

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED

DOMESTIC	FOREIGN
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE CABLE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED CABLE
NIGHT MESSAGE	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	RADIOGRAM
SHIP RADIOGRAM	

PATRONS SHOULD CHECK CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED. OTHERWISE MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS A FULL-RATE COMMUNICATION

Postal Telegraph

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Commercial
Cables



All America
Cables

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Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

Form 2L

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

MARCH 18, 1942

HONORABLE TOM STEWART
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ANSWERING YOUR TELEGRAM MARCH FOURTEENTH IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO COME TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AS I MUST BE IN COURT AND HAVE MANY IMPORTANT CITY MATTERS TO ATTEND TO HERE. I MIGHT COME ON AT A LATER TIME IF YOU FEEL MY TESTIMONY ~~WOULD~~ ^{WOULD} BE OF VALUE. I SUGGEST OTHER WITNESSES AS FOLLOWS. TOM WALLACE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS, FEDERAL BUILDING, LOS ANGELES, WHO HAS MADE INVESTIGATION OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. JAMES STEADMAN, FEDERAL BUILDING, LOS ANGELES, WHO FOR TWO YEARS HAS MADE INVESTIGATION OF LOCAL ~~PROPERTY~~ ^{Japanese} FOR DIES COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE. AND LYLE KANE, DEPUTY COUNTY ASSESSOR, HALL OF JUSTICE, LOS ANGELES, WHO HAS COLLECTED SOME VERY INTERESTING INFORMATION IN ASSESSING PROPERTY OF JAPANESE IN THIS COUNTY. I WILL BE VERY GLAD TO COOPERATE WITH YOU IN ANY WAY YOU MAY SUGGEST.

FLETCHER BOWRON

MAYOR

Chge to Mayor's acct
FB:M

POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY

TRANSMITS AND DELIVERS THE WITHIN MESSAGE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS:

To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of a message should order it REPEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this, one-half the unrepeated message rate is charged in addition. Unless otherwise indicated on its face, THIS IS AN UNREPEATED MESSAGE AND PAID FOR AS SUCH, in consideration whereof it is agreed between the sender of the message and this Company as follows:

1. The Company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the UNREPEATED MESSAGE rate, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any message received for transmission at the REPEATED-MESSAGE rate, beyond the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the SPECIALLY VALUED MESSAGE rate, beyond the sum at which such message shall be valued, in writing, by the sender thereof when tendered for transmission and for which payment is made or agreed to be made of the amount of the repeated-message rate and an additional charge equal to one-tenth of one per cent of the amount by which such written valuation shall exceed five thousand dollars; nor in any case for delays arising from unavoidable interruption in the working of its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure messages.

2. The Company is hereby made the agent of the sender, without liability, to forward this message over the lines of any other company or by any other means of communication when necessary to reach its destination.

3. Domestic messages and incoming cable messages will be delivered free within one-half mile of the Company's office in towns of 5,000 population or less, and within one mile of such office in other cities or towns. Beyond these limits the Company does not undertake to make delivery, but will, without liability, at the sender's request, as his agent and at his expense, endeavor to contract for him for such delivery at a reasonable price.

4. No responsibility attaches to this Company concerning messages until the same are accepted at one of its transmitting offices; and if a message is sent to such office by one of the Company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent of the sender.

5. The Company shall not be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is filed with the Company for transmission.

6. It is agreed that prompt and correct transmission and delivery of this message shall be presumed in any action for recovery of tolls thereto; subject, however, to rebuttal by competent evidence.

7. Special terms governing the transmission of messages under the classes of messages enumerated below shall apply to messages in each of such respective classes in addition to all foregoing terms.

8. NO EMPLOYEE OF THIS COMPANY IS AUTHORIZED TO VARY THE FOREGOING.

POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY

CLARENCE H. MACKAY, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
A. H. GRISWOLD, EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT

DOMESTIC MESSAGES

FAST TELEGRAMS. A full-rate expedited service.

DAY LETTERS. A deferred day service at rates lower than the fast telegram rate. One and one-half times the Night Letter rate for the transmission of 50 words or less, and one-fifth of the initial rate for each additional 10 words or less.

SPECIAL TERMS APPLYING TO DAY LETTERS. In further consideration of the reduced rate for this special "Day Letter" service, the following special terms in addition to those enumerated above are hereby agreed to:

(a) Day Letters may be forwarded by the Telegraph Company as a deferred service and the transmission and delivery of such Day Letter is, in all respects, subordinate to the priority of transmission and delivery of full rate telegrams.

(b) This Day Letter is received subject to the express understanding and agreement that the Company does not undertake that a Day Letter shall be delivered on the day of its date absolutely and at all events; but that the Company's obligation in this respect is subject to the condition that there shall remain sufficient time for the transmission and delivery of such Day Letter on the day of its date during regular office hours, subject to the priority of the transmission of full rate telegrams under the conditions named above.

NIGHT MESSAGES. Accepted up to 2.00 a. m. at reduced rates to be sent during the night and delivered not earlier than the morning of the ensuing business day. Night messages may at the option of the Telegraph Company be mailed at destination to the addressees, and the Company shall be deemed to have discharged its obligation in such cases with respect to delivery by mailing such Night Messages at destination, postage prepaid.

NIGHT LETTERS. Accepted up to 2.00 a. m. for delivery on the morning of the ensuing business day, at rates still lower than night message rates, as follows: The fast telegram rate for 10 words shall be charged for the transmission of 50 words or less, and one-fifth of such rate for 10 words shall be charged for each additional 10 words or less.

CLASSES OF SERVICE

SPECIAL TERMS APPLYING TO NIGHT LETTERS. In further consideration of the reduced rate for this special "Night Letter" service, the following special terms in addition to those enumerated above are hereby agreed to:

(a) Night Letters may at the option of the Telegraph Company be mailed at destination to the addressees, and the Company shall be deemed to have discharged its obligation in such cases with respect to delivery by mailing such Night Letters at destination, postage prepaid.

CABLE MESSAGES

FULL RATE MESSAGES receive regular and prompt service in their order of filing. Code language permitted.

DEFERRED RATE MESSAGES at one-half of the full rate to follow full rate messages. Must be in plain language of country of origin, or of destination, or in French. Full particulars as to countries where this class of service is effective will be furnished upon application to any Postal Telegraph office.

NIGHT CABLE LETTERS at reduced rates. Must be in plain language of country of origin, or of destination, or in French where transmitted by telegraph to destination. Subordinated to the priority of transmission of full and deferred rate messages. May be posted, when sender so directs, to countries where this service is not available, at tariffs to countries from which such messages are posted. Under latter circumstances, messages must contain complete mailing address including chargeable posting instructions (i. e., "Post London," etc.). Minimum word basis of twenty to twenty-five words applied. Code addresses may be used except for messages delivered by post. Figures explained by text admitted. Indicator "NLT" required and charged for as one word. For further particulars apply at any Postal Telegraph office.

NO EMPLOYEE OF THIS COMPANY IS AUTHORIZED TO VARY THE FOREGOING.



T1.60
FLETCHER BOWRON
MAYOR

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY HALL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

April 24, 1943

Honorable A. B. Chandler, Chairman
Subcommittee of Committee on Military Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

Important affairs of the City of Los Angeles will make it impossible for me to be present as a witness before your committee. I am therefore taking the opportunity afforded by your telegraphic request, to submit a statement of facts and an expression of my views and recommendations relative to the treatment and disposition of Japanese, both American and foreign born, now located at the War Relocation Centers.

