

REPORTER

INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS LIBRARY

JUN 13 1996

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY

EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT & SECTION 8a(2)

**The Team Act:
Corporatism for
Workers, A Threat for
Real Unions***Michael Eisenscher*

An arcane but strategically important provision of Federal labor law has become the target of a concerted employer offensive in the wake of recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In its 1992 *Electromation* and 1993 *DuPont* decisions, the NLRB found employer-initiated employee involvement (EI) programs at the two firms were in fact illegal company-dominated labor organizations that interfered with employee rights to organize and to be represented by a union of their choice.

Some in the corporate community responded with a virtual declaration of war on Section 8a(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from dominating a labor organization or interfering in its internal affairs. This is known as the "company union" prohibition of the NLRA. It is intended to ensure workers have free choice regarding representation, and to prevent unions from becoming captives of employers. To listen to employers, however, one would believe that the future of the American economy was threatened by the limitations imposed by Section 8a(2).

Organizations of the business community launched a barrage of criticism against Section 8a(2),

charging that it constitutes a major impediment to the kind of employee participation that is critical if U.S. business is to be competitive in the global market. Section 8a(2), they claim, constitutes a barrier to worker-management cooperation and to employer efforts to "empower" their workers and give them "voice" in the enterprise. They portray Section 8a(2) as a shackle on those employers who want to involve employees in improving quality, efficiency, and safety.

The Republican victory in the 1994 elections which gave the GOP effective control of Congress turned the business community's political broadside against Section 8a (2) into a focused legislative assault on the company union ban in the form of Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, known as the TEAM Act. The House bill (H.R. 743) was introduced in 1994 by Representative Steve Gunderson (R-WI); the Senate version (S. 295) is carried by Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), who also chairs the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee.

The TEAM Act itself is the brainchild of the Labor Policy Association (LPA), an organization of human resource executives of over 200 of the nation's largest corporations. The LPA organized the TEAM Coalition, a consortium of corporations and employer associations (Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and many others) who have banded together to promote passage

*continued on page 3***Dunlop Commission
Recommendations
on Section 8a(2)**

In 1993 the Clinton administration appointed the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (known as the Dunlop Commission, after its chair.) This Commission was charged with reviewing the nation's labor relations laws and practices and recommending changes which would enhance productivity and competitiveness by encouraging labor-management cooperation, reducing conflict, and reducing reliance on the legal system for resolution of workplace conflict.¹

With respect to employee participation and labor-management partnerships, the Commission's report states "[a]ll parties want to encourage expansion and growth of these developments."² To this end, the Commission recommends "clarifying" Section 8a(2), "to insure nonunion employee participation programs are not found to be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of 'terms and conditions' of work or compensation as long as such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of these programs."³ The scope of change suggested in the Dunlop report is limited in comparison to legislation in the TEAM Act. Nonetheless, Douglas A. Fraser, former President of the UAW and member of the Dunlop Commis-

*continued on page 3***ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:****Does Raising the Minimum Wage Lower Employment? (page 5)**

FROM THE CHAIR

The Labor Center has been going through a period of reorganization in the past few months and is now looking forward to an exciting future. As the new Chair of the Labor Center, let me bid our past Chair, Mary Ruth Gross, a fond farewell. We wish her luck and commend her on the work, commitment and dedication she has given to the Labor Center.

I would also like to welcome the new members that have joined the Labor Center team. Kirsten Spalding joins us as an academic specialist. As an attorney, she handled labor cases and instructed union members in the legalities of workers' rights. Ezinda Franklin, our administrative assistant, is a recent graduate from the University of California at Berkeley in the area of Legal Studies. Elizabeth C. Rudd, a graduate student researcher, will serve as the editor of the Labor Center Reporter and will be involved in the Labor Center's Internship Program this fall. In addition, the Labor Center Reporter's Editorial Board has added a new student, Doug Schwalm, and a new union representative, Mara Math, an organizer and researcher with the Service Employees International Union.

We are planning some exciting programs for 1996. On May 16th, we will be presenting a conference on Unions Participating with Management. We are also developing an interactive teleconference on the Minimum Wage debate in the Fall of 1996, a conference in November on Labor in the Global Economy that will focus on joint organizing campaigns in the Americas, and the second annual Young Unionists Leadership Conference this summer. Finally, we are proud to continue the Bay Area Labor Studies Seminar series and the Undergraduate Internship Program.

