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³'WHO GETS THE BIRD?'
HOW THE COMMUNISTS WON 'POWER AND TRUST'
IN AMERICAN UNIONS:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
'RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE POLITICAL'

by

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
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"Who Gets the Bird?" -- or, How the Communists Won "Power and Trust" in American Unions: An Empirical Analysis of the "Relative Autonomy of the Political"

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"'Who Gets the Bird?' -- or, How the Communists Won 'Power and Trust' in American Unions: An Empirical Analysis of the 'Relative Autonomy of the Political.'"

American labor combines a history of militant and often violent forms of struggle against capital to win its immediate demands -- at levels of intensity unparalleled in England and Western Europe -- with an essential loyalty, so far, to capitalism itself. But if "capitalist democracy . . . has not been challenged by a significant nation-wide socialist movement" in the United States (Lipset 1950, p.1), it is also the case that -- for an ephemeral historical moment -- a "powerful and pervasive radical movement in American life" was built and led by Communists (Starobin 1972, p.x). In particular, they and their radical allies established a broad base in the insurgent industrial unions organized from the late 1930s on under the banner of the CIO.¹ At the height of the Communists' strength among industrial workers in the United States, during the "red decade" and beyond, through the early post-war years, Communists and their allies led, it seems, about half of the CIO unions, and officially represented at least 2 million workers, amounting to some 30 percent, perhaps more, of the CIO's members.² The historical/sociological question, then, is, how did the Communists win "positions of power and trust" and secure a political base in these CIO unions?

The broad historical answer, and the starting point of the present empirical analysis, is that "the Communists . . . won positions of power and trust in the CIO," in C. Wright Mills' words (1948, p.196) "by the standard method of gaining power in U.S. labor unions: by being the organizers." "The main . . . source of CP [Communist Party] strength in the CIO," Irving Howe and Lewis Coser (1957, p.375) emphasize, "was the participation of thousands of its members in the organizing drives of the late thirties. If there was dirty work to do, they were ready. If leaflets had to be handed out on cold winter mornings before an Akron rubber plant or a New York subway station, the party could always find a few volunteers. If someone had to stick his neck out within the plants, a Communist was available. . . . Never were the Communists more than a minority among the CIO organizers. . . . Plenty of other people, ranging from run-of-the-mill unionists to left-wing Socialists, worked hard and took chances. But the Communists were the best-organized political group within the CIO. . . . The devotion, heroism, and selflessness of many Communist unionists during these years can hardly be overestimated."³

The logic of our inquiry into the reasons why the Communists were able to win "power and trust" in American unions is thus to ask a quite different -- and all but completely neglected -- theoretical and empirical question than the prevailing one in the political sociology of working-class politics. It is a question (and general answer), however, that is implicit in or presupposed in the brief words quoted here from Mills and Howe and Coser, and in the writings on Communists and U.S. labor by many other

scholars -- whether sociologists, historians, or political scientists. That is, our aim here is not to discover the "social basis" of Communism within the working class, i.e., it is not to try, as previous substantive analyses have done, to reveal the "structural roots" or "social determinants" of "political attitudes," or the "types of deprivation" and related "social factors that correlate" with workers' electoral and union support for Communists and other leftists (see, e.g., Form 1985, chs. 8-10; Goldthorpe et al. 1968, 1969; Hamilton 1967; Leggett 1968; Lipset 1960, ch. 7; Zeitlin 1967).

Rather, we focus here, instead, on how the political practice of the contending parties or factions within the working class affected their chances of winning the leadership of the new industrial unions. The "run-of-the-mill unionists," assorted radicals, socialists, and Communists who organized the CIO were engaged in a simultaneous fight on two fronts: the main front, of course, was their common struggle against capital, but the second front was the internecine, if often hidden, struggle among them for the leadership of the organized working class itself.

The leading theoretical issue here, then, is how concrete political struggles shape the actual "political terrain" on which, as time goes by, subsequent struggles take place, and which in turn affects how they will be fought -- and resolved. By "political struggles," following the dicta of both Max Weber and Karl Marx ("every class struggle is a political struggle"), we mean struggles to transform or preserve, in Weber's phrase, "the relation of men dominating men" (1946; cf. Poulantzas 1973, p.86) -- and, in particular, the quintessential relation of one class dominating another.

Thus, the present empirical analysis does not aim to gauge how workers' political attitudes or class consciousness are determined by "objective structural conditions" (production relations, labor process, division of labor, industrial structure, intraclass differentiation, etc.). Rather, these conditions are assumed, for the purposes of the present analysis, to be constant, and our aim here instead is to attempt to assess the actual political consequences of the specific, partly contingent social relations which (whether wittingly or not) are created by political struggle -- and which themselves now emerge as "objective conditions." In Adam Przeworski's acute formulation, not only "production relations" but specific "political relations" which they both make possible and set limits on are themselves "objective conditions of class struggles" (1977, p.368). In short, what we are attempting here is an empirical analysis of the impact to the so-called "relative autonomy of the political" on intraclass conflicts.⁴

Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman implicitly raised a nearly identical question over three decades ago (though, unfortunately, without following through systematically on their penetrating observation) about the causal relevance of political practice. Comparing the relative internal factionalism and democratic political life of the United

Automobile Workers (UAW) to the bureaucratic regime of the United Steel Workers, they wrote that a critical "variation in organizational history accounts in large part for the differences in the political history of [these] . . . two unions formed about the same time and affected by similar structural conditions" (1956, p.443, italics added).

Our analysis also has implications for the understanding of how classes are formed. For "classes," as Jean Paul Sartre (1968, p.96) perceptively observes, "do not naturally exist, but they are made." A class gains its effective identity, i.e. its identity as a historical subject, in the course of struggles against antagonistic classes. But these struggles against antagonistic classes always and, simultaneously, involve inseparable struggles within the class, among rival claimants for its independent political leadership. Thus, the process of class formation is itself a partly contingent historical consequence (to an extent that has to be analyzed empirically) of both class and intraclass struggles.

Our focus here is precisely on the political outcomes of intraclass struggles among contending historical actors (Communists and other allied and opposed union organizers and leaders who were vying to create and lead "an effective working-class movement [i.e., one whose] organizations [would] influence community and national events" [Form 1976, pp.181-182]), at a decisive historical moment (the Great Depression cum New Deal) in the development of capitalism and democracy in the United States. The objective of these internecine struggles among rival parties and factions was double-edged: to organize and re-organize workers into industrial unions and, at the same time, to win their independent political leadership -- and thus, in effect, to actively shape (though not just as they pleased) the working class' specific historical form, i.e. its relative organizational cohesion and political self-consciousness.

The critical issue, then, and the empirical question of the present study, is, whether or not and to what extent these intraclass conflicts resulted in the establishment of specific types of objective political relations that affected the chances that one or another of the contending factions and parties -- in particular, the Communists and their allies -- would win a union's leadership. Thus, outside the purview of the present analysis, which focuses on the political consequences of political struggles, are the political issues themselves -- ideological, programmatic, or strategic -- that divided the Communists and other CIO factions. Nor do we inquire here as to how the actual positions of the Communists and their rivals on these issues -- including the issue of "Stalinism" and the Soviet dictatorship, to which, as Zieger (1984, p.300) puts it, "whatever the courage and admirable personal qualities of individual pro-Soviet laborites, . . . even the most saintly rank-and-file CPer was linked" -- affected these struggles. It is worth noting, however, that C. Wright Mills, then a young left-wing opponent of the Communists, was scarcely laudatory

about the "major motives," often combined in a single individual, that impelled "the majority of American labor leaders actively or passively [to] fight Communists": they fought the Communists, Mills wrote, because they were as "anti-Communist as any businessman," because fighting them was a way "to kill off troublesome factions within their unions," and because the Communists were "bad for public relations . . ." (1948, pp. 190-191). In the concluding section of this article, we do, however, try to re-formulate major "liberal and left wing" charges against the Communist-led unions as sociological issues, amenable to empirical analysis.

Sources and Methods

The 38 CIO unions included in this analysis constitute virtually the entire known universe of durable CIO international unions. Of the 40 CIO internationals attending the crucial first post-war CIO convention in 1946 (Kampelman 1957, pp.45-47), we found no data on two, the Optical and Instrument Workers Organizing Committee and the United Railroad Workers of America (which existed only for somewhat over a year, 1946-1947). All 36 CIO unions listed by the Research Institute of America (1946, pp.17-18) in 1946 are included among our 38. Eleven short-lived CIO unions, founded sometime during the 1937-1950 period with which we are concerned (i.e., when Communist-led unions were still a potent CIO force), are listed by Leo Troy (1965, pp.A20-A23), but are not on Max Kampelman's list (nor ours); only 4 of these 11 unions lasted more than three years.

Our data on each union are drawn from secondary historical sources; we reviewed every relevant study in search of information that would allow us to categorize each CIO union on the 4 independent political variables used in the following tables. Chart 1 in Appendix 1 lists each union and indicates how it is categorized on each variable. Chart 2 in Appendix 1 provides detailed notes on some items where necessary, and cites the reference sources for the specific information used to classify the union on each variable; not cited are the many other secondary sources which we reviewed without finding any relevant information on these variables.

Obviously, even the attempt to construct the major dependent variable, i.e. the "political camp" of the union's leaders, especially the decision to categorize a union as "Communist-dominated," is inherently controversial. As is well known, "red-baiting," i.e. charging that a union organizer or leader was a "Red" or "Communist," was long a standard anti-union tactic used by American capitalists. But many of the affiliated unions of the old AFL also prohibited Communists from holding union office, and even union membership; the AFL expelled Communists and their industrial unionist allies en masse in the mid-1920s, and the officials of individual AFL unions who were confronted by Communists in the opposition also normally responded by expelling them and barring them from their unions (as even some of the CIO's founders, like John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, also had done when their unions were in the AFL) (Saposs 1959, p.121; Taft

1953, p.23). Clauses barring Communists from union office were also not uncommon in CIO unions, years before a dozen so-called "Communist-dominated unions" were expelled from the CIO in 1949-50. So, the proclivity of individual Communists in the union movement to dissemble about their membership in the party was not a mere Leninist reflex, but both a matter of principle ("don't let red-baiting break you up") and practical political (and often physical) survival.

This, of course, makes classification of the politics of union leadership difficult, and a matter of some guesswork. Indeed, because it was rare that Communists in the official leadership of a union publicly (and proudly) acknowledged their party membership (as did, for instance, the International Fur and Leather Workers' Ben Gold and several of its other top officers, or some district United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers' leaders, for instance, William Sentner, who openly sat on the party's national committee), it has to be emphasized that to classify unions in the "Communist camp" or as "Communist dominated" doubtlessly involves something of a distortion (and construction) of political reality.

The present article's classification of the unions into political "camps" involves no guesses of our own; it is entirely Kampelman's (1957, pp.45-47), which itself was based mainly on other (anti-Communist) sources (e.g., Avery 1946; Research Institute of America 1946, pp.17-18). The Research Institute of America (1946, p.16) explains how it arrived at its own (somewhat more cautious) labelling of "left-wing" (rather than Kampelman's "Communist") unions as follows: The unions "listed as 'left-wing' have espoused causes or taken positions similar to the Communist Party positions as revealed by the Daily Worker. Whether this is coincidence or is the result of Communists within the union can best be determined by one who deals with them over a period of time. Nor is there any attempt to distinguish here between those unions whose action is caused by the fact that the officers are Communist [sic] and those unions whose policy is set by the fact of their having either a majority Communist membership or a small but active group of Communist members."

Kampelman uses this same method of classifying the unions politically (as do the sources he relies on). The causes advocated and positions taken by union leaders, but rarely any evidence of actual party membership, are the basis of Kampelman's classification. In turn, his "evidence" is drawn mainly from the CIO's "formal cases" against each of the unions that he classifies in the "Communist camp" (1957, pp. 121-140; 167-224).

Thus, it is unfortunately unavoidable, given the task of our analysis, that the political classification we employ here cannot, by its very nature, be separated from the CIO's "own dispiriting version of the red scare that dominated American politics in the early 1950s," when 11 of its affiliated international unions were put on "trial" mainly because of the dissenting foreign policy positions taken by their officers. "CIO staff members prepared and presented elaborate, pseudolegal

'cases' against the accused organizations" before expelling them in 1949-50 as "Communist-dominated." That leaders of the expelled unions had often "parroted the pro-Soviet line" was the main "evidence" used against them (Zieger 1986, pp.131-132).

