


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INSURGENCY, RADICALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL UNIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

Our findings contradict if they do not confute the theory that "oligarchy" in labor unions is an "immanent necessity" of "organization." Neither oligarchy nor democracy is more immanent or necessary than the other; they are alternative possible paths of union development. Which path the union takes depends on the resolution of relatively contingent political struggles among working-class factions and parties, and thus on the resultant pattern of political relations in the union, and the character, radical or conservative, of its political leadership. Logit analysis shows that a.) the ensembles of political practices involved in organizing, b.) internal factionalism, and c.) a union's political leadership had substantial independent effects, whatever the "structure" of the industry, in determining the odds that the constitutions of America's industrial unions were democratic or authoritarian.

"Insurgency, Radicalism, and Democracy in America's Industrial Unions"

A specter haunts the analysis of union democracy, the specter of "the iron law of oligarchy." In Robert Michels' oft-quoted formulation, "every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy. . . . It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors. . . . Who says organization says oligarchy" (1949, pp. 400, 401, 402). This naked assertion, draped in a "theoretical tapestry devoid of even the plainest empirical trimmings" (Gouldner 1955, p.501), has long been the prevailing premise of the writings on union government in the United States. The "tragedy of organization," so it is said, is the "organizational frustration" of "relative democracy." For "[w]herever there is organization, whether formally democratic or not, there is a split between the leaders and the led" and an "abdication to bureaucratic imperatives" (Selznick 1943, p.49; 1949, p.9). So, the "spread of bureaucracy and the decay of democracy in trade unions are not abnormal excesses but are rooted in the very nature . . . of organization in general" (Herberg 1943, p. 413). A real democratic union thus becomes conceptually transmogrified into a "deviant case"—that is, it is said to "deviate from the iron law of oligarchy" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.12)—and the "quest" for union democracy becomes "futile" (Magrath 1959, p.525). In such a theoretical world, "all that remains . . ." of the dream of the democratic self-determination of labor "is the inevitable current moving the trade unions toward bureaucratization and oligarchy" (Jacobs 1963, p.151).

We reject this cast of thought as a theoretical starting point for our own empirical analysis. For not only does it mistake postulation for analysis, but it also converts undemonstrable organizational "needs"—e.g.,

for stability, security, and continuity--into inescapable, tragic realities.¹ No such "teleology of bureaucratic imperatives" (Zeitlin 1989, p.7) underlies our own substantive theory of the origins and consequences of democracy and dictatorship in labor unions. Rather, if history often has the retrospective appearance of inevitability, the analysis of the concrete circumstances in which the political forms characterizing labor unions originate will reveal that "oligarchy," like democracy, is the product, not of "imminent necessity" (Michels 1949, pp. 402, 382) or "inevitable currents," but, on the contrary, of contingent, though determinate, political struggles.

The most democratic unions, C. Wright Mills suggests (1948, p. 268) ". . . are usually born of a direct struggle, such as the sit-down strikes. . . . Everything has been gained bitterly over long periods of time." Mills' proposition focuses on the ostensible democratizing effects of the workers' direct struggle against capital, of the "industrial battle" of class against class. But "every class struggle is simultaneously an intraclass struggle"--a struggle "among [its] contending factions and parties . . . to define its interests and what has to be done to protect and advance them" (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1989, p. 504).

So, union organizing, as a mode of class struggle, also involves the workers simultaneously in battles on two fronts. The main front, of course, is their "direct struggle" against their employers. The second front is the fight among the workers' own factions and parties to win their political leadership--and thus to actively construct the political forms through which the unions are governed.

The fights on this second front are crucial in determining not only who wins "power and trust" in organized labor (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1989), but also whether union government is democratic or authoritarian. Our empirical analysis will reveal that democracy in America's industrial unions—much as in nation-states (see Moore 1966; Therborn 1977; Zeitlin 1984; Stephens 1989)—has insurgent and radical origins.²

The focus of our empirical analysis is on the "international unions" of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, during the late 1940s, at the height of the CIO's independent existence.³ Born in 1935, in the midst of an upheaval which "ripped the cloak of civilized decorum from society, leaving exposed naked class conflict" (Bernstein 1970, p. 217), the CIO organized so many workers so quickly that within less than a decade its affiliated unions represented roughly 80% of the country's industrial workers (Bell 1960, p.91). Indeed, by midcentury, unionization was so extensive that organized labor had become "to all intents and purposes the government of the labor community" in the United States (Leiserson 1959, p.3).⁴

THE "DIVIDED SOUL"

Any analysis of the sources of democracy, necessarily implies a conception of an ideal democratic polity—that this is "democracy"—against which any concrete polity has to be measured. What democracy is, moreover, is not a mere matter of definition, but involves contentious questions in political theory: especially, whether the active participation of ordinary men and women in making the decisions that affect them is essential to democracy (see Pateman 1970), or if it suffices that—instead of "tak[ing] upon themselves collectively" the responsibility for governing—they merely

take part, as John Stuart Mill sardonically remarked long ago (1963, p.229), in elections, "a political act, to be done only once in a few years."

Conceptualizing "union democracy" and trying to measure it is thus doubly difficult. For even assuming theoretical agreement on the meaning of democracy in a state or other polity, the question remains, whether a labor union "ought to" be democratic, and if so what that means empirically. For the union's sine qua non is that it is supposed to be a fighting organization of workers, a "reserve corps for industrial battle," that has to be in constant readiness to confront, defy and limit the "sway of property" over their lives; "at each point where property owners strive to dominate," the union must be ready to engage them (Mills 1948, pp. 8, 4). So, any labor union worth its salt is, minimally, a sort of irregular (if unarmed) workers' "army" engaged in "a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system" and "the encroachments of capital" (Marx 1973, pp. 75-6).

So, asking what determines union democracy, implies that the labor union not only can but also should be not only an "army" but also a "town meeting": the union's irregulars, its rank and file, should participate fully in making the decisions that affect them; they should freely argue the issues, decide on a battle plan, elect their "generals" and "sergeants," and themselves vote on the "declaration of war" (strikes) and on the terms of each truce (contract) (Muste 1928, p.187; Mills 1948, p.4).

But why "should" they? Why must the labor union be torn by a "divided soul," in A. J. Muste's words (1928, pp.187, 189), and seek to "combine within itself two extremely divergent types of social structure, the army and the democratic town meeting"? Two polar answers have been given: first,

that it "must," for democracy is of the union's essence; second, that it "must" do no such thing, for democracy is irrelevant or even detrimental to the union's real objective.

"For the union to become an instrument of social transformation," in the first view, its members ". . . must think of it as their creature; they must want to know all about it and want to run it in as much detail as possible." In this way, as C. Wright Mills argues (1948, pp. 268, 253), their common struggle also makes them "humanly and politically alert." Without internal democracy, without "a sophisticated organized opposition," S. Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman argue (1962, pp.460-61), "the members have no way of discovering for themselves what is possible." Nor can the "unions represent their members' interests when the members have little control over policy formation."

In the opposite view, "trade union organization is not based on theoretical concepts prior to it, that is, on some concept of democracy, but on the end it serves. . . . [T]he end of trade union activity," in V. L. Allen's words, "is to protect and improve the general living standards of its members and not to provide workers with an exercise in self-government" (1954, p.15). "Successful union activity vis-a-vis modern industry demands businesslike, i.e., nondemocratic, organization. . . . [D]emocracy," says C. Peter Magrath (1959, p.525) is as inappropriate within the international headquarters of the UAW [United Automobile Workers] as it is in the front office of General Motors."

MEASURING UNION DEMOCRACY

Our conception of union democracy derives from the "critical theory of democratic constitutionalism" (Neumann 1957, pp.173-76): certain basic

"freedoms"--inscribed in the constitution or common law--are the indispensable (though not sufficient) foundation of the active participation, and self-realization, of men and women in self-governing communities. All CIO unions were governed under a constitution of their own making, and our measure of a union's "level of democracy" is based on the provisions in its constitution that specify, and limit or expand, the personal, civil and political rights of its members. We describe these provisions in a moment. A prior question, of course, is whether these provisions can provide a rough measure of the "real" level of democracy in the unions of the CIO.

For "the differences between formal democratic structure and the real exercise of rank and file rights" can be vast (Levenstein 1981, p.333). As Jacob Dubinsky, then president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), told Victor Reuther at the UAW's tumultuous founding convention, "In my union, we have democracy too--but they know who is boss!" (Cochran 1977, p.339).

So, any realistic analysis has to recognize that discrepancies necessarily existed between the letter of the law and political actualities in America's unions. But this is not the same as simply assuming (as the authors of what is arguably the major sociological study of union democracy do) that they were unrelated. In "nominally democratic [trade unions] . . . the clauses in the constitutions which set forth the machinery for translating membership interests and sentiments into organizational purpose and action bear little relationship to the actual political processes" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, pp.2-3, italics added).⁵ Rather, the critical question is how widespread the discrepancies between constitutional

provisions and actual political processes were, and what the pattern was. For even if they were discrepant (as they probably were, to some unknown extent), they could have been (and, we shall argue, probably were) systematically related.

If clauses protecting basic personal, civil and political rights are mere shibboleths (as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman imply), shouldn't this also be true (by the same reasoning) of clauses that restrict these rights? We ourselves doubt that clauses in a union's constitution endowing the executive with extensive power over its members are "little" related to "the actual political processes" in the union. So, for instance, the constitution of the AFL United Leather Workers, gave the union's ". . . executive council . . . the power to declare an emergency and suspend the operation of any law for a period of 90 days, [and] to extend the suspension from time to time until in their judgment the emergency has ceased to exist." The constitution of the AFL's International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers authorized the president to remove any officer for "non-performance of duty"; to suspend or expel locals; to "suspend the cards and membership of any member who, in his judgment, is working against the welfare of the I.B.E.W. in the interests of any group or organization detrimental to the I.B.E.W.—or for creating dissension among members or among L.U's [local unions] . . ."; and to decide all "questions of law and organization disputes" (Taft 1948, p. 468). The Musicians Union vested the power in its president to "annul and set aside constitution, by-laws, or any portion thereof . . . and substitute therefor other and different provisions of his own making; the power to do so is hereby made absolute in the president . . ." (Shister 1945, pp. 105, 104). Or take the somewhat less

absolute power given to the presidents of the CIO's conservative Steelworkers or radical Farm Equipment Workers (FE). The USWA president had "the authority to appoint, direct, suspend, or remove, such organizers [and] representatives . . . as he may deem necessary" (USWA 1948, p.8). FE's had "the power to suspend local unions for violation of the laws of the Constitution of the International union, or to suspend the officers or Executive Board members of such local unions" (FE 1949, p.27).

Surely, it isn't sensible (indeed, it is dangerous) to simply assume that such clauses, which concentrate power in the hands of top union officials, "bear little relationship to their actual political processes."⁶ And if such anti-democratic clauses really matter, then clauses that provide guarantees of democratic freedoms and political rights ought to be taken no less seriously, as meaningful if imperfect measures (and determinants) of the internal political life of America's unions.

Several prior studies have documented the extent to which the constitutions of America's international unions in the 1940s protected internal democracy. Clyde Summers (1946) examined the clauses relating to equality of franchise; Philip Taft (1948) examined the provisions relating to the "constitutional power of the chief executive."⁷

Summers' study of the franchise, provoked by the "frequent charges of racial discrimination" and other alleged discriminatory union admissions policies, focuses on the rights of workers to join and retain membership in a union—regardless of their race, creed, nationality, sex, or political beliefs or affiliations—as "one important part of the problem of internal democracy" (1946, p.66). He found that, as of 1946, the constitutions of most international unions (AFL, CIO, and independent combined) had no

provision expressly prohibiting the exclusion or expulsion of members on any of these grounds: only about a third of the constitutions of these 138 international unions expressly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race or creed (religion); about a fifth prohibited discrimination against non-citizens or women; and a sixth prohibited discrimination on political grounds. On the other hand, one constitution in eight expressly limited membership to "white," or "Caucasian," workers or excluded Negroes, Mexicans, or American Indians; a fourth excluded non-citizens--or allowed in, as did the AFL Boilermakers Union, only citizens "of some civilized country"; a fourth also excluded "subversives," and members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), One Big Union, and the Communist, Fascist, and Nazi parties.

Taft's study of the constitutional power of the union's top officer was concerned with the "extensive and many sided powers" that this officer "frequently exercises," including the power to sanction strikes, to intervene in disputes with the employer, to preside at the union's conventions and appoint its committees, to control the content of the union's newspaper, to discipline subordinate groups and members, etc. Based on an examination of the chief executive's appointive and disciplinary powers, and checks on them, Taft classified each union's constitution as endowing this official with "routine," "moderate," or "considerable" power. Of the 115 union constitutions Taft examined, some three out of four gave their top officer "extensive" (i.e., either moderate or considerable) power (44% gave him "considerable" power).

Thus, these content analyses of union constitutions certainly suggest strongly that, at least during the 1940s, it was probably a "fact [that]

. . . entrenched oligarchy and lack of internal opposition . . . characterize[d] most unions on the national level" (Galenson and Lipset 1962, p.203).⁸ But, it has to be emphasized, this was not a "fact" about most of the CIO's unions (not, at least, until the mass Cold War purges of dissidents on the Left). Both the relative equality of franchise and the concentration of executive power embodied in the constitutions of the AFL and CIO unions differed sharply.

Among the 88 AFL and 12 independent unions, only a small fraction (ranging from one in six to less than one in twenty, depending on the provision) of the constitutions expressly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, citizenship, sex, or political beliefs or affiliation. But in the mass industrial unions of the CIO--born in an insurrection against the immobilism and conservatism of the AFL, as "naked class conflict" raged in the nation--some seven in ten prohibited discrimination by race or creed; and--give or take a few percentage points--roughly half of the CIO's 38 internationals prohibited discrimination against non-citizens or women, or on political grounds (Summers 1946, Table 3). Similarly, though the contrast on this political dimension is not as sharp, some half of the CIO constitutions examined (14 of 29) gave their top officer only "routine" power, but this was so for less than one sixth of the AFL union constitutions examined (12 of 74) and one quarter of the independent unions. On the other end of the spectrum of power, one fifth of the heads of CIO internationals but half of the heads of the AFL and independent unions held "considerable power."⁹

So, the vast majority of the independent and AFL unions (quite consistent with the latter's autocratic reputation) were not even "nominally

democratic" (as measured by these constitutional provisions). But between half and three quarters of the CIO unions (depending on the provision examined) were, in fact, at least "nominally democratic." (On our own much more comprehensive index, described in detail below, two out of three of the CIO internationals had either a "high" or "medium" level of constitutional democracy.)

These findings (which reveal sharp differences in the pattern of the franchise and executive power embodied in the constitutions of the AFL, independent, and CIO unions) suggest that it makes good sense to consider their constitutions relevant to the unions' inner political life. Indeed, it is especially sensible to take union constitutions seriously—to consider them as the "enacted rules of the game," which both reflect and shape "the nature of parties and of representation" within the unions (cf. Lipset 1963, pp.292, 313). For if the constitutions of states often have been swept aside or ignored, labor unions are not states. Nor do they possess a "monopoly of legitimate violence" with which their officials can defy their union's constitution and impose their rule on its members.¹⁰

In the United States, in particular, the judiciary has long reinforced the potency and dominion of union constitutions. In "intra-union disputes" concerning members' rights brought before the courts, from the early years of the 20th century through the CIO era, the source of the court's decision was "in most instances" the relevant provisions of the union's constitution (Shister 1945, p.79; Williams 1954, p.829; Summers 1955, pp.604-6). Indeed, the courts often protected "union members by demanding literal compliance with the [union] constitution" (Summers 1955, p.605). In some instances, therefore, they have even upheld the right of a union—in order to defend

itself against slander and libel, and as a means of punishing deliberate violations of union rules—to invoke provisions in its constitution forbidding criticism of its officers, printing and distributing leaflets to union members without the consent of its officers, or forming factions within the union. "On the other hand, the courts have been prompt to set aside union abuses of these provisions for the purposes of taking revenge upon defeated political opponents [and] suppressing criticism . . ." (Aaron and Komaroff 1949, p.657). Evidently, then, the working of our courts, during the era in question (1935-1950), tended to assure that the relevant clauses in union constitutions and their "real" internal political processes were systematically if not closely related.

