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Grant: Presentation and Analysis of longitudinal Oral Histories...

1981

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS THROUGH LIFE HISTORIES OF  
JAPANESE AMERICANS SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE  
1943-1945 and 1981-1982

Rosalie Hankey Wax

Life Histories 1943-1945

I have prepared eleven life histories, 1943-45, of Japanese Americans who were my respondents at the Tule Lake Segregation Center. These biographies contain all the statements made orally to me by the respondents. Since the Japanese Americans were discussing or reacting to events that took place over a period of two and a half years, during which many traumatic and stressful event occurred, I have inserted explanatory statements where this seemed appropriate. I have also added several essays given to me by the particular respondent, some of which are not available in the depository file of the Bancroft Library.

In the process of preparing these life histories I learned many things of value. As one reads their words - week after week - one becomes acquainted with these people as wonderfully complex human beings and as genuine individuals. I intend to prepare at least four more of these histories.



Interviewing Japanese Americans in 1981-1982

Though I put notices in the Japanese American newspapers and sent out some sixty letters of inquiry, I was able to locate and interview by telephone only nine of the Japanese Americans I had known in Tule Lake. I thereupon decided to approach persons who had not been my respondents. Fifteen Japanese Americans were quite willing to be interviewed; two preferred to respond to the interview in writing; one voluntarily sent me a short but very moving autobiographical statement. In the process of looking for new respondents I learned that many of the Japanese Americans who were confined at Tule Lake find their experiences so agonizing that they will not talk about them. The most severely traumatized appear to be young people who were taken to Japan by their parents, sometimes against their personal inclinations, who underwent the traumata of life in post-war Japan and subsequently returned alone to the United States.

Interviewing the people who had not been my respondents increased the scope of the data. In 1944 and 1945 almost all my really fluent respondents were over 25 years old. Some were married couples with whom I was able to develop a social relationship. Others were "older men" who were willing to instruct and assist me. In 1981 and 1982 most of my new respondents had been in their teens or early-twenties at the time of the evacuation. Their experiences, emotions, and observations often differ significantly from those of the older segregants.



Editing and Typing of Fieldnotes Written in 1944-1945

Since many of the persons interviewed in 1981-1982 did not wish to talk about some of the more disturbing and, historically significant periods of life at Tule Lake, I decided that it was essential that I put my extensive field notes into a form that would make them available to historians and humanists. I therefore added essential explanatory comments and had these notes typed onto a word processor and stored on disk.

Monograph in Progress

I am preparing a monograph which, in large part, will take the form of a chronological account of the experiences of the Japanese Americans accompanied by the statements they made in 1943-1945 and in 1981-1982. The interviews conducted in 1981-1982 suggest that the most severe traumata experienced by the Japanese Americans were (1) the conviction that their Constitutional rights had been abrogated, and (2) the abiding and irreparable sense of injustice, insecurity, and stigma that haunts the people who, for three years were "treated like criminals, traitors, or dangerous people".

To date I have written about half of this monograph. The editor of a university press has expressed interest in these materials.



A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS THROUGH LIFE HISTORIES OF JAPANESE AMERICANS  
SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE -- 1943-1945 and 1981-1982

Rosalie M. Hankey

Life Histories - 1943-1945

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4.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
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To date I have written <sup>this</sup> about half of ~~this~~ monograph. <sup>the editor of a university press</sup> A ~~publisher~~ has ~~xxxxxx~~ expressed interest in these materials.

4.

Brief History of Events: mid-October to November 5, 1943  
The Trauma of the Barbed Wire Fence and the Watchtowers.  
Respondents Statements - 1981-1982.  
Respondents Statements - 1944-1945



Rosalie Hankey Wax  
Professor of Anthropology, Emerita  
7106 Westmoreland Drive  
University City, Missouri 63130

Academic affiliation: Washington University at St. Louis

Telephone: 314 721-6848

Social Security Number: 569-01-2935

Title of Project:

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL ORAL HISTORIES OF  
JAPANESE AMERICANS SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE: 1943-5 and 1981.

General area of research: Cultural Anthropology

Total amount sought: \$20,000.00

Duration and starting date of project: 09/01/81 - 08/31/82

Other sources of support: I plan to request supplementary assistance  
for travel and field expenses from:

American Philosophical Society  
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological  
Research  
Pan Asian Mental Health Center

Description of Project:

From February 1944 to May 1945 I was employed as a field researcher at the Tule Lake Segregation Center. During this period I paid regular visits to some 25 Japanese Americans, recording verbatim their freely given opinions, fears, grievances, and advice. Their statements comprise over a thousand pages of single-space notes. In 1981 I plan to interview ten to fifteen of my surviving respondents or their relatives.

With these materials I will prepare ten to fifteen longitudinal oral histories dictated by individuals undergoing an extended period of extreme restriction and confinement. These histories will conclude with their present views and their advice on how their experiences might be used to mitigate the denial of human rights in parallel contemporary situations. Finally, I will prepare an analyses of these materials, emphasizing their relevance to contemporary situations involving displacement, confinement, impoverishment, and the progressive abrogation of human rights.



# BUDGET

## Salaries

Wax, Rosalie Hankey, Ph.D., Principal Investigator	
09/01/81 - 05/31/82 50%	\$15,000

Clerical typing assistance - 600 pages @ \$4/page	2,400
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Consumable supplies - tapes (casette)