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The Isolated Mass and the Integrated Individual--An  
International Analysis of the Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike

by

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Are certain industries in democratic and industrialized nations uniformly strike-prone while others are uniformly strike-free? If the facts give an affirmative answer to this question, then how can this social phenomenon be explained? Further, how do several of the standard theories of industrial peace and industrial conflict fare in the light of these facts? Finally, if it were desired either to encourage or discourage the propensity to strike in an industry, how best should it be gone about? These are the four questions to which this article is addressed.

1. Do longshoremen and coal miners, wherever strikes are permitted, strike more frequently than other workers regardless of national boundaries; and do trade and railroad workers similarly refrain from striking? This chapter examines the propensity to strike, industry by industry, for eleven countries--Australia, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The industries in each country for which statistics are available have been divided into five categories according to the demonstrated propensity of the workers to strike<sup>1</sup>--high, medium high, medium, medium low, and low (Table 1). For the eleven countries and the nineteen periods covered, a substantial uniformity of behavior is revealed.

<sup>1</sup> The statistics recording man-days lost in industrial disputes for the several countries examined comprise man-days idle resulting from both strikes and lockouts.

2. How can this uniformity be explained? There are two questions here: (a) in what direction does the industrial environment press--for strikes or against them; and (b) how great is the pressure? Environments are divided into five types: coercive for war, coercive for peace; persuasive for war, persuasive for peace; and neutral (Table 2). If the coal mining industry is always war-like, it seems reasonable to conclude that the surrounding environment must be compulsive for war; and if trade is always peaceful, that the environment must be compulsive for peace. Why are some industrial environments coercive or persuasive for war and others for peace? An attempt was made to break industrial environments down into their component elements, such as labor as a percentage of cost and the elasticity of the demand for the products, but this proved to be fruitless. The statistical data required for this proved, at best, to be inadequate and, at worst, completely non-existent. Consequently, reliance is placed on general knowledge, rather than statistical proof, to analyze the character of the several environmental types and to demonstrate why some push in one direction and others in another, and why some push harder than others. For this reason, hypotheses are offered rather than conclusions stated.

Industries can be described in other dimensions than peace and war alone, as, for example, by whether they are progressive or regressive, competitive or collusive; but the concern here is only with peace and war. Peace and war, in turn, can be measured in many ways--the number of grievances, the quit rate, the level of morale and productivity--but we are employing only one measure: the propensity of the workers to strike.

The industrial environment can affect the propensity to strike after several fashions. We treat here only with how it works on the

inter-industry propensity to strike. It undoubtedly also helps explain the comparative propensities to strike among nations and among regions in one nation, among firms in the same industry and plants and even departments in a single firm, and from one time to another in each of these contexts. Further, the total environment includes more than industrial factors--for example, political forces--but this analysis is limited to the industrial factors solely. The specific question, then, is: how do industrial factors affect the inter-industry propensity to strike?

3. Scholars have variously sought to explain the causes generally of industrial peace and warfare and specifically of strikes. These explanations have run along the lines of (a) the economic environment, (b) the political environment, particularly of the unions, (c) human relations at the face-to-face level, (d) the trend of historical development, (e) the selection of techniques and policies, (f) the role of dominant personalities, (g) the adherence to ideological views, and (h) the division of bargaining situations into key, satellite, and isolated. What light, if any, do the facts of inter-industry strike propensities throw on the value of these theories? Further, are the facts set forth here useful in evaluating certain theories of the labor movement which may be identified as the (a) "monopoly," (b) "job control," (c) "status," (d) "bureaucratic," (e) "power," and (f) "class" theories. As will be seen later, the facts are suggestive but not conclusive on any of these points. Finally, can these facts yield any insights into a theory of strikes?

4. Groups and individuals in our society are variously interested in retarding or inspiring industrial conflict. Are there any clues from this study as to how either effect might be secured and as to whether the effort, in either case, would need to be a major one or not?

With so many questions riding on the back of these data, one can only wish that they were more adequate to the task. There are only eleven countries covered for a limited period of time and the industrial breakdowns are neither sufficiently numerous nor quantitatively comparable from one country (or even one time period) to the next.

#### The Data

Useable data were found for eleven countries, and the resulting rankings are set forth in Table 1. Data were examined for six additional countries but in each case were inadequate:

<u>Belgium</u>	-	No man-days lost in industrial disputes by industry were published until very recently.
<u>Canada</u>	-	No employment figures are available to match against man-days lost.
<u>Denmark</u>	-	Man-days lost are shown by occupation instead of industry.
<u>Finland</u>	-	Man-days-lost data are given by occupation and industry but no comparable employment data are available.
<u>France</u>	-	Man-days lost are published in aggregate but not broken down by industry.
<u>Union of South Africa</u>	-	No employment data are available to match against the man-days-lost data given by industry and occupation.

The essential facts on the data for the eleven countries follow:

<u>Australia</u>	-	Man-days lost and trade union membership data are available for fourteen industry groups for approximately three decades which have been divided into three periods in Table 1.
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>	-	Man-days-lost data are available for the same twenty industry groupings for the period 1921-1936 (except for the years 1926-1928 and 1931). Employment data for the same industry groupings are from the 1921 and 1930 censuses.



Germany

- Man-days-lost data are available for twenty-one industry groupings for the period 1915-1924, and for 24 industry groupings for 1925-1932; and employment data for the same groupings for 1907 and 1925, and it has been assumed that employment ranking in those two years was representative for the two periods respectively.

Italy

- Man-days-lost data are available for seventeen industry groupings only for the eight years, 1916-1923. Trade union membership data for the same groupings were available for the year 1921.

Netherlands

- Man-days-lost data are available for twenty-one industry groupings for the period 1913-1940 (except for the years 1919 and 1927). Comparable employment data are taken from the 1920 and 1930 censuses of industry. The data are divided into two periods in Table 1.

New Zealand

- Man-days-lost data are available for approximately three decades (except for the years 1944 and 1945) for fifteen industry groupings and trade union membership statistics for the same groupings for 1924-1948. The periods set forth in Table 1 were selected for the consistency of behavior in each period.

Norway

- Statistics on man-days lost and workers covered by collective agreement are available for nineteen industry groupings for the years 1925-1949, but Table 1 is based on the period only to 1939 since strikes were banned during the war.

Sweden

- Man-days lost and workers covered by collective agreement are available for the same fourteen industry groups for 1920-1937.

Switzerland

- Man-days-lost data are available for the period 1927-1949 for ten industry groupings and are divided in Table 1 into two periods, 1927-1939 and 1940-1949 with employment data for 1930 and 1941 taken as representative for the two periods respectively.

United Kingdom

- Man-days-lost data are available for only six industry groupings. The ranking in Table 1 is based on the calculations of K. C. G. Knowles of man-days lost per worker in employment for the period 1911-1945.

United  
States

- Man-days lost and employment estimates are available for twenty-two industry groupings for the period 1927-1941, and for 29 groupings for 1942-1948.