For many years prior to Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by this country against Japan, in the Los Angeles metropolitan area was the largest concentration of Japanese in America. Within the limits of the city and within the radius of a comparatively few miles of Los Angeles resided approximately one-third of all of the Japanese on the Pacific Coast, about one-fourth of all of the Japanese in America. Not only was the largest population located here but we believe this was the center of activity and intrigue in preparation for the conflict that many Japanese secretly knew was to come some day. The selection of occupations, the location of businesses, truck farms and other activities, could not have been mere coincidence. While during years past we were all too blind to see it and most of us were disarmed and unsuspecting because of the smiling courtesy and what seemed inoffensive and undesigning peaceful pursuits of the friendly Japanese in our midst, as we look back now we verily believe that many of the Japanese residents in this section moved and acted in accordance with a definite plan and that many of them were prepared to turn and rend those who befriended them. We believe that part of their strategy was to appear inoffensive, friendly, and the loyalty proclaimed and declared by numerous of the Nisei, or native born Japanese, was merely a shield to make no one suspicious of their activities and to permit them to be more effective when the time came to strike.

In order to give force and meaning to my views and recommendations, I feel that it is necessary to give something of a historical background to the Japanese situation in Southern

April 24, 1943

California because it is my earnest recommendation that every precaution be taken, and every Japanese (regardless of how loudly he proclaims his disfavor for the ruling military clique in Japan and how apparently earnestly he proclaims his loyalty to this country and with whatever apparent fervor he declares his American patriotism) should be watched and given no opportunity to serve the cause of the Mikado by conveying information, any act of sabotage, or otherwise.

I believe that many, probably the great majority, of the Japanese now located in this country would prefer an American to a Japanese victory. I believe that many of them would serve faithfully in the armed forces of the United States. I believe that the larger proportion, even if given an opportunity, would not turn a hand to aid the country of their forefathers. But I also believe, and, if I am correct, this is the crux, the important consideration to determine the handling of Japanese and precautions to be taken -- I believe that no one is able to separate the good from the bad, to determine in advance what any individual Japanese will do if he has the opportunity. His birth in this country cannot be the determining factor, in fact, I believe that many of the foreign born Japanese who left their country because they objected to rule by the military power to seek a new land are far less dangerous than many who were born in California, right here in Los Angeles. Neither do I believe that those in the relocation centers, or at any time, or at all, who have declared Japanese loyalty or loyalty to the United States of America, have voluntarily placed themselves in the proper category. I believe that those who are most dangerous have been instructed in the matter of pretense and that those who will be most useful and most valuable to the Japanese Government are those who best avoid suspicion and because suspicion is not directed at what they may do will be able to make contacts, get in places where they can secure the most information, and relay the information or otherwise assist the cause of our enemy. I feel that it is a part of the Japanese philosophy and training to attain perfection in deceit.

Now, let me review briefly some of the things that went on for years under our noses in Southern California. A Japanese fishing fleet supplied a considerable portion of fresh fish for our food supply and for the fish canneries. On Terminal Island in Los Angeles Harbor was located the largest fish canning industry in America. Close by was a Japanese village to which came Japanese from the many Japanese ships that entered the harbor. It has been reported on good authority that there were

April 24, 1943

frequent substitutions in Japanese crews, thus affording a means of illegal entry of many persons from Japan sent here on secret and diplomatic missions. The Japanese fishermen for many years plied the waters of the Pacific Coast, extending their regular trips along the shores of Lower California and other Mexican points. It is reported that they made frequent contacts with mysterious ships at sea. Many of these fishing craft were large ships, large enough to cruise many thousand miles, across the Pacific, if necessary, and equipped with powerful radio sending and receiving sets of the most modern design. This afforded an opportunity to chart every mile of our coast line and to take pictures of every point that could be readily recognized by sea, land or air, in fact, among the Japanese were many expert photographers who took pictures of everything.

Aside from the fishing industry, the principal occupation of Japanese in this area was produce raising. They had small farms or truck gardens in many localities, but principally along the coast where landings could be effected, where observations of the sea lanes could be made, and close to military objectives. Most of these farmers near the sea coast had tractors which could have been used to assist in effecting landings and drawing artillery. Practically all of the farmers and vegetable dealers had large trucks, which, taken together with the tractors, would have supplied a fairly respectable mobile unit for a landing army. In fact, several years ago, during the annual maneuvers of the California National Guard, one of the units simulating a landing party made their landing entirely with Japanese fishing boats and Japanese-owned equipment. The produce business afforded an opportunity for Japanese to go everywhere day and night. Most of the produce was hauled to market in the night time. About two-thirds of the vegetables and berry production in Los Angeles County was controlled by the Japanese. This control was from the grower to the consumer through the wholesaler and retailer. The operating technique of these Japanese was along the lines of a business trust or monopoly. The Japanese farmer or vegetable grower would sell only to Japanese wholesalers and the wholesalers sold almost exclusively to retailers of their own race. Japanese vegetable markets were everywhere, along the highways and as concessions in most of the business sections of this and other Southern California cities. The Japanese wholesalers would sell some of their inferior quality products to American and Chinese dealers. Every Jap grower, wholesaler and retailer belonged to one of the many trade associations which had been organized for each of the various phases of production and distribution of agricultural products. These trade associations, in turn, were joined together

April 24, 1943

to form the Central Japanese Association which was controlled and directed from the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles. Thus we had a complete and effective organization reaching every section in Southern California through which every one of the Japanese race could be contacted. A check indicated that there were 1538 Japanese farms in Los Angeles County; the majority of them, or 1391, raised vegetables and berries, about 90 raised flowers for the local market, and 57 produced miscellaneous products, such as alfalfa, grapes and citrus fruits. It is estimated that the Japanese controlled about 65% of the total acreage devoted to vegetables and berries in Los Angeles County and about 37% of such acreage in the State of California. The evacuation of the Japanese caused some temporary dislocation to the vegetable business in this area but there has been a more rapid readjustment than anticipated. Replacement of Japanese vegetable growers has been made by American farmers increasing their previous acreage and by placing Chinese, Koreans, Mexicans and a few others on the small farms vacated by the Japs. Were it not for the present labor shortage throughout the country, which is acute in this area because of the constant demand for more workmen in war industries located in Southern California, vegetable production probably would have returned to normal. We have plenty of experienced growers, the problem is to obtain enough farm labor to work in the fields. It is interesting to note that, so far as can be determined, few Japs did agricultural work for wages. The Japanese who operated the larger farms usually employed Filipinos or Mexican workers. The smaller Japanese farms or truck gardens were operated by individual families, the parents and children doing all of the work of planting, cultivating and taking the produce to market. There appears to be no accurate inventory as to the amount of farm machinery and equipment that was left behind by the Japanese when they were gathered up and sent to relocation centers. The American Legion is now conducting a survey in an effort to collect as much of the equipment as possible and plans are under way to make the same available for use by American farmers. Some is in storage but recently published reports to the effect that Japanese farm equipment was made unavailable are probably exaggerated. At the Los Angeles wholesale vegetable markets the Japanese were in control of at least two-thirds of the business. When the Japs left, American and Chinese took over. This was done with no apparent difficulty. It is estimated by the produce dealers association of Los Angeles that there are about 4000 retail vegetable outlets in this county, most of them being connected with large grocery markets. The Japanese controlled approximately 2500. The usual method here was for Japs to obtain a sub-lease

April 24, 1943

from a market and sell vegetables as a concession in the larger stores and retail markets.

In the City of Los Angeles the principal concentration of population was in a section of the city commonly referred to as "Little Tokio." Most of the property in this area is owned by American citizens not of Japanese parentage who leased buildings to Japanese to be used as stores, hotels and rooming houses. Some of the properties were purchased by American-born Japanese. Upon evacuation, most of the Japs defaulted in their leases or purchase contracts and the owners are faced with a somewhat serious problem of making use of the property. Practically all of the property still remains unoccupied because there seems to be a disinclination of others to move into the "Little Tokio" area.

From what has been stated, it will appear that it has been demonstrated that Japanese are not essential to our California agricultural or business economy, that they have been replaced in various fields, despite the wartime manpower shortage.

