.

HOW TO BEHAVE IN POLITICS— THE GROUP

Here are a number of “do’s, don’ts and be carefals” that the group members must learn and

relearn and practice. Some of them may seem obvious, but in politics you must assume that nothing is obvious. In summary they are:

1. *Avoid even the appearance of independence.* Volunteer groups, of which the most unfortunate example was the Associated Willkie Clubs of America in 1940, can annoy and dispirit the regular organization to the point of disaster for both the amateurs and the professionals. Seeds of frustration are almost sure to be scattered by an organization calling itself something like “Independents for Whoosit.” Moreover, the word “independent” in its proper meaning no longer applies to a political worker the moment he dedicates himself to a candidate or to a cause. Such mushroom movements usually die after elections, and the job then becomes even more arduous in maintaining support for an elected candidate or, in case of defeat, in preparing for the next round. Regulars are quite understandably afraid that much of the money used by the auxiliary would otherwise have gone to their organization which they have loyally held together in bad times and good.

2. *Concentrate on a few issues.* Don’t confuse voters with many issues, some of which are small and others large. A selection should be made by a committee composed of the wisest and most experienced of the organizing

group, together with the candidate or candidates and top regular party people. Then stick to those issues. Don't be diverted into adding new issues brought up by the opposition. Those wise in the ways of politics can usually determine the issues before the opposition has opened fire. When presented often, these put the opposition in a position of answering and denying which is often fatal. Seize the initiative and keep it.

3. *Never debate a smear.* If, after consultation among wise counselors, a smear needs an answer, make it brief, publicize it, and drop it. Try not to make petty personal attacks. Voters discount them or don't heed them. Magnanimity is a great practical political value.

4. *Don't argue.* Make your points and let voters judge them. Debates of any kind, I am convinced, are perilous. The opposition may be glib and discursive. There are many public men I might name who use debates, especially the limited time on radio and television, merely to make speeches with little relevance to the issues raised. The slow, intellectually honest, careful speaker is at a great disadvantage against the practiced demagogue. Remember that most people, while quick to make snap judgments, think slowly about serious things. Be simple and deliberate. Even at the expense of repetition, make your point understandable. This you

cannot do in the heat of argument.

5. *Respect and remember the party, but don't expect voters to respond merely to an appeal to party.* Save appeals to party for intra-group meetings.

6. *Research is important.* Gather facts to support the issues and to measure the voting population. This work should be assigned to a few special volunteers working under the manager and a competent director. For the most part this should be done before campaigning starts.

7. *Avoid lavish spending.* Money is necessary, but it can hurt as well as help. Waste is an institutional habit of political organizations. The vital component in any organization is the unpaid energy of devoted workers. Inevitably, demagogic opposition is going to attack the people who create a prodigal auxiliary as "fat cats," "minions of wealth," "rapacious big business." Ostentation has killed many a candidacy. British constituency agents operate and get results on a budget that would be incredible in the United States. Labor agents in Britain are not political spendthrifts because they don't have much, and trade unionists watch such things because it is their own money. Conservative agents operate on slim budgets, in part because the law strictly limits them, but largely because they are smart.

8. *Watch the dollars with*

minute care. Workers' necessary expenses should be paid at fixed times to all alike, and each should know that there are no favored recipients. Jealousy among workers and paid employees can wreck the morale of an organization. Strict accounting should be continuous, not only because compliance with law is required but because the auxiliary should be ready at all times to reveal its finances publicly in the event of attack by the opposition.

9. *Organize sub-groups*, such as "junior citizens." Never mind whether they are old enough to vote. They are citizens who like to work in teams and can make a showing. Young people can win considerable sympathy for a cause and candidate. Set up groups in specific trades and businesses, because there is an underlying community of interest in each which can be associated with the issues in the campaign. In my opinion women should not be separately organized. They are citizens and belong with the men. For the most part they resent being set aside as special problems.

10. *System is essential.* Voters' lists are vital. These should be arranged so that specific workers can know exactly where their responsibility lies.