The industries for each period in each country (except the United Kingdom) were ranked, first, by number of man-days lost and, second, by volume of employment (or union members or workers covered by contract, as the case might be<sup>1</sup>) and then the relation of the one rank to the other compared. Table 1 shows the industries in their resultant ranking. They have been arbitrarily divided into five categories as follows:

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| High        | - Man-days rank substantially above employment rank. |
| Medium high | - Man-days rank significantly above employment rank. |
| Medium      | - About the same ranking for both.                   |
| Medium low  | - Man-days rank significantly below employment rank. |
| Low         | - Man-days rank substantially below employment rank. |

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<sup>1</sup> In the first instance (employment) the propensity to organize and then to strike is shown, and in the second and third (union members and workers covered) to strike after being organized. The difference is not so great, however, as might at first appear, since in four countries where employment data were not used (Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden) unionization is very widespread. We should have preferred to use employment data throughout since we are concerned with the propensity of the workers in an industry to strike; or, since organization is normally a pre-requisite to striking, to organize and strike. Generally workers who are not easily organized are also the ones who do not readily strike once organized.

Table 1. Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike

Rank	Australia			Czechoslovakia
	1919-1929	1930-1939	1940-1946	1921-1936
High	Mining Shipping, wharf labor, etc.	Mining Shipping, wharf labor, etc.	Mining Shipping, wharf labor, etc.	Quarrying and stone- ware Mining, metallurgy
Medium High	Wood, furniture, sawmills, etc. Books, printing, etc.	Pastoral, agri- culture Other land transport	Books, printing, etc. Food, drink, etc. Other manufactur- ing industries	Pottery, glassware Skins, leather, etc. Textile industry Chemical industry Paper industry
Medium	Other manufactur- ing industries Other land trans- port Engineering, metal works, etc. Building	Engineering, metal works, etc. Food, drink, etc. Other manufac- turing indus- tries Wood, furniture, sawmills, etc. Books, printing, etc.	Building Other land trans- port Wood, furniture, sawmills, etc. Engineering, metal works, etc.	Building Wood Gas, water, and electricity Rubber Machines Printing Metals Clothing
Medium Low	Domestic, hotel, etc. Miscellaneous Food, drink, etc. Railway and trainway ser- vices	Domestic, hotel, etc. Clothing, tex- tiles, boots, etc. Building Miscellaneous	Domestic, hotel, etc. Pastoral, agri- culture Clothing, tex- tiles, boots, etc.	Banks, etc. Food and drink
Low	Pastoral, agri- culture Clothing, tex- tiles, boots, etc.	Railway and trainway ser- vices	Railway and trainway ser- vices Miscellaneous	Hotels and rest- aurants Agriculture Commerce and auxiliary branches

Table 1. Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike (Continued)

Rank	Germany		Italy
	1915-1924	1925-1932	1916-1923
High	Machinery Mining (coal, salt, etc.) Chemicals	Musical instruments and toys Iron, steel, and metal works Quarrying Iron and metal extraction	Mining (extraction industries)
Medium High	Wood and wood products Printing and publishing Quarrying	Machinery (including vehi- cles) Electrical machinery, pre- cision instruments, and optical industries Rubber and asbestos Fishing Textile Wood and wood products Paper and printing	Food and drink Stone, clay, and sand Textiles
Medium	Metals Forestry: allied products Fishing and animal hus- bandry Textiles Transportation and com- munication Leather Paper Gardening Arts and crafts	Chemicals Construction Mining Theatre, music, sports, etc.	Skins and leather Buttons, etc. Paper and printing Metallurgy and machines Precision instruments and precious metals Clothing Transportation and com- munication Wood, straw, and allied industries Construction
Medium Low	Construction Hotels, inns, etc. Health and sanitation Food, drink, tobacco, etc.	Clothing Gardening and animal husbandry Leather and linoleum Transportation and com- munication Water, gas, and elec- tricity Food, drink, tobacco, etc.	Agriculture
Low	Clothing Trade	Hotels, restaurants, etc. Health and sanitation Trade	Chemical industries Production and distribu- tion of power, light, heat, and water Commerce and public ser- vices

Table 1. Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike (Continued)

Rank	Netherlands		New Zealand		
	1918-1929	1930-1940	1920-1934	1935-1939	1940-1948
High	Manufacture of goods of wood, cork, straw Mining, peat-cutting Manufacture of earthenware, glass, lime, and stoneware	Fishing and hunting Paper industry	Mines and quarries Transport by water	Mines and quarries Stone, clay, glass, and chemicals Transport by water Wood, etc.	Mines and quarries Transport by water
Medium High	Building and related industries Applied art Chemical industries Paper industry	Textile industry Manufacture of earthenware, glass, lime, and stoneware Manufacture of goods of wood, cork, and straw Building and related industries Clothing and cleaning	Wood, etc.	Power, heat, and light	Wood, etc. Stone, clay, glass, and chemicals Power, heat, and light Accommodations, meals, and personal services
Medium	Metal industry Diamonds and other precious stone work Printing industry Fishing and hunting Transport Food, drink, and tobacco Textile industry Insurance	Metal industry Mining, peat-cutting Diamonds and other precious stone work Applied art Food, drink, and tobacco Printing Chemicals Gas, water, and electricity Insurance Transport	The land (farming pursuits) Food, drink, etc. Power, heat, and light Metal Accommodations, meals, and personal services Skins, leather, etc.	Paper, printing, etc. Food, drink, etc. Metal Skins, leather, etc. Building and construction	Skins, leather, etc. Food, drink, etc. Paper, printing, etc. Building and construction Metal
Medium Low	Leather, oilcloth, and rubber industries Gas, water, and electricity Clothing and cleaning	Credit and banking Leather, oilcloth, and rubber industries	Stone, clay, glass, and chemicals Miscellaneous Paper, printing, etc.		Clothing, footwear, and textiles Transport by land
Low	Agriculture Credit and banking Commerce	Agriculture Commerce	Clothing, footwear, and textiles Transport by land Building and construction	Miscellaneous Transport by land Clothing, footwear, and textiles Accommodations, meals, and personal services The land	The land Miscellaneous



Table 1. Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike (Continued)

Rank	Norway	Sweden	Switzerland	
	1925-1939	1920-1937	1927-1939	1940-1949
High	Textiles Mining and quarrying Extraction of metals	Mining and quarrying		Mining Wood, pottery
Medium High	Paper Leather and rubber Publishing and printing Metal industries	Leather, skins, and rubber	Leather and rubber Mining Wood, pottery Textiles	
Medium	Food and tobacco Clothing Forestry Wood Gas and electricity Construction Hotels and restaurants Oil and lubricants	Forestry and wood Construction Paper and printing Chemical Textiles and clothing Agriculture and fishing Food Other industries Commerce and trade	Construction Clocks, jewelry Chemicals Metals, machines	Chemicals Leather and rubber Construction Textiles Metals, machines Clocks, jewelry
Medium Low	Chemical industries	Metallurgy and construction of machines Land and water transport Public institutions and enterprises		
Low	Trade Transportation and navigation Miscellaneous		Clothing Transport	Clothing Transport