The Japanese were active in other fields in this locality, the selection of which assuredly must have been by design and in accordance with a carefully laid plan. The Japanese Consulate at Los Angeles apparently assumed direction of many things that had to do with what appeared to be normal activities of the Japanese population. Within the past few days the American press has made reference to a spokesman of the Japanese Government who in a radio address in Tokio justified the murder of American aviators who were captured after the bombing of Tokio and other Japanese cities. The name of this spokesman is Tomokazu Hori. It is quite apparent that he is a rather important personage in Japan. From 1934 to 1937, Tomakazu Hori served as Japanese Consul in Los Angeles. During that time there was much activity of an ominous character, the significance of which was not at that time appreciated. Under date of June 28, 1934, the Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Bureau of Water Works and Supply of the City of Los Angeles received a request from the Japanese Consulate for detailed information concerning the entire water system of the city, with maps and specifications relating to reservoirs, water supply and pipe line system. The city official to whom the request was addressed informed the Division of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, and asked for advice. The Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Investigation stated that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of that office and suggested that the

April 24, 1943

General Manager of the Water Bureau communicate with the Commanding Officer at Fort MacArthur, San Pedro. This was done and the Commander of the fort advised that he was forwarding the letter to the Commanding General, Ninth Corps Area, at the Presidio, San Francisco. Word came back that the request of the Japanese Consulate did not pertain to the peacetime functions of the regular army and the city official was directed to refer the matter to the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, so we were back where we started. Therefore, no Federal investigation was made of the matter whatever. However, the Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Bureau of Water Works and Supply felt it inadvisable to supply the information. Years passed by, and in December 1941, after Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war, I felt it advisable to make a check to find what employees of Japanese extraction of the city had and what they were doing and if they were in such position that they could secure information of military value. I discovered to my amazement that Japanese by schooling themselves and taking civil service examinations had filtered into the most important positions where they not only had all of the information relative to our water works system but also our electric power development and distribution system as well. <While I am unable to suggest that these city employees were in their positions by design or that there was evidence that any of them was disloyal to this country, nevertheless, Japanese employees in the City of Los Angeles were in a position not only to have secured valuable information but to have sabotaged our water and power and light systems.> Moreover, I found that a Japanese was in an important position in our Civil Service Department where he could be of great assistance in placing other Japanese in various civil service positions. Incidentally, the latter was a son of a former Japanese admiral, with whom he lived, and was actively identified with the Japanese tourist or travel bureau. Although employed in the City Hall, he lived at the harbor some fifteen or twenty miles away, and reports reached me, which I transmitted to Federal authorities, that he had over a period of years frequently met Japanese from various Japanese ships landing at the harbor and may have assisted in the illegal entry of many Japs in this manner. This particular Japanese was one of those who loudly declaimed American patriotism and, according to my information, has been released from a relocation center and is now located in the middle west.

Permit me to mention another case, that of a brilliant young Japanese woman, the wife of a doctor, who last fall was released from a relocation center and permitted to go on a speaking tour throughout the country for the International Y.W.C.A. This

April 24, 1943

woman was born in this country and is a graduate of a California university. After her graduation, she went to Japan where she remained five years, being connected with the Travel Department of the Anglo-Japanese Division of the Japanese Society of Cultural Relations. I have definite information that while in Japan she was in close association with Germans in business and diplomatic life. After her return here, she was actively identified with various Japanese organizations prior to Pearl Harbor.

I mention these two cases to show that those who make decisions in releasing Japanese from the relocation centers have released two highly intelligent and potentially dangerous Japanese in the belief that they are loyal to this country and would not under any circumstances do anything that would give aid or comfort to our enemy in time of war. I doubt if anyone is qualified to make this decision. There is no known test. It is impossible to look into an Oriental mind and determine the mental reservation at the time a Japanese proclaims his pro-American feeling. The number of actual enemy agents among them may be small but I am of the firm belief that there are many, including Japanese men and women born in this country, who would aid Japan if the opportunity presented itself. But even if the percentage was very small, I do not feel that we can afford to take the chance of attempting to make a determination and separate the loyal from the disloyal, the innocent from the dangerous, in time of war when so much depends upon the outcome of our conflict with Japan. I feel that it is a matter of discretion and a part of wisdom to treat them all as potentially dangerous.

Looking back on events of the past few years, I feel that a comparatively large percentage of local Japanese must have known what was coming before Pearl Harbor and were preparing for it. The night before the Pearl Harbor attack practically all Japanese places of business in Los Angeles were closed, although it had long been the practice for them to keep open on Saturday night. There had been unusual activities and meetings of associations and groups. During the calendar year 1941, American-born Japanese rather overdid it in proclaiming American loyalty, performing patriotic acts, and declaring their adherence and belief in the principles of American Democracy. Only a few months before the cowardly attack on our fleet in Hawaiian waters, a group of representative local Japanese residents gave a luncheon to which they invited me as mayor of the city, the United States District Attorney now deceased, the District Attorney of the County, the Sheriff, a judge of the local bench, and possibly a few other officials. They told us, in effect

April 24, 1943

"We want to be better American citizens, please advise us what we should do". (It is my firm belief that this was done for the purpose of misleading those in local official life.) The Japanese Consul was very solicitous, put himself out to be agreeable, and frequently called attention to the patriotic activities of the American-born Japanese. On an occasion that I fix as the early fall of 1941, I was called on by a Japanese visitor from Japan who represented himself as a traveling correspondent of one of the large Japanese newspapers. He evidenced great interest in the local Japanese population and the attitude of local government and the people of this community toward them. Finally he asked: "If such a thing should happen as war between the United States and Japan, what would be the attitude on the part of city government towards the Japanese residing here?" Then he proceeded to ask numerous questions in considerable detail. ✓

While the proof may be considered insufficient to establish the fact, I nevertheless feel that it was the intention and plan for the local Japanese population to have played a very important part during the war -- a part they were prevented from playing by the evacuation through the timely and efficient action of Lieut. General John L. DeWitt. In company with Tom Clark, now Assistant Attorney General, I held a conference with General DeWitt and urged that the Japanese be evacuated from the coastal area, more specifically, from the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Mr. Clark showed understanding and judgment in his handling of matters relating to enemy alien population in this area. He doubtless can be of considerable assistance to the committee.

My opinions and recommendations are as follows:

- (1) That no Japanese, either foreign or American born, be permitted to return to Los Angeles or the coastal area for the duration; ✓
- (2) That all Japanese be kept away not only from the combat zones but from war production areas, wherever same may be situated throughout the country; ✓
- (3) That Japanese born in this country, of military age, be inducted into the armed forces and used either as labor units or in whatever other manner those in military authority may deem advisable; ✓
- (4) That all other able-bodied Japanese be required to work for their sustenance and that such work be confined principally to the production of food; ✓

April 24, 1943

(a) That since many of these have had experience as agriculturists, they may well be placed on farming projects, under federal governmental management, supervision and control, where they could raise potatoes or other vegetables for the Army and Navy and fresh vegetables for not too far distant training camps; ✓

(b) That some be used to relieve the shortage of seasonal labor in farming areas, but that these only be employed in units of sufficient numbers that they may be under constant guard. While this will necessitate their use on larger farms only, it will permit the release of other farm laborers for the smaller farms; ✓

(c) That other Japanese who are able to work, not used for agricultural labor, be employed in appropriate war work, where hand labor is necessary; ✓

(5) That those who have declared their loyalty to Japan or who are known to be un-American be confined in concentration camps where they should be required to work and produce under guard and strict observation;

(6) That no attempt be made to segregate the rest of the Japanese through the selection of those determined to be innocent and loyally pro-American. No one is competent to make such decision and errors are likely to be very dangerous if the Japanese so selected should be given freedom to the extent that they may have an opportunity to perform some act detrimental to the war effort of this country; ✓