11. *Canvass the potentially sympathetic.* Sometimes this can be determined by places of residence or economic status, but not

always. Don't waste time on the convinced opposition, because the time it takes to convert a person who by habit has voted against your side can be profitably used to activate fifty inert but potentially sympathetic people who share your philosophy. Ask yourself, if you are a business executive, whether you have ever seen an AFL-CIO COPE canvasser. Probably not. They are too smart to bother with such as you. They sow the seed where the ground is receptive.

12. *Don't attack "labor" if COPE or any similar group is in there supporting the opposition.* Concentrate on the "bosses" and the control they are exercising over the political freedom of workers.

13. *Handle relations with the press with great care.* The auxiliary must on the one hand avoid too much publicity and on the other avoid too deliberate secrecy. To the press a new organization is news. The press may regard the regular organization as old stuff, or may be antagonistic toward any and all politicians. It will be bound to know of the new group, and any effort to cloak it with secrecy only sharpens its zest for news. Perhaps disarming frankness is the best policy: "Yes, we are a group supporting Candidate X. We are helping with volunteers, working in friendly fashion with the party organization which nominated him. Just doing our duty as American

citizens. That's all. Pretty routine stuff."

HOW TO BEHAVE IN POLITICS— THE INDIVIDUAL

Here are a few personal suggestions, proved and tested, for those who want to be an influence in political life:

1. "*Good manners*," was the instant reply of the most intelligent woman politician of her time, Ruth Hanna McCormick Simms, when a college student asked her, "What is it that makes a good politician?" By this she meant not merely adherence to the strictures of Emily Post. She meant warm concern for the rights, convenience, and dignity of others; that agreeable manner which keeps the other fellow's concerns in the foreground. Politicians must remember that the people whom they seek to persuade are thinking of their own interests. They generally don't give a hang for what happens to the people who solicit their cooperation.

2. *Politics is many little things*: "Let me first be faithful in those things that are least, then I also will be faithful in much."

On another occasion I said this in commenting on the simple, almost juvenile, off-hour interests of Franklin D. Roosevelt, those interests which came to be so well understood to the generality of Americans — an understanding which was a major factor in his prodigious popularity:

"To a philosopher, a scientist or a great lawyer, the preoccupations of a politician seem to be the interests of a person too lazy to apply himself to serious things. This is a gross underestimation of the politician's quality of mind. For beneath the surface he is applying his mental faculties to exceedingly complex subject matter. Political genius is the capacity to give continuous, undivided, sedulous attention to matters that to most people seem too trivial to bother with."

3. *Be articulate*. Get into community discussions. Take part in forum discussions. Lose no appropriate opportunity to state your views on fundamental political questions. However, this articulation must be kept within the limits of good sense and good taste. Don't be a nuisance.

4. *Be a good neighbor*. Join and be active in local clubs and associations. Throw away the carpet slippers. The best potential that a person can have for exercising political influence is a name well and favorably known in those community activities which have nothing to do with politics. The community is held together with many ties, only one of which is political.

5. *Get your facts straight. Don't be dogmatic*. One of Aristotle's most profound observations was that "anyone is your judge whom you have to persuade."

6. *Don't underestimate yourself.* A character in "The Green Pastures" said, "I ain't much but I'm all I got." The famous George Washington Plunkett of Tammany Hall advised the beginner in poli-

tics, "Git a following, if it's only one man." T.R.'s injunction applies to the person as well as the organization: "Do what you can, with what you have, where you are."

A MORAL IMPERATIVE FOR FREE MEN

HERE AND NOW

George Santayana, whose spiritual and intellectual roots were in his Spanish ancestry and in the aristocratic atmosphere of New England society, took a dim view of the possibility of preserving a truly popular government. Its operation, he believed, would demand more of the average citizen than his past behavior might promise. "If a noble and civilized democracy is to subsist," he wrote, "the common citizen must be something of a saint and something of a hero."

He pointed out that it is not in the spirit of democracy to offer great prizes. Even public office, he continued, confers no great distinction, and no great profit if honestly administered.