As always, your participation is instrumental in helping us to continue providing support to the Labor community.

-Bob Redlo

LABOR CENTER

R E P O R T E R

2521 Channing Way #5555, Berkeley, CA 94720-5555
(510) 642-0323, e-mail: clre@violet.berkeley.edu

Editorial Board

Kim Voss, Faculty Sponsor, Sociology

Elizabeth C. Rudd, Editor

Ezinda Franklin, Production, CLRE Publications

Terrence K. Huwe, IIR Librarian

Mara Math, Service Employees International Union

Robert Redlo, Chair, CLRE

Doug Schwalm, Economics

Kirsten Spalding, Labor Specialist, CLRE

Ron Teninty, International Brotherhood of Teamsters

CLRE is the Center for Labor Research & Education.
IIR is the Institute of Industrial Relations.

Notes . . .

Looking for Labor Information on the Net?

Back issues of the LCR, a list of publications and upcoming events, and more are all available on-line on the World Wide Web!
Our address: <http://violet.berkeley.edu/~iir/clre/clre.html>

Support the Labor Center Reporter

With continuing budget cuts, the Labor Center needs your support now more than ever in order to continue to produce the LCR. You can use the form on the back of this issue to help. Thank you.

The articles in this issue do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Center for Labor Research and Education, the Institute of Industrial Relations, or the University of California. Each author is solely responsible for the contents of his or her article. Labor organizations and their press associations are encouraged to reproduce any LCR articles for further distribution.

TEAM ACT

continued from cover

of the TEAM Act. Many of these firms have long-standing contracts with unions and profess a desire for labor-management cooperation (e.g. AT&T, NYNEX, Ford, Chrysler, GM, GE, Boeing, UPS, Xerox). The LPA also counts among its members some of the nation's most anti-union employers (e.g. McDonald's, PepsiCo, Marriott, Sprint, MCI, Motorola, Texas Instruments) and others that have turned on their unions (e.g. Caterpillar, International Paper, Bridgestone/Firestone).

What the TEAM Act Does

One thing the TEAM Act does is exempt from regulation under Section 8a(2) all employer-initiated programs designed to involve employees in joint committees or other structures to address quality, productivity, and safety issues. It permits employers to establish, assist, maintain or participate in organizations, programs, plans, committees, and other employee structures. Employers, rather than workers, would have the power to initiate and terminate such structures; determine the basis of employee participation (even picking the employee leaders); set the agenda of meetings; write the organization's bylaws or ground rules; define its mission; and control the outcomes. This is precisely the kind of interference that Section 8a(2) was drafted to prevent.

The TEAM Act allows such committees to discuss "matters of mutual interest," which may include mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (wages, hours, benefits and other conditions of employment). Even if the employer commits egregious violations of employee rights prohibited by other provisions of the NLRA (such as firing workers for union activity or refusing to bargain in good faith), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) would no longer be able to order the employer to disband the offending employee involvement entity.

Historical Context

When the Wagner Act was passed in 1935, it represented a

Magna Carta of workers' rights that spurred the organization of millions of workers. Most employers defied the law until the Supreme Court found it constitutional in 1937. The LPA was founded in 1939 to coordinate employer efforts to frustrate the Act's mission of promoting and protecting worker self-organization and free collective bargaining. World War II brought a truce to virulent employer resistance and helped institutionalize the system set up by the Wagner Act (also known as the National Labor Relations Act, or NLRA).

Not long after the end of the war, some employers (led, in part, by the LPA) renewed their assault in the form of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act. Over the next three decades, NLRB and court decisions also seriously undermined the original mission of the NLRA.

These laws and decisions weakened employee protections during organizing campaigns, in negotiations, and during strikes. They tipped the New Deal balance that favored workers back toward employers, and turned the NLRB from a guarantor of worker rights into a "neutral" administrator of an increasingly employer-friendly administrative mechanism. Section 8a(2) is one of the few provisions of the original Act that has not been compromised by Board, Court, and Congressional actions.