Moreover, the constitutions of the CIO's international unions—whatever might have been the situation in the AFL or other unions at the time—were undoubtedly not mere shibboleths, but living political documents. They were written originally during a moment of escalating workers' insurgency and self-organization that transformed the political terrain of labor/capital conflict in the nation. In the aftermath of the CIO's split from the moribund if not reactionary AFL, the constitutions defined the distinctive identity of the new, militant, socially conscious, industrial unions. They embodied the decisions of the unions' founders about the union's future structure, defined and channeled the union's aims, and established the organizational forms of its internal political life (cf. Neumann 1944, pp. 8-9). From the constitutions' original formulation, not "by constitutional lawyers, but working men" (Taft 1962, p.125), at the unions' founding conventions (which often involved heated, lengthy, and detailed debates and political infighting among contending union factions over each crucial

provision) through their repeated amendment and revision in the midst of serious political struggles over the years, a close reading of union history suggests that the constitutions of the CIO unions roughly reflected their real inner political dynamics.¹¹

The regular convention of the CIO international union was simultaneously a legislature, a supreme court, and a constitutional assembly (Leiserson 1959, p.122). It was at their conventions that the major political battles of the internationals were fought to a conclusion, compacts made, officers elected, and, as a result, their constitution often amended or revised. So, under these circumstances, "the constitution itself paints a very vivid picture of the actual operation of the union" and, especially, of the union's "dominant political machine . . . in action" (Shister 1945, p.78; Seidman 1953, p.227).

Decisive political shifts, especially in the balance of power among the unions' contending factions, were usually sealed at their conventions by new constitutional provisions affecting their members' civil and political rights, local autonomy, executive authority, "rank and file" power, and even their formal aims or official union political philosophy.¹² So if a gap existed between the provisions of CIO international constitutions and their inner political realities, these were, nonetheless "effective forces"—as men on opposing sides agreed—in the often "bitter factional struggle" within them (Herberg 1943, p. 408). "Correct constitutional laws . . . are vital," said the sometime Wobbly, syndicalist, and then Red unionist William Z. Foster in 1937, "as they place in the hands of the rank and file effective democratic weapons, if they will but use them" (1937, p.258).¹³

In sum, we are convinced (and will show) that the constitutions of the CIO

international unions were palpable reflections and embodiments of their actual political life, and they can, therefore, provide us with meaningful measures of their "real" level of internal democracy.

If a political system claims to be a democracy, it must implement specific, minimal basic personal, civil, and political rights: "Equal franchise and equal access to all public offices, and equality of treatment," without regard to class or calling, are the most basic political rights, without which open participation in political life is impossible. In turn, these presuppose basic civil rights (or "liberties"), both "personal"—freedom of the person—and "societal"—freedom of association (or organization)—without which equal suffrage is a sham and political representation an illusion. Any abrogation of civil rights necessarily vitiates political rights—though not vice versa.

By "personal rights" (or "human" or "natural" rights) are meant those whose validity is bound solely to a person as "an isolated individual" and which do not depend on association or organization: "security of the person, of houses, papers, and effects, the right to a fair trial, prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures."

In contrast, "societal civil rights" are rights of association and organization: the "freedoms" of religion, of speech, of assembly, and of property. One limitation, however, is inherent in them: their exercise must not deprive others of the exercise of theirs. These rights or freedoms presuppose personal rights; without security of the person, freedom of association is impossible, for if people are subject to arbitrary arrest and cannot expect to have a fair trial, they cannot associate or assemble freely either (Neumann 1957, pp.173-76).

We have tried to translate these precepts of democratic constitutionalism (against which any concrete political system would be found wanting) into a scheme for measuring constitutional democracy in industrial unions. We reviewed the constitutions of the CIO unions, as of the late 1940s, to see whether they guaranteed the same or equivalent basic rights.¹⁴ We were also guided by a number of articles by legal scholars, and by "a bill of rights for union members," drafted in 1947 by the American Civil Liberties Union, "couched in terms of the rights of an industrial worker" (ACLU 1947; Aaron and Komaroff 1949; Baldwin 1946; Kovner 1948; Summers 1946, 1950; 1951; Williams 1954).

We constructed a Guttman scale for each set of civil rights (both personal and societal) and political rights (both franchise and accountability) based on the presence (or absence) of relevant provisions in the union constitution (item analysis indicates each scale has an acceptable, and high, coefficient of reproducibility). We combined the scores on these separate Guttman scales into an "index of the level of constitutional union democracy" for each union. We made Guttman scales for two reasons: 1. technically they are required for scales used as variables in logit analysis (though we decided not to run them as separate variables precisely because constitutional democracy is an inseparable construct of all these basic rights). 2. theoretically, much as political rights presuppose societal civil rights, and the latter presuppose personal rights, and they all hang together (or they each hang separately!), the same is so for the specific constitutional provisions composing each cluster of rights, which also tend to form a set whose components presuppose others (higher in the scale). The items and scales, and the method of scoring to construct

the index of union democracy are given in Chart 1.¹⁵

FACTIONALISM

The entire bundle of personal, civil, and political rights is meant, above all, to guarantee the freedom of political opposition, that is, the freedom to oppose the existing regime and its policies, alone or in association with others, to form, join, and participate actively in organized opposition groups, factions, or parties. "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. . . .," James Madison wrote during the debate over the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. "[L]iberty, which is essential to political life, . . . nourishes faction" (Beloff 1987, p. 42).

Union "liberty" also "nourishes faction"—and is nourished by it. "Faction is the life blood of [union] democracy," if not its very definition (Martin 1968, p.207; cf. also Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, pp.7-11, 13; Magrath 1959, p.505). The "theoretical freedom [to voice opposition to leaders and policies] is made instrumental," as Bert Cochran (1977 p.340) argues, "only by the corrolary right to organize opposition factions." In other words, the existence of active opposition to established leadership or of contention for power among opposing groups, blocs, or factions, as a recognized form of political activity, is an "essential feature" of union democracy (McConnell 1958a, p.604).

The "decisive proof of democracy in a union," or in any polity, as Irving Howe and B. J. Widdick (1949, pp.262-63) argue, is that ". . . oppositionists have the right to organize freely into 'parties,' to set up factional machines, to circulate publicity and to propagandize among the members. . . . [T]he right of factions to exist and function freely or the

equally important right of the membership to express its attitude toward them . . . is the overhead (well worth paying!) of democracy. . . . The alternative is dictatorship."

Even when a constitution enshrines basic rights, organized opposition—and an active minority anxious to guard their own freedoms—is essential to enforce them, and to preserve and enliven democracy. Put as a general proposition, "a system of factionalism within a union" is ". . . the surest means of gaining what is important in constitutional government as found in any of the western democracies." Conversely, constitutional guarantees that are essential to the security of political opposition are also "probably necessary as a condition for the successful operation of a factional system" (McConnell 1958a, p.604; 1958b, p.639).

Unlike the probable pattern in the AFL, whose unions were "characterized internally by the rule of a one-party oligarchy" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.1), many if not most of the unions in the CIO probably were relatively democratic. The established leadership of many CIO unions often faced serious organized internal opposition; organized "caucuses," "blocs," or "factions"—which were recognized parties in all but name—regularly contended for power within them.¹⁶

Many if not most CIO unions were characterized, then, not by "one-party oligarchy," but (as the situation in certain major unions in Britain is described) by a "fluid and fragmented 'multi-party' political system," whose government involved "an uneven and uneasy coalition between representatives of different ideological tendencies." The dynamics of such intraunion coalitions, "like the dynamic of government formation in the French Fourth Republic," was determined by the relative strength of the contending

factions (Martin 1971, p. 244). In short, the government in CIO unions often was a form of "polyarchy," in which "multiple minorities" having their own independent political bases competed for power (Dahl 1956).

So, if both pluralist and critical theories (see Neumann 1944, pp.10, 11, 79, 477) would predict a close relationship between the level of constitutional democracy in CIO unions and the presence of internal political factions, the same is suggested to us by the available historical evidence. For, as we stressed earlier, intraunion fights among contending factions often involved attempts to amend and revise the union's constitution.

A couple of examples are instructive. In 1941, a fight in UE over the issue of "local autonomy" led to "an open split" between its left and right. UE's president, James Carey, in reply to an inquiry from a union local, said that UE's constitution allowed a local to bar Communists and fascists from positions of "responsibility and trust." Other UE officers said that such a prohibition would be unconstitutional. UE News carried letters for months afterwards taking sides on the issue, and a newly organized caucus for "Progressive Trade Unionism" openly denounced UE's leadership for "following the Communist line." At the convention that year, the delegates voted overwhelmingly against amending the constitution, but re-affirmed the right of local unions to set qualifications for office as long these would not deprive any "good standing member of the Union" of rights guaranteed by UE's constitution. At the Oil Workers 1940 convention, in contrast, an insurgent "workers' control" group, which had been active since the union's founding four years earlier, won the union's leadership, and then carried its program into effect by passing a complex of constitutional amendments that aimed to

limit the executive power of the union's top officers. These amendments provided that all members, rather than convention delegates alone, could vote on the election of officers and the executive council; and they excluded full-time officers from the executive council (Galenson 1960, pp.262-64; 417, 423).

Whether or not the presence of factions was associated with constitutional democracy in CIO international unions, is not an easy question to answer empirically, for the available information on factionalism provided in historical works, while occasionally detailed, is spotty and sparse. Much has been written about the same few major unions and little or nothing about most. We scoured many historical works on American labor, but few provided anymore than sketchy information on the extent of organized opposition in certain unions. From the information in these works, we were able to classify 23 of the 38 durable CIO unions on the presence of internal factions. We classified each union as having enduring or "organized" factions, periodic or "sporadic" factions, and no known factions.¹⁷

Even these crude data on a truncated universe, with small numbers in the cells compared, reveal a striking association between the presence of factions and the level of constitutional democracy in CIO unions during the late 1940s. (Not incidentally, this finding thereby also tends to confirm the validity of our measure of constitutional democracy, for it reveals a close association between a crucial expression of the unions' actual inner political life and their written constitution.) Unions with organized factions were nearly twice as likely as unions with sporadic factions to have a high level of constitutional democracy; none of the unions without

factions had a high level of democracy, and most had a low level of democracy (Table 1).

--Table 1 goes about here--

INTRACLASS STRUGGLE

No "factional system" is born full blown; nor is it somehow self-induced. Rather, it is the product both of earlier and continuing struggles over the nature of the common interest--in the CIO's case, of intraunion struggles over the nature of the common class interest of workers.

The CIO itself was born as an organized faction of the American Federation of Labor. When the "Committee for Industrial Organization" was formed on November 9, 1935 by the heads of eight AFL unions, this was merely the formal culmination of a long-raging factional struggle within the AFL. Their split with "reactionary AFL leaders" over the issue of "organizing the unorganized" in mass production industries (CIO 1949(?), p.3) was no solitary act. Rather, it came in the immediate wake of battles for industrial unionism that thousands of workers had been waging since the early 1920s, both within and outside the AFL.

So, the CIO was born as an amalgam of disparate, often hostile, elements: involved in organizing the CIO unions were new, young, and inexperienced organizers and battle-hardened survivors, ex-AFL officials, "pure-and-simple" unionists, Catholic activists, liberals, Communists, and radicals of all stripes--and they were all determined to take charge, to lead their unions, and thus their class, in accordance with their own conceptions of its interests.

Our central question, then, is how much difference the struggles among contending working-class factions and parties, and their organizing strategy

and actual political practices, make in determining the political relations within a union, and thus its form of government, democratic or authoritarian, whatever the "structure" of the industry in which the union is located.¹⁸

These struggles and their resultant political relations can be seen as constituting and being constituted by four bundles of historical events involved in the drive to organize the unorganized into the new CIO unions: 1. whether or not early Red organizing had taken place in an industry; 2. whether the union seceded from the AFL "from below," in a workers' insurgency or "from above," in a revolt of its top officers; 3. whether the union was originally organized independently or under the aegis of a CIO "organizing committee"; and 4. whether the union was formed as an amalgamated or as a unitary organization. These bundles, we want to emphasize, represent both crucial types of political practices and constellations of internal relationships among contending political forces. The immediate empirical question, then, is how and to what extent these different political practices and relations were involved both in the creation of "a system of factions" and the consolidation of constitutional democracy in the international unions of the CIO.

I. Red Unionism

For many years before the CIO took up the call, the cause of industrial unionism and of "revolutionary" or "Red" unionism had been all but synonymous. Since the decline of the "Wobblies" (Industrial Workers of the World [IWW]), the Communists had been the main bearers among workers of the ideas of militant action and industrial unionism. In the early days of the CIO's split with the AFL, the Communists were, therefore, skeptical or even

hostile toward CIO efforts. "In a way, the Communists looked upon the CIO as a rival that was capitalizing on some of its issues, particularly that of industrial unionism" (Saposs 1959, p.123).

From 1920 through late 1935, two successive Red "trade union leagues" under Communist leadership had been trying (first by forming militant factions within existing AFL unions, then by organizing independent industrial unions to wage a struggle of "class against class") to organize some of the same industries and plants that the CIO targeted for organizing. By the time of the CIO's birth, tens of thousands of workers had been involved in mass strikes and unionizing drives under Red leadership, most recently through the "Trade Union Unity League" (TUUL).¹⁹

Communist union organizers led some heroic, fiercely fought and bloodily suppressed strikes. "All unions were fought bitterly in those days. But the most brutal terror was reserved for the Communist unions" (Draper 1972, p.392). Some of the "brutal terror" reserved for them came, however, not from employers but hostile AFL unionists, who collaborated with employers in heading off radical unionism and in quashing the rival Red unions. "The American Federation of Labor had no qualms when it came to breaking I.W.W. and T.U.U.L. strikes" (Galenson 1940, pp.40-41). Characteristic, for instance, were the clashes between Red unionists and AFL adherents: in the "garment industry wars of the 1920s" (Levenstein 1981, p.108); in the anthracite coal fields, where "one of the bloodiest fratricidal wars in the history of trade unionism" was waged during the late 1920 and early 1930s (Galenson 1940, pp.12-13); and among furriers, sailors, longshoremen, and many other rival unionists on the East Coast during the same years (Levenstein 1981, p.107).

In the fur trade in New York city, for example, where "the Fur Workers Industrial Union fought the A.F. of L. International Fur Workers to a standstill, 'Vicious fights on the picket lines, in the shops and on the streets were a daily occurrence. Few weeks passed by when workers, slashed with the knives of their trade or trampled by the boots of rival unionists, did not fill the emergency wards and night courts.'" (Galenson 1940, p.10; internal quote from Scheyer 1935). Or, for example, in the 1936 East Coast maritime union strike, AFL thugs "got some money from the shipowners," as Joe Ryan, head of the AFL International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) himself told it, "and drove them [the strikers] back with baseball bats where they belonged. Then they called the strike off" (Kempton 1955, pp.95).