(7) That all Japanese, whatever their work, be carefully watched;

(8) That at the conclusion of the war all of those who are known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause be transported to Japan, that with respect to those who may be permitted to remain in this country every effort be made to prevent concentration of the population in the Pacific coastal area;

(9) That the relocation center at Manzanar be discontinued at an early date for the following reasons:

(a) It is located near the source of the domestic water supply of more than a million and a half people in Los Angeles;

(b) There is no opportunity to put the Japanese to useful and proper work in the area of Owens Valley, there being not sufficient available agricultural land, the season is too short, it is not a proper location to raise diversified vegetable products;

April 24, 1943

(c) Most of the land in this vicinity, which constitutes the watershed for the municipal aqueduct, is owned by the City of Los Angeles. We were given to understand that the relocation center would merely be a place of concentration and checking, that the Japanese would be held in this location for a brief time only and then sent to other places, and it was on the basis of this understanding that no more serious objection was raised either by the city or by the people of this community;

(10) That, whatever is done, too much popular sympathy must not be aroused for the Japanese. The murder of members of the Air Force of the United States Army, captured as prisoners of war and wearing the uniforms of combatants, is only another evidence that we are dealing with a race not far removed from the barbarian who will stop at nothing. The people of the nation must be aroused and must be unrelenting in a determination to wage an all-out war in which human sympathy can play no part. We will not stoop to compete with the Japanese in the kind of war they wage or do inhuman things, but we cannot afford to take a chance in assuming that all Japanese are not deceitful, even if this does violence to our peacetime conception of justice to ninety-nine out of one hundred of those of the Japanese race who were resident in this country at the time the cowardly unprovoked attack at Pearl Harbor plunged this country and the Japanese into a war of survival, which is much more significant and much more serious than many Americans seem yet to realize.

Very truly yours,

M A Y O R

FB.M

T 7.60

May 24, 1943

Honorable Tom Clark
Assistant United States Attorney General
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Clark:

I am very much disturbed over the matter of the release of Japanese from the relocation centers and their being scattered all over the country.

Enclosed is a clipping from the Los Angeles Times of May 20 from which it appears that Attorney General Biddle has requested the release of a Japanese to work as a houseman for a relative. This, following the recent publicity in connection with the action of Secretary Ickes in securing several Japanese for his farm near Washington, has caused a most unfavorable reaction in Southern California and I believe in the entire coastal area. < So far as I can determine public opinion, and I think I know it fairly well in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the release of the Japanese without a proper plan is going to seriously injure the Federal Administration in public estimation, and, on the coast, will so disturb the public mind that it will injure morale in connection with the war effort. >

Wherever I go people are talking about this subject. I get numerous letters and petitions from citizens. Many fear that Japanese will be permitted to come back into the coastal area, and let me assure you that if they do there will be trouble. But, even if the Japanese are kept out of the defense area for the duration, the people cannot yet understand why, after effecting the evacuation, the Government spent many millions of dollars building houses and feeding them for a year and now permits them to go into private employment, or, what is worse, as domestics in private homes.

The other evening I was talking with the wife of an Admiral of the United States Navy. She told me that throughout the Middle West and in various other sections of the country many of her acquaintances are getting Japanese servants. Of course, because of the employment problem there are many people who would welcome the opportunity to get Japanese as domestics, particularly because they can doubtless secure them at reasonable wages. The other day I was told of a local resident who paid \$300 a month and room for a woman cook in her home. Another friend told me of a couple who received \$250 a month, board and room, and who quit because they had received a better offer. I assume that a similar situation exists in various sections of the country and am wondering to what extent the selfish interest of persons who want help enters into the release of Japanese. ✓

I believe that the use of Japanese as domestics is fraught with the greatest danger. In this manner they will be able to pick up much information, not only from their employers but from persons entertained in the homes. Everyone knows that the average American talks too freely over cocktails. As a matter of fact, it is generally understood that much of the information secured by the Japanese government in the coastal area during the past quarter of a century was through the placing of domestics in the homes of important people. A houseboy of one of our prominent local families later was identified as a high ranking officer of the Japanese navy.]

For your information I am enclosing a copy of a communication addressed to Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, intended as a statement in lieu of testimony before the Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Also enclosed is a copy of a recent radio broadcast, which further sets forth my views.

This is a personal letter and you may be assured that I will not release it for publication. I am not endeavoring to embarrass anyone. I am deeply concerned about the situation and I know of no one to whom I would rather present my views than yourself because of your understanding of the facts and your part in effecting the evacuation of Japanese from the coastal area.

With kind personal regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

M A Y O R


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1254 NO. Cedar St,

Glendale, Cal., May 20/1943.

Hon. Mayor of Los Angeles,
Los Angeles, Calif.,

Dear Mr Bowran=



Some thirty years ago an old friend of mine Mr John Howard Todd came to Sacramento in charge of the A.P. on the Bryan special train when the Government of the United States asked the state of California to soft pedal the Japanese controversy at that time because they were such refined people and so emotional, and an infiltration of Jap blood would be a good thing to bolster us up anyway.

Mr Todd was an able writer, on the editorial staff of the N.Y. Herald for sixteen years and sent to the orient and South America by the A.P. at the request of the Government many times. He was very sincere but of course fooled by the Japs just as millions of others have been and are being fooled by their cunning trickery today.

I suggest that all the western states pass exclusion laws immediately against all Japs. This would bring it before the United States ^{Supreme} Court and if Representative Rankin says is true the court might probably would uphold it because Mr Rankin says their so called citizenship is based on a case 50 years ago when Chief Justice Fuller dissented and Mr Rankin says Fuller was right. So the Court might easily reverse that decision and that would leave all Japs right where they belong, as citizens of Japan. Only recently all Japs in Hawaai were registered and signed allegiance to the Emperor I am informed. The people of the eastern states who know nothing about the Japs should not be allowed to decide it for us. I just read in Rep. Moorhis new book that in 1929 one third of the people in the U.S. could produce all the necessities for all the people so if there was no

other reason at all it is obvious that we dont need any Japs here. While our young people were swarming out of the schools and universities and unable to find employment not a single Jap missed a meal during the depression.

Nobody wants them here in our midst except perhaps some large land owners who would lease them land or exploit their labor, some polititian who would appreciate their votes, or some lawyer who wants a retainer even if they cut all our throats in another generation.

There is only one way to get rid of the Japs and that is for the western states to all kick up enough stink to wake the people up to America's menace number ONE. Otherwise there will be no end to it and in the end as sure as fate they will own this country clear to the Mississippi river which would menn subjugate all of the United States.

Nobody offers any valid reason why a Jap should be here. If the people of the eastern states want them they should be made to take them all and they would soon get their belly full.

A fanatical barbarian pagan who would slit his own stomach at a moments notice at the bid of his emperor has no business in the United States of America.

Yours respectfully,


N.H. SMITH

P.S.

I enclose a copy of a letter I wrote to the Chamber of Commerce at Pomona, Calif.

N.H.S.

1254 No. Cedar St,

Glendale, Cal., May 18/1943.

Chamber of Commerce,

Pomona, California.

Gentlemen=

Copy

I see by the morning Times that you dont want any Japs back here. That implies they may be all right somewhere else. Why dont you make it clear that you dont want anything further to do with the Japs and want them deported and crystalize public opinion instead of befuddling the issue.

It is a sickening and revolting thought that the Japs were dragged out of barbarian pagan seclusion only nine decades ago because they caught tortured and murdered shipwrecked mariners. If there was anything to a Jap is was certainly all cancelled out when they sent their emmesaries to Washington to talk peace and their bombers to Pearl Harbor at the same time to murder our boys who were tumbled into a common grave.

These Yellow fellows are only a jump ahead of the Head hunters and and Cannibals on the scale of civilization.