Enhancing Employer Control

The TEAM Act is designed to turn employee "voice" into an echo of employer priorities, values, and interests. It provides an additional weapon to employers who seek to avoid unionization and frustrate employees who want representation by a genuine labor organization. It gives license to employers to solicit grievances, to identify discontent and potential leaders among dissatisfied workers, to propagandize workers, to give the appearance of dealing with employee concerns, and to subvert employees' capacity for collective action.

A 1993 Cornell University study by Kate Bronfenbrenner shows that

DUNLOP

continued from cover

sion entered a dissenting opinion into the official report.

The parts of the Dunlop Report which refer specifically to Section 8a(2) as well as Fraser's dissenting statement are reproduced below.

Here is what the Dunlop Commission's report says about Section 8a(2):⁴

"The commission recommends that non-union employee participation programs should not be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or compensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of these programs.

"We believe that programs of the types referred to above, which are proliferating in the U.S. today, do not violate the basic purposes of Section 8a(2). Therefore we recommend that Congress clarify Section 8a(2) and that the NLRB interpret it in such a way that employee participation programs operating in this fashion are legal.

"The Commission is concerned that in encouraging employee participation in nonunion settings, it does not adversely affect employees' ability to select union representation, if they so desire.

"Thus, the Commission reaffirms the basic principle that employer-sponsored programs should not substitute for independent unions. Employee participation programs are a means for employees to be involved in some workplace issues. They are not a form of independent representation for employees, and thus should not be legally permitted to deal with the full scope of issues normally covered by collective bargaining."

Here is Fraser's dissenting view:

Statement of Douglas A. Fraser⁵

"Section 8a(2) stands as a bulwark against forms of representation which are inherently illegitimate because they deny workers the right to a voice through the independent representatives of their own choosing and put the employer

TEAM ACT

continued from page 3

workplaces with such employer-sponsored EI substantially reduce the likelihood of workers voting for a union or of a union winning a representation election. Bronfenbrenner surveyed 261 lead organizers for information on a representative sample of elections conducted between 1986 and 1988. The presence of various EI programs reduced the union vote in representation elections by seven percent, and lowered the union victory rate to twenty-two percent.

Bronfenbrenner's study shows that the presence of EI programs may impede union organizing efforts. Reasons for this effect are suggested by other research which discusses the psychological mechanisms, group interactions, and organizational dynamics that can make these programs powerful tools of management influence and control (Barenberg; Hogler and Grenier).

GOP Strategy

The GOP hoped to defuse union opposition to the TEAM Act and give the appearance of compromise by amending the House bill, limiting it only to non-union workplaces. As it is, only about fifty-seven percent of the work force is under the jurisdiction of the NLRA, which covers only private sector employees and contains numerous exceptions even for that segment of the labor force. With only ten percent of the private sector still organized, the priority of employers is keeping the rest of the work force union-free. GOP readiness to limit the TEAM Act to non-union workplaces reflects this priority.

Although the rhetoric of those in favor of the TEAM Act emphasizes employee empowerment, the TEAM Act will not enhance worker rights. Both union members and unorganized workers want a greater role in their workplaces and more control over their jobs. The principal obstacle to achieving genuine employee involvement is not the objections of unions. It is management's refusal to grant real power to workers. By weakening Section 8a(2) of the NLRA, the TEAM Act creates a legal sanction for employee organizations dominated by management. This has

been outlawed for sixty years by the NLRA precisely because such behavior undermines the capacity of workers to exercise free choice and to act collectively for mutual aid and protection.

Congress Acts

On September 27, the House voted by a margin of 221 to 202 to enact the TEAM Act. The measure is still pending in the Senate, but could be passed out of the Labor and Human Resources Committee at any time, most likely as a rider on some other, more high-profile bill. President Clinton promised labor he would veto the bill if it failed to overcome organized labor's objections. That pledge, made early this year, was repeated this October at the AFL-CIO convention by Secretary of Labor Robert Reich. But under GOP pressure, the Clinton Administration has been drifting to the right. The labor movement's ability to make the pledge stick many depend on more than a political promise.

The TEAM Act will not likely be defeated by relying alone on labor's "friends" in Congress. This fight can only be won if local unions mobilize their members to communicate with Congress directly. They need to educate the public about the real meaning of a bill that preaches empowerment as it subverts the source of real worker power, and claims an objective of competitiveness as it frustrates legitimate employee involvement and the exercise of independent employee voice.