Table 1. Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike (Continued)

Rank	United Kingdom	United States	
	1911-1945	1927-1941	1942-1948
High	Mining and quarrying	Anthracite coal-mining Bituminous coal-mining	Bituminous coal-mining Anthracite coal-mining Stone, clay, glass products Automobile and automobile equipment Rubber and rubber products
Medium High	Textiles	Lumber, timber basic products, furniture and finished lumber products Textiles and apparel Leather and leather products Transportation equipment (in- cluding autos and auto equip- ment) Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	Leather and leather products Textile mill products Lumber and timber basic products Non-ferrous metals and their products Iron and steel and their products
Medium	Metal and engin- eering indus- tries Transport and communication Building and construction	Construction Transportation, communication, etc. Stone, clay, and glass products Non-ferrous metals and their products Tobacco manufacturers Iron and steel and their products Machinery (including electrical)	Food and kindred products Products of petroleum and coal Transportation equipment (except autos) Machinery (except electrical) Paper and allied products Tobacco manufacturers Transportation, communication, etc. Construction Furniture and finished lumber products Electrical machinery
Medium Low	Clothing	Services--personal, business, others Food and kindred products Paper and allied products; print- ing, publishing, and allied in- dustries Chemicals and allied products; products of petroleum and coal	Printing, publishing and allied trades Chemicals and allied products Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Low		Trade Other non-manufacturing indus- tries Agriculture, forestry, and fish- ing	Trade Apparel and other finished products Other non-manufacturing industries Services--personal, business, etc. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Finance, insurance, and real estate

## Note to Table 1.

Sources: Australia--Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia; Czechoslovakia--Manuel Statistique de la Republique Tchecoslovaque and Annuaire Statistique de la Republique Tchecoslovaque; Germany--Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich and Statistik der Deutschen Reichs; Italy--Annuario Statistico Italiano; Netherlands--Jaarcijfers voor Nederland; New Zealand--New Zealand Official Yearbook; Norway--Statistisk Arbok for Norge; Sweden--Arbetsinstallelser och Kollektivavtal samt Forlikningsmannens Verksanket; United Kingdom--K. C. G. Knowles, "Strikes and Their Changing Economic Context," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, September 1947; United States--Handbook of Labor Statistics (1947 edition), Statistical Abstract of the United States, and Strikes in the United States 1880-1936 (Bulletin 651 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics); General--International Labor Office, Yearbook of Labor Statistics.

### The Industrial Environment

A generalized grouping of certain of the industries listed in Table 1 is set forth in Table 2. Five type situations are created by dividing environmental pressures into "coercive," "persuasive," and "neutral" and the direction of the pressure into "toward conflict" and "toward peace." By a "coercive" environment is meant one which determines the behavior by compelling action of one type or another. By a "persuasive" environment is meant one which draws people in a certain direction and predisposes, but does not require, them to act in a certain way. A "neutral" environment is one which either equally balances the pulls in either direction or in which the pulls are so weak that other forces are dominant. "Conflict" simply means a high propensity to strike and "peace" a low propensity.

The assignment of industries in Table 1 to a box in Table 2 is admittedly determined on a somewhat impressionistic basis. Only those industries which show a generally discernible uniformity of behavior in Table 1 are located in Table 2. Many industries in Table 1 do not appear in Table 2 because there are too few observations of them (as rubber) or because, while they are referred to several times (as paper), it is often in a paired grouping with some dissimilar industry (paper and printing) and there are too few separate rankings. The combination of distinct industries into the same statistical grouping is particularly annoying--clothing and textile, and land and water transportation,<sup>1</sup> for example--when each of them separately is an interesting case. The evidence for the placement of one industry (railroad)

<sup>1</sup> A particularly disturbing combination is "transportation and navigation" in Norway. Do railroads pull down the rank or do both railroads and shipping rank low; and, if shipping ranks low, why is the Norwegian experience so different from that in the other countries?

is partly from general knowledge, since it is not often clearly shown by itself. On the basis of general knowledge alone, several other groups might confidently be placed in this table--domestic servants, government employees, and white-collar workers in the "coercive toward peace" box--and some reference will be made to them in the discussion.

"Manufacturing (general)" is, of course, an omnibus description and the grouping may turn up in the "neutral" box only because quite divergent patterns cancel each other out. On the other hand, it seems more likely that general manufacturing (which includes, perhaps most importantly, metal working) is the significant standard case, and the question then becomes: Why are some industries more strike-prone and others less than general manufacturing?

The industries in the "neutral" box may be divided into two types: those which are quite consistently "medium strike-prone" (general manufacturing, leather, and construction) and those which vary considerably from "high" or "medium high" to "medium low" or "low" (printing, chemical, and food and kindred products). As noted above, industries in the "neutral" category are likely to be under either balanced pressures toward conflict or peace or under little pressure in either direction so that forces arising from other sources than the industrial environment are predominant. While the concern here is exclusively with industries, it is to be expected that individual firms in industries in the "neutral" category would vary more widely one from another than firms in industries in a "coercive" environment. A "neutral" industrial environment gives wide latitude for individual firm variations while a "coercive" one is more likely to demand individual conformance; and general observation attests to the fact that there is more



uniformity in behavior among coal mines or government bureaus than among general manufacturing plants.

Essentially what Table 2 does is to sort out from Table 1 the industries where there is some considerable evidence and then turn "high" propensity to strike into "coercive toward conflict," "medium high" propensity to strike into "persuasive toward conflict," "low" propensity into "coercive toward peace," "medium low" into "persuasive toward peace," and "medium" or mixed ("high" to "medium low") into "neutral." Table 1 ranks the industries. Table 2 states that, since there is such observable uniformity in the ranking of certain industries, the industrial environment (which is the only common force at work--the countries, the time periods, the personalities, the ideologies, and so forth are all different) must be an important cause of the behavior at least in what are called the "coercive" situations and perhaps also the "persuasive" ones. Before turning to the question of whether there are any reasonable hypotheses to explain the great impact of certain industrial environments on the propensity to strike, certain exceptions to the uniformity of behavior must be noted:

Trade in Sweden (higher than usual)

Mining in Germany in the second period and in the Netherlands during the second period (lower than usual)

Machinery in Germany (higher than usual)

Automobiles in the United States in the second period (higher than usual)

Pastoral agriculture in Australia during the second period and in New Zealand in the first (higher than usual)

For the first two exceptions we have no explanation to offer; but comments on the last three will be made later on.