But, as historian Robert Zieger observes: "Often, the political struggle within the unions led to suspicion of anyone with a dissenting reputation. . . . Anti-Communist radicals soon realized that government investigators, employers, and even co-workers, did not make the subtle ideological distinctions that were obvious to any dedicated radical. Staunchly anti-Communist socialists and Trotskyists, many of whom supported at least the original efforts to discredit the pro-Soviet elements, found themselves . . . frozen out of union politics, and often hounded out of the labor movement because of their alleged 'subversiveness'" (Zieger 1986, p.134).

Not mere analytical tendentiousness but a crucial element of political repression were thus surely involved in the very construction of the "variable" of the union's political alignment ("camp") that we are using here. Nonetheless, as we think our analysis confirms, the "Communist," "Shifting, and "Anti-communist" political "camps" were not mere figments of red-hunting imaginations; the participants in these intraclass struggles were real and they fought real and recognizable adversaries, whose politics were, within unavoidable limits, known. The "camps" dividing the rival factions and parties within the CIO, and the working class movement as a whole, were real, too.

The results of our own study of the historical materials accords, with minor reservations, with the observation of Barrington Moore, Jr., writing at a time when Communist strength in the CIO was at its height: "Unions whose officers are Communist party members or sympathizers . . . are readily distinguishable on the basis of their political actions and statements. . . . In their petitions and political statements, they uphold the favorite Communist causes, even [causes] . . . vigorously opposed by virtually every other section of the labor movement" (1945, p.38).

Whatever distortion may be involved in categorizing a given union in one of the political camps, the very findings of the following analysis themselves confirm the relative validity of the Kampelman classification; for our findings will reveal a clear pattern of underlying relationships among earlier political practices, emergent political relations, and subsequent political alignments in the international unions of the CIO.

Analysis and Findings

So, then, how and to what extent was there a connection between the political practices of the contending parties and factions in the labor movement and their chances of winning union leadership?

Historians of American labor typically suggest that battles among rival factions and parties were indeed decisive in creating political demarcations within the organized working class, but

that there was no pattern to who won and who lost from union to union. In his recent CIO history, for instance, Harvey A. Levenstein argues that, "As for patterns in the response to Communist overtures among American workers, the most striking feature is a lack of apparent pattern." Where the "CP was strong" in a union, Levenstein suggests, it was "mainly because a few leaders . . . happened to be in the right place at the right time, creating a following for themselves and their factions through their determined leadership under fire. . . . There is more accident than pattern in CP strength in the . . . CIO unions" (1981, pp.71, 55).⁵

Similarly, sociologist Nathan Glazer, in his unique study of the "social basis of American Communism" (1961, p.120), concludes that, "In the light of the various histories of many unions, large generalizations appear to be crude and clumsy, scarcely helpful in explaining any single outcome. . . . Conditions in an industry may help make workers more susceptible to radical appeals. . . . But what the specific radical outcome will be in any situation will vary greatly, depending on other circumstances. . . . In the end it would seem to be the organizational factors that predominate: the skill and training and luck of Communists and their opponents."

No doubt these observations are correct, but they are also incomplete. For if historical "accidents" (like being "in the right place at the right time") or contingent "organizational factors" count in the making of history, the question is why. If contingencies matter, what makes one rather than another, alternative, contingency matter? Are apparent historical contingencies themselves (at least partly) socially determined? (Cf. Miliband 1980, esp. pp.148 ff.). This is an issue -- the determination of contingency -- that is closely if not inseparably involved with the issue of the relative autonomy of the political. For political relations are themselves -- to an extent that has to be examined empirically -- the contingent outcome of prior historical struggles.

Red Unionism

To begin with, if being in the "right place at the right time" with the "skill and training" needed to make history is what mattered, it was neither mere "luck" nor an "accident" that thousands of skilled and trained Communists were in the right place (in the thick of organizing struggles), at the right time (at the moment of the sudden workers' insurgency of the late 1930s), when others were not. On the contrary, "Red unionism" and "industrial unionism" had been all but synonymous for nearly two decades before the CIO took up the call. Indeed, in the early days of the CIO split with the AFL, the Communists were "skeptical and even hostile toward its efforts," as David Saposs (1959, p.123) observes. "In a way, the Communists looked upon the CIO as a rival that was capitalizing on some of its issues, particularly that of industrial unionism." After the decline of the "Wobblies" (IWW), the Communists were the main carriers of the ideas of militant action and industrial unionism.

Since 1920, when the red Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) had called for "organization of the unorganized" and "for industrial unionism through the amalgamation of existing unions" (quoted in Barbash 1956, p.327), the Communists had been trying to organize some of the very industries that the CIO targeted for organizing from 1937 on (Foster 1947, pp. 198 ff). By then, several thousand Communists already "had cut their eyeteeth (and broken their backs) trying to stimulate independent unions" and had won a reputation in several industries as "militant partisans of workers' rights and industrial unionism" (Starobin 1972, p.37; Levenstein 1981, p.20). As a result, they won uncounted numbers of supporters among the workers in these industries, as well as preparing many more for the thrust of industrial unionism that was to come.⁶ In auto, for instance, the Communists had started agitating for an industrial union in 1925, and soon were printing and distributing shop papers for a dozen of Detroit's major auto plants (Keeran 1980, p.37). "These little four-page sheets, sold for a penny or given away by Communist distributors at plant gates, were often eagerly accepted; they provided the only news of conditions and grievances inside the plants available to workers" (Cochran 1977, p.63).

Despite their past failure to build enduring unions, the Communists were able, as Howe and Coser (1957, p.373) report, to retain "a kind of skeleton apparatus" in auto, transport, electric, lumber, shipping, and other industries; "in this way, the Communists were able to begin functioning in the CIO with an embryonic structure of organizers who knew each other from 'the old days' and, though assigned to different industries, could help one another with regard to both party interests and their own status." The TUEL and TUUL experiences, if nothing else, probably served "as a training ground for the Communist unionist in organization techniques and in administering unions" (Taft 1962, p.16). But, "aside from these organizational advantages," as Glazer (1961, p.111) emphasizes, "the Communists were in fact founding fathers, with all the moral authority that gives a leader."

In sum, these early years of "red unionism" apparently created in many industries a cadre of experienced Communist organizers and effective, even charismatic, leaders with a legitimate claim to the workers' support. It follows, then, that the Communists probably had a better chance of winning "positions of power and trust" in the CIO unions later established in the industries that they had been trying to organize for years before the CIO's rise, than in unions set up in industries that they had never tried to organize.

This is, indeed, what we find: well over half of the CIO unions among the industries penetrated by earlier red union organizing (before the CIO's establishment) were led by Communists, as compared to four out of ten among the industries where there had been no red unionism. Perhaps as important, proportionately more of the CIO unions were led by "shifting" political coalitions (i.e., Communists were at times highly

influential in the coalition holding union office or in the coalition forming the main opposition to the current leadership) among industries where there had been earlier red union organizing, than among industries where there had been none. Similarly, proportionately about two and a half times as many of the unions among the industries where there had not been earlier red organizing were led by "anti-Communists" (i.e., by officials who considered the Communists to be an illegitimate [or worse] union faction) as among the industries that had been penetrated by red unionism in earlier years (see Table 1).⁷

-- Table 1 goes about here --

Independent Organizing

Forged in the earlier red union organizing drives, thousands of experienced Communist organizers dedicated to the cause of industrial unionism formed a ready but recalcitrant, if not politically dangerous, reservoir of organizers to be tapped by the men who founded the CIO (some of whom, of course, e.g., Ben Gold, who took his Fur Workers out of the AFL and into the CIO in 1937, were also Communists). John L. Lewis and other CIO leaders "had no choice but to accept the support of the Communists," as Saul Alinsky gives Lewis' thinking on the matter. "Even after the debacle of 1933 and 1934, when the American Federation of Labor smashed the spirit of unionism, it was the left-wingers who zealously worked day and night picking up the pieces of that spirit and putting them together. . . . The CIO was waging economic war, and it welcomed allies wherever they could be found" (quoted in Cochran 1977, p.97). Lipset (1960, p.386) also emphasizes that "John L. Lewis was forced to employ many young Communists as organizers for the C.I.O. when it first started, because they were the only people with the necessary skills who were willing to take the risks involved for low pay. Two of the three major unions in the old C.I.O. -- the U.A.W. and the United Electrical Workers [U.E.] -- as well as most of the smaller ones, were organized largely by Communists or democratic leftists."

The CIO's founders (notably John L. Lewis) thus tried both to use these skilled and trained Communist organizers and to hobble them so that they could not take power in the new CIO unions to whose organizing, as Alinsky says, "they made a major contribution." Responding to critics' warnings that hiring Communists meant trouble for the CIO, Lewis asked sardonically, "Who gets the bird, the hunter or the dog?" (Cochran 1977, p.97).

But just in case, to prevent the "dog" from straying, Lewis and other CIO officials exerted tight control over hired CIO organizers, who worked as employees of CIO "organizing committees" put in charge of organizing the unorganized in an industry (Taft 1964; Bernstein 1970, p.616). What happened to Communist organizers in the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) exemplifies the process of control: "With Philip Murray [later head of the CIO] and his superbly competent, experienced, and anti-Communist lieutenants in charge of the steel organizing campaign, . . . when Communists were spotted, or became too dangerous a threat, they were discharged" (Saposs 1959, p.122).

SWOC organizers were all hired, paid, and fired by the head office. When they organized a local, the SWOC moved them to another area, allowing SWOC officials to take control. "Thus, a Communist who had helped to organize twenty-five SWOC locals lamented that despite a few successes, Communists 'weren't too successful' in wooing the leaders of the locals they helped to organize . . ." Communists played an important role in the four-year battle to organize "Little Steel," the violently anti-union steel companies that held out long after the US Steel Co. capitulated, "but when the struggle was over, they were quietly fired by SWOC head Philip Murray" (Levenstein 1981, p.51; also see Taft 1964, p.517).⁸

In auto, in contrast, a host of contending radical, Communist, Socialist, Coughlinitic Catholic, and other factions competed to organize the unorganized, and for power in the new CIO union. The UAW financed its own organizing drives by collecting dues from the workers, and the CIO itself had little influence in the immediate struggles against the big auto companies. As a result, "even at the height of CIO influence in the internal affairs of the UAW," the CIO was unable to impose "outside leadership" (Galenson 1960, p.133). Also, the major auto companies bitterly resisted unionization; GM, for instance, agreed to bargain with the CIO union only after a tenacious, often violent, battle against the workers. In these struggles, and in some of the decisive sit-down strikes -- e.g., in Flint, "the first great victory" for the UAW "and one of the epic confrontations in American labor history" (Zieger 1986, pp.46-47) -- Communists "gained a reputation as superb organizers" and combative and courageous leaders (Levenstein 1981, p.52), and were thus able to create strong rank and file groups in the industry (Galenson 1960, p.150).

Consequently, where the Communists engaged in independent organizing, rather than organizing as hired employees of a CIO organizing committee (or where they refused to cede their control of the organizing campaign when the CIO offered to "assist" them by sending in an organizing committee), their chance of building their own mass base and winning the emergent union's leadership must have been enhanced. Aside from the moral authority they commanded as militant organizers and active leaders in the fight against the companies, the Communists could, where there was no CIO Organizing Committee to stand in their way, "bring in reinforcements on the lower levels who could provide a solid layer of support for its people on top" (Howe and Coser 1957, p.377).

For these reasons, we would expect to find that far more of the unions that had been built by independent organizers than by CIO organizing committees were led by Communists and their allies. This is, quite strikingly, what we find. The Communists won the leadership of just one sixth of the unions that came into existence through the agency of CIO organizing committees, as compared to nearly four times as many, proportionately, of those that had been independently organized. Also, proportionately

twice as many of the unions begun as CIO organizing committees were led by "anti-Communists" as those that had been independently organized (see Table 2).⁹

-- Table 2 goes about here --

Red Unionism and Independent Organizing

The question, of course, is how these two sets of political variables -- i.e. a history of earlier red unionism in an industry vs. its absence, and independent organizing vs. organizing by a CIO organizing committee -- interacted. Were they both of independent causal relevance? For instance, hired Communist CIO organizers ordered by CIO officials to leave on another assignment probably had a better chance of finding sympathetic, radical, or even red, workers to replace them and take over the local's leadership after their departure, if they were organizing in an industry that had been targeted in the past by red union organizers, than if reds had never tried to organize it. On the other hand, whether or not the industry had been penetrated by red unionists in earlier years, Communists who were organizing a CIO union on their own probably had a better chance of forging alliances and building a base to win and sustain them in union leadership than if they were working as the hired employees of a CIO Organizing Committee.