Michael Eisenscher is a doctoral candidate in Public Policy, University of Massachusetts-Boston, union organizer and labor consultant.

Literature cited.

- Barenberg, Mark (1994) "Democracy and Domination in the Law of the Workplace Corporation: from Bureaucratic to Flexible Production," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 94, no. 3, April, pp. 753-983
- Bronfenbrenner, Kate (1994) "Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, Restoring the Promise of American Labor Law," in Friedman, Sheldon et al (eds.) ILR Press
- Hogler, Raymond L. and Guillermo J. Grenier (1992) *Employee Participation and Labor Law in the American Workplace*, Quorum Books/Greenwood Publishing
- Kohler, Thomas C. (1986) "Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8a(2)," *Boston College Law Review*, Vol. 27 (May), pp. 499-551

FRASER

continued from page 3

on 'both sides of the table,' to quote Senator Wagner's words from 1935.* Thus, I place great importance on the fact that the Commission has not proposed any wholesale revision or exemption to Section 8a(2).

"Nonetheless, I cannot join the majority's recommendation that 'Congress clarify Section 8a(2)' by somehow providing that 'employee participation programs should not be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or compensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of these program.'

"The prudent course would be to allow the administrative and judicial processes to address the issue of 'incidental discussion' in the first instance. If problems were to develop—if, in fact, the law in practice were shown to substantially interfere with the kind of incidental discussions the majority seeks to protect — Congress could then take up the subject against a far clearer legal and factual background.

"In dissenting from the recommendation to amend Section 8a(2), I wish to make clear that I do not minimize the value of encouraging 'employee participation' and 'labor-management cooperation.' But to my mind, the kind of 'participation' and 'cooperation' that should be encouraged is democratic participation and co-operation between equals. I agree with Peter Pestillo, the Executive Vice President of Ford Motor Company, that 'A strong alliance requires two strong members. There should be no quibbling about that.' And I likewise agree with Morton Bahr, the President of the Communication Workers of America, that:

to effectively participate in work-place decision-making, front-line workers must first have their own organizations, educated leadership, and significant resources in order to have the confidence and preparation to participate as equals and without fear. (Sept. 15, 1993 Tr.

continued on page 7

DOES RAISING THE MINIMUM WAGE LOWER EMPLOYMENT?

Scott Susin

By the end of the year inflation will have pushed the minimum wage to its lowest value since 1955 (measured in inflation adjusted 1995 dollars). Even President Clinton's proposed 90 cent increase would still leave minimum wage workers worse off than they were in the 1970s.

Traditional economic theory holds that an increase in the minimum wage will lower employment. The textbook model of supply and demand predicts that if the price of labor goes up, firms will buy less of it - in the same way that consumers buy fewer apples when apple prices rise. Today, using new studies, some economists are revising old economic models and creating new ones demonstrating that a minimum wage may actually increase employment.

Most studies of the minimum wage have focused on teenagers because they are especially likely to be affected by it. The most common measure of impact on employment is the "non-employment" rate. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of teens without jobs by the total number of teens. This measure is better than the conventional unemployment rate, because the unemployment rate is based only on those actively seeking work. Moreover, most studies haven't found an effect on unemployment rates.

Figure 1 graphs the value of the minimum wage and the non-employment rate of male teenagers. The figure shows that non-employment rates stayed fairly constant over the past 35 years and indicates little correlation between the two lines. However, the figure leaves out several important factors.

Most importantly, minimum wage coverage was extended over the years to more and more industries. Also, the graph makes no adjustments for recessions or booms. Most older studies of the impact of minimum wage legislation on employment used sophisticated statistical techniques to control for these other factors.

Studies done in the 1970s found that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage causes a drop of 1 to 3 percent in employment. Brown et al (1982) reviewed these studies and concluded the most plausible estimates were the smaller ones. More recent studies, which incorporate the experience of the 1980s, when the minimum wage fell to historic lows, have found even smaller effects. For example, Wellington (1991) estimated that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage causes only a half percentage point drop in employment.

Recent Studies Of The Impact Of State Laws


In response to low minimum wage levels of the 1980s, some states passed their own minimum wage laws. Several studies of the

impact of these laws found no employment loss. David Card, a Princeton labor economist and winner of the American Economic Association's prestigious Clarke Medal, studied the impact in California of the 1988 increase in the minimum wage from the national level of \$3.35/hour to \$4.25/hour.