Some of the ablest and toughest opponents of the Red unionists were themselves other radicals, especially elements of the Socialist Party and ex-Reds who had quit or been expelled from the Communist Party (CP) after the late 1920s. Some ex-Red unionists even found themselves battling former comrades with whom they had suffered through earlier Red organizing struggles (Saposs 1959, pp.136-41, 150). In the early 1930s clashes between rival unionists in the auto industry, for example, elements of the "CPUSA-Opposition (led by Jay Lovestone)" whose members had been expelled from the Communist Party in 1929, were the bitterest enemies of the Red unionists (and of such Red "tools" as the Reuther brothers!) (Levenstein 1981, pp.107-08).

To this motley and explosive political mix, were added, from the late 1930s on, Catholic activists organized in the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU), who saw their mission as fighting against Communist

unionists, even--if not mainly--within Red union strongholds. ACTU's earliest rank-and-file caucus activity was often a direct response to earlier Red organizing (Seaton 1981, pp.144, 153-159; Levenstein 1981, pp.110-20).

So, the CIO unions that were organized in industries that had been penetrated by earlier Red unionism, inherited not only nuclei of experienced Red organizers and effective leaders, but a variety of rival ex-AFLrs, Catholic activists, leftists, socialists, radicals, and communists of all stripes, many of whom were also knowledgeable and alert leaders, ready, willing, and able to engage in battle with each other over the destiny of the union, no matter which of them had won its immediate leadership. For these reasons, we should expect to find that contending factions were more likely to characterize the unions established in the industries penetrated by Red unionism in earlier years than those established in industries where no such earlier Red organizing had occurred.

For much the same reasons suggested as to why Red unionism was connected to the presence of factions in a CIO union, it should also have been associated with a higher level of union democracy. Some of the contending factions were especially active in seeking constitutional guarantees of basic civil and political rights, both out of principle and self-interest, given their own vulnerable, minority political situation.²⁰ This applies, in particular, to the Red unionists, who bore the bunt of repression, and expulsion, in their battles to form "revolutionary oppositions" inside AFL unions or to amalgamate existing AFL "trade" unions, and organize the unorganized, into industrial unions.

So, like other opposition groups, Red unionists also tended to "develop

. . . a democratic ideology, an insistence on specific minority rights, as a means of legitimating their own right to exist" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.16); they insisted that "the fight for industrial unionism [went] hand-in hand . . . with the need for genuine trade union democracy" (Foster 1936, p.208). In the words of a 1927 Trade Union Educational League book on the "misleaders of labor," written by its head, William Z. Foster, reactionaries build up "powerful bureaucratic machines . . . to prevent the left wing from mobilizing the discontented rank and file against it. [They] apply . . . autocratic methods of control . . . and new dictatorial methods . . . [including] the arbitrary disfranchisement of the opposition. . . . The very life of unionism . . . is at stake in this desperate effort to suppress union democracy and to force the workers back under the arbitrary direction of the reactionary leaders, which means under the control of the employers" (1927, pp. 286, 296-97, 299).

This TUEL handbook first told American workers about the lessons contained in Michels' Political Parties (long before its academic apotheosis). Foster listed what Michels said were "the many devices used by Social Democratic bureaucrats to maintain themselves in office," and said: "But American trade union leaders use not only most of the tricks that Michels touches upon but many more of which he never dreamed. To hang on to their jobs they appeal to the gun and the knife, they make open alliances with the employers and the state against the workers, and they ruthlessly suppress democracy in the organizations" (Foster 1927, pp.270, 273-74; 312, 316; 324).

So, then, was there a connection between earlier Red Unionism in an industry, internal factionalism, and union democracy? Unfortunately, we

found information on factions in only six unions located in industries that Red unionism had not penetrated; comparing them with 17 unions in industries where Red unions had been active gives us mixed results: among the unions in industries that had experienced earlier Red unionism, the proportion of unions with organized factions is higher, but the proportion with no factions is also somewhat higher (Table 2). The pattern is roughly the same, with far more complete data, when we compare the level of constitutional democracy among the unions in these contrasting industrial categories. Among the 20 unions in industries that had experienced earlier Red unionism, the proportion with a "high" level of democracy was three times the proportion among the 15 that had none; but the proportions of "oligarchical" unions, i.e., those with a "low" level of democracy, scarcely differed (Table 3). We suggest one crucial reason for this below, in our analysis of how the chances for union democracy were affected by contrasting "organizing strategies."

—Tables 2 and 3 go about here—

II. AFL Secession: "from above" or "from below"

In the fall of 1936, the AFL "suspended" 10 unions affiliated with the CIO (then still the "Committee on Industrial Organization") on charges of "dual unionism" (the same charge the AFL used to throw out the adherents of the TUWU 11 years earlier) and of "fomenting insurrection." The 10 unions immediately started making their per capita payments to the now independent CIO (Bernstein 1970, pp.422-423).²¹ These founding unions of the CIO, and a few others that soon followed them, came into the new industrial union movement as the result of what we term "a revolt from above." Their top officers broke away from the AFL and joined the CIO with their staff and

organizational hierarchy--and much of their union jurisdiction--intact. As a result, they had a continuity of leadership, and little if any internal dissension or crystallized--let alone organized--opposition factions; for the same reasons, probably only minimal changes were made in the relatively autocratic constitutions they inherited from the AFL.

In contrast, most other CIO unions grew out of local and district battles between craft and industrial unionists over the control of its AFL precursor. Such workers' "insurgencies from below" split many AFL unions. The workers in these AFL locals and districts then joined the CIO to form the core of new international unions, and brought their leading organizers into the new union with them. This happened, for instance, in the AFL's Upholsterers International Union in 1937, where a number of locals defected from the AFL, and combined with some other independent craft unions and a few CIO locals to form the CIO United Furniture Workers (Peterson 1944, p.135). Other struggles "from below" took place in the newly chartered AFL "federal labor unions," i.e., the newly organized locals given a temporary AFL charter to "store workers" until they could be "parcelled out" to AFL craft affiliates (Bernstein 1970, p.355). Some seceded from the AFL to become the locals of a new CIO union, rather than be parcelled out and subordinated to craft control.²²

Of course, radicals and Communists abounded among the original insurgent leaders, but these rebellions also probably resulted in a "colossal overproduction of organizers" (in Nikolai Bukharin's apt phrase) and of experienced and skilled rank and file leaders at all levels of these new unions. Thus, such insurgent origins must have endowed these unions with an ample pool of skilled activists--with their own personal ambitions

and differing political commitments and conceptions of workers' interests—that would "nullify the stability" of the union's officials and form the basis of an organized opposition to them (Bukharin 1925, pp.310, 311, emphasis in original; also see Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.455).

At their founding conventions, one of the first political acts of the unions that arose out of workers' insurgencies often was to throw out their old AFL constitutions, which had centralized power in a handful of top officials, and write new ones that broadened rank and file representation in the union's executive bodies and provided guarantees against the kinds of organizational abuse suffered by their insurgent organizers when they had been dissidents or radicals in the AFL. The members of the new ILWU, for instance, abolished the notoriously dictatorial IIA constitution and replaced it with one that was more open and democratic. Among its provisions, for instance, were, first, a simplified recall procedure to assure accountability: as few as 15% of the members could initiate recall proceedings against any elected officer; and, second, an egalitarian salary cap: no elected union officer could earn a salary more than 10% above the earnings of the highest paid workers, so that any "purely economic incentive for seeking and remaining in office" would be reduced (Kimeldorf 1988, pp.10-11).

For these reasons, the unions born "from below" were probably more likely than those born "from above" to have internal factions and a high level of constitutional democracy.²³ We find, indeed, that this was so: the presence of factions and the level of democracy in the unions in these categories both differ sharply. Over twice as many of the unions that arose through workers' rebellions had organized factions as those whose top

officers broke with the AFL and took their union into the CIO. The difference in the proportions of constitutionally democratic unions in these categories is even sharper: nearly half of the unions born "from below" but only about a tenth of the ones born "from above" had a high level of constitutional democracy (Tables 2 and 3).

III. Independent Organizing

Most of the CIO unions were organized by independent rank and file committees, made up both of workers who organized clandestinely "on the inside" and of their comrades on the outside. They decided for themselves on their overall organizing strategy and on the detailed tactics of the struggle: they wrote and then distributed their own leaflets at the factory gates or in the workers' neighborhoods, and decided what demands to make, and when and how to make them, and whether to call strikes.

Top CIO officials, such as UMW's John L. Lewis and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Sidney Hillman, often had little alternative but to let independent rank and file organizers alone, for without their hard-work, courage, commitment and sacrifice to organize the unorganized, the CIO could well have been still-born. Radicals of all kinds were found among the organizers: some were experienced, battle-hardened old hands, "the flotsam and jetsam of years of sinking radical dreams"--Wobblies, home-grown and immigrant class-conscious Socialist unionists, and Reds--who had been baptized in earlier organizing battles (Levenstein 1981, p.63). But many more were young radicals who came of age in the Great Depression and were drawn to the cause of industrial unionism by the mass misery and the open class war then being waged in America. Although CIO officials had to give "some leeway" to the ready but recalcitrant, even politically dangerous,

radical organizers who usually took the lead in organizing the new unions, they also did what they could to keep "firm control" in their own hands.

Whenever they could, CIO officials set up "organizing committees" instead of independent international unions, put their own men in charge, and tightly controlled the organizers (Taft 1964; Bernstein 1970, p.616). For example, Lewis put Philip Murray, his own union's vice president, in charge of the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee (SWOC), and Van Bittner, another United Mine Workers Union official, at the head of the Packinghouse Workers' Organizing Committee. CIO organizing committees were also set up in shoes, textiles, oil, and other industries. These committees were not autonomous; their members, who daily went out to organize, were not allowed to decide on their own strategy, make policy, call strikes, negotiate contracts, or vote on any issue—only Lewis and Hillman and their closest associates made these decisions.

CIO officials also tried to make their own deals with the bosses, and often forged agreements with them in "informal, secret sessions" (as Lewis did, for example, with Myron C. Taylor, U.S. Steel board chairman, "after three months of secret negotiations"), without involving the rank-and-file committees that sprang up in industry after industry or even their own CIO organizing committees (Lens 1961, p.185).

If a CIO organizing committee's members, whatever their political coloration, but especially if they were radicals of any hue, began to gain an independent following among the local workers, or became "too dangerous a threat, they were discharged" (Saposs 1959, p.122). SWOC, for instance, had 200 full-time organizers and another 233 part-time organizers on its payroll, paid out of CIO funds (mainly contributed by the unions of the

miners and the clothing workers). Among the 200 full-time organizers were 60 Communists (including the head district organizer in Pittsburgh, Bill Gebert, a Polish-born member of the party's national committee) (Foster 1952, p.349; Walker 1982, pp.35, 184-85). All of SWOC's organizers were hired, paid, and fired by the CIO's head office. As soon as they successfully organized a local, Philip Murray either fired them—especially the identifiable Communists and radicals among them—or moved them to another area, so that SWOC officials could take control (Taft 1964, p.57; Levenstein 1981, p.51).

Set up in 1937, SWOC was not transformed into the autonomous USWA until 1942 (and then only because Lewis resigned and took his UMW out of the CIO). At its first constitutional convention that year, the USWA was born without enduring the sharp "birth pangs" characteristic of the independently-organized unions. Its foundation was accompanied by "nothing that could be called factional strife" (Leiserson 1959, p.159). When a couple of delegates tried to get time to study the 24-page printed draft of the constitution submitted by a committee (because, as one delegate said, "I think this constitution paper we have here is going to build our rights for years to come, and we have got to establish them"), Murray told them they would have "plenty of time" to study it while it was being read from the podium. When another delegate asked if each section could be amended, Murray said they could "vote down the report" if they wanted to, and then added that he was not trying to push a "single solitary line in this constitution . . . down your throat," but wanted the "bickering and . . . noise making, . . . and all that stuff" stopped. After less than 10 hours of discussion, at a convention attended by 1,700 delegates from 1,100

locals, "every clause of the constitution was adopted by the delegate body without changing a word in the printed draft. . . . Each of the national officers was elected by unanimous ballot"—the previous heads of SWOC (Leiserson 1959, pp.159-63).

In auto, in contrast, a host of contending radical, Communist, Socialist, Coughlinite Catholic, and other factions competed to organize the unorganized and to win power in the new CIO union. The UAW financed much of its own organizing drives by collecting dues from the workers. Although the CIO also contributed money and organizers to the Ford drive, top CIO officials had little direct influence on the conduct of the campaigns against the big auto companies. As a result, "even at the height of CIO influence in the internal affairs of the UAW," the CIO was unable to impose "outside leadership" (Galenson 1960, p.133). Also, the major auto companies bitterly resisted unionization. GM, for instance, agreed to bargain with the CIO union only after a tenacious and often violent struggle with the workers. In these battles, and in some of the decisive sit-down strikes—e.g., in Flint, "the first great victory" for the UAW "and one of the epic confrontations in American labor history" (Zieger 1986, pp.46-47)—all sorts of radicals (from anti-Communist Socialists like the Reuther brothers and Emil Mazey, Trotskyists like John Anderson, "anti-anti-Communists" like George Addes and Richard Leonard, to Communists like Nat Ganley, Bob Travis, and Wyndham Mortimer)—earned reputations as superb organizers and combative and courageous leaders. Consequently these groups were able to create strong rank-and-file bases in the auto industry (Galenson 1960, p.150). No wonder, then, that shortly after its founding in 1937, the union split, and had to be re-founded again as a CIO affiliate at a special convention two

years later. Whatever their differences, the various UAW factions, which held regular meetings and had recognized delegates, sought in one way or another to enhance rank-and-file power, protect dissent, decentralize authority, and, especially, limit the authority of the president and other international executive officers (Galenson 1960, pp.171-72; Leiserson 1959, pp.154-59). The founding conventions of other unions that were organized independently may have "lacked the exaggerated conflicts and spectacularism of the UAW-CIO," but otherwise, they were quite similar (Leiserson 1959, p.158).

These were the circumstances, we suggest, in which the chances were highest that various factions of a union could build their own political base and continue to contest if not win its leadership over the years. Where, however, the organizing was done under the aegis (and thumb) of an official CIO organizing committee (as in SWOC), this tended to prevent the organizers from putting down roots from which an independent opposition might grow, and whose activities in the union would be reflected in a more democratic constitution. If this reasoning is correct, we should find that far more of the unions built by independent organizers than by CIO organizing committees not only had organized factions but a high level of constitutional democracy as well.

This is, however, not exactly what we find. Rather, relatively fewer of the unions formed through independent organizing than those formed under the aegis of a CIO organizing committee had organized factions, although sporadic factionalism did characterize far more of the former than the latter. But this finding is consistent with our prediction in the crucial sense that nearly three times as many of the unions formed under a CIO

organizing committee as those formed through independent organizing had no factions. The pattern is roughly the same for the relationship with constitutional democracy: these contrasting organizing strategies resulted in no measurable difference in the number of unions in each category with a high level of democracy. On the other hand, again, nearly twice the proportion of the unions built by CIO organizing committees as of the independently organized unions were "oligarchic," that is, were characterized by a low level of democracy (Tables 2 and 3).