This reasoning is borne out by our findings, although the very small number of cases in some cells may somewhat distort the results. A reliable comparison is possible between the 13 unions that were built by independent organizers in industries where there had been some earlier red unionism and the 13 unions that were independently organized in industries with no such history; over three fourths of the unions in the former category were led by Communists but somewhat under half of those in the latter category, and the contrast between the number of "anti-Communist" unions in these two categories is also in the expected direction, and even sharper.

At the same time, independent organizing was also a potent source of union power for the Communists, whether or not red unionists had tried to organize the industry in the past. In both cases, where there had been some and where there had been no earlier red union organizing, far fewer of the unions set up by CIO organizing committees were later led by Communists than those that had been independently organized by indigenous workers and various "agitators" not on the CIO payroll. Conversely, under both sets of circumstances, far more of the unions set up by a CIO organizing committee than of the unions that had been independently organized subsequently came under the control of "anti-Communists" (see Table 3).

-- Table 3 goes about here --

AFL Secession: "from above" or "from below"

In the fall of 1936, the AFL "suspended" 10 unions affiliated with the CIO (then still the "Committee on Industrial Organization") on charges of "dual unionism" (the same charge the AFL used to throw out the adherents of the red TUEL 11 years earlier) and of "fomenting insurrection"; the 10 unions immediately started making their per capita payments to what was now to become the independent CIO (Bernstein 1970, pp.422-423). These founding unions of the CIO, and a few others that soon followed them, thus came into the new industrial union movement as the result of a so-called insurrection "from above," i.e., they broke with the AFL to join the CIO with their now former-AFL leaders, staff, and organizational hierarchy -- and much of their union jurisdiction -- intact. Their "machines were," to borrow Mills' remarks (1948, p.197) in a related context, "already built and fenced in before any organizing campaigns were undertaken." As a result, they "had a continuity of leadership," Jack Barbash suggests, "that [was] proof, by and large, against Communist domination" (1956, p.342).

In contrast, most other CIO unions grew out of various local and district battles between craft (or "trade") unionists and industrial unionists over the control of its AFL precursor. Such local insurrections "from below" split many AFL unions, with workers in various locals and districts coming over, in the midst of the unprecedented labor upheavals of the late 1930s, into the CIO, to form the core of new international unions. This happened, for instance, in the AFL's Upholsterers International Union, where a number of locals defected from the AFL, and combined with some other independent craft unions and a few CIO locals in 1937 to form the CIO United Furniture Workers (Peterson 1944, p.135). Other struggles "from below" took place in the newly chartered AFL "federal labor unions," i.e. the newly organized locals given a temporary AFL charter to "store workers" until they could be "parcelled out" to AFL craft affiliates (Bernstein 1970, p.355). Some seceded from the AFL, rather than be parcelled out and subordinated to craft control, to become the locals of a new CIO industrial union. Of the 18 CIO unions in our study that seceded from the AFL as the result of rebellions "from below," 4 originated in rebellions in federal unions, the other 14 in rebellions in various locals and districts of existing AFL international unions.

Often, of course, the leaders of the local rebellions against the old craft leadership were radicals of various stripes, including Communists and their allies. Unlike the situation in the former AFL unions that came into the CIO "from above," these left leaders thus had the opportunity to gain secure political bases in the new CIO unions they built in struggles "from below." This happened in longshore, for example, with Harry Bridges. An Australian seaman, his leadership in the epic 1934 West Coast maritime strike and, particularly, the general strike in San Francisco had, with Communist support, catapulted him from ordinary dockworker into the presidency,

first, of the San Francisco local and then, in 1936, of the Pacific Coast district. In 1937, he led 17,000 west coast dockers out of the old International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) into the CIO, to form the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) (Kimeldorf 1987; Levinson 1956, pp.262-263).

For these reasons, we should expect far more of the unions that had been born in an insurrection "from below" than in a secession "from above" to be Communist-led. Indeed, we find a marked contrast between the number of Communist-led unions in each category: nearly three fourths of the CIO unions whose secession from the AFL had been the result of struggles "from below" were later led by Communists and their allies, but fewer than one sixth of the old AFL internationals that had joined the CIO "from above" were Communist-led; in fact, nearly half of the latter were "anti-Communist" in comparison to just 5 percent of the former (see Table 4).

- Table 4 goes about here --

Of course, if Communists had penetrated an industry in the past, gained experience there, won some adherents, and built some bases of support in it, they also were probably among the leading activists involved in what AFL officials called "fomenting insurrection" against them and leading the workers in that industry into the burgeoning CIO unions. In fact, we find that among the industries that had been a focus of earlier red union drives, the vast majority, about three out of four, of the CIO unions were born in rebellions "from below," while among the industries that had not been penetrated by earlier red unionists, most of the unions, some six in ten, were led into the CIO "from above" (see table 5).

-- Table 5 goes about here --

Red Unionism and Insurrection "from below"

How, then, did these two sets of political relations interact in propelling the Communists and their allies into the leadership of the CIO unions? Alas, the number of unions in the relevant categories precludes reliable comparisons, although the results are suggestive. It is clear, despite the very small numbers of unions compared, that, whether or not the industry had a history of red unionism, the vast majority of the unions that had come into the CIO through struggles "from below," but only a small fraction of those that had joined "from above," were led by Communists and their allies (see Table 6).

Yet if a union was born in struggles "from below," prior red union drives in the industry do not seem to have enhanced the chances that Communists would later win its leadership. We can surmise that these struggles themselves probably provided enough of an opening for the Communists and their allies to win leadership in the emerging unions. Also, once such struggles against the old AFL leadership were under way, the party had the capacity to back up its existing organizers by bringing in cadre from other industries or CP-led unemployed councils, whose members "were frequently absorbed into the burgeoning new unions

as the job market expanded in the late thirties" (Howe and Coser 1957, p.377).

Unexpectedly, earlier red unionism in their industry did have a modest impact on the chances that unions led into the CIO "from above" would later be led by Communists or anti-Communists (see Table 6). Perhaps, this is precisely because, as we know from the historical record, the nuclei of red unionists created through earlier red organizing drives (surviving despite anti-Communist purges) provided the original base for Communist influence or even ascendancy in some AFL unions.¹⁰

-- Table 6 goes about here --

Amalgamation

Many unions, whatever their origins -- whether they began as company unions or independent (non-AFL) unions, or whether they joined the CIO as the result of rebellions "from below" or of secession "from above," or even split away from another CIO union during the early wave of organizing -- were born as relatively "unitary" or centralized and hierarchical organizations; as they grew, they tended to incorporate new members and locals into the union's existing structure, "with the new subordinate officials and groups deriving their authority from the summits of the organization" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956, p.442). The United Rubber Workers' leadership, "which stemmed chiefly from the company's union leaders" (Saposs 1959, p.123), won an AFL charter in 1935, but bolted to the CIO later that year -- and subsequently led some of the bitterest recognition strikes in any industry in the late 1930s. The United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers (FE) originated from within the CIO itself, when a number of locals in farm equipment manufacturing broke away from the CIO's Steel Workers Organizing Committee to become an independent CIO organizing committee (and, later, an independent union) in that industry. The International Woodworkers union originated as the result of a dissident movement among the "unskilled" within the AFL's Brotherhood of Carpenters, where such woodworkers had no voting rights. But, despite the diversity of their origins, each of these unions retained its preexisting centralized organizational structure as it grew in membership and extended its sway in the industry.

In contrast, other unions came "into existence as a federation through the combination of a number of existing . . . independent locals or groups of leaders." (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956, p.442).¹¹ This happened, in particular, because industrial "jurisdictions" -- whatever the union's CIO charter said -- were mixed and shifting in the early organizing years of many CIO unions; sometimes several unions were organizing in different branches of the same industry; sometimes a single union branched out and organized locals in several closely related industries. It was thus always a political question -- a matter of the distribution of power -- as to how and to what extent CIO officials could impose their own demands on these new unions: i.e., whether they allowed (or compelled) a union to retain and amalgamate such mixed industrial locals into its permanent

structure, or allowed (or compelled) several unions in different parts of an industry to amalgamate into a single union.

It was, of course, also a political question, as well as a specific matter of organizing strategy, for the unions and various locals involved. The CIO ordered the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE), for example, to relinquish its locals in the utilities industry, where it had been organizing, with CIO assistance, for over a year, and created a new jurisdiction to establish a separate Utility Workers Union (Galenson 1960, p.253). The UE leaders may have accepted the CIO diktat because UE-directed organizing was being carried out mainly with the use of paid CIO organizers, and the rival Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) was also active in organizing there; under these circumstances, fighting to hold on to the utility workers would have been costly and destructive of labor unity. It may also have been a necessary gesture by UE Communists to their new CIO allies, in tune with the "Popular Front" line of the party.¹²

A strategy of amalgamation of competing if not hostile independent unions, former company unions or AFL federal unions, and even the remnants of a TUUL union, in an industry (or closely related industries) promised some stability to the new, larger, amalgamated, union, by consolidating these unions, their leaders, members, and finances, within a single structure. But it also meant a redistribution of power within the new amalgamated union; some officials of what had been the separate unions would now be reduced, at best, to secondary officers of the new international or even to the officers of a local; others would be elevated to the top leadership of the international itself.

Nonetheless, whatever the outcome for individuals, a process of union formation through amalgamation tends, as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman emphasize, to create internal factionalism, based on political competition among autonomous centers of power, and thus, in turn, to enhance the chances of union democracy. Two of the "big three" CIO unions, for instance, in the auto and electrical manufacturing industries, came into existence through amalgamation. The UAW "was formed out of an amalgamation of a number of existing automobile unions, and a number of its other local units were organized independently of national control. . . . Most of the factional leaders in the UAW were leaders in the early organizational period of the union, and the different factions have largely been coalitions of the groups headed by these different leaders jointly resisting efforts to subordinate them to the national administration" (1956, p.443).

For the same reasons, where radical or Communist-led locals or unions were incorporated into the new union through amalgamation, they, too, had a chance to compete for its international leadership. "A strong local dominated by the party," Philip Selznick (1952, p.213) points out, "may become the [Communist] fraction's base of operations, its officers assuming a guiding role in relation to other party-led groups in the union."

In the UAW, one of the most influential of the organized factions in the union over the years was led by Communists; they "had a sizable membership" in the union and were among the leaders of several important locals, including (well into the 1950s) the world's largest local, Ford Local 600 at River Rouge. They also had close ties to "powerful non-Communist allies who had participated in the great sitdown strikes"; but, though highly influential, they made no effort to take over the union's leadership (Glazer 1961, p.112; Keeran 1980). Not merely the Communists, of course, but other leadership factions (including the one led by the Reuther brothers and the ACTU) were also successful in "winning local centers of power," and using them "as bases for further operations," in an effort to forge alliances and build their own "machine" within the union (Selznick 1952, p.213).

In contrast, in the relatively diversified "electrical industry," the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union, whose very name reflects its amalgamated union origins, was largely organized and led by Communists and their allies, which included many older radical and socialist workers (the industry had been penetrated in earlier decades by the IWW). Communists had organized one of the major unions (the TUUL's Steel and Metal Workers Union), and had sizeable memberships and significant influence among several other independent and local unions (e.g. in GE's Schenectady plant) that amalgamated in 1936 to form the new union; they thus succeeded in winning the new union's international leadership. As Levenstein (1981, p.62) explains: "Because it was essentially a coalition of independently-organized unions, the UE had a relatively democratic constitution with many features ensuring local autonomy and decentralization of power. The districts into which UE was organized were exceptionally powerful, paying the salaries of their own elected officers. With much of the support for the Communists resting at the local level, . . . the task of overthrowing [their] leadership would have to involve arduous battles for local after local, for district after district."

Consequently, the process of amalgamation of several unions into a single union probably tended to enhance the chances that these unions' various leaders could retain local political bases within the new CIO union, from which to attempt to extend their influence and contend for its leadership. Under these circumstances, we surmise, the Communists had a better chance of gaining the leadership of amalgamated unions than of unitary unions. This is, as expected, what we find: the vast majority, some two thirds, of the unions that had been formed through amalgamation were led by Communists, whereas the unitary unions were split almost evenly among the three "camps" (see Table 7).

-- Table 7 goes about here --

Independent Organizing and Amalgamation

We discussed earlier the CIO officials' self-conscious use of "organizing committees" to prevent the Communists from getting a grip on an industry. But this political strategy, which was

aimed not only at the Communists but also at other organized left opposition to CIO officials, also resulted in the creation of a bureaucratic political regime in some unions.

Indeed, we wish to stress that even where the "objective conditions" in the "industry" were highly conducive to intraunion factionalism, the political action of CIO officials had its own relatively autonomous effects: they imposed a system of concentrated power designed to override such "natural" factionalist tendencies, as well as to exclude the Communists, and thereby -- not unwittingly -- forged a centralized, hierarchical, unitary union political structure, with their own subalterns in control.