Table 2. Environmental Types and Industrial Conflict and Peace--A Classification of Selected Industries

Environmental Pressure	Direction of Pressure	
	Toward Conflict	Toward Peace
Coercive	Mining Maritime and longshore	Agriculture Trade Railroad
Persuasive	Lumber Textile	Clothing Services (hotels, restaurants, etc.) Gas, water, and electricity
Neutral	Leather Manufacturing (general) Construction Printing Chemical Food and kindred products	



stenographers or electricians. Protest is less likely to take the form of moving to another industry and more of the mass walkout. Just as it is hard for these workers to move out, so also is it difficult for them to move up. Where can the longshoreman or coal miner or logger rise to in the natural course of events? Nor is he likely to be pulled from the mass in other ways. In these communities there are not the myriad of voluntary associations with mixed memberships which characterize the multi-industry town. The force of public opinion must seem rather weak to the logger in the camp or the miner in the coal patch who never sees "the public"; and it is no more possible to cut trees than to mine coal with bayonets. The employer throws out few lines to these workers. He is usually an absentee owner who "cuts out and gets out" in the logging business, or exhausts a mine and moves on, or hires longshoremen on a casual basis, or gets his views of personnel relations from the law on mutiny. The worker is as detached from the employer as from the community at large.

The union becomes a kind of working class party or even government for these employees, rather than just another association among many. Union meetings are more adequately attended and union affairs more vigorously discussed; and, as one consequence, personal and ideological factionalism and rival unionism are more likely. Strife within and between unions is a sign that the union is important.

The strike for this isolated mass is a kind of colonial revolt against far-removed authority, an outlet for accumulated tensions, a substitute for occupational and social mobility. The industrial environment places these workers in the role of members of separate classes distinct from the community at large--classes with their share of grievances. These individuals

are not members of the ubiquitous middle class but of their own class of miners or longshoremen; and they do not aim to be more considerate of the general community than they think the general community is of them.

2. The integrated individual. At the extreme from the member of the isolated mass is the integrated individual. "Integrated" is used here not in the psychological but the sociological sense--absorbed in and unified with society at large. The workers in the industries at the other end of our scale--those where the industrial environment is coercive or-persuasive toward peace (railroad; trade; agriculture; clothing; gas, water, and electricity; and the services; and we might add government, domestic services, and clerical)--are given an industrial role to play which integrates them better into the general community. They are more likely (with the exception of farm hands) to live in multi-industry communities, to associate with people with quite different working experiences than their own, and to belong to associations with heterogeneous memberships. In these communities their individual grievances are less likely to coalesce into a mass grievance which is expressed at the job level. There are many neutrals in any dispute and this helps to assure the impartiality of public officials.

In most of these cases the worker can either change his industry fairly readily without losing the value of his skill, or has access to higher skilled jobs or managerial or even employer status. Generally, also, the employer is either not so remote or not so callous if remote--the industry has small-scale employing units or the employer-worker relationship is normally a continuing one. And the community can bring pressure to bear to encourage peaceful conduct. The workers see and feel the general community and in at least two cases (railroads and government) the government asserts



the supremacy of the public interest in continuity of service, and in at least one other (clothing) the market for the products makes steady production the sine qua non for both investment and jobs. The union, except in the garment trades where it runs the industry and the railroads where it administers seniority, is not so wound into the lives of the workers and in no instance is it so much the chosen instrument for protest.

The workers in these industries are generally more dispersed in the general community, more stratified in the hierarchy of jobs in each industry, more attached to their individual employers, more restrained by social pressures, more able to escape job dissatisfactions without striking than the workers in the "conflict" industries. The strike is against a known employer and affects a community of which they are a part. These workers are contained in society rather than maintained on its periphery.

Several further notes are needed on the hypothesis that the location of the worker in society is the basic determinant of the inter-industry propensity to strike. Agriculture in New Zealand and Australia is, during certain periods, an exception to the rule of rural tranquility. It is also in California and Hawaii. These areas have in common large-scale agriculture. When agriculture moves from employing the single hired-hand to large groups of socially isolated workers, it also moves from peace toward conflict. It is also instructive that the automobile and rubber industries, which rank so high in the second period in the United States, are highly localized in the special communities of Detroit and Akron which were also the two homes of the sit-down strike; and that the one peaceful period in the recent history of the longshore industry on the West Coast has come after prolonged conflict had impaired the health of the industry and the volume of jobs.

The location of industries in the "neutral" box is not so readily elucidated by this hypothesis, although the occasional adventures into the conflict category of the printing and chemical industries might be laid to the well-developed sense of a common community which characterizes some printing trades and the frequent geographical isolation of chemical plants; and the "medium" behavior of the general manufacturing, construction, and leather industries by the balance of pulls toward group and societal identification.

Hypothesis 2--The character of the job and the worker. The second hypothesis is that the inherent nature of the job determines the kinds of workers employed and their attitudes, and these workers, in turn, cause conflict or peace. If the job is physically difficult and unpleasant, unskilled or semi-skilled, casual or seasonal, and fosters an independent spirit (as in the logger in the woods), it will draw tough, inconstant, combative and perhaps even virile workers, and they will be inclined to strike. If the job is physically easy and performed in nice surroundings, skilled and responsible, steady and subject to set rules and close supervision, it will attract women or the more submissive type of man and they will ~~abhor~~ strikes. Certainly the bull-of-the-woods and the mousy bank clerk are different types of people and can be expected to act differently. Certainly, also, the community is more sympathetic with striking miners coming out of the ground than with school teachers abandoning their desks.

This hypothesis explains a good many of the facts but not quite so neatly as the first. Sailors, longshoremen, miners, and lumberjacks are popularly accepted as being more vigorous and combative types than garment workers, grocery clerks, railway conductors, hotel maids, or cannery

employees, and they not only seem to strike more often but their strikes are also more violent. But textile workers and printing craftsmen, who also strike with some frequency, are not classed as so forceful, while teamsters, farm hands, steelworkers, and construction tradesmen, who are, do not strike with unusual frequency.

Several other elements of the industrial environment have been examined, but they did not seem to lead to a general theory of the inter-industry propensity to strike. They may, however, be important factors in the behavior of individual industries, or explain the record of the different plants within an industry or other characteristics of industrial relations than the tendency to strike. These factors are:

1. Sensitivity of the industry to the business cycle.
2. The structure of the product market.
3. The elasticity of demand for the product.
4. Labor as a percentage of total cost.
5. The profitability of the industry.
6. The average size of plant.
7. The state of technological change.
8. The rate of expansion or contraction of the industry.

An examination of Table 2 will convince that reference to any of these elements will be insufficient to explain the bulk of the facts.

We are left then with the two general hypotheses set forth above, of which the former seems consistent with a higher proportion of the known facts. The two theories have a uniting thread. Both of them are consistent with the thesis that strikes occur where they can occur, that is, where the working

class community is close-knit and the workers forceful, not where the workers are dispersed and subdued. This is not the same thing, however, as saying that strikes take place where strikes pay, for the grocery clerks are probably in a better position to benefit from strikes, if they could develop them, than are textile workers, and railroad workers than sailors.

The two hypotheses can, in fact, be combined to state that strikes occur most severely in industries which (a) concentrate together large numbers of persons who (b) do disagreeable work. Concentration by itself is not enough for members of the "lower gentility" (telephone operators, bank clerks, and the like) would not strike frequently, in deference to their lower-middle class psychology, even if they were put off by themselves in large groups; nor is disagreeable work enough by itself for scavengers, sand-blasters, divers, and chimney-sweeps have disagreeable jobs but are so occupationally isolated that joint action is almost impossible. The extreme cases then may be described as follows: (1) an isolated mass of persons doing disagreeable work and (2) isolated individuals doing pleasant work.