One important reason for this result, we suggest, is that Lewis and Hillman tried to put CIO organizing committees in charge of the organizing in precisely those industries in which they had earlier fought the Red unionists: many more of the CIO unions that arose in these industries, as we have shown elsewhere (1989, p.516), than in the industries that had not been penetrated by earlier Red unionism were actually the product of a CIO organizing committee (38 percent of the former [N=21] versus 23 percent of the latter [N=17]). This is the reason, we think, that the earlier struggles and many-sided politicization of the workers in the industries penetrated by Red unionism had contradictory effects on both the growth of internal factions and the emergence of union democracy. Also, for the same reason, independent organizing did not eventuate more often in organized factions or democratic unions. The self-conscious political strategy of the Lewis-Hillman officialdom tended to counter the effects both of earlier Red organizing in an industry and of the later independent organizing of CIO unions (which otherwise might have arisen more frequently in the industries affected by earlier Red unionism). This, in turn, resulted, we suggest, in the contradictory effects of both of these insurgent practices in the

determination of the formation of organized factions and a high level of democracy in the CIO's unions.

IV. Amalgamation

Whether they were born "from above" or "from below," independently or under the aegis of a CIO organizing committee, the formation of CIO unions tended to follow roughly either a "unitary" or a "federated" (or "amalgamated") path. Unitary (i.e., centralized) organizations tend, as they grow, to incorporate new members and locals into their existing (usually hierarchical) structure, "with the new subordinate officials and groups deriving their authority from the summits of the organization." In contrast, an amalgamated organization grows through the lateral merger or combination of a number of existing unions, locals or groups of leaders (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.442).²⁴

Some unions amalgamated because their "jurisdictions," whatever their CIO charter said, were still mixed and shifting. Sometimes several unions were organizing in different branches of the same "industry." Sometimes a single union branched out and organized locals in several closely related "industries." To amalgamate or not to amalgamate was thus always a political question, as well as a specific issue in the organizing strategy of the unions and locals involved. Whether such coalitions should be permitted or not was also a crucial political question for top CIO officials. For example, the CIO's head office ordered the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), which soon was to become known as the CIO's "Red fortress," to relinquish the utility worker locals UE had been organizing for over a year. CIO officials created a new jurisdiction and established a separate, conservatively-led, Utility Workers

Union (Galenson 1960, p.253).

Two of the CIO's "Big Three," UAW and UE, arose through amalgamation; but the USWA, as we know, was a thoroughly unitary structure, "built from the top down, with power firmly concentrated at the top. Indeed, despite its enormous growth, . . . the union's top officers [retained] total administrative power . . . [in the] still highly centralized union" (Levenstein 1981, p.51). It became the very model of a unitary organization, with little if any local or district autonomy, and "no serious factional disputes [giving] . . . the members the right to choose among rival candidates for office. Any local center of disturbance was eliminated by [Philip Murray]" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.443).

Was the USWA's authoritarian regime a "functional requirement" of the industry's (large scale, highly concentrated) structure itself? As plausible as such an explanation is, it does not square, for instance, with what happened in auto, i.e., in another industry with a similar scale of production and level of concentration. Nor does it hold, for instance, in the contrasting case of textiles.

During the 1920s, a number of rival unions had been involved in trying to organize auto workers, among them the TUUL's Auto Workers Union; in 1937, their battered remnants, revived by the decade's mass struggles, amalgamated to form the UAW. In turn, they formed the basis for the UAW's internal factions, most of whose leaders had been deeply involved in the earlier years of organizing. The various factions consisted largely of "coalitions of the groups headed by these different leaders jointly resisting efforts to subordinate them to the national administration." So, despite the unfavorable "structural conditions . . . for internal democracy

and large-scale rank-and-file participation" in a huge union in a mass production industry like auto, it remained a relatively democratic union throughout most of the CIO era (and, as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman wrote in 1962, "it has taken close to two decades to approach a one-party structure and the process is still not completed" [1956, p. 443]).

So, the formation of a union through amalgamation, as the example of the UAW suggests, in bringing the leaders, members, and finances of the merged unions into a single organization, results in the redistribution of rank, authority, and power within the new union. Some officials of the previously separate unions are reduced, at best, to secondary officers of the new international or even to officers of a local, while others emerge as top officers of the international. But, whatever the outcome for individuals, amalgamation ordinarily also tends to preserve autonomous centers of power in the new union and to improve their leaders' chances to retain political bases within it, from which they can try to extend their influence and contend for the international's leadership. In a sense, then, such amalgamated unions tend to ". . . have internal opposition groups . . . built into them" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.465).

We want to stress that "amalgamation" is by no means a simple product of an industry's "structure," nor even of the (consequent?) prior existence of competing unions within it. For, as the situation in textiles illustrates sharply, even where an industry's "objective conditions" on both these counts were "naturally" conducive to the formation of an amalgamated union, the political action of CIO officials had its own relatively autonomous—and anti-democratic—effects.

Textiles was "simply not an industry," as Irving Bernstein (1970,

p.616) observes. "It was cotton, woolen and worsted, rayon and other synthetics, silk, hosiery, carpets and rugs, thread and braid, dyeing and finishing. Each of these 'industries' had its own geographic distribution, its own markets, its own technology, its own distinctive labor force."

So, this was an "industry" whose "structure"—its geographical, technical, and market diversity and heterogenous labor force—"naturally" should have nurtured the formation either of several CIO unions fitting its major niches or, instead, a single union formed through amalgamation, having, as a result, diverse centers of power with in it. In fact, in the pre-CIO era, "no industry had so much dual unionism": AFL, independent, IWW, and other syndicalist and radical unions had fought each other for years to organize and win the allegiance of the workers in this bunch of industries (Foster 1927, p.155). Historically, textile workers belonged to "innumerable small groups, characterized by . . . frequent combinations and separations."²⁵

Under these circumstances, the upsurge of unionism from the late 1930s on easily—if not "naturally"—"should" have led, through the amalgamation of these unions, to the creation of a single, relatively decentralized union with considerable autonomy in its districts and locals; and these pre-existing unions would then have formed the basis for lively rival factions and organized opposition to its international officials, resulting in the formation of a highly democratic industrial union. But this was not the path taken. Rather, Sidney Hillman, who headed the CIO's Textile Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC), set it up and ran it so that the pre-existing unions aligned within it (especially unions like the MIWU, that were led by Communists or other radicals with a long history of involvement in textile unionism) had no voice in the TWOC (Bernstein 1970, p.616).

To achieve this, and at the same time rein in the centrifugal forces of this newly formed "industry," Hillman's TWOC imposed a centralized bureaucratic structure on the new union.²⁶ TWOC established industry conferences and joint boards designed "to provide the internal coordination that was essential in so diversified an industry . . . without permitting the rise of permanent functional suborganizations which might eventually challenge the authority of the national union" (Galenson 1960, p.333, italics added).

The way the textile workers union was organized, then, illustrates how effectively political men can impose a system of concentrated power designed to override an industry's "underlying tendencies" toward the emergence within it of a highly decentralized union with many autonomous centers of power, organized factionalism, and, consequently, democracy. Instead, Hillman and his comrades forged a political structure for the new textile workers union that was unitary, centralized, and hierarchical—with, of course, their own subalterns in control. So, once it was formally established and recognized, the Textile Workers International Union was not "plagued" by factionalism; nor were its officials bothered by organized opposition. Instead, TWIU became a lasting oligarchical union whose members surely came to "know who is boss!"

Evidently, then, the "shotgun marriage" of independent unions, through enforced "amalgamation from above," can vitiate amalgamation's otherwise democratic potential.²⁷ Ordinarily, however, amalgamation tend to result in the preservation of autonomous centers of power and of diverse leadership groups—and thus in political competition if not factionalism—within the amalgamated union, so that the chances for the consolidation of democratic

self-government are enhanced. Unitary unions, in contrast, would tend not to have such internal political heterogeneity built into them; and this in turn would lessen their chances of being democratic.

Consistent with this reasoning, we find that the vast majority of the amalgamated unions had organized factions within them; and half of them had a high level of constitutional democracy; in contrast, the vast majority of the unitary unions had only sporadic factionalism or none at all; and a plurality among them were oligarchic (Tables 2 and 3).

INDEPENDENT EFFECTS OF THE FOUR INSURGENT POLITICAL PRACTICES

Indeed, of the four historical bundles of diametrically opposed political practices analyzed here, it was amalgamation, above all, that determined the chances that a union would later turn out to be highly democratic.²⁸ This is revealed by a logit model constructed to estimate the independent effects of these political practices, in particular, the "insurgent political practices" of earlier Red unionism, secession from below, independent organizing, and amalgamation. The odds that unions formed through amalgamation rather than as unitary organizations would later be highly democratic were 10 to 1. Also, though much lower, the odds that unions that seceded from the AFL in a workers' insurgency rather than in a revolt led by their top officers would later be highly democratic were 3 to 1 (Table 4). Independent organizing has no measurable effect, however, and earlier Red unionism in an industry has a negative effect on the odds of union democracy.

Why earlier Red unionism was negatively related to the odds of union democracy, has been suggested already: the Reds' CIO opposition emplaced tightly controlled organizing committees in these industries to forestall

Communist penetration and leadership of the new CIO unions and, perhaps unwittingly, also prevented deep-rooted opposition factions and internal democracy from emerging there.

Nonetheless, we suggest, earlier Red unionism, as well as independent organizing, contributed indirectly to the process that culminated in union democracy.

—Table 4 goes about here—

Long before the formation of the CIO, radical industrial unionists—from Eugene Victor Debs to William Z. Foster—fought to make "amalgamation" a "burning issue." They advocated the "concentration of the forces of organized labor [through] amalgamation of the six score craft unions into a few industrial unions," and saw amalgamation as a "life necessity of trade unionism" (Foster 1927, pp.32, 22). So, for both practical and principled reasons, the organizers and other workers (especially the radicals among them) who had been involved in, or at least influenced by, these earlier organizing battles, probably tried to amalgamate the new CIO unions they were building; in this way they could "concentrate their forces" against capital. For these reasons, the CIO unions organized in industries penetrated by earlier Red unionism tended to originate through amalgamation. In addition, since the AFL long had opposed industrial unionism, in principle, and had "made so little effort to organize the unorganized" (Draper 1972, p. 374), the major industrial unions probably arose, with rare exceptions, only where radicals, and Red unionists particularly, had been active in the pre-CIO era.²⁹ Maybe most of the TUUL unions had become "moribund" or had "faded away" by the time of the CIO upsurge (Klehr 1984, pp.47, 133). But some of them or their remnants had survived with enough

independence and cohesion to be able, once the CIO drive began, to amalgamate with other such remnants, AFL federal locals or independent unions. So, for instance, UE grew out of the amalgamation of the locals of the TUUL's Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union led by James Matles; several independent electrical worker locals organized by skilled immigrant English Socialist unionists, who elevated Julius Emspak to their leadership; and the Radio and Allied Trade Union Workers led by James Carey (who only a few years earlier, in 1933, had been clashing with Red unionists in Philadelphia) (Levenstein 1981, p.60).

This reasoning about the effect of earlier Red unionism on the chances that unions in the industry would amalgamate, is supported by our findings: of the 21 unions in industries which saw earlier Red organizing, 52% were formed through amalgamation; but of the 17 unions in industries without significant earlier Red organizing, 94% were formed as unitary organizations.³⁰ In turn, of course, amalgamation was to be crucial in the formation of democratic unions.

Similarly, to the extent that earlier Red unionism radicalized the workers involved or created local Red bases within AFL unions, this made insurrections against their officials and secession to join the CIO more likely. As many as 635 AFL union locals had radical or Red nuclei organized within them by the time the CIO was born (Klehr 1984, p. 225). These nuclei were decisive, we suggest (as AFL officials themselves charged) in "fomenting insurrection" against the AFL, and leading their fellow workers into the burgeoning CIO unions. Again, this reasoning is consistent with our findings: of the unions in industries with earlier Red unionism, 62% were born in workers' insurgencies; but 71% of the unions in industries

untouched by earlier Red unionism came into the CIO in a revolt of their top (AFL) officers.³¹ In turn, as we know, establishing a CIO union through a workers' insurgency rather than through the revolt of its top officers' favored its becoming democratic.

So, earlier Red unionism increased the chances both of union amalgamation and of workers' insurgency and thus indirectly contributed to the consolidation of union democracy. But it had contradictory effects, as we have pointed out, on independent organizing—although the latter also indirectly contributed, we suggest, to shaping a democratic union. CIO organizing committees tended, for the reasons given earlier, to foster the formation of unitary unions, even under conditions where amalgamation of the existing locals and independent unions in an industry might have been expected, although amalgamation was also an unavoidable part of their organizing strategy in some industries. In contrast, independent organizers in an industry, would tend to form their own local bases of support, because of the struggles they initiated and led; they built their unions from the bottom up, often linking themselves with other organizers, pooling their resources, devising a common strategy, and engaging in more or less unified industrial battles. We surmise that these alliances among various unions or locals, also frequently would have eventuated in their actual amalgamation.

Our findings are consistent with this reasoning, for independently organized unions were more than twice as likely to amalgamate as unions formed under the aegis of CIO organizing committees: of the former (N=26), 39% were formed via amalgamation; of the later (N=12), 17%.³² Independent organizing thus encouraged amalgamation and, therefore, indirectly contributed to building democratic unions.

COMMUNISM, ANTI-COMMUNISM, AND UNION DEMOCRACY

No factional struggle within the CIO was more chronic, divisive, bitter, and ultimately self-destructive than the conflict between the anti-Communists and the Communists and their radical allies. The latter had considerable support throughout the CIO, and they led 18 of the CIO's 38 durable unions, enrolling nearly a third of the CIO's total membership. But whether Communists and their allies won "power and trust" in these unions varied with the political practices of the unions' organizers: the odds on their winning a union's leadership, rather than opposing CIO factions, as we have shown elsewhere (1989), were far higher: first, if the union had seceded from the AFL as the result of an insurgent workers' movement rather than a revolt of its top officers; and second, if the union had been organized by independent organizers rather than by a CIO organizing committee. Two other insurgent political practices indirectly favored the Communists and their allies winning a union's leadership: earlier Red organizing in an industry (although its effects were contradictory); and forming a union through amalgamation instead of as a unitary organization. Thus, the same insurgent political practices that raised the odds favoring union democracy over autocracy also (paradoxically?) raised the odds (although not in precisely the same way) favoring the Communists and their allies rather than their political rivals winning union leadership. So, the question, given this constellation of political relations, is what effect Communist union leadership had on union democracy, and why.

To read the writings on American workers in this century, is to discover that hardly any question is as contentious, and the prevalent answer given as tendentious and less substantiated by systematic evidence,

as the political character and relevance of the Communists and their allies in organized labor—especially during the period of their sojourn at the helm of so many CIO unions. On the particular issue of the Communists' effect on union democracy, the prevalent view was put concisely by the young radical, C. Wright Mills (writing at a moment when their impending defeat and purge was imminent): "Communist rule within the U.S. unions they control is dictatorial" (1948, pp.198-99). This was, Mills said, one of the primary "charges" made against the Communists by their "liberal and left-wing opponents" (among whom he included himself).

No one acquainted with the conduct of the Communists when they were engaged in pushing the (latest) party line on an issue, or who now takes the time to peruse the pages, say, of the Daily Worker at the time, is likely to doubt that "personal defamation and intrigue," and "campaigns to bury gainsayers under an avalanche of denunciations and slander" were among the well-worn weapons in their political arsenal (Mills 1948, p.199; Cochran 1977, p.379). Undoubtedly also, despite a "meticulous adherence to the outer forms of democracy," Communist unionists sometimes "manipulated democratic procedures" (Howe and Coser 1957, p.383) or perverted them, as the head of the ACLU charged, "to gain control" (Baldwin 1946, p.58).