Textiles, for example, was "simply not an industry," as Irving Bernstein (1970, p.616) observes. "It was cotton, woolen and worsted, rayon and other synthetics, silk, hosiery, carpets and rugs, thread and braid, dyeing and finishing. Each of these 'industries' had its own geographic distribution, its own markets, its own technology, its own distinctive labor force." Nonetheless, Bernstein points out, Amalgamated Clothing Workers' head Sidney Hillman, who ran the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, "saw to it that the Communists, despite their historic involvement in textile unionism, had no voice in TWOC" (1970, p.616).

But to achieve this, and at the same time rein in the centrifugal forces of this unusually heterogeneous "industry," TWOC imposed a centralized bureaucratic structure on the new union. It established industry conferences and joint boards designed "to provide the internal coordination that was essential in so diversified an industry . . . without permitting the rise of permanent functional suborganizations which might eventually challenge the authority of the national union (Galenson 1960, p.333, italics added).¹³

The question, then, is whether the preceding findings are spurious, and our inferences thus false, concerning the consequences of "unitary" and "amalgamated" organizational forms for the unions' internal political life and, in particular, for the chances that Communists could gain power within them. Are these apparent causal relationships, in reality, merely reflections of the underlying processes, which we have already examined, that had been set in motion by independent organizing vs. organizing under the control of a CIO organizing committee? The answer (although the small number of unions in one of the relevant categories limits the reliability of this comparison) is a fairly clear no.

Rather, examining the two sets of relationships simultaneously reveals that both amalgamation and independent organizing enhanced the chances for Communist union power. Thus, among the unions that had been independently organized, far more (and indeed, the vast majority) of the amalgamated unions were in the "Communist camp" than of the unitary unions. Similarly, among the unions that had been organized by a CIO organizing committee (and, despite there being only 2 amalgamated unions in

this category), none of the amalgamated unions but half of the unitary unions were led by "anti-Communists." Or, if we compare the unitary unions built through independent organizing to their counterparts established by CIO organizing committees, we find that well over half of the former but only a tenth of the latter were in the "Communist camp." The pattern is similar when comparing the number of "anti-Communist" unions in these same categories (see Table 8).

-- Table 8 goes about here --

Insurrection "from below" and Amalgamation

The same question must now be asked about the combined effects of the process of union formation and of the type of secession from the AFL in determining the subsequent political alignment of the CIO union's leadership. The unions that came over to the CIO as the result of a secession "from above," i.e. with their now former-AFL leaders, staff, and organizational hierarchy -- and much of their union jurisdiction -- intact, probably did not find it necessary (or desirable) to amalgamate with other unions, in order to consolidate their union power in their industry. But for those unions that had been born in insurrections "from below" at the local and district level, and had to continue to organize other workers in the industry and engage the corporations in battle while also trying to consolidate themselves as full-fledged unions, organizational alliances and eventual amalgamation with other unions in the same or closely related industries was probably a potent political strategy. In any event, only 3 of the 13 unions that seceded "from above" but 9 of the 18 that were born "from below" adopted a strategy of amalgamation, as new CIO unions.

How, then, did amalgamation affect the chances that the Communists gained power in the CIO unions, given the differences in the birth of these unions through struggles "from below" or secessions "from above"? Despite, again, the few unions in the relevant categories, the contrast remains: among the unions born in struggles "from below," the vast majority of both amalgamated and unitary unions were led by Communists and their allies; but the Communists in the amalgamated unions had a slight edge over their comrades in the unitary unions, where the new union's officials had a tighter grip on their locals and a better chance to defeat dissidents to their left. Among the unions born "from below," 78 percent of the amalgamated unions compared to 67 percent of the unitary unions were in the "Communist camp." Among the unions that came over to the CIO "from above," although a small minority of the unions in both categories were led by Communists and their allies, the relationship between amalgamation and subsequent Communist leadership also holds (see Table 9).

-- Table 9 goes about here --

Insurgent Political Practice

A final empirical question remains as to how the full constellation of political relations examined so far affected who -- left, right, and center -- won and who lost in the struggle

for union "power and trust." Because the small number of cases involved precludes an examination of complex multivariate relationships, we have constructed an index of what might be called "insurgent political practice," based on assigning points to the insurgent dimension of each of the 4 independent political variables. A union received 1 point for each of the following: if red unionists had penetrated the industry before the rise of the CIO union itself; if workers and independent organizers had organized the union, rather than the staff of a CIO organizing committee; if an insurrection "from below" against the AFL brought the union into the CIO [but if it had no past AFL connection, it received a half point]; and if the union's founders had used a strategy of amalgamation with other unions to consolidate it. This index ranges from 0 points (received by 1 union) to 4 points (received by 6 unions); to allow appropriate comparisons, the index is trichotomized, "low" (0-1 points), "medium" (1.5 to 2.5 points), and "high" (3-4), into three levels of "insurgent political practice."

What we find is striking confirmation of the cumulative impact of alternative organizing strategies on the character of the leadership that emerged in CIO unions. We find a direct relationship between the level of insurgent political practice its organizers used to build the union and the chance that Communists would win "positions of power and trust" in it. Of the unions that had been built by a combination of all four insurgent organizing strategies, i.e., whose original organizers had acted at the highest level of insurgent political practice, the overwhelming majority, some eight out of ten, were led by Communists and their allies. In contrast, just one in six of the unions built by a low level of insurgent political practice were in the Communist "camp," and well over half were led by "anti-Communists." And ranged between these levels, in the proportion of unions in the Communist "camp," were the unions built by a "medium" level of political insurgency, which were split almost evenly between those led by Communists and those led by "shifting" coalitions (with a slight edge to the Communists), and with only a small fraction led by "anti-Communists" (see Table 10).

-- Table 10 goes about here --

Conclusion

This analysis, focusing as it has on the "second front," i.e. the intraclass struggle for working class leadership, has neglected how the fight on the main front, i.e. the common class struggle against capital, itself affected the intraclass struggle (and vice versa). American capitalists long resisted unionism with a ferocity unparalleled among their Western European counterparts, disposing of their own virtual private armies, as well as having the assistance of local and state police, the national guard, and, occasionally, the U.S. army itself, to repress their workers' strikes and efforts to unionize (Taft and Ross 1969; Goldstein 1978). But if "many employers fought unionism with every weapon at their command"

(Taft and Ross 1969, p.289), others were readier to compromise and accommodate themselves to the new unions. A critical question, then, is how employers' varying levels and kinds of resistance or accommodation to unionization affected the political practice of the contending factions and the chances that Communists, rather than their CIO competitors, would win the workers' trust and take power in the new unions.¹⁴ To conduct an empirical inquiry concerning this issue would necessitate primary historical research on at least the paths taken by each of the major corporations in all of the industries organized by CIO unions during the vast wave of unionization in the late 1930s. In turn, it would be necessary to assess how the stance toward unionization taken by different employers within an industry affected the political outcome both at the local level and in the international union as a whole. In steel, for example, U.S. Steel ("big steel") suddenly and surprisingly capitulated to the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1937 while the so-called "little steel" companies engaged in a bitter four year battle before recognizing the union. Were such an analysis carried out, it would then be possible to weigh the relevance of both class and intraclass struggles in determining the political alignments in the organized working class.¹⁵

The present analysis and findings demonstrate that concrete intraclass struggles can, whether wittingly or not, create new objective political relations, which in turn shape the internal political alignments, if not the historically specific social form, of a class. In short, they demonstrate the "relative autonomy of the political" in making history.

But let us be clear that none of this implies any sort of "voluntaristic theory of politics." The original historical opening for the left in the working class was provided by an extraordinary crisis of American capitalism, the ensuing political upheavals at all levels of government -- local, state, and federal, legislative and executive -- and the unprecedented, primarily spontaneous, "labor upsurge" of the 1930s (Brody 1980, pp. 103, 130-144). "Such times are rare and certainly not of anyone's deliberate making" (Piven and Cloward 1977, p.173); and it was in these times that "the few Communists who had been working in factories and mines and shops found themselves," in Glazer's apt yet misleading simile (1961, pp.100-101), ". . . carried like corks riding a flood to top positions in a host of unions."¹⁶

The Communists and other radicals of the 1930s involved in the leadership and organization of the working class, however, were not mere "corks riding a flood" but active, self-conscious men and women, and they were not "riding" but actually shaping, though assuredly not just as they pleased, the sudden social eruption in which they were leading participants. These "rare times," these "objective structural conditions," did not determine what happened, but constituted "a structure of choices given at a particular moment of history," or a "realm of possibilities" (Przeworski 1977, p.377): they objectively allowed

and objectively limited what was now possible, given the active intervention of real actors (collective and industrial). But what was now possible was itself (as we saw) already the partial creation, within (unknown) objective limits, of what these men and women had done in the past, as leading actors in workers' struggles.

The political divisions within the organized segment of the working class (at least, within its organized industrial segment) were certainly not shaped, at this particular historical moment, only (or even mainly?) by "objective structural conditions." These intraclass political demarcations were also formed, to an extent partly revealed here, by the workers' own self-conscious activity, and, above all, by and in concrete political struggles and by the objective consequences (intended and unwitting) of these struggles, which, to borrow Max Weber's metaphor, "loaded the historical dice," and affected the chances that the Communists or their opponents would win positions of "power and trust" in American's industrial unions.

Epilogue

A colleague, on hearing the phrase in this article's title, "how the Communists won power and trust in American unions," quickly suggested the subtitle, " -- and abused both." What the historical impact of the Communists on American labor was during their historically brief sojourn at the helm of so many CIO unions -- whether they did, in reality, abuse the positions of power and trust they held in American unions, is, to say the least, an issue which still arouses the passions of even academic scholars forty years after the expulsion of the Communist-led unions from the CIO (witness, for instance, the exchanges between Theodore Draper and "new historians" of American Communism, whom he charges with "political partisanship" and "historical bias" (1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d). It is an issue, although outside the purview of the present analysis, about which a few words are nonetheless inescapably necessary here.

On the eve of the expulsions of the Communist-led unions from the CIO, the "primary charges" of "liberal and left wing opponents" against the Communists in organized labor were laid out by C. Wright Mills: "First, the turns of these U.S. Stalinists from leftward to rightward, and back again, have been determined not by their judgment of the changing needs of the working people, or by pressures from these people, but by the changing needs of the ruling group in Russia. Second, the ways for maintaining power which are habitual with the U.S. Stalinists include personal defamation and intrigue, carried, if need be, to the point of wrecking a man or a labor union. . . . Third, Communist rule within the U.S. unions they control is dictatorial; although they talk the language of democracy they do not believe or practice democratic principles. . . . Fourth, the existence of Communist factions, and their lack of independence, is a strong deterrent to . . . any genuine leftward tendencies of labor in America" (1948, pp.199-200).

Implicit in these charges, then, are critical historical/sociological questions bearing on the political practice and concrete achievements of Communist-led unions; two of these questions, at least, seem to be amenable to empirical sociological analysis: Was Communist "rule" of their unions in fact "dictatorial"? Did the Communist-led unions in fact subordinate the "needs" of the workers they represented to the "needs" of the Soviet regime? Put analytically, we can ask: How did the internal political life of the Communist-led unions compare to that of the unions in the "shifting" and "anti-Communist" camps? What impact did the Communist-led unions have on the shop-floor conditions and broader life experiences of the workers they represented, as compared to unions in these other political camps?

These two questions -- of both social relevance and theoretical significance -- are the focus of other research in which we are now engaged. Their answers also carry implications for the interpretation of the historical meaning of the CIO's expulsion of the Communist-led unions (and the subsequent disappearance of all but a few of them). What did their expulsion mean for the labor movement's subsequent vitality, for its social achievements and political relevance in American life? What, put differently, did this mean for the organization and reorganization, for the relative class consciousness and internal cohesion -- in a word, for the "making" -- of the American working class, in our times?