Effective exercise of political influence in a free society demands unremitting devotion to prosaic activity. Its rewards are balanced against its sacrifices, bitter reverses, and periodic frustration. Thus, what Henry Wallace loosely called the age of the common man can be attained only by the efforts of uncommonly good and brave men and women.

Perhaps this arduous prospect is what inspires so many, comfortable excuses for inaction. One of these is the belief that a political Moses will lead us out of danger. I noted this in a book which appeared in 1952 and warned against the fatuity of putting all reliance upon a candidate for President. I said that the election of no single individual to the Presidency could be a permanent solution to the problems that beset us. For even an authentic Moses could not save us single-handed, and there was always the chance that the man elected might not be Moses at all.

Millions felt after the election of General Eisenhower that their job was done. Many of those millions who voted that year sat out the election of 1954. This made it possible for well-organized minorities to increase their grip upon Congress and state legislatures. In 1956 that grip was tightened. Shattering news may greet many of us in 1958 if, as is quite possible, only a minority of the voters go to the polls.

A reaction against the unions'

political power will come, say many businessmen, and normal political life will return. The McClellan revelations have assured that reaction. This deliberately ignores the fact that those revelations so far have almost exclusively dealt with common crimes, derelictions of duty, and improprieties such as larceny, assault in various degrees, and mismanagement.

To all who suffer the delusions mentioned above, I suggest the case of the Frenchman who decided to ignore the French Revolution.

POLITICS IS EVERYWHERE

I hope I have not created the impression that the practice of politics is only an austere piece of drudging duty. It teems with the elements of high and invigorating adventure.

In politics we come to grips with all that is challenging in human life. It is a worn phrase once used by Woodrow Wilson that nothing which is human is alien to politics. There is revealed in politics all the grime and glamor of human nature; its fascinating but inscrutable complexities; its narrow alleys and broad highways; its dizzying sense of change. Politics dashes the hopes of the scientist who would measure it and exacts the utmost from the artist who would depict it.

It is not merely a game or a business. It is the delicate process by which free men seek a compromise between freedom and order.

It is also the ruthless master of our lives and affairs.

Whether or not we are aware of it, politics lays a heavy hand on every circumstance of our lives. It takes our money and spends it. It can tell us how much we can save and what interest we can get for it. It can measurably tell us what job we may have and what we get for our labor. It takes our children and decrees what they shall be taught. It can take our youth and destroy them in war. It can enter our dwellings and seize our private effects. It we go on as we have, it will regiment our lives from conception to dissolution. Even our quiet graves are made to specifications drawn by a bureaucrat.

Certainly politics is not something to avoid or abolish or destroy. It is a condition, like the atmosphere we breathe. It is something to live with, to influence if we wish and to control if we can.

We must master its ways or we shall be mastered by those who do.

LEST WE FORGET

The evidence of our incomparable achievement in technology and industrial management is all around us. It is here in what we see and it is written on the luminous pages of history. It is the product of a hardy race enjoying the bracing climate of a classless society. It is the creation of free men and women dedicated to the ideal of

economic liberty.

Our generation has achieved a miracle of productivity, of efficiency and inventive genius. Its abundance is far beyond our needs and almost beyond our wants.

But all this may pass "with Nineveh and Tyre" if we neglect our basic political institutions. Busy with the material things we are creating, we forget the preservation of those values which give meaning and purpose to life and which in the long run determine material progress. The political institutions we have inherited seem to us so excellent that we foolishly assume that they need no attention and support. In enjoying the ex-

cellence of the fruit we are blind to the care of the tree.

This incomparable land of ours was, it is true, blessed by nature with protective oceans and with superabundant resources. But these alone do not make a civilization. That is built by human beings—in our case by a choice selection of imaginative, venturesome, creative, and liberty-loving individuals of many older nations. These people held high the ideal of a classless society, government by the consent of all, and political parties inclusive of all, not some interests. This civilization and its political institutions are ours to cherish in mastery or meanly, bitterly to lose.