But anyone acquainted with the conduct of the Communists' "liberal and left-wing opponents"—that is, anyone who is not the latter's mere partisan—could also correctly describe their conduct in similar terms. If it was true that Communists and their allies in a union usually met or caucused "in advance of rank and file meetings to plan strategy," it was also true that their opponents "long practiced this policy" (Ozanne 1954, pp.103-04). If the Communists often "packed meetings" to get their way, so did their

opposition.³³ Nor can any serious scholar deny the intrigue against and defamation and slander of alleged "Communists" by their "liberal and left-wing opponents," or their own "campaigns" of virulent red-baiting—or, most important, their actual "perversion of democratic procedures," especially when they threw out Communists and "fellow travelers" from organized labor, and collaborated in denying them basic civil and political rights.³⁴

The fight by "anti-Stalinist leftists" against the Communists and their allies in the CIO did not consist—as the noted anti-Communist labor historian Robert Zieger points out—only of "vigorous, democratic competition on the shop floor and in the union halls." Rather, as he says, it was characterized all in all by "sordid episodes of reckless charges, personal violence and intimidation, and collaboration on the part of anti-Communists with some of the most disreputable congressional witch hunters and antilabor publications" (1986, pp. 132-33).

So, any effort to carry out a sustained empirical analysis of the role of the Communists in organized labor, and specifically their effect on the relative internal democracy of the unions they led ("dominated"), is burdened by having to confront (if we may borrow the words of historian Irving Bernstein [1970, p.783]) abundant "myth, exaggeration, and nonsense." Indeed, until we began the research to carry out the present analysis, the lament of Lipset, Trow and Coleman over three-and-a-half decades ago (1962, p.456), was still true: "No one has attempted either a qualitative or quantitative analysis of the relationship between diffuse political [that is, socialist or Communist] or specific business-union ideologies and the presence or absence of political conflict [that is, of factionalism and democracy] within trade unions."

The Political Camps Among CIO Unions

In this analysis, we compare the relative internal factionalism and constitutional democracy of the unions in the CIO's three major "political camps." But measuring the union's political camp is inherently controversial—especially the decision to classify a union as "Communist-led." For not only the "bosses" but even their union rivals used redbaiting (attacking or denouncing a person or group as "Communist") as a political weapon. Many AFL unions and even a few CIO unions, as we saw earlier, constitutionally barred Communists from office (also see Saposs 1959, p. 121; Taft 1953, p.23). So, for Communists to dissemble about their party membership was not merely a Leninist reflex; it was often both a matter of principle ("don't let redbaiting break you up") and of practical political (and even physical) survival. So "avowed" Communists were rare among CIO unionists. Any classification of unions as Communist-led (or "Communist dominated") thus has to involve something of a distortion (and construction) of political reality.

We have used the classification made by Max Kampelman (1957, pp.45-47), despite its tendentiousness; it is based mainly on the CIO's "trials" of "Communist-dominated" unions and on other (anti-Communist) sources (e.g., Avery 1946; Research Institute of America [RIA] 1946, pp. 17-18). Kampelman categorized the unions mainly on the basis of the issues raised, causes advocated, and positions taken by their leaders. For the "Communist camp," this amounted to the claim that they were "parroting the Soviet line"; rarely was any evidence offered to demonstrate actual Communist party membership (Kampelman 1957, pp. 121-40, 167-224). Nonetheless, this classification's merit is that it represents the common political

understandings of many union activists at the time. It also roughly accords with our own study of the historical record.

Political Camp, Factionalism, and Democracy

This part of our analysis starts from two closely related propositions:

1. "the more diffuse the ideology of a trade union, the greater the likelihood of internal factionalism." 2. "political cleavages" based on ideological differences tend "to sustain permanent democratic opposition" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, pp. 457, 468). In particular, we suggest that the presence of Communists and their radical allies in the leadership of a union enhanced its chances for internal democracy, first, because of their socialist conception of the "labor movement . . . as a weapon for the liberation of the working class" (Foster 1927, p.23; cf. Marx 1973, pp.75-6). Such a transcendent conception of organized labor's mission tends to legitimate internal ideological and political controversies within a union, whereas "business unionism, as a set of ideas justifying the narrowest definitions of a union's role in society," discourages such controversies, "for it implies that union leadership is simply the administration of an organization with . . . undebatable goals: the maximization of the members' income and general welfare." Business unionism thus also "helps to legitimate one-party oligarchy" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.456).

Whether wittingly or not, then, the politicization of everyday life by Communist unionists, their intense commitment to confront a broad range of public issues (from the "poll tax" and lynching to "imperialism," as well as the "defense of Soviet socialism") that transcended the matters dealt with in collective bargaining, enhanced the chances that conflicts would arise over these issues—which thereby encouraged political factionalism and thus

constitutional democracy—within the unions they led. Unions whose leaders appeared to "parrot the Communist line" were also specifically targeted for penetration by anti-Communist activists, most notably by CIO organizing officials dispatched by Lewis or Hillman (e.g., Alan Haywood and Adolph Germer) and by the ACTU "Actists" mentioned above. So, the establishment of an organized opposition in Communist-led unions probably was less often the product of spontaneous generation from within than of a self-conscious policy by their enemies (Levenstein 1981, pp. 87-90).

In addition, the Communist-led unions, perhaps because of the Red unionists' long-held strategic and ideological commitments to forging industrial unions through amalgamation of the existing craft unions in an industry, were much more likely than other unions to have been formed as amalgamated rather than unitary organizations: 44% of the Communist-led unions (N=18) but only 20% of the unions in each of the other camps (N=10 each) were built through amalgamation.³⁵ And, as we know, amalgamation tends to create relatively autonomous centers of power in a union which provide it with a basis for internal political opposition and thus sustain democracy within it.

It is, therefore, "no accident" that the Communist-led unions were, in reality, characterized by internal political conflict. Many of them had "opposition factions too strong to be intimidated, too large to be expelled" (Cochran 1977, p.380), whereas the anti-Communist unions rarely had any factions. Among the 23 unions about which we have solid information on factionalism, we find the following: every one of the 10 Communist-led unions were marked by internal factionalism; five of them had organized factions, and five had sporadic factions. Among the eight "shifting"

unions, that is, unions in which Communists and their allies had a significant base but were not in control, four had organized factions, and two had sporadic factions. But among the five anti-Communist unions, namely, the ones most dedicated to the narrowest "business unionism," only one had organized factions, another one had sporadic factions, and three had none.³⁶ The breadth of the concerns fostered by the ideology of Communist unionists, by inviting organized opposition on a broad range of political issues, thus (unintentionally) encouraged political factionalism within the unions they led (cf. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.456).

This "diffuse ideology" was, however, a peculiarly contradictory amalgam. For if American Communism was "the legitimate heir of American radicalism," it was also "the bastard child of Soviet totalitarianism" (Naison 1985, p.101). Ardent sycophancy of Stalin's dictatorship, if not apologetics for his regime of terror, coexisted within it in uneasy tension with an elemental democratic impulse, free-wheeling individualism, and egalitarian passion.³⁷ What the weight of these elements was, and in what mix, in this ideological amalgam—and how deeply held they were as motivating commitments in the political consciousness of Communist workers, among union activists, organizers, and leaders, we do not know.³⁸ But the classical socialist (and syndicalist) elements in this ideology, emphasizing the self-reliance of the working class—that "the emancipation of the working class is the job of the workers alone"—probably had a special immediacy and meaning for Communist unionists.

In their conception, repressive union bureaucracy had its roots, not in "organization" as such but in "the class collaboration policies of the union officialdom," which by "rigidly suppress[ing] all union democracy, poison[s]

the very class soul of the unions" (Foster 1927, pp. 94-5). Further, specific home-grown ideas of "rank and file power" forged in the cauldron of earlier concrete organizing and political struggles (as we emphasized earlier) had a direct bearing on the Communists' commitment to union democracy. Communists and other radicals--both in principle and for their own protection--had long been committed to establishing specific political forms and constitutional guarantees that would ensure democracy in the new industrial unions.³⁹ They, especially, tended "to oppose very great centralization of authority [because] union suspensions and receiverships . . . [could] also be used to enforce conformity of opinion within a union; and this weapon . . . [was] used mainly against 'Communists'" (Davis 1953, p.236).⁴⁰

Thus, for all these reasons, we suggest, contrary to the prevailing view that the "fully Communist-run unions [were] the most undemocratic in the labor movement" (Pitzele 1947, p.31), that the chances for the existence of union democracy were actually greater in Communist-led unions than in unions in rival CIO camps. And this is, indeed, what our analysis reveals: a far higher percentage of the unions in the Communist camp than in the anti-Communist camp had a high level of constitutional democracy, with the unions in the "shifting" camp ranged between these extremes. Further, only one of the Communist-led unions (see note 4) measured low on constitutional democracy, whereas half or more of the unions in rival camps did (Table 5).⁴¹

These findings, we hasten to add, are consistent with the results of the two previous studies of union constitutional provisions referred to earlier (Summers 1946 and Taft 1948). Our "secondary analysis" of the

information they provide on CIO unions shows that the concentration of executive authority—i.e., the authority to supersede local officers and to suspend and cancel local union charters—was least by far in the Communist-led unions: in Taft's conception, over two thirds of them endowed their "chief officer" with only "routine" authority; while, in sharp contrast, this was true of less than a tenth of the unions in the other camps (Table 6).⁴² The pattern in the relative equality of the franchise among the unions in the different camps, though not as sharp, is similar. Constitutional clauses expressly prohibiting the exclusion or expulsion of members because of their race, creed, or citizenship, were more frequent in the Communist-led unions, but were also characteristic of the unions in the other camps; but the Communist-led unions were far more likely than the others to expressly prohibit discrimination against women or on the basis of a worker's political affiliation. Further, far more of them than of the "shifting" and anti-Communist unions had clauses prohibiting discrimination on every one of these grounds (Table 7).

—Tables 5, 6, and 7 go about here—

INDEPENDENT EFFECTS OF COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, FACTIONALISM, AND INSURGENT
POLITICAL PRACTICES IN DETERMINING UNION DEMOCRACY

Communist union leadership, as we have shown, tended to arise from the same insurgent political practices that also encouraged the emergence of union democracy; in addition, the Communist-led unions were also much more marked than others by internal factionalism, which is also closely associated with union democracy. So, it is surely possible, and plausible to suppose, that our finding (as well as the findings of Taft and Summers) that the Communist-led unions were far more likely to be democratic than

their rivals in the other political camps is actually a spurious relationship. The question, in other words, is whether Communist leadership still has a measurable independent effect in the determination of union democracy, once the effects of these four insurgent political practices and organized factionalism are taken into account.

Restricted by the small number of unions in our analysis, and even fewer on which we can measure every relevant variable, we have constructed three separate logit models to estimate the independent effects of these variables in determining union democracy. Also, because only amalgamation and workers' insurgency among the four insurgent practices had measurable direct effects in determining union democracy, and the effect of the former was by far the most important, we have taken the expedient of including only amalgamation in the logit models.

These logit models reveal sharply that the odds favoring union democracy over autocracy were increased both by the presence of organized factions and by amalgamation. Further, Communist leadership also had an independent effect in the determination of union democracy: taking these variables' effects into account, the odds favoring union democracy were still far higher—ranging between five to one and six to one in the three models—if Communists and their radical allies rather than anti-Communists led the union (Table 8).

The main hypotheses and findings of our entire empirical analysis are presented in figure 1, in the form of a "theoretical model," showing the direct and indirect effects of insurgent political practices, organized factions, and Communist and allied radical leadership in the determination of union democracy.

—Figure 1 goes about here—

CONCLUSION

These findings contradict if they do not confute the theory that oligarchy in labor unions is an "immanent necessity" of "organization"; it is no more "immanent" or "necessary" than democracy. Both, to put it differently, are as immanent and necessary as the other: they constitute alternative possible paths, democratic or authoritarian, of union development. Which path a union takes depends—as we have tried to show—on the resolution of concrete, relatively contingent political struggles among contending working-class factions and parties, and thus on the resultant pattern of political relations within the union, and the character, radical or conservative, of its political leadership.

So, if there is an "iron law of oligarchy," then there must also be an opposite "law," the "iron law of democracy." For, in Alvin W. Gouldner's words (1955, p. 506), "if oligarchical waves repeatedly wash away the bridges of democracy, this eternal recurrence can happen only because men doggedly rebuild them after each inundation." In short, insurgency, radicalism, and union democracy are inseparable.

But, to return to a question we raised at the beginning but have avoided until now: so what? What difference does it make whether democracy or oligarchy triumphs in a union? Do the rights and liberties enjoyed by union members as "citizens" of their own organized political community matter in their common quotidian lives as workers? Does their enlarged "control of policy formation," as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman suggest, assure that their interests are more effectively represented? If workers "think of the union as their creature" and "run it in as much detail as possible,"

will it then seek, as in Mills' radical vision, to "become an instrument of social transformation"? These critical questions—which are the focus of our continuing research—are central to the analysis of the implications of democracy and oligarchy in organized labor for the reproduction of class domination under advanced capitalism.

1. Edelstein and Warner (1975, p. 339) make more or less the same point: "Organizational theory . . . is for the most part slanted towards bureaucratic, or at least intrinsically undemocratic, organizations and is usually exasperating in its tangential relevance to organizational democracy, the essential components of which are seldom given more than peripheral recognition. [It] . . . has tended towards simplistic pessimistic biases concerning the effects of such variables as the age, size, and complexity of organizations, and of trade unions in particular. It has also been apolitical and vapidly global in its approach to political processes, to the extent that . . . constitutional features, and their relative independence from their current environment, have not usually been adequately appreciated."

2. Actually, despite its Michelsian cast, the thrust of much of Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's substantive analysis of the origins of democracy in the so-called "deviant case" of the International Typographical Union and our own thesis are quite consistent with each other, for they draw freely in the course of their analysis (often explicitly) on radical democratic and socialist theory (see, for instance, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, pp. 15-16; 69-76).

3. "International" because these unions organized workers not only in the United States but also in U.S. territories and Canada.

4. The hitherto nearly moribund AFL also grew rapidly—if not as spectacularly as its new rival—from the late 1930s on, as its own organizing in some industries now cut across once-hallowed "craft" lines. By 1950 or so, well over half of all manual workers, outside of agriculture,

were unionized. Our calculations provide us with a rough estimate that 56.2% of all non-farm manual workers, men and women combined, were in unions in 1952: of 14.95 million union members in 1952 (Bell 1960, p.91), somewhere under 3 million were women (Paschell 1955, p.64, says "almost 3 million" in 1954). Although a few CIO unions organized Office Workers; Public Employees; Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians; and Retail and Wholesale Employees, only the latter union had a sizable number of members (120,000); together, these unions constituted only a tiny fraction of all union men and women. In 1950, the number of non-farm wage workers (craftsmen, foremen, and kindred; operatives and "kindred"; laborers, and service workers, except private household) consisted of 5.3 million women and 21.3 million men (US Bureau of the Census 1953, Table 124). So, the proportions of men and women in manual occupations who were union members were nearly identical: 56.0% of male manual workers and (assuming "almost" 3 million women unionists), 56.7% of female manual workers. Few so-called "service workers," e.g., janitors, charwomen, bootblacks, counterworkers, and hospital attendants, police or firemen, were then unionized. This means, therefore, that as of 1950 about 80% of the core of the working class—craftsmen, operatives, and laborers—was unionized. Typical estimates of the size and significance of organized labor in the United States usually refer to the undifferentiated "labor force" or, at best, "nonfarm labor force," rather than to employed wage workers. Bell correctly (1960) emphasizes the invalidity of such measures, but he does not make separate calculations of the rate of unionization among wage workers as contrasted with salaried employees. On the relative organization of different segments of the working class (both "white collar" and "blue

collar") as of the late 1970s, see Zeitlin (1989, pp.181-220).