They have captured the tools of production of the more enlightened nations and then turn them against us. Rep. Rankin thinks their citizenship may be cancelled by a new hearing in the United States Supreme court. Fifty years ago Chief Justice Fuller dissented in a case their so called citizenship is based on. The Court refused a few days ago to review a decision by a lower court in a Jap case, but if that suit had been based on the Fuller opinion, or on the ground that all Japs swear allegiance to Japan, what they call dual citizenship the court might take notice. I think we should send word to Japsn that if they do not observe the rules of war we would feed every Jap in this country to the hogs. They miltiply just like rats and just as in the past the barbarians have over run

the more enlightened races so they will finally subjugate us unless we wake up to the first law of survival and take notice that both Germany and Japan have proclaimed this a total war.

Every Jap should be in confinement and when the war ends deported and if Japan don't want them then send them to some island in the Pacific. Japan has 3000 islands and only 600 of them are populated. They have 2400 that are not populated.

How can anybody be a citizen of two countries.

A third of the population of the Hawaiian islands are Japs and they recently all signed a pledge of allegiance to Japan. We have in normal times a huge surplus of labor, so we don't need any Japs here. Their religion is pagan their political philosophy is inimical to ours and they are masters of chinannary guile and deceit. If there was a sprinkling of Longfellow's Lincoln's Edison's Washingtons or Milligans among them it wouldn't seem so funny to be splitting hairs to prove which Jap was loyal. You don't have to prove it anyway when you can find out by simply asking him. Even a simpleton knows you can depend on him if he says so. Facts are that a small powerful group want the Japs here while the great majority know they are America's menace number ONE. And this menace will increase at an accelerating pace until they will destroy us if we don't get rid of them and now is the time to do it. After the other war we had the 14 point plan, the rehabilitation plan, the Huwes Plan all of which didn't amount to a continental damn and we ought to stop making mistakes and get this thing straight. Get rid of every single Jap and everyone who has married a Jap, take all their tools of production and shove them back into Japan and keep them blockaded so there will be less and less instead of more and more of them.

Yours truly,

N.H.SMITH

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June 3, 1943

Mr. N. H. Smith
1254 North Cedar Street
Glendale, California

Dear Mr. Smith:

Your letter expressing approval of my views regarding the Japanese is very much appreciated. It is particularly gratifying to receive words of encouragement from citizens like yourself and to know that you have a thorough understanding of the problem involved.

Enclosed you will find a copy of my radio talk of May 26 in which I outlined my thoughts on this subject in considerable detail.

I thank you for the interest you have displayed and for your helpful comment.

Very truly yours,

M A Y O R

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ees.

"It's Different"



255 SOUTH BARRINGTON AVENUE, WEST LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TELEPHONES: ARIZONA 3-6528 -:- BRIGHTON 0-4604

May 29, 1943



Hon. F. Bowron
Mayor of City of Los Angeles
Office of the Mayor
Los Angeles, California

Dear Mayor Bowron:

As a resident for fifty-one years of this state may I be permitted to express to you my admiration for your far-sighted and statesman-like attitude with respect to the inexpediency of allowing the Japanese back in this area.

For my part, I think they should not be allowed back now or any other time. I have been in a good position to observe to what an extent they tend to lower the standard of living for a large part of many of our people who find it impossible to compete with them on a fair and even basis, all this entirely aside from the fact that their heritage and traditions make them dangerous residents in our community.

I appreciate as every sensible man does that there are good and loyal Japanese, but it is manifestly impossible to say who is good and who is bad.

Expressing to you my high regard and esteem, I beg to remain,

Respectfully yours,

Hugh Evans

HE*vb

T 1.60

June 3, 1943

Mr. Hugh Evans
255 South Barrington Avenue
West Los Angeles, California

Dear Mr. Evans:

Your letter expressing approval of my views regarding the Japanese is very much appreciated. It is particularly gratifying to receive words of encouragement from citizens like yourself and to know that you have a thorough understanding of the problem involved.

Enclosed you will find a copy of my radio talk of May 26 in which I outlined my thoughts on this subject in considerable detail.

I thank you for the interest you have displayed and for your helpful comment.

Very truly yours,

M A Y O R

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FROM WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

BUREAU _____

CHG. APPROPRIATION _____

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-1728

Washington, D. C.

STRAIGHT WIRE

JUN 12 1943

Congressman John M. Costello
c/o Dies Committee
1405 Federal Building
Los Angeles, California

I have today sent the following telegram to Mayor Fletcher
Bowron of Los Angeles: Quote

Press reports of your testimony at hearings of Costello Subcommittee
of Dies Committee quote you as saying Kiyoshi P. Okura whom you consider
dangerous had been released from a relocation center. For your information
Kiyoshi P. Okura has never been in a relocation center or under jurisdiction
of War Relocation Authority.

If there are others whom you regard as dangerous and who may
have been released from relocation centers this agency would like to
have their names and any evidence you can provide supporting your
feeling of their disloyalty in order that the national safety may be
protected. Unquote.

D.S. Myer

Dillon S. Myer
Director

JCBaker:LH
June 12, 1943

*June 2 - 43
Myer to W. J. J. -
HWA cancellation
due to Myer Dies
Comm. Report
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W. J. & J. J.

June

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Fletcher Bowron
Mayor

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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
City Hall

Los Angeles 12, California

August 10, 1944

Secretary to the President
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I will be in Washington during the afternoon of August 18 and would like to have an opportunity to discuss with one or more persons in an official position certain phases of the question of the return of the Japanese to California. I would like to make a factual presentation in support of my sincere belief that as a matter of military necessity the order made by Lt. General E. L. DeWitt at the time he was the Commanding Office of the Western Defense Command, should not be relaxed.

I feel that while the probability of enemy attack on the West Coast is now remote, the return of Japanese, even those born in this country, would seriously affect war production in this area and might well be quite dangerous in connection with the transportation of troops and material through the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, as well as other west coast ports. This is particularly true in this metropolitan area because of the very serious situation we have with reference to the Negro problem. By reason of the immigration of sixty or seventy thousand Negroes, mostly from Southern states, the local housing shortage and other circumstances, the situation is so acute that we may at any time have racial disturbances resulting in serious riots. The return of Japanese I ~~XXXX~~ feel would seriously affect public morale and result in dangerous consequences.

Attorney General Biddle will be in Los Angeles the day following my departure, however, I see no particular advantage in discussing the matter with him, as I have no legal argument to present with respect to the status of native born Japanese. I desire to address myself to the practical aspects of the question and therefore, I am anxious to arrange an appointment with those who may have something to do with the fixing of the national policy with reference to the possible relaxing of the Exclusion Order based on military necessity. I feel quite definitely that General DeWitt was right and that his order should be supported, although the reasons therefore may be different than those that occasioned the issuance of the order.

My position is not based upon prejudice but upon a knowledge of conditions in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and my conclusions have been formed as a result of numerous conference with City and State officials of Washington, Oregon and California and after consultations with industrialists, local Federal officials and Army and Navy officers. I feel that the information that may influence those in Washington has come from persons who are not fully familiar with the facts.

I will arrive at the Washington National Airport at 12:53 p.m., Friday, August 18, and expect to leave by train for Philadelphia some time the same evening; therefore, I would appreciate very much if an appointment could be made for me. I expect to have with me Mr. W. C. Mullendore, the President of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, who will be able to present the matter from the point of view of local business.

If I do not receive word from you ~~xxx~~ prior to my departure on the afternoon of August 17, I will contact the Executive Offices immediately following my arrival in Washington.

Very truly yours,

(sgd.) Fletcher Bowron

MAYOR

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Air Mail

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August 12, 1944

Dear Mayor Bowron:

This is in acknowledgment of your letter of August tenth, in which you request an opportunity to discuss with one or more persons in an official position certain phases of the question of the return of the Japanese to California.