### Certain Theories Examined

The data on the inter-industry propensity to strike are crude, but this does not mean that they yield an inaccurate tableau. The ranking of industries from this data corresponds generally with the ranking which general knowledge and common sense would recommend and this may be a better test of their validity than is usually supposed. Two explanations of this ranking have been offered--the location of the workers in society and the character of the jobs and the workers, both of which explanations relate to what may be called the industrial environment; but there are many other theories which can be applied to these data although not specifically devised to explain them. It may be argued that it is unfair to test a theory against data it was not knowingly devised to cover, but these theories purport to have general explanatory value. While several of them seek to explain more than the causes of industrial conflict and peace, each of them attempts to explain at least this much.<sup>1</sup> The sole question is: how adequate are these theories in interpreting these particular data?

(a) The economic environment, which for these purposes we shall define as the market aspects of the larger industrial environment which was discussed above, makes a contribution to an understanding of these data, but by itself is an inadequate explanation. The industries located at each extreme have quite various product and labor market structures. An elastic demand in the product market may encourage peace,<sup>2</sup> particularly where business

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<sup>1</sup> There are other tests of the validity of these theories for the explanation of industrial conflict and peace than how well they elucidate these data. If the theories fail this test, this does not mean they will not pass other tests or explain other phenomena.

<sup>2</sup> An elastic demand for the products of a firm or a group of firms and an elastic demand for labor has been advanced on occasion as a basic cause of labor-management cooperation. The employer faces stiff competition and the



may be lost to non-union employers, and an inelastic labor supply situation may lead workers to strike since it reflects the fact it is difficult for them

union does not wish to injure his competitive position. The union, however, may not be so considerate if (1) any job reduction for this firm is matched by an increase in jobs somewhere else for members of the same union organization and perhaps even for the same workers (as may often happen in local trade and service industries), or (2) the union or its leaders for the sake of survival must make certain wage gains regardless of the potential effects (which may be much delayed) on job opportunities. Union-management cooperation is most likely to result when disturbing actions by the union would cause a loss of jobs to areas outside its job territory and where its leaders are in a position to consider this effect as the dominant influence. An inelastic demand for the products is probably more generally conducive to peace since it gives the employer greater lee-way in accommodating himself to the union. Then a gap is more likely to exist between the maximum which the employer can readily afford to pay and the minimum which the union can reasonably accept. Cf. Richard A. Lester, Economics of Labor (MacMillan, 1946): "Practically without exception. . . labor-capital cooperation has been adopted by individual firms with a fairly elastic demand for labor either because of competition within the industry or because of the practice of contracting out for work. . . ." (p. 697), or "union-employer cooperation to regulate competition has occurred, for instance in . . . /several industries are enumerated/. In such industries price-cutting and wage-cutting are likely to occur to an extreme degree because there is a large number of small employers in the industry, it is so easy to enter the business, and wages are such an important item in total costs." (p. 145) Hence the need for the "stabilizing" effect of the union. Shister, in his analysis of union-management cooperation also emphasizes the influence of the economic environment in working for cooperation: ". . . union-management cooperation has appeared mainly, although not exclusively, when the bargaining unit was in an adverse economic situation." (Joseph Shister, "Union-Management Cooperation: An Analysis," Insights into Labor Issues, edited by Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister, MacMillan, 1948, p. 90.) Shister continues to point out that if the cost reductions resulting from union-management cooperation involve hourly wage reductions, "then it is necessary that the employer's demand for labor be elastic over the relevant range. A union would not be likely to agree to reduce wage rates, under union-management cooperation, if it did not see a possibility of gaining more than proportionately in employment and/or income from the wage reduction." (pp. 90-91) Further illustration of arguments stressing the economic environment's influence in affecting industrial peace or conflict may be found in Frederick H. Harbison, Robert K. Burns, and Robert Dubin, "Toward a Theory of Labor-Management Relations" in Insights into Labor Issues, (op. cit., pp. 8-14); and in John Dunlop's contribution to "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1950, where he states, "the conditions in the labor market in which the labor services are purchased by the management, and the conditions in the product market in which the output or service is sold" (p. 386) constitute an important aspect of the total environment impinging on the prospects for peace or conflict.

to move out; but an elastic demand for the product may also cause trouble where a union is competing in a wage war with a rival union or is under pressure to match a pattern wage settlement and the employer is handicapped in translating higher wage costs into higher prices for fear of losing volume, and an inelastic labor supply may encourage peace if it helps give rise to higher wage rates. Product market and labor market forces are, perhaps, more likely to explain variations among firms or between periods in the life of an industry than between industries over a span of time.

(b) The political environment, particularly of the unions, has been persuasively adduced as the cause of industrial warfare or peace: the more secure the union and its leaders, the fewer the strikes; the less secure, the more numerous. The unions of grocery clerks, government employees, agriculture workers, however, have generally less institutional security than those of coal miners, printers, and longshoremen, yet they strike less. More jurisdictional and organization rivalries usually face the construction and railroad unions than the unions of miners, yet they are the more peaceful. In the United States the leader of the mine workers is popularly conceived to have a more secure position than the chief of the air line pilots association, yet his union strikes more; and peace descended on the West Coast waterfront when the established union leaders became less secure. Certainly the political environment of the union and its leaders is useful, even indispensable, in explaining certain situations at certain times, but it does not provide a generally valid explanation of the inter-industry propensity to strike.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ross and Irwin conclude that "differences in the frequency of strikes between one country and another can best be explained by differences in the position of the union and the union leader" and that "internal factionalism, like external competition, encourages the development and prosecution of grievances." (Arthur W. Ross and Donald Irwin, "Strike Experience in Five

Among the industries "coercive toward conflict," while unionism is usually most secure, union leaders and specific institutions may on the average be somewhat less secure than usual. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the "isolated mass" builds a strong union movement and that active memberships give rise to factionalism. Among the industries "coercive toward peace," unionism finds its greatest uncertainty and factionalism its least assured market.

Employer associations are particularly strong where the industrial environment is "coercive toward conflict" (coal, mining, logging, longshore, maritime). While, by increasing the ability to pay of the individual employers, by reducing inter-employer competition, and by lowering the level of the union's ultimate demands by raising the cost of strikes, multi-employer bargaining may encourage peace, it finds its origins in part, in war.

Strikes may better be explained not by looking to the organization but to the membership. They not only occur most frequently in places where the membership is restless due to its industrial environment, as we have seen above, but at times of membership unrest.<sup>1</sup> It is to the reactions of the workers and not the tactics of the leaders to which we must turn for the more basic explanations.

Countries, 1927-1947: An Interpretation, "Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1951, pp. 336-337.) The organizational stability and political security of the union do not in themselves, however, explain inter-industry differences in proneness to strike and internal factionalism, while almost certainly encouraging industrial conflict, may itself be explained in terms of the "mass isolation" hypothesis offered above.

