

P4.00

May 10, 1943

MINIDOKA RELOCATION PROJECT
Community Analysis SectionJapanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

REPORT ON RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT

I Motives and elements behind reluctance to leave center:

There is little hesitancy on the part of the Nisei here at Minidoka to leaving the center. The majority of this group is looking forward to going out and is making plans along that line. A great many of them are merely waiting until they find in their words, "the right job." Others take unskilled labor jobs with the announced or planned intention of looking around for better jobs. As a group, then, the young married Nisei and those who have become of age are eager and anxious to establish themselves in new communities.

The older generation, however, on the whole do not want to leave the project. It is with this group that the first part of this paper is concerned.

The motives and elements that lie behind this reluctance to leave are many and complex.

1. Fear based on economic insecurity:

Probably the most vital aspect of this reluctance to leave is based on economic insecurity. Since the average age of the first generation people (Issei) is well over 50 years, the majority of the Issei do not have the courage to start life over again in a strange area.

The large proportion of the residents at Minidoka Center are from either Portland or Seattle and previously were making fair living. There is a definite reluctance on the part of many to take other than the same type of work they were doing before evacuation.

Having been isolated from the outside world for many months, the majority of these people have no true conception of living conditions on the outside. They hear and read reports of high prices, rationing, etc. and feel they must have higher wages than they were making before evacuation. Many estimate that

a monthly income of \$250 per month may not be enough for subsistence for a family of four or five. Some will not consider a job unless the wages are as high or higher than pre-evacuation days. There is little attempt to think in terms of gradual salary increase and to understand the point of view of the employer who must regard them as beginners. An Example of this is demonstrated by a highly trained professional worker who was offered a job beginning at \$2600 a year. Since the individual had made about \$4000 a year previously, he would not consider the job. There is almost a defeatist approach to job offers on a salary basis.

What do the Issei themselves say about going out and starting over in new communities?

First, there is the group who prior to the war ran their own businesses. These little shopkeepers, hotel keepers, and other small businessmen on the whole feel that they cannot afford to risk their savings in a strange community. Many of this group, however, would be willing to go out if they could get some sort of government supervision. Typical Issei comments along this line are: "It is doubtful that we can get enough wages to support our family, unless we run our own business. If the government will sponsor us we will be glad to go out." The Issei who were farmers, again as a group, are on the whole unwilling to settle in strange community where not only the people but methods of farming would be strange. Typical opinion of this group is:

"We are too old to start over again. If we buy a farm somewhere in the Middle West, it will take us five, or six years before we understand the land and crops. We have no assurance that we even can keep the land if we bought it or rent it. Why should we go to worn out areas and build up the land only to be thrown out after the war?"

The majority of this farm group look with longing eyes at the little truck and fruit farms they left on the West Coast. Many of this group plan on working on nearby farms during the summer months and returning to the Center next winter.

The group of older people who might be called ordinary workers are acutely aware of the difficulties that beset them. Because of their age only certain jobs are open to them and in addition many of them feel that they cannot find

jobs. Typical comment of this group is expressed as:

"We are different from the young people here. We don't know English very well and are getting old. Who would want to hire us anyway? Even if we get a job, it is doubtful that we could get enough wages to support our family."

Then there is a small group of old people past working age. Many of these are without close relatives and were living on old age pensions. For this group there is nothing to do but remain in the Center.

The predominant fear of the older group, thus, centers around economic security and many of the older people are doubtful whether they can earn enough to support their families. It is felt that perhaps it would be better for the head of the family to go out alone and later on send for the family. The attitude of regarding the relocation center as a nice boarding station is not at all uncommon. Along with these attitudes is found a firmly entrenched rumor that once an individual leaves the project he cannot return. In spite of all denials this is still believed by many of the residents.

2. Fear of discrimination and violence:

There is a growing reluctance on the part of the residents to accept indefinite leave without knowing the sentiment of the community. To some extent this demonstrates that there is no real desire for relocation in new communities. There is, however, a very real fear concerning personal safety. Reports filter into the center of unpleasant experiences of relocated Japanese. All these assume magnified proportions to the individual sitting in the comparative safety of the relocation center. The older people especially are affected and a dominant fear among the older folk is that they will not be accepted in the new community. Many of them can scarcely speak English and have marked accents. They possess different customs and physically stand out.

Linked with this fear of discrimination is fear of actual bodily harm. The inability of American Public to differentiate between the loyal Japanese-American and Japanese in Japan has resulted in unpleasant incidents on the outside. While these may be few in number, they are widely publicized both in

project newspapers and by word of mouth. Almost every resident can cite examples of beatings and threats that have occurred in various parts of the country. Such incidents have a profound effect on those individuals who are reluctant to leave the Center in any case.

3. Uncertainty of resettlement:

The majority of the residents here came from the Pacific Northwest. This area is home to them and they look forward to the day when they can return to it. A great many do not want to leave the Center and secure a job for they feel it would merely be a temporary job for the duration. They do not feel that they will be able to settle permanently in new communities. There is a labor shortage now and jobs are relatively easy to get. After the war they fear they will be no longer needed or wanted.

The Middle West and other areas seem very far away and strange. The thought of leaving their friends and relatives is very hard to bear.

The Issei group who owned their own businesses and concerns and who may have sufficient money for investment do not want to risk their savings. Their status with the U.S. government is uncertain. Issei are technically enemy aliens and there is a strong belief that they might be deported to Japan after the war. This belief is kept alive by pressure groups on the West Coast who are continually agitating for deportation of the alien group.

4. Concern for welfare of younger generation:

Concern for the welfare of their children is an important factor to the older group in considering relocation. Many feel that their children are not receiving proper education in the Center schools. The lack of proper school buildings and facilities and shortage of equipment is felt keenly by parents who want their children to receive a better education than they were able to have. Closely allied with this is the fear that living in the Center behind barbed fence will have and psychological effect on the young people. This is often expressed as "I want my

children to breathe free air." On the one hand, then, there is a feeling that it would be best to leave the Center if only for the sake of the younger generation.

Counteracting this are all the problems discussed above: economic insecurity, discrimination, physical safety, uncertainty of resettlement. In addition, there are the problems that the younger generation will face in the future. Some parents are looking forward to the day when their children will face the problem of marriage. This was well summed up by a father with several daughters of marriageable age.

"WRA tells us to go out and resettle in small communities in the Middle West. That is fine for people who can fit into such communities. If we do that, maybe there will be only several Japanese families near us. Perhaps we will be the only family. Now I have several girls of marriageable age. Who are my daughters going to marry? It is fine to tell us to scatter and not congregate in little groups but we have no other choice."

The Issei are faced with a most difficult problem. They are a weary lot. The experience of evacuation was for many only culmination of many years of discrimination. To a certain extent a persecution complex is developing. A great majority of the younger generation are still children and depend on the older group for physical and moral support. For the sake of their children the Issei cannot afford to lose all hope.

II Types of jobs available.

During the period January 1 to March 31, 1943, 325 indefinite leaves were issued:

INDEFINITE LEAVES Jan. 1, - March 31, 1943			
TYPE			NUMBER
Social			24
1. Join husband, family etc.	18		
2. Mixed marriage	3		
3. To be married	3		
Volunteering			1
School			81
Employment			196

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

MINIDOKA PROJECT

Community Analysis Section

Wash.

Monthly Report to Project Director

May 10, 1943

The Community Analysis Section has now been in operation since the arrival of the Field Analyst on March 23, 1943. Mr. E. H. Spicer of the Bureau of Sociological Research at Poston, Arizona, spent a month at the project assisting Mr. deYoung in setting up the Community Analysis Section and making a comparative study of Community self-government. He left on April 14 to return to Poston.

For the first six weeks of its existence, the office of the Community Analysis Section was located in the Administration Recreation Hall. The office is now located in Block 22-11-G, which immediately borders on the Civic Center area. A staff of three full-time research assistants, one part-time assistant, and an office force has been set up.

The research staff has prepared two reports on request from the Washington Community Analysis Section. These were; a report on the attitudes of residents toward the barbed wire fence and watchtowers, and a report concerning the attitudes of the residents toward relocation and resettlement. At the present time, a study is being made of reactions of the residents to the change in Administrative Instruction No. 34 which allows Issei participation in self-government.

In addition to these reports prepared on request from the Washington office, the Community Analysis Section has started its basic study of the social structure and organization of the center. An ecological survey of the center is underway. A block by block distribution of the residents by sex, age group and marital status has been completed. Likewise, a block by block distribution of citizen and non-citizen by age groups has been prepared. At the present time, distribution by previous residence, assembly center, previous occupation, present occupation, religious affiliation is being worked out. Since the center is too large to permit a systematic study of the entire community, certain blocks have arbitrarily been chosen for intensive study.

A study of the significant social trends within the center is also underway.

John deYoung

attachments: 2

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER

Community Analysis Section

May 10, 1943

REPORT ON PROBLEMS OF RESETTLEMENT

(continued)

Agricultural	53	Hospital	3
Domestic	61	Mechanic	4
Clerical	18	Refrigerator Servicer	2
Gov't Service	3	Porter	1
Restaurant work	13	Janitor	1
Bakery work	3	Commercial Artist	1
Instructor in Japanese	4	Warehouse	1
Chick-sexer	2	Foreman	1
YMCA work	1	Chauffer	1
Grocery	1	Handyman	1
Fishery	2	Maintenance	1
Nursery school	1	Optometrist	1
Greenhouse	3	Laboratory technician	1
Establish business	2	Hotel	6
Poultry house	1	Miscellaneous	3
Accompany parents, husband, etc.			<u>23</u>
		TOTAL	325

of these
 Twenty-four/leaves were to individuals who were leaving to be married or to join their families on the outside. Eighty-one were school leaves, 1 leave was issued to^a/volunteer and 23 were issued to children and wives accompanying parents and husbands. One hundred ninety-six were employment leaves. Of these employment leaves, 27% were agricultural, 31% domestic, 9% clerical, 16% unskilled, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ % professional, 8% skilled, 4% semi-skilled, and 1% miscellaneous. Over 85% fall in domestic, unskilled or farm labor category. For example: There have been in the past about 10 domestic offers to everyone that could be filled.

offers
 Up to April 10th, out of 268 employment/accepted at Minidoka Project almost 88% fell in the domestic, farm labor, and unskilled labor category. These 268 employment offers were as follows:

OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT OFFERS ACCEPTED
 Until April 10, 1943

Registered nurse	1
Translator	1
Laboratory technician	2
	<u>4</u>
TOTAL PROFESSIONAL	
Office work	3
Secretary	5
Stock clerk	1
Switch	1
	<u>10</u>
TOTAL CLERICAL	

(continued)

Cooks	3	
Domestics	70	
Nursemaid	2	
Waiter and waitress	9	
Kitchen worker	11	
Attendant, amusement	1	
Attendant, hospital	1	
	<hr/>	97
	TOTAL PERSONAL SERVICE	
Farm workers	119	
	<hr/>	119
	TOTAL	
Baker's help	3	
Logging	1	
Mining	1	
Driver	5	
Railroad laborer	2	
Fur cleaner	1	
Dry cleaner	4	
Photographer	3	
Mechanic	13	
Upholsterer	1	
Food checker	1	
Carpenter	1	
Janitor	1	
Sheep herder	1	
	<hr/>	39
	TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS	
	<hr/>	268
	GRAND TOTAL	

These 268 employment offers refer to number of offers accepted and not the actual number of people involved. Some of these offers are group job offers and the people involved would be much larger than the actual number of job offers. This is especially true in farm work and railroad labor where group contracts are made. For instance, there was a group contract of 37 railroad workers. As of March 31st, there were 392 people out on indefinite work leave and 338 out on group employment making a total of 730.

On a percentage basis this breaks down into:

Domestic & Personal jobs	36%
Farm Work offers.....	44%
Unskilled labor offers.....	8%
Clerical.....	4%
Skilled.....	6%
Professional.....	1%

It is interesting to note the distribution of these outside employment offers.

8

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
(Outside Employment Offers Accepted)
Until April 10, 1943

Idaho	160
Utah	31
Illinois	18
Washington	16
Oregon	15
Montana	9
Colorado	5
Ohio	4
Michigan	3
Minnesota	2
Nebraska	2
Wisconsin	1
Indiana	1
Wash. D.C.	1
TOTAL	<hr/> 268

Only 28 offers or 9% of total job offers came from the east side of the Mississippi River while 88% came from States in the immediate vicinity of the center.

Several observations can be drawn from these facts. First, the majority of the jobs that have been offered to the residents have been in the lowest levels. Second, the majority of these jobs available have been in the nearby vicinity of this project and are either seasonal or war-duration jobs. In this area and other areas where the usual labor supply has been cut off, the demand for Japanese labor is great. The Japanese who have accepted such jobs in these areas cannot be regarded as permanently relocated for once these jobs can again be filled by local labor, they will not be open to the Japanese.

The Relocation program up to the present time has not achieved a satisfactory solution with regard to jobs for the many Japanese who are neither farmers nor domestics but who possess specialized skills and training. The WRA field offices have not been turning in enough job offers that are of the type that can be filled. The ambitious and specialized young Nisei group feel this keenly. The fact that such a great proportion of the jobs are domestic, farm labor or unskilled labor is discouraging to these individuals who see in this only a pattern of peonage.

As a result many of the young people with other qualifications may take

9

agricultural, unskilled or domestic jobs in order to get out of the project. Once out they survey the situation and secure better jobs for themselves. It is significant to note that a great many of the better jobs which have been secured by residents have been through individual efforts. This changing of jobs in itself cannot be criticized for they are doing exactly what any individual who is anxious to improve his status would do. On the other hand, the employer who in good faith has hired these individuals is left more or less in the lurch. Such instances can only lead to misunderstandings and will result in a black eye for the relocation program. Happily, this is at present still occurring on a small scale. It would be much wiser and sensible to put more effort on placing such individuals on the jobs for which they are qualified at the very start. The fact that the individuals themselves can secure jobs effectively discounts the belief that only unskilled and domestic jobs are available.

III Attitudes toward Cash Grant Policy of WRA:

When the policy of providing cash grants for travel and living expenses for evacuees taking outside jobs was first announced by WRA, some confusion resulted. Among the Issei a common opinion that was held was that in order to qualify for this financial aid, the applicant must be penniless. Further, it was believed that the money was only a loan. This impression that the cash allowance was temporary loan seemed to be widely held by the older group. Investigation revealed that the original story in the Japanese section of the local project newspaper describing the cash grant had been misinterpreted. In translating the English word "grant" into Japanese, a word having the connotation of loan had been used. This had led many of the older people who read only Japanese to interpret the cash allowance as a temporary loan which must later be paid back.

Among certain of the Issei there seemed to be hesitancy about applying for this allowance. Some Issei felt that asking for relief was something of a stigma. This was partly tied up with the notion that in order to qualify the ap-

10

plicant must have exhausted all his savings. Many of the older people felt that there was humiliation in asking for this aid.

Another common impression which was held at first was that the entire family must leave at the same time in order to qualify for the allowance. This was in spite of the fact that the newspaper announcement had plainly stated that it was not necessary for all members of the family to leave the Center at the same time in order to receive cash grant assistance. In addition, while both English and Japanese sections of the local project newspaper carried the story, many residents (some holding as responsible community positions as block manager posts) were unaware of the new policy as late as two weeks after the initial announcement. This merely substantiates the fact that newspaper information reaches only a certain proportion of the residents. Following the initial newspaper story which was couched in relatively formal terms there does not seem to have been any follow-up story until three weeks later. During this interim misinformation on the policy sprang up.

Effectiveness of cash grants.

The policy of granting cash allowances for travel and subsistence expenses has not been in effect long enough to enable us to draw any definite conclusions as to its effectiveness as an incentive to relocation. There is, however, indication that certain trends are developing. The cash grant policy was put into effect here roughly about the beginning of the second week in April. Up to the end of April, 57 applications for this aid had been received. Only 7 of these applications were Issei while 50 of the applications were made by Nisei who planned on leaving. 15 of the applications represented family groups. 33 were applications from single individuals whose families have no plans of leaving the Center. Many of these families have definitely decided not to relocate. 9 of the applications were from single individuals who have no families in the center. Of the total number of applications 35 were approved, 18 were rejected and 4 were still pending at the end of April. 13 family groups were among the 35 applications approved, and only one family application was rejected.

//

It is easily seen that most of the applications for this cash allowance are coming from single individuals whose families do not plan on going out at present and many do not plan on leaving at all. The applications received during the first week of May follow the same pattern. It seems then on the basis of this tentative information that the cash allowance is not proving an incentive for family groups to go out. There appear to be several reasons behind this reluctance of the older family groups to leave. Lately there has been a great deal of talk both in and outside the centers regarding the future of the relocation center. Removal of certain restrictions in the western Defense area, statements by nationally prominent individuals with respect to abolishment of the centers have given rise to belief that the relocation centers may be abolished very soon. Rumors are rife concerning this aspect. A statement by a noted radio commentator to the effect that General DeWitt's statement concerning the disloyalty of all American-Japanese might lead to his transfer from the western Defense area soon blossomed into a thriving rumor that General DeWitt had been removed and the West Coast was going to be immediately re-opened to the Japanese. An ever increasing number of people are beginning to think that in six months or so they will be back in Seattle and the sensible thing to do is to sit in the Center and wait.