I am glad to assure you that Mr. Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of the Interior, and Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of War Relocation Authority in the Department of the Interior, will confer with you and Mr. W. C. Mullendore, the President of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, in Mr. Fortas' office on the sixth floor of the New Interior Building at 2:30 p.m., on Friday, August eighteenth. ✓

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. HASSETT
Secretary to the President

Honorable Fletcher Bowron,
Mayor of Los Angeles,
City Hall,
Los Angeles 12, California.

AIR MAIL

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August 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM to the Under Secretary

Mrs. Wright has informed me regarding Mayor Bowron's visit on Friday next, along with the president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. I am sorry I am not going to be here, but I will see that Mr. Pitts is thoroughly informed on the background. It is my judgment that the Mayor should be allowed to present his case and that we simply smile and tell him as pleasantly as possible that the return to the coast is purely a military decision and that we have always complied with military regulations and will continue to do so as long as that policy is in effect. Any other position on our part, I think, at this time, would touch off another ~~XXXXXXXX~~ campaign against return.

I am taking this trip on Gen. Bonesteel's invitation and I think it will be an excellent opportunity to present to Gen. Bonesteel many problems that have not ~~EM~~ occurred to him or to members of his staff that need consideration. Furthermore, Gen. Bonesteel seems to be in a cooperative mood and feels that the job should be a joint one when the Exclusion Order is lifted.

D. S. Myer
Director

cc, Mr. Pitts

CONFIDENTIAL

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AUG 22 1944

MEMORANDUM to the Under Secretary

From: Mr. M. E. Pitts

In accordance with the request of Mr. Fletcher Bowron, Mayor of Los Angeles, California, ~~in his letter of August 10, 1944, to the White House, a meeting was held at 4 p.m., August 18, 1944, in the office of the Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior.~~ Those present at the meeting were: Mr. Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of Interior, Mr. Oscar L. Chapman, Assistant Secretary of Interior, Mr. Fletcher Bowron, Mayor of Los Angeles, California, Mr. W. C. Mullendore, President of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Malcolm E. Pitts, Assistant Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mayor Bowron stated that the reason he had requested such a meeting was to present to responsible officials in Washington a few facts and problems on the West Coast at the present time which he, and other civic leaders, believe are so important as to require the continued prohibition of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast area until the war is completely over. These situations should be clearly understood, and carefully studied and considered, before permitting any persons of Japanese ancestry to return to their former homes or locations in the now restricted area. It was understood, he stated, that serious consideration was being given to revoking the present military restriction which required the evacuation in 1942.

Although there was not now much probability of an attack by Japan on the West Coast, Mayor Bowron stated he did not trust persons of Japanese ancestry, and it was perfectly possible, in his opinion, for acts of sabotage to be committed in the highly industrialized Pacific Coast states where vital war material is being produced at an accelerated rate. Such acts might be in the nature of reprisals for the evacuation. Even the possibility of sabotage, however, was not the important factor in his recommendation, and that of other West Coast leaders, that no return to the Pacific states be made at present by the evacuees.

The most important considerations relating to Mayor Bowron's recommendation that the restriction of residence by evacuees on the Pacific Coast remain in effect were the following:

1. Lack of housing facilities. It was pointed out that all of the housing facilities formerly occupied by persons of Japanese ancestry are now filled with war workers, many of them Negroes. The population of Los Angeles proper has grown over 350,000 in the past three years, and all housing facilities now available are filled to capacity. Some additional temporary housing construction is now under way, but this will not provide enough facilities to really give adequate housing to the persons already there.

2. Possible racial conflicts. Between 60,000 and 70,000 Negroes have been imported into greater Los Angeles from the South. The public attitude at best, at the present time, is almost at tinder point, and riots similar to the one in Detroit are expected if the evacuees return to the Coast. Since there are a large number of Filipinos in Los Angeles, and on the Coast, particularly in the farming areas, who had close relatives on Bataan, it is expected that there would be acts of homicide, arson, and possibly gang activities, resulting in civil strife, loss of life, property, and agricultural crops.
3. Inadequate police protection. Because of the draft, war work, and other causes for manpower shortage, the Los Angeles Police Department is 500 ~~xxx~~ men short of what it should have to handle its population. It was pointed out that protection could not be guaranteed to persons of Japanese ancestry if they returned to the Coast and any disturbance should occur.
4. Evacuee owned property really not available. There are between 8,000 and 10,000 residences or rooming houses owned by American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Los Angeles that are now occupied by other persons, most of whom are engaged in war work. If an evacuee owner should insist upon legally correct eviction orders being issued against the present residents, serious problems, which will result in large scale demonstrations and possible riots, are envisaged. Some evacuees, such as those who lived on Terminal Island, have no home or property to return to, as the government is condemning and buying all of Terminal Island.
5. Public opinion not conditioned for return of evacuees. The West Coast public has not been developed through public relations media to accept a return of persons of Japanese ancestry to that area. This should be done, if a return is to be made, and the return very gradual. Soldiers and soldiers families should be first, with considerable publicity as to their war records and injuries. The return should not be a quiet one of just appearing without any notice. The attitude of the present residents on the Pacific Coast, it was pointed out, is still deep seated in resentment against any person of Japanese ancestry and public can think of nothing good, honest, or honorable about them. It is believed that the evacuees were well organized to assist an invasion by Japan if it has come, and that assistance would have been given. It is still the public opinion that General DeWitt did the right thing; and now that the persons of Japanese ancestry are gone, they are not wanted back.

Mayor Bowron stated that he realized that the evacuees, particularly those that were born in America, could not be excluded perpetually from the area, and would have to return some time, but he again advised that it was his best judgment that the evacuees be excluded from the coastal area until after the war was completely over.

Mayor Bowron stated he had recently attended a regional meeting of mayors, with representatives from all the coast cities and as far east as a resolution was passed, he had personally talked to nearly all present at the meeting and all felt that the evacuees should not leave the centers or return to the coast now.

Mr. Mullendore was asked by Mayor Bowron to add anything further that he might care to. Mr. Mullendore stated that he wished to ~~reaffirm~~ reaffirm all that Mayor Bowron had said, and would only add that, speaking for industry and the interests of business, that any conflicts or strife that might take place would disrupt vital war production.

Under Secretary Fortas thanked both gentlemen for their sincere, frank and honest presentation of the problem and the viewpoint which they represented. He pointed out, however, that the Department of the Interior and the War Relocation Authority were, in reality, only collaborators in the situation, and not in a position to make a decision as to whether the military exclusion order should or should not be lifted, and the evacuees permitted to return. The following were the principal observations made by Mr. Fortas on matters pertaining to the situation.

1. Change of restriction order a War Department responsibility. Since the restriction of residence and the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry in the West Coast area was promulgated under the wartime authority of the War Department, thru the Army, as a measure stated to be of military necessity, the decision to rescind the order must be made by the War Department on the same basis that the military necessity for defense and security no longer exists. If ~~xxxxxxx~~ a military decision is made to raise the restriction order, an orderly process of return of the evacuees could be expected with many of the various agencies of the government cooperating to make it as smooth and effective as possible.
2. Possibility of litigation deciding the problem. It was pointed out that there were in the courts at the present time several cases which had a direct bearing upon the entire problem -- beginning with the evacuation and thru all its various ramifications to the right of return to the Coast. Some of the cases involve soldiers of Japanese ancestry, or their families or widows, who have served in this war. (Mayor Bowron stated that he had already talked to Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice about some of the cases and was familiar with them.) The point was made

that if the problem were solved by litigation thru decisions of the Supreme Court, that the various agencies of the government, and the government itself, would be in much poorer position to assist with this problem, than if it were handled before a court decision was made.