1. The most comprehensive historical account of the rise of the CIO is Bernstein 1970.

2. Obviously, these figures depend on how the "Communist camp" gets defined. Kampelman (1957, pp.45-47) lists 40 unions in the CIO at the time of the 1946 CIO convention, 18 of which (or 45 percent) he classifies in the "Communist camp." (Here he follows Avery 1946.) The Research Institute of America (1946, pp. 17-18) lists 36 CIO unions, 17 of which the Institute classifies as "left-wing unions" (which coincide with 17 of Kampelman's CP-led unions), and another 5 of which it classifies as "probably left-wing unions" (of which one is classified as CP-led by Kampelman) (see Appendix 1, chart 1). Barrington Moore, Jr.'s assessment in 1945 was that "the Communists and their sympathizers are quite evenly matched within the CIO . . ." (1945, p.37). Mills (1948, p.195) claims that, throughout 1947, "Communist-controlled" unions amounted to about 25 percent of the CIO's unions, while the number "troubled by, but not under the threat of CP control" declined sharply from 35 percent to 15 percent during that same year of heightened conflict. (He does not identify the unions he has classified in these categories nor explain the basis of his categorization.) Seidman (1950) estimates that the Communists led unions representing a third of the CIO membership in 1946; Arnold Beichman, author of the RIA's 1946 report, wrote a dozen years later that in 1946, "by universal admission," Communists led unions with 20 percent of the CIO's membership; and Kampelman (1957, p.157) estimates 25 percent in 1946, down to 15 percent by 1948, but elsewhere (p.249) also says "that Communist-led unions in 1949 claimed a membership of more than two million," which would put the percentage at that time at about the same as Seidman's estimate, i.e. a third. Levenstein's (1981, p.213) most recent learned guess is that the Communists led unions representing 20 to 30 percent of the CIO membership. These estimates of the membership of "Communist-controlled" or "Communist-dominated" unions do not take into account the members of Communist-led locals in other unions or of various unions in which Communists had enough of a presence to influence them significantly, although not enough to "control" or "dominate" them. See Appendix 1, Chart 1, which lists the unions in the present study and indicates in which "camp" they are classified (Communist, "shifting," and anti-Communist)

3. Similarly, Barrington Moore, Jr. (1945, p.37), comments: "The Communists won their position in the CIO through their willingness to take on the more unpleasant and in some instances routine tasks of trade union organization and maintenance that were shirked by those members who did not have a political axe to grind. In this fashion they came in at the beginning of the

growth of mass unionism, and won strategic positions as union officers from which they have not been dislodged by their opponents."

4. On the question of class formation, "objective conditions," and political struggle, see the insightful theoretical essay by Przeworski (1977); on political action, determination, and historical contingency, see Miliband 1980; also cf. Skocpol (1979, pp. 291, 5) who, in analyzing social revolutions, emphasizes "objective relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups . . . rather than the interests, outlooks or ideologies of particular actors . . .," and argues that "basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense sociopolitical conflicts in which class struggles play a key role." The work of Poulantzas (1973, esp. pp.85-98), is perhaps the most influential attempt to deal with the "region of the political" within a "structuralist problematic"; but his conception permits of no historical subjects who actually engage in the political struggles that produce the "pertinent effects" of which Poulantzas is so fond theoretically; rather, in this peculiar Marxian variant of structural-functionalism, "history," as Przeworski (1977, p.368) remarks, ". . . becomes a history that proceeds from relations to effects without any human agency."

5. In fact, implicit in Levenstein's and other fine labor historians' tales of specific struggles are important insights into the general political processes involved, and we have learned much from them in formulating the interrelated hypotheses in the present analysis. In this, we follow the implicit advice of the authors of the now classic work on the political structure of a union. "At the present time, one may spend a great deal of time examining the large number of studies of individual trade unions . . . without being able to validate a single proposition. . . . The data collected in such case studies do not lend themselves to re-analysis to test hypotheses, since the researchers rarely focused their observations in terms of any set of explicit hypotheses" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1962, p.469). Here, of course, we try to focus the particularizing and unsystematic observations of historians, as well as of some sociologists, by formulating these observations as an explicit set of interrelated hypotheses about the relatively independent causal efficacy of intraclass political struggles in creating political relations.

6. These red organizing drives took place in two phases, first, until the fall of 1929, in an effort to create revolutionary oppositions within the major AFL unions, through the Trade Union

Educational League (TUEL), then, until 1935, in an effort to build independent industrial unions, through the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL). On the TUEL and its successor, the TUUL, see Foster 1937; Starobin 1972; and Cochran 1977.

7. We can think of no convincing line of argument that the other insurgent political practices to be examined in the following analysis (independent organizing, insurrection "from below," and amalgamation) in some way reflected the specific "objective conditions" of the industries organized by the CIO unions that were formed through these practices. But in the case of red union organizing, it can be plausibly argued that an industry's structure did have a bearing on the very existence of that insurgent organizing practice, and on the Communists' success or failure in penetrating that industry. The Communists, after all, were inveterate seekers after the appropriate "objective conditions" in which to carry out their activities; and the TUEL and its successor TUUL did target certain industries for that reason, as well as because they considered organizing these industries to be of crucial importance in the struggle to organize all industrial workers (e.g. such core mass production industries as steel, auto, chemicals). In short, it could be argued that earlier red union organizing had an impact precisely where "objective conditions" favored it. If so, the apparent causal relationship between earlier red unionism and subsequent Communist leadership of the unions in these industries could be spurious, both reflecting instead the objective conditions of the industries at the time the red unionists originally penetrated them. Yet it is also true that the Communists often tried to organize the unorganized in industries that in no way were "strategic" or possessed of the sort of structural conditions that might be seen as objectively favoring industrial unionism. On the contrary, as Levenstein (1981, p.71) correctly remarks, ". . . often their egalitarian impulse led them to expend inordinate energy on organizing those least powerful and least strategically placed: tragic cases such as the migrant workers, 'losers' such as southern textile workers, the infinitely replaceable Macy's salesclerks, or hospital workers." Howe and Coser's assessment (1957, pp.257, 272) of the red unionists, especially during their "revolutionary" Third Period, makes the same point differently, in a chapter fittingly called "Heroism and Disaster": by bowing to Comintern decisions that ignored the real situation in the United States, "TUUL leaders and members," although they "often displayed a heroism and self-sacrifice which no amount of political disagreement should deter anyone from admiring," Howe and Coser argue, led workers, time after time, in one industry after another, from coal mining to textiles, into disastrous strikes and senseless efforts to organize dual unions, where the objective conditions were heavily, and obviously, against them -- and thus "burned themselves out in a senseless and irresponsible adventure." For these reasons, we doubt that

"objective conditions" in what were in reality extraordinarily diverse industries penetrated by the TUEL and TUUL could account for the enduring impact of their years of red union organizing; indeed, the Communists went on to win the leadership of unions in a broad range of entirely different types of industries, and to lose in some and win in others whose objective conditions appear to have been quite similar (as has also been emphasized by Glazer [1961, p.120], quoted on p.13 above, one of the few sociologists who has studied American Communist unionists). The point must also be stressed that the very decision of the red unionists of the TUEL and TUUL to target an industry, for whatever reasons ("strategic," "revolutionary," or "egalitarian impulse"), had consequences (which are, in principle, discoverable and measurable) for the nature of an industry's "objective conditions," none the least of which was employers' re-organization of the immediate labor process, to tighten surveillance and control of the workers, in order to withstand unionization. This, of course, is another, perhaps crucial, instance of the "relative autonomy of the political." Withal, the question (or suspicion) we began this note with still remains critical, but answering it empirically would necessitate carrying out primary historical research on the organizing successes and failures of the TUEL and TUUL and on the nature of the industries in which they occurred. These data are certainly not available in the existing secondary historical sources.

8. It ought to be noted that the fight in Steel was, according to Levenstein, entirely one-sided, constituting a rather clear illustrative instance of the independent causal relevance of "the political": the Communist leadership, following the "Popular Front" line, never "challenged the purges or sought to increase Communist power by calling for the democratization of the SWOC," because they feared alienating their liberal allies (1981, p.51).

9. Rarely, a CIO Organizing Committee fell into hands not unfriendly to the Communists or it was short-lived (or both); in either case, in consequence, the Communists were not hampered from creating their own nuclei of support in the new union. For instance, Powers Hapgood, CIO-appointed head of the Shoe Workers Organizing Committee, was not unsympathetic to the Communist Party (Levenstein 1981, p.108). Further, this organizing committee lasted only a year (perhaps because of the influence of the Communists in it) before transforming itself, in 1937, into a full-fledged union and fighting, the next year, a "series of heroic strikes in the corrupt and vigilante-ridden New England shoe towns" (Stolberg 1938, p.230). The United Shoe Workers Union was, consequently, still led by Communists and their allies a decade later.

10. The Fur and Leather Workers is the one Communist-led union in this category (i.e., that came over to the CIO "from above," in an industry with a history of earlier red unionism). Its top officials were "openly avowed" members of the Communist Party, who had first won the New York district leadership of the union when they ran on a TUEL slate in 1925 (Kampelman 1957, pp.215-216).

11. Amalgamation, then, refers to a process in which a union was constituted of several independent units that merged at the time of the CIO union's formation in the 1930s. For this reason, we did not classify unions formed out of the FL federal locals alone as amalgamated, because, in general, these federal locals had little if any prior independent organizational existence. If a union already had been an established AFL union before it joined the CIO and before the time of its merger with another union or unions, to be classified as amalgamated, the merger had to lead to a substantial reorganization of the union's administrative or political structure. Only three unions had any record of mergers after joining the CIO, i.e., Mine, Mill, which added a Die Casting Division in 1942, 5 years after it bolted the AFL to be a charter member of the CIO; the Fur and Leather Workers, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Because of the timing of the Mine, Mill merger, long after its political structure had been established, it does not qualify, in our terms, as an amalgamated union. As to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, it also does not qualify as an amalgamated union. Despite its name, it had become in reality a highly centralized union long before it absorbed the Journeymen Tailors Union and its some 6,000 members in 1936, and, later, the 9 locals of the CIO's Laundry Workers; and no significant reorganization of the union's administration occurred after these mergers (Galenson 1960, p.285; also see Bernstein 1970, pp.73 ff). In contrast, when the International Fur Workers Union amalgamated in March 1939 with the National Leather Workers Association, the union was restructured to be constituted of two divisions, fur and leather, each of which would elect its own officers and manage its own finances, while the combined executive boards of the two divisions would constitute the executive body of the new amalgamated international union (Foner 1950, p.556; Brown 1947, p.135); this re-structuring was also reflected in the new union's name, the International Fur and Leather Workers Union. For this reason, it qualifies here as an amalgamated union.

12. This is speculation, of course, but it is speculation that accords with the decision of Communist unionists in other unions at the time. In the UAW, for example, under pressure from the party's leadership, Communists in the union did not make a fight for the top offices, despite the fact that they had a sizable

membership, broad rank-and-file support, and such immensely popular Communist leaders of the sit-downs as Bob Travis and Wyndham Mortimer (Keeran 1980; also see note 8, above, on steel). The officials of the Utility Workers union were to be among the most vociferously anti-Communist. As Kampelman (1957, p.46) observes: "Recently granted [its] CIO charter. [The Utility Workers'] new constitution contained one of the most drastic bans against Communists ever adopted by a labor union, specifically excluding Communists and providing for their expulsion from membership."

13. Similarly, the United Steelworkers, in contrast to UAW and UE, the other two unions in the CIO's "big three," came into existence under the top-down control, as we know, of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee headed by Philip Murray and the national CIO leadership; indeed, it remained an "organizing committee" for some 6 years, until the union was formally established in 1942. The United Steelworkers thus became the very model of a centralized, unitary organization, with little if any local or district autonomy. "With few exceptions, almost every local was created after the initial power structure was established. From its inception there have been no serious factional disputes in the union which have given the members the right to choose among rival candidates for office. Any local center of disturbance was eliminated by Murray" (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956, p.443, italics added). Given the absence of local autonomy, of course, "despite the Communist workers in the steel mills, despite the Communist organizers who worked in the drive, the party gained no important sphere of influence in the union. A skillful anti-Communist administration," Glazer points out, "keeping close reins on local unions and preventing the development of local autonomy, also prevented the establishment of a Communist base . . ." in the union (1961, p.113, italics added).

14. A subsidiary -- perhaps inseparable -- question, in particular, is what effect anti-union employers' anti-Communism had on the Communists' relative success in winning union leadership. For, as Levenstein (1981, pp.101-102) points out, "Most of the unions whose membership surged upwards in the 1930s . . . did so in the face of employer-sponsored charges that they were in fact Communists. . . . When the La Follette committee investigated employer abuse of civil liberties in the late 1930s, the most frequent justification it heard for employer antiunion activities was anticommunism. It 'was used to justify everything from the confiscation of union literature to the killing of the Memorial Day marchers'."