The other aspect concerns the amount of the grant. It is already evident that the older age group families who have no money are unwilling to take a chance on the outside with such a small amount of money as a stake. There is no getting around the fact that this older group does not and probably will never possess the same courage that most of the younger people are demonstrating.

The cash grants are apparently based on the theory that everyone taking a job outside will immediately be making enough money to meet all expenses. In actuality this is not the case. There is no allowance made for difference in standard of living in various areas of the country. Prices will vary to quite an extent and the arbitrary limit which may be sufficient in one section of the country might prove to be utterly inadequate in another section.

Another problem arises in regard to those young people who may want to go out but whose families hold back. If these families have sufficient funds, the individual according to the WRA regulations is not eligible for a cash grant. Hence he is forced to remain in the Center.

It seems almost safe to prophesy that if the WRA is to locate the older family groups, more substantial financial aid than traveling expenses and a maximum grant of \$100 to meet initial living expenses must be furnished. Another problem that must be faced is that of convincing residents who possess a small cash reserve to take a chance on the outside without WRA financial assistance. Already people who are not receiving this cash grant are beginning to grumble. Certain individuals feel that it is not fair to ask them to spend their small savings which they have painfully kept in tact while other people who have spent their savings are helped by the government. It is too early to determine what effect such attitudes will have on the relocation program. Of the 18 applications rejected during the month of April at this project because the applicant possessed sufficient funds, nine or half of the people making the application have proceeded with their plans and have left the project. It is too early to determine whether the other nine who did not meet the requirements will give up plans to leave the project because they were refused the cash grant.

In short, then, the present cash grant does not seem to be achieving the desired results of acting as an incentive to family relocation.

There is also lack of information regarding help that is available on the outside in the event a relocated family or individual suffers financial setbacks. This is not limited to residents but to also project administrative units. Project staff members often are not aware of important aspects of problems that directly concern their divisions. The local Leaves Officer, for example, had no information on the financial aid the Social Security Agency will provide in event a relocated evacuee gets into financial trouble. Apparently the Leaves office never received this information. Although the project newspaper carried a story on this financial

help, it does not seem to have been absorbed by many of the residents or project staff. It is evident that there is still much to be done in keeping the project administrative staff members better informed on policies and problems that concern relocation. The Japanese can scarcely be expected to venture forth to begin a new life, if we cannot offer them as complete a picture as possible of the problems that face them and the aid that is available.

IV Suggestions as to actions that might be taken to overcome resistance to Relocation

1. Increase cash grant:

If as the preliminary survey reveals, the older family groups are reluctant to leave the project because of the inadequacy of the cash grant, it might be well for WRA to increase this allowance. In addition, the arbitrary limit should be relaxed. The Project director perhaps could be given authority to determine the amount of the grant based on the circumstances of each individual case as reported by the Social Welfare Division. It should be made clear both to the WRA administrative personnel and residents that financial help from other sources is available on the outside in case an evacuee becomes stranded. There is a definite need for a better information system concerning such problems.

2. Better field service:

Since the authority of the project administrative staff goes only to the boundaries of the project, they must rely on field agents for knowledge of conditions outside. At the first of the program there was not adequate coverage of field areas but this has now been partly remedied by the establishment of additional field offices and more field men. These field offices have been doing a fine job in seeing that the jobs which are offered meet the standard requirements and are not substandard jobs. Certain areas have been closed because jobs offered have been substandard and placing Japanese in these positions would have meant jeopardizing the future of the Japanese-Americans. Likewise the field offices have closed areas when it appeared that overcrowding was eminent. Areas have also been closed for short periods such as Indianapolis and counties in Montana where the bad public sentiment threatened security of the Japs.

3. Closer gauge of public opinions:

It is along this line that possibly more work should be done. A closer gauge of public opinion seems to be needed. In the past weeks rumors and actual incidents of molestation of Japanese workers in certain sections bordering the project have come to the attention of the project authorities. There is need for constant vigilance on the part of the fieldmen to keep abreast of changes in public opinion.

4. Field offices keep projects better informed of conditions outside:

The field men who are living and working in the areas in which the Japanese are being resettled are in a position to furnish the projects with up-to-date accurate data on living conditions in their areas. Possibly a weekly or bi-monthly report could be issued by the field office which would briefly survey the the conditions a newcomer would have to face. This should consist of specifics that could be utilized by the project staff. Information as to what is a standard house or apartment rent, survey of housing space available, price of food, etc. would be included. This should be illustrated by specific examples of people earning a certain wage and living in these areas, telling exactly what can be done on these wage levels. These bulletins from the Field Office could then be utilized by the project leaves' office and other project staff members.

5. Project should keep residents better informed of conditions outside:

There is a real need for better information services to the residents. The project newspaper while printed both in English and Japanese still reaches only a limited proportion of the residents. Courses dealing with relocation problems have been tried both in the high school and on adult level with apparently little success. Some of these may have been too general in nature and may not have been sufficiently advertised. Forums for Issei on Relocation have proven successful at this project. A series of four forums on this subject in the past is estimated to have drawn 1500 of the older generation. However, there have been no forums on Relocation since the cash grant policy was instituted and the resettlement program stepped up.

It would seem to be advisable to institute a program of forums and discussion meetings again following, however, not a general pattern but based on very concrete examples and illustrations. Thus a forum could concern itself with prospective life in a definite locality: citing opportunities for finding a place to live, telling^{what} food prices are, illustrated by newspaper ads from local paper; giving recreational opportunities for children; describing attitudes of the Caucasian residents; and telling of the experiences of the Japanese who may already be in this locality. This information must be up-to-date and couched in simple terms.

Further this type of information should be available in more than one place. The hurly-burly of a leaves office is not ideally suited to a leisurely discussion of such problems. Possibly the social welfare office could furnish information of this type.

6. National office provide more information for residents :

A measure of success in informing the outside world about relocation has been achieved through the use of illustrated booklets. This method is already being utilized to some extent in booklets prepared for the residents which tell them about regulations concerning leave from the projects and /how to get along outside. This same method might be utilized to sell relocation to the older people. Booklets with single diagrams, with text both English and Japanese might be prepared. Possibly short films such as have been used to explain rationing might be made.

CONCLUSION

The idea of resettlement is going to have to be sold to the older group. It will not be achieved by merely opening the gates.

Up to the present time, there has not been much attempt to seek out older people who may possess qualifications that are demanded by outside jobs. It is the procedure to post job offers in the outside employment office. On the whole it has been the young active individuals who have sought out these jobs. This has

been especially true here because of the physical layout of the project. Older people have expressed this many times in such words as:

"Most of the time we never hear about the good job offers until they have been filled. By the time we can get to the outside employment office way up in the administrative area, the young fellows have beat us. Only farm jobs and unskilled labor jobs are left and many of us are not able to do that kind of work."

This seeking out of older people for jobs for which they are qualified may smack of pampering to some but it must be remembered that these people have undergone a soul-shaking experience. This older group fought against tremendous odds to achieve apparent security for themselves and families in the United States. Suddenly the experience of evacuation was forced upon them. Now they are asked to begin a new life in strange communities. We must expect to find a lack of optimism with regard to the future. Looking back this group cannot help but be pessimistic. To some extent a persecution complex has resulted. It is up to WRA to change this feeling and to sell relocation. This is not going to be an easy job.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTIONMINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER
Community Analysis Section
Hunt, IdahoREPORT ON COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT
(Analysis of election for ratification of Charter)

Note: Mr. E. H. Spicer of Poston prepared an analysis of government at Minidoka as a result of residence at Minidoka in March and first part of April. This report is a brief analysis of the results of the election on the charter submitted to residents of Minidoka June 15.

On June 15, 1943 eight months after the issue of community government had been raised in Minidoka project, the residents of the center by a count of 2375 to 1568 voted against ratification of a charter submitted to them by the Organization Commission. This charter which was very simple and brief proposed a Community Advisory Council of seven members and a Community Advisory Council Co-ordinating Commission consisting of block representatives whose function was to act as a liaison body between the council and the block residents. This particular form of community government set-up deviates a great deal from the original provisions as outlined in Administrative Instruction No. 34. This deviation was purposeful on the part of the Administrative advisor and Organization Commission who felt that a simple advisory type of relationship was best suited to Minidoka. In short the proposed charter sought to a large extent (as Mr. Spicer pointed out in his report) to formalize two sets of relationships which had been developing in the project, namely, "(1) advisory relationship between the administrators and various informed and responsible evacuees and (2) the block organizations." Why then did the residents turn this proposal down?

A combination of factors seem to have been at play in this respect. These can be summarized as:

1. Indifference of the residents and block delegates to the issue of community government.
2. Insufficient information and lack of explanation regarding the charter, and too short a period between submission of charter and election day.
3. Active campaign against charter by members of the Block Manager group.

4. Antagonisms towards block delegates and organization commission members.
5. Neutral attitude of Project Administration toward the proposed Charter.

Many other factors entered in but the above seem to have played the most important part in determining the vote.

I. Indifference of the residents and block delegates to the issue of self-government

The question of community government has been hanging fire for almost eight months and interest in it has died down. Many of the people who were most interested in this problem have left the project. This is true also of block delegates. Some of the block delegates have not been interested enough to attend the Congress meetings. To some extent this indifference cropped out in certain members of the organization commissions.

II. Insufficient Information and lack of explanation concerning charter.

The Organization Commission after meeting with Dr. Provinse of the Washington office early in April reworked their proposed charter and submitted it to Mr. Stafford for approval. This charter was turned over to the Project Attorney, Mr. Moore, who briefed it into its final form. This briefed form was then presented to the Organization Commission on May 11 for their final approval. At this time there was misunderstanding on the part of certain members of the Organization Commission who could not understand why their draft had been summarized and briefed in such a form. These misunderstandings were apparently ironed out and after a few minor changes had been made in the Code of Organization, the Charter and Code were presented for approval to the Congress of Delegates on May 20, 1943. Almost one third of the Delegates were absent at this meeting. A few changes were made by the Delegates such as eliminating the clause calling for appointment of a temporary council and lowering the voting eligibility to 18 years instead of 21 years as proposed by the code of organization. It was decided at this meeting that the Charter and Code be translated into Japanese. The Organization Commission was given the authority to select an election committee. This was done on May 25 when ten men were selected to act as special

election committee. On June 3, this election committee met and formulated rules for the election which had been set for June 15. The block representatives were given instructions to call a block meeting prior to election to explain the nature and contents of the proposed charter and Code of Organization to the block residents. On June 12 the election committee met and completed plans for the election. The charter was mimeographed in its original English form and the Code of Organization was mimeographed in both English and Japanese. The election committee decided that the charter which was very brief and simple did not need translation into Japanese. These mimeographed copies of the Charter and Code and the election instructions were released for distribution on June 10, five days preceding election. However, the distribution to the block representatives was entrusted to the block managers. Many of them did not immediately deliver this material to the block delegates. As a result the majority of the delegates did not receive this material until Friday or Saturday. In a few instances the block managers did not release this material until Sunday and in one specific case not until Monday the day before election. Thus, the block delegates had only a very short period in which to familiarize themselves and their block residents with the proposed charter.

Most of the block delegates called meetings on Monday evening, June 14, to explain the charter. Some did an excellent job, others either did not have sufficient understanding themselves or were not interested enough or did not have the ability to make adequate explanations. Only a few copies of charters and codes were available for the residents to examine. These usually were pinned to dining hall bulletin boards.

The residents themselves showed little interest in these block meetings. A cross-section of these meetings revealed that they were poorly attended. In one block with 146 eligible voters only 41 turned out for this meeting with but 4 Niseis represented. However, in this block 117 cast votes the next day. Another block with 108 eligible voters had a turnout ^{of} 23 residents with only 2 Niseis represented. This block cast 81 votes in the election. In the other blocks much the same situation was repeated.

III. Active Campaign against Charter by Members of the Block Manager Group.

Certain members of the Block Manager group actively worked against the proposed charter. In some instances this campaign was begun as long ago as March, 1943. The election committee in turning over the mimeographed copies of the charter and election instructions to the block managers instead of to the block representatives played directly into the hands of those block managers who were against community government. This block manager group has gradually acquired many functions which were not originally intended for this group and many are loath to give up the power and prestige they have gained. In some blocks, the block managers openly spoke out against any form of self-government, predicting trouble and factional strife if such a proposal went through. In other blocks, block managers while not openly speaking against the charter by indirect methods clouded the issue. Such instances as holding up the delivery of copies of the charters and instructions fall into this category.

IV. Antagonisms towards Block Delegates and Organization Commission Members.

Possibly because of the long interval between the submission of the charter and the election of the block delegates and appointment of the organization commission, some resentment was built up towards the commission. The proposal of a seven-man Advisory Board was said by some to be an attempt on the part of the seven members of the organization commission to retain their positions. The personal unpopularity of one member from Portland apparently swayed to some extent the vote of the Portland group.

V. Administrative attitude towards the Proposed Charter.

The administration has in the past dominated project decisions and has taken clear and firm stands on community issues. An example is seen in the recent Registration actively worked for the volunteering program. With regard to the election for ratification of the proposed charter the administration maintained a position of strict neutrality. While the organization commission knew that this particular form of advisory counsel had the approval of the project director, this was not understood by the majority of the residents. As a result, residents who had become accustomed to

the Administration taking an active part in community affairs were slightly unsure of their position. This hesitation was played upon by certain groups who were against any form of Community Government.

Analysis of the vote by block.

An analysis of the votes cast in each block support the above contentions (see appendix). The final vote was 2375 against ratification to 1568 for ratification. Out of a total 5330 eligible voters, 3943 or approximately 74 per cent voted.

Eleven out of 35 blocks were in favor of ratification. These were:

<u>Block No.</u>	<u>No. of eligible voters</u>	<u>In favor of Ratification</u>	<u>Against Ratification</u>	<u>Total votes cast</u>
15	131	68	41	109
16	146	76	11	117
19	148	112	25	137
22	108	66	15	81
24	149	66	40	106
26	179	105	28	133
28	153	82	25	107
36	188	69	65	134
38	158	64	43	107
40	178	59	39	98
42	169	85	48	133

An analysis of these blocks demonstrated that in these blocks a relatively clear and sufficient explanation had been given to the people and that the block managers in general did not take part in campaigning against the charter. On the other hand, those blocks in which the vote was overwhelmingly against ratification told a different story.

<u>Block No.</u>	<u>No. of eligible voters</u>	<u>In favor of Ratification</u>	<u>Against Ratification</u>	<u>Total votes cast</u>
6	123	7	31	38
7	168	18	104	122
12	103	9	83	92
13	161	25	113	138
34	177	35	119	154
37	159	13	131	144
39	166	4	88	92

Of these blocks, numbers 34, 37, and 39 are predominantly made up of Portland people. One of the Organization Commission members who is a Portland man and lives in this area is unpopular. To some extent the vote in this section was a vote against this

60

member personally rather than a vote against the charter. In addition, there was a feeling among the Portland group that because the majority of the residents are Seattle people, the council and block coordinators would be predominantly a Seattle-controlled group and the Portland people would not be represented. These factors plus lack of a clear understanding of the issue resulted in an overwhelming proportion of the vote being cast against ratification of the charter in this section of the center.

In another section, for example, one of the block managers openly went on record as opposing any form of community government and attempted to convince the residents of his block that it was unnecessary and would lead to trouble. The result was a 5 to 1 vote against the charter. It is apparent that much the same situation prevailed in other blocks.

There is no doubt that inadequate management of the election played an important part in determining the outcome. As has already been stated the majority of the residents had grown indifferent to the self-government issue. This indifference carried over to the block representatives. The election committee which was appointed from the block representatives again demonstrated this indifference.

The election committee after working out the mechanics of the election went on the assumption that their work was completed and made little or no check to see that their instructions were carried out. This is illustrated by the response of the election committee to a request from one block which had not received enough ballots and asked for additional election ballots on the morning of the election. This request was ignored by the election chairman and his group on the grounds that every block was supposed to have received the proper quota and that in any event it was too late to provide any more ballots since they were all gone. To secure these extra ballots it would have only been necessary to contact the mimeograph office which still possessed the stencils. Such indifference was typical of the election proceedings. The block delegates although they were placed at a disadvantage by not receiving their instructions sooner, could, however, have acquired the information if they so desired. Some

61

delegates who did not completely understand the Charter sought out members of the Organization Commission and asked for this information. The block delegates as a group tended after the election to blame the election committee for the poor distribution of material. The election committee, on the other hand, felt the blame rested with the block delegates who did not show sufficient interest.

The Next Step -- Representation or not.

It is evident that although the residents of Minidoka voted against ratification of the charter submitted to them by the Organization Commission, this cannot be interpreted to mean they were voting down community representation.

An analysis of the events immediately preceding and following election has clearly demonstrated that the majority of the residents did not fully understand the provisions of the proposed charter.

Both project authorities and evacuee leaders feel that some form of representative counseling is necessary for intelligent and efficient operation of the center. After careful study, they have chosen to regard the results of the recent election as an indication that the residents did not fully understand the proposed charter and accordingly turned down this particular form of representation. With this in mind, a revised plan is being prepared for resubmission to the residents. A new set of block delegates is being elected. This group will present and fully explain the revised charter. Sufficient time will be allowed for the residents to thoroughly understand and assimilate the provisions of such a charter. A more intelligent approach with respect to the mechanics of election will be carried out. This will avoid the pitfalls of the past election and will by-pass that section of the block manager group who used their roles as appointed representatives of the Administration to cloud the issue for their own gain.