3. International implications. The Japanese government did not intern all of the American nationals in Japan and other countries conquered in Asia until after the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry, American citizens and alien alike, from the Pacific Coast of the United States. Every activity at a relocation center is carefully reported to the Japanese government by their neutral representatives, the Spanish government. Representatives of the Spanish government visit regularly the relocation centers of the War Relocation Authority and the internment camps of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau of the Department Of Justice. Public attitudes and opinions are carefully reported thru this channel, and possible others, to the Japanese government. Without doubt, some actions on the part of the United States toward persons of Japanese ancestry here have resulted in reprisals by the Japanese government against American nationals and military prisoners held in Japan or Japanese conquered countries. Anything that can be done to avoid any such reprisals should be done, as those persons held in custody by the Japanese government should be protected as much as possible.

4. Public opinion definitely not one sided. The Department of the Interior and the War Relocation Authority find that public opinion definitely is not one sided or consistent. On the one hand, a portion of the public raises cries that the evacuees are being coddled given sumptuous quarters, overly fed with scarce or rationed foods, and are pampered in regards to work. On the other hand, another portion of the public, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, shouts loud at discrimination, violation of civil rights and liberties, endeavors to instigate litigation, and probe each case to find malfeasance and violation of constitutional rights. It is definitely a difficult and undesirable position for any branch of the government to be placed. A situation of this kind is tenable only for a temporary period under war time situations.

5. Relocation centers are temporary havens, not reservations. In effect, the Department of the Interior and the War Relocation Authority are but "big hotel keepers," providing a place of temporary residence, refuge, and protection for these displaced people until they can return to their homes. When these people can return to their homes, there is no reason for maintaining relocation centers -- and they should not be kept open. There is no legal right to detain the evacuees in centers after it has been determined that the military necessity, which required their evacuation, no longer exists. The War Relocation Authority has merely carried on with a problem which the War Department was not in a position to cope with because of more active pressing war situations.
6. Loyalty of evacuees pretty well established. A brief review of the screening processes of the War Relocation Authority the Army, the activities of the Joint Board, etc., was given, pointing out the extensive use that had been made of all intelligence and security information available from F.B.I., O.N.I., M.I.S., ~~XXXXXX~~ W.D.C., local police records, and WRA center experiences and registration. The process of registration, segregation, and the status of the Tule Lake Center was briefly explained. It was believed that all, or practically all, information available about the evacuees had been marshalled, checked, and scrutinized.
7. Security at one point in the United States should mean security at any point. The relocation and resettlement program was briefly reviewed, and how all persons relocating obtained leave clearance. Yet, it was pointed out, there are many times the point is raised by communities that if it is not safe for evacuees to be at Sacramento, why is it safe for them to be at Omaha? Or the reverse, if they are all right to be at Omaha, why isn't it all right for them to be at Sacramento?
8. Relocation progress. Because of the fact that about 30,000 evacuees had left the centers to work at various points throughout the United States and they had performed well, many in vital war plants and industries, and there had been no serious troubles of community acceptance or problems of security or sabotage, it was pretty well established that the evacuees were no different than any of the other people in the United States. The point was granted that a concentration of a racial group is undesirable and unhealthy and that a diffusion of the former concentrations was desirable. The efforts of relocation were, it was certain, to bear considerable fruit in dispersion of the evacuees throughout the entire country. It was not believed that anywhere near all the evacuees would return to the West Coast seeking permanent residence. Chicago, with a present population of persons of Japanese ancestry of about 4,500 was cited as an example of relocation activity

9. Military record of the evacuees. The activities of over 10,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army in all theatres of action was mentioned, and also some reference made to the valuable service that many evacuees had contributed to intelligence work thru linguistic ability. Particular mention was made of the activities of the 100th and 442nd Battalions in Italy and some activities in Burma.

As the meeting drew to a close, Mr. Fortas again pointed out that the responsibility for the revocation of the present military restriction to evacuees on the West Coast was solely that of the War Department, evaluated in similar terms to the time when it was invoked.

Mayor Bowron and Mr. Mullendore thanked Mr. Fortas, Mr. Chapman and Mr. Pitts for the meeting and the exchange of information and points of view.

The meeting lasted for fifty minutes.

Ma colm E. Pitts
Acting Director

CC. Mr. Myer
Mr. Tozier

M. E. Pitts:lkx
August 22, 1944

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

CITY HALL

Los Angeles 12, California

January 26, 1945

Mr. William H. McReynolds
Administrative Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McReynolds:


Referring to our discussion while I was in Washington last November relative to the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coastal area, I fully intended, upon my return, to prepare and forward to you a statement containing certain facts I feel have been largely overlooked and outlining my views relative to the problem as it affects the City of Los Angeles and southern California. Due to the pressure of other matters, this was delayed and, after announcement of the action of the Army, followed by the Supreme Court decision, it appeared that such statement would serve no useful purpose.

I desire, however, to make certain suggestions which I hope you will be able to place before such person or persons in official position who will determine the policy with reference to the future program of the Federal Government as to the care and treatment of such of the Japanese as are now at liberty to return to California, Washington and Oregon. Let me make it clear that anything I may have said in the past was not based upon a lack of appreciation of the constitutional rights of these people or because of racial prejudice, but solely by reason of a sincere desire to see that nothing was done that would in any manner interfere with the prosecution of the war.

You will recall that I expressed great concern about the matter of housing for the Japanese, and indicated a fear that their return in large numbers might result in serious consequences for the following reasons: (a) that many war workers now living in houses owned by Japanese would be evicted, with no place to go, and that the Japanese who replaced them in their living quarters would not be accepted as employees in local war plants; and, (b) that the section of the city (known locally as Little Tokyo) where most of the Japanese formerly lived, now embraces almost exclusively a colored population for whom other housing in this immediate area simply cannot be provided. Knowing the temper of the people, I feared an adverse effect upon morale in this important war production area, disturbances, and possibly race riots.

While in Washington, I had a conference with Under Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas and Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, and since that time I have had several conferences with Dillon Meyer and

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various other connected with the War Relocation Authority. I feel that these gentlemen have made an honest mistake in misjudging public opinion, and that they are in error when they believe that the majority of the people favor the return of the Japanese. This was only natural because of the people with whom they came in contact. Those entertaining a deep-seated prejudice and resentment are not demonstrative and vocal. But on every hand, citizens with whom I come in contact tell me privately how they feel. I have received a report, as yet unverified, that a secret anti-Japanese organization has been formed for the purpose of discouraging future concentration of Japanese population in California and other Pacific Coast States by resorting to illegal methods such as employed by the vigilantes of a half-century or more ago.

Fortunately, very few Japanese have as yet returned to this area and so long as the greater number of them now at liberty will remain elsewhere, this will be the happiest and most desirable solution of the problem. So far as appears upon the surface, the people of Los Angeles have accepted the decision to permit the Japanese to return gracefully. We are doing our very best to adjust local conditions to receive them, and, in this we have had excellent cooperation from the press. I believe the public mind will not be unduly disturbed so long as the Japanese continue to trickle in. If we do not have too many to deal with, through the city police department and otherwise as far as we can do so, we will fully protect them in their persons and property and as to all citizenship rights of those born in this country. There is, however, great danger if they come in large numbers because, first, of housing shortage and, second, because many people are determined that there must not again be such a large concentration of Japanese population in this area.

It must be remembered that Los Angeles was the center of population for about one-third of all Japanese, both native and foreign born, residing in America before the war. There were 37,000 in Los Angeles County alone and 43,000 in Southern California, out of a total of approximately 126,000. Since the evacuation of Japanese from the coastal area our economy and other conditions have been adjusted to their absence and during that intervening time approximately 500,000 people, including war workers and their families, have taken up residence in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Under existing conditions, it will be very difficult indeed to absorb any considerable proportion of the original Japanese population, and their return would produce problems for this area and community beyond the power and ability of local government to handle, and for which we feel the Federal Government has direct responsibility.

Very frankly, I feel that it would have been far better if the Japanese had not been removed in 1942, and the present situation cannot be met by resolutions of organizations and the declarations of minority groups that all Japanese should be welcomed back as American citizens. It is far more practical than that. After mature consideration, I feel that the only answer is to keep open certain of the relocation centers, particularly those at Gila, Poston and Manzanar, and to permit Japanese to remain there purely on a voluntary basis. The present announced policy of closing these camps will force many Japanese to return to Los Angeles and other congested industrial areas of the Pacific Coast against their wish and preference. I am confident of this from investigations I have made. I have personally talked with some of the Japanese who have

come back to Los Angeles and from various sources have ascertained the attitude of those still remaining in the centers who are at liberty to go where they will.

According to the best information obtainable there are approximately 60,000 Japanese remaining in all war relocation centers who are eligible to leave. Most of those who formerly resided in Southern California are located in centers above named, which have capacity for housing Japanese as follows: Posen, 15,000, Gila, 10,000 and Manzanar, 6,000. I am informed that 90 per cent of the Japanese people remaining in these relocation centers would prefer to stay there until after the war. About 10 per cent seem determined to return to California. We can take care of that number. Therefore the problem is comparatively simple by merely caring for the Japanese who would voluntarily remain away if given an opportunity to do so. If, in accordance with announced plans, all centers must be closed by the end of the calendar year 1945, many of the Japanese will return here because this section is familiar to them and they know of no other place to go. The result of numerous inquiries leads me to believe that if the relocation centers are closed by the end of the calendar year, we will have back in Los Angeles and in this congested area more than 50 per cent of the large Japanese population. It is quite obvious that if they could have been induced to go elsewhere this would have been already accomplished. Over a period of two years the War Relocation Authority has been able to relocate only about 35,000 Japanese.

In the light of this experience, it appears to be an impossibility to move the remaining 60,000 in 11 months under any plan or purpose to break up concentrations and secure a wider distribution of population. If 60,000 Japanese are to be set adrift during 1945 I can see little else than turmoil. What I fear is that we may have some unpleasant occurrences which will be so magnified by the time the news reaches Japan that our interned American citizens and war prisoners in Japanese custody will receive brutal treatment or be killed on the theory of retaliation.

The following information is presented in the belief that it is factual:

Under present directives, all schools in the centers will be closed by the end of June. This will mean that approximately six months may elapse during which Japanese children will have no schooling and no adequate supervision. The result will be serious delinquency problems, both before and after these children return to California public schools.

From 20 to 25 per cent, or from 12,000 to 15,000 of the Japanese remaining in the centers are classified as social security or dependency cases. Some are old, some are ill; some are so classified because they do not speak English, or otherwise could not adjust themselves without considerable assistance. Few, if any, of these will be able to earn a living. In the event of their release from the relocation centers, these people would receive payment in amounts of from \$20.00 to \$50.00 per month, which would be far short of a sufficient amount to support them. This would mean that they would be dependents and a community burden. While I have no way of verifying the statement, I have been informed that these Japanese may be supported at the relocation centers at an average per capita cost of \$36.00 per month.

All of the centers are provided with well-equipped hospitals, and hospital facilities in Los Angeles are not only overcrowded, but wholly inade-

quate to take care of the local civilian population. I am informed that at the present time approximately 1 per cent of all Japanese in the relocation centers are hospital patients. Hillcrest Sanitarium in Los Angeles County now has 400 Japanese tubercular cases, and there are 30 more at Manzanar awaiting transportation. There are approximately 200 tubercular cases in all of the centers.

At Manzanar there are about 50 Japanese orphans under 12 years of age. There is no place for these children in local orphanages.

From the foregoing facts I suggest, and strongly recommend, that the three war relocation centers remain open for an indefinite period because of the continued existence of an emergency resulting from the impact of war and occasioned, in part at least, by the action of the Federal Government in removing the Japanese people from their homes in California and elsewhere.

In further support of this recommendation I call attention to the serious housing situation in the Los Angeles area. Not only are homes owned by American-born Japanese now occupied by others, but the housing problem in Los Angeles at the present time is, I believe, the most difficult of any large city in America. There are no vacant houses, apartments or hotel rooms. Within the past few days I have held conferences with Army and Navy officers, and local and regional representatives of OPA, War Manpower, War Production, National Housing Authority and others in official position. The situation is indeed critical. There are no places for the families of Army and Navy personnel, including enlisted men as well as officers, to live. War production cannot be increased because of labor shortage. The estimate at the present time of such shortage is about 25,000 of which 8900 represent the number of employees needed in those industries having the highest priority rating. Even if it were possible to secure employees from other sections of the county, the local manpower shortage could not be relieved for the very obvious reason of lack of living quarters. Returned servicemen, veterans discharged from the Army and Navy, cannot find living accommodations. It therefore must be apparent that if Japanese are to return to Los Angeles they will directly or indirectly displace Army and Navy personnel stationed here, returned veterans, and war workers and their families.

I also wish to call your attention to other facts which have relation to affording protection to returning Japanese and are of most serious consequence with respect to the protection of life and property and security in this area. I refer to the greatly reduced personnel in our police and fire departments. The total authorized strength of the Los Angeles Police Department is 2594. This was inadequate even before the war, largely because of the vast area of the City of Los Angeles and changing population. Since the war, our population has increased within the city limits by approximately 250,000, and the increase in the metropolitan area, of which Los Angeles is the center, has been in excess of 500,000. All of this is in addition to the military personnel. And it must be remembered that Los Angeles is the playground for hundreds of thousands of people who do not regularly live here, mostly war workers from outside areas, and soldiers and sailors on leave. This situation has attracted here many undesirable characters, hoodlums, gamblers, prostitutes, camp followers, and an objectionable criminal element. Despite the greatly increased population and multiplicity of problems, it is impossible to maintain our police force at even pre-war strength. Five hundred and nine police officers are in the armed forces. Others have gone into

war work, and there has been the usual number of retirements. Although we have greatly reduced mental and physical standards, it is impossible to fill vacancies, which now number exactlt 500, the total present strength being 2094.

Now, we learn from the State Director of Selective Service that within the next three months we will lose all policemen who are under 29 years of age. This will mean 374 polie officers, including 170 regular officers and 204 emergency police officers appointed for the duration. What we are going to do to protect the people of Los Angeles I do not know. With a population of approximately 1,750,000, and with the many problems resulting from the total area population of 3,500,000, a police fore of 1720 is wholly inadequate, and we fully expect a crime wave to result. On top of this, we ae asked to afford protection for returning Japanese who will move into an overcrowded city and, largely of necessity, will push out of their living quarters whites and blacks, amny of whom are war workes.

The problem is not much simpler in connection with protection against fire. It must be understood that many of the war plants in this area rely heavily upon the Los Angeles Fire Department to afford protection against fire. The normal authorized strength of the fire department is 1812 which, as in the case of the police, was inadequate efoe the war. There ae 285 on military leave. The number of vacancies at the present time is 431, and, by taking all firemen 29 years of age or under, we will lose an additional 122. And, just as in the police department, there is no possibility of filling these vacancies.

There is yet another point I would like to make, although it is not in any way connected with the administration of local government. It refers to the question of security. If the number of Japanese in this area should be reduced to approximately 10 per cent of the former population, their movements and activities could be much more easily observed, and in such manner, this vital war production area could be more adequately protected against possible sabotage and espionage. I do not have great fear of sabotage, but for reasons that I made known to you during our conversation, I believe that at least some of those who return may collect and transmit valuable war information.

I am submitting this letter to you with request that you will see that the information and suggestions herein contained will receive consideration by one who will not only appreciate the seriousness of the situation, but who is in a position to, and will, do something about it.

Yours very truly,

Fletcher Bowron

Mayor

Mayor Bowman in (1) Keeping Jobs in
Camp and (2) Taking away citizenship
May - June - July, 1943

Substantial agreement

Substantial Disagreement

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1 letter, 48 signatures