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February 8, 1943

TO: The Editors of the Heart Mountain Sentinel

SUBJECT: Recent Draft Status of the Nisei Internees

THEME: That not all of us feel as the JACL does, in considering that joining the army without clarifying our status constitutes the best method of appeasing public opinion.

Certainly, we who have been interned in the various assembly and relocation centers could not have been unaware of the worldwide implications of the present war between the dictator and democratic nations. But we have also been aware of the minimum part being played by the Nisei as a group. It is general knowledge that our volunteers in the past have been rejected, and outside of a very few individuals, the very soldiers in uniform have been relegated to positions menial labor, their fighting spirit curbed, their natural abilities overlooked.

Therefore, is it strange that there is a lassitude in our thinking, when it comes to actual participation in a war in which we can see no ultimate gain, either for ourselves or for our aged parents? The government has shown that it intends to follow the whims and caprices of public opinion rather than the cold light of statistics and proof. It has rejected us spiritually, economically and politically by surrounding us with barbed wire and armed sentries. It has passed us by in the needs of the country both in national defense and on the home front. It has allowed the growing suspicion that we are undesirable and dangerous to foster and spread until actual hostility is shown us wherever we have dared to relocate.

~~By~~ Now with the nation growing acutely aware of manpower shortages, and the need for capable young men desperate, the government has finally turned to us and asked us to volunteer our services. Volunteer, that is, not as an integrated part of the United States Army, but rather a separate corps.

What the actual intentions of the government are, are very obscure. Whether it intends to release us permanently from the stigma of being "Japs" before or after our registration is completed, is not mentioned. Whether or not it intends to clear our name to the country at large, is not admitted. What our actual status is, in terms of constitutionality, remains shrouded and vague. How our parents are to be treated in our absence (provided we enlist) is also a mystery.

These and other questions are not mere excuses offered by us to forestall further criticism of our actions, nor are they to be interpreted as a refusal to join the Army. But they are vital queries on which the future actions of our youth will depend, when they face actual combat. For how much emphasis does the government place upon the moral of white Americans under ~~the~~ arms? Quite a great deal,

without doubt. Yet the American soldiers have no such problems confronting them are are facing these of Japanese extraction. Are the white parents being kept behind barbed wire fences, living in crowded quarters, facing a difficult and ominous future without their means of support guaranteed? Hardly. Then how well could any soldier fight with these truths steadily becoming reality day by day?

Is there, then, any wonder that there is a undercurrent of suspicion among us that we are being cictimized again, sent to areas against our will, on the flimsy protest that we are doing our "duty". The whole Evacuation program was based on the principle that it was our solemn obligation not to interfere with the war program, and that we should quietly leave our homes, our friends, our jobs, and become wards of the government. That much we did, and admirable, for dissenters were in extreme minority.

Actually, however, the means by which the program was and is, being carried out, and especially in the light of certain recent events we are becoming more and more aware that our evacuation was not merely a matter of military necessity alone. Bills being submitted to the California legislature smack of economic dealings as well. For, granted that certain politicians in that state found it to their advantage to use us as a lever to raise themselves into prominence, why then is there the urgent necessity to keep us out permanently? Why the undiminished clamor to couple our citizenship with the land problem? Only a blind person could fail to see that there have been, and there are now, certain interested parties to whom the evacuation of Japanese from the West Coast was more than a fear of possible sabotage.

And is there any reason to believe other than that these same parties have been largely instrumental in keeping the loyalty and true feelings of we Nisei in the dar, smudged by the powerful newspapers who blared (totally without proof) the evil-doings of the Japanese? Why should there be, when even the foremost governmental agencies have been suspicious of our intentions--when the FBI itself had been delude to believe that every fishing boat carried radios and weapons with which to spy on, and possibly cripple the Pacific fleet!"

And our pitifully few voices that were raised in the wilderness of public disapproval were woefully inadequate to prove our loyalty. Even our splendid public record was not enough to sway public opinion, for us in our battle for equality. There is no need here to pursue the endless statistics which prove beyond doubt our high moral, social, scholastic records. They are buried and forgotten by American as surely as our personal property, back deep in the archives of public opinion. Not because they have proved our disloyalty, but because they did not.

Even the investigating Congressional committees from Washington could find no fault with our behavior. Still, we are here, victims of whatever choice was forced upon us. ~~N~~ And our future certainly is no brighter for our having evacuated. Nor is there any reason for hoping it will be bettered when we have joined the colors. The present plan to form a Japanese-American unit has proved that we are still regarded as unequal as still un-assimilable by the government.

Whatever angle we attack with reference to our future, we find the cards stacked against us. No amount of wishful thinking by idealists will better our lot now or after. Rather, what is needed now is hardheaded realism, and facing of facts.

One of the facts stands clear: There is left to we Nisei one opportunity to better our fate after the a war; one means by which we can assure for ourselves and our people the treatment we so richly deserve after our mis-hankling by the people of America; one remaining lever to pry off the veil of hypocrisy and greed, from the plain ~~truth~~ truth of our loyalty. That one last hope is the present volunteer plan submitted by the Army, which is now in the process of digestion.

The means we have at hand, the plan is simple. We should, we must demand now our true status in American life. We still have time to discover whether we are being used as we have been used in the past, or if this time, the government is really extending to us the opportunity we need to prove one and for all our unswerving loyalty to America. By our status, however, we should make clear that we mean the rights and privileges of full citizenship, and not merely the handouts of a tolerant society. We must demand that our name be cleared, and have it read to the world that there had never been a justification for our evacuation, and that ~~we~~ we are fighting, not to redeem ourselves, or to clear our names, but for what we have always believed in.

Then, should we be put off with a pretext that the time is not ripe for such actions, we will know at least just where we stand. This much in itself will clear the air.

But there is reason to hope that the government will accede to our demands. Why should they keep back the truth--that we have proven our citizenship requirements far and above that demanded of ordinary citizen? We have given everything the American people have asked, and more. The government of this country has adopted a course which the world now looks forward to, a course which will rid the world of fear and persecution. Such a ~~policy~~ policy by such a government cannot be lightly followed at home, for the eyes of the world are focused here.

Surely, it is not un-American in demanding such clear, forceful measures now. The world is waiting for such a statement, on a much broader and more comprehensive basis. And could not this policy be an ~~an~~ assuring factor abroad as well as at home? For what could be a greater blow to the Axis preaching of race-hatred than the news that the sons of the sons of Nippon are actually treated as equals in America? And what could be a greater blow than throwing 30,000 of us at their weakening lines?

Isn't it worth a little effort now to clear up our status? Isn't it worth a great deal of effort to become American citizens in fact as well as in name? Isn't it worth the yellow publicity we will surely invite, if we can stand and face an un-enlightened public with the majority of clear-thinking, unprejudiced people behind us? For here are many such men and women today.

Then, now is the time to speak out, to act. For once we have been "volunteered" into the army, our rights to free speech will have been submerged for the duration--and perhaps longer. And those who hopefully cling to the dream of a more kindly-minded Congress and public opinion after the war, need only to ask themselves--"How easily does human nature change? How easily will those politicians and opportunists who have used us as tools to power, change their minds? And how easily can we re-educate the public in our favor, when it tool from the Gentlemen's Agreement to Pearl Harbor to brand us slowly but surely as un-American, ~~however untruthfully~~ however untruthfully?"

Respectfully submitted,

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
WASHINGTON

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March 9
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Report on Registration at Heart Mountain

by Phil Barber

Causes for Resistance to Registration.

I. Arising from evacuee attitudes.

A. Resentment against racial discrimination.

1. Bitterness against evacuation because of racial basis.
2. Resentments against congressional and newspaper attacks since evacuation.
3. Resentment against attitude of Cody people, "The God-damned Japs".
4. Resentment that Washington W.R.A. deals exclusively with project staff - no contact with evacuees.

B. Skepticism as to both efficiency and good faith of the Government.

1. "My God - another questionnaire! What do they do with 'em?"
2. "It's a trick, Sign that application for leave and they'll throw you out to starve." "Trying to pull a fast one. Say yes to #27 and you'll wake up in the Army, big boy!"

C. Emotional tension toward Army, rising out of evacuation by the Army.

D. Passionate desire of most nisei for restoration of full citizenship rights. (They regarded this as at least a slim chance for obtaining clarification of citizenship rights. Their resistance was against partial citizenship not against citizenship. Intensity against registration without clarification of citizenship indicates deep desire for citizenship.)

II. W.R.A. errors.

A. Insufficient preparation.

1. Issei council not consulted at all 'till crises arose.
2. Insufficient oral and written explanation, particularly in Japanese.
3. Lack of coordination between Army representative and administration.



B. Pussy-footing approach; indefiniteness.

1. Registration presented to evacuees as routine commonplace. Later developments made this seem deceitful.
2. Changes in wording of questionnaire not made by administration but left to evacuees to write in.
3. Bluff - "It's compulsory" closely followed by "There's no penalty if you don't register."

III. Army errors.

- A. Lieutenant stated he had not received information on Relocation Center before leaving Washington. Thought he was going to Concentration Camp.
- B. Tying registration up with enlistment befogged both issues.
- C. Mimeographed Japanese version of Army speech alleged to have been translated by a Korean, and contained 20 Korean phrases. Considered as evidence of Army skepticism regarding Japanese loyalty.
- D. Rank of officer sent (Lieutenant) regarded as insultingly low although they liked him personally. He was wrongly regarded as the Ambassador of the Army to compromise the injustice of evacuation.

Fallacies Current Among W.R.A. Project Staff.

1. "It's the issei who are talking the nisei into opposing registration." (An issei Block Chairman broke the registration strike of February 17. Nisei say issei were scrupulous not to exert influence. "They were swell!" A patriotic nisei of 22 actually lead the resistance.)
2. "Lots of the boys wanted to register but they didn't dare. They were threatened." (The threat excuse is too readily accepted by project staff. Perhaps it appeals to their sense of drama. The nisei leader referred to above publically recanted and registered without any sign of violence.)

Bad Results of the Registration Controversy.

A. Among the evacuees.

1. Sense of injustice deepened in nisei. Bitterness over loss of citizenship increased.
2. Cynicism. Trauma of the psyche. Spiritual discouragement.
3. A new evacuee controversy launched between those who wish to go out and relocate and those who wish to stay.

B. Among staff members.

1. An intensification of caste feeling, based on belief in moral superiority and lack of understanding of evacuee position. Manifest in such statements as "It's about time we got hard boiled." "A Jap's a Jap. This proves it." "They don't appreciate what we do for them." "Might as well drop this sentimental attitude and be realistic," etc.

Recommendations.

There is strong evacuee feeling at Heart Mountain that the mistakes of registration could not have occurred if there had been some direct relationship and consultation between evacuee representatives and Washington officials. They feel that the present relationship is paternal at the best, and that they have a real contribution to make in the determination of their own future. They feel their psychology is abnormal at present, and that more accurate knowledge of their peculiarities is needed in Washington. I was asked to convey this message to Washington by over a dozen evacuees, representing the Temporary Council, the Block Managers, the Judicial Commission as well as individual opinions.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

Memorandum

Confidential

To: Mr. Provinse

Date: 3/31/43

From: Philip W. Barber

Subject: Information from an evacuee at Heart Mountain
of possible interest to Mr. Myer

The following material is quoted from the personal letter of an Issei block chairman at Heart Mountain, at present secretary of the Temporary Council. It was ~~the~~ block chairman whose shrewdness and firmness were largely responsible for breaking the registration "strike".

"I read the text of Mr. Myer's testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, as well as what transpired at the hearing. I was rather pleasantly surprised to know that Mr. Myer has such a fair understanding of the whole evacuee problem.

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Registration

"As I used to say, an evacuee community, like any other, is divided into three groups: five per cent which is consistently and consciously loyal to democratic ideals, five per cent consciously pro-Axis and the ninety-~~five~~ per cent - sincere - but tremendously confused. The problem for the truly progressive has always been and still is how to win over to their side those confused, but sincere masses. In this respect, I am quite sure this registration controversy really brought the real issue before the eyes of the sincere masses, and gave them food for thought. In this respect I am inclined to characterize the new evacuee controversy as more or less a good result of the registration. Especially when we think of the importance of giving more confidence to the evacuees - to go out and make their living themselves in the outside world, instead of being made the wards of the government - then the drawing of the line between those

who wish to go out and those who want to remain is a welcome development. This is particularly so inasmuch as the drawing of the line was by the evacuees themselves and NOT by anyone who are not evacuees.

"A factor which should be taken into consideration is the problem of the parolees. Not that I say they are bad or dangerous; still you have to admit that they are not the best kind of influence to have in the relocation centers where all kinds of evacuees live.

Relocation

"The most important thing we must do is re-education, or enlightenment. I hope we'll be embarking on this very shortly. While at it, let me write a few lines about the developments here. A couple of days ago Yoshio Kodama (Nisei) was invited to speak to the Council. It was not only timely, but I imagine, very effective. He narrated first his impressions of the "outside" - he went to Kansas City to attend the National YMCA Conference. He recounted how many jobs he was offered. Also, he raised the question of how much difference there would be if a fellow stayed cooped up behind the barbed wire. He said he did not know until he went out and breathed the free air. 'For the sake of your children', he said, 'please push very hard the vocational training program which is to start very soon.' 'Jobs may be offered', he said, 'but I am afraid that few of the Nisei are really qualified to accept good jobs.' Encouragingly, Council members were very favorably impressed."

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"With the arrival of Spring, quite a few 'dead' are being resurrected. Number one is the Co-op. It seems someone tried to pull a fast one. Bulletin issued last

Saturday called for block meetings where residents were to vote yes or no on taking over the stores. The date was set for Friday, March 26. Naturally this kind of thing cannot get away unchallenged. Challenge came from two sources. One from those Issei groups who were not let "in". The other, Block Managers, and some of the Nisei Block Managers went so far as to translate that part of the bulletin (Japanese) which called for this particular conference and showed it to the Director. (This was not in English text - hence the extremely bad feelings). Among the Issei there are still some who cannot forget their old habits of pulling a fast one on someone else. This IS unfortunate.

"Another resurrection will be the Charter. Issei are not particularly keen about it, BUT Ricky (Tomo - Chairman of the Block Managers) seems to be VERY, very much interested in its resurrection. When Mr. Kimball came from Washington it was Ricky who got so mad as to suggest re-submission of the original draft. He was even against examining point by point administration suggestions. Now, he is rumored to be willing to accept the amendments almost in toto. Well, Easter is still far away, and what will be hatched next week or the week after that, I don't know. One thing. Our mutual 'friend' Doi seems to be working with him, too, in this hatching business.

"What my stand on this? Well, I am still thinking. Maybe I wrote you or maybe I didn't, but someone asked me a little while ago how long the Council intended to stick to 'appeasement' policy. I said that so far as I'm concerned it has ended. 'Registration brought its death', I replied. I hope you understand what I mean.

One thing is ~~sure~~^{SURE} though, - so far as popular interests go, charter is deader than a clay pigeon. Make no mistake about that. On the other hand, there is deadly urgency in giving Nisei a greater freedom and a wider initiative. If the charter can give that to them, OK. But will it? That's what I'm wondering about. I have to sound out the opinions of sincere Nisei on this. (I got some already, and that makes me think still more.)"

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HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER

Community Analysis Section

February 3, 1944

THE REACTION OF HEART MOUNTAIN TO
THE NEWS OF THE ATROCITIES COMMITTED ON
AMERICAN WAR PRISONERS BY THE JAPANESE;
ANNOUNCED JANUARY 27 - 28.

There is some evidence that the reaction of the appointed personnel was more marked than that of the evacuee residents. Certain staff members expressed the opinion that all passes to the outside should be denied for several days, until the response of the public to the announcement could be gauged. The matter was discussed early in the morning of January 28, with the following results: (1) The scheduled departure that day of 38 evacuee workers in the motor pool for Omaha to bring back trucks was postponed. It was felt that it would be unwise to allow such a group to undertake a long journey at that time. The group did leave February 2. (2) It was decided that passes for necessary business in nearby towns and relocation leaves should continue to be granted.

The question arose immediately as to whether a trip to Cody to take care of the legal requirements preliminary to a wedding, already set for Sunday, January 30, was necessary business. Several persons took the stand that it would be better to put off the wedding for awhile. Virgil Payne of the Welfare Section pointed out that the evacuees were strongly opposed to the postponement of weddings and argued that such an action would tend to accentuate any fears the residents of the Center might have as a consequence of the announcement. This view prevailed and the arrangements for the marriage proceeded as planned.

Subsequently, on February 1, a notice published in the Sentinel Supplement announced that leave to the Denver and Salt Lake areas were restricted and added, "Short terms and indefinites to all

other areas will be issued as usual....Authorization leaves to nearby towns have been frozen except in emergency cases." A check with the leave office indicates that, before this notice came out, no requests for passes were denied, though three women who had applied previously for short-term leave for a shopping trip to Billings withdrew their applications voluntarily.

Notwithstanding the fact that the only definite early action was the postponement of the trip to Omaha, a rumor spread through the community and still persists in spite of Sentinel notice to the effect that all leaves, permanent and temporary, have been cancelled. It may be that the people expected such a move and so found it easy to believe. Or, perhaps, there were some staff members who assumed without question that leaves would be denied and expressed this point of view to or in the presence of evacuees before the matter had been discussed and a decision arrived at.

For the first two or three days after the news broke, it was the subject of many conversations among evacuees. But interest faded rapidly and by February 1 or 2 it was not often mentioned. The writer cannot give a very adequate statement of comments and attitudes of the residents due to his recent arrival at the project. Here are some of the things that has been told.

There is a disposition among many "ordinary" evacuees to think of WRA as being the Government. They are annoyed and confused, therefore, when the Government urges them to relocate and then makes relocation more difficult by putting out such an announcement. Even those with a more sophisticated idea of Government structure say that issuing the news shown poor coordination. This

suggest that some residents of the center have the notion that the most important current activity of the Government is relocation.

A good many persons express skepticism regarding the facts that presented in the announcement and consider it propaganda designed to stimulate the purchase of war bonds. Others who accept the news as substantially true give this same explanation for its release at this particular time.

People generally expect that it will stir up animosity toward evacuees on the outside and make relocation harder for them. Mr. Booth, Relocation Officer of the Cincinnati area who has just completed a month's stay in the Center, reported that individuals who were already relocation-minded were disturbed, but that, as far as he could judge, they were inclined to accept his reassurance that in the Middle West and the East the increased hatred of the Japanese would not be extended to the relocatees. Those who are indifferent to or opposed to relocation, on the other hand, seize upon this new development as one more reason they should remain where they are. It is probable that some persons who are on the fence, sincerely trying to reach a decision, will be discouraged.

If a conclusion can be drawn to these not-very-definitive remarks, it would be this: The news did not create much excitement of any kind at Heart Mountain. It did raise an additional question in the minds of those who are considering moving out, and it will be a factor in inducing some to remain. It emphasized that, despite its disadvantages, the Center provides evacuees as much or more security than does any other place in America.

A.T. Hansen
Community Analyst.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION PROJECT
November 14, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

RYOICHI FUJII'S PROGRAM TO REORIENT ISSEI
THINKING, WITH ADDED COMMENTS ON THE WAR
AS THE ISSEI NOW VIEW IT

This report is written in answer to a request from the Chief of the Community Management Division for information on the influence of Mr. Fujii's newsletter on the thinking of the Issei. At the time the inquiry arrived, it so happened that the analyst was making a few special inquiries on the course of the war as the Issei see it, with special reference to the Philippines campaign. The report will cover both topics since they are closely related.

First, a few words about Mr. Fujii himself. He belonged to a rather well-to-do family in Japan and came to this country partly as a result of disagreements with his father. It appears that he was something of a radical in his high-school days, as were many other Japanese youths at that period. His father was displeased. The son finally left for schooling in the United States as a semi-exile. His father continued to contribute to this education, however, through five years at Oberlin College. Mr. Fujii has a master's degree from that institution.

After graduating, he held a number of different jobs. One was writing for a Japanese-language paper in Los Angeles which was variously labelled liberal, radical, or communist, depending on political views of the individual who was making the judgement. His reputation has been colored ever since by this association. Actually he probably never was a communist. In fact, the analyst would call him no more than faintly pink. But he does make favorable comments about USSR and consistently argued that Germany would fail in Russia. Also, for years he has carried on a vigorous verbal crusade against Hitler and the Nazis.

In Santa Anita Assembly Center he gave lectures on American history and current events. They became very popular. About 600 people heard him regularly. At Heart Mountain he continued to lecture on the same subjects and here, too, he had a considerable group of followers.

When relocation was adopted as a WRA policy, he advocated it vigorously from the beginning, both in talks within the center and in articles published by Rocky Shimo. It was always his contention that relocation while the war was still on was feasible for Issei as well as Nisei, a rather revolutionary idea a year and half ago.

After he left the center and settled in Chicago last year, he continued to write many letters to his friends and admirers here and at Granada. This summer his Granada disciples paid his way from Chicago to give lectures and counseling on relocation. Thereafter, he came to Heart

Mountain as indicated in the weekly report, dated August 11. In both places he devoted one lecture, the last one, to the international situation.

Even before this journey, he had begun to mimeograph some of his letters. At the time of the visit he decided to start making a small charge for them and to get them out regularly. About 150 persons at Heart Mountain took subscriptions and about the same number at Granada, according to casual statements by Mr. Fujii.

The main burden of his speaking and writing, as the analyst understands it, is:

1. That Germany will surely lose the war.
2. That Japan will also lose, though he says this only by indirection in order not to create too much antagonism among the Issei who disagree with him.
3. That the future of the evacuees -- Issei and Nisei -- is and should be with America.
4. That they should make such sacrifices as are necessary to relocate as an expression of their identification with America.

A few other items are pertinent to an examination of Mr. Fujii's influence. He is in his early forties and is unmarried. His chief interest in life is the study of history, economics, and international politics. His critics and his followers agree that he speaks and writes excellent Japanese. Among his virtues, modesty is not included. One man claimed Mr. Fujii had ambitions to be "the Moses of the Japanese in America." Whatever his ultimate ambitions, one does not need to converse with him long to find that he does not under-rate himself and his influence on his fellow Issei.

What is his influence? Probably 200 Issei see his newsletter and are disposed to accept the viewpoints he expresses. Presumably they already share many of his ideas, and he simply takes them little by little in the direction he is moving. What they read may be used in the discussions about the war and the future with friends and acquaintances, but the analyst suspects they do not mention Fujii as the source unless they are talking to someone whose favorable attitude toward him is known.

Who are his followers? The analyst does not know who many of them are. The five he happens to be acquainted with are, with one exception, younger Issei. This exception is an older man who has two sons in the army -- volunteers. Four or five of his other children have relocated, leaving just one in the center -- a girl in high school.

It seems quite clear that his followers and those who would read his stuff sympathetically or even tolerantly are a minority. Much more common than favorable comment is unfavorable comment. Critics of Fujii include:

1. He is too young to have wisdom or to be taken seriously.
2. He is a bachelor. His recommendations about relocation ignore the problems family men face.
3. He is a communist or a near communist.
4. He is a stooge of WRA and the Government. It is widely believed that he is on the WRA payroll secretly.
5. He is too pro-American. To be pro-American is all right, but it is claimed that he carries it so far that
6. He is anti-Japanese. When a Nisei is anti-Japanese, it is understandable and forgivable. But Fujii is an Issei. Therefore,
7. He is little better than a traitor. This extreme accusation is rarely made, perhaps due to his careful handling of the question of the outcome of the war in the Pacific.

The foregoing suggests that his words have little weight with the majority of the Issei at Heart Mountain. He is generally considered by them to be a propagandist advocating a pro-WRA point of view that does not show enough appreciation of the problems of evacuees and urging an anti-Hitler, anti-Axis point of view that casts some doubt on his loyalty to his homeland. Some people are very antagonistic to him. While he was living here, his activities stirred up so much hostility that for a period one or more of his friends always accompanied him when he went anywhere after dark. There were repeated threats to beat him up. Heart Mountain readers took steps to boycott Rocky Shimpo if it did not cease carrying his articles. The paper capitulated. In one of his lectures last summer an old man publicly asked him if he was an inu for WRA. When he pointed out in his last talk -- the one that dealt with the international situation -- that he had predicted the defeat of Germany two years before, a few Issei became quite annoyed. They thought he was wrong earlier and they agreed with him by last August, but they did not like his triumphant attitude.

Many other Issei who are not violently antagonistic toward him simply view him with tolerant disregard. To them, he is a just young fellow who over-rates himself and who has gone slightly haywire. They would not dignify him with their active opposition.

One older Issei who persists in presuming that Fujii is on the pay of the Government commented, "If the Government wants to influence the thinking of the Issei, it should buy up the editors of the three Japanese-language newspapers. These men were journalists of prestige before the war. What they say people read and take seriously. But this Fujii! Nobody cares what he says."

He went on. "Fujii was popular at Santa Anita and in the early days at Heart Mountain. Those were hectic days. The Japanese newspapers had been suppressed. People would listen to anybody. They were hungry for

news of any kind. If Fujii had stayed here, he would have found that his popularity declined as the community settled down, as other sources of information became available, and as people learned to know him better."

It is significant that the speaker always referred to him simply as "Fujii" not as "Mr. Fujii" or its Japanese equivalent.

The conclusion to all of this is that he probably affects the thinking of a minority of Issei through most of these may already agree with him anyway. Doubtless he does make a small number of converts. But in the total thinking of Heart Mountain Issei his influence appears to be negligible.

How might the thinking of Issei about the war and future be modified? Before we consider that question, let us look at some of their present ideas.

It goes without saying that the ideas of Issei have changed and that there are wide variations in what they think. We shall begin with those whose conceptions are farthest removed from the notions Americans hold, those presumably most in need of reorientation. There are a considerable number of Issei who view the situation thus: Japan will never be defeated unconditionally. American supply lines are getting longer; Japanese lines shorter. Americans cannot conceive of the vigor, skill, and tenacity with which Japan will defend the homeland and the nearer and richer portions of the new empire. Sooner or later, the Allies will weary of their hopeless task. It will be they, and not Japan, that will sue for peace. The result will not be as favorable to Japan as had been anticipated earlier, but when it is all over and the reconstruction has been accomplished, Japan will be in a better position than before the war.

Why do they think this way? For good and sufficient reasons to their minds. In the first place, Japan just doesn't lose wars. One gathers that in the world there are strong nations and weak nations. But there is one, only one, invincible nation. They are quite patient and tolerant of Americans, even intelligent Americans like the analyst, who are unable to comprehend this fixed and final fact. After all we never knew Japan and our ignorance should not be held against us.

Moreover, the war is not going so badly. Germany will probably be defeated before many months, but then the United States and Britain will be terrified by the great power of Russia. The Allies may even begin fighting among themselves. The aspersions the Chicago Tribune casts at the Soviets are significant. USSR, satisfied in Europe, will be unlikely to join the attack on Japan; may even take the stand that an undefeated Japan would be a useful bulward against the ambitions of the Americans and the English in the Far East. At any rate, the three powers will probably be too busy watching each other to operate against Japan effectively.

The campaign in China is proceeding very satisfactorily. Not only has Japan achieved notable military successes but the recall of Stillwell

indicated a deep rift in Chinese-American relations. The result may be a withdrawal of the support of the United States and an early end to the long-drawn-out China war. Such an event would release men and equipment for use elsewhere and with hostilities over in China, that country would add strength to Japan.

The landing in the Philippines caused some concern. But then it occurred to a local strategist or the Tokyo radio suggested that it was a publicity stunt to help Roosevelt win the election. Many anticipate that before long the Japanese will succeed in ejecting the invaders. Their expectations were probably strengthened last Wednesday when American newscasters passed on a Tokyo report to the effect that the Japanese commander on Leyte was going to demand McArthur's surrender.

The American failure in the Philippines is rendered even more likely by the recent victory of the Japanese fleet. This stirring triumph stimulated certain enthusiasts to organize a victory celebration that was held in Block 22 on Friday, November 3. It was an invitational affair. Those who came contributed one dollar each. The festivity was well attended. On Wednesday, November 8, the analyst heard that a similar occasion was being planned for Block 6 for the lower half of the center. By then, however, some opposition had developed and the celebration may have been cancelled.

The analyst, in common with many other people, has different ideas on what has been happening and what will happen. He was a little flabbergasted by these Issei views. Especially he thought that it was perfectly clear that the Americans had won in the several naval engagements that have taken place in the Philippines area.

Why do the Issei think differently? All one has to do is to listen to and read the Japanese reports and believe them. Those approved for publication are abundantly available. The New York Times carries them fully. The Japanese-language papers translate and reproduce them, being careful to give American reports as much space. In more fragmentary fashion information from the Tokyo radio comes out in ordinary American news broadcasts. There may be some short-wave sets in the center and there certainly are among the Japanese on the outside. But even ignoring these, there is ample information on Japanese claims in the other sources mentioned.

One Issei remarked, "Of course, the United States could change our thinking on the war if it would carefully control and manipulate the sources of news. But as long as we can read these Japanese reports we will read them. And we have found them right when the American reports hid the seriousness of American losses for months."

In some weekly reports last summer the analyst stated that the invasion of Europe and the Marianas had produced a notable change in Issei ideas regarding the outcome of the war. With reference to the kind of Issei here considered, he has concluded that he over-emphasized the effect of these two events. It may be, however, that they did produce a marked loss of confidence that has since been rationalized away. They looked again

at their maps and decided that after all the Marianas were far from Japan and the core of the empire was still intact. And maybe the fate of Germany had no real connection with the fate of Japan anyway. This type of conceptual juggling is familiar to everyone. When the battle of Bataan was going on, to many Americans its loss seemed almost too terrible to contemplate. After it was lost, Americans readjusted very well. It became an unfortunate incident, half forgotten, that had no important bearing on war.

Back of this strong disposition to believe Japanese rather than American reports, and to expect that the conflict will turn out all right for Japan, there is a history. Soon after the analyst arrived on the job, he has occasion to see an anonymous document written by an Issei which attempted to describe and account for the attitudes of Issei toward the war. It went something like this: The Japanese in America had always been a struggling and somewhat despised minority. By the time of the twenties, however, many of them had attained a fairly satisfying economic status from which they drew great comfort in the absence of other status satisfactions. Then came the Depression. The Japanese suffered severe financial reverses in company with everyone else. But the great status-value of their previous economic position meant their losses were especially better to them. As they scraped along through the depression, uncomfortable and unhappy, Japan began to do impressive things in Manchuria and then in China. It was expanding, standing up to the other powers. Japanese in America observed these developments with intense interest. The hostility of Americans toward them grew, but they felt more inner self-respect, derived from their identification with their increasingly vigorous and potent homeland. As the relations between the two countries became more strained, the eventual possibility of a war was recognized. With the patriotic confidence in their own nation that men usually show, the Issei expected that Japan would win the Far East and force a peace that would make it the dominant power of that region. Such a war and such a peace would humble America a little and prove to Americans that Japan and the Japanese must be taken seriously. Japanese in America would then be more respected and have still greater self-respect. The Issei, a minority starved for ego-satisfactions, looked forward to this hypothetical situation with deep yearning. Now that the war is on, they feel a fierce and tenacious hope that it will end as they anticipated. It involves their conceptions of themselves and their status to a degree that can hardly be over-emphasized.

How many Issei are there who continue to be quite certain of the ultimate success of Japan; more moderate success than they expected earlier, but success nevertheless? Obviously the question cannot be answered, but there are probably several hundred of them.

What can be done to reorient their thinking? The Issei quoted above gave the only answer. Even if this were done, the sources of information would have to be controlled and manipulated so cleverly that nobody was aware of the fact. Since this will not be done, it is the analyst's opinion that nothing short of the defeat of Japan itself will convince them that Japan can be defeated and that they should plan their lives on that basis. Meanwhile, we should be patient.

At this point it should be proclaimed that this is not and is not meant to be a description of the thinking of Issei, all Issei, at Heart Mountain. It represents the ideas of perhaps a third of them. Among the other two-thirds, there are many who think the naval battles in the Philippines ended in a draw and a few who take it as a fact that the Japanese received a severe drubbing. Almost nobody expects an unconditional American victory, but there are a good many who anticipate what amounts to a Japanese defeat -- the new empire gone, the old empire weakened for years to come by the destruction of the war.

Practically no Issei, including Mr. Fujii himself, are prepared psychologically for the events that will transpire in the Pacific during the next two years if things happen that many well-informed Americans expect. Little can be done to prepare them through the use of symbols. Only events are convincing. These are presented faithfully in the Japanese-language press as they are reported by both Japan and the United States. Reiteration by the Reports Division of the American communiques probably would not hasten the learning process appreciably.

A word about the Nisei. When the war broke out, they tended to share with other Americans the belief in an early Japanese defeat. After evacuation, they were isolated with Issei and the war news was clearly favorable to Japan. Many of them gradually accepted the idea that Japan would win a very favorable negotiated peace, though they often accepted this idea regretfully and reluctantly. Now, while the Issei are still clinging to their earlier conceptions regarding the outcome, changing their ideas only after completed events force them to do so, most Nisei have swung rapidly to a belief in ultimate American victory.

A. T. Hansen

HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
Community Analysis Section

Extra
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December 8, 1944

LETTER OF CONDOLENCE

In the conversation with Mr. Fujioka that took place at the time this letter of condolence was presented, these are some of the things that came out:

Before Ted graduated from high school in the spring of 1943, he spent much time looking at college catalogues. Two days after commencement, he startled his father by saying that he had decided to volunteer for the Army. He explained that his decision was the result of no sudden impulse. He had been weighing the matter for weeks and had concluded that it was his sacred duty to his country and to his people.

Although his father was startled, he spoke calmly, "all right son, if you are sure that it's what you want to do. This is your country; you are a citizen. But before you make up your mind finally, you should seek the counsel of your older brothers. When you have done so, come and talk to me again."

He talked to them. They agreed that he should volunteer since he felt the way he did. When he approached his father again, his father told him to go ahead and to be a good soldier.

When he went to Cheyenne to enlist, he was asked if he wanted to enter active duty immediately. He said that he did and wired home that he would not be back.

Fathers "Ted was where he wanted to be; he wanted to be a soldier. It seems to me that death on the battlefield must bring

joy to a real soldier. It is his destiny.

"He fought in Italy. Then he went to southern France with the air-borne infantry. On November 6 he wrote us a letter. In it he said that he felt very good that day. For a long time, he had had no opportunity to clean up. This day he had had a bath with plenty of hot water and had fresh clothes on. He said that as he wrote he could hear the sound of battle in the distance. Tomorrow, he added, it would be time for his unit to go to the front again. But that would be tomorrow. Today, he felt fine.

"The next day Ted was killed. You remember, that the Samurai used to clean themselves up thoroughly before they went into battle. The day he wrote us Ted was preparing for battle. He felt good. He was ready."

Heart Mountain Community Council
Heart Mountain, Wyoming
December 8, 1944

Mr. and Mrs. Shiro Fujioka
Heart Mountain, Wyoming

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fujioka:

We were profoundly impressed that your son, Ted Fujioka, in response the great principle of citizenship, went overseas to fight for the country of his birth. Now we learn that he has been killed in action on the battle field in France. This you must have long accepted as something that might befall a soldier. But now, it has actually come to your son!

We believe that to have given himself to his country, in spite of the injustice done to his people, is an expression of unbounded devotion. We also believe that his sacrifice will not fail to make an imprint on the history of this nation.

We the members of the Community Council of Heart Mountain hereby express to you our deep and solemn condolence in this time of your bereavement.

Yours very sincerely

Chairman

HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
Community Analysis Section

Extra
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July 14, 1943

Attitudes Towards Segregation at Heart Mountain

Introduction

As with other projects, the recent months have been a period in which the tensions of evacuation and relocation were resolved partially by registration which brought all members of the centers, including the appointed personnel, to a high level of excitement. The complete resolution of the anxieties and tensions at Heart Mountain was retarded by the motor pool strike and by the fact that registration was not an adequate, not a satisfactory way to resolve finally the ambiguities of status and the insecurities of evacuation. It was not adequate for the reason that basically Nisei personality has developed in such a manner that it is one adjusted to following a middle-of-the-road course. Face to face with a final choice, the Nisei faced an acute emotional crisis which made possible for parents, community leaders, and the so-called "agitators" to play upon their wishes to avoid making a cleancut decision -- either for Japan or for the United States. Segregation represents, in this way of viewing it, the final phase of moving people onto one side or the other, the last scene in the act of "choosing up." In view of the fact that at Heart Mountain the period of registration, the motor pool strike, and the process of relocation have resolved the tensions in a fairly good measure,

it is fairly accurate to say that problems of segregation will be approached somewhat more objectively. The material following is a hurried and brief effort to appraise segregation as it may develop problems and affect community life of Heart Mountain. It is directed towards answering the questions raised in the letter of Mr. Provinse, dated July 2, 1943.

The Meaning of Segregation

From conversations with evacuees, the meaning of segregation involves 1) the movement to another camp where people will remain for the duration with eventual repatriation; 2) the selection and movement of people who are not qualified for relocation. A third factor is often noted in discussing this, namely, the selection of individuals who are disturbers of routine operations. Evacuees will often use the term "agitator" for such persons. When the administration sends some person to Loupp, this is not looked upon as segregation.

From the standpoint of the appointed personnel, the meaning of segregation is essentially that of a means by which undesirable evacuees will be removed from this center. Hence such a program is viewed as a relief from troubles. A second part of their definition is the factor of patriotisms. They do not want to have around or be associated with anyone who is loyal to our enemy. Whenever a Japanese is faced with a decision regarding a "for or against" decision, a member of the Caucasian staff expects the decision to be made immediately. Any time taken to reflect or to talk it over with family members

seems to develop a feeling of revulsion within the Caucasian.

To both groups the meaning of segregation is that it is a logical necessity and a reasonable program which will bring a period of hard work and personal inconvenience, but it is inexorable and must be faced. There is no alternative.

Families Applying for Repatriation

In the Heart Mountain project, we have about 878 individuals who have applied for repatriation. Of this number about 124 have applied for withdrawal of application, this count being as of July 9 when the last letter of transmittal was forwarded to the Washington office. These 878 individuals were organized into 214 families, leaving 150 single people who have applied.

So as to appreciate how these people are distributed within the residential area, the page following is a base map of the area. In each block is shown the number of single people, the number of families, and the total number of individuals involved.

Every block in Heart Mountain will lose some residents. These range from the eight in Block 7, which is only a quarter of a block, to the 118 of Block 20. The latter block is inhabited mainly by people from the Los Angeles area, particularly San Gabriel.

A large number of informants have given information which leads us to believe that in general those people are from rural areas and have been rather quiet in their period of residence

at Heart Mountain. Discussion with some of these individuals indicates that they expect to be segregated. The most resistance to it comes from the dislike of moving. By the time the program is instituted, many of these people will have been here for about one year. In that time they have become accustomed to their neighbors, have fixed up their apartments, and as with other people, are not anticipating the problem of packing and getting on the move again. Yet because of their application for repatriation, such resistances will be overcome.

A second point about these families is that problems within the family have in some instances been settled. For six weeks the analyst has heard of families who decided to go without any difficulty whatsoever. At the same time there has been the occasional nisei who has gone to Miss Payne of the Social Welfare, asking for advice as to what decision should be made. By the time the actual process of segregation is started, it is expected that most of such internal family problems will have been settled. It is for this reason that the actual dates of segregation should be announced as early as possible. There are a few people who are expected to ask for assistance in breaking from their family. In some of these instances the application of selective service to the Nisei would likely solve their problem for them.

As far as we can ascertain at this writing, the movement of these families will not affect seriously the leadership of

Block Distribution of Individuals who have
Applied for Repatriation at Heart Mountain.

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | S 5 F 9 (28) T 29 | S 7 F 5 (29) T 21 | S 4 F 11 (50) T 38 |
| S 7 F 17 (27) T 60 | School | S 8 F 4 (25) T 24 | S 2 F 7 (24) T 22 |
| S 21 F 20 (20) T 118 | S 14 F 2 (21) T 21 | S 8 F 8 (22) T 37 | S 2 F 7 (23) T 23 |
| S 7 F 20 (17) T 74 | High | S 4 F 4 (15) T 18 | |
| S 7 F 19 (12) T 76 | School | S 15 F 8 (14) T 35 | |
| S 9 F 18 (9) T 76 | S 9 F 17 (8) T 70 | S 0 F 4 (7) T 8 | |
| School | S 3 F 12 (6) T 53 | | |
| S 6 F 10 (2) T 53 | S 7 F 6 (1) T 30 | | |

Symbols: 1 Block number
S Single
F Families involved
T Total number of individuals involved

Thus, these would be read, 7 single men plus the members of six families amounts to 30 individuals who expect repatriation.

Single 150
Families 214
Total # 878 individuals

the project. There will be a few of the Nisei who are active in community activities who will be going. There appears to be no single case of an outstanding Issei who is leaving.

Unsatisfactory Answers to 27 and 28

In a previous report we have submitted statistical material dealing with this group. Mr. Robertson reports about 300 cases which will have to be processed individually.

Since the registration period, there has been a cooling off, and along with changes in Issei attitudes, there has been a change in the attitudes of this group. As indicated by the number of people who have requested a change in answer, and the number of attempts which have been made by "friends" to sneak in changes in the records, this group of people shows anxiety regarding the outcome of the segregation program. Some within this group wish to be segregated and want to go to Japan. Others are still fence-sitters and consequently have anxieties about having to get-off. From an individual in this group, the following interview material is quoted:

My husband was not antagonistic toward the U. S. previously. This developed when evacuation took place. He had not approved of the manner in which it was done. He was at first classified by his draft board as 3A but later reclassified to 4C which made him an enemy alien. This made him angry since he is an American citizen. He had done no sabotage and had been held on no charge so that he felt acutely this injustice. B. H. told him that he should appeal the decision, but he feels now that he does not wish to fight for the U. S. if that is the way they do things.

Because of his "no" vote in registration, he was released from the police force on June first. He was supposed to go to work for the Housing Dept., on June

21. But he received a note from Mr. Embree saying that he should wait until Mr. Anderson called him for a hearing. I feel that it would be best to have this hearing as soon as possible, for he could then get his "gripes" out of his system. I went to Mr. Anderson and told him that since these people who voted "no" were doing no one any good it would be better to have the hearing and decide what they were going to do about them.¹

I voted "yes." My husband knows this but we do not discuss it. "I will have to be good to my wife as she is the one who is able to get out." It is going to be hard on us because of his "no" vote and we will likely have to remain here, so I simply do not discuss it with him. Personally, it nearly worries me "crazy."

I have noticed recently that when the Sentinel comes, he scans the ads for relocation jobs. This, I suppose, means that he might decide to change his vote. Also, when a friend came in from the outside last week, he had quite a long discussion about relocation and when this girl left he said, "I might be seeing you outside soon." This makes me think that he might be urged to change his mind, and this is the reason I would like to get this hearing over with as soon as possible.

My husband has a "mind of his own" and so it is best if I do not try to urge him, if he is not ready for it.

The foregoing quotation indicates the anxiety suffered by this group, the inability to request a change, and the gradual transition to at least becoming interested in the outside. If the hearing board segregates such a person as this, then the individual is very likely to get off the fence and cast his lot of Japan.

¹The work of this hearing board was announced June 12 in The Sentinel. At this writing it has heard one case. On July 14, it was hearing its second case. Mr. Carroll, the Employment Division chief is off the project, and Mr. Lechlitter, our project attorney, does not know how many cases have been received.

With respect to this group, the administration is aware of individuals who are in it because they were swayed and influenced by some one else. At the same time, those who did the "swaying" answered their questions satisfactorily. Such persons are commonly known as "agitators." The one case which the Hearing Board has heard reveals the names of several people whom the applicant claims to have "influenced me." It is the expectation of both evacuees and appointed personnel that such people will be located and likewise segregated. It is felt by some administrators that unless such persons are weeded out, any later problem of the center is likely to become an issue. It is felt by the evacuees that such people need to be disciplined for the part which they played while at the same time answering their own questions satisfactorily.

The evacuees feel that it has been a long time since registration. As a matter of fact many claim that segregation is long overdue and that it should have come in 1942. The people in this category are eager for the Hearing Board to get busy at once. For them it is the only way in which the final suspense may be resolved. They want to get it over. Age and sex distributions for this group are shown in the previous statistical analysis.

The Kibei

Although no definite word has been received regarding plans for this group, it is commonly accepted among the evacuees that in most cases the Kibei will wish to be segregated. There are several Kibei from here who have relocated, some on seasonal leave. In one case we found that the father had applied for repatriation. The children did not wish to return. The son is a Kibei and at present is on seasonal leave. His father finally cancelled the application for repatriation at the urging of the children, including the Kibei. To segregate such a person would manifestly be unjust in view of his record and actions in moving the father to cancellation.

Of the 214 families referred to earlier, 59 of these were constituted of citizen parents and their children, 21 being childless. These are almost all Kibei families which wish to return. With such persons there will be no difficulty for they are about the same as Issei families.

Another reason for segregation of many Kibei is because of the problem which they have with language in school. Our school system here is not adjusted to the highly specialized work which such a person requires. Last year several of the teachers had difficulties with Kibei who insisted upon speaking Japanese and who at times expressed considerable surliness.

The Employment Division made a count of Kibei, but the

definition was so broad that it included people who had been in Japan for as little as one year. This placed some 1,100 names on the list. A refinement of this would reduce to approximately 300 the list of individuals who are over 18 and who have been in Japan long enough to develop the self-conception of being Kibei.²

²"the average age of 347 Kibei who were 17 years of age and over is 24.8 years." From "An Analysis of Family Compositions..... who Answered Question Twenty-eight Unsatisfactorily," page 8, f.n. No.1, by the Heart Mountain Analyst.

Split and Relocated Families

In view of the fact that people who have asked for repatriation are listed in the "stop File", they are not out on leave. Family cards of the repatriates were run against the leave file, and it was found that of the 241 families involved, only five now have some member on leave. One father who has a daughter on indefinite has applied for cancellation approved. Thus, only a relatively few families with members on leave have not applied for repatriation.

As to the split families, we presume that Mr. Province refers to those in which there is dissension regarding the partenal decision. Reference has already been made to these. Although various informants say there will be lots of discussion and argument, the known cases are few in number. Of six well known cases, it is certain that all but one of them will end in a parental victory. This was true in two cases which went to Crystal City.

It is important that our announcements regarding segregation be made early enough in advance so that this domestic problem can be settled. Further cases are likely to come to light during the interim prior to the actual movement of people.

Segregation and its affect on Center Life

On Monday, July 11th, the Los Angeles Times with the statement of testimony of Mr. Myer from the Sub-committee Hearing arrived on the project. It is not known how many copies of this paper came into the project, but it is claimed that there are about 125 subscriptions and 20 sales at the stores. On Monday evening the analyst found only two families which were discussing the problem. On Tuesday morning, none of the usual informants regarding rumors had heard of the statement. After consultation with Mr. Robertson, the Reports Division decided to make reference to the statements of the Times in the regular supplement of the Sentinel. Thus, by Tuesday afternoon, July 12, the residents have access to the probable starting of the program, its cost, and something about the people to be included, although this latter is vague and naturally is causing the most discussion.

By late Tuesday afternoon, this information seems to have caused no stir whatsoever. Typical comments were, "It is long over due." "Now they can start packing." "There sure will be lots of argument started at home." The general reaction is that people will dislike to move but are now faced with it.

As indicated previously each block will lose at least 18 people, except #7 which is a small block. No particular difficulty is expected if the people are notified in time.

The more serious problem is one on which we have too little information to appraise accurately the affects of segregation.

It is claimed that the agriculture project and the motor pool will have taken out of them some of its most capable people. It is further claimed that in view of the ~~reduction~~ of employment, it is advisable to terminate those who have asked for repatriation. Replacements can be found to some extent, but this problem will have to be assessed when our later material is available. Hence, Mr. Anderson has suggested that we prepare a brief report on this aspect as soon as data are available.

All informants and administrators do not expect any particular disturbance. Considerable discussion is bound to occur as soon as residents have been before the Hearing Board and their own definitions and appraisal of "Justice" emerge after the results of each case becomes known.

At the present time ~~one~~ of the most important developments at Heart Mountain is that of the schism within the Buddhist group. This separation is being developed by the Nichiren and the Nishi Honganji group. The latter is a very large sect. The three priests, Revs. Aso, Mohri, and Murakita are giving it direction. Two of them have applied for repatriation. Consequently it is hoped by the administration that segregation will come quickly to these two priests so that this burning issue will be quenched before it disrupts into too significant pressure for the administration to continue overlooking it. Pressure has been put upon the Space Committee. One of the priests pried a lock off a door so as to gain access

to a building for church services. Another building was pre-empted and then the Committee faced a fait accompli.

The Christians feel that this schism is an expression of the fact that for some months after evacuation the Buddhists were not particularly active. Now they are becoming bolder as may be seen in the demand for space, the holding of several Bon Odori, and what they claim to be the conversion of summer religious education schools into Japanese language schools.

Two days ago an informant claimed that the schism had so worried the wife of a priest who is interned that she has almost broken under the strain of trying to work in the churches for both groups. Her husband was interned, and so she is here without him. At present Social Welfare is trying to secure an interim parole or some other arrangement to unite this particular family. The children are reflecting the neurotic condition of the mother. The informant felt that the strain of the conflict was a contributing factor to this family problem as well as the fact that the family has no income.

Claims are made by informants that the sermons of Rev. Murakita are filled with nationalistic teaching. Through his work and his competing Bon Odori the Christians are confident that he is winning too many children and adolescents to the side of Japan. Hence considerable pressure was brought upon

Mr. Robertson to cancel the whole of the public dancing, even as late as Saturday Morning when it was to held that evening, July 10th.

At the present time the Buddhist Church is dependent upon quite a few Kibei to be Sunday School teachers. An informant reports that since most of the Kibei will be segregated, this will make a difficult situation for his church.

Some administrators are of the opinion that the center will be operated much more easily. After segregation it is felt that the sides will have been chosen and that it will be possible to exclude citizens and friendly aliens from the influence of those who are listening to Tokyo broadcasts or who are deliberately circulating claims of having news "from Tokyo." For example, the latest statement is that "Vladivostok has been bombed and captured by the Japanese." Such rumors keep certain groups stirred up and these groups are disliked by the friendly aliens. Hence administrators expect to have an easier time and evacuees a more peaceful time after segregation.

It has already been suggested that the Hearing Board should convene as quickly as possible. On the morning of July 14, the morning on which this report was finished, the main discussion among residents was coming from the group of "no-no" answers. They have acute anxieties. One informant explained that for the first time in months she ran across the recreation ground to catch up with a group. They were discussing segregation.

A second point to be urged is that the board should be constituted of people who are not involved in operational or

administrative work. It is evident due to demands on time for project operation, that heads of divisions would find difficult to devote sufficient time to processing our 300 cases.

Segregation and Relocation

Even though we had done much more systematic research on various problems associated with segregation, it is quite likely that it would be difficult to say how the program will affect relocation. The evacuees are in the process of becoming more relocation-minded. This morning one mess hall was without sugar. Almost everyone said, "Well, I guess this is to make us relocation-minded." Several days ago an informant described how a mother had decided to stay here "until she rotted at the government's expense." She now has two children out on leave, and two days ago, she in turn suddenly started searching for domestic work. Ministers report people, particularly the Issei, changing their minds. Although the residents have been relatively indifferent, to the point where it is rather easy for the charter to get no discussion or interest in the election this Wednesday night, it is possible for such a fundamental program as segregation to stir up those who have vague dispositions to get out. As one woman expressed it this morning, "Everyone is moving-minded." This attitude appears to be mercurial. Although indifference or passivity may characterize the residents for the past two months, this is not a fixed, stable passivity. It is possible to stir them up when some

factor which affects their immediate security or their longer future becomes operative. Segregation is one such factor.

In several meetings with staff members, the analyst has pointed out the necessity for synchronizing relocation and segregation. Due to the excitement that will be developed, the WRA should capitalize upon this. Consequently a more flexible program of grants, and other items mentioned in Admin. Instr. # 96, should go into operation with full force. If this is not done, we shall not be able to move as many people out later, for as soon as the new residents arrive from their other projects, we shall find them settling down as well as the "old timers here." A good portion of the "Japanese feel licked", as one chap said. He has been active in community affairs and has finally given up. But he is moving out, just to "wander around." Hence, with the excitement of segregation, the relocation program can become far more interesting and effective, but not just on the momentum which has characterized it to date. We may expect people to be resigned to relocation center life when the segregation problem is completed, and as a result the selling campaign for relocation will have far more inertia to overcome when segregation is completed. It is thus fortunate that at Heart Mountain we have our committee organized and plans made for relocation to go into operation. It is the analysts notion that to leave any stones unturned for relocation within the next four months would be tantamount to failure in that part of our program. In short, the next four months are quite likely

most crucial months in the program of relocation.

SUMMARY TABULATION

1. Families applying for repatriation are fairly well distributed throughout the center. They are reluctant to move mainly because of inconvenience. No important functionaries appear to be within this group.
2. The chief disturbance may be expected from the group which answered 27 and 28 unsatisfactorily. On the morning of July 14th, many questions were being raised none of which can be answered until administrative instructions are received and hearings started.
3. It is expected that the Kivei, except in a few instances will be segregated. A Kivei club is behind one of the priests who is directing the separatists movement in the Buddhist Church. Our school is not adjusted to handling their special problems.
4. The number of split and relocated families appears to be relatively few. The period between now and actual segregation will provide time for domestic issues to be settled.
5. Community life will be affected in at least two ways: 1) there may be some relief in the intense conflict developing within the Buddhist group; 2) a number of project employees will be segregated. The extent of this is at present unknown.
6. Segregation is an opportunity for developing relocation if the two programs are synchronized.
7. It is hoped that the Hearing Board will be so constituted so as not to overload members of the staff who are directly concerned with daily problems of project operation.
8. Evacuees expect to be segregated. The administrative personnel feels that it will facilitate project morale.

Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
July 20, 1943

Dr. Opler
File

Given
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SEGREGATION

In Block 26, according to an informant, there is a family with many girls and one boy. The boy said "no, no", and because of that, the girls and parents who were originally "yes" became "no" as they did not want to become separated.

RELOCATION

A young fellow, a nisei, who was very upset by the evacuation, and who had turned morose and uncooperative, answered "no, no" on the questionnaire. In later months under the influence of fellow nisei, some of whom volunteered for the U.S. Army, he became more normal and cooperative, and as his mental health improved he became more cheerful and eventually went to see Mrs. L. Adams. He changed his answer to "yes" and she sent him to see Mr. Heath. He did not do this, however. No doubt the reason is that he does not want to relocate yet.

Carl Kondo, Staff Member
Community Analysis Section

Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
July 20, 1943

G. J. J. J.
27E

QUESTION 28, SEGREGATION AND RELOCATION

At Office of Block 4 during Registration for Rehearing on Answers to Question 28, July 19, 1943. (Where residents of Blocks 3, 4, 9 and 10 registered.)

Mrs. Yamamoto of 10-3-4 came in and said:

I have two children, Sumiye, a girl and Takashi, a boy. They are both kibel and have said "no". The boy has said "no" twice; the girl registered "no". They don't want to change. If they are segregated I want to go with them. I don't want to be separated from my children. Do I have to change my "yes" to "no" to stay with my children?

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Mr. Jirodo Ohara of 9-3-4 told me this story and asked my advice:

We have 3 children. The youngest is not of age and did not register. The boy who registered is Fumio. He is not what you would call a kibel but he has been to Japan. He said "no" and he wants to stick to "no". It's up to him what he says. He's willing to give up his American citizenship. (This in response to the question: Do you know that this may affect Fumio's American citizenship later on? Are you satisfied that he is answering "no"?) Fumio is 20 years old. Our girl is Chitose. She is

22 years old. She is a kibeï and answered "no". I and my wife answered "yes" to our question. I want to know whether our family is going to be separated. If the children are segregated we want to go with them. We want to change our "yes" answers to "no" if it is necessary.

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From a 25 year old nisei:

I just registered, but I think I should give my brother's name too. He's at a class this evening and may not get here. My case is funny. My wife is a kibeï. She answered "yes". She was thinking of me. When I went in I told the fellow that my father was in Japan and I wanted to see him. He said, "That means "no", "no", and put it down. I didn't mean it that way. My father went back to Japan in 1939. He intends to stay there. When this trouble broke out of course I was worried about him. Besides, I'm from Terminal Island and you know how we were treated. The men were all held at the immigration station; the women were left alone and didn't know what to do. But I know that I wouldn't get along in Japan. I've never seen the place and don't know anything about it. It would kill me if I couldn't follow the big league baseball teams and the football teams. My ambition is to see each big league team play on its home grounds.

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From a nisei from Terminal Island: by ^{the} name of Shiba, who is called "cowboy Shiba."

They call me that because I sing cowboy songs. I know all of those songs. I'm down as a "no, no". I came into that office and the soldier said, "I'll bet if I put you down "no, no" for you I'll be guessing right." I was going to answer "no" anyway. I let it go and walked out.

We want to know what the score is. We never know what the score is. There's always something behind that we don't know. That's why we're suspicious, that's why we don't like to say "yes" to anything.

Right now we don't know what these answers will mean to us. We don't know what is going to happen to a person who changes to "yes". We hear that all the "yesses" are going to be pushed out of here; are going to be made to relocate. They say that after segregation they are going to cut down the pay of those in the center to the point where they can't get along and are dissatisfied and will have to go out. We want to know something definite, what it means if we do one thing or the other. This way they get your answer first. Then they tell you, "Now you said 'yes' so we are going to do this or this with you." The government can do anything it wants with us. We are just like blind people trying to decide which way it would be best to go.

I'm from Terminal Island. Lot's of us don't want to relocate. We lost everything. They say we were evacuated

in 48 hours, but we didn't even have that. We had about 40 hours. Now they want to give us \$50 dollars and tell us to go to some place we don't know anything about. That's just about subsistence for three days for a family.

I've got a big family. If I go out how do I know that I can ever get back and see them again. You have to start with nothing.

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From a nisei named George (this was on his sweatshirt) to who refused/give his last name, saying: "What do you want to know my name for? I'll be here in Block 4 when you want me."

I've been "yes" on question 28 from the beginning. I've been out on furlough work several times. I have good recommendations. It doesn't do any harm. Now it looks as though my family will be split. My father says he is going to Tule Lake. I don't know whether he is going to change his answer from "yes" to "no". In fact, I don't know what his answer was. All I know is that he advised me to say "yes" to question 28. But now he says that all his friends are going to Tule Lake; they are all talking about it. And he wants to go too. My mother is sick. She has been in the hospital here. If my father goes I'll stay here and take care of her. There are several in the family that I have to take care of. I don't see how I could take care of all of them on the outside. I'm willing to go out to work

but I don't want indefinite leave.

What we want is information. What is the segregation center going to be? Is it going to be under ^{the} military? Will it be guarded more strictly and will the people have less privileges than here? Will the food be the same or worse? We hear all kinds of rumors about this. How do we know that those who are left in this center will not be forced ^{to go} out? When the first people came to this place they thought that they were going to work here and then go out. But they found that they were stuck here. They thought they were going to get wages too.

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From A Terminal Island nisei:

What is this change from "no" to "yes" going to mean. Are they going to tell all the "yes" people that they have to get out of here. I'm going to stay right here. Maybe I'll have a 5 or 6 year vacation. That's all right. I'm going to stay right in a center and eat. I'm lazy now. No, I don't like it here. But the government brought me here and I'm here. You read what happened in New York or Chicago or some place. Three nisei were stabbed to death. I'm not going to go out there and get stabbed in the back. Why didn't they bring Germans and Italians to places like this? Why didn't they ask them these questions too. The government should never have asked this question in the first place.

From another nisei:

After segregation will they let us go back of camp into the hills and let us go fishing? No one can get over the mountains; no one wants to run away from the Center anyway.

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From a male kibe:

When I left Japan and wanted to become an American citizen I left everything in Japan. I expected to be treated as an American citizen. I came to this country quite a while ago, about 13 years ago. I didn't go to school in this country but I have been in business here for some time and speak pretty good English. Yet when the Japanese-American war broke out I was treated as an alien. I was not even a dual citizen. That is why I answered "no, no".

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Chronological

Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
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SOURCE MATERIAL ON SEGREGATION AND RELOCATION

From Kazuyuki Takehashi of Block 35:

Is anything being done to stop the misunderstanding about sending everybody out of this camp after segregation? It's getting serious in my block. This was brought out in an election for Block Manager held last night. The Block Manager resigned. Really he was forced to resign. The people were not satisfied with his work; he didn't do anything that a Block Manager should do. He didn't make the announcements properly after a Block Managers' meeting. So two older people in the Block, representing the residents of the Block, told him that he ought to resign, that at a critical time like this when segregation is coming, we need someone who explains what is going on and is interested in his work.

So he resigned and last night we were to hold an election to choose his successor. About three men were nominated and they all declined on the grounds that they were going to change their answers from "yes" to "no" so they will be segregated. Their argument was that all who remain here after segregation will have to go out. No one challenged this idea. I didn't because while I don't believe it is so, I haven't the proof to go on. It has been the policy of

the government to prevent the "disloyal" from going out. Now the segregation will get rid of the "disloyal". And there is a big drive on for relocation. Also the centers have been subjected to a great deal of criticism by congressmen and the newspapers. It all looks perfectly logical to the residents. They think the loyal will have to relocate.

Finally one man was nominated who said he would consider it for a few days. He didn't give the reason why he didn't accept right away. But I heard later from some of his friends that he too is considering changing his answer and going to Tule Lake and that is probably the reason. It looks like all the prominent people in our block are heading that way unless their worries are quieted down.

The whole thing is that the people are sick of this uncertainty. They want some security and peace. They are going to answer anything to get in a center where they can have it. The feeling is that as long as they are going to be pushed out again they might as well go to the segregation camp and feel secure for the duration.

I get the feeling that the majority of the administration is thinking in terms of how to get the people out. The residents are thinking in terms of how to remain in a center. So one side doesn't understand the other side's point of view, I guess.

Don't you think that most of the aliens do not give

a hoot whether they are considered loyal or disloyal by people on the outside? All they are interested in now is in living in peace and security during the war and in not getting pushed around. That will be the main thing in these answers from now on. Family unity and security is what matters to these people now.

People are getting madder and madder about relocation. There are lots of small gatherings with talk mostly in Japanese. They say: "Doggonit, the W.R.A. are doing their best to get us out in one way or the other. This segregation is just a trick to push relocation." I suppose these people figure that after segregation there will be nothing that will hold up relocation in the loyal camps.

There is another fantastic rumor going around. According to it, after segregation there will not be permitted in the loyal camps any Japanese music, any kendo, and flower making or anything that is Japanese. The old ladies were gathering around and talking about this. They were saying, "My goodness, if all these are going to be done away with, what will we have to do here in Manzanar." A few were laughing at them and telling them, "That can't happen." But they said they had heard it. Things like this influence the old people a great deal.

I also heard in Block 35 that everyone left in the center after segregation will get \$12 and there will be no clothing allowance. My wife's sister heard the same thing

in Block 28.

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From a nisei:

I'll tell you about one case, the Yamasaki family which lives at 14-7-2.

The father is old. He has a son in the army. The boy volunteered in January, 1941. This soldier has a younger brother in camp who is living with the father. The boy in camp is classified as a kibel. He is on the list to be segregated. The father wants to go with him because this son in camp is the only one he can fall back upon to look after him. So he has asked for an appointment with Mr. Merritt to see him and ask him if he can possibly go along with his son. He hasn't seen Mr. Merritt yet.

This kibel boy was over there about four years. He came back when he was about 18. He speaks English. He is tongue-tied a little. The boy really wants to go to Japan. The whole thing comes down to evacuation. That is the thing that made these kibel and many of these nisei say "no".

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From Tom Takahashi- 20-14-6.

I changed my answer long ago but I signed up anyway for an appointment with the hearing board because I want to ask a few questions. I hear that they are going to have a trade school here and send out those who are trained on relocation.

I don't want to relocate. I can take care of myself on the outside but I have four other mouths to feed. There is my father. He is 57 years old. He was a barber. He isn't doing anything now. He married my stepmother in Japan in 1932. He finally got her into this country on a visitor's permit in 1937. That permit has to be renewed every 6 months. Even through the war I have to fill out a renewal for her. I did it just about a month ago. A priest made out a very fine statement for her last time and I just copied that. It said that she had come to love this country and would become a citizen if she could. We asked for a law that would permit her to stay in this country permanently. These laws are passed by Congress for particular individuals. But it's impossible to do it in war time, I guess. My father and my step-mother have two small children. Because she has overstayed her time the immigration department has sent her a form to fill out. She has to request an extension of stay. It came a little while ago. She has these two children here, American citizens. Perhaps after the war, because of them, it can be arranged so that she can stay. If not, my father will return with her and I would probably go to take care of him. So I have to think of that.

I'm afraid that there will be quite a few changes from "yes" to "no" as a result of this ^{re-}registration. The reason is that talk is going around the camp asking why we should

be forced to answer this question. A good many say we'd be better off in a segregation camp where the government would be forced to take care of us.

The government has come out several times with the announcement that there will not be forced relocation. But the people have no faith in the government and this country because the policy changes every day. What we want to know, too, is whether there will be a disfranchising of the citizenship of those who expressed "no" sentiments.

From Tom Takahashi of 29714-6.

I have a letter from a fellow who is in the army at Fort Custer, Michigan. He was in there before the war started. His name is Kioshi Kido. He has a brother here in the Center, a younger brother named Isami. Kioshi wants his brother to relocate but the boy doesn't feel that the time is ripe yet. Kioshi is willing to come here on furlough after him and take him to Chicago and help him get a job if he is willing to come out.

Isami is a kibe; he doesn't speak English well. This older brother has been in Japan. He had to take the family to Japan when his father died. He was only 13 years old then. Because of economic conditions it was cheaper to live there then, that is why some of the family stayed there.

Isami is a quiet boy and easily influenced. He was influenced by others. When he came before Mr. Merritt he stood his ground and kept the "no, no" answer. Now he is

worried about it. He wants to leave the way open to go out but he doesn't want to go out yet. He reads the daily papers and it scares him.

Now, can this fellow get out if he wants to get out? Is there any chance for him to explain and change his answer?

His brother writes to me constantly. His brother has a lot of influence with him and wants him to remain in this country. His brother says this is the only country to live in.

They have a sister in Japan. She is now married. There is another brother there, I think. I'm not certain about the brother.

(Later) I told that fellow to come in and see you. But he has been discouraged by others who have been talking to him and says its no use. He says, "They won't give the kibei a chance. They are against the kibei."

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