The outcome of the new election should then indicate whether the residents wish to have a formal method of representation at Minidoka.

RATIFICATION ELECTION RESULT TABULATION

Block Number	Number of eligible voters	In favor Ratification	Against Ratification	Total votes cast
1	190	54	80	134
2	157	38	74	112
3	146	30	41	71
4	136	20	74	94
5	151	36	62	98
6	123	7	31	38
7	168	18	104	122
8	154	35	75	110
10	120	46	47	93
12	103	9	83	92
13	161	25	113	138
14	150	49	71	120
15	131	18	41	109
16	146	76	41	117
17	173	57	80	137
19	148	112	25	137
21	152	34	90	124
22	108	66	15	81
24	149	66	40	106
26	179	105	28	133
28	153	82	25	107
29	167	12	128	140
30	145	29	98	127
31	142	33	86	119
32	113	19	69	88
34	177	35	119	154
35	178	30	80	110
36	188	69	65	134
37	159	13	131	144
38	158	64	43	107
39	166	4	88	92
40	178	59	39	98
41	153	59	59	118
42	169	85	48	133
44	139	24	82	106
Total	5,330	1,568	2,375	3,943

P3.99

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Central Utah Project
Community Analysis Section
June 25
1943

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

Memorandum to Mr. Charles F. Ernst
Project Director

From Dr. Weston LaBarre (Topaz)
Social Science Analyst

Subject Report on Minidoka Charter

Minidoka's self-government has had everything stacked against it:

1. Sakamoto of the JACL, a nisei group one expects would be most familiar with democratic attitudes and procedures, was described to be personally "high-handed, and dictatorial." The evacuees had no confidence in him. The best bet for real strength of the democratic process was therefore sabotaged by the unfortunate personality of the leader of this group.

2. An unskillfully worded question gave an unhappy and confusing experience on the first referendum to public opinion. "Are you satisfied with the present evacuee management of the center?" - If they said "no" they thought all self-government would then cease, and the alternative "yes" was falsely interpreted to mean popular support of the JACL group then in power. The rise of strong anti-JACL gangs with threatening letters to the JACL head Sakamoto are evidences of the lack of popular support. If "official" organization does not channelize political pressures, unofficial groups surely will express these pressures and this is what happened here.

3. When the Project Director (himself decidedly luke-warm toward self-government) shelved the charter from November to March, the popularly elected pro-Charter group severely lost face and influence with people who elected them, and thus another pro-democratic tentative was sabotaged.

4. The Administration insisted on its theoretical over-all "community" plan and wasn't approving of or realistic in using natural units of social and political organization already present. A "benevolent dictatorship" opposed the block units by supporting the artificial ward system, by hamstringing block political influence and even block recreational unity. So the third chance of getting a self-government nucleus, block managers, was weakened and suppressed.

5. The Administration, besides side-tracking and skipping over (for partly good reasons) self-government nuclei like the JACL and the block managers group, also did not use Puyallup organization. The Issei in administrative positions of influence, who had been pre-evacuation leaders in Seattle, were supported by the Administration against the Nisei-JACL group that had emerged under evacuation conditions at Puyallup. This strengthened those unfamiliar with American democratic ways against those who were familiar with them.

6. The appointive personnel and the Administration were not basically sympathetic to self-government by evacuees. This influence must have affected the older Issei personnel who were working closely with the Administration. Besides, the Issei already had power as administrative personnel. The Administration and the Issei were therefore both against democratic methods and any naturally representative groups had been systematically undermined by the lack of Administration support.

7. As far as a self-government charter was concerned:

The Issei were against it since it implied more Nisei authority over the camp and the Issei already had the authority they wanted in their own hands.

The Nisei thought an Issei-weighted government would be factionalistic and non-democratic in manner and method, and they may have had good reason in regarding both the Administration and the Issei as paternalistic, authoritarian, and dictatorial, besides, why have "self-government" when it only strengthens Administration stooges;

The Administration had no confidence in the residents' abilities or potential abilities in self-government. There's no mystery that residents said, "Well, then we'll leave it all up to the Caucasians who brought about all this mess. Self-government is a farce, and we're only here temporarily anyway, so let them worry about it." In the end the permissiveness or non-permissiveness of the Administration, which has the real decisive power originally, controls the situation. No democratic organization can flourish unless there is some surrender -- gradual perhaps but it must be genuine -- by the autocratic source of authority. This never happened at Minidoka; instead, every group that did rise up was slapped down.

If this analysis of the forces at work is even partly correct, it is both gratifying and surprising that even 26% still wanted self-government.

Dr. Weston LaBarre
Social Science Analyst

WLB:ms

File Copy R400

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER

Community Analysis Section

SUBJECT: The preliminary report on Evacuee reaction to Relocation Program.

DATE: October 7, 1943

Evacuee concepts of public acceptance:

Many evacuees are still doubtful as to how well they will be accepted in a new community. This fear is persistent in everyone who is contemplating on relocating. Strangers in a strange community always have to go through mental strains as well as anxieties. Evacuees do not wish to become wards of charitable organizations. Those who gave negative response to relocation always believe in rumors and propaganda of the outside. Many of the evacuees feel that they are not wanted in any community. Furthermore, they believe that the changes in general government or WRA policies are so frequent, that they have doubt in the future outcome.

The favorable letters from the persons who have succeeded in relocation receive very little attention by the residents of the centers in comparison to the unfavorable letters which arouse interest and curiosity. Such factors as the denial of free education to children; the instances of girls' demoralization; the resolutions passed by American Legions; Dies Committee investigation; making public fools of Japanese in the newspapers such as referring to them as "monkeys"; generally make big news in the center thus hindering the relocation program. The recent unpleasant race riots which took place in Detroit and Texas are concrete examples which are detrimental to the better public relationship between the Caucasians and the minority groups.

The relocatability of ministers and doctors can hardly be realized unless little 'Tokyo' is established within some large cities, in spite of the fact, that the formation of such communities are not in accord with the policy of the WRA.

As far as economic or material security is concerned, food and shelter are provided for the evacuees in the center. Some Issei have been relocated in order to escape from the demoralizing effects of the center life upon the younger sets, although in a family with five to ten children there is hardly any possibility of relocating.

Ever since the establishment of the Relocation Guidance Council in Minidoka Center, the evacuee reactions to relocation program has been studied and discussed from various angles.

Some residents feel that the evacuation program was a political success but a social failure. They feel politicians who made such grave errors should see this program through although no single person is responsible for the evacuation.

Relocation program in the centers should be encouraged but not by high pressure salesmanship method. In fact, such pressure might result in not only negative response, but even create antagonistic feeling. Those who wish to relocate will relocate eventually with or without pressure. Psychology of evacuee people should be taken into consideration in order to cope with this problem.

In order to expedite relocation, the outside offers should be reasonable and within the standard wage scale so that the evacuees will be able to maintain the subsistence in fairly decent manner. Many residents feel evacuees are not paid standard wages everywhere. Some of the things being considered in relation to the relocation program by the evacuees are:

- factor of safety
- group resettlement on co-operative basis
- WRA or FSA furnishing necessary fund or equipments to start a new life
- returning to the farm lands on the Pacific coast area.

Many people feel that in order to encourage resettlement, making life miserable in the center is not the correct approach nor an adequate method; it is inhuman.

(D.K.)

EVACUEES' REQUESTS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE CLOSING OF CENTER

There are two groups of people in the Center regarding this matter. The first group requests that the same kind of protection and maintenance as that afforded by the WRA continue to be provided to them for the duration by WRA or by some other government agency.

The second group is willing either to return to the West Coast or relocate elsewhere provided a certain number of their requests are granted by the Government.

FIRST GROUP: Due to the lifting of the Evacuation Order, the return of the people of Japanese ancestry to the West Coast has become possible. However, the majority of the people find themselves in a situation which makes it impossible for them to avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered. They therefore, request that the same kind of protection as that afforded by the WRA continue to be provided. Their reasons:

1. The mental blow caused by the forced evacuation was so severe that they are unwilling to go out of the center.
2. The economic structure built by the people of Japanese ancestry in the past half a century had been radically destroyed.
3. The oppression and presecution of the Japanese minority is still existing in the outside community.
4. This group has an uneasiness which arises out of the fact that the Issei are too old and no young people are with them to help in case they decide to start any enterprise particularly agriculture. The average age of the Issei now is 61 years and it is impossible to undertake any business successfully without the help of their sons. But most of the Nissei have relocated to the Middle West or East, and some of them are in the armed forces.
- 5.
6. Mr. Milton Eisenhower, former director of the WRA, announced in a pamphlet which are distributed among the Japanese people in the assembly centers that the relocation centers would be kept open for the duration of the war. Many people acted on the basis of that announcement. They disposed of their property rights and made other arrangements on the West Coast. Therefore, they have nothing on the West Coast to go back to.

SECOND GROUP: This group is willing either to return to the West Coast or relocate elsewhere, provided the following requests are granted:

1. That the Government provides special protection through Federal agencies for the life and property of returned evacuees. They think that in certain cases local authorities are not adequate to provide protection.
2. That the Government establish a means to give a guarantee of living to those who go out until they firmly reestablish themselves. This help is to be extended to relieve suffering from lack of livelihood and shall be given on a basis similar to the Army's dependency allotment, or as unemployment insurance benefits or out of cash especially appropriated from the Federal Security Administration's fund.

3. 3. That the present relocation cash grant be increased and also that the penalty provision in connection with it be eliminated. Most of the people are altogether out of funds on account of the forced evacuation. In addition, living in a Center in which the basic pay is \$16.00 per month for $2\frac{1}{2}$ years, the people have been forced to spend most of what they had left. Therefore, those who remain in the Center are those who cannot afford to relocate. They are not on the whole wage earners. Most of them are businessman and farmers. If they relocate now, it will take several months before they can re-establish themselves in the kind of businesses in which they were engaged before evacuation. They need some funds to tide them over the period in which they can make plans and execute them so that they can finally get started and become selfsupporting.
4. That a counseling service be established in the WRA offices which would be maintained for the duration.
5. That the Government extend loans to those who start agricultural and other enterprises and also to individuals who are wage earners, to relieve them in case of emergency.

About 70% of the people were engaged in independent industries prior to evacuation. Therefore, real reconstruction of livelihood can be achieved only through a plentiful supply of loans. This is the reason why this group requests that loans be extended to all those who were engaged in agriculture, business, or manufacturing industries. The loans offered through the Farm Security Administration and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation are limited to Nissei only, but it is the Issei who need the loans more than the Nissei.

Therefore, this group believe that the fact that they are evacuees should be sufficient grounds to qualify them to receive loans. As they may not have collateral to give in exchange for loans, this collateral provision should be altogether ignored by the Government. Also the provision that the recipients of loans must be citizens should be set aside.

The same treatment as regards loans should be extended to evacuees who are wage earners or laborers.

6. That housing facilities be provided for relocatees..
- It seems the housing shortage on the outside is discouraging the evacuees from relocating. Therefore, this group requests that the Government encourage the establishment of more hostels.

When we were evacuated, we went to assembly centers then were transferred to relocation centers. Now, "disassembly centers" should be set up at vital points on the West Coast to give housing to the evacuees so that they could relocate from these centers to the outside.

The housing shortage should be eased by building houses through the FHA for returned evacuees in big and important cities on the West Coast.

7. That property service be extended for the duration for those evacuees who need it.
8. That a public relations agency be established to fight anti-Japanese movements and propaganda.
9. That, to safeguard against evacuees' sickness, and injury, the Government grant a sickness and injury insurance policy to each evacuee for the duration.
10. That, the Government exert its influence so that evacuees can buy life, fire, auto, and other insurance policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM BLOCK 34

In regard to the announcement by the War Relocation Authority of the closing of the relocation centers in connection with the lifting of the blanket exclusion orders by the Western Defense Command, we wish to request the Authority to take into careful considerations our recommendations and to reconsider the decisions it has recently made for the immediate future of its program.

Before coming into assembly centers, we were advised by government officials that we were headed to war duration camps. We made arrangements accordingly. While in assembly centers, we received pamphlets from the WRA reccenters. It was definitely states that the centers would be in operation for occupancy by evacuees for the duration of the war. While in the relocation centers, the WRA emphasized again and again that the evacuees would not be forced out of the centers and that the prime objective in WRA is the successful relocation of the evacuees.

We believe that the closing of the centers before the end of the war is definitely against the promise made by the government. We believe that announcing the closing of the centers before solving the relocation problems of the evacuees is against the WRA policy of not forcing the evacuees out of the centers. We believe that the attempt to relocate the evacuees by closing the centers within a limited period is against the WRA's prime objective of "successful relocation for every evacuee." We honestly believe that a plan to relocate the evacuees by improving the relocation department and its programs rather than by closing out the centers is in accord with the WRA policy and is the American method of solving the situation. We have faith in the government that she realizes further unjust treatment of these unfortunate people to reflect on her honour and prestige and that she will not choose to act as to cast a blot upon the history of her nation.

Therefore, we wish to make two recommendations to the Authority: (1) that the WRA will not contemplate on the closing of the centers until the end of the war and continue to operate these centers under similar policies and procedures used prior to the time of the lifting of the west coast ban; and (2) that the relocation of the evacuees will be facilitated by improving the relocation department and its programs. We wish to take this opportunity and state eight reasons to our first recommendation and make ten suggestions to our second recommendation.

Our first recommendation of not closing the centers for the duration is based on the following reasons.

(1) Frequent change in government policies.

If the government changes its policies frequently or does not live up to any of the promises made previously, it becomes very difficult for us to plan our future course on its policies and promises. If the closing of the centers is carried out within this year contrary to the original plan announced by the government, we can not but doubt the content of the pamphlets just issued on the final phase of the relocation program.

(2) No sound relocation plans in the evacuated area.

Since we have been unable for the last two years to relocate to any community outside the evacuated area, we interpret that the decision of the Authority to close the centers is based on the assumption that we shall return to the evacuated area as soon as the west coast ban is lifted. However, most of us have no place to go back to, since they disposed of their homes, businesses and other properties at

the time of evacuation. Even few of us who have places to go back are hesitant to return, since their friends who kindly consented to look after their properties for the duration will be made homeless in turn. Therefore, the opening of the evacuated area does not help us to solve our relocation problems to such an extent as to justify the WRA's decision of closing the centers.

(3) Fear of physical assault by unreasonable individuals or by mob action.

Anti-Japanese movements still prevail all over the country. We read in papers of incidents of racial discrimination. We realize that there will always be some who feel bitter toward us as long as there exists the war against Japan. Some influential persons in the west are predicting violence and disorder instead of taking a definite stand for the united home front. Certain organizations are threatening us of mob action. We know how people all over the country react to unfavorable war news and even to propaganda. We are told of many incidents of injury on persons in similar circumstances as we are at the moment when a war comes to its end. We are afraid of especially those who become unreasonable under the influence of liquor. Instead, these relocation centers mean "Security" to us. Indeed, our love of freedom and our yearning for normal life is more than offset by our fear of physical assault.

(4) Disadvantages of going into our own businesses. Many of us were engaged in their own businesses, and wish to go back to businesses again. Many of us, however, sustained too great a loss at the time of forced liquidation of their properties that they are unable to start all over again without any provision for the reimbursement of their losses. Loans are available from RFC only to those who have securities, and one can not contemplate of going in his own business with loans if he has no security. In some cities or states, Japanese aliens cannot obtain business licenses nor own or lease lands. Then those families who have their sons in the armed forces are no longer able to go in their own businesses, since only aliens are left behind. Even though we may be able to engage in our own businesses again, we fear the effect on our businesses of the discrimination by consumers as well as by wholesalers.

(5) Little confidence in making ourselves self-support. The majority of Isseis are well advanced in ages. What they had built up by hard labor and rigid economy for thirty to fifty years were destroyed by forced liquidation and forced evacuation. Now they lack in physical strength and energy to go out with bare hands into strange communities and to work alongside with younger and stronger men. They have sent their older sons into the Army whom they were depending on to bring up their younger children. Even the younger members of our group are not confident of becoming efficient employees, since they were so used to working for themselves. They are afraid of extremely complex and expensive living conditions that always prevail during wartime. Of course, public assistance may be available in case of need. However, we have been brought up to consider it a shame to live on relief, and we do not like by any means to take a chance of bringing disgrace upon ourselves.

(6) Uncertainties in providing for our subsistence. Even though we behave as good tenants, there will always be fear in our mind that, so long as there exists wartime housing shortage situation, we may be ordered out of our homes by unreasonable landlady or by popular demand or threat of neighbors. We hear of grocery stores refusing to sell us foods and other stores or shops refusing to serve us. We may have difficulties in purchasing fuels for the winter. We realize the shortage in every line of merchandises, and we are afraid that we shall be the first ones if any one is to go without the necessities of life.

(7) Possibility of another "Military Emergency."