15. Put with desperate brevity, two diametrically opposed, and plausible, hypotheses can be advanced about how the stance of employers toward unionization weighed in the political balance: 1. that the fiercer the resistance of employers to unionization, the more were the most militant and radical workers pushed to the forefront of the struggle, giving them an opportunity to prove their mettle and win their fellow unionists' trust, and thus, while stilling more moderate union voices, enhancing the Communists' chances of winning the workers' leadership and eventual union power. 2. that the fiercer the resistance of employers to unionization, the more were the most militant and radical workers isolated as the struggle proceeded, giving more moderate elements in the union the opportunity to convince their fellow unionists of the need for compromise and accommodation, if only to avoid the consequences of severe repression, and thus enhancing the chances that non-Communists and anti-Communists would win the workers' leadership and eventual union power.

16. Implicit here are crucial historical sociological questions whose answers are by no means clear, and to which little if any sustained attention has been paid (see Brody 1980, pp.82-172; cf. Piven and Cloward 1977, pp.41-180): Why and how did the workers (and which ones) suddenly abandon their fatalism, quietism, and resignation to join in mass struggles for the right to organize? What indeed accounts for the rise of the CIO itself as an independent organization successfully rallying workers to its banner of "industrial unionism"? (Neither the split with the AFL nor the CIO's brilliant achievements in organizing the unorganized were inevitable.)

Table 1. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by Earlier Red Organizing Activities (1920-1935).

Earlier Red <u>Organizing</u>	<u>"Shifting"</u>			<u>(N)</u>
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
Some	52	29	19	(21)
None	41	23	35	(17)

Table 2. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by the Union's Original Organizing Strategy.

<u>Organizing</u> <u>Strategy</u>	<u>"Shifting"</u>			<u>(N)</u>
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
Independent Organizing	61	19	19	(26)
CIO Organizing Committee	17	42	42	(12)

Table 3. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by Earlier Red Union Organizing and the Union's Original Organizing Strategy.

<u>Some Earlier Red Organizing</u>				
Organizing Strategy	"Shifting"			(N)
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
Independent Organizing	77	15	8	(13)
CIO Organizing Committee	13	50	37	(8)

<u>No Earlier Red Organizing</u>				
Organizing Strategy	"Shifting"			(N)
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
Independent Organizing	46	23	31	(13)
CIO Organizing Committee	25	25	50	(4)

Table 4. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists by Whether the Union's Secession from the AFL Came "From Above" or "From Below."

Type of <u>Secession</u>	<u>"Shifting"</u>			<u>(N)</u>
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
"from above"	15	38	46	(13) ^a
"from below"	72	22	5	(18)

^aFive unions fit neither category because they were independent (non-A unions before the CIO was established (e.g., the Federation of Archite Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians) or were organized in an industry had no prior AFL union in it (e.g., the Farm Equipment Workers).

Table 5. The Percentage of International Unions Whose Secession From the AFL Came "From Above" vs. "From Below," by Earlier Red Union Organizing.

Earlier Red <u>Organizing</u>	<u>Source of Secession</u>		<u>(N)</u>
	<u>"from above"</u>	<u>"from below"</u>	
Some	28	72	(18)
None	61	38	(13)

Table 6. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by Earlier Red Union Organizing and the Type of Secession from the AFL.

<u>Secession "from above"</u>				
Earlier Red	"Shifting"			
<u>Organizing</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Some	20	40	40	(5)
None	13	37	50	(8)

<u>Secession "from below"</u>				
Earlier Red	"Shifting"			
<u>Organizing</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Some	69	23	8	(13)
None	80	20	0	(5)

Table 7. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s
 Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists
 by the Process of Union Formation.

Union Formation	"Shifting"			(N)
	Communists	Coalitions	Anti-Communists	
Amalgamation	67	17	17	(12)
Unitary	38	31	31	(26)

Table 8. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by the Union's Original Organizing Strategy and the Process of Union Formation.

<u>CIO Organizing Committee</u>				
Union	"Shifting"			
<u>Formation</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Amalgamation	50	50	0	(2)
Unitary	10	40	50	(10)

<u>Independent Organizing</u>				
Union	"Shifting"			
<u>Formation</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Amalgamation	70	10	20	(10)
Unitary	56	25	19	(16)

Table 9. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by the Process of Union Formation and the Type of Secession from the AFL.

<u>Secession Led "from above"</u>				
Union	<u>"Shifting"</u>			
<u>Formation</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Amalgamation	33	33	33	(3)
Unitary	10	40	50	(10)

<u>Secession Led "from below"</u>				
Union	<u>"Shifting"</u>			
<u>Formation</u>	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Amalgamation	78	11	11	(9)
Unitary	67	33	0	(9)

Table 10. The Percentage of CIO International Unions in the 1940s Led by Communists, "Shifting" Coalitions, and Anti-Communists, by the Level of "Insurgent Political Practice."

Level of Insurgent Political Practice	"Shifting"			(N)
	<u>Communists</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Anti-Communists</u>	
High ^a	82	9	9	(11)
Medium ^b	47	40	13	(15)
Low ^c	17	25	58	(12)

^a 3-4 points.

^b 1.5-2.5 points.

^c 0-1 points.

Appendix 1. Chart 1. Classification of CIO Unions on the Political Variables

	1		2		3		4		5
	EARLIER RED <u>UNIONISM</u>		INDEPEN- DENT <u>ORGANIZING</u>		AFL <u>SECESSION</u> FROM FROM		AMALGA- <u>MATION</u>		POLITI- ICAL
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>BELOW</u>	<u>ABOVE</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>"CAMP"</u> ^a
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America	X		X			X		X	SHIFTING
American Communications Assn.	X		X		b	b		X	CP
American Newspaper Guild		X	X			X	X		ANTI-CP ^c
Barbers and Beauty Culturists Union of America	X			X	b	b		X	SHIFTING

1		2		3		4		5
EARLIER		INDEPEN-		AFL				
RED		DENT		<u>SECESSION</u>		AMALGA-		POLITI-
<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM	<u>MATION</u>		ICAL
YES	NO	YES	NO	BELOW	ABOVE	YES	NO	"CAMP"

Fedn. of Glass,
Ceramic, and
Silica Sand
Workers of
America

X X X X ANTI-CP

Food, Tobacco,
Agricultural and
Allied Workers
of America

X X X X CP

Industrial Union
of Marine and
Shipbuilding
Workers of
America

X X X X ANTI-CP

Inlandboatmen's
Union of the
Pacific

X X X X CP

1		2		3		4		5
EARLIER		INDEPEN-		AFL		AMALGA-		POLITI-
RED		DENT		<u>SECESSION</u>		<u>MATION</u>		ICAL
<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM			
YES	NO	YES	NO	BELOW	ABOVE	YES	NO	"CAMP"

Int'l. Fedn. of
Architects, Engi-
neers, Chemists
and Technicians

X X b b X CP

Int'l. Fur and
Leather Workers
Union

X X X X CP

Int'l. Longshore-
men's and
Warehousemen's
Union

X X X X CP

Int'l. Union of
Fishermen and
Allied Workers
of America

X X X X CP

	1		2		3		4		5
	EARLIER	RED	UNIONISM	INDEPEN- DENT	ORGANIZING	AFL <u>SECESSION</u> FROM	FROM	AMALGA- <u>MATION</u>	POLITI- ICAL
	YES	NO	YES	NO	BELOW	ABOVE	YES	NO	"CAMP"
Int'l. Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers		X		X		X		X	CP
Int'l. Union of Playthings and Novelty Workers of America	X			X	b	b		X	ANTI-CP
Int'l. Woodworkers of America	X			X	X			X	SHIFTING
Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Assn. of the Pacific Coast		X		X		X		X	CP
National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Assn.		X		X		X		X	SHIFTING

	1		2		3		4		5
	EARLIER	RED	INDEPEN-	DENT	AFL	<u>SECESSION</u>	AMALGA-	POLITI-	
	<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM	<u>MATION</u>	ICAL	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	BELOW	ABOVE	YES	NO	"CAMP"
National Maritime Union of America	X		X		X			X	CP
Oil Workers Int'l. Union		X		X		X		X	SHIFTING
State, County and Municipal Workers of America		X	X		X			X	CP
Textile Workers Union of America	X			X		X		X	ANTI-CP
Transport Workers Union of America	X		X		X		X		CP
United Automobile Workers of America	X		X			X	X		SHIFTING

1		2		3		4		5
EARLIER	RED	INDEPEN-	DENT	AFL	<u>SECESSION</u>	AMALGA-	POLITI-	
<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM	<u>MATION</u>	ICAL	
<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>BELOW</u>	<u>ABOVE</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>"CAMP"</u>

United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine
Workers of America

X		X		X		X		CP
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	----

United Farm
Equipment and
Metal Workers
of America

	X		X	b	b		X	CP
--	---	--	---	---	---	--	---	----

United Federal
Workers of America

X		X		X			X	CP
---	--	---	--	---	--	--	---	----

United Furniture
Workers of America

X		X		X		X		CP
---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	----

United Gas, Coke and
Chemical Workers
of America

	X	X		X			X	SHIFTING
--	---	---	--	---	--	--	---	----------

	1		2		3		4		5
	EARLIER		INDEPEN-		AFL		AMALGA-		POLITI-
	RED		DENT		<u>SECESSION</u>		<u>MATION</u>		ICAL
	<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM			
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>BELOW</u>	<u>ABOVE</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>"CAMP"</u>
United Office and Professional Workers of America	X		X		X		X		CP
United Packing- house Workers of America	X			X	X		X		SHIFTING
United Paper Workers of America		X		X	b	b		X	ANTI-CP
United Retail and Wholesale Employees of America	X			X	X			X	SHIFTING
United Rubber Workers of America		X	X			X		X	ANTI-CP

	1		2		3		4		5
	EARLIER		INDEPEN-		AFL		AMALGA-		POLITI-
	RED		DENT		<u>SECESSION</u>		MATION		ICAL
	<u>UNIONISM</u>		<u>ORGANIZING</u>		FROM	FROM			
	YES	NO	YES	NO	BELOW	ABOVE	YES	NO	"CAMP"
United Shoe Workers of America	X		X		X		X		CP
United Steel Workers of America	X		X			X		X	ANTI-CP
United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America		X	X			X		X	SHIFTING
United Transport Service Employees of America		X	X			X		X	ANTI-CP
Utility Workers Union		X	X		b	b		X	ANTI-CP

Notes

- a CP=Communist-led; SHIFTING="uncertain and shifting coalitions";
ANTI-CP=anti-Communist (Kampelman 1957, pp.45-47).
- b The union never had an AFL connection.
- c New York and Los Angeles branches were in the "Communist camp."

Appendix 1. Chart 2. Notes and Sources for the Classification of the CIO Unions on the Political Variables

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

- 1 Foster (1937, pp.237-238,,273) lists the Needle Trades Industrial Union (as does Galenson 1940, p.9) as one of the three main TUUL unions. Levenstein (1981, pp.10, 21) says the NTIU organized among ladies and men's garment workers and rivaled the Amalgamated. Cochran (1977, p.357) says Foster claimed 25,000 members for it.
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee. (But the ACW's Sidney Hillman headed the Textile Workers Organizing Committee.)
- 3 ACW was an established AFL union and one of the charter members of the CIO (Levinson 1956, p.238). It was originally organized in 1914 "by a group of workers in the men's clothing industry who seceded from the United Garment Workers' of America. It reached jurisdictional agreement with the latter in 1933, and affiliated with the AFL in that year" (Peterson 1944, pp.87-88).
- 4 The Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union was joined by the Journeymen Tailors' Union in 1936 (Peterson 1944, p.88), and later by the Laundry Workers, but the union was already established by this time, and did not undergo a substantial reorganization as a result of the mergers.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the uncertain and shifting camp.

American Communications Association

- 1 The TUUL's American Radio Telegraphists' Association was a precursor

of the ACA. (Stolberg 1938, p.240)

2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee.

3 ACA was founded in 1935 as an organization of marine radio operators and joined the CIO in 1937 (Levinson 1956, pp.263-264). Stolberg (1938, pp.240-241) says it was an outgrowth of TUUL's ARTA.

4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.

5 Kampelman classifies the ACA in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

American Newspaper Guild

1 Foster (1937, p.244) refers to a TUUL Printing Workers Industrial Union that was local in scope and also mentions TUUL influence in the AFL Printing Trades Industrial League, but we found no indication that these unions were involved with the ANG jurisdiction.

2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among Newspaper Workers.

3 According to Stolberg (1938, pp.245-246), the AFL assigned Newspaper Workers to the ITU. The editorial workers organized themselves. Efforts in Cleveland and by subsequent president Heywood Broun were made. In 1933 12 independent guilds met in Washington and joined the AFL, but later withdrew and joined the CIO, and also established commercial and advertising workers departments.