<sup>1</sup> "Frequent disputes are mainly caused by dissatisfaction among the workers; strikes for improvements are frequent when rising prices are not adequately met by rising wages, strikes against a worsening of conditions when the workers are menaced by cuts and especially by wage cuts not justified by a proportional fall in prices." (K. Forschheimer, "Some International Aspects of the Strike Movement," Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics, January 1948.)

(c) Human relations at the face-to-face level are said by some to explain not only industrial but even international relations. Misunderstandings are not inherent in a situation but result from faulty communications.<sup>1</sup> It is undoubtedly true that face-to-face relations are worse between long-shoremen and coal miners and their employers than between grocery clerks and theirs; and that if face-to-face relations were better between coal miners and their employers then there would be less conflict. But why are face-to-face relations so universally bad between coal miners and their employers? Is it because they always know less about semantics than construction workers and their employers, and is it only faulty communication systems which stand between them and ultimate harmony? And how are face-to-face relations to be improved? Can it be done by giving courses in group dynamics and introducing social engineers into the situation?

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<sup>1</sup> "According to this approach [*i.e.*, the "human relations" approach], actions and sentiments are the items to be explained: Why do workers increase (or decrease) their productivity? Why do they stay on the job--or go out on strike? Why do they express hostile (or favorable) sentiments toward management? And the analysis of patterns of interaction [*where* "interaction" refers to all personal contacts between two individuals or among three or more individuals] seems to me the most effective means of explaining actions and sentiments." (William Foote Whyte, "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views," *op. cit.*, p. 395.) The economic, social, and political environments are determinants in this schema only in so far as their influences are manifested in specific items of behavior of the people observed within the "social system" which the plant constitutes. The determining influence in shaping "sentiments" is the nature of the "human relations" which prevail: "The trouble is that people's sentiments cannot be changed by simply telling them that it is a good idea to change their sentiments. In this case [*the* Chicago plant of the Inland Steel Container Company], union and management people began with hatred and distrust, while now mutual good will prevails. But the good will was a late arrival on the scene. It only developed following far-reaching changes in human relations. That is the sequence of change we see, as a rule: first a change in human relations, then a change in sentiments." (William Foote Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, Harper and Brothers, 1951, p. 228.)

It seems more likely that some situations are structured against good face-to-face relations and that this structure is the more basic cause and the source of the more basic changes. The climate of face-to-face relations may be one way of testing and of describing the degree of conflict or cooperation in an industry and there may also be occasions when manipulation of these relations alone may bring great changes, but it seems unlikely that the peace in government agencies and the warfare on the waterfront is due primarily to the universal superiority in human relations techniques of government bureaucrats over stevedoring contractors. Even if this were the case, it would still need to be explained why government draws to it a more skillful elite than the longshore industry. Labor relations may be a mirror in which the employer sees his own reflection--the decent employer may see decent relationships reflected back at him<sup>1</sup>--but why then are employers more decent in one industry than another? At this point some reference needs to be made to the industrial environment.

(d) The trend of historical developments varies considerably from one collective bargaining system to another. In industries "coercive toward conflict" the origins frequently been more violent and time has had less of a subduing effect. The printing trades tend to be among the earliest organized as are the coal miners, but they both continue to be disposed toward conflict long after other industries have learned to tread a more peaceful path. The garment trades in the United States were organized in bitter struggles but, given an environment "persuasive toward peace," soon established the standard

<sup>1</sup> Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Rutenber, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, Harper and Brothers, 1942: "Management as a general principle, gets the kind of union leadership it deserves. A tough management begets tough union leaders, while a patient, friendly, cooperative management begets a like type of union leadership." (p. 58.)



for peaceful conduct. Both the nature of the birth and the trend of development must be explained by some common causes, for both have been quite uniform for the same industry from one country to another. More than historical accident is at work. The nature of the birth appears to be not purely accidental, so it is necessary to say more than that a bad start leads to poorer continuing relations than a good one; and since time works fewer wonders with some industries than others, it is necessary to state more than that time smooths the wrinkles in the relationship.<sup>1</sup>

(e) Dominant personalities certainly leave an imprint on relations in an industry; but why do the coal and longshore industries bring a John L. Lewis and Harry Bridges to the fore and clothing a Hillman, and why do coal and longshore and clothing perform about the same way in other countries without Lewis, Bridges, and Hillman?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Robert R. Brooks, As Steel Goes (Yale University Press, 1940), p. 190: "There are three stages in the development of successful collective bargaining. The first is the signing of a contract by a company giving a union the right to bargain for its members only. Such a contract often amounts to no more than a letter of introduction. It may be followed by a period of intense conflict between union and management representatives during which the union fights for a permanent status, and the management fights for the status quo ante. In the second stage, individual companies concede a stable position to the union and cooperate with it in the adjustment of personal grievances, but the use of the word 'grievance' clearly suggests that union-management relationships remain essentially negative. In the third stage, collective bargaining becomes a cooperative relationship directed toward increasing the productive efficiency of the industry. Positive action toward this objective must ultimately lead to industry-wide union-management cooperation by organized workers and associated employers."

<sup>2</sup> Several of the case studies in the National Planning Association series on the "Causes of Industrial Peace" emphasize the importance of dominant personalities in the shaping of the peaceful relations found. For example: "Perhaps the most important factor [determining the course of the relationship] is the president of the company. His philosophy and his personality have had a great deal to do with the ultimate development of health." (Douglas McGregor and Joseph N. Scanlon, The Dewey and Almy Chemical Company and the International Chemical

(f) Adherence to ideological views or merely to certain specific attitudes toward the other party affects profoundly bargaining relationships and the propensity to strike.<sup>1</sup> Communist-led unions probably cause more trouble and tough-minded employers invite more than do non-Communist-led unions and soft-hearted employers. Belligerent unions and reactionary employers seem, however, to be more effect than cause for the citadels of union radicalism, and the hot-beds of employer reaction are found in about the same industries from country to country.

(g) It is suggested, particularly by economists, that the selection of good bargaining techniques can prevent conflict since strikes never pay and that good policies can assure peace since peace does pay;<sup>2</sup> but all the parties, regardless Workers Union: A Case Study, National Planning Association, 1948, pp. 63-64); or, "A long and successful evolution has brought about these conditions, but what was the genesis of this evolution? Why did collective bargaining get off to a good start in this industry? The personality of Sidney Hillman played a dominant role. His constructive and honest approach was often an effective substitute for the picket line." (Donald B. Straus, Hickey-Freeman Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers: A Case Study, National Planning Association, 1949, pp. 70-71.)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Benjamin M. Selekman, "Varieties of Labor Relations," Harvard Business Review, March 1949, pp. 179-180: "Beyond any short-term changes in the bargaining program, accordingly, the ideological structure does constitute the most un-deviating and ineradicable conflict pattern in present-day industrial relations. For the party-line leaders accept neither the system of free collective bargaining nor the American democracy of which it is a part. Manifestly, such an undivided focus on external goals means that the ideological structure of relationship possesses no innate potentialities for evolution toward a more accommodative structure of joint dealings. Consequently, the reliance on time and experience, which may prove helpful in other structures, in this one can become a source of actual danger. Only by outsting party-line leaders from positions of union leadership, whether by legislation or by employer resistance or by intra-union action, may this source of conflict be minimized."