Since there was no military emergency in Hawaii and on the East coast to such an extent as to require mass evacuation, we know now that our evacuation was not caused by real military emergency but rather by race prejudice and inturn fear of mob action and disorder. Race prejudice will not die down, and there always will be certain individuals and organizations trying to swing the public sentiments against us. Another "military emergency" may arise and bring about our evacuation again. "Military emergency" may be declared in different communities, and our evacuation may be ordered not by a government action but by the popular demand of the members of a community.

(8) Restricted privileges.

Even though we are being released out of the centers as loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens, we are always declared as persons of Japanese descent and cannot enjoy same privileges as all other loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens in the United States. The curfew orders are still in force on the west coast. Alien relocatees will be bound by travel regulations. Certain states, cities and communities will not extend to us same privileges as enjoyed by other members. Above all, the federal government has not yet acted on to extend to our Issei members the right to become citizens by naturalization. Our Issei members are immigrants from Japan and deserve to be treated differently from government officials, students and tourists from Japan. They are entitled to same privileges and rights as those from Europe.

Our second recommendation of facilitating our relocation by improving relocation programs is made with the following suggestions.

(1) Employment of persons of Japanese ancestry who are familiar with both English and Japanese languages in relocation offices all over the country.

If employed as assistant relocation officers, these persons will be in position to assist more of us to relocate. They are familiar with our problems, and we feel more free to explain our difficulties. We feel reassured to have them to rely on in case of emergency after relocation. When the relocation offices are closed, these men are to be transferred to public welfare offices to accomodate us further. Taking these steps require very little efforts on the part of the government, but it means to us how sincerely she intends to restore her unfortunate victims of the war to normal life.

(2) Improving the public sentiments toward us.

Bad public sentiment is probably the greatest obstacle in planning our relocation. Our loyalty has been established as a fact by FBI. Our presence in Military Area No. 1 has been declared by the Army Department no longer deemed dangerous to the national defense. Our return to the evacuated area has been approved unanimously by the Supreme Court. There is really no justifiable reason for any bad feeling toward us. We hope that every federal, state and city government official will keep his oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States and take a definite stand against any anti-Japanese movement. We sincerely hope that President Roosevelt will make a statement over a national network urging every loyal American citizen to respect the Constitution and to refrain from any act which may hunder our war efforts. We hope that every broadcasting firm and every newspaper in the country will endeavor to influence the public to act in accord with democratic principles.

(3) Re-induction into relocation centers made easier.

Making re-induction into the centers easier means encouraging us to take a chance on relocation. For, if we fail on our first attempt, we shall be able to come back and plan on our second one. If it is difficult to get reinducted back into the camps, we shall not leave unless we are very sure of succeeding in our attempt. The WRA policy of making re-induction almost impossible after relocate once makes us wonder whether it is interested in successful relocation of all of us or it is working merely toward sending us out of the centers.

(4) Outside relocation offices to accomodate us more.

We understand that the WRA does not intend to help those without "good reason to return" through relocation offices in the evacuated area in getting jobs and houses. We all believe that we have "good reason to return" since we were forced out of our former homes and that we are entitled to every assistance possible to resume our life from where we left off.

Whether the centers are to be closed within this year or not, it is our guess that the WRA plans to close the relocation offices two months after the closing of the relocation centers. We believe that the responsibility of the government from the standpoint of humanity does not end with the relocation of the evacuees from the relocation centers to outside communities, but in reality sincere efforts on the part of the government begins then in order to restore them to as nearly same conditions they were in before evacuation as humanly possible. We understand that the WRA will remain in operation as long as the emergency created by evacuation exists. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kimball stated that that emergency no longer existed, then it became necessary to consider liquidation, since the reason for continuance of the centers no longer existed. However, we firmly believe that the emergency created by evacuation still exists and continues to exist until every one of us returns successfully to normal life. It cannot be expected that every one of us will be able to solve our relocation problems successfully as soon as he departs from the centers. Changing jobs, moving homes, receiving grants, making loans and attempting relocation to another community may become necessary to adjust ourselves. Since the WRA's prime objective is to solve our relocation successfully, we can reasonably ask these relocation offices to be kept open to accommodate us for one year after the closing of the centers.

(5) A grant to enable us to investigate our relocation.

We would like to go out to investigate relocation opportunities and living conditions before we set out definitely to relocate. Some of us do not have any savings to finance such trips. Others who have little saved up are hesitating to go out on their own expenses with fear that the trips may result in disappointment and in wasting of their money. A grant of \$500 a family may be sufficient for its head member to investigate personally its relocation opportunities.

(6) Additional relocation grants.

We understand that travel grants will not be made to those who are considered by the Authority as not having "good reason to return" to the evacuated area. We believe that we all have good reasons to return to be entitled to every grant available.

At the time of our evacuation, many of us sold our household goods and personal effects at unreasonably low prices. If we are to relocate, we have to buy practically everything at war-time cost in order to furnish our new homes. Even though we may live in apartments temporarily, sooner or later we shall have to move into our permanent homes. The WRA is assisting very few of us who did not

sell everything by transporting their properties to their new locations on government expenses. However, there is no allowance for the majority of us who have nothing to be transported and therefore nothing to be used in furnishing their new homes. Exact amount for this type of grant needs further investigation.

A grant of \$50 to every evacuee before his departure is to take care of miscellaneous expenses that are needed by one who moves out of camp life to enter a normal outside community.

The \$25 grant for every member of a family after reaching their destination seems to be the allowance for their groceries, house rent and other living expenses till their first pay check comes in. We doubt very much if \$25 is sufficient for such purpose to most of our families. "Well begun is half won" and we all wish to start on our right foot. Such a grant is best to be more than sufficient so that there will be no worry in our minds of running short of cash before our first pay day.

(7) A grant to enable us to return to our former homes to settle on our properties.

At the time of our evacuation, some of us made arrangements with our properties with the intention of coming back after the war. If we wish to relocate elsewhere with the intention of never going back to our former homes, we wish to go back there on short term leaves to make settlement on our properties. Those who are going to have their goods shipped to their new homes outside the evacuated area wish to inspect them personally before shipping them so that there will be no mistakes. This is true especially in case of several parties sharing one store room. Some of us have theirs stored in several different places. In case of those who are still excluded from the coastal area, special permits are necessary in addition to the grants.

(8) Assurance by the government of our subsistence.

We understand that there are facilities and resources available for public assistance in normal communities throughout the nation, but that they are being handled by other government agencies. We hope that the WRA with the cooperation of such other agencies explains in details every facility and resource available for public assistance with answers to such questions as "When are we entitled to it", "How do we apply for it", "How much can we get", "How soon shall we get it", etc. Informations with different examples will make us understand easier. Then we shall know what to do if and when an emergency situation arises. If we have a clear picture of all these means of assistance together with the guarantee by the government of no racial discrimination in benefiting those aids, we shall feel more assured of our living after relocation.

(9) Clarification of the indemnity.

The Authority is well aware of the fact that every one of us suffered from a tremendous loss by forced liquidation of his properties. Furthermore, it is true that more than two years of racial segregation and confinement in camps have brought hardships on us and had their effects on our morale. We understand that we cannot collect damages from the government except if the government is willing to pay it. We understand further that payments may be made by a law passed by the government, but it is not usual that they are made during war. Some of us seem to think that going out of the centers will automatically forfeit their claims to the indemnity. In this respect, clarification of the question of the indemnity is quite necessary to facilitate our relocation. At the same time, we are very much interested to learn how the government reacts to our claims of the indemnity.

(10) Guarantee by the government of our living quarters, our foods and clothes and fuels, our hospital cares, and schooling for our children.

We admit that it is impossible for the government to guarantee every phase of our living. But we believe it is within reason that we request those listed

above to be guaranteed. We do not mean that the government ought to provide these free. We merely mean to request the government to step in and settle for us if and when we are refused any of the services listed above. The Army Department will issue us identification cards upon request. The government will be good to issue us memorandum cards addressed to whomever it may concern and stating her expectation of him to serve without discrimination.

Meeting
in
Project Director's Office

December 5, 1944
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon

Those Present: Messrs. Stafford, Rawlings, Huberman, Nichols, Smith, Graham, Barclay, Mann, Barrett, McIntyre, McLaughlin, Fujii, Osawa, Mayeno, Nakayama, Nakahara, Tsudchida, Yamamoto.

Discussed: Coal hauling situation.

Stafford: Have you any particular proceedings, Mr. Fujii? On the theory that we did not get much coal hauled yesterday, I asked you to contact these fellows and I presume you did so last night.

Fujii: In my opinion, I feel that after all we are interested in getting a constant supply of coal, regardless of what has passed, but we find out there are some difficulties involved in the situation. I don't believe there is any obstacle to carrying out regulation matter of coal hauling. The purpose this morning is to clear up the difficulties and to get cooperation from the appointed personnel and evacuees. We are all interested for the benefit of the residents.

Stafford: We are all interested in getting some coal hauled. I understand we had one load per truck yesterday morning. How many of you hauled more than one load of coal? Did all of you haul one load?

(Boys answered that they had all hauled one load, but none more than one load.)

Stafford: I guess everybody will agree that the residents are not going to have enough coal with one load hauled in half a day. May I raise the question, why only one load here yesterday morning? Has anybody any answer to that?

Osawa: We have several reasons partly accounting for it. One reason is that they have been held down to 20 miles an hour with load. When you come to a hill at this speed and put car in low gear sometimes it stops entirely.

Barrett: On that point, isn't there an expert here. Mr. McIntyre, won't the trucks they use go up the hill in second or in low?

McIntyre: Yes.

Barrett: The object is to keep from having accidents.

Osawa: How many accidents have there been.

McIntyre: There have not been any.

Osawa: So now when we need coal you cut down the speed of the trucks.

Stafford: Let me interfere here. Is it the purpose of the council members to answer all these questions? Do you want to question the boys or do you want to answer the questions? I asked Mr. Fujii about procedure, and that is perfectly all right. Certainly I think for the benefit of the record we ought to have quite a little order in the discussion. I propose to raise some questions here. If you council members want to talk for these boys that is all right.

Osawa: I am not thoroughly conversant with all details. Day before yesterday's meeting was the first time I entered in any coal discussions.

Stafford: It is a matter of procedure here. The fact we are not getting coal is obvious. The purpose this morning is to find out why, to see if we can't get order out of a chaotic situation. Now I asked for opinions as to why. You stated one reason was cutting trucks down to 20 miles an hour.

Osawa: This does not mean going 20 miles an hour all the time, this is a top speed of 20 miles an hour which means the average speed is less.

Stafford: I will ask Mr. McIntyre -- You have some purpose in controlling speed of the trucks, do you, and what is your comment on this?

McIntyre: The trucks are in a condition that makes it unsafe to drive them loaded at a very high speed. Also, this time of year, you might haul half a day, and it might start to storm. If you get the truck going 35 or 40 miles an hour in bad weather it is not safe.

Osawa: Isn't it true that heavy equipment runs better at high speed? You have more clutch trouble in your equipment because of low speeds and shifting gears.

McIntyre: I don't think this has anything to do with speed.

Stafford: Mr. Osawa, do you object to controlling speed on these trucks?

Osawa: If you want more coal, it slows up the work.

Stafford: Do you object to controlling speeds?

Osawa: Yes.

Stafford: Are you familiar with highway speeds? Are you in favor of observing these speeds?

Osawa: Yes.

Stafford: Will you say McIntyre can judge these trucks and regulate speeds accordingly?

Osawa: I question his judgment.

Stafford: Do you have any comment, Mr. Fujii?

Fujii: No.

Stafford: What other item is there now?

Barrett: I think in government regulations, the person responsible for equipment ought to judge the condition of the equipment and if it is necessary to reserve it be reducing speeds, then he has the right to do it. It is his responsibility and duty if he considers the condition of the brakes and motor such that speeds should be cut down, to do so. It is a matter of security and safety of the drivers. If he neglected to reduce speeds the WRA would be subjected to a great deal of responsibility for these boys if they were injured.

Osawa: How much have they taken for all these accidents?

Barrett: Under compensation act, to the full extent.

Osawa: What portion of your cars are tied up now due to clutch trouble?

McIntyre: Two.

Osawa: Just two?

Barrett: One other point is that county and state authorities have warned us to keep these down in speed.

Osawa: Down to 35 miles an hour?

Barrett: Keep the speed down to a safe operation. That latter part comes to a technical question, of course of McIntyre deciding how fast an engine should operate, and if he decides that 30 miles an hour is all right on a day when there is no sleet that is up to him. I think a reasonable regulation is something the boys should be willing to follow. There is also the possibility of bad public relations resulting from speeding and possible accidents on the highway.

Mann: I would like to inject some figures here to show that using the speed of 20 miles an hour the trucks could easily bring four loads of coal per day. The round trip to the spur takes 40 minutes, it takes 5 minutes to load the truck at the spur, and 15 minutes to unload here in camp; or a total of 60 minutes for the trip.

Fujii: Another thing to explain the situation: The boys are very anxious to bring enough coal for residents. They know they are impatient with situation at present moment. They are willing to do the best they can for the benefit of the residents. Since those people are old enough to know, and they are more or less selected type of driver, they know they are very careful in speeding. They feel that such a limitation is unfair to them. They know the conditions. They know the speeding limit outside. They are not too young. They have families. They know the coal situation. If they cannot carry out their job the residents will place the blame on them. If they are limited to such an extent, then there is no use to keeping up. Somebody else take the job if anyone can do it. Dump trucks are so limited in there also I doubt with four or five dump trucks they can supply enough coal. Depend on their judgment. So after all I think there must be some feeling involved in the situation.

McIntyre: Take such a morning as yesterday morning, there are no heaters in the trucks, and the windshields haven't much visibility. What speed would you recommend.

Fujii: Leave it up to them.. They know the condition. They feel that they are old enough to give fair judgment.

Rawlings: With 15 trucks on the project, how do you account for the fact that running under their own judgment during the past six to eight months, we are only able to keep four or five trucks on the road?

Fujii: I made a suggestion to Mr. Stafford yesterday, try to get more selected type of drivers. We know severay very young men driving trucks. Other people driving coal trucks. Now more or less new on coal trucks. How many people have children? Different story altogether.

Osawa: Most trucks damaged in hauling sand.

Rawlings: By drivers.

Osawa: Not by coal crew.

Barrett: When the Presidential proclamation was made reducing the national speed limit to 35 miles an hour a lot of people thought it was ridiculous.

Osawa: Speed has been increased to 40 for heavy equipment.

Barrett: This was a regulation for a particular unit. McIntyre knows better than the person who made this increase, as far as his own equipment is concerned.

Osawa: I don't think so.

Barrett: At any rate, he has technicians down there, who with him, are responsible for trucks.

Osawa: You admit it slows up. There is a lot of more or less red tape when you haul in coal. They have to go through a lot of red tape to get it delivered, and get back from the point of hauling to the spur.

Nichols: Is it red tape tied up with the hauling?

Osawa: Yes.

Nichols: With speed?

Osawa: Other red tape.

Barrett: The boys ought to make a statement as to their feeling on the subject.

Stafford: What is your view on this speeding? Any contribution?

Yamamoto: (spoke in Japanese, interpreted by Osawa.) Think the speed should be raised over 20 miles an hour. The speed limit is 20 miles an hour even in good weather.

Nakayama: I disagree with Mr. Osawa, and what I think is this: I have been in here for more than a year and I know how it has been handled. I was not driving myself. I was always afraid that there might be some accident due to speeding. I have children of my own walking, attending nursey school. When I drive, I always take him and other kids into consideration. If it is possible, I think the speed limit should be left up to us. I think we can regulate, preventing any accidents. Twenty miles an hour, on the highway, in slippery weather, maybe we would have to cut down to 5 miles an hour. We can judge that ourselves. That is my own opinion. I am quite sure the others will agree. In nice weather I think 30-35 would not hurt the car at all. That way we the car is running smoother. When you cut down to 15-20 it is hard to shift. Gears are not in good condition. We try not to bother with them. Those speeds I think should be left to our own judgment.

Nakahara: Since the speed here is 20 an hour, won't it wreck the car worse here than outside. The road outside is a lot better.

Yamasaki: We have been told not to exceed 20 miles an hour. You just about have to stop in order to shift gears.

It was brought by Mr. McIntyre, that 20 miles an hour is to be maintained as an average speed, perhaps taking a slight run before a hill, and if gears are shifted soon enough when making a hill, there would be no difficulty with stalling engines.

Osawa: Did he say 25 miles an hour at the bottom of the hill would be all right?

Barrett: He just said that.

Osawa: Now he states different than his orders.

Stafford: I am interested in the fact that Mr. Mann has pointed out that a complete trip, including loading and unloading can be made in an hour, averaging 20 miles an hour on the road. Do you think we will get more than one trip an hour even at higher speeds?

Osawa: You can't get one trip an hour. He said average of 20 miles an hour and you can't average that if your top speed is 20 miles an hour. Your average is 15 miles an hour.

Stafford: I want to know if you think one load an hour is enough for the trucks. Suppose they did make one trip an hour. How many trips do you suppose they should make, should have made yesterday morning.

Osawa: I haven't been out on the road. I couldn't say.

Stafford: You couldn't say. How many loads should be brought in?

Osawa: At least two or three.

Stafford: They can make one trip and hour at 20 miles an hour, and only one load of coal was brought in yesterday morning.

Osawa: ~~There are~~ other factors that come in.