Card compared California's employment statistics to a group of states with similar labor market conditions where the minimum wage was not increased. Between 1987 and 1989 the employment rate for teenagers in California went up from 42% to 47.4%. In the comparison areas, the employment rate went down slightly, to 46.1%. Overall, employment of teenagers went up 5.6 percentage points more in California than in the comparison areas. This finding is statistically significant. Card's results contradict the textbook model which predicts that an increase in the minimum wage will lower employment.

In an even more surprising study, Card collaborated with Alan Krueger, also a Princeton economist who is currently Chief Econo-

continued on page 6




NEW TECHNOLOGY BRINGS THE MINIMUM WAGE DEBATE TO CAMPUS

Cal Day, an annual public showcase at the University at California, Berkeley was held on Saturday, April 13. During this event, the Center for Labor Research and Education and the Haas School of Business, hosted an interactive videoconference. An electronic link was established between two locations. The videoconference was a debate on current proposed minimum wage legislation. Professor David Levine of the Haas School and graduate student researcher Steven Raphael presented arguments from both sides of the issue. After brief presentations, Levine and Raphael fielded questions from the audience members at both locations.

The teleconference was staged as a pilot, show-

ing the benefits of interactive technology in communicating and exchanging information. This technology is increasingly being used on campuses around the state to give students access to classes that may not be available on their particular campus. Beyond the campus community, other organizations including union halls have taken advantage of these resources for the education of their members. According to Bob Redlo, the chair of the Labor Center, "interactive technology opens the window for an exchange of ideas among professors, community members, and workers in a format that simultaneously encourages participation across the state and we look forward to additional programs in the future."



continued from page 5

mist of the Labor Department, to evaluate the effects of New Jersey's 1992 increase in the minimum wage from \$4.25/hour to \$5.05/hour. This study compared employment in fast food restaurants in New Jersey to a group of restaurants on the Pennsylvania side of the border. Restaurant employment and wage information at the firm level is not publicly available, so Card and Krueger collected original data through a telephone survey of restaurants. Each restaurant was surveyed once a few months before and once about eight months after the wage hike.

Card and Krueger found that employment increased where the minimum wage was raised. In Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage was not increased, the average number of employees per restaurant decreased from 23 to 21, probably because of the national recession that affected both states. In New Jersey, where the minimum wage was raised, restaurants hired an extra .6 workers on average. Employment rose by 2.75 employees per restaurant more in New Jersey than in Pennsylvania.

This study also compared the impact on employment of raising the minimum wage in restaurants that were already paying at least \$5.00/hour and in restaurants pay-

ing less. Restaurants which were already paying \$5.00 per hour were almost unaffected by the new \$5.05 per hour minimum wage. But these restaurants lowered employment by an average of about 2 employees, just as the Pennsylvania restaurants did. The New Jersey employment gains were concentrated in the restaurants that paid the lowest wages. The restaurants which were forced to raise their wages the most also raised employment the most.¹

New Economic Models

Textbook economic theory predicts that a minimum wage will always lower employment. The studies discussed here suggest that the minimum wage might have a small negative effect, a small positive effect, or no effect on employment. Large effects, however, are clearly ruled out.

One implication is that we can be pretty sure that low-wage workers as a whole benefit from a minimum wage increase. A 10% increase in the minimum wage raises the average wages of teenagers by about 5% (since most teenagers already earn more than the minimum). If we assume that this will lower employment of teenagers by 1%, then teenagers as a group take home 4% more pay. This might be worrisome if that 1% never works again. But since low-wage work-

ers have very high turnover (300% per year in the fast food industry), the employment loss and wage gains may well be shared.

This new evidence suggests that the textbook model may be misleading. The traditional theory says workers will be hired as long as they produce at least as many dollars of output as they are paid. When a higher minimum wage is legislated, firms will lay off those workers assigned to the least productive tasks.

This model assumes employers can hire as many workers as they want at the "market wage." If there's some job useful enough to justify the going wage, then another worker will be hired. Suppose, instead, that firms can't hire more employees without offering a higher wage. Firms may then find it more profitable to pay low wages, accept higher turnover rates, and leave lower-productivity jobs unfilled.