<sup>2</sup> J. R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages (Peter Smith, 1948): "Under a system of collective bargaining. . . the majority of actual strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation. . . . The danger lies in ignorance by one side of the other's dispositions, and in hasty breaking-off of negotiations." (pp. 146-147.) See also Sumner H. Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations (Cornell University Press, 1947, pp. 138-145); and Massachusetts Proposals for Better Industrial Relations (The New England Council, 1947, pp. 11-15), for discussions of the importance of improved techniques.

of industry, have access to the same storehouse and can draw from it the sword or the green table as they wish. Better bargaining techniques, just like better human relations practices, can improve some situations, but it is not for lack of bargaining skill that strikes have occurred in the coal mines and on the waterfront.

(h) Key bargains are thought to lead to more conflict than "satellite" bargains.<sup>1</sup> This thesis cannot be examined very adequately at the inter-industry level, since, particularly in the United States, "key bargains" are made at the company level. However, the key nature of the bargains may explain the comparatively high ranking of the automobile industry in the United States during the second period and of the machinery industry in Germany where the metal workers' union is the largest and most powerful union and the normal pattern setter. Again, however, this theory is better at explaining individual situations than the propensity to strike industry by industry. The steel industry sets patterns in the United States, but is not particularly strike-prone, and the longshore industry sets no pattern but is strike-inclined.

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<sup>1</sup> Harbison and Dubin, Dunlop and others, emphasize the "key bargain" hypothesis; Harbison and Dubin point to the difficulties in achieving good union-management relations where labor patterns are set rather than followed and Dunlop points to the overall difficulties with respect to the establishing workable relations for the economy where a few key bargains set the pace for the followers. See Frederick H. Harbison and Robert Dubin, Patterns of Union-Management Relations: United Automobile Workers (CIO), General Motors, Studebaker (Science Research Associates, 1947): "The question of corporation survival and maintenance of employment is not so likely to be a determining factor in negotiations between organizations such as General Motors and the GM Department of the UAW. Negotiations between such giants do not conform solely to our economic environments; indeed they actually tend to create much of the economic environment for the mass production industries. As we have indicated, the forces influencing collective bargaining in the power centers make the development of constructive union-management relations difficult. Here lies the most crucial problem in present-day labor relations." (p. 221.) See also: John T. Dunlop, "American Wage Determination: The Trend and its Significance," Wage Determination and the Economics of Liberalism (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1947, pp. 41-43.)

Theories of the trade union movement.

→The trade union movement is variously analyzed as moving toward "monopoly," "job control," "status" in its own trade union society, "bureaucracy," "power accumulation" and "class consciousness." These are either the ascribed goals or contemplated ends, and it might be thought that as individual unions reach the culmination of their development some effect on their proneness to strike would be noticed--more peace in the first few cases and more conflict in the last. What do the facts on the inter-industry propensity to strike show? Generally the industries at the conflict end of the ranking have unions with a greater "monopoly" in the labor market than those at the other end of the range. Once "job control" is obtained by the teamsters peace overwhelms the industry, but longshoremen continue their conflict after "job control" is seized. The garment workers have achieved a degree of "status" in a partially self-contained society of their own creation and seldom strike; typographical workers have also and are much less quiescent. The "iron law of oligarchy" has settled over the coal miners' union in the United States without the dove of peace alighting <sup>on</sup> the coal tippie. "Power" has been accumulated by the unions of mine workers sufficient to make governments shake in the face of it, but they have not been satiated; but then the process of accumulating power never comes to a final end. The "class consciousness" theory says that (1) workers are becoming more class-minded and (2) when they do, they are more inclined to violence against the surrounding society. While the first part of this theory is of doubtful truth, the data seem to bear out the second part--workers strike most often and most violently when they are in an "isolated mass."

This suggests that some strikes have elements of a small-scale revolt against society rather than of bargaining tactics alone. There is a sense of a mass grievance against society and little sense of community responsibility.

The cost of striking is lowered for there is more class support for the strike and less felt public pressure against it, and the gain in prospect is not alone a better contract but the release of accumulated tensions. The single equation of prospective economic cost against prospective economic gain (which will seldom show a positive surplus) is particularly inappropriate here, for cost and gain are calculated in more than the economic dimension. The revolt element is certainly not present in all strikes or even many, but the industries where it may be account for a substantial proportion of the man-days lost. In New Zealand during the first period over eighty percent of all man-days lost were in mining and water transport alone; in Germany during the second period mining alone accounted for over forty percent of the total man-days lost; and in the United Kingdom mining and quarrying accounted for almost fifty percent (exclusive of the 1926 losses) of the total man-days lost in industrial disputes during the three decades covered. It was out of the isolated masses of coal miners in Great Britain and longshoremen in San Francisco that two of the greatest general strikes developed.<sup>1</sup>

Summary. The most general explanation of the inter-industry propensity to strike is the nature of the industrial environment and particularly its tendency to direct workers into an isolated mass or to integrate them into the general community. This hypothesis explains the behavior of most of the

<sup>1</sup> A perusal of Wilfred Harris Crook, The General Strike (University of North Carolina Press, 1931) indicates that many of the general strikes evolved from disputes in coal, lumber, textiles, and the waterfronts; for example, the 1842 general strike in Britain developed out of a dispute in the collieries as did the 1902 strike in France; the 1904 strike in France began with a lockout of the harbor workmen in Marseilles and the 1903 strike in Holland also grew out of a dispute which involved the Dockers Union; the 1904 strike in Italy developed when troops were sent in to maintain order in a strike of the miners, and the 1909 strike in Sweden involved the lockout of sawmill and textile workers. (pp. 18-20, 38-39, 115 ff, 185, and 283.)



industries surveyed for most of the time periods covered, and does so better than alternative theories. It does not explain the ranking of all industries all of the time, however, and thus other explanations are necessary. We are dealing with complex phenomena and must resort to multiple causation; and, as we have seen, other theories are helpful or essential in explaining certain situations.

The hypothesis of the location of the worker in society is satisfactory for the one task of explaining the inter-industry propensity to strike. It has little to say about the behavior of individual firms except that a coercive environment is likely to enforce more uniformity on the firms in the industry than a non-coercive environment. At the level of the firm, many more factors than the industrial environment must be examined and particularly if the industrial environment is "neutral" as it appears to be for the bulk of manufacturing. The only explanation this hypothesis offers for the variation of the propensity to strike from one period of time to another is that the propensity will rise or fall in an industry or society as the workers become more isolated in masses or more integrated into society, and the only explanations of international differences in the inclination to strike are that the industry mix is important as is also the general integration of workers into society.