Stafford: How many loads ought we to have in half a day, all things operating -- how many loads?

Osawa: Two or three.

Stafford: Two or three. It has been demonstrated that if you average 20 miles an hour you can make a trip in an hour.

Mayeno: That is what he figured, but can you do it?

Yamasaki: Depends how far you have to go into the center.

Nichols: Even allowing $1\frac{1}{2}$ hrs. per trip, it would still be possible to make four trips in a 6-hour day.

Nakayama: From past experience record, which is available, we made three in the morning, four in the afternoon -- from that I think it is quite obvious that we can make three. I myself don't think we are going too fast. I felt the truck was slow, and that is what we can do. We knew the situation was such that we can't depend on quitting a certain time. We were willing to work until midnight, if we had to.

Mr. Osawa stated that when the boys were allowed to drive their trucks home at noon, they often made a last trip in the morning that would get them back to the project a little after noon. Now, having to make the convoy at a certain time, the situation is altered.

Mr. McIntyre stated that a special convoy was being run for the coal crew, which would wait for them. Mr. Osawa said the convoy was there one day out of the last three. The query was raised as to why the men did not eat their lunch at the workers mess.

Yamasaki: If you want to eat up there you can, but you want to go home and eat with your family. You can't just set rules up and say, eat there.

Stafford: We had a great deal of pressure on us to establish Mess Hall #45. What is your opinion of the food there? Do you like to eat there?

Yamasaki: As far as I see, it is all right.

To further questions about convoy service, Mr. Yamasaki said the drivers had convoy last night (December 4), but sometimes they have hopped rides with passing cars. He said the workers depended on the convoy Saturday night but nobody came after them.

Mr. Stafford made it clear to the boys that it was Mr. McIntyre's prerogative to control the speed of the trucks. No matter what speed is driven, one load per day from the trucks will not supply the project with enough coal -- even if all the trucks in camp were used. It may become necessary to supplement the dump trucks with some stakes and cargoes, and if so, this will be done.

Mr. Osawa now questioned policy of allowing some trucks to go 35 mph, and Mr. McIntyre explained that cargo trucks were allowed to travel at this speed both because they were in better condition than the dump trucks and because as a type of truck they were more flexible, more easily handled.

Mr. Osawa now brought up the point that although these dump trucks were in poor condition, difficult to drive, still the boys were given to understand that the beginners started on these, and graduated to cargoes, stakes and passenger cars. This impression creates bad morale within the coal crew. Discussion developed the fact that Mr. McIntyre had stated people already driving trucks would be given first chance when jobs driving cargoes or passenger cars developed, if they wished them -- since there seemed to be a preference for this type of driving job. Mr. McIntyre is attempting to find skilled, matured people for all driving jobs, and there is no "grade" attached to the fact that one man drives a dump and one a cargo truck.

Tamasaki: You can't... you put us down where you don't have any confidence in our driving, so you put us on dumps, driving from the spur. You don't have that much confidence in us drivers to put us on cargoes.

Barrett: Don't think McIntyre meant that -- certainly no one else had that idea. We thought you were assigned there because that is the most urgent, and important business. If I were on the dump trucks, I would consider it a compliment.

Osawa: That is what everybody thinks, except McIntyre's statement is the opposite.

Mr. Stafford commented that he did not think Mr. McIntyre had taken any "opposite" point of view. Mr McIntyre has put a considerable amount of importance on the transportation of people. Mr. Fujii puts considerable amount of importance on the transportation of coal right now. It does not follow that Mr. McIntyre has taken an opposite point of view. He is maintaining control of the motor pool. If that is not objectionable, we may have to live with it. Everyone has put into the record that these boys on the dump trucks are skilled drivers. In any event, the motor pool is Mr. McIntyre's responsibility -- it is not going to be everybody's business and nobody's business.

Tamasaki: I think I could talk for all the boys here. We have no offense at Mr. McIntyre putting us on dump trucks. The thing is that when we just had an interview with him he said we would be promoted from dump to stake to cargo to passenger cars. When I was in here before. . .

Stafford: Have you been out on seasonal?

Yamasaki: This summer. I drove a semi for a while. When they said you start on dump, that was O.K. with me. When he said about advancement, I think most of the boys still think there should not be any such a promotion from dumps on up, regardless of what they are.

Stafford: How many of your truck drivers were out on seasonal leave this summer?

Four of the boys said they had been out on seasonal. Mr. McLaughlin asked the other boy if he had not been out on work leave, and he replied, yes.

Yamasaki: There should not be anything like promotion. There might be a different rating, A.B.C. But this way you put dump drivers at the bottom of the list.

Mann: Hasn't this been created by desire of the boys themselves for driving jobs?

Osawa: Naturally you can't deny - - - as far as WRA is concerned you should have the best drivers possible. They should be at the top of the list.

Stafford: Has anybody asked you boys if you wanted indefinite leave?

Nakayama: I don't remember.

Ysuchida: I don't remember.

Stafford: Do you understand the difference between seasonal, short term and indefinite leave?

The boys all replied in the affirmative.

Nakayama: I think one relocation officer contacted my family when I was away. I don't know what he was up to. Probably asking family situation.

Stafford: The point I am making is that you boys exercise your privilege of going out of the project -- no one objects -- and your privilege of returning, at will -- still no one objects. You come back of your own choice, and find

yourself on the payroll. You choose to come back; you do not choose indefinite leave. We stay here, day in and day out, faced with problems of running the center. Mr. McIntyre has been working out his problems in the motor pool while you were gone, and I do not imagine that you worried very much while you were out about the operation of the motor pool. I question whether you have the privilege of being so easily offended, now that you are voluntarily returned to camp, by procedures which may have been set up while you were off the project. I think you are being rather too discriminating. We have no object here except to get some services performed. We would like to have some coal in here. We are here this morning to hear your complaints and factors entering into the fact that we got one load of coal per truck hauled in here yesterday morning. Quite frankly, if you are going to fail to take into consideration some of these things, you are going to be at a disadvantage in trying to render service to the community. I don't think the administration in general, or Mr. McIntyre in particular, is discriminating against you boys. I just want to get that in the record, and I want you boys to think about it. Now, what are other factors that contribute.

Fujii: I want to say one thing. In my opinion, I feel I am correct to say that when I made a recommendation to you yesterday on a subject that we would like to have the most select, skilled drivers on dump trucks because at least during winter time the residents are most concerned about coal, next to food. We cannot neglect that thing. We know that you carry out operations in hauling coal. I still think there should be no discrimination or classification between one driver or another. In summer time the coal driver is not so important as in the winter time. Those who are skilled drivers on other trucks. I am disappointed in the policy that McIntyre has now. I wish that he would modify policy so that all drivers will be treated on equal basis.

Stafford: Mr. McIntyre has organized his department to operate on a year-round basis. This summer we struggled along as best we could. Now you get into the situation where importance is being put on coal. Nobody considers coal hauling anything else than important. I don't think Mr. McIntyre is degrading anybody who hauls coal.

McIntyre: That is correct.

Stafford: Many workers have been here all through the summer, and have done good work. They cannot now be tossed around. I am not in favor of doing that. I think these boys have to take into consideration their own attitude. At least they have to have a fair appraisal of the situation.

Barrett: As I sense this discussion, the boys would like an occasion to break their truck hauling with different types of driving.

Yamasaki: We don't want to break into anybody else's . . . We are satisfied with driving these trucks. The idea comes in that as you came in we are promoted, We are not discriminating. Maybe you take it that we drivers are discriminating, but we are not.

Barrett: McIntyre did not mean it as you have thought he meant it. He feels that you are responsible drivers. He trusts you more than he would one of us as drivers. In a way we envy you because of your ability.

Osawa: Mr. McIntyre does not put it that way. The main question is the question of coal.

Nakayama: Thanks for the compliment anyway. I feel in the past we have put in quite a lot of hours. Of course, if I may say, the procedure we have been following is different. We check out the car, and check gas and oil and leave the project. That will take some time. Then put in three hours in the morning. We have been taking car home, parking right by family house, then about 12:30 or 1:00 going back. In that way, we can bring more coal. Have been doing that because we had interest in the people here, and we thought we could bring in more coal to help the people. Now that time is limited -- it is just the psychology ...idea that this feeling gets ... it is not that we have tried to discriminate against Mr. McIntyre. We are not. Of course, with the full confidence in the people here, we have always thought we could bring in the coal the way we think, and I think past record proves that. Our idea has been turned down. From the meeting here, most points are cleared up. We are willing to give service.

Osawa: This crew and previous one worked up to 8 and 9 at night, benefitting the residents. They were given responsibility and they took it. When you don't give them responsibility they will go according to rules, and you don't get coal.

Stafford: I think the boys ought to know that we have talked about Central Services since last July. We have had discussions and agreed that for our purposes here Central Services was probably best. Now the Washington Office has decreed that the motor pool shall be organized separately and independently, and that the Motor Maintenance Superintendent has authority over all equipment. They have also decreed that equipment shall be in the compound at certain specified times. I think the boys might be interested to know that we can no longer go along with Central Services idea, especially the coal unit idea. The Washington Office has had experience with 10 projects, and has decided that we shall operate in a certain way. Mr. McIntyre is entirely bound by those procedures, and we have no alternative as far as I am concerned. He has visited Heart Mountain and the set-up is working at that project.

We have handled lots of coal here the hard way because we did not have equipment. We finally got trucks and equipment, and now we have the clam shell loader, which should help some. We have done the best we could. The residents have done the best they could. I think lots of the drivers have done the best they could. What Mr. McIntyre is doing may look out of line in view of what we have done in the past. As a matter of fact, we are trying to get on a procedural basis which Washington office says is working out well at other projects. There is no use trying to blame Mr. McIntyre or me as Project Director.

Osawa: These boys know from the discussion. You say Mr. McIntyre went to Heart Mountain. Did you discover the situation there, with two boys on the truck, one being in the morning and one in the afternoon? They work only half a day.

Stafford: There is no place here for that kind of thing.

Osawa: You brought out that other projects were using this plan.

Stafford: If it takes half-time workers on full-time pay to make the run and get coal in here, forget it.

Osawa: The boys don't agree either, You brought the question of Heart Mountain in here.

Stafford: I doubt that it is the rule. I have never enforced a regulation in this camp because it was done somewhere else. I don't run this project in accordance with what they do elsewhere. I run it according to mandates from Washington.

Fujii: Last night in meeting with the boys, we find out they are willing to work even more than is required and it requires as Mr. Nakayama says, more cooperation or sympathetic understanding from the administration. That is what he is asking for. A question I would like to raise here, for instance, if we all know the coal situation is very critical, then, in view of the fact, if Mr. McIntyre could so arrange that minor repairs on dump trucks might be made before other trucks, for full cooperation and keeping up morale, if such a practice means giving full cooperation.

Stafford: Let's get into the question of maintenance or repair, if that is in order.

Fujii: Last night we were informed that sometimes they have difficulty with little repairing jobs but as regular procedure, they take care of requisitions for repair in the order they get them. The boys feel that certain minor repairs could be made, so long as Mr. McIntyre has full responsibility of equipment, and to his judgment if such minor repair could be made it would be done before taking of other things -- in view of the acute situation on coal.

Stafford: What you are talking about is giving priority on coal trucks.

Mann: Both Mr. Hicox and Mr. Hebert had instructions that dump trucks had priority over other equipment.

Rawlings: Which one of you drivers stopped last Friday evening and had to be pulled in, and nothing was wrong with the truck.

Yamamoto: That was my truck. Engine stopped. I never do anything to engine. Never touch truck.

Barrett: We want the boys to know that the administration and the community council made every effort to keep the Central Services set up, but Washington turned it down.

Osawa: I don't think the drivers are especially interested in Central Services. They want their crew intact as a coal crew.

Barrett: We didn't want the drivers to think the Community Council had not done everything possible about this.

Osawa: Drivers are not complaining about that.

Rawlings: I think we should clear up the idea of a "coal crew." These trucks might haul coal today and something else tomorrow.

Stafford: We have a motor pool, with equipment, and we have drivers. As far as an entity or unit of "coal crew" or a coal unit, there is nothing in the book, and we don't have one. We used to have what the boys called the coal crew. They had a pennant. We can't carry that on any more because of getting on procedure. All drivers belong to the motor pool. All swampers will be outside the motor pool.

Fujii: I raised the question about priority of coal equipment.

Stafford: As I understand, we have always given precedence to whatever was pressing us the most. I presume there is no problem in your maintenance shop of keeping coal equipment on priority as long as the thing is tight.

McIntyre: That is right.

Mr. Stafford also assured the council members that the clam shell would be moved from the onion cellar as soon as it was finished, down to the spur. This will be used in conjunction with the gasoline loader. More trucks will also be allocated to the hauling of coal if this is deemed necessary, although trucks other than the dumps will have to be unloaded by hand. All available equipment is going to be used to get the coal in just as early as possible, so that if equipment at the spur should break down, or we should have some bad weather, there will be sufficient pile of coal in the center to run for awhile.

Fujii: I would like to ask another question. Suddenly, McIntyre requested drivers to check in trucks at the eating hour. We heard from the boys that they could save time and make one extra trip if necessary as well, if they have the truck, as they have done in the past. The other trucks are now free, and the drivers take them out on the lunch time. Why do the dump trucks have to be checked in.

Stafford: We don't want any more miles on those dump trucks than we have to have. Keeping the trucks in the compound at all times except during working hours is necessary to maintain control of equipment. To avoid discrimination this rule has been applied to all trucks.

Rawlings: It is being applied as rapidly as possible, and will be even to passenger cars.

Fujii: The boys feel they are responsible for their equipment and they are of the opinion that even if they take equipment to their homes, they will take care of it. While we are faced with this coal situation, they feel that if this privilege could be given to the drivers they could save one trip and their main object is to accomplish the job.

Rawlings: We had assumed that mess hall #45 for the use of the workers would make it unnecessary for the boys to go home at noon. Perhaps we should decide whether to close this mess hall and convoy the workers home or keep the mess hall open and have the boys eat there.

Fujii: Other truck drivers take other types of trucks. The dump truck drivers are restricted. It seems to be discrimination. I know the intention of McIntyre is good. I appreciate that. But still there is discrimination on this point.

Rawlings: Dump trucks are something we have to protect. If we give the boys a ride home, I can't see that is any less convenient than letting five trucks be driven to five different blocks.

Osawa: They might come in a little after noon, and make an extra trip.

Rawlings: It is cheaper to operate this other way.

Osawa: That is part of the reason you are not getting coal.

Stafford: It is not going to be possible for these trucks to be driven home at noon. Some decision should be reached regarding use of mess hall #45 or convoy of workers to their separate homes at noon.

Osawa: Start someplace where it is not critical and work up to it.

Stafford: These things can be largely cleared up by explanation. Our problem is to control the equipment, and conserve it, since it is probably all the equipment we shall get. We are not discriminating against the dump trucks.

Osawa: The dump trucks handling gravel still go home.

McIntyre: There are no gravel trucks running at present.

Fujii: Do you think you could get good drivers for dump trucks when other drivers are allowed to take equipment home.

McIntyre: If they don't want to take the job, that is out of my control.

Fujii: We are more interested in getting coal.

Rawlings: We are interested in overall operation of the motor pool. Coal is only a part of that. Trucks running on a schedule in and out of camp must be in the compound during eating hours and after hours. A decision should be made regarding mess hall #45, whether the boys want to eat there, or whether they want convoy service at noon.

Stafford: On that point, I take it the boys here, in realization of the criticalness of the coal situation, if they want to contribute they might temporarily consent to eat their noon meal at mess hall #45.

Fujii: I feel this way, that if the idea is not discrimination against the boys, I think they are willing to cooperate. If that is so, I think everywhere the same policy should be applied right away.

Rawlings: I can see that is causing confusion.

Osawa: If you are going to do it, then put the coal crew last.

Rawlings: We put the coal boys and convoy first because they were in the motor pool section, and that is the one we worked on first.

Fujii: I think that is the only reason today we have to clarify some of the misunderstandings.

Rawlings: The solution is to get them all on a uniform basis.

Mr. Stafford again stressed that all possible equipment will be used in the effort to get coal into camp. Mr. Rawlings added that every effort is being made to get all 14 dump trucks into service.

Fujii: The boys now are faced with the difficulty of getting signatures. They are being double-checked. They feel that double-checking is unnecessary procedure.

Rawlings: We feel that will not be necessary after we get the plan into operation.

Osawa: Right now the signatures take time. The boys can't always find the boilerman. They are not there from 1 - 4 in the afternoon.

Rawlings: May we should have the block clerk's office sign.

Fujii: On this point they feel they are old enough to see. They are sincere enough with the residents to help them out. If they see a pile of coal they won't dump. If they know of blocks that need coal they will make delivery of the coal there.

It was explained that in order to take pressure from the drivers, and to place responsibility for delivery of the coal on the warehouse, the warehouse will designate the block where coal is to be left. A survey will be made each morning to determine where coal is needed, and it will then be so distributed. After all blocks are supplied, coal will then be delivered to the block piles on a regular schedule.

Fujii: In order to save time when they report to warehouse #1, have them tell him where to deliver the coal then to relieve responsibility to driver.

Mr. Stafford pointed out that it is necessary to know that someone acknowledges delivery of the coal, because while coal is so short, what the driver delivers may have disappeared by the time he gets back up to the gate.

Mr. Osawa still objected to the practice of getting signatures, since he contended it wasted too much time. After discussion, it was agreed that the driver would deliver his coal as directed by warehouse one, and he would make delivery to that block, but no signature from the block would be required by warehouse. This system will be tried, and followed unless it develops that it is not working, and that there are still too many complaints that coal is not coming where it is needed.

Nakayama: One of the boilermen wanted me to back in between the buildings to dump the coal. I argued him out of it. We are trying to cooperate, and all of us were asked not to do this.

In line with this statement of Mr. Nakayama's, he was commended for having followed procedures, and it was again stressed that coal should be delivered to only two places on the block, at the mess hall pile and at the laundry room pile. This is especially important since two different types of coal are used. A plat of the project is being prepared, designating every coal pile on the blocks, and at any other specified points where coal delivery is necessary, such as the farm, and so forth. This map will be available in warehouse #1, and in the motor pool, for examination by the drivers.

Fujii: Another thing, I have in mind that according to the figures I get from other sources, that consumption of coal amounts to about 80 tons a day.

Mr. Mann explained that he had averaged out figures over a period of time, and the consumption averages 50 tons a day.

Fujii: I have an idea in order to protect the coal crew on the dump trucks, I feel that the boys on this figure, plus the reserve should be built up for the year. We take a very safe figure, and when we get the daily report of coal hauled, then we know where we stand. If the trucks being used are not capable of carrying the requirement, the administration will have to prepare some faster way to bring the coal hauled up to the figure, so that I can protect their drivers, and so they won't get the blame from the residents.

It was stated that this information would be available from Property Control at any time it was wanted.

The trucks can haul $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3 tons of coal per load. With six trucks making four trips a day, a surplus of coal can easily be hauled each day.

Fujii: We have to work out a plan based on these figures. Another thing I have in mind, we have so called swampers. According to Washington instructions, the swampers and drivers belong to separate divisions. In order to keep them in close contact here, make one happy family, is it possible to assign swampers as truck driver helpers.

Mr. Rawlings explained that the plan was there would be no work for swampers. Trucks are to be machine loaded at the spur, and the only clean-up work will be cleaning out a few cars at the spur every day. Men will be assigned for this work, but not from the motor pool.

Mr. Nakayama mentioned ten half-time workers which he believed were assigned to Mr. McIntyre in the motor pool. This matter has already been cleared up by Mr. Stafford's memorandum of December 1 to the Personnel Office. The men are not assigned to Mr. McIntyre, and are responsible to Mr. Doi.

Mr. Osawa objected that the machine loader was very slow. It was pointed out that it was considerably faster than to load trucks with shovels. Mr. Newbry reported that he had checked loading times yesterday (December 4) and it took 10 minutes to load the first truck, and 5 minutes per truck thereafter.

Mr. Stafford mentioned it was getting close to noon and asked if there were any further questions before the meeting adjourned.

Nakayama: Before we leave, can somebody tell us what the procedure is going to be.

Barrett: I think the procedure can be summarized about as follows:

1. Drivers will continue under McIntyre, strictly according to regulations which he sets up with regard to speed of trucks, and crew to man trucks.

2. Trucks will clear from Warehouse 1. Driver will sign dispatch ticket there and be responsible for dumping load at the specified place. Signature from the block will not be necessary as long as the boys can make the plan work.

3. Drivers will refer anyone objecting to their actions in following directions to Warehouse No. 1.

4. Trucks will continue to come into the compound at lunch hour, and transportation home will be furnished to those workers who desire it.

Stafford: In connection with point 4, if the workers could eat at mess hall #45 for the time being it will simplify matters.

Nakayama: Can't we take truck home for emergency?

Stafford: No, that is out.

Nakahara: How about clothing?

Stafford: You have clothing allowance don't you?

Nakahara: Not enough.

Nichols: I think he is referring to work clothing, but there is nothing in the procedure providing for work clothing for workers in this category. The only thing that can be allowed is gloves.

Nakayama: Which division will furnish workers for cleaning up the cars?

Stafford: We will determine that.

Osawa: Up to now the drivers have been cleaning up the cars.

Rawlings: As long as the machinery works this will not be necessary. We will furnish someone else to clean the cars.

Mayeno: If the machinery breaks, who will furnish swappers?

Rawlings: We will have to make some arrangements for that. If we can get a surplus built up, we can wait a day or so for machinery to be repaired. Drivers will take care of their equipment and drive the trucks. They have a lot of work in connection with their trucks. They are responsible for keeping the trucks oiled, greased, tires up, truck washed and shined.

Osawa: If Mr. McIntyre will give the procedures in writing, that will clarify matters.

Stafford: I don't think Mr. McIntyre will have any objection to doing that.

Nakayama: The coal crew is not a clean job. It is dirty. It has been said, I am sure, that some of the drivers leave the trucks running. As far as we are concerned, we are willing to take responsibility. We have been getting complaints without ground. Those things should be stopped.

Stafford: You boys should tie right up with Mr. McIntyre. I think it is a matter of working closely with him on the management of the trucks. I am sure Mr. McIntyre is not going to criticize anybody that is not entitled to criticism. I am sure you boys are not going to conduct yourselves in a manner requiring criticism.

Rawlings: What it amounts to, you boys in the motor pool are running a trucking service for the project.

Fujii: As far as the driver is concerned, they see the picture clearly. Residents take a different point of view. They think whoever drives the coal truck is responsible for the coal.

Stafford: I do not blame the residents, when only one truckload of coal came in yesterday morning.

Fujii: Again, the residents blame them, although they were trying the best they could. As far as we know, Mr. Gooding is responsible for coal. Mr. McIntyre is just renting trucks to property control. Confusing there to the residents.

Rawlings: Nobody knew who was to do what. That is what we are trying to clear up.

Stafford: We are trying to get a clarifying statement of the whole arrangement. When we get that, I think it is available for the residents or anyone else.

p4 00

War Relocation Authority
Community Analysis Section

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

Subject: Some Notes on Labor Problems in Minidoka

Date: October 19, 1944

The problems revolving around the labor conditions in Minidoka may best be introduced by summarizing the general attitudes of the appointive personnel apropos evacuee labor. There are various shades of negativism presented by the administrative members, but the basic ones may be listed as follows:

1. The evacuees are lazy and non-cooperative. No matter what approach you take to them you will get no place. Just as well make the best of a bad situation.
2. The evacuees are trying to put something over on the government, and they are all in "cahoots" on this plan.
3. The evacuees are in a negative mood on any type of cooperation with any Caucasians.
4. The lazy _____ ought to be made to work 8 hours if we have to call in the MP's to do it.
5. Let all the basic types of work "go to the devil." If they won't work 8 hours let 'em starve and freeze.

These five attitudes or opinions are fairly representative of the types of statement made by Caucasian members of the A.P.'s when they discuss the labor problem over the lunch table, in their rooms or at a "poker" session. It should be stressed that not all AP's have these negative attitudes, but on the whole all but a small group tends to definitely be identified with one or a combination of the above attitudes.

The evacuees, on the other hand, have a set of attitudes and opinions that are well matched with those shown by the appointed personnel. A summary of the principal evacuee attitudes follows:

1. "Who does the WRA think I am? I have spent as much money on my traibing if not more than many of the AP's. Why should I work as hard and as

long as they are supposed to for only 16 or 19 dollars? Not only that, so say some, but why should a professional man or woman get the same basic pay as the common laborer? In this connection the following statement has been made. "Supposing all the appointed personnel in the relocation center should work on the same wage scale. If the project director (who has heavy responsibilities) should get the same pay as the farm foreman, would there be any type of efficiency? The same applies to us."

2. "I am a worker on the coal crew, and my work is a lot harder than that performed by most of the office help. Why should I work as long as they do when I really work?"
3. A large number of the evacuees in the center firmly believe that the government has the sole responsibility of providing the evacuees with food, clothing, and shelter. "We did not ask to come here. We were forced to leave our legitimate type of work for the Caucasians to take over and make money on during the war. Therefore, if we choose not to work, the government still has the obligation to see to it that we are treated right."
4. "My Caucasian supervisor doesn't know what the 'score' is. He is not efficient nor does he try to get the aid and suggestion of some of us who have been doing this type of work for a longer period than he has." "You take the case of Mr. _____'s foreman. That fellow doesn't do half the amount of work he is supposed to do. When you try to find him to ask about something, he is always somewhere visiting with some of the other AP's." The implication here is that the AP's, in many instances, expect the evacuee laborers to do the work that he is supposed to do, and thus the AP gets the credit as well as the check. "Why should we do the work and let some one else get the pay?"
5. The Administration is trying to do the best they can under the circumstances, is the attitude of some of the evacuees, but because of the language difficulties, vagueness of some of the orders, and the attitude of some of the AP's and some evacuees, it is a sort of a hopeless job.

Let us now turn to a more general discussion of some of the problems and situations one can find in the center in relation to labor and labor conditions. This report does not claim to be the last word on the labor conditions, nor does it claim to be an infallible analysis of the total situation. The picture is changing from day to day, and as the members of the community leave in larger numbers the situation will be even more negative.

It is a known fact among both the evacuees and the appointive staff that evacuee laborers do not work more than six hours at the most, some even less. There are a number of contributing factors to be considered in relation to this "working hour"

philosophy bringing about the "six hour day or less." The working habits of the evacuees in the early days were such that it was considered right to work only a short time and thus make way for others who were on the payroll. By this is meant that when the evacuees first arrived on the project, everyone who was physically able to work was encouraged to do so. This resulted in a situation where the people employed outnumbered the basic jobs to be done. With this condition prevailing, the workers needed to work only half as long and half as hard as the job required. As a matter of fact, a crew working on gravel hauling was so large that one third of the men would shovel for a brief time, then another third would work, and so on. Some of the 'teen age boys and girls who had never worked before in their life began to acquire bad work habits and many of these have carried over this habit to the present time.

It is a basic psychological fact that all persons tend to follow the lines of least resistance, and as a result of some of their early experiences, many of the workers assumed the easy-going attitude toward project work, especially since they were receiving only 12-16-19 dollars a month.

Another factor incorporated in the hours worked, and attitude toward work, is the fact that there are inequalities in the hours worked and the amount and kinds of work required to be done by various individuals. Some of the residents recognize that many of the evacuee workers are getting by with very little amount of work while others have to really "bear down" and get very little recognition for the job they do. Granting this type of things exists, one finds that all concerned gradually come over to a sort of workman's agreement where no one will do more than another.

There is another factor closely associated with the above situation, and it has to deal with the work habits--true or false--that the evacuees believe to be in existence among the appointed personnel. Many of the evacuee workers, it should not be forgotten, are business men in their own right, and have had the supervision of large numbers of persons under their employment before evacuation. These persons

are highly critical of an AP supervisor. When this supervisor is not "efficient" in the eyes of the evacuee, he is literally "put on the spot," and the evacuee feels that he should not take the blame for the supervisor's inefficiency. The evacuee is also very cognizant of the work habits of the supervisor, and when the supervisor comes late to work, or "goes off the job to visit with other supervisors," the evacuee wonders why he should be expected to work all 6 or 8 hours and get much less pay when the AP supervisor is getting ten times more than he is and yet doesn't stay on the job. This also becomes involved in the resentment still held by many evacuees growing out of evacuation, and the feeling that the government should take care of them whether they work or not.

The problem of raising labor for the farm has always been a "bone of contention" among the evacuees and the AP. It is true that there are many experienced farmers in the center; however, with the passing of the months this group has declined rather rapidly. The relocatees have in some instances been farmers. Many of the old farmers were tired of farming, and upon evacuation many wished to do something else besides farm. It should not be lost sight of, in this respect, that there is a tendency for Japanese to look down upon farming as being a lower type of work. Many times one will hear the Issei refer to a person as "hyakusho" (farmer) in contempt, meaning he is ignorant, clumsy, stupid, etc. Besides these factors, many urban people have the belief that they are physically unable to do the type of work required on the farm. There is another aspect to the farm labor problem demanding attention and perhaps some sort of clarification is needed before any sort of extensive program is attempted. It is rumored in the center, the Steward's Division is forced to buy the project's farm products at prevailing market prices, even though the quality of the products is inferior. If such is the case, so the argument runs, the residents are not getting their full 45 cents a day allowance, because some of this inferior farm produce bought by the Steward's Division could be substituted for higher quality goods through outside purchases. Why, ask the residents, should we be interested in working on the farm when we are really getting

less for our work than by not working at all?

The attitudes of the evacuees toward the appointive staff members on the whole seem to be a negative one. There is a general criticism among the evacuees in regard to the efficiency of the Caucasian supervisor. It is possible to assume the majority of the evacuees feel that most of the appointive personnel are not competent, in spite of the fact (or because of the fact) they are drawing "big" salaries from the government. The evacuees seem to feel that all the "good men" should be able to hold a good permanent position in a normal community instead of accepting the temporary jobs in a relocation center. With the exception of several persons in the higher brackets (i.e., project director, the evacuees regard --on the whole--the appointive personnel as inefficient and incompetent. To cite an example used by the residents, a technician accepts a job in the center in the motor division but he proved himself unable to even suggest how certain mechanical jobs should be done or how work should be planned. This person soon lost the respect and the cooperation of the evacuees. It can be shown through discussions with the evacuees about their work and by listening in on conversations that whether the Caucasian supervisor is accepted by the evacuees and whether they will work for him (or her) depends greatly upon the competency and the efficiency of the person in charge and the personal attitude shown by the supervisor. The arrogant attitudes on the part of the Caucasian supervisor result in resentment among most all of the residents. In cases where the supervisors have made remarks such as "If you don't like to work in the center, why in hell don't you get out?" results in an unfavorable reaction toward work, not only in his own division, but throughout the project.

Another important factor involved in the "labor question" in the center revolves around the responsibilities of the WRA in relation to furnishing certain

basic (vital and essential) types of services to the residents. Many of the evacuees feel that since they were moved here through force they should be guaranteed that certain basic services should be furnished them. However, not all of the residents look at the problem in this light. Some hold that such attitudes as mentioned above, are examples of selfish thinking, the thoughts of people obviously sorry for themselves, and who do not stop to think there are people who are much worse off than they are. However, even this group feels that WRA should issue some sort of statement as to exactly where the government responsibilities end and the evacuee's responsibilities begin; this should be stated in order to give some of the more positive groups in the community some sort of concrete basis upon which to work in establishing a feeling of responsibility in the community. Somehow, this group maintains, it must be shown that Caucasian manpower is not available to fulfill the "extremists'" demands. In this connection, it is of interest to note what one "liberal minded" evacuee had to say along this line. "If Caucasians were available, and the WRA went all out for the evacuees, the evacuees would still not be satisfied with their services because they (evacuees) observe with such a distorted view the actions of most Caucasians. How can one think objectively with such a frame of mind?"

The hospital has been another spot where labor recruiting has been a "sore thumb" to the efficient running of the center. Historically, in the early days of the life of the center, it was a fairly easy matter to get workers for the hospital. In fact, there was more of a supply of laborers than a demand. The reasons for this may be summarized as follows:

1. There was the element of "newness" in being able to work in such an important place as the hospital.
2. The hospital workers were regarded as higher in the occupational status than other workers.
3. The workers felt the knowledge gained by hospital experience would help them later in getting a job on the outside.

This sort of appeal and interest has now declined. The main objections to hospital work presented to the block commissioners and others when people are contacted to work in the hospital are:

1. The work is dirty.
2. The work is long hours, and more often than not one has to work overtime without adequate compensation.
3. The working on "graveyard" and "swing" shifts are detrimental to the health of the young as well as the old.
4. There is danger of having to work in and around the TB ward.
5. The head nurse is not considerate, and asks the nurses' aides to do all sorts of work outside their recognized duties. She is overbearing and a "slave driver".

Another factor becoming more important in the total labor picture in the center is the correlation, on the part of some administrators, of a change in labor schedule (working hours) with that of the changing evacuee personnel. If this type of correlation is speeded up too much there is a good possibility of literally "freezing out" new evacuee laborers from taking or filling the vacated positions. The acceptance of these vacated jobs by new evacuees, under a revised work schedule, has a comparable position as "labor scabs" in the eyes of the prospective laborers as well as in the eyes of the community.

There is much negativism among both the evacuees and the appointed personnel in relation to volunteer labor. Both groups seem to shy away from too much volunteering for work; this was shown in the call for volunteers to aid in working on the Gym during "Build the Gym Week" (see Weekly Analysis Summary, September 23-29). The appointive staff members are unable to understand why it is becoming nearly impossible to get any volunteer workers to cooperate in doing certain types of "desirable" improvements in the center. This tendency to do less volunteer work is taken by some AP's to mean that the evacuees are getting more "sullen", uncooperative, and more anti-administration as well un-American. This is perhaps the easiest and most simple explanation, and one which fits into some already prejudiced attitudes about persons of Japanese ancestry, especially as it applies to the Issei. It should not be forgotten that in the past, when volunteers have been called for, the evacuees "turned out" for cemetery construction and improvements, hauling of coal, the construction of sidewalks, the building of a swimming pool, and the repairing of the "riprap" on the canal. During the last few weeks some

attempts have been made to interest the evacuees in doing certain types of volunteer work (i.e., working on the gym), and aiding in recreational activities, but without success. It is doubtful if much success will be achieved in any type of elaborate volunteer work. The factor involved--as far as the evacuees are concerned--might be summed up in the term "fear of exploitation." This fear of exploitation can be recognized thru the statement made by evacuees concerning the belief that "WRA is trying to get work done for nothing in order to keep a good record for some of the administrators." Or, as the attitude is sometimes stated: "The more we volunteer, the more we will be expected to work for nothing, and its little enough we get for what we do, as it is."

The attitudes, as we presented above, have deeper roots in the psychological make-up of the evacuees than mere sullenness, and feelings of anti-administration and anti-American. As suggested previously, these explanations are the most simple ones and the most easy to rationalize. All of the aspects of labor relations mentioned so far are contributing factors to the anti-volunteer feeling among the evacuees. No one simple explanation is adequate to explain the total feelings of the evacuees and the appointive personnel.

The last important factor to be considered in any discussion of labor in Minidoka rests upon the facts of population decrease within the community. The population at the present writing will be even more pronounced in relation to alien and citizen members as well as to age groups of males and females that might be possibly available for the carrying out of certain types of labor in the community. There are at least two factors shown in the charts that need to be carefully considered. (1) There is a greater alien population than citizen in the community. This increases the problem of communication between the administration and the residents. Also, it demands that any work program or revision must be considered in terms of the "psychological" and "sociological frame of reference" of these older, alien people. It is practically impossible to approach these

groups in the same manner as one would approach the Nisei or a group of persons wholly aculturated to the western philosophy of "getting things done". One must start to accomplish a job with the implements at his disposal, this also must apply to human beings. (2) The second facts to be considered, in the terms of population composition, is that this is becoming a female population. If this fact is overlooked along with its basic implications, little constructive activity will be accomplished. Again we have the problem of language and methods of adequate communication. It is a well known fact that Issei women are even more weak in the use of English than the men, and that the women have had less business and social experience with Caucasians than their husbands. Another aspect of this female dominance, in numbers for the labor situation, involves the possible types of labor that can be made available to women and the transferring of men from certain jobs possibly acceptable to women to jobs that cannot be done by the females.

This community has now become one in which the young and the old predominate. The majority of the evacuees, I am sure, realize this fact but they have not thought through all of the implications of this phenomenon. This can be attributed to two factors: (1) They have not been presented in a concrete and adequate fashion with all of the facts nor have they had a chance to publicly discuss this issue; (2) The residents, in many instances, still feel that the responsibilities of maintaining center operations rest upon the WRA. This belief has deep roots, buried back in various statements released by WRA as well as by statements made by officials with whom the residents have had some direct contact. Added to this, we have the whole mental and emotional feelings and attitudes embodied in what might be called "evacuee psychology."

The above social, psychological, and statistical aspects of the labor problem are not to be considered as all-inclusive of the total problem, but it is believed that this material presents a fair cross-section of the various factors involved. The theoretical material present for discussion in the above material is numerous, but it seems advisable to leave this aspect for a later report. (ERS)

War Relocation Authority
Community Analysis Section

Subject: Factors for Consideration in Analysing the Minidoka Community and
Seeing Possible Trends.

Date: July 8, 1944

In previous reports and field studies by the community analysis section of Minidoka there seems to be a certain series of events that tend to pile up before a crisis situation arises and is brought to the attention of the administration. This can be seen by a recheck of the following reports: Community self-government, No. 27; Resident attitude toward block managers, No. 105; Attitude toward employment cut, No. 132; Farm field crew walkout, No. 143; Employment reduction attitude, No. 153; Preliminary report of reduction of evacuee personnel, No. 275; A preliminary survey of the boilermen's dispute at Minidoka, January 17, 1944; Factors involved in warehouse labor relations (all reports, beginning April 22, 1944); Background and developments in "Irrigator" and reports officer conflict in Minidoka. Under the present conditions there seems to be a type of pattern again taking shape, and tending to become complicated and tense. After the warehouse trouble had been settled on a temporary basis the tension was relieved for a short time, but the contributing factors for another crisis situation are beginning to pile up quite rapidly. It is the purpose of this report to attempt to present these factors in some sort of a cause and effect relationship pattern or scheme. This is difficult to do because of the large amount of overlapping of the factors involved. However, a diagram and outline (the outline corresponds to the factors presented in the diagram as nearly as possible, and is an attempt to make a complicated set of lines and words probably more intelligible) will be presented with an attempt at general explanations following the presentation of the diagram and the outline.

Outline of Diagrammatic Factors

I. Minidoka Community--Resident and Appointive Personnel.

A (I) Basic Common Incidents.

1. Misunderstandings and conflict situations.

a. Personal remarks.

1. Lt. Harrington's negative remarks at public induction ceremony (see Field Study No. 303).
2. Remarks of appointive staff members on various subjects and about various persons.
3. "Irrigator" and reports divisions relations.
4. Reports officer's release to papers on canal fire.
5. Promises and agreements.

b. Policy.

1. Promises and agreements.

- a. Retractions.
- b. Indecisions.
- c. "Irrigator" and reports division.
- d. Summer camps:
 1. Personnel
 2. Transportation
 3. Church and national organizations.
 - a. Visit of Dr. Ade.

2. Labor supply shortage and distribution.

- a. Hospital.
- b. Operations, et al.
- c. Farmers, swampers, truck drivers, warehouse workers, etc.
- d. Coal supply and labor problems, and question of coal orders and shipments.

3. Equipment use and distribution.

- a. Ditto for all of subdivisions of 2.
- b. Indecisions and contradictions.

4. Community Council.

- a. Acting in supervisory capacity for labor and equipment.
 1. This developed during warehouse trouble. (Question as to permanency).
- b. Administration represented through checks with Project Director.

B (II) Appointive Staff Conflicts.

1. Personal and divisional.

a. School principal and others in school system and community management.

1. Visit of Dr. Ade.

b. Operations head and supervisors and their relations and conflicts with other members of administration.

c. Property control and supervisors and conflicts and relations with other members of administration.

d. Personnel: hiring, firing, ratings.

2. The conflicts and tensions seep into the community and give rise to rumors, stories, and opinions.

C. (III) Relocation and Summer Labor Relations.

1. Outside experiences.
 - a. Positive.
 - b. Negative.
 1. Discrimination and wage misunderstandings (See report for June 27, 1944).
 - c. These taken into the community and causes unrest, insecurity, and feeling of noncooperation on part of the administration.

D. (IV) Resident Conflicts Within the Community.

1. Personal.
 - a. Competition for status and leadership.
2. Policy.
 - a. Anti - Pro - administration.
 - b. Becomes involved with personal relations and personal competition.
3. Points 1 and 2 plus all the other factors, becoming and will become involved in August elections of Community Councilmen and block commissioners.
4. Consumers Cooperative and Steward Division Association.
5. Family integration and disintegration, selective service, repatriation, expatriation.

Discussion of Diagram and Outline (in brief):

I. Basic Common Incidents:

This division includes, as the diagram and outline suggest, a number of what appears at first sight miscellaneous factors. However, in the attitudes of the residents and in their discussions these factors and incidents become part of a total "frame of reference." In either direct or indirect contact with the appointive staff members the residents are told or understand that they are told (which amounts in the last analysis to the same thing) that certain things or policies would be expected to be followed out. In the final situation, or when some definite problem arises in which these various statements of policy or belief (hope?) are to be put into practice, they (the residents) often discover that something else has developed in the meantime and that their understandings or beliefs are incorrect. In some instances downright indecision, as far as the residents are concerned, seems to mark the reactions of the persons associated with the administration. This has been brought out in the instances associated with the "Irrigator" and reports officer relations, as well as in the warehouse and some other labor relations. Recently this occurred when the various groups in the center (YWCA, Boy Scouts, YMCA, Federated Church Groups) were planning a series of camps for the younger people of the center. It seems to have been the understanding of these

groups that WRA would and could furnish transportation to the camps. After a series of conferences it was decided that if these groups were nondenominational WRA would furnish such transportation and food as needed. On the same afternoon (Saturday, July 1), so the general version goes, that the above agreement was believed to have been reached, this idea or policy was said to be impossible, and that the church groups in particular would have to wait until the project director returned from Tule Lake before any decisions could be made. This decision corresponded to the visit of Dr. Ade, and some remarks of his have been associated with influencing this change of policy. Since that time a number of decisions have been made, discussions have been carried on, and still at the present writing (July 8th) there is much misunderstanding about the matter. This, in terms of gossip, is used as a good example of retraction and indecision on the part of WRA officials here.

Another example of indecision and "backbiting" in the eyes of many of the evacuees is the apparent mixup in relation to the construction of a swimming pool for the children and young folks in the community. Various members of the AP staff have given commitments of what could and could not be done by WRA in aiding in the building of a swimming pool. The excavation was made for the pool, but much of the hand labor necessary for its completion is still left undone. At present some of the WRA staff have evidently withdrawn some of their agreements as to what they could do, and as a result the resident labor is definitely skeptical as to what they should do to cooperate in aiding in finishing the job. This particular job is believed by some to have become involved in the controversy in the operations division and with the termination of the head of that division and with the political maneuvering associated with this shift in operation's headship. Thus, many of the evacuees are afraid to become too much identified with any type of relationship with the construction of the swimming pool, especially where volunteer labor is concerned.

The reaction to Lt. B. M. Harrington's speech (as reported in Field Study No. 303, June 21, 1944) has been violent enough to cause the Community Council to send a statement in protest to Fort Douglas, Utah. His speech has been used as an example of the kind of discrimination and treatment that the persons of Japanese ancestry can expect in the army of the United States. It is also used by some persons and groups to show that persons of Japanese ancestry are desired in the army only as "cannon fodder", and that no equal treatment can be expected for them. This becomes, in the thinking of some, tied up with the general policy of the government in handling the whole Japanese situation. (The copy of the letter of the Council and Mr. Stafford's reply to the Council as well as the reply of the Ninth Service Command, are found in Appendix A).

During the warehouse labor troubles in April, the Community Council under the direction of the Project Director took over the job of controlling labor distribution in the center, especially where warehouse work and activities were concerned. It was believed that this was to be only a temporary arrangement, but this system is still being used. The problem presents itself as to what will be the outcome of the labor relations when and if this system is revised, and if it is to be permanent when will such statements be made. This situation is used by some in the community to cast negative remarks about the Council as well as the administration. Involved in the general field of "problems for evacuee worry and gossip", is the fact that no definite steps--as far as they know--have been taken to guarantee adequate coal supplies for the winter (some mess halls have been short of coal for some time) nor adequate labor to carry on hauling of coal, harvesting the farm crops, etc. Another of these "worry problems" has to do with the shortage of doctors and adequate medical care for residents in the center. This is not stating one way or the other the shortage or non-shortage of adequate medical care, but it is the sincere belief of many--if not most--of the residents that WRA is not seriously attempting to solve the medical problem nor the others in a decisive and cooperative manner.

II. Appointive Staff Conflicts:

The above discussion leads us directly into the next factor, which becomes established in the minds of many as helping to explain why the administration is not taking definite steps in the attempt to solve some of these above problems. The evacuee is definitely influenced in his thinking by the facts or rumors (or both) involved in the inner workings of the conflicts existing within the appointive staff.

The situation or situations bringing about the request that Mr. Jerome Light, principal of the high school, resign or be terminated, caused quite a commotion within the high and junior high student body. They had signed petitions to the community council supporting Mr. Light and a representative group of the student body called upon the Project Director about the matter. A large number of teachers in the school signed letters of protest to the superintendent and project director about the request for Light's resignation or termination. This information became common property of the community. By statements, stories, and rumors various well-defined attitudes have been taken by the community towards the school situation. Many of the students insist that they will not cooperate with a new principal as long as the present superintendent is in power, and that they (students) will definitely not cooperate if some of the teachers supporting Mr. Light do not return to their post in the fall. Some of the adults are using the Principal's case as another bit of evidence to prove that the administration is not willing to have any person in a responsible position who is well liked by the residents and who "is understanding and sympathetic" toward the evacuees. (This is not an attempt on the part of the analyst to evaluate the right or wrong of this conflict between the principal and his superiors or subordinates.)

The conflict developed between the head of operations and some of his supervisors with other administrative officers is common knowledge among the evacuees, especially among those closely associated with this division. The evacuees--on

the whole--seem to support the division head and his supervisors. It is here that the problem becomes very involved and somewhat mixed up at the present time. Many of the problems listed under labor supply, labor and equipment and distribution falls under the operations division. It is rumored in certain quarters that any change--at least upon the basis of terminating any of the present supervisors or division head--would bring about a tie-up in labor and equipment operations. How true or sincere these rumors are the analyst at this date does not know, but at least it has been suggested, and such a situation is definitely "in the cards" at the moment. In this connection, it is also held by some evacuees that the present labor shortage and equipment distribution is the result of the failure of the administrative officials to give the full cooperation needed to some of the supervisors and the division head.

The property control division does not have the concrete support or confidence of the evacuees because they believe--at least so stated in opinions--that some of the supervisors there are not cooperative and are negative to the evacuees (see warehouse reports). This is used as fuel to feed the general belief that the administration--in these instances at least--is incapable of making a decision and sticking to it. Also, in this connection, it has been suggested that the property control division is under the set control of personal friends of the Administration, and thus changes are not made that have been recommended. It is also believed that this is the partial basis, at least, for the "getting rid of" some persons in operations--thus creating jobs for various "friends".

Another "incident" used as an argument for the non-cooperation of the administration is the "negative" newspaper publicity released by the reports officer on the canal fire. They point out the "contradiction" in this report in relation to the news item released by the canal officials. The two reports follow:

Twin Falls Times-News:

Four Sought in Hunt Canal Fire

"Four Japanese evacuee residents of Hunt who are said to have set fires which burned off 1,8000 feet of sagebrush riprap on the north side canal near here Sunday night are being sought by authorities, it was said by H. L. Stafford, project director."

"The fire was discovered by Al Kennison, canal company ditchrider, who reported it by telephone to company headquarters at Jerome. A number of canal company officials and workers, including J. B. Stocking, watermaster, hurried to the scene and extinguished the flames after nearly a third of a mile of the riprap had been destroyed."

"The reports officer here said that Kennison reported he saw four evacuees setting fires, and saw them run up the bank and join eight other evacuees, all of whom then vanished in the darkness. The location of the fire was about three miles downstream on the canal from the relocation center. Stocking said Kennison told him that he saw the men near the flaming sagebrush, but did not actually see the fires set."

A force of 75 volunteer evacuee workers tomorrow morning will begin the job of replacing the riprap at no expense to the government or to the canal company, Stafford said."

"The volunteers were recruited by the Minidoka community council, evacuee governing body, which accepted responsibility for the damage upon hearing of the incident, although disclaiming any knowledge of the perpetrators."

"In the meantime," said Stafford, "no pains are being spared to apprehend the incendiaries, so that they can be turned over to the Jerome county authorities."

Minidoka "Irrigator, May 27, 1944:

Volunteers Finish Work on Rip-Rap

Fire Damage to Canal Bank Repaired by Evacuee Labor

"Volunteer crews of workers from Hunt finished repairing riprap along the main North Side canal which was accidentally destroyed last week by fire. Canal officials state that the repair job was excellent in every way, and was done at no expense

to the company, or the government, according to the Jerome North Side News."

"The repair job was necessary when some sage brush rip-rap was destroyed in what appears to have been an accidental fire set by youngsters along the canal bank. The watermaster wishes to express his appreciation for a mighty fine job of repairing done by volunteer workers from the relocation center."

III. Relocation and Summer Labor Relations:

(See report of Analysis Section for June 27, 1944, on "A Brief Survey of Japanese-American Farm Labor Relations in Idaho")

As suggested in the above report, the stories and rumors and conditions seeping into the center from outside would probably have some influence upon evacuee reactions to other situations and problems in the community. These "situations" and "conditions" as understood by the various groups and individuals among the evacuees are becoming part of the general argument that the policy of WRA is not a constructive one in the hands of some of the administrative staff members. It should be pointed out that this report is not here concerned with the truth or falseness of these beliefs, but it is concerned with what is often believed to be the truth, and with what these beliefs can do and are doing to the whole problem facing the community at present.

IV. Resident Conflicts within the Community:

The conflicts within the evacuee community revolves around persons and policies, and since this becomes in its last analysis a political problem, many of these issues will be basic in the August elections of Community Council members and block commissioners. There are definite anti-administration and pro-administration groups and individuals in the community. It is upon one or the other of these philosophies of policy that, in the last analysis, many issues are discussed and decided upon. There are a number of persons among the evacuees that are looked upon with disfavor by the other members of the community, and when these particular persons became involved in any type of policy forming, group conflict situations are more likely to develop, and especially is this true where such relations involve direct relations with the administration.

The Consumers' Cooperative ("Co-op") has become involved in politics within the center, especially since some of members of the Community Council are members of the board. Not only this, but the conflict between the "Irrigator" staff and the reports officer has become an issue with the "Co-op", because the "Irrigator" is under the private enterprise of the "Co-op" organization. This, thus, adds fire to the inner community conflict between the so-called pro- and anti-administration groups. This has become more complicated by the announcement of the printers that a 25 per cent increase will become effective within 60 days in the cost of printing the paper. The "Co-op" seems not to be in favor of standing this increase, and the possibility is that the newspaper will be thrown completely back into the lap of WRA.

The newly organized Steward's Association, which does not have official administrative approval to date, is becoming a very live issue, and has the possibilities of playing an even more important part in the life of the community later on. The general translation from the Japanese into English of the statement posted in the various mess halls follows:

BY-LAWS OF MINIDOKA MESS HALL WORKERS ASSOCIATION

- "Section I. The name of this association shall be the "Minidoka Mess Hall Workers' Association".
- "Section II. The membership is opened only to mess hall workers.
- "Section III. The purpose of this association is to promote mutual benefits and cooperation among the members and insure harmony and coordination with the various department personnel within the project.
- "Section IV. The named officers of the association shall be Chairman, Vice-Chairman, board of directors, councilors from each block, two treasurers, secretary, and president.
- "Section V. All the officers are to be elected by the members, but it is possible to recommend and select officers by the members.

- "Section VI. The term of the officers is six months.
- "Section VII. The Chairman has right to call regular meeting as well as special meetings when it seems necessary.
- "Section VIII. In the case of vacancy, new officers will be elected as provided in Section 5.
- "Section IX. A membership fee is 5¢ per month. A responsible person in each mess hall may be authorized to collect monthly dues.
- "Section X. The aim of the association.

"We are in urgent need of an association of this nature in the project, but it has not been realized until today. Finally the mess hall workers of the Minidoka Project are able to establish the association. We are requesting the cooperation, betterment and progress of this organization and to further promote fuller understanding among members. We work toward coordination and understanding with the Appointed Personnel of the various departments in the center. We are fully aware of the responsibilities as mess hall workers, and we hope to contribute something to the life of the residents in the center. Our conduct has direct bearing upon the morale of the residents. We are asking the mess hall workers to realize the importance and significance of their responsibilities and we must use greater prudence in the future. This is the fundamental aim of this association."

These two specific groups, and all the other factors outlined previously, have the potentialities of bringing to a head many issues at the August elections for Community Councilmen and block commissioners. It is highly possible, and probable, that the various issues suggested in the diagram, may be brought to a crisis before that time. At least it is safe to say that there are a number of dormant crisis situations present, and that some of them seem to be arousing themselves a little more every day. At the present writing (July 11, 1944) a number of tense situations within the operations division have developed, revolving around changes and shakeups in personnel; this situation is not isolated in the minds of the residents but is part of the total pattern.

One more important factor becomes a part of the total scene as it influences AP staff and evacuee attitudes and relations. This factor may be labeled "institutional behavior philosophy". It seems clear that most of the appointive staff each have a different "slant" as to what "institutional behavior" means, and activities considered within this framework by one person appear to another to be outside this pattern. As a result we have charges and countercharges made by various staff members against one another as to collusion with the Japanese, playing politics with the evacuees, or noncooperation, anti-Japanese feelings, etc. The residents are conscious of the "institutional philosophy" but they have about as many ideas as to its meaning as do the AP staff members. However, one common idea seems to be attached to this "philosophy" by the residents, namely, that the AP staff members, upon this basis, are or are made to feel as if they were far superior to the members of the community, and that the residents are no better than prisoners of war.

This is the general outline of the complicated picture as it appears at present, and by following through the various possible interrelations of the various factors one becomes conscious of the areas for possible conflict. This report (it must be stressed) is not an attempt to evaluate nor list all the facts involved, but it is an attempt to suggest some of the main factors tending to create a crisis situation.

Supplement No. I

At 12:15 p.m. July 11, 1944, two statements from a Caucasian and a Japanese were picked up concerning a coming labor conflict to take place that afternoon. At first it appeared to deal with the farming activities, but a more complete check showed the tension to be in operations but under the sewage disposal division. The principals involved are all appointive staff, but there are definite repercussions among the residents who are either directly or indirectly associated with this division and the AP staff involved.

(ERS)

War Relocation Authority
Community Analysis Section
Minidoka Relocation Center

Subject: Factors Involved in Warehouse Labor Relations in Minidoka
(Preliminary Report No. 1)

Date: April 22, 1944.

The various complications involved in the warehouse dispute between the administration and evacuee workers seems to require a series of "progress reports" of which this is the first. These reports will be followed by a complete report when the warehouse situation has been cleared up and a more total picture can be given. (Introductory material included in separate report.)

I Summary of Basic Thesis of Japanese:

The concensus of opinion among the Japanese seems to be that certain supervisors and administrative staff members are noncooperative and antiJapanese to the degree of being obnoxious. A summary of the basis for this opinion may be given as follows:

- A. Certain Caucasians are trying to show their authority and do not act in accordance with Mr. Stafford's orders.
- B. These Caucasians use offensive and negative language in giving orders.
- C. There exists a large amount of non-cooperation between supervisors and foremen. The foremen are not taken into the confidence as to rules governing general working conditions and to jobs to be done.
- D. A negative attitude upon the part of an increasing number of the Japanese has been built up by one administrative official's verbal attack upon the Chairman of the Community Council on the afternoon of April 20th.
- E. The Japanese laborers in the warehouses cannot understand the exchange of 5 men from one division to another for 5 other men, as of April 20th. They have interpreted this move to be a show of authority and superiority on the part of certain supervisors.
- F. Many of the residents believe that some of the administrative staff members are trying to put the "squeeze play" on the Project Director for their own advantage and thus they keep doing certain things to irritate the laborers under them.
- G. The new rules and regulations governing the new labor arrangements are not clear, and there is no definite way by which a laborer is able to tell for what division he is working or from whom he is to take orders. The Japanese workers seem to be asking for a more clear

pronouncement as to their position, at least to have issued some sort of a classification as to the division under whom employed.

II. Problem of Rumor About the Fight in Block 17 and Labor Dispute:

A foreman of one of the warehouse crews involved in the labor dispute was attacked on Friday, April 21st by storekeeper of Block 17. The foreman (Charley Ito) asked the Internal Security to take the attacker into custody on a charge of assault and battery. This was done.

Some residents associated the arrest of this storekeeper as a move by some members of the administration to show what might be done unless things quieted down at the warehouses. This view does not seem to be held by the residents "in the know," but only by a small minority number of persons in the community.

The background for the conflict or fight goes back to the past. It seems to have been basically developed thru the attacks or criticisms of Charley (the foreman) about the use of food in block 17. The foreman has insisted that block 17 had not been using all the food sent over by the Steward Division, and had not been following the established menu. Evidently the storekeeper told the foreman, or said in his presence, that it was a good thing he had saved some food back from previous deliveries, because now mess 17 had the necessary food. One word led to another, and the foreman was attacked.

III. Some Social-Psychological Factors as seen by Japanese:

Many of the Issei contacted refer to the social solidarity of the various groups in the community, and the fact that community solidarity rests upon the loyalty to leaders and to the leaders' loyalty to the community. Thus, when the leaders (be they foremen or a member of the Community Council) are "insulted" or not consulted for action and cooperation, the community comes to their support and criticizes, and finally acts against this "outside" force. Many of the more understanding Issei recognize the fact that they have a long cultural or social background of community solidarity, developed in their living areas along the Pacific Coast. They are also conscious of the fact that this solidarity--instead

of being decreased by evacuation and living in a relocation center--has been increased. This community solidarity rests upon the loyalty to the community and to recognized leaders.

Some of the Issei feel that definite antagonistic acts against one group in times of a crisis only create more crisis situations, and that the dictum "we will show them how it is going to be done even if we have to use the M.P.'s" is not getting the job done, but is creating a lot more new jobs to be both done and undone.

Certain administrative staff members (especially the Project Director Mr. Stafford) seem to have the loyalty and the confidence of the leaders as well as the general residents and, therefore, the leaders of the residents desire to enter into full cooperation with these respected administrative staff members.

On the other hand, there are specific supervisors and other higher members of the appointive personnel that do not have this respect and confidence of the residents. Instead they have their antagonism, and since most--if not all --the contacts, orders, etc., involved in the reorganization program of Central Services since April 1st, have been with some of these supervisors, trouble has developed, and was especially set off by the unloading of cement and lumber and by incidents in warehouses 7 and 10.

The incidents of the afternoon of April 20th in which two (2) men were asked to leave their job of unloading produce to do another job created another point of conflict. These 7 men continued on with their job, and "any" 2 men did not leave for the other work. The residents do not consider they have broken their agreement because the 7 men were at the time busy doing a job that was of "immediate necessity". Also, it has been used by some residents to show the refusal on the part of certain persons to give due consideration to the Project Director's leadership, and to show the noncooperative and negative attitude toward any attempt to cooperate with the residents in settling the problem of labor relations.

The residents and their leaders in particular recognize the need for--

- (1) Rules governing work,
- (2) That supervisors are to see that jobs are assigned and done,
- (3) That cooperation is needed between the administrative staff members, supervisors, foremen, and laborers,
- (4) That the reorganization of labor distribution will not be accomplished all at once.

It has also been suggested that some sort of Fair Labor Board be set up on an elective basis to aid in the bringing about of a more cooperative and tolerant attitude of all concerned in settling various labor difficulties. This idea or suggestion seems to be in its formative stage, but was not the direct outgrowth of the present incident; instead it has its roots in some months past.

(Elmer R. Smith)

War Relocation Authority
Community Analysis Section
Minidoka Relocation Center

4/22/44

Subject: Introductory Material on Warehouse Labor Relations in Minidoka

To understand the total picture of the warehouse labor trouble, it becomes imperative to have a background of the "new work orders" issued on April 17, 1944, by the Project Director. Through the "new work orders", the Central Service Division was disbanded and a new distribution was set up of laborers:

I. Administrative Management:

- (a) Steward--17 workers and 2 trucks
- (b) Property control--16 workers
- (c) Community management--2 workers

II. Operations:

- (a) Engineering--16 workers, 3 trucks
- (b) Maintenance--8 workers
- (c) Agriculture--about 20 workers.

The total involved about 77 workers, but property control never had 16 workers, because several persons were discharged on April 1st, thus causing a condition of "short-handedness". The residents seem unable to explain the basic reasons for this action on the part of Property Control. It may have been, say some residents, that the supervisor did not like specific individuals, and took this opportunity to fire them, thinking they could be easily replaced. This replacement of labor was not done.

Five Caucasian staff members were definitely implicated in the reorganization program. These staff members are as follows:

- (1) A. J. Ford, Property and Warehouse Officer
- (2) Hinkle Cox, Property Officer
- (3) Dean Miller, Assistant Project Director
- (4) C. W. Wilder, Chief Steward
- (5) William Powers, Project Assistant Steward

The next incident of importance leading up to the peak of the trouble revolved around the unloading of some cement and lumber. Due to the "shortage in Property Control", carpenter and utility crews were asked to unload this material. They did not report for the unloading, so "they were terminated." However, after

some negotiating the cement and lumber were unloaded later.

The car of oranges, that was to be unloaded early in the week of April 17th, seems to have "set off" the general negative labor feelings at present to be found in the center. Five persons were asked to unload the car, but it was thought by the workers that 5 persons were not enough since most of the workers are Issei (men were past fifty years old), and "they knew it was hard work to unload over 500 cases of oranges." Eight other laborers were requested by these five to aid them in the unloading. This request "was flatly refused by the supervisor," and as a result these 13 persons' jobs were terminated. It was held by the laborers that "this unloading of the oranges should have been taken care of by the Property Control crew but at this particular time, the Property Control crew was busy unloading wood." The short-handedness of the Property Control crew was the reason why warehouse #10 crew was asked to unload the oranges. "The Property Control crew had only about 8 workers when it should have had about 18." When the warehouse #10 crew refused to work and were fired, the workers in warehouse 7 were asked to unload the car of oranges. These workers also refused and were terminated. It has been suggested by some of the residents that this refusal was based upon "sympathetic support" for the workers in warehouse #10.

The morning of April 20th, 1944, found the Community Council representatives meeting with the Director for the purpose of discussing problems and policies to be applied relative to the labor relations in warehouses #7 and #10. The Committee requested Mr. Stafford to issue a directive allowing the resident workers to return to work. In the discussion, it was agreed that certain personality clashes were present, and that some steps needed to be taken to clear the general atmosphere governing the relations between supervisors, foremen, and workers. The suggestion was also made that the Committee "gather facts on the present trouble", its background, etc., and present these for consideration and further discussion to Mr. Stafford.

Mr. Stafford stated to the Committee that a person employed to do work

on the project would be held to that obligation, and should not have the right to refuse or stop work because he or she did not like the job.

The distinction was made by Mr. Stafford and concurred in by the Committee that essential services and "convenient services" were to be considered under the same general policy as far as the necessity of working was concerned, and the obeying of work orders.

The carpenter and utility crews' refusal to unload cement was brought to the attention of the Committee by Mr. Stafford, and they were told the same general policy would apply to them as to the workers in warehouses 7 and 10.

It was the feeling of some that there were probably certain individual evacuees who were basically responsible for much--if not all--of the negative agitation in specifically the motor pool and steward divisions. Mr. Stafford voiced the opinion that he was for "getting rid of such individuals, and keeping them out of the hair of the efficient administration of the essential services."

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that Mr. Stafford would issue a directive allowing the evacuee workers to go back to their jobs (see enclosed memorandum). The Council would continue their study of the various factors involved in the labor difficulties, and would report their findings to Mr. Stafford.

ERS.

Minidoka Project
Hunt, Idaho

April 20, 1944

Memorandum to: Mr. Y. Fujii, Chairman
Fact Finding Committee

Pursuant to our meeting at 9:00 a.m., April 20, 1944, it seems advisable to permit all persons in the Warehouse Foods and Property Control areas, as well as utility men of Motor Pool and others involved, to return to work, provided that all such persons understand that mutiny or refusal to take relative assignments as may be ordered will constitute violation of general working conditions.

In behalf of the Administration, I am willing to enter into a full review of the material gathered by the Fact Finding Committee and look forward to a clarification of difficulty and differences of opinion or interpretation. This agreement covers all persons recently discharged for insubordination irrespective of category and assumes common understanding that insubordination will not be resorted to irrespective of inter-divisional work involving relative types of task.

Harry L. Stafford
Project Director

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER

Community Analysis Section

Religious Affiliation of Minidoka High School Students

A tabulation of the religious affiliation of the June, 1943 enrollment of the Minidoka high school indicated that 53.8% of the high school students specified their religion as Christian, 33.5% as Buddhist, and 12.7% as unspecified or none. In comparison with the religious affiliation of the citizen group this indicates that the younger age group Nisei fall more predominantly in the Christian group. (see table below)

Religious Affiliation


<u>Citizen group (Nov. 1942)</u>			<u>High School group (June, 1943)</u>		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Christian	2683	47. %		609	53.8%
Buddhist	2020	35.5%		380	33.5%
Shintoist	26	.5%			
None	<u>968</u>	17. %		<u>143</u>	12.7%
Total	5697			1132	

A comparison of the student's affiliation with that of the parents demonstrates that there is a definite trend away from Buddhism as evidenced by the fact that over 18% of the high school students have turned to Christianity although their parents are Buddhist. (see attached table and chart)

A comparison of the high school student religious affiliation by sex reveals that the girls have a slightly higher percentage in the Christian bracket than the boys'. The boys possess a higher percentage in the unspecified or none bracket.


MINIDOKA PROJECT
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION of
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS



MINIDOKA PROJECT COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

COMPARISON OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT'S RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION WITH THAT OF PARENTS



(as of June 1943)

	No.		%
Both parent and child Buddhist	368		32.5
Parents Buddhist, Child Christian	213		18.8
Parents Buddhist, child unspecified	38		3.3
Parents unspecified, child Buddhist	10		.8
Parents Christian, child Buddhist	2		.2
Both parents and child Buddhist	299		26.4
Parents unspecified, child Christian	97		8.5
Parents Christian, child unspecified	10		.8
Both parents & child unspecified or none	95		8.4
total	1132		

COMPARISON OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT RELIGIOUS

AFFILIATION BY SEX (1132)

As of June 1943



MINIDOKA PROJECT
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION


COMPARISON OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT'S RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION WITH THAT OF PARENT'S

	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Both Parents and Child Buddhist	368	32.5
Parents Buddhist, Child Christian	213	18.8
Parents Buddhist, Child Unspecified or none	38	3.3
Parents Unspecified or none, Child Buddhist	10	.8
Parents Christian, Child Buddhist	2	.2
Both Parents and Child Christian	299	26.4
Parents Unspecified or none, Child Christian	97	8.5
Parents Christian, Child Unspecified or none	10	.8
Both Parents & Child Unspecified or none	95	8.4
total	<u>1132</u>	

(June 1943)

MINIDOKA PROJECT
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Comparison of High School student's Religious
affiliation with that of Parents. (as of June 1943)



	No	%
Both parents and child Buddhist	368	32.5
Parents Buddhist, child Christian	213	18.8
Parents Buddhist, child unspec.	38	3.3
Parents Unspec., child Buddhist	10	.8
Parents, Christian, child Buddhist	2	.2
Both parents and child Buddhist	299	26.4
Parents unspec. child Christian	97	8.5
Parents Christian, child nhspec.	10	.8
Both parents and child unspec. or none	95	8.4
total	1132	