4 In 1933, according to Fink (1977, p.254), representatives from 21 local bodies met in Washington to form the ANG. Stolberg (1938,

pp.245-246) refers to 12 guilds that merged. The first convention established the union as a loose association of local bodies and ANG retained this amalgamated form in the CIO (Peterson 1944, p.256).

- 5 Kampelman classifies ANG in the anti-Communist camp, but also notes that the New York and Los Angeles branches were in the Communist camp.

Barbers and Beauty Culturists Union of America

- 1 Foster (1937, p.244) lists the TUUL Barbers Industrial Union (local in scope).
- 2 Galenson (1940, p.23) lists the CIO Barbers Organizing Committee, as does Peterson (1944, p.40).
- 3 Peterson (1944, p.40) says the barbers union was formed in 1939 as an organizing committee of the CIO. It was chartered as an international union in 1943.
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the uncertain and shifting camp.

Federation of Glass, Ceramic, and Silica Sand Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing in the glass industry.
- 2 We found no mention of an organizing committee among these workers.
- 3 The Glass Workers union was organized in 1934 as an independent union. (Peterson 1944, p.146). Later that year, the AFL agreed to take it in and, says Stolberg (1938, pp.237-239), promptly "forgot about it." In February, 1936 the union bolted to the CIO. Prior

to this all workers in flat glass were in the AFL's Window Glass Cutters League. AFL relinquished control over all except window glass cutters in 1934 to the Federation of Flat Glass Workers, which was then an AFL union. The Federation affiliated with the CIO in 1937 (Levinson 1956, p.255).

- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the anti-Communist camp.

Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers of America

- 1 The Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union and the Tobacco Workers Industrial Union (both national in scope) were TUUL unions (Foster 1937, pp.241, 243, 256; Galenson 1940, p.9). Also, Stolberg (1938, pp.241-244) claims that the Sharecroppers and the Federal Agricultural Workers were largely dominated by "Stalinists."
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee in any of these industries.
- 3 When the Southern Tenant Farmers Union was formed, the AFL showed no interest in granting it a charter. The CIO formed the Farm, Cannery, Fruit and Vegetable Union in 1937. Delegates from 56 unions attended the union's founding convention, at which they voted to join the CIO (Levinson 1956, pp.241-243). Stolberg (1938, pp.241-244) mentions that the founding convention in 1937 was financed by the CIO. According to him, "Stalinists" claimed that 56 unions representing 100,000 workers met at Denver, including the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, the Sharecroppers, the Federal

Agricultural Workers (locals from the AFL) and independent farmers' organizations. He reports that the Sharecroppers were organized by "Stalinists," and that the Federal Agricultural Workers also were largely Stalinist, including Donald Henderson, later president of FTA who had been involved in the TUUL. Peterson (1944, p.75) reports the union was organized in 1937 as a group of AFL federal unions joined the CIO.

- 4 This union was the result of the amalgamation of several units (see note 3 above).
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America

- 1 Foster (1937, p.256) says that the independent Shipyard and Marine Workers Industrial Union was influenced by the TUUL, evidenced by its "characteristically TUUL name." Taft (1964, p.624) alludes to earlier TUUL influence, when he reports that "a fight within the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers Association took place in the late 1940s, with the Communists losing the contest." Levenstein (1981, p.277) also reports that "Leftist nuclei were wiped out in the CIO Shipyard Workers..." while CP unions were being raided in the 1940s.
- 2 The union conducted its own "carefully planned organizing drives" (Fink 1977, p.211).
- 3 Defections from eighteen AFL crafts unions in the yards merged with the Marine and Shipbuilding union. It joined the CIO in 1936

(Stolberg 1938, p.187).

- 4 In 1933, an independent local replaced a company union in Camden NJ; organizing expanded, and in 1934, 6 locals met to form the union, later joined by defections from 18 craft unions. (Fink 1977, pp.210-211) (Stolberg 1938, p.187).
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the anti-Communist camp.

Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific

- 1 We found no mention of a TUUL union among inland boatmen although the TUUL's Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union may have been active among them too. But we classified the inland boatmen as having no earlier red union organizing.
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among inland boat workers.
- 3 We found very little information on this union. According to Peterson 1944, p.173), IB was organized in 1918. As of 1937, according to Stolberg (1938, p.198), IB was a subsidiary of the National Maritime Union. But Galenson (1940, p.23) says it affiliated with the CIO in 1937 after seceding from the AFL's International Sailors Union.
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies IB in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

International Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing among these professionals.
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among these professionals.
- 3 The FAECT was organized in 1934 and remained independent until 1937, when it affiliated with the CIO (Peterson 1944, p.26).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

International Fur and Leather Workers Union

- 1 The Needle Trades Industrial Union (TUUL), which was one of the three main TUUL unions, had a fur section with 10,000 members (according to Foster, cited in Cochran 1977, p.357). Levenstein 1981, pp.10,21) says that this was the most successful TUUL union. Also see Foster (1937, pp.237-238, 273).
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among Fur or Leather Workers.
- 3 Stolberg (1938, pp.231-237) says that the "Stalinists" won control of the AFL union in the fur industry in the 1920s and retained control afterwards. According to Peterson (1944, p.133), the Fur Workers union was organized in 1913. It withdrew from the AFL and affiliated with the CIO in 1937.
- 4 The National Leather Workers Association, an independent union,

affiliated with the CIO in 1937. In 1939, it amalgamated with the Fur Workers Union. Although the Fur Workers Union was an established union, once it merged with the Leather Workers the new union was amalgamated in our sense because the Fur Workers and the Leather Workers worked out a formal agreement to split administration of the union between the two sections (See Brown 1947, p.135).

- 5 Kampelman classifies the Fur and Leather union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union

- 1 The TUUL's Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union was active in the AFL's Longshore jurisdiction. Foster (1937, p.240) says that MTWIU grew out of "the state of demoralization in the industry created by the dozen weak and squabbling AFL craft unions, of which the most important are the ILA and the ISU... "According to Cochran (1977, p.61), MTWIU's newspaper, the "Waterfront Worker," was influential in longshore, but few workers joined the MTWIU. Harry Bridges became the editor of the paper and his faction took control of it. According to Levenstein (1981, p.24), in "some cases, the weakness of the AFL locals or unions made it more tempting for Communist workers to take them over than to create new TUUL unions. For example, in San Francisco in 1932, Communists helped organize dockworkers into a strong local of the AFL ILA led by Harry Bridges at the same time that they were still recruiting west coast seamen into the TUUL's Marine Workers Industrial

Union."

- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee on the waterfront.
- 3 Harry Bridges led 17,000 West Coast dock workers out of the AFL's
ILA and into the CIO in 1937 (Levinson 1956, pp.262-263; Peterson
1944, p.202).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies ILWU in the Communist camp. (RIA Classifies it
as "left wing.")

International Union of Fishermen and Allied Workers of America

- 1 Foster (1937, p.244) lists the Fishermen and Cannery Workers
Industrial Union (TUUL) but says it was local in scope. Cochran
(1977, p.357) says Foster claimed 2,000 members for this
union. Also see note 3 below.
- 2 We found no mention of an organizing committee in the fishing
industry.
- 3 Although Peterson (1944, p.130) reports that the union was only
"organized and chartered by the CIO in 1939, a Fishermen's Union
publication (Pinsky 1947, pp.77-80), mentions the AFL's ISU and the
TUUL's Fishermen and Cannery Workers Industrial Union among its
predecessors.
- 4 According to a union publication (Pinsky 1947, pp.77-80) the union
was the product of the amalgamation of several independent units.
(Also see note 3 above.)
- 5 Kampelman places the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it
as "left wing.")

International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers

- 1 Foster mentions no TUUL union in this industry; but Galenson (1940, p.9) refers to a TUUL union named the Mine, Oil and Smelter Workers Industrial Union, which was a successor to the National Miners Union.
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee in non-ferrous metal mining.
- 3 Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' predecessor was the Western Federation of Miners, established in 1893, which also gave birth to the IWW. Mine Mill affiliated with the AFL in 1896, withdrew in 1898, and reaffiliated in 1911. It was a charter member of the CIO (Peterson 1944, p.244).
- 4 Peterson (1944, p.244) mentions that The National Association of Die Casting Workers was "absorbed" by Mine, Mill in 1942, long after the union was established (Peterson 1944, p.244; Fink 1977, p.224). Thus, we classify it as non-amalgamated.
- 5 Kampelman classifies Mine, Mill in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

International Union of Playthings and Novelty Workers of America

- 1 Two local TUUL unions had been organized in this old AFL jurisdiction, the Jewelry Workers Industrial Union and the Doll and Toy Makers Industrial Union (Foster 1937, p.244).
- 2 A Toy and Novelty Workers Organizing Committee was established in 1938 or earlier (CIO proceedings 1938, p.14; Galenson 1940, p.23).

- 3 The union was established 1938 by a conference of local industrial unions affiliated with the CIO; it amalgamated with the Paper union, but later withdrew (Fink 1977, pp.287-288).
- 4 Aside from the temporary amalgamation with the Paper Workers (see note 3), we found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the anti-Communist camp.

International Woodworkers of America

- 1 The Lumber Workers Industrial Union had some 3,500 members nationally, according to Foster (1937, pp.243,256; Cochran 1977, p.357), and (Levenstein 1981, p.20) supplied organizing cadres for IWA.
- 2 The CIO set up a Woodworkers Organizing Committee (Bernstein 1970, p.631; Levenstein 1981, p.149).
- 3 The Woodworkers broke from the AFL's Brotherhood of Carpenters, where they had no voting rights (Stolberg 1938, pp.239-241; Peterson 1944, p.410).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Woodworkers in the uncertain and shifting camp.

Marine Cooks and Stewards Association of the Pacific Coast

- 1 According to Stolberg (1938, p.198), the Marine Cooks and Stewards were at one time under the National Maritime Union, so these workers may have been indirectly affected by MTWIU, but we found no evidence of this.

- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among these workers.
- 3 The union was organized in 1901 as the Pacific district unit of the AFL's International Sailors Union. Sometime after 1936, it withdrew from ISU, and it affiliated with the CIO in 1938 (Peterson 1944, p.221).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing.
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among marine engineers.
- 3 The union was formed in 1875 by a merger of two associations. It affiliated with the AFL in 1918, but withdrew five years later. In 1937, it joined the CIO (Peterson 1944, p.223).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies Marine Engineers and Stewards in the uncertain and shifting camp.

National Maritime Union of America

- 1 The Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union (TUUL) was national in scope (Foster 1937, pp.240, 256, 260, 263). Cochran (1977, pp.60-62, 357) says it became an established force in the west coast maritime unions and had a membership of anywhere from 2,000 to 7,000

workers (cf. Galenson 1940, p.9). While Bell (1967, p.140) asserts that it was not of importance in the industry.

2 We found no mention of an organizing committee among these workers.

3 Joe Curran led the revolt out of the AFL's ISU into the CIO.

(Levinson 1956, pp.259-262; Stolberg 1938, pp.197-198).

4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.

5 Kampelman classifies NMU in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

Oil Workers International Union

1 Foster mentions no TUUL union among Oil Workers, while Galenson (1940, p.9) refers to a Mine, Oil and Smelter Workers Industrial Union (successor to the National Miners Union), without providing any other information, so we classified the Oil Workers as having no earlier red union organizing.

2 The CIO setup the Petroleum Workers Organizing Committee, with Kennedy as chairman (Levinson 1956, p.253; Galenson 1960, p.415; Lens 1949, p.302).

3 The Oil Workers organized in California in 1917 as the International Association of Oil, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America, and was chartered by the AFL in 1918 (Peterson 1944, pp.261-162).

Threatened with dismemberment by craft leaders, and impeded by company unions, it became a charter member of the CIO (Levinson 1956, p.253).

4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.

5 Kampelman classifies the Oil Workers in the uncertain and shifting

camp.

State, County, and Municipal Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing among these government employees.
- 2 No CIO organizing committee was set up among government employees.
- 3 This union was launched in July 1937 by the CIO, and a "number of AFL locals and national leaders of the Federation's competing group deserted at once to the new union" (Levinson 1956, p.250).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

Textile Workers Union of America

- 1 The National Textile Workers Union was one of the three biggest TUUL unions (Foster 1937, pp.233-236; Galenson 1940, p.9; Stolberg 1938, p.145).
- 2 The United Textile Workers (AFL) gave full power to the CIO in 1937 by signing the Textile Workers Organizing Committee agreement (Levinson 1956, p.239).
- 3 The United Textile Workers Union was a charter member of the CIO (Peterson 1944, p.381; Stolberg 1938, p.207).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Textile Workers in the anti-Communist camp.