5. Union Democracy "began to take shape" during the late 1940s, at the tail end of the CIO era, and was published a year after the CIO-AFL merger. Which "clauses" Lipset et. al have in mind here, they don't tell us. In fact, they occasionally refer to (e.g. pp.271, 290), and seem to take quite seriously for the unions' internal political life, clauses that prohibit internal factions, "slander" of union officers, or issuing circulars to members. They provide no systematic evidence (or even cite the "studies of social scientists") that, as they say, would "tend to confirm" this "generalization" that union constitutional clauses and actual union internal political life "bear little relationship" to each other. They do, however, provide one salient, and important, example of the discrepancy between formal constitutional provisions and actual practice in a union: although the International Typographical Union had an institutionalized two-party system, its constitution explicitly prohibited ITU members from joining a "combination composed wholly or partly" of ITU members "with the intent or purpose to . . . influence or control the legislation of this union." Yet by the end of the book, they formulate an hypothesis that contradicts their rejection at the book's outset of the importance of constitutional rights: "The greater the protection for the rights of political opposition included in a union's code of law, the greater the chances for democracy" (1962, p.468). This hypothesis is indeed the underlying assumption of our measure of union democracy, and is consistent with our own close reading of the history of the CIO unions, as we discuss below. Further, as we shall see, it is supported by the findings of our empirical analysis.

6. In fact, despite their blanket denial of the relevance of constitutional clauses, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman themselves specifically point to such authoritarian clauses as evidence of "the power of top officials": "Most unions have given their executive boards the right to suspend local officials for violating policies of the central bodies . . ." and thereby increase "their monopolization of internal power." Lipset, Trow, and Coleman refer specifically to constitutional provisions that forbid "slandering union officers," distributing circulars to union members, or forming internal factions, cliques, or parties as restrictions on union democracy (1962, p.8; also see pp. 271-72).

7. Summers also studied the disciplinary powers codified in 154 union constitutions. He found that "two thirds of the unions have clauses [in their constitutions] which expressly restrict internal political action" (1950, p. 513). Unfortunately, this article does not provide systematic information on each clause for each union constitution examined, as did his earlier article on the franchise (1946), discussed below.

8. So, Mills' appraisal is not correct if applied to the AFL: "Almost always on paper, . . . the American labor unions are democratic societies" (1948, p. 5, italics added).

9. We compiled the data and calculated these relationships on the basis of the information given in Summers (1946, Table 3) and in Taft (1948, pp.459-66). We omitted unions with under 2,000 members and unions whose membership is not given. Contingency tables showing these relationships (in percent) are available upon request. They are omitted here to save space.

10. Of course, some union officials, in collusion with employers have had a hand in the control of illegitimate means of violence (e.g., in the racket-ridden, east-coast International Longshoremen) (Kimeldorf 1988) or the UMW's "benevolent satrapy" under John L. Lewis during the 1920s (Taft 1948, pp.469-71; Foster 1927, pp.132-37).

11. See, for instance, Leiserson's detailed descriptions of the founding conventions of the UAW and United Steel Workers of America (USWA), which we discuss below (1959, pp.154-77). Of course, even when the drafting of the constitution or actual writing was done by an attorney (e.g., Maurice Sugar, the UAW's general counsel, wrote its constitution's precise wording [Johnson 1991]), the final content of the provisions was the result of decisions made by the assembled union delegates.

12. For some important instances, in the unions in steel (USWA), auto (UAW), electrical (UE), rubber (URW), textiles (TWU), wood (IWA), oil (OWIU), and the newspaper industry (ANG), see Galenson (1960, pp. 114, 171, 263-65, 273, 347, 396-97, 405-06, 417, 423; 562-63); in east coast maritime (NMU), see Levenstein (1981, p.257); Saposs (1959, p.141); in west coast longshore (ILWU), see Kimeldorf (1988, pp.10-11); in transport (TWU), USWA, and UE, see Preis (1969, pp. 372, 327, 339, 401).

13. Foster (who later became a leading figure in the Communist Party) led the organizing of Chicago's packinghouse workers, under the aegis of the AFL after World War I, and the "great steel strike" of 1919; and in 1920, he organized and led the "Red" Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) (on which, see below) (Cochran 1977, pp.92-93).

14. Most of the constitutions we reviewed were for 1948. Some unions held no convention in 1948, so we took the constitution for the nearest year. We focus on the late 1940s, near the close of the CIO era, because these constitutions, therefore, reflected much of their union's history during the years preceding the CIO's expulsion of 11 "Communist-dominated" unions, and the purge of alleged Communists from the leadership of many other unions. These expulsions and purges, which transformed the CIO's political life, were begun formally at the CIO's November 1949 Convention.

15. A chart listing the scale and index scores for each CIO union in our sample is available on request.

16. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1962, pp.75-6) concede elsewhere that: "Many international unions have had competing political groups within them." But they ignore the analytical implications of this—which allows them to treat the ITU as a unique deviant rather than as merely an extreme variant of the pattern of durable internal factionalism characteristic of many other—but especially CIO—unions.

17. A chart (with references) showing how each union is classified on the presence of factions is available on request.

18. Such intraclass, and intraunion, struggles take place, of course, under varying "objective conditions" (e.g., the industries' technical and organizational forms, ownership concentration, and market relations, and, partly as a consequence, the types of workers—skilled or unskilled, men or women, native or foreign born, etc.) the unions organize. We abstract here from these sorts of "objective conditions" or "structural factors." Perhaps

such (ostensibly given) "objective conditions" circumscribe these struggles, both limiting and enabling them and, therefore, affect their political consequences. But they do not determine how—and over what issues—these struggles are waged, nor who wins and who loses.

In this analysis, we assume that such objective conditions remain constant; and we explore how the political relations resulting from political struggles (whether wittingly or not) become integral components of the emergent objective conditions for subsequent struggles and the form taken by union government.

We have tried, however, to estimate the effects in determining union democracy of some of the "factors" in the "structure of the industry" or the composition of its workers that are often suggested as its determinants. See Appendix: On Measuring "Objective Conditions."

19. The first phase of Red union organizing, from 1920 through late 1929, was under the direction of the TUEL. The second phase, through late 1935, was under its successor, the TUUL. See Cochran (1977); Draper (1957, 1960, 1972); Foster (1937; 1947); Klehr (1984); Starobin (1972). Nearly two decades ago, Theodore Draper observed that, other than his own article (1972, p.371), "not a single book, dissertation, or article, scholarly or otherwise, has ever been devoted to [the TUUL or] . . . to any of its constituent unions." This situation has now begun to change. See Johanningsmeier 1988, 1989; and Foner 1991, pp. 76-169, which deal with the TUEL in some detail.

20. Although this was surely not true of many ex-Communists and Socialists, or of their allies in ACTU, which consistently "endorsed increased restrictions on the civil liberties of left-wing CIO members and demanded government intervention within the CIO should the CIO unions prove unwilling to 'clean house'" (Seaton 1981, p.192).

21. The CIO officially transformed itself into the "Congress of Industrial Organizations" at its constitutional convention in November 1938.

22. Of the 38 durable CIO unions, 18 had seceded from the AFL as the result of an insurgent workers' movement: 14 originated in rebellions in various locals and districts of existing AFL unions, 4 in battles in "federal" unions.

23. Seven CIO unions were independent non-AFL unions before the CIO was established (e.g., the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians) or were organized in an industry that had no prior AFL union (e.g., the Farm Equipment Workers [FE]). Because they also joined the CIO with their organizational hierarchies intact, we included them in the "from above" category.

24. "Amalgamation" refers here to the merger in the 1930s of several independent units to form one CIO union. So, we do not classify unions as amalgamated that were formed out of the merger of AFL federal locals alone; in general, these federal locals had little if any prior independent organizational existence. Only if the merger of an established AFL union led to a substantial reorganization of its administrative or political structure when it joined the CIO, is it classified as amalgamated. Three

unions underwent mergers after joining the CIO: 1. Mine, Mill, which added a Die Casting Division in 1942, five years after it bolted the AFL to become a charter member of the CIO; 2. the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; 3. the Fur and Leather Workers. Because the Mine, Mill merger occurred long after its CIO political structure had been established, we did not classify it as an amalgamated union. (Classifying it as amalgamated would strengthen our findings.) As to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW), it had become a unitary highly centralized, union long before 1936, when it absorbed the Journeymen Tailors Union (and its some 6,000 members), and later on, the CIO Laundry Workers (and its nine locals). No significant reorganization of the ACW's administration occurred after these mergers (Galenson 1960, p.285; also see Bernstein 1970, pp.73 ff). So we did not classify it as an amalgamated union. In contrast, the merger of the International Fur Workers Union in March 1939 with the National Leather Workers Association resulted in its restructuring. The new union reconstituted itself with two relatively independent divisions, fur and leather; each division elected its own officers and managed its own finances. Their combined executive boards constituted the executive body of the new International Fur and Leather Workers Union (Foner 1950, p.556; Brown 1947, p.135). So we classified it as an amalgamated union.

25. Among them were the AFL's United Textile Workers; Associated Silk Workers (organized in 1916 by the IWW, and later successively affiliating with, seceding from, and then rejoining the AFL again in 1931); One Big Union; Amalgamated Textile Workers; American Federation of Textile Operatives (mainly in New Bedford, Massachusetts); Amalgamated Lace Operatives; Federated Textile Unions of America (itself formed by the merger

of six independent unions in 1921); TUUL's National Textile Workers Union (NIWU) (founded in late 1928); and still other unions, "a host of lesser lights," that arose over the years among textile workers (Galenson 1940, pp.15-16; Foster 1927, p.155).

26. This example also illustrates our proposition "that what came to be considered an 'industry' in capital/labor relations was itself at least in part a political artifact of these organizing struggles" (1989, p.513).

27. Similarly, if the imbalance in the relative economic situation, size and resources of the amalgamated unions is great, a dominant unitary union in the merger could simply absorb the other unions, and their leaders, without altering its own structure. (Worse, of course, if the dominant union were itself oligarchic, while the others were democratic, this could result in "retrogression from democracy under the auspices of oligarchic leaders" [Edelstein and Warner 1975, p.350].)

28. We use logit modeling (rather than probit) because not only are its coefficients interpretable as precise measures of effect, but they also can be restated in everyday language as the comparative odds of alternative political outcomes.

29. As of 1937, 103 unions belonged to the AFL, only 12 of which were, in fact, more or less industrial unions, rather than craft unions; and, of these, eight were not founded until the late 1930s (Daugherty 1938, p. 350).

30. Log odds ratio = 2.9; s.e. = 1.12; $p < .05$.

31. Log odds ratio = 1.36; s.e. = .696; $p < .03$.

32. Log odds ratio = 1.14; s.e. = .87; $p < .10$.

33. The then liberal anti-Communist Kampelman (1957, p. 136) approvingly refers to the "hard-headedness" and useful advice of the ACTU's tactical manual, which advises "Actists" to pack a union meeting: "Place your people carefully in the meeting hall. Try to have a good-sized bunch down front. . . . Place others on each side and place a nice contingent in the back. This is called the Diamond, the oldest meeting strategy in the world. It makes it look as if the entire meeting is filled with your people." Had the Communists advised such tactics in a publication of theirs, no doubt it would have been described less endearingly.

34. So, for example, long before Philip Murray and other CIO officials declared open war on the Communists and their allies, he met in secret with anti-Communist UAW executive board members to plot strategy against them. He also secretly channeled Steelworkers' money into the hands of the anti-Communist Group ("Members for Democratic Action") in the UE, although the Communist-led UE was then a highly democratic union, according to nearly every serious observer (Levenstein 1981, pp.211, 334). Once the split was in the open, Murray spoke of Communist unionists in such delicate language as the following: "sulking cowards . . . apostles of hate," they were forever "lying out of the pits of their dirty bellies" (Zieger 1986, p.131). Or take UE president James Carey's remark (showing a certain flair for political satire) about UE's Communist unionists: "The performance of a trapeze artist in a circus is entertainment, but political acrobats in pink tights posing as labor leaders are a disgrace to the union and an insult to the intelligence of the membership" (Critchlow 1976, p.232). Similarly, the

dispassionate, objective historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. describes Communist labor leaders as "dreary fanatics and seedy functionaries, talking to themselves in an unintelligible idiom . . ." (1957, p.22). For an overview of "the persecution of the radical minority within the American working class," see Cauter (1979, p.360).

35. Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 0.665; s.e. = .468; p<.08.

36. Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 0.789; s.e. = .418; p<.03.

37. How the mix of "Stalinism" and egalitarianism entered into the CP's struggle against racial segregation, for instance, especially during World War 2, is a hotly debated issue. The evidence suggests to us that their egalitarianism is what actually mattered in determining how Communist unionists acted. "Communists played very active roles in combating discrimination in both shop and union affairs. In union after union, Communists challenged the traditional devices built into the rules of unions and work places perpetuating segregation of the races and second-class status for blacks. Their record in unions . . . was generally exemplary on this score" (Levenstein 1981, p. 332). So, for example, although "Negroes" made up less than 3% of all workers in the electrical manufacturing industry, Communist-led "UE acted on political issues such as the poll taxes and lynching," and UE News carried articles trying to "rally union forces to oppose the poll tax" (Critchlow 1976, p.235). Where blacks were a sizable part of the work force in given locals (such as the locals of UE district 8 centered in St. Louis and headed by UE vice president and "avowed Communist" William Senter, or in the integrated local of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers in the Red Mountain iron mines of Alabama) or in the industry as a

whole (as in longshore, transport, auto, and maritime), Communist unionists displayed an extraordinary commitment to fighting racial discrimination. They remained firm in this commitment even when (as in MM's battles with USWA, or those of the National Maritime Union (NMU) with the AFL Seafarers International Union) rival AFL or CIO unions used racist slogans to try to break or raid them (Critchlow 1976, pp.234-37; Huntley 1977). The NMU, for example, was founded as a breakaway from the autocratic and segregated AFL International Seamens Union (ISU) in the midst of widespread rank and file sitdown strikes in mid-1937 unifying black and white seamen on east coast ships. Throughout the era of Communist leadership, NMU continued to fight to end segregation in hiring and on shipboard while the Seafarers (SIU), successor to the Seamens Union (ISU), "used the appeal of segregated shipping to oppose the NMU and to recruit new members" (Critchlow 1976, pp.237, 241).

38. Although oral histories and memoirs (e.g., Starobin 1972, Matles and Higgins 1974; Nelson et al. 1981; Mortimer 1971; Healey 1990) provide us with a glimpse.