A modest minimum wage prevents firms from doing this, and raises employment. Of course, a minimum wage that's too high (above the productivity of the least needed worker), will still lower employment. In this view, then, a minimum wage is like aspirin: a whole bottle will send you to the hospital, but a few pills will cure your headache.

MINIMUM WAGE

continued from page 6

¹ Card and Krueger's study has been criticized by two economists, David Neumark and William Wascher, who collected employment data directly from payroll records. It is not clear whether or not Neumark and Wascher have overturned the earlier results. It is difficult to compare these studies, since Neumark and Wascher haven't made their data public, while Card and Krueger have.

Literature cited.

- Brown, Charles, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen, "The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 1982, pp. 487-528.
- Card, David and Allen Krueger, *Myth and Measurement: the New Economics of the Minimum Wage*, 1995.
- Neumark, David, and William Wascher, "The Effect of New Jersey's Minimum Wage Increase on Fast-Food Employment: A Re-evaluation Using Payroll Records," *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #5224*, 1995.
- Wellington, Allison, "Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Employment Status of Youths: An Update," *Journal of Human Resources*, 1991, pp. 27-46.

Sources for Graph

- Employment Rates: Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Current Population Survey*
- Inflation (CPI-U-X1): *Economic Report of the President*, 1996
- Minimum Wage: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*

FRASER

continued from page 4

at 63)

"Because I am deeply committed to the principal of work place democracy, I cannot join in any statement that proclaims that you can have fully effective worker management cooperation programs without having a truly equal partnership based upon workers having an independent voice. I must therefore dissent.

¹ *Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations*. Issued January 9, 1995, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington D.C. 20037, p. x


² *ibid*, p. xvii

³ *ibid*, p. xvii

⁴ *ibid*, p. 8

⁵ *ibid*, p. 13

•*Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act*, p. 1416-17.




A N N O U N C I N G

RESEARCH INTERNS AVAILABLE FOR LABOR UNIONS

18 undergraduate economics students will be available to intern with local unions and labor councils in the fall semester. The interns can do economic research projects such as: analysis of wage and benefit data in an industry for collective bargaining purposes, developing shop steward manuals, analyzing contract language, preparing grievance databases, etc. The interns will work with the union for approximately 8 hours per week and their research will be supervised by the faculty and staff of the Center for Labor Research and Education.

For more information, contact Kirsten Snow Spalding at (510)643-0323 or spalding@uclink4.berkeley.edu



L C R U P D A T E C A R D

Name _____ Organization _____
 Address _____ City State Zip _____
 Phone _____ FAX _____
 e-mail _____

☐ My address has changed. Above is my new, correct address.

YES, I would like to support the *Labor Center Reporter*. Enclosed is my check made payable to UC Regents for the following amount: ☐ \$20 ☐ \$50 ☐ \$100 ☐ Other

C A L E N D A R

THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY April 19

Three South African specialists on labor and economics issues presented a panel discussion. This event was cosponsored by CLRE, the African Studies Department and the Institute for International Studies.

TAIWANESE LABOR DELEGATION April 25

The delegation will visit the Center for Labor Research and Education from 4 to 6 p.m. Labor leaders, students, faculty and staff are invited to meet with them and discuss labor issues of mutual concern. Call 510-643-323.

1996 WESTERN REGIONAL SUMMER INSTITUTE FOR UNION WOMEN June 5-9 A four day intensive training experience to enable union women to strengthen their leadership skills and increase their participation in the labor movement. cosponsored by the Center for Labor Research and Education. Contact: Brenda Cochrane, Dept. of Labor Studies, SF State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, SF, CA 94132.

6TH ANNUAL WESTERN SEMESTER July 14-August 9

Twelve courses for union leaders. Study subjects such as organizing, union building, leadership, contract negotiations, and communications in solidarity with hundreds of other union leaders and activists in Palo Alto, CA. Cosponsored by UC Berkeley, the George Meany Center for Labor Studies and the AFL-CIO Department of Education. Call 301-431-6400.

IR-15
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
 CENTER FOR LABOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
 2521 CHANNING WAY #5555
 BERKELEY, CA 94720-5555

NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION
 U.S. POSTAGE PAID
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA