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Political Ideology + Participant Observation ...

1989

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Political Ideology and Participant Observation: Nisei Social Scientists
in the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study, 1942-1945

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(Presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association
held in San Francisco, California, on December 30, 1989)

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On Independence Day 1942, twenty-six-year-old Charles Kikuchi, an American citizen of Japanese descent confined by his government in the Tanforan Assembly Center south of San Francisco, pondered in his diary the meaning of freedom and democracy. If the country at large was now really feeling "the grim realities of war," these had been acutely apparent to Kikuchi, his family, and his ethnic community from the outset of hostilities between his ancestral and native countries. In the wake of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government had apprehended and interned a substantial number of resident Japanese aliens, issei, deemed "potentially dangerous." Ten weeks later, following President Franklin D. Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, the remaining alien Japanese population and their American-born children, nisei—all told some 120,000 people, two-thirds possessing citizenship—were prohibited from living, working, or traveling in specified military zones on the West Coast. This exclusionary policy initially was placed on a "voluntary" basis, but by late March it had been supplanted by an involuntary uprooting and removal to fifteen hastily improvised detention centers, built largely within fairgrounds and race tracks (such as Tanforan), that the Army operated through its newly created quasi-civilian agency, the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA). As for Kikuchi, in early May he had curtailed his university studies across the bay in Berkeley to join his parents and five younger siblings at Tanforan where, as occupants of converted stable 10, stall 5, they became members of a barbed wire girded, military police guarded "community" that by the Fourth of July totaled 8,000 people. "I get so tired of the flag waving," decried Kikuchi,

This war must mean more than that. It is supposed to represent a way of life to us. We can only hope that it will turn out this way in the post war period. . . . The Japanese here are not disloyal. But we may as well be realistic about it. How can the democratic victory be applied to all minority groups in this

country? It certainly won't be any better unless we fight for it now since the Caucasian American won't change his attitudes too much. These questions do prevent many Nisei from not being more positively American. It is difficult to reconcile some things that have happened with true Democracy. Negroes are sent out to Australia to fight for Democracy; at home they don't get a full share of it. Nisei boys serve faithfully in the army; their parents are sent to Tanforan. Our problem is getting it to work better as well as to preserve it in this war. Unless we do this, we risk losing the essence of the whole thing we are defending on the war fronts of the world.¹

While Kikuchi had accepted with relative equanimity the abrogation of his freedom as a sacrifice in the fight against fascism, he was not prepared to be stripped of his constitutional rights as an American citizen without offering stiff resistance. A case in point was freedom of the press. Remarked Kikuchi, the star reporter for the camp's internee-staffed newspaper, the Tanforan Totalizer: "We . . . had fireworks [today] as far as the paper was concerned." That week's edition--containing three "questionable" submissions by Kikuchi, including one on the Constitution--had been distributed without receiving the mandated double-check by camp authorities. Consequently, staffers were obliged to retrieve all 2,500 copies of the Totalizer, editor Taro Katayama was "given hell," and the Army clamped a triple-checking approval policy on the paper.

The next week, a Katayama editorial was rejected for quoting a comment from the latest Pacific Citizen, the Japanese American Citizens League's newspaper published at the JACL's transplanted wartime office in the "free zone" of Salt Lake City. The offending passage, which the irrepressible Kikuchi advised Katayama to "run anyway," pertained to a recent indignity suffered by a nisei with the surname of Suzuki:

What happened to Citizen Suzuki and 70,000 other American-born Japanese in the first year of America's war for world freedom is already a chapter in American history. . . . The facts are all there. . . . Only the human side of the picture remains to be filled in. . . . Historians need documentation. The men who will write the human picture of the greatest forced movement of people in American history will do so from the personal records of the people themselves. . . . We hope that Citizen Suzuki is keeping a record of his experiences and his times.² (emphasis added)

This assault on the freedom of the press incensed Katayama. Before the month was out, he was grumbling to Kikuchi that he didn't "give a damn about the paper because it is so limited and could not have any value as social documentation." Kikuchi, whose "Your Opinion" column was arguably the newspaper's most popular feature, agreed with Katayama, though he opined that the Totalizer was not being published "for social documentation but as a service with an eye to raising morale [and giving] some picture of the Nisei to the outsiders that happened to get a hold of the paper."³ Though not saying so directly, doubtless Kikuchi felt that the University of California-sponsored Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS), the interdisciplinary project for whom he maintained his diary at Tanforan and who had just confirmed his imminent employment as a participant-observer at the newly constructed Gila Relocation Center in southcentral Arizona, would tackle the significant task of social documentation.

The purpose for adducing the foregoing skein of facts has not been to enter the current debate over the nature and degree of censorship exercised against the internee press in the WCCA assembly centers, such as Tanforan, and the ten semipermanent relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority (WRA), like Gila, that superseded them.⁴ Rather, it has been to provide a point of departure and an

analytical context for bringing together and mutually illuminating two late advances in the historiography of Japanese America—the configuring of competing political styles within the nisei generation and the assessment of the performance of selected nisei social scientists who, like Charles Kikuchi, were charged with documenting the Japanese American Evacuation for JERS. After discussing these two historiographical developments, this paper will argue that the pervasive political approach to social change among the principal nisei participant observers in JERS was "progressive" (i.e., left-liberal to radical), that this ideological perspective predisposed them toward a policy of "critical" as against "constructive" cooperation with respect to the Evacuation, and that this predisposition, in turn, manifested itself in the extensive personal-cum-social-scientific data they produced for JERS and, perforce, for future historical interpretation.

Nisei Political Styles

Although the motion picture industry in this country continues to depict ethnic minority communities as monolithic enclaves whose members have been incapable of resisting racism through purposeful and consequential self-activity,⁵ this baleful situation is being somewhat redressed by practitioners of the new ethnic studies. Much of their scholarship has revolved around questions of conflictual power relations, both of an internal and external variety, and emphasized the agency of complex and dynamic community institutions and human constituents.⁶

A striking example relative to the Japanese American community is the political sociologist Jerrold Haruo Takahashi 1980 doctoral dissertation, "Changing Responses to Racial Subordination: An Exploratory Study of Japanese American Political Styles." This study embraces the full sweep of the Japanese American past between the

late-nineteenth-century influx into the United States of the immigrant issei and the maturation of their sansei grandchildren during the late 1960s/early 1970s racial consciousness movement. However, it is only that portion pertaining to the interwar formation and World War II functioning of nisei sociopolitical perspectives which requires schematic restatement for the restricted objectives of this paper.⁷

During the two decades prior to the Second World War, the nisei combatted their subjugated status in America and sought to achieve racial equality and a positive identity through developing three major ideological perspectives or political styles: the cultural bridge; the American ideal; and the progressive. The first of the three emerged during the xenophobic period following World War I. Because it was palliative and not curative for the endemic discrimination confronted by the nisei, the "cultural bridge" perspective was modified and absorbed into the ideal of Americanization. This political style, which emphasized patriotism at the expense of ethnicity, steadily gained currency throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s. It was promulgated in West Coast urban centers by a few prominent nisei businessmen and culminated, institutionally, with the formation of the Japanese American Citizens League in 1930.

Within a decade, the JACL became the leading nisei organization, boasting fifty chapters comprised of some 5,600 dues paying members. Its leadership, both at the national and local levels, consisted chiefly of petty bourgeois, college educated men. Considerably older than the majority of nisei, they were commonly bilingual and responsive to the conciliatory temper and concerns of dominant issei organizations like the Japanese Association. Indeed, the JACL's "emphasis on legal and legislative change, along with extensive public relations work, paralleled the political style of the Japanese Association," while in matters of foreign policy, "the League often became the spokesman for the Issei in defense of Japan's role in the Far East."⁸

Central to the JACL's political style was "a staunch faith in the capacity of American institutions to promote economic and racial progress."⁹ Positively, this faith was expressed through an appeal to the nisei generation to "lower the anchor" into the mainstream culture by pledging unqualified allegiance to their country of birth, exercising their civic duties through voting in local, state, and national elections, upholding the Constitution, and cherishing American political and economic ideals such as individualism, private property, and free enterprise. Negatively, it manifested itself in an aggressive posture toward any group or individual perceived as antithetical to America's capitalistic society or the classical republican virtues underpinning it. JACL leaders campaigned against excessive government regulation of the economy, unions and prolabor legislation, and radical "agitators," particularly Communists and alleged Communists. In spite of adopting an organizational policy of nonpartisanship, JACL leaders customarily aligned themselves with the Republican Party and its policies.

In the late 1930s, when the nisei were beset by the Depression and the deteriorating diplomatic relationship between Japan and the United States, a constellation of nisei liberal and radical groups repudiated the JACL leadership for being preoccupied with material possessions, status mobility on an individual basis, and "much too conservative in their approach to social change."¹⁰ United under the banner of "progressives," a term used "to circumvent the intense anti-left bias prevalent in the Japanese community,"¹¹ they fashioned a competing political style. Instead of urging nisei to lower their anchors, progressives aimed to raise their consciousness through offering a vocal and critical "left perspective on domestic, international and community issues."¹²

Progressive groups like the Los Angeles and Oakland branches of the Nisei Young Democrats consisted of a predominantly working-class membership augmented by

some college students and a few card-carrying Communists. Domestically, these economically less privileged and socially more alienated "young bloods" established four priorities: (1) to work on behalf of New Deal slates at the national, state, and local levels; (2) to promote legislation expanding rights and opportunities for racial minority groups, even if to do so required confrontation tactics; (3) to support the demands of unions for better wages and working conditions, especially those, like the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), stressing racial equality and solidarity; and (4) to resist "domestic fascism," whether in the form of racism, "red" baiting, or attacks on the labor movement. Internationally, they "clearly opposed the rise of militarism in Japan and Germany and openly voiced their fears about fascist threats to world democracy."¹³ Transcending myopic cultural nationalism, they condemned Japan's invasion of China and picketed ships in major West Coast ports loading war materials destined for Japan.

Neither the ideology and political style of the JACL nor that of the progressives appealed to the nisei rank and file, most of whom were still in their teens, lacked political consciousness and experience, and were economically dependent upon their ethnic community. Whereas the former struck them as unsubstantial, snobbish, and insular, the latter appeared to be subversive of democracy and deviant to accepted subcultural norms. That the JACL ultimately prevailed in the intragenerational struggle for dominance with progressive groups like the Nisei Young Democrats was probably due to the combination of the following factors: (1) its orientation was more particularistic (i.e., stressed ethnic as against class and racial issues); (2) its program, especially at the local level, revolved more around purely social activities; and (3) its approach to social change was more compatible with the cultural values of mainstream America.

When the rapidly eroding relationship between the United States and Japan during 1941 made a war between these two powers probable, the JACL and progressives were drawn into a tenuous alliance. For their part, the JACL disassociated itself from the Japanese Association and ceased its role as an apologist for Japan's incursions into China and southeast Asia. Simultaneously, JACLers suppressed their ethnicity and adopted a chauvinistic Japanese American creed capstoned by the slogan of "Better Americans in a Greater America." As for progressives, they reacted to the deepening crisis by de-emphasizing their political differences with the JACL and by muting their critique of American institutions and practices.

Pearl Harbor and the impending Evacuation transformed the JACL-progressive alliance into a working consensus. After the imprisonment of issei leadership, federal and military authorities, responding to the JACL's numerical superiority and greater resonance with the wartime mandate for unambiguous national loyalty, accorded the JACL the role of official representative for the Japanese American community. Although progressive groups continued to be wary of the League's political philosophy, they conceded that, given the intense climate of anti-Japanese sentiment, the JACL was best situated to mobilize community resources and chart a course of action.

After the JACL resolved to cooperate with and not resist the government's evacuation policy, progressives affirmed this position--though they did so "with strikingly different ideological imperatives."¹⁴ As explained by national secretary Mike Masaoka, the League's principal spokesperson during this juncture, the JACL's stance of "constructive cooperation" was a pragmatic one.

[It] did not waive the unconstitutionality of the evacuation process, nor was it an admission of guilt and disloyalty. Furthermore, cooperation did not mean that Japanese Americans were compromising their rights as American citizens. Rather, the JACL felt that this strategy would improve their rights at a later time. It simply meant a temporary suspension of their rights in order that all their rights could be secured in the future.¹⁵

Progressives, on the other hand, pursued a policy of "critical cooperation" toward the Evacuation. This policy was premised on the notion that the fight for democracy and against fascism and militarism, not the Evacuation, was the primary issue at stake. Their compliance, therefore, was driven by an urgency for national unity. Although progressives pledged their full cooperation in the war effort, they reminded the government that, in times of crisis, it must be solicitous toward the constitutional rights of its citizens as well as the security of the nation. In this spirit, the Nisei Young Democrats of Oakland issued a policy statement proclaiming that the proposed mass evacuation was "inconsistent with the democratic principles in which we believe and for which we fight" and predicting, darkly, that "suspension now of democratic principles for some may mean permanent loss for all."¹⁶ To prevent this development, "many progressives joined the JACL with the intention of moving the League in a more progressive direction."¹⁷ Significantly, Larry Tajiri, a prominent community journalist and the "godfather" of the Nisei Young Democrats in Oakland and San Francisco, agreed to assume the editorship of the League's newspaper, the Pacific Citizen, a strategic position from which to promote the progressive philosophy.¹⁸

Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study

During the interval between Pearl Harbor and the Evacuation, while the JACL and progressives groups were cementing their coalition, Dorothy Swaine Thomas, a social demographer and professor of rural sociology at the University of California, Berkeley,¹⁹ was busily engaged in assembling the necessary pieces—scholarly guidance, governmental sanction, operational expenses, and trained personnel—for an ambitious study of the enforced mass migration of the entire West Coast Japanese American population. Aided by her husband W. I. Thomas, the eminent sociologist and coauthor of the seminal immigration study, The Polish Peasant,²⁰ she gathered together an impressive cadre of interdisciplinary, social-scientific colleagues on the Berkeley campus to conceptualize the contours of her projected study.²¹ Official approval was extended by Milton Eisenhower, the newly appointed director of the War Relocation Authority, the agency created to administer the planned detention of Japanese Americans.²² Financial support, ultimately totaling over \$100,000, was garnered from foundation grants and university subsidies.²³ As for staff, both in the Berkeley campus central office and in the field at designated detention camps, it was determined that these were to consist predominantly of selected social science students—graduate and undergraduate, Caucasian and Japanese American—connected with the University of California.²⁴

Until the 1980s, virtually the only published accounts of this significant endeavor, the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS), were found in the prefaces to the three official and one unofficial project volumes issued in the postwar period. However, during the present decade, as part of the upsurge in public interest in the wartime experience of Japanese Americans, scholarly attention has been

accorded the involvement in the Evacuation of social scientists, including those affiliated with JERS. One former evacuee, the anthropologist Peter Suzuki, was the first scholar to take up both the larger and the more specific dimensions of this topic.²⁵ In addition to being polemical, Suzuki has not paid substantive attention in his writings to the part played by social scientists of Japanese ancestry, such as those associated with JERS. In contrast, the nisei historian Yuji Ichioka recently has edited an anthology, Views from Within: The Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, that is both mixed in its assessment of JERS's approach and accomplishment and includes essays by and about the project's Japanese American personnel.²⁶

In concluding his cogent introduction to Views from Within, Ichioka, surely with the work of Suzuki uppermost in mind, enters this caveat:

Today, with the benefit of hindsight combined with a political perspective derived from the 1960s, some may condemn JERS out of hand as an unethical research project with no redeeming value. Doubtless, such people would argue that it was carried out solely for the sake of academic professionalism. Those who reaped the benefits were Dorothy Thomas and those JERS staff members who were able to advance professionally as a result of their participation in JERS. On the other hand, Japanese-Americans, the objects of JERS research, gained nothing--JERS neither improved their condition or status, nor promoted their political interests, either during the wartime years or after. Indeed, some may go so far as to argue that JERS was fundamentally inimical to Japanese-Americans. Detached or divorced from their interests as it were, JERS was necessarily for the benefit of others.²⁷

Ichioka then goes on to argue that the fact that JERS was a research project conducted within an academic framework instead of done "in the service of a political cause on behalf of Japanese-Americans" must not be construed to mean that it "has

no redeeming value." Indeed, observes Ichioka, "the JERS sources, especially those in the form of daily journals, diaries, life histories, and field reports, expressingly [sic] produced at [Dorothy] Thomas's insistence upon creating and preserving an empirical record of the internment experience, retain an enduring value because they lend themselves to the writing of a social history of concentration camp life."²⁸

Nisei Social Scientists in the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study

Although a considerable amount of the JERS source material referred to by Ichioka was produced by Caucasian and issei staffers,²⁹ the majority of it was generated by five nisei participant observers—Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, Tamie Tsuchiyama, Tamotsu Shibutani, James Minoru Sakoda, and Charles Kikuchi. On the basis of a preliminary investigation of their staggering wartime output of social-scientific data,³⁰ their assorted postwar writings,³¹ and lengthy, in-depth interviews with the latter two of these individuals,³² it appears amiss to suggest that these five people transacted their work for JERS "solely for the sake of academic professionalism" and that Japanese Americans "gained nothing" from their efforts. Because prior to the war all of these relatively young nisei social scientists had adopted a progressive political ideology, albeit to varying degrees, they approached the Evacuation and their participation in JERS from that perspective. Assuredly, they saw in JERS an opportunity to advance their academic and professional aspirations. At the same time, their political orientation and social consciousness militated against mere status seeking, such as that exhibited by JACLers both before the Evacuation and after their arrival at internment centers. Along with other progressives, they were "concerned about opportunity and mobility, but they looked at them from the standpoint of collective movement among the rank and file in contrast to the quest for

individual advancement implicit in the ideology of the JACL."³³ Thus, while there was a convergence of their beliefs and behavior with that of JACL leaders, who were widely reviled among the interned population for their self-seeking and complicity with the camp administration,³⁴ this critical philosophical difference shaped their work as social scientists. Certainly they did not establish the overarching framework for the research they did for JERS, but the relevant evidence suggests that JERS director Dorothy Thomas "gave minimal direction to the field research staff."³⁵ Accordingly, there was greater scope for staffers to select the phenomena they valued for "objective" documentation. Such a situation not only spared the participant observers some of the pain involved in splitting-off questions of knowledge from ones of value, but also served to facilitate the progressivist moral agenda for promoting democratic ideals and constitutional rights.

Due to time constraints, only the experience of James Sakoda will be considered here, and that but suggestively.³⁶ However restrictive, this strategy commends itself on several scores: first, in a cohort group characterized by generational marginality, Sakoda represents one extreme of that social condition;³⁷ second, his period of service and research productivity matches or exceeds that of the other JERS participant observers;³⁸ third, he worked for JERS in a multiplicity of research settings.³⁹ fourth, he is the only nisei participant observer to be listed as a contributor on two of JERS's authorized postwar publications;⁴⁰ fifth, of the core JERS nisei, he was one of only two who officially joined the JACL during the war;⁴¹ and finally, he was among the trio of nisei participant observers to base their doctoral dissertations on their JERS fieldwork.⁴²

Sakoda, who has characterized himself as a "conservative nisei," was born in 1916 in Lancaster, California, but at age five moved with his family to the Little

Tokyo vicinity of Los Angeles, where he was brought up in strict conformity with traditional Japanese practices and values, and largely apart from Americanizing influences. Owing to the Depression, his father, who managed a credit union and money lending business, was forced to relocate the family to the rural southern boundary of Los Angeles County, where he ran a hog farm. In 1933, when Sakoda had still not completed high school, his father decided to return to Hiroshima, Japan, and was accompanied there by his wife and four children. Ironically, during the next six years, while Sakoda attended a commercial school and studied Japanese and Chinese classics at a university, he became, as he later put it, "more Americanized than I had ever been." As a member of the Hiroshima Nikkei Club, he socialized almost exclusively with nisei whose situation was similar to his own and enjoyed, as he would afterward recall, "probably the happiest time of my life." So Americanized did he become, in fact, that in 1939 he left his parents in Japan and returned to California to continue his college education.⁴³

After a year at Pasadena Junior College, during which he worked as a "schoolboy" and farm laborer, he transferred in the fall of 1940 to the University of California, Berkeley, as a general education and psychology student. There he roomed with Kenny Murase, a nisei undergraduate who was active in assorted left-wing campus clubs and causes and also belonged to the Nisei Young Democrats of Oakland, which numbered ten or so college students, and a smaller number of Communists, like Mary, Nori, and Kazu Ikeda, and outspoken non-Communists like Michio Kunitani and Harno Najima, both of whom Dorothy Thomas later employed for JERS. Through the Nisei Young Democrats, too, Murase became friends with members of the Nisei Writers and Artists Mobilization for Democracy.⁴⁴ The NWAMD, according to a highly romanticized

manuscript written by Murase during the spring of 1942, was led by such nisei progressives as:

Tomomasa Yamazaki, who once rejected a lucrative position with the Japanese consulate because he did not choose to "sell out to fascism"; Isamu Noguchi, noted sculptor whose works reveal a profound social consciousness; Taro Katayama, a young intellectual; Eddie Shimano, who openly declared himself for China and actively campaigned for its support at the outset of the Japanese aggression; [and] Larry Tajiri, widely respected liberal and pioneer Nisei journalist.⁴⁵

In a matter of months, Yamasaki would be on the editorial staff of the Manzanar Free Press, Shimano and the aforementioned Katayama would be editing the papers at two others assembly centers, Santa Anita and Tanforan, while Tajiri, as earlier noted, would be occupying the editorial chair for the JACL-sponsored Pacific Citizen.⁴⁶

Although Sakoda never penetrated the periphery of either of these two progressive groups,⁴⁷ he was well aware of and influenced by their political orientation. Moreover, through Murase he came into contact with "the more marginal" of the approximately 500 nisei students on the Berkeley campus, among whom were future JERS coworkers Tom Shibutani and Charles Kikuchi, individuals who, to quote Sakoda, were "both outside of organized Nisei groups and even disliked Nisei groups." Both Kikuchi and his brilliant roommate, Warren Tsuneishi, who was nicknamed "Wang" in tribute to his ostentatious support of China in the Sino-Japanese war,⁴⁸ traveled in the same progressive circles as Murase, and they, doubtless, affected Sakoda's politicization. In turn, Sakoda assisted the political education of Murase, Kikuchi, Tsuneishi, and some of the other campus progressives. "Jimmy," explained Murase, "was less a dreamer . . . [and] more of a logician. With six years spent in Japan, Jimmy was

in a position to make a comparative estimate of Fascism and democracy; he supplied us with the facts to substantiate what we felt to be the situation under fascist oppression."⁴⁹

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, both Sakoda and Kikuchi were introduced to Dorothy Thomas by Shibutani, one of her students. She needed qualified nisei to compile social documentation for a projected study on the pending removal and detention of Japanese Americans. Since the three of them were interested in social science or social work careers and were already collecting data on the unfolding crisis in their ethnic community, it was arranged that they would be put on JERS's payroll.⁵⁰

As it turned out, Shibutani and Kikuchi went to the nearby Tanforan camp, but Sakoda was interned in central California at the Tulare Assembly Center.⁵¹ There he remained for one month, until he was transferred to the Tule Lake Relocation Center on the California-Oregon border in mid-June of 1942. The journal/diary he maintained at Tulare and the few short reports he wrote there reveal his progressive perspective. What most worried him was that the camp administration had permitted JACLers to self-appoint a temporary community council consisting almost exclusively of former JACL chapter presidents, active members, and others "connected with influential Japanese firms." As one diary entry clarifies, Sakoda sparred with one of these former chapter officers who thought it quite "normal" that the council should be formed and dominated by the JACL." Sakoda sharply disagreed: "I told him the advisability of holding an election right away to carry through democratic principles. He asked whether the people weren't disappointed with Democracy. I told him that we were heading for deportation after the war if something weren't done about it, and this seems to have impressed him."⁵²

Because Thomas had designated the Tule Lake camp as JERS's major "social laboratory," she sent there not only Sakoda, but also Shibutani, Frank Miyamoto, and several other project members.⁵³ During his fourteen-month tenure at Tule Lake, Sakoda, as his diary and correspondence to Thomas disclose, felt pressured to master social science theory, field research methodology, and transact a series of structural and dynamic reports on camp life, while averting internee suspicions that he was a government spy or an administrative informer. As Tule Lake was rife with internee resistance—strikes, work slowdowns, boycotts—Sakoda was preoccupied observing and capturing this activity for JERS,⁵⁴ though he did teach a psychology course for the adult education program and, significantly, act as his block's representative to the camp's consumer cooperative.⁵⁵ Accordingly, he was, by his own admission, more of an observer than a participant. Privately, some of his acquaintances expressed the opinion that he was "too cold and scientific," that he looked at the interned population "only as specimens to be studied," and that he had "moral integrity, but knew the advantages and disadvantages of situations, too."⁵⁶ The extraordinary pressure he felt was partly responsible for his conveying this impression; so also was the fact that he and his siblings lived in a block peopled by "strangers" from the rural Sacramento area. Fortunately, his diary indicates the nature of his relatively private—and progressivist—existence in this concentration camp. We discover that his nonprofessional reading consisted of proletarian novels like John Steinbeck's In Dubious Battle and John Dos Passos's USA and social reform nonfiction literature like Louis Adamic's From Many Lands and Carey McWilliams's Brothers Under the Skin.⁵⁷ We learn, too, that this eligible bachelor ruminated about the sort of woman that he wanted to marry—that she be more of a "companion," and not "too middle class and conventional."⁵⁸ We are also told that he was bothered by the "bootlicking" political

style of JACL camp leaders who "played the role expected by the Caucasian group with the assumption that this would achieve the greatest amount of rights for the Japanese people."⁵⁹ Further, we find that he believed social work harmful "because only enough of it was done to keep the present socio-economic setup, and kept people from revising the whole system, which was really at fault,"⁶⁰ and that nisei, if they wanted to advance, "should join labor unions."⁶¹

Notwithstanding Sakoda being impressed with the power of mass political action exerted by the "residents" of Tule Lake to redress injustices stemming from the camp's disproportionate power arrangements, at one point, during the "loyalty" registration crisis of early 1943, he became victimized by such mass action.⁶² The public position he took on that occasion—to permit people to decide for themselves whether they wanted to register and that it was crucial for nisei to protect their citizenship rights—was unpopular, even perilous, and perhaps injudicious—yet it was consistent with his progressive philosophy and commitments. For a number of weeks, he was socially ostracized by his block neighbors, treated like an inu (i.e., dog, informer), and threatened with bodily harm.⁶³ So, too, were his JERS coworkers, Shibutani and Miyamoto, who were so intimidated that shortly thereafter they left Tule Lake to work on the resettlement stage of the study in Chicago.⁶⁴ During the darkest hour of the crisis, a badly shaken Shibutani paid Sakoda a commiserative visit. "We discussed future possibilities," relates Sakoda in his diary on February 23,

but we could only come to the conclusion that his study and mine for a PHD thesis had not been in vain. The only thing was that we would not be able to continue it to its logical conclusion. The story of the Japanese people in camps are [sic] going to be written up by someone, and if the Japanese themselves do

not take a hand in it, then the Caucasians are going to write it without being able to get the Japanese side of the story very clearly.⁶⁵

Sakoda weathered the storm. In a few weeks, not only was he able to reconstitute normal relations with his neighbors, but some troubled nisei even sought his counsel as to the course they should steer with respect to the registration.⁶⁶ Moreover, when the WRA announced subsequently that Tule Lake would be converted into a segregation center for those in the ten camps deemed "disloyal" on the basis of their response to the registration and that "loyal" Tuleans would be removed to several other centers, Sakoda assumed an active and constructive role in effecting this transition. Both as an official interviewer and as a behind-the-scenes wire-puller, he helped ensure that the segregation process was transacted humanely and prudently. "In this segregation process," confided Sakoda to his diary in August 1943, "I have been more of a participant than in other incidents. . . . While I could have been satisfied with the role of an observer, just watching how the officials will handle the situation and how the people react, I can't help wanting to point out the mistakes that are being made by the former and the misunderstanding on the part of the latter. This can be based on a desire for leadership and attention, but is probably also due to identification with the interest of the evacuee."⁶⁷

Though Thomas proposed to transfer Sakoda to JERS's "check site" at the Gila Relocation Center in Arizona, he desired to marry a woman he had met in Tule Lake and to accompany her, her family, and 1,700 other "loyal" Tuleans to the Minidoka center in Idaho. His wish was granted. In that camp, from the beginning, Sakoda, although producing a prodigious amount of documentation, was more a participant than an observer. Heretofore, Minidoka had been a "quiet" camp, characterized by a benevolent administration and an accommodating appointed leadership. To Sakoda and

many of the other incoming Tuleans, who had been politicized by their Tule Lake experience, it appeared that the Minidoka administration was becoming increasingly dictatorial and its internee leadership more concerned with gaining personal preferments than fighting for the rights of the camp population. Accordingly, although Thomas had cautioned JERS personnel to stay out of camp politics, Sakoda found himself documenting persisting and escalating work walkouts, strikes, and related dissidence,⁶⁸ as well as working on behalf of establishing a democratically elected camp council. Moreover, after its establishment, he accepted its labor relations adviser post and investigated labor practices and conflicts (though eventually resigning when his researcher role was threatened).⁶⁹ However, he continued to take part in a "political clique" whose four-person core of internees and anti-administration Caucasian personnel dedicated themselves to democratizing Minidoka's system of inequitable governance.⁷⁰ He also documented and attempted to mitigate the harsh, unfeeling policy the Minidoka administration took toward internees during the camp's closure period, not leaving the center until it had been completely vacated in June 1945.⁷¹

Epilogue

A few months prior to transferring from Tule Lake to Minidoka, Sakoda was sent by Thomas to visit the Arizona centers of Gila and Poston. On his return to California, he stopped off at Salt Lake City. There he bumped into a former progressive friend from his Berkeley days who took him to a discussion session with a group of left-leaning nisei settlers. They voiced their anti-JACL feelings, probed the possibility of "concerted action with the labor unions," and considered the advisability of political alignment with other oppressed minority groups. "The group," noted Sakoda in his diary, "is rather reminiscent of the Oakland YD [Young Democrats]."

While in Salt Lake City, he also called at the national JACL office. There he encountered Larry Tajiri and two new progressive assistants, Dyke Miyagawa and Bob Tsuda, on his Pacific Citizen staff. Tajiri clearly impressed Sakoda, telling him how he had a free hand in running the newspaper. Flaunting copies of the Progressive Monthly, Tajiri proclaimed that nisei "should not be drafted until their full rights are returned, including the right to return to California," and boasted that the JACL was involved in filing briefs with the Supreme Court in support of the major Evacuation test cases and contesting anti-Japanese legislation at the state level. "I felt," Sakoda later wrote, "that Larry was different from other JACL leaders. . . . Larry is all right." Before leaving, Sakoda was arm-twisted into joining the JACL, which he did, though with mental reservations. "While there is a possibility of change in the JACL structure," he remarked in his diary, "the Old Guards still seem to be holding firm."⁷²

A year later, Sadoka left Minidoka to attend a JERS conference in Salt Lake City. While there, Tajiri invited Sakoda and a few other JERS staffers to attend a dinner party whose guest list included JACL national president Saburo Kido. This experience left Sakoda and his JERS associates cold. No longer did Tajiri strike Sakoda as "quite liberal in view," particularly in regard to the Pacific Citizen's treatment of those nisei who had protested the Department of War's recent policy to draft them out of the camps into a segregated military unit. Tajiri's "use of the word 'draft-dodger'," said Sakoda in his diary, "especially was distasteful to me because it showed a lack of sympathy. To other members of the staff it represented 'flag-waving' and the expression of 120 per cent Americanism." It also shocked Sakoda and the others that Tajiri wanted to have the government suppress the three vernacular newspapers published in Colorado and Utah because they were "distorting the minds of the center residents."

Worse still was the commentary of Kido, an attorney who had been badly beaten by internees at the Poston center for his aggressive Americanism. In Kido's opinion, nisei who remained in the centers and refused to relocate "were all hopeless," especially "the 'draft-dodgers'." Kido, too, "thought it was dangerous to associate with Negroes because of their extreme attitude," citing as an example his experience at a race-relations meeting when a black woman had upbraided him for his attitude toward the enjoined nisei draft resisters, saying, "You shouldn't be against your own people." Finally, Kido, according to Sakoda, flatly stated: "I believe in my country right or wrong." So embarrassing was this statement to Togo Tanaka, a vernacular journalist who was then part of JERS but had barely escaped being murdered for his JACL connections while interned at the Manzanar camp in 1942, that he "tried to point out to him [Kido] that intelligent persons didn't say things like that."⁷³

Upon returning to Minidoka, Sakoda got embroiled in a discussion with the anthropologist Elmer Smith, the camp's community analyst and a member of Sakoda's political clique considered very supportive of the internees. On this occasion, however, he and Sakoda were at swords' points--over the role of the JACL. Whereas Sakoda contended that the JACL lacked the people's support in the camps, Smith felt that its leadership had been correct in exaggerating their patriotism because this was the message Caucasians wanted to hear. The brief account of their exchange in Sakoda's diary, because it so vividly juxtaposes the political styles of the JACL and the progressives, seems a fitting end to this paper on the conjunction between political ideology and participant observation within the context of the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study.

He [Smith] emphasized over and over again the necessity of winning the support of the CAUCASIANS. That he referred to a certain type of Caucasian became evident when he stated that the Niseis in New York had made the mistake of becoming mixed up with COMMUNISTS!!!, and had lost the support of such persons as Pearl Buck. He also pointed out the danger of being aligned with certain 'hotheaded' Negro groups. The JACL had the support of the CAUCASIANS, and therefore it was all right. I tried to point out that it didn't have to exaggerate its behavior to the extent that it was all out of sympathy with its own group. I pointed out, for instance, that it didn't have to worship the WRA blindly, as it seemed to be doing.

I kept to my argument. Leaders who did not have the support of the following were not functioning as leaders.⁷⁴

Endnotes

1. "Charles Kikuchi Diary" (July 4, 1942), Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Hereafter cited as "Kikuchi Diary."
2. "Kikuchi Diary" (July 4, 8, 1942).
3. Ibid. For a more accessible, though abridged, version of this episode, see John Modell, ed., The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle From An American Concentration Camp (Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1973), 160-68.
4. See Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps," 15 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 70-79, and Barry Saiki, letter to the editor, in Pacific Citizen, 13 October 1989, 5. During World War II, Saiki served as one of several editors of the camp newspaper at the Rohwer War Relocation Center

in Arkansas. According to Saiki, among his closest friends while an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, on the eve of the war were three individuals later connected with JERS: Tamotsu Shibutani, James Sakoda, and Charles Kikuchi. See Barry Saiki, "The Uprooting of My Two Communities," in Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, ed. Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H. L. Kitano (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986), 15-16.

5. See, for example, K. Cha-Jua, "Mississippi Burning: The Burning of Black Self-Activity," Radical History Review 45 (Fall 1989): 125-36. The same production team responsible for Mississippi Burning, which is centered on the Civil Rights movement for blacks, has recently completed the shooting of a fifteen million dollar companion film relative to the Japanese American Evacuation; entitled Come See the Paradise, it is scheduled for public release in 1991.

6. For a very recent example of this genre pertinent to the Mexican American political experience, see Carlos Munoz, Jr., Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1989).

7. Jerrold Haruo Takahashi, "Changing Responses to Racial Subordination: An Exploratory Study of Japanese American Political Styles" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1980), especially chapters 3 and 4 ("The Formation of Competing Political Styles" and "The Internment Experience and the Rising Significance of Americanization"), 110-218. Hereafter cited as "Japanese American Political Styles." For a slightly revised version of the third chapter of this study, see Jere Takahashi, "Japanese American Responses to Race Relations: The Formation of Nisei Perspectives," Amerasia Journal 9 (Spring/Summer 1982): 29-57. Hereafter cited as "Nisei Perspectives." The balance of this section of the paper represents but a digest of the relevant chapters in Takahashi's dissertation plus his article. In mechanically adapting Takahashi's analysis, I have robbed it of its textured, nuanced character and jettisoned his deftly strategic use of Karl Mannheim's concept of "generational unit," Antonio's Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, Max Weber's idea of legitimation, and neo-Marxist class analysis.

"The term style," asserts Takahashi in an explanatory note on the first page of his dissertation, "refers to the unique methods and techniques Japanese Americans have

devised to deal with the problems of racism and discrimination. It tries to capture not only the influence of distinctive group characteristics but also the impact of larger political and economic realities of the dominant society on this ethnic community. Also, the notion of style seeks to portray members of the community, their leadership and their ideologies as active parts of the socio-historical process."

8. Takahashi, "Nisei Perspectives," 38.

9. Takahashi, "Japanese American Political Styles," 129.

10. Takahashi, "Nisei Perspectives," 41.

11. Takahashi, "Japanese American Political Styles," 140.

12. Ibid.

13. Takahashi, "Nisei Perspectives," 46.

14. Takahashi, "Japanese American Political Styles," 180.

15. Ibid., 162.

16. As cited in *ibid.*, 182.

17. Ibid., 151.

18. For Tajiri's critical role in the formation of both the progressivist Japanese American Democratic Club of San Francisco and the Nisei Young Democrats of Oakland, see *ibid.*, 143. The appellation of "godfather" is attributable to James Matusmoto Omura, the former editor of the prewar nisei progressivist magazine Current Life. See Omura's rejoinder to Takahashi's above cited 1982 article as well as the present author's interview with him, respectively, in the Amerasia Journal 10 (Spring/Summer 1983): 101-104, particularly page 103, and the Amerasia Journal 13 (1986-87): 99-113, especially page 107.

19. See Yuji Ichioka, "JERS Revisited: Introduction," in Views From Within: The Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, ed. Yuji Ichioka (Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center, University of California at Los Angeles, 1989), 4-6. See also the obituary for Thomas (1899-1977) in the Washington Post, 3 May 1977.

20. For the influence on JERS of William Isaac Thomas (1863-1947) and The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, the five-volume study he coauthored with Florian Znaniecki between 1918 and 1920, see Dana Takagi, "Life History Analysis and JERS: Re-Evaluating the Work of Charles Kikuchi," in Ichioka, Views From Within, 198-202. For biographical information on Thomas and the Chicago School of Sociology of which he was a founder and key developer, see "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: A Landmark of Empirical Sociology," chapter four in Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 45-63, and Lester R. Kurtz, Evaluating Chicago Sociology: A Guide to the Literature, with An Annotated Bibliograph (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 1-97 passim, especially 30-34, 84-88, and 89-90.

21. According to Yuji Ichioka, in "JERS Revisited," 6, the University of California colleagues of Dorothy Thomas's connected at the outset with JERS were: "Robert H. Lowie of the Anthropology Department, Milton Chernin of the Social Welfare Department, Frank L. Kidner of the Economics Department, and Charles Aikin of the Political Science Department."

22. *Ibid.*, 6-7.

23. *Ibid.*, 6.

24. For a listing of these individuals along with their corresponding academic disciplines, see *ibid.*, 7.

25. See Peter T. Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans: A Documentary Study," Dialectical Anthropology 6 (1981): 23-60 and Peter T. Suzuki, "The University of California Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study:

A Prolegomenon," Dialectical Anthropology 10 (1986): 189-213. The first of these articles encompasses work transacted by those social scientists affiliated with two other groups that, apart from JERS, conducted research on Japanese Americans during their World War II detention experience: the War Relocation Authority's Community Analysis Section, which was headed up, successively, by the anthropologists John Embree and Edward Spicer and had community analysts stationed at each of the ten WRA centers, and the Bureau of Sociological Research (BSR), which was directed by the anthropologist-psychiatrist Alexander Leighton, restricted to the Poston center in Arizona, and run under the aegis of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Unlike JERS, both of these other projects were applied social-science efforts aimed specifically at improving camp administration. It is Suzuki's contention that many of these applied social scientists involved served as government intelligence agents and/or administrative spies. For a recent critical assessment of the WRA community analysts, see Orin Starn, "Engineering Internment: Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority," American Ethnologist 13 (November 1986): 16-36. Both the Community Analysis Section of the WRA and the Poston BSR included Japanese Americans, though to date virtually no attention has been accorded their contributions. Two JERS staffers, Richard Nishimoto and Tamie Tsuchiyama, originally were BSR affiliates. For a bibliography of the JERS material, see Edward N. Barnhart, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement: Catalog of Material in the General Library (Berkeley: University of California, General Library, 1958). Hereafter cited as Barnhart, JERS. The JERS collection also includes most of the work compiled by social scientists in the other two projects. For a complete bibliography of reports issued by the Community Analysis Section, see Estelle Rebec and Martin Rogin, comps., Records of the War Relocation Authority (Washington: National Archives, 1955), Record Group 210, Entry 16. Convenient access to the BSR material is available at Cornell University, where it was deposited by Alexander Leighton after the war. See D. Gesensway, M. Roseman, and G. Solomon, comps., Guide to the Japanese-American Relocation Centers Records, 1935-1953 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Cornell University, 1981).

26. For bibliographical data on this volume, which is based upon a two-day conference (organized and directed by Professor Yuji Ichioka) at the University of California, Berkeley, on September 19-20, 1987 entitled "Views from Within: The

Japanese-American Wartime Internment Experience," see fn. 19 above. Oddly, though the critical assessments of JERS in this volume are mixed, the promotional statements printed on the back cover by two authorities of the Japanese American wartime experience, Peter Irons and Richard Drinnon, closely correspond to the condemnatory perspective of Suzuki (whose essay "For the Sake of Inter-university Comity: The Attempted Suppression by the University of California of Morton Grodzins' Americans Betrayed," 95-123, is represented in the anthology). Essays in this volume about Japanese American personnel in JERS are: Lane Ryo Hirabayashi and James Hirabayashi's "The 'Credible' Witness: The Central Role of Richard S. Nishimoto in JERS," 65-94, and Dana Y. Takagi's "Life History Analysis and JERS: Re-evaluating the Work of Charles Kikuchi," 197-216; those by Japanese American personnel are: S. Frank Miyamoto's "Dorothy Swaine Thomas as Director of JERS: Some Personal Observations," 31-63, "Resentment, Distrust, and Insecurity at Tule Lake," 127-40, and "Reminiscences," 141-55; Charles Kikuchi's "Through the JERS Looking Glass: A Personal View From Within," 179-95; and James M. Sakoda's "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 219-45, and "The 'Residue': The Unsettled Minidokans, 1943-1945," 247-84.

27. Ichioka, "JERS Revisited," 22.

28. Ibid., 22-23.

29. The major Caucasian field researchers for JERS were the anthropologists Robert F. Spencer and Rosalie Hankey Wax and the sociologist Robert Billigmeier. Their writings are included in Barnhart, JERS. A retrospective article by Robert Spencer, who was stationed at the Gila center in Arizona, is included in Ichioka's Views From Within; see Robert F. Spencer, "Gila in Retrospect," 157-75. Rosalie Hankey Wax, who replaced Spencer at Gila and also did fieldwork at the Tule Lake center in California, has written about her experiences in Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 59-174. The principal issei researcher for JERS was Richard Nishimoto at the Poston center in Arizona. For a penetrating assessment of his role, see the essay in Views From Within by Lane Ryo Hirabayashi and James Hirabayashi, as cited in fn. 26.

30. For a list of their respective contributions to JERS, see Barnhart, *passim*. For Miyamoto, see especially 155-56, 167-69, 172; for Tsuchiyama, 17, 89-90; for Shibutani, 16, 158, 167-68, 172, 177; for Sakoda, 16, 157-58; and for Kikuchi, 100-101, 166-167, 169, 176.

31. Aside from the essays by Miyamoto, Kikuchi, and Sakoda included in Ichioka's Views From Within (see fn. 26 above), a number of other relevant studies by these three men should be consulted. For Miyamoto, see "The Career of Intergroup Tensions: A Study of the Collective Adjustments of Evacuees to Crises at the Tule Lake Relocation Center" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1950); for Shibutani, "Rumors in a Crisis Situation" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1944), "The Circulation of Rumors as a Form of Collective Behavior" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1948), Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); and The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); for Sakoda, "Minidoka: An Analysis of Changing Patterns of Social Interaction" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1949); and for Kikuchi, The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp, as cited in fn. 3 above.

32. James Sakoda, interview by Arthur A. Hansen, August 9-10, 1988, transcript, Japanese American Project, Oral History Program, California State University, Fullerton; Charles Kikuchi, interview by Arthur A. Hansen, August 1-3, 1988, transcript, Japanese American Project, Oral History Program, California State University, Fullerton. Both of these interviews were transacted in Rhode Island. The verbatim transcript for the former interview numbers 276 pages, and for the latter 390 pages. Specific quotations from these interviews have not been utilized in this paper since their transcripts need first to be reviewed and released, respectively, by Sakoda and the widow of the late Kikuchi.

33. Takahashi, "Japanese American Political Styles," 150.

34. A number of scholars have riveted attention on the widespread antipathy to the JACL in the World War II period. For one comprehensive treatment of this phenomenon, see Rita Takahashi Cates, "Comparative Administration and Management of Five War

Relocation Authority Camps: America's Incarceration of Persons of Japanese Descent During World War II" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburg, 1980). So deep and abiding was this antipathy, that it has persisted up to the present. Recently, in 1989, the JACL itself appointed an attorney connected with the the Asian American Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley, Deborah Lim, to investigate the policies and actions taken by the JACL during the WWII evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans. A final report of Lim's investigation is due for release in the spring of 1990. For details about Lim and the investigation, see Pacific Citizen, 19 May 1989. James Omura, the most vocal and vociferous critic of the JACL's wartime role, is presently completing a monograph on the subject that is due for publication within the next few years.

35. Miyamoto, "Dorothy Swaine Thomas," 39. See also, Kikuchi, "Through the JERS Looking Glass," 189; Spencer, "Gila in Retrospect," 160; and Sakoda, 223.

36. At this point in my research, I have not systematically and exhaustively purused the relevant documentation in JERS respecting Miyamoto, Tsuchiyama, and Shibutani, though all of them, especially Shibutani, appear to have been influenced by the same progressivist ideology and to reflect that outlook in their JERS writings. Shibutani, like Kikuchi and Sakoda, was a University of California, Berkeley, student who was active in leftist politics on that campus prior to Pearl Harbor. As for the political backgrounds of Tsuchiyama and Miyamoto, both of whom were somewhat older and had passed their doctoral qualifying examinations before the war, they remain shrouded and require exploration.

37. Sakoda was the only kibe (American-born but educated in Japan) participant observer in JERS. As a consequence, his marginality, unlike the other citizen observers, stemmed from his being more "Japanesy" than the typical nisei. At the other extreme, was Charles Kikuchi, who was raised in an orphanage bereft of any Japanese cultural influences and was thus marginal in relation to his ethnic generation because of this situation.

38. Sakoda was affiliated with JERS from 1942 to 1945. In addition to his journal, diary, and correspondence, he produced, by his own count, twenty-five interpretive

reports totalling over 1,800 pages. See Sakoda, "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 232.

39. Sakoda was a participant observer at the Tulare Assembly Center, the Tule Lake Relocation Center, and the Minidoka Relocation Center.

40. See Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage: Japanese-American Evacuation during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946) and The Salvage: Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952). The first of these volumes lists Sakoda, Rosalie A. Hankey, Morton Grodzins, and Frank Miyamoto as contributors, while the latter lists only Sakoda and Charles Kikuchi in this capacity. In addition to these two volumes, there existed a third authorized project publication, Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), and an unauthorized book, Morton Grodzins's Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). For an analysis of the conditions surrounding the publication process connected with these latter two volumes, see Suzuki, "For the Sake of Inter-university Comity."

41. The other nisei participant observer in JERS to affiliate with the JACL during the war was Charles Kikuchi, who became both a member and an officer at the Gila center in Arizona. Although his participation in the Gila JACL, the only chapter of the League to emerge in any of the camps, was substantial and spirited, it was enacted within a progressivist ideological perspective, as I intend to show in a forthcoming paper. For insight into the Gila JACL and Kikuchi's role in it, see Charles Kikuchi, "Development of Gila JACL" (July 1942), folder K 8.22, Gila Relocation Center, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study [GRC-JERS], Bancroft Library [BL], University of California, Berkeley [UCB].

42. Sakoda's dissertation, as well as the dissertations produced by Miyamoto and Shibutani, are cited in fn. 31 above.

43. See Sakoda, "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 220-21.

44. Ibid. See also the following two unpublished studies: James Sakoda, "As They Await Evacuation: The Impact of the War Between America and Japan on the Values of Different Types of Japanese on the West Coast" (April 22, 1942), 42-47, folder A 17.03, Reports and Observations by Evacuees, JERS, BL, UCB, and Kenny Murase, "I Protest," included in "Kikuchi Diary," March 29, 1943 (see fn. 1 above). For the part played by the Ikeda sisters in the Nisei Young Democrats of Oakland, see the interview with Kazu (Ikeda) Iijima by Glenn Omatsu in the Amerasia Journal 13 (1986-87): 83-98. Kunitani wrote only one report for JERS during his internment at the Tanforan Assembly Center, though this report clearly reveals his progressivist background and the progressive political agenda at Tanforan. See Michio Kunitani, "Tanforan Politics" (n.d.), folder B 8.29, Tanforan Assembly Center [TAC], JERS, BL, UCB. For the JERS contribution of Najima, see T. Shibutani, H. Najima, and T. Shibutani, "The First Month at the Tanforan Assembly Center for Japanese Evacuees" (n.d.), folder B 8.31, *ibid.*

45. Murase, "I Protest," 8.

46. Ibid.

47. Sakoda to Hansen, interview, 9-10 August 1988.

48. Murase, "I Protest," 6. See the tribute written by Tsuneishi, now the chief of the Library of Congress's Asian Division, to the memory of Charles Kikuchi (1916-1988) in Ichioka, Views From Within, vii.

49. Murase, "I Protest," 6.

50. See Sakoda, "Reminiscences," 221-22.

51. Ibid., 222; Modell, The Kikuchi Diary, 68.

52. See James Sakoda, "Report #3" (May 24, 1942), Tulare Assembly Center (TUAC), JERS, BL, UCB and James Sakoda, 30 May 1942 ("Journal: April 24 to June 14, 1942), folder B 12.20, *ibid*.

53. In addition, Thomas sent another nisei social scientist, Haruo Najima, plus a Caucasian fieldworker, Robert Billigmeier, to Tule Lake. Najima apparently did not write any reports for JERS while at Tule Lake, though the correspondence he carried on from there is available to researchers; see folder R 21.58, Tule Lake Relocation Center [TLRC], JERS, BL, UCB. For the various Tule Lake reports authored by Billigmeier, see folders R 20.01 through R 20.14, *ibid*.

54. See James Sakoda's Tule Lake journal and diary in folders R 20.83A-D, R 20.81A-Y, and R 20.82, *ibid*, *passim*.

55. Sakoda, "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 224-25.

56. Sakoda, "Diary" (April 10 and January 19, 1943), folder R 20.83A, TLRC-JERS, BL, UCB.

57. *Ibid* (March 8, 10 and March 11-12, 1943).

58. *Ibid* (September 7, 1943). See also the entries in his Tule Lake diary dated 11 March and 20 March 1943 where he comments about one female companion: "M's a fine girl, but our political ideas do not quite jive since she is a JACL supporter" and "M is a swell, considering girl, although she has a slightly-capitalistic bias and a feeling of superiority toward many of the Niseis."

59. *Ibid* (February 3, 1943) and Sakoda, "Journal" (December 5, 1942), folder R 20.81A, TLRC-JERS, BL, UCB. On Sakoda's attitude toward the JACL while at Tule Lake, see also the entries for October 4 and December 25, 1942, and February 10, 11, 1943), *ibid*.

60. *Ibid* (June 19, 1942).

61. Ibid (September 10, 1943).
62. See Sakoda's recollections about this experience in "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 228-29.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 233.
65. Sakoda, "Diary" (February 23, 1943), folder R 20.83A, TLRC-JERS, BL, UCB.
66. Ibid (March 9, 1943).
67. Ibid (August 19, 1943)
68. See in particular Sakoda's "Pickling Plant Conflict Report" (November 26, 1944) and "Warehouse Conflict Report" (April 1944), folders P 8.15 and P 8.20, both in Minidoka Relocation Center [MRC], JERS, BL, UCB, and Sakoda, "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 229. For a summary of this period at Minidoka, see Sakoda, "The 'Residue,'" 262-63.
69. Sakoda to Hansen, interview, 9-10 August 1988.
70. Ibid; Sakoda, "Reminiscences of a Participant Observer," 229-30.
71. See chapter ten, "Eviction," 321-60, in Sakoda, "Minidoka," and his summarization of same in "The 'Residue,'" 264-67.
72. Sakoda, "Diary" (June 19, 20, 22, 1943), folder R 20.83A, TLRC-JERS, BL, UCB.
73. Ibid (June 16, 1944).
74. Ibid (June 29, 1944).