The Greater Strategy

It is generally, although by no means universally, accepted that the amelioration of industrial relations is desirable, but those who possess this goal are not always working toward it. What is the most general principle for the accommodation of employers and unions with each other and with society? It is not making the demand for all products elastic to encourage union-management cooperation, or giving the union a closed shop and an administration safe from the whims of the rank and file for the sake of institutional and leadership security, or training the managerial elite to stroke the workers' fur the right way, or to wait for time which solves all problems to solve this one also, or to psychoanalyze the leaders and turn them into more benevolent despots, or to suppress or encourage certain ideologies or attitudes, or to nail a list of approved bargaining techniques on every conference table, or designate one industry (preferably one with no useful product) to mark the course for the lambs to follow (although all these devices contain some merit in them), but to integrate the worker and the employer as fully as possible into the general society.<sup>1</sup>

The effort should be to increase vertical and horizontal mobility, to encourage a wide variety of mixed associations, to break down barriers between groups and between individuals, to create the mixed community instead of the "Gold Coast" or "Back of the Yards," which alike inspire ideological thinking. The opposite road is toward the all-absorbing party of the Communists, the

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<sup>1</sup> This is, of course, a prescription which is difficult or impossible to apply to the coal mining or lumber or maritime industries; and thus the observation may be more useful as a warning against the creation of other similar situations than as a proposal for a cure of existing ones.

all-absorbing corporation of Mayo,<sup>1</sup> and the all-absorbing union of Tannenbaum.<sup>2</sup> As between the isolated group and the isolated individual, it is the former which is the greater threat to democracy. Rather than either of these, however, we should encourage the limited-function party, the limited-function corporation, the limited-function union;<sup>3</sup> and the unlimited individual. The extreme left and the extreme right alike seek the answer in the monolithic organization. The democratic approach is for the individual to be many things but most of all a

<sup>1</sup> "Here. . . Mayo gives us instances where industrial administrators have succeeded in making factory groups so stable in their attitudes of group cooperation that men in the groups explicitly recognized that the factory had become for them the stabilizing force around which they developed satisfying lives. . . . Thus Mayo shows us for the first time in the form of specific instances that it is within the power of industrial administrators to create within industry itself a partially effective substitute for the old stabilizing effect of the neighborhood. Given stable employment, it might make of industry (as of the small town during most of our national life) a socially satisfying way of life as well as a way of making a living." (From Wallace B. Donham's foreword to Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945, pp. viii-ix.)

<sup>2</sup> Frank Tannenbaum, *A Philosophy of Labor* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1951): "In terms of the individual, the union returns to the worker his 'society.' It gives him a fellowship, a part in a drama that he can understand, and life takes on meaning once again because he shares a value system common to others. Institutionally the trade-union movement is an unconscious effort to harness the drift of our time and reorganize it around the cohesive identity that men working together always achieve." (p. 10); "The trade-union is the real alternative to the authoritarian state. The trade-union is our modern 'society,' the only true society that industrialism has fostered. As a true society it is concerned with the whole man, and embodies the possibilities of both the freedom and the security essential to human dignity. The corporation and the union will ultimately merge in common ownership and cease to be a house divided. It is only thus that a common identity may once again come to rule the lives of men and endow each one with rights and duties recognized by all." (pp. 198-199.)

<sup>3</sup> See Will Herberg, "For 'Limited' as Against 'Total' Unionism," *Labor and Nation*, April-May 1946: "Each kind of organization has its own proper function in the pluralistic scheme of a democratic society and for its own good as well as for the good of society as a whole, each should confine itself primarily to the sphere determined by that function. There are undoubtedly other purposes and interests of deep concern to workers, who, it must be remembered, are not

citizen and to find his protection from domination in the multiplicity of organizations. Fluidity and diversity<sup>1</sup> are the cornerstones of a free society.

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merely workers, but men and citizens as well. For the furtherance of these purposes and interests there exist a wide variety of organizations--and where none exist new ones may be formed--in which trade unionists may naturally take part, though not as trade unionists but in one or another of the many capacities in which citizens function in a free pluralistic society." (p. 54.)

<sup>1</sup> See C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, "A Typology of Societies," Rural Sociology, September 1951.

Some confirmation for our findings in the Bay Area is available in a staff study on fair employment practices legislation by the Humphrey Subcommittee of the Senate Labor Committee, which reported that in San Francisco 90 per cent of the jobs are closed to Negroes, and 75 per cent are closed to Orientals. -- Labor Relations Reporter, 31 LRR 56 (December 1, 1952).

See also: Davis McEntire and Julia R. Tarnopol, "Postwar Status of Negro Workers in San Francisco Area," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 70, No. 6 (June, 1950), pp. 614-616; Davis McEntire, The Labor Force in California (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 64-65.

23. In personnel interviewing, the "Patterned Interview" advocated by McMurry and the "Diagnostic Interviewer's Guide" of Wonderlic both include items dealing with the candidate's activities while in school: clubs, positions of leadership, and so on. See Gordon S. Watkins, et al., The Management of Personnel and Labor Relations (2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), pp. 279-289.

24. This problem has been reported by others. See: Myers and MacLaurin, op. cit., p. 3; W. S. Woytinsky, Three Aspects of Labor Dynamics (Washington: Social Science Research Council, 1942), pp. 66-68.

25. Clark Kerr, "The Balkanization of Labor Markets" (unpublished manuscript, University of California Institute of Industrial Relations, Berkeley, 1953).

26. Myers and MacLaurin, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Reynolds, op. cit., p. 51.

27. Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 45, 54, 83.

28. Industry divisions were classified as follows, according to degree of unionization:

High (80-100% of the firms unionized): Building & Construction, Nondurable Manufacturing, Durable Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, and Public Utilities, Transportation, & Communication.

Substantial (50-79%): Retail Trade, and Service & Miscellaneous.

Very Low (0-19%): Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate.

29. Another illustration of the separation between the job market and the wage market is found in the analysis of the Brockton Shoe industry by George P. Shultz. In his Pressures on Wage Decisions (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1951), labor mobility is hardly mentioned, except insofar as serious unemployment may be so considered.

30. We are indebted to Clark Kerr and the late Lloyd H. Fisher for their observations on this point. See their "Multiple-Employer Bargaining: The San Francisco Experience," op. cit., p. 52. See also Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 226-229.

31. In discussing the adjustment of the labor market to changing conditions, Reynolds referred to recruiting only by saying that "the employer will try to recruit the necessary number of workers in the least expensive way," --ibid., pp. 258-259n. Emphasis in the original.



32. We did not collect data on "personnel ratios" (i.e., the number of persons employed in personnel work per hundred employees served by them), but our impressions correspond with the results reported by Yoder and Nelson. Their 1950 survey of 370 firms found an average personnel ratio of .87, although this varied somewhat with the size of firm and with the industry and organization structure. See Dale Yoder and L. Patricia Nelson, "Personnel Salaries and Ratios in 1950," Personnel, Vol. 27, No. 1 (July, 1950), p. 18.

33. For a brief and interesting review of the current economic and social status of the Negro in America, see "The U. S. Negro, 1953," Time, Vol. LXI, No. 19 (May 11, 1953), pp. 55-58.