Transport Workers Union of America

- 1 Communists took the lead in organizing TWU in New York in 1934 (Fink 1977, pp.400-402). Among its founders were John Santo, Mike Quill, and a handful of transport workers who probably had been affiliated with the TUUL (Kampelman 1957, p.149). Whatever these leaders' formal affiliation, earlier red union organizing here is clearly evident. According to Levenstein (1981, p.37), a Communist-led Transportation Union had organized earlier and it abandoned the AFL for the CIO in April 1937.
- 2 No CIO organizing committee was set up among Transport Workers.
- 3 The TWU, according to Stolberg (1938, pp.225-228), was first organized among New York subway workers in 1934. Two years later, the AFL's International Association of Machinists admitted it as a separate Lodge 1547. In 1937, when the AFL ordered Lodge 1547 to turn its members over to 20 different craft unions, Quill led its members into the CIO.
- 4 The TWU was formed by groups that withdrew from IAM, the Teamsters and the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, all of which had Class B status in the AFL (Peterson 1944, p.391). See also, The Twentieth Century Fund (1945, p.951).
- 5 Kampelman classifies TWU in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

United Automobile Workers of America

- 1 The Auto Workers Union (TUUL) (Stolberg 1938, p.145; Foster 1937, pp.238-240) was national in scope; also see Galenson (1940, p.9);

Levenstein (1981, p.21). Cochran refers to its TUEL predecessor (1977, pp.62-63). According to Cochran (1977, p.357), Foster claimed 5,000 members for the AWU.

- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee in the auto industry.
- 3 The UAW was formed as an international in Detroit in 1935, from the AFL's National Council of Automobile Workers, which had been organized in 1934 by an amalgamation of AFL federal labor unions. UAW affiliated with the CIO in 1935 (Peterson 1944, p.32).
- 4 The UAW, according to Peterson (1944, P.32), was formed by the amalgamation of AFL federal labor unions. But other writers mention the roles of three independent automobile unions in the early organizing period of the UAW. The Automotive Industrial Workers Association (AIWA) and the Associated Automobile Workers of America (AAWA), both voted to amalgamate with the UAW in May 1936, and several locals from the Mechanics Educational Society of America (MESA) also joined the UAW (Galenson 1960, pp.132-133). The UAW convention in 1936 reserved a seat on its executive board for a representative from AIWA, even though its membership was quite small (as was the AAWA membership) (Bernstein 1970, pp.507-508).
- 5 Kampelman classifies UAW in the uncertain and shifting camp.

United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America

- 1 The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union (TUUL) was a national union (Foster 1937, pp.239-240); (Galenson 1940, p.9); (Levenstein 1981, p.61); (Weinstein 1975, p.69). Cochran calls it the Metal Workers Union, and says Foster claimed that it had 21,000 members (1977, pp.75, 357).
- 2 We found no mention of an organizing committee among the Radio or the Electrical Workers. The UE, with the help of CIO organizers, began the organizing drive in the utility jurisdiction.
- 3 According to Filipelli (1970, pp.11-47) three distinct units (none of which was an established AFL union) amalgamated to form the UE: AFL federal locals in the radio fields (led by Philip Carey and others), independents in the electrical industry (led by Julius Emspak and others), and lodges from the AFL International Association of Machinists (led by James Matles). Matles' group originated in the TUUL's Machine Tool and Foundry Workers Union. (See also Galenson 1940, p.31 and Stolberg 1938, pp 217-225.)
- 4 Several independent unions amalgamated to form UE; see note 3 above.
- 5 Kampelman classifies UE in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red Union organizing in the farm equipment industry.
- 2 FE did have a CIO organizing committee, but an unusually independent one; see note 3 below (also Levenstein 1981, pp.149-150).

3 The FE was organized entirely within the CIO. A group of locals
affiliated with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee withdrew in
1938 and established the FE Workers Organizing
Committee. It was chartered as an international union in 1942
(Peterson 1944, p.120).

4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.

5 Kampelman classifies FE in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it
as "left wing.")

United Federal Workers of America

1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing in this
government jurisdiction.

2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among Federal
Government employees.

3 According to Levinson (1956, p.250), dissatisfied affiliates of the
AFL Government Workers union and new recruits to unionism
among other government workers joined the CIO. According to
Stolberg (1938, pp.265-267) and Peterson (1944, p.125) a number
of lodges broke away from AFGE (AFL) in 1937 and formed the UFW,
which affiliated with the CIO.

4 Although Levinson mentions that AFL affiliates were joined by
"new recruits to unionism," there is no indication that these "new
recruits" had yet established an independent union. So, this union
is not amalgamated.

5 Kampelman classifies the Federal Workers in the Communist camp. (RIA
classifies it as "left wing.")

United Furniture Workers of America

- 1 The TUUL's Furniture Workers Industrial Union was national in scope, and, though small, provided a base for the CIO Furniture Workers (Foster 1937, pp.243-244, 255-256; Galenson 1940, p.9; Levenstein 1981, p.20). Foster claimed 8,000 members for this union, according to Cochran (1977, p.357).
- 2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among Furniture Workers.
- 3 The union was organized in 1937 by the representatives of a number of locals that withdrew from the AFL Upholsters' International Union, several local industrial unions of the CIO, and several independent unions (Peterson 1944, p.135).
- 4 This was an amalgamated union (see note 3 above).
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Furniture Workers in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

United Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers of America

- 1 We found no specific mention of earlier red union organizing among these workers, although there is some indication that the National Miners Union made an attempt to organize them. But we classified the union as having no earlier red union organizing in the industry.
- 2 We found no mention of any CIO organizing committee among these workers.
- 3 The union was organized in 1942 by a group of locals that withdrew from District 50, United Mine Workers and was chartered that year as a separate CIO union. (Peterson 1944, p.143).

- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation after the union withdrew.
5 Kampelman classifies the union in the uncertain and shifting camp.

United Office and Professional Workers of America

- 1 The TUUL's Office Workers Union, was organized on a local level, according to Foster (1937, p.244) and Galenson (1940, p.9).
Kampelman (1957, p.96), says that UOPW "had originally been the Office Workers Union."
2 We found no mention of a CIO organizing committee among Office Workers.
3 Twenty federal locals of the AFL joined by independent groups met May 30, 1937 to form the union (Levinson 1956, pp.249-250).
Stolberg (1938, pp.257-261) says that in 1926, the AFL expelled the left wing from BSAU, and it joined the TUUL. When the TUUL dissolved in 1935, its members rejoined BSAU and later dominated it.
The UO&PW joined the CIO in 1937.
4 The UO&PW was formed through an amalgamation of various units (see note 3 above).
5 Kampelman classifies the union in the Communist camp. (RIA classifies it as "left wing.")

United Packinghouse Workers of America

- 1 The TUUL's Food and Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union was national in scope (Foster 1937, pp.244,256; Galenson 1940, p.9).
2 The union was at least in part organized by the CIO's Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (Peterson 1944, p.263).

- 3 The CIO organized and chartered local industrial unions among meatpackers and butchers (Levinson 1956, p.237; Galenson 1960, p.362), and AFL secessionists were among those in the initial nucleus (Fink 1977, p.269).
- 4 Strong local unions existed in several packing districts; these local unions, some independent unions, local industrial unions affiliated with the CIO, and a few secessionist AFL Locals amalgamated to form the nucleus of the new union (Fink 1977, p.269).
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Packinghouse Workers in the uncertain and shifting camp.

United Paper Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of a TUUL union in the paper industry.
- 2 The CIO set up the Paper Workers Organizing Committee in late 1944.
- 3 In 1940 the CIO approved the amalgamation of all of its paper converting industrial unions with the Playthings and Novelty Workers (Peterson 1944, p.272), but conflicts resulted, and the CIO split these divisions into two separate unions (Fink 1977, pp.277-280). Since CIO industrial union locals were the counterpart to the AFL federal unions, with little or no autonomy (Lens 1949, pp.302-303) the "amalgamation" of paper converting industrial unions does not constitute an amalgamation in our sense.
- 4 Aside from the initial amalgamation with the Playthings and Novelty Workers union which was reversed (see note 3), we found no mention of an amalgamation.

5 Kampelman classifies the Paper Workers in the anti-Communist camp.

United Retail and Wholesale Employees of America

- 1 A local TUUL Wholesale and Drygoods Workers Union had been organized (Foster 1937, p.244; Galenson 1940, p.9). According to Levenstein (1981, p.69), "Communist-led secessionists from the AFL Retail Clerks International Protective Association" founded this CIO union. They may have originated in the earlier TUUL union.
- 2 A CIO Department Store Organizing Committee was set up in 1937 with Sidney Hillman as chairman (Levinson 1956, p.330ff), but according to Fink (1977, p.331), the organizing committee "was never a very active organization and was administered primarily from United Retail Employees of America offices. In 1940 it was dissolved, and its jurisdiction was assumed by the UREA, which then changed its name to the United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees of America."
- 3 The AFL's Retail Clerks expelled its largest local, and with it Samuel Wolchak. Most of the active locals seceded to the CIO and he became the new union's president (Levinson 1956, pp.250-251; Stolberg 1938, pp.261-164).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Retail and Wholesale Employees in the uncertain and shifting camp.

United Rubber Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of a TUUL Rubber Workers union.

- 2 No CIO organizing committee was set up among Rubber Workers.
- 3 Rubber Workers first began to organize a union under the AFL in
1933. The AFL granted the union a charter in September of 1935, but
it seceded to join the CIO several months later, in July of 1936
(Fink 1977, p.333).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Rubber Workers in the anti-Communist camp.

United Shoe Workers of America

- 1 The TUUL's Shoe Workers Industrial Union was national in scope
(Foster 1937, p.242; Stolberg 1938, pp.229-231 and Galenson
1940, p.9).
- 2 The CIO's Shoe Workers Organizing Committee was headed by Powers
Hapgood (Stolberg 1938, pp.229-231).
- 3 The shoe industry had several contending unions, including the
AFL's Boot and Shoe union, from which there were continued
defections which usually became independent unions. In 1937, the
CIO brought about a merger of these independent unions, and a few
months later, 10,000 members of New York's AFL Boot and Shoe
Workers voted to secede and join the CIO's new union (Stolberg
1938, p.230).
- 4 This was an amalgamated union (see note 3 above).
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Shoe Workers in the Communist camp.
(RIA classifies it as "probably left wing.")

United Steel Workers of America

- 1 The TUUL's Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union claimed 21,000 members nationally (Foster 1937, pp.239-240, 255, 257, 265; Weinstein 1975, p.63; Galenson 1940, p.9; Levenstein 1981, p.24; Cochran 1977, p.357).
- 2 The Steel Workers Organizing Committee is widely discussed: (see Galenson 1960, p.86-100; Levenstein 1981, pp.37, 46, 95; Cochran 1977, pp.95, 100; Lens 1949, pp.302, 307, 313).
- 3 The CIO and the ex-AFL Amalgamated Iron and Steel Union agreed to start SWOC in 1936; it was headed by Philip Murray of the UMW (Fink 1977, p.357).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Steel Workers in the anti-Communist camp.

United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America

- 1 We found no mention of earlier red union organizing among these workers.
- 2 No CIO organizing committee was set up among Stone Workers.
- 3 The Quarry Workers union was founded in 1903 and affiliated with the AFL. The new CIO union was chartered in 1938 (Peterson 1944, p.360).
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Stone Workers in the uncertain and shifting camp.

United Transport Service Employees of America

- 1 The AFL Railroad Workers Industrial League was influenced by the TUUL (Foster 1937, p.244), but we found no indication that the league was active among red caps.
- 2 No CIO organizing committee was set up among red caps.
- 3 "In 1936, the Chicago Red Caps secured a federal local charter from the AFL, and the following year, took the initiative in calling a conference of red-cap locals that had sprung up in a number of cities. Out of this conference emerged the International Brotherhood of Red Caps, an independent union," which remained independent until it joined the CIO in 1942 (Fink 1977, pp.398-399). Because the union was formed exclusively from AFL federal locals that did not break off from an AFL parent union before the union seceded, we classify this as secession "from above."
- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the union in the anti-Communist camp.

Utility Workers Union

- 1 There is no record of red union organizing in the utility industry before the UE began its organizing drive there.
- 2 The Utility Workers Organizing Committee was set up by the CIO (see note 3 below).
- 3 The Utility union began as a division of UE, but the CIO withdrew the Utility Workers jurisdiction from the UE, and set up the Utility Workers Organizing Committee (Stolberg 1938, pp.221,223; Fink 1977, p.407).

- 4 We found no mention of an amalgamation.
- 5 Kampelman classifies the Utility Workers in the anti-Communist camp.

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