39. Among the specific measures repeatedly advocated by Foster, in his writings throughout the era of Red unionism and in the first years of the CIO's emergence, were the following: "admit Negroes" without discrimination; "reduce [officials'] exorbitant salaries"; "establish a free press in the unions"; "secure the right of free expression by political minorities"; "abolition of the expulsion policy"; "right of all members to run for and hold offices"; "right of all [union] members to hold any political belief"; biennial national conventions; "broad rank and file delegations in the

convention"; "strict financial reports"; "all convention committees to be voted on . . . by convention delegates"; "no restrictions upon the introduction of resolutions . . . before or during the conventions"; "the right . . . to secure a roll call vote"; "officials, as such, should have no votes"; "the convention to be adjourned only by a majority vote to prevent officials from arbitrarily closing the convention to stifle democratic rule"; right of "initiative [and] referendum"; "the right to recall elected officers by majority vote at any time; "election, not appointment, of convention committees"; "free discussion of all economic and political questions and opinions in the local meetings and official union journals" (1927, pp.319, 322-23, 333-34; 1936, p.208; 1937, pp. 251, 253, 259, 274).

40. So, it is not at all "fairly obvious," as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman say (1956, p. 87), that U.S. "Communist labor leaders" were "totalitarian," and that this, not a commitment "to encourage and deepen internal democracy in their unions," is why they "made strenuous efforts to increase interest in the union by establishing various forms of union-controlled liesure-time organizations and making attendance at union meetings compulsory." After all, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, who open their work by quoting (on p. 3) the infamous, foolish words of ILWU head Harry Bridges in 1947 extolling the virtue for unions of "totalitarian government" (where there are "no political parties. People are elected to govern the country based upon their records."), also say 146 pages later that: "The east coast [rightwing, AFL longshore] union is one of the worst dictatorships in American unionism, whereas the West Coast union [ILWU], though Communist-controlled on the international level, is very democratic. The San Francisco local [the heartland of Bridges' support] has two permanent political groups, which

alternate in power much as do parties in the ITU" (1956, p.149n). Goodman (1963) and Kimeldorf (1989) agree with this characterization of ILWU by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman. Other authors, however, have been less generous in their assessment of ILWU's internal democracy, e.g., Levenstein (1981), p.334; Hield (1949). Further, on our own measure of constitutional democracy, the ILWU was the only union in the Communist camp to come out "low."

41. The inclusion of a political litmus test in a constitution, prohibiting Communists from membership or holding union office, is a crucial infringement on the basic political right of the franchise. The constitutions of all of the unions led by Communists and their allies prohibited discrimination on the grounds of political affiliation or beliefs. Since this is a crucial component of the index of the level of constitutional democracy, we wanted to be sure that this clause itself had not "loaded" our index in favor of the Communist-led unions. So, although in our conception, constitutional democracy is an inseparable constellation of civil and political rights, and our index is meant to measure this constellation as a whole, we separately ran each Guttman scale measuring personal and societal civil rights, and the political rights of the franchise and accountability, by political camp. On each scale, though the percentages vary, the pattern is similar: The Communist-led unions were far more likely than the anti-Communist unions to have a "high" score on each set of rights (although the "shifting" unions were less likely than the anti-Communist unions to have a "high" score on societal rights). The table showing these relationships is available upon request.

42. Taft remarks with implicit dismay that all but one of the unions in his own category of "routine" executive authority were "recognized as members of the leftist faction, and their policies have been largely determined by well-entrenched communist groups operating within the unions. Does the absence of a strong executive," he asked rhetorically, "make political domination easier, in that it eliminates the possibility of the defection of the chief officer changing the policy of the union?" As an afterthought, he adds that "other reasons" might be that these unions' "chief executives have either lacked the will or the opportunity to appropriate much power." The question, of course, which we have tried to address here, is what explains such differences in "will" and "opportunity"?

Appendix: On Measuring "Objective Conditions"

This brief appendix is intended merely to assess the relative effects of some structural or demographic "factors" mentioned in the literature as determinants of the chances for union democracy. (See Strauss [1977] for a recent survey of the literature.) No one has systematically tested the independent effects of these variables in determining union democracy, although Edelstein and Warner (1975, p. 172) measured correlations between some union organizational variables and some attributes of union democracy. Plausible arguments occasionally have been offered to suggest why a particular structural factor matters. More often only the haziest reasons are given, or the "hypothesis" is so hedged around with qualifications, that it is unclear what the hypothesis really is. Sometimes, in different places, the same author will suggest diametrically opposed effects of the same variables. But we refrain here from a critical digression on these "hypotheses," and merely report our "tests" of the independent effects of such variables as compared with those of our own main political variables, namely, "amalgamation" and "political camp."

To our knowledge, the only work to propose a set of interrelated "propositions" about the determinants of union democracy is Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1962). Consistent with the thrust of our own analysis, it is noteworthy that, although they suggest 22 main and 10 additional corollary propositions, only one (corollary) proposition concerns the possible effects of industry structure (the level of industrial concentration) on union democracy.

Three industry-level variables and one concerning the structure of the union itself often mentioned in the literature as determinants of the

chances for union democracy are plant size, industrial concentration, and occupational status, as well as union size.

Union-specific data on the structure and demographic characteristics of industries in the 1930s or 1940s do not exist. So, we had to use U.S. Census industry-level (4-digit SIC) data. But such data are also lacking on many unions. We also doubt that measures based on industry-level data are reliable and valid measures of union attributes. First, the jurisdictions and memberships of CIO unions often cut across the boundaries of several SICs. Many of the unions had to be categorized, on the basis of our best estimates, into several different SICs. We assigned very rough estimates of industry weights in the absence of union-specific data. We examined the relationships between these variables and union democracy with and without these weights and found no substantively important differences. Second, unless an industry is quite homogeneous on a given variable, it may not be correct to infer from an industry characteristic to the union. For example, a union may be in an industry that has a high proportion of small shops, or of skilled workers, but the union may have organized only the biggest plants or only semiskilled and unskilled production workers. Third, adequate industry-level data are missing for three variables on nearly half of the unions and for another variable on over one-fourth of the unions (Appendix Table 2).

Withal, we constructed logit models to estimate the independent effects of the size-distribution of the industry's plants (both a. the % large plants and b. the % of workers in large plants); the industry's level of concentration (4-firm) (manufacturing only); and the industry's skill composition (% skilled craftsmen, men only). In addition, a fifth model

estimates the independent effect of union size (number of members).

The larger the plants in an industry, or the larger the "employer unit," the less the chances for union democracy (Strauss 1977, p. 232; Pierson 1948, p. 594). We find that the size distribution of plants in an industry has no measurable independent effect on the odds that a union will be democratic—whether measured by the % of workers in large plants (Model 1) or by the % of all plants in the industry that are large (Model 2).

The greater the industrial concentration, the more bureaucratization of the union, and, consequently, the less the chances for union democracy (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p. 465). "The more decentralized and unconcentrated in ownership is the industry a union deals with, the less it is obliged to create a large centralized and bureaucratic administration of its own." This is the corollary of: "The less bureaucratized is a union administration, the greater the chances for democracy."

But precisely the opposite hypothesis is also suggested by Lipset (1960, p. 218), namely, that "increased bureaucratization is found in industries that are highly competitive," because in such an industry the union wants "a highly centralized structure" of collective bargaining "so as to be able to force . . . bureaucratic structures on employers by forcing them to join industrial associations and set up codes of business practice."

On the other hand, it is also suggested (Edelstein and Warner 1975, p. 21) that less concentrated industries are less likely to be democratic: "The greater decentralization of bargaining has facilitated racketeering. . . . Racketeering is more likely . . . where [as in a highly competitive industry] local union leaders deal directly with businessmen." So, doubt of any systematic "relationship between industrial and union

centralization" is understandable. As Edelstein and Warner (1975, p. 21, original italics) observe: "There is no strong reason to state that the greater centralization of bargaining . . . is a greater or less liability, in itself, to democracy." They provide no test of this hypothesis, however.

We find that the level of industrial concentration does have a sizable independent, and negative, effect on the odds of a union being democratic, but that the independent, and positive, effects of amalgamation and "Communist camp" remain far greater (Model 3).

The greater the proportion of skilled workers in a union, the higher the chances for union democracy. (This is a translation of two closely related propositions on the "status of the occupation" of the workers in a union (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, pp. 465-66): "The smaller the difference between the status of the occupation and the status of the 'union leader,' the greater the chances for democracy." "The higher the status of an occupation, the more likely its members will claim the right to participate in its union's decision-making processes; the more members who hold this value strongly, the greater the chances for democracy.")

We find that the percentage of skilled workers in a union has no measurable independent effect on the odds of union democracy (Model 4).

The larger the union, the more likely it is to be bureaucratic, and, therefore, undemocratic (Pierson 1948, p. 594, quoting Justice Brandeis, calls this "the curse of bigness") or, "the smaller the [union], the greater membership control." Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1962, p. 14) say: "There can be little doubt that this is true" Edelstein and Warner (1975, p. 98) refer to the "common notion that larger national unions tend to be

more oligarchic." They report, however, that their findings on the "effectiveness of opposition" as related to union size "offer no support" for this "notion," although they do report a modest negative correlation of $-.20$ between union size and "the closeness of elections to top permanent posts" in 15 British unions (Edelstein and Warner 1975, p. 170). This is supported by the findings of Anderson (1978, pp. 289-90), in a comparative analysis of democracy in local unions in Canada. He finds that "dimensions of bureaucratic control" are "not significantly correlated" with "closeness of elections." Further, he finds that "the larger the union, the closer the election"; and he comments that this "may indicate that in larger unions a larger pool of candidates exists."

We find that union size has no measurable independent effect on the odds of union democracy (Model 5).

In sum, of the several variables considered (plant size, industrial concentration, skill level, and union size), only industrial concentration has an independent (and negative) effect on the odds of a union being democratic. None of these variables, however, including industrial concentration, affect our finding that amalgamation and Communist and allied radical leadership are by far the major determinants of the odds of a union being democratic.

Chart 1. Guttman Scales of Civil and Political Rights and Index of Level of
Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s

CIVIL RIGHTS

PERSONAL^a

5. Constitution requires that charges against a union member be signed.
4. Constitution stipulates that the trial committee be elected.
3. Constitution stipulates time limits on trial duration.
2. Constitution allows an appeal to the union convention against the trial committee's verdict.
1. Constitution stipulates that charges against a union member be in writing.
0. None of the above.

SOCIETAL^b

3. Constitution has no provision for suspension of an individual union member on charges of "slander" of the union.
2. Constitution has no provision for suspension of a union local for criticism of international officers.
1. Constitution has no provision for putting a local under administratorship or trusteeship.
0. None of the above.

POLITICAL RIGHTSFRANCHISE^c

3. Constitution prohibits political discrimination.
2. Constitution does not prohibit Communists from holding union office.
1. Constitution does not prohibit Communists from being union members.
0. None of the above.

ACCOUNTABILITY^d

4. Constitution stipulates that convention committees be elected.
3. Constitution requires broad representation on convention committees.
2. Constitution has a provision for recall of international officers.
1. Constitution requires audits of expenditures by international officers.
0. None of the above.

a dichotomized, 4-5 high, 0-3 low

b dichotomized, 3 high, 0-2 low

c dichotomized, 2-3 high, 0-1 low

d dichotomized, 3-4 high, 0-2 low

e Index of level of constitutional democracy: very high = high on 4 scales;
high = high on 3 scales; medium = high on 2 scales; low = high on one scale;
very low = high on none.

Table 1. Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s, by the Presence of Internal Political Factions (in percent)

	Level of Democracy			(N)
	High	Medium	Low	
Organized factions	60	30	10	(10)
Sporadic factions	37	13	50	(8)
No factions	0	20	80	(5)

Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 1.09; s.e. = .46; $p < .01$

Table 2. The Presence of Internal Political Factions, by Types of Political Practice Involved in Organizing the Union (in percent)

	Presence of Internal Factions			(N)
	Organized	Sporadic	None	
Earlier Red Organizing ^a				
Some	47	29	23	(17)
None	33	50	17	(6)
Source of Secession ^b				
Workers' insurgency	58	33	8	(12)
Top officers' revolt	27	36	36	(11)
Organizing strategy ^c				
Independent	40	47	13	(15)
CIO Committee	50	13	37	(8)
Union Formation ^d				
Amalgamation	70	20	10	(10)
Unitary	23	46	31	(13)

a Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .11; s.e. = .61

b Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 1.06; s.e. = .61; $p < .05$

c Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .23; s.e. = .56

d Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 1.31; s.e. = .68; $p < .05$

Table 3. Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s, by Types of Political Practice Involved in Organizing the Union (in percent)

	Level of Democracy			(N)
	High	Medium	Low	
Earlier Red Organizing ^a				
Some	40	25	35	(20)
None	13	60	27	(15)
Source of Secession ^b				
Workers' insurgency	47	29	23	(17)
Top officers' revolt	11	50	39	(18)
Organizing Strategy ^c				
Independent	29	46	25	(24)
CIO Committee	27	27	45	(11)
Union Formation ^d				
Amalgamation	50	42	8	(12)
Unitary	17	39	43	(23)

a Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .31; s.e. = .45

b Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .91; s.e. = .48; $p < .05$

c Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .38; s.e. = .48

d Log odds ratio (uniform association) = 1.28; s.e. = .56; $p < .01$

Table 4. Logit Estimates of the Direct Effects of "Insurgent Political Practices" in Determining the Level of Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s

Insurgent Practice	Logit Coefficients	Odds Multipliers
Earlier Red organizing	-1.33	.26
Workers' insurgency	1.12	3.06
Independent organizing	-.29	.75
Amalgamation	2.30*	9.97
Alpha 1	.56	
Alpha 2	-1.57*	
Likelihood ratio chi-sqr. (df)	9.89(4)*	
(N)	(35)	

** p<.01

* p<.05

x p<.10

Table 5. Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s, by CIO Political Camp (in percent)

Political Camp	Level of Democracy			(N)
	High	Medium	Low	
Communist	44	50	6	(16)
"Shifting"	20	30	50	(10)
Anti-Communist	11	33	55	(9)

Log odds ratio (uniform association) = .86; s.e. = .34; $p < .01$

Table 6. Constitutional Authority of the "Chief Officer" in CIO International Unions in the 1940s, by CIO Political Camp^a (in percent)

Political Camp	Constitutional Authority of the "Chief Officer"			
	Routine	Moderate	Considerable	(N)
Communist	69	23	8	(13)
"Shifting"	0	50	50	(6)
Anti-Communist	17	50	33	(6)

Log odds ratio = .88; s.e. = .40; $p < .01$

^a Compiled and calculated from information given in Taft 1948, p.460. Taft says he studied 29 CIO unions but provides the names and categories of power for only 25 unions (he refers to 14 in the "routine" category, but names only 10 unions).

Table 7. Equality of Franchise in the Constitutions of CIO Unions in the mid-1940s, by CIO Political Camp^a (in percent)

Political Camp	"Eligible Regardless Of":						(N)
	Race	Creed	Citizenship	Sex	Polit. Affiln.	All Five	
Communist	89	89	61	61	83	50	(18)
Shifting	60	60	40	10	10	10	(10)
Anti-Communist	50	50	50	30	20	10	(10)

Log odds ratio =

Standard error =

** p<.01

* p<.05

x p<.10

y p<.11

^a Compiled and calculated from information given in Summers (1946, Table I, p p.92-107). Only explicit provisions that anyone is "eligible [for union membership] regardless of . . . ," or "irrespective of . . . " are counted here.

Table 8. Logit Estimates of the Direct Effects of Amalgamation, Organized Factions, and CIO Political Camp in Determining the Level of Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s

	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>		<u>Model 3</u>	
	Logit	Odds	Logit	Odds	Logit	Odds
	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Mltplr.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Mltplr.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Mltplr.</u>
Amalgamation	1.30 ^X	3.67			1.10	3.00
Organized factions			2.18*	8.85	1.73 ^Y	5.64
Communist camp ^a	1.83*	6.23	1.76 ^Y	5.81	1.65 ^Z	5.21
"Shifting" camp	.32	1.38	-.51	.60	-.33	.72
Alpha 1	-.36		-.91		-1.21	
Alpha 2	-2.63**		-2.29*		-2.65*	
Likelihood ratio						
chi square (df)	11.85(3)**		11.28(3)**		12.49(4)**	
(N)	(35)		(23)		(23)	

Table 8. (contd.)

a The unions in the Communist camp and the "Shifting" camp are separately compared with those in the Anti-Communist camp. If this variable is dichotomized, so that the unions in the Communist camp are compared with the unions in the other camps combined, then: in Model 2, $p < .05$ for organized factions and for Communist camp; in Model 3, $p < .10$ for organized factions and $p < .057$ for Communist camp.

** $p < .01$

* $p < .05$

x $p < .10$

Y $p < .12$ for model 2; $p < .11$ for model 3

z $p < .16$




Figure 1. Theoretical Model of the Direct and Indirect Effects of Insurgent Political Practices, Organized Factions, and Communist and Allied Radical Leadership in the Determination of Union Democracy.

Appendix Chart 1. Scores on Civil and Political Rights Guttman Scales and Index of Level of Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP ^f	<u>CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES</u>				<u>LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e</u>			
	PERSONAL CIV. RTS. ^a	SOCIETAL CIV. RTS. ^b	EQUAL FRANCHISE ^c	ACCOUNT- ABILITY ^d	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MED. LOW	VERY LOW
<u>COMMUNIST:</u>								
American Communications Assn. (20,000) ^g	5	3	3	4	X			
Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers of America (65,000)	5	0	3	2			X	
Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific (3,000)	0	3	2	0			X	
Int'l. Fur and Leather Workers Union (90,000)	4	2	3	0			X	
Int'l. Longshore- men's and Warehousemen's Union (50,000)	3	2	3	2				X

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP^f</u>	<u>PERSONAL CIV. RTS.^a</u>	<u>SOCIETAL CIV. RTS.^b</u>	<u>EQUAL FRANCHISE^c</u>	<u>ACCOUNT- ABILITY^d</u>	<u>VERY HIGH</u>	<u>VERY LOW</u>
					<u>HIGH</u>	<u>MED. LOW</u>
<u>COMMUNIST (cont.)</u>						
Int'l. Union of Fishermen and Allied Workers of America (20,000)	0	3	2	2		X
Int'l. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (125,000)	5	1	2	2		X
Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Assn. of the Pacific Coast (8,000)	5	2	3	4		X
National Maritime Union of America (90,000)	4	3	2	4	X	
Transport Workers Union of America (95,000)	5	2	2	2		X
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (500,000)	4	1	3	3	X	
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (72,000)	5	1	3	2		X

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP^f</u>	<u>PERSONAL</u>	<u>SOCIETAL</u>	<u>EQUAL</u>	<u>ACCOUNT-</u>	<u>LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e</u>			
	<u>CIV. RTS.^a</u>	<u>CIV. RTS.^b</u>	<u>FRANCHISE^c</u>	<u>CAPABILITY^d</u>	<u>VERY HIGH</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>MED. LOW</u>	<u>VERY LOW</u>

COMMUNIST (cont.)

United Furniture Workers of America (45,000)	4	3	2	1				X
United Office and Professional Workers of America ^h (60,000)	4	3	3	1				X
United Public Workers of America ⁱ (71,000)	3	3	3	2				X
United Shoe Workers of America (65,000)	4	3	3	4				X

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP ^f	PERSONAL	SOCIETAL	EQUAL	ACCOUNT-	LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX ^e		
	CIV. RTS. ^a	CIV. RTS. ^b	FRANCHISE ^c	CAPABILITY ^d	VERY HIGH	HIGH MED.	LOW LOW

"SHIFTING" COALITIONS

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (325,000)	3	2	2	0			X
Barbers and Beauty Culturists Union of America (5,000)	2	0	2	0			X
Int'l. Woodworkers of America (62,000)	5	3	0	4	X		
National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Assn. (11,000)	5	2	2	2		X	
Oil Workers Int'l. Union (75,000)	5	2	0	2			X
United Automobile Workers of America (1,000,000)	5	0	3	1		X	
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America (40,000)	4	0	1	2			X

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP ^f	PERSONAL	SOCIETAL	EQUAL	ACCOUNT-	LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX ^e		
	CIV. RTS. ^a	CIV. RTS. ^b	FRANCHISE ^c	CAPABILITY ^d	VERY HIGH	HIGH MED.	LOW LOW

"SHIFTING" COALITIONS (cont.)

United Packing-
house Workers
of America
(95,000)

5	2	2	3	X		
---	---	---	---	---	--	--

United Retail
and Wholesale
Employees of
America
(120,000)

3	0	3	1			X
---	---	---	---	--	--	---

United Stone and
Allied Products
Workers of America
(6,000)

5	0	3	1		X	
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CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP ^f	PERSONAL	SOCIETAL	EQUAL	ACCOUNT-	LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX ^e		
	CIV. RTS. ^a	ACTIV. RTS. ^b	FRANCHISE ^c	CAPABILITY ^d	VERY HIGH	HIGH MED.	LOW LOW

ANTI-COMMUNIST

American Newspaper Guild ^j (21,000)	5	3	3	3	X		
Fedn. of Glass, Ceramic, and Silica Sand Workers of America (35,000)	1	1	1	2			X
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (400,000)	1	2	1	2			X
Int'l. Union of Playthings, Jewelry and Novelty Workers of America (27,000)	NA	NA	NA	NA			
Textile Workers Union of America (340,000)	3	0	1	0			X
United Paper Workers of America (20,000)	2	3	1	3		X	
United Rubber Workers of America (175,000)	5	2	0	1			X

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SCALE SCORES LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX^e

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP ^f	PERSONAL	SOCIETAL	EQUAL	ACCOUNT-	LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY INDEX ^e		
	CIV. RTS. ^a	CIV. RTS. ^b	FRANCHISE ^c	CAPABILITY ^d	VERY HIGH	HIGH MED.	LOW LOW

ANTI-COMMUNIST (cont.)

United Steel- workers of America (800,000)	4	2	1	0			X
United Transport Service Employees of America (13,000)	5	0	3	2		X	
Utility Workers Union (35,000)	5	3	0	1		X	

Notes

- a dichotomized, 4-5 high, 0-3 low (see chart 1 for specific rights scored in Guttman scales)
- b dichotomized, 3 high, 0-2 low (see chart 1 for specific rights scored in Guttman scales)
- c dichotomized, 2-3 high, 0-1 low (see chart 1 for specific rights scored in Guttman scales)
- d dichotomized, 3-4 high, 0-2 low (see chart 1 for specific rights scored in Guttman scales)
- e Index of level of constitutional democracy: very high = high on 4 scales; high = high on 3 scales; medium = high on 2 scales; low = high on one scale; very low = high on none.
- f Kampelman's classification (1957, pp. 45-47). Union names are as of 1946.
- g Numbers in parentheses are the international union's 1944 total membership (Huberman 1946, pp. 166-180).
- h United Office and Professional Workers absorbed the 8,000 members of the International Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians in the mid-1940s.
- i United Public Workers was formed in the mid-1940s through the merger of the State, County and Municipal Workers of America and the United Federal Workers of America.
- j The New York and Los Angeles branches of the American Newspaper Guild were in the Communist camp.

Appendix Chart 2. Presence of Factions in CIO International Unions through the Late 1940s

UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP	<u>FACIONS PRESENT</u>			<u>SOURCES</u>
	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u> N.A.	
<u>COMMUNIST:</u>				
American Communications Assn. (20,000)		X		Seaton 1981, pp.157-8, 173, 205.
Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers of America (65,000)			X	
Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific (3,000)			X	
Int'l. Fedn. of Architects, Engi- neers, Chemists and Technicians (8,000)			X	
Int'l. Fur and Leather Workers Union (90,000)		X		Fink 1977, pp.113-15.
Int'l. Longshore- men's and Warehousemen's Union (50,000)		X		Seaton 1981, pp.174, 221

FACTIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
<u>COMMUNIST</u> (cont.)					
Int'l. Union of Fishermen and Allied Workers of America (20,000)				X	
Int'l. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (125,000)	X				Fink 1977, pp.223-5; Leven- stein 1981, pp.192, 274; Cochran 1977, p.149; Seaton 1981, pp.174, 204, 221; Jensen 1954, pp.68ff, 91-92, 108ff, 299, 306-07.
Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Assn. of the Pacific Coast (8,000)				X	Cochran 1977, p.282.
National Maritime Union of America (90,000)		X			Seaton 1981, pp.154-6, 144, 218, 221; Saposs 1959, pp.141-43.
State, County and Municipal Workers of America (45,000)				X	
Transport Workers Union of America (95,000)	X				Seaton 1981, pp.154, 158, 164, 172; Levenstein 1981, pp.117-8, 239; Saposs 1959, p.147.
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (500,000)		X			Seaton 1981, pp.158, 164, 173-4, 197, 221; Galenson 1960, pp.257, 263; Saposs 1959, pp.147-48.
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (72,000)				X	

FACIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY</u> <u>POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
<u>COMMUNIST</u> (cont.)					
United Federal Workers of America (26,000)				X	
United Furniture Workers of America (45,000)	X				Fink 1977, pp.115-17.
United Office and Professional Workers of America (52,000)			X		Seaton 1981, pp.154-6, 158, 164, 220, 221.
United Shoe Workers of America (65,000)	X				Fink 1977, pp.115-17.

FACIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
<u>"SHIFTING" COALITIONS</u>					
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (325,000)				X	Stolberg 1938, p.151; Shannon 1959, p.103.
Barbers and Beauty Culturists Union of America (5,000)				X	
Int'l. Woodworkers of America (62,000)	X				Bernstein 1969, p.630; Galenson 1960, p.390, 394, 400-1, 405-6.
National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Assn. (11,000)				X	
Oil Workers Int'l. Union (75,000)			X		Galenson 1960, p.414; Seaton 1981, p.174; Fink 1977, pp.260-2; Stolberg 1938, p.151.
United Automobile Workers of America (1,000,000)	X				Levenstein 1981, p.54; Galenson 1960, pp.150,155, 158, 164-5; Leiserson 1959, pp.154-8; Saposs 1959, pp.136-38, 143-47, 158, 199-200.
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America (40,000)			X		Levenstein 1981, p.277; Shannon 1959, p.103.

FACIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY</u> <u>POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
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"SHIFTING" COALITIONS (cont.)

United Packing- house Workers of America (95,000)	X				Fink 1977, pp.268-7; Galenson 1960, pp.357, 374- 7, 389.
United Retail and Wholesale Employees of America (120,000)	X				Seaton 1981, pp.164-221; Stolberg 1938, p.264; Shannon 1959, p.103.
United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America (6,000)				X	

FACTIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
<u>ANTI-COMMUNIST</u>					
American Newspaper Guild (21,000)	X				Seaton 1981, pp.154, 159, 164, 205; Galenson 1960, p.560.
Fedn. of Glass, Ceramic, and Silica Sand Workers of America (35,000)				X	
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (400,000)			X		Seaton 1981, pp.174, 195.
Int'l. Union of Playthings, Jewelry and Novelty Workers of America (27,000)				X	
Textile Workers Union of America (340,000)			X		Bernstein 1969, p.616; Galenson 1960, p.333.
United Paper Workers of America (20,000)				X	
United Rubber Workers of America (175,000)		X			Fink 1977, p.333; Saposs 1959, p.123; Galenson 1960, pp.272-3 (but cf. Lens 1961, p.219).

FACTIONS PRESENT

<u>UNIONS BY POLITICAL CAMP</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>INTERMITTENT</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>SOURCES</u>
<u>ANTI-COMMUNIST</u> (cont.)					
United Steel- workers of America (800,000)			X		Bernstein 1969, pp.440-1; Leiserson 1959, pp.159-61.
United Transport Service Employees of America (13,000)				X	
Utility Workers Union (35,000)			X		Seaton 1981, pp.154, 201.

Appendix Table 1. "High" Protection of Civil and Political Rights^a in the Constitutions of CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s, by CIO Political Camp (in percent)

Political Camp	Civil Rights		Political Rights		
	Personal	Societal	Franchise	Accountability	(N)
Communist	75	50	100	31	(16)
"Shifting"	70	10	70	20	(10)
Anti-Communist	55	33	22	22	(9)
log odds ratio	.43 ^Z	.51 ^Y	2.67 ^{**}	.27	
Standard error	.44	.46	.85	.48	

^a See Chart 1, for the components and scoring of each Guttman scale in the Index of Level of Constitutional Democracy.

** p<.01

* p<.05

x p<.10

Y p<.13

Z p<.17

Appendix Table 2. Logit Estimates of the Direct Effects of the CIO Political Camp, Amalgamation, and the "Objective Conditions" in an Industry in Determining the Level of Constitutional Democracy in CIO International Unions in the Late 1940s

	Logit Coefficients									
	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>		<u>Model 3</u>		<u>Model 4</u>		<u>Model 5</u>	
	Logit <u>Coeff</u>	Odds <u>Mltplr</u>								
Communist camp	2.01 ^Y	7.46	1.66	5.26	2.20 ^X	9.02	1.78 ^X	5.93	1.56 ^X	4.76
"Shifting" camp	1.26	3.52	1.17	3.22	1.44	4.22	.56	1.75	.38	1.46
Amalgamation	2.64*	14.01	2.63*	13.87	2.14*	8.49	1.51 ^X	4.53	1.75*	5.75
Large plants ^a ,										
% <u>workers</u> in	-.05*	.95								
% of <u>plants</u>			-.16 ^X	.85						
Concentration ^b					-1.37	.25				
% skilled workers							-.002	.998		
Size of union (1944)									-.00	1.00
Alpha 1	1.53		-.15		.79		-.68		-.04	
Alpha 2	-1.21		-2.66*		-1.58		-2.70*		-2.40**	
(N)	(20)		(20)		(21)		(28)		(35)	

** p<.01

* p<.05

x p<.10

y p<.12

a "Large" equals over 250 workers.

b "Concentration" is defined as the percentage of the industry's wage earners employed by the top 4 firms.

[Sources for Appendix Table 2]

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Appendix Table 3. Constitutional Authority of the "Chief Officer" in AFL, Independent, and CIO International Unions in the 1940s^a (in percent)

Constitutional Authority of the "Chief Officer":				
	Routine	Moderate	Considerable	(N)
AFL	18	30	53	(74)
Independent	25	25	50	(12)
CIO	48	31	21	(29)
Total	26	30	44	(115)

^a Compiled and calculated from information given in Taft 1948, p.460.

Appendix Table 4. Equality of Franchise in the Constitutions of AFL, Independent, and CIO International Unions in the 1940s^a (in percent)

	"Eligible Regardless of":						
	Race	Creed	Citizenship	Sex	Polit.	All	(N)
					Affiln.	Five	
AFL	17	15	8	15	5	1	(88)
Independent	8	8	0	0	0	0	(12)
CIO	71	71	53	39	47	29	(38)

^a Compiled and calculated from information given in Summers (1946, Table I, pp.92-107). Only explicit provisions that anyone is "eligible [for union membership] regardless of . . . , " or "irrespective of . . . " are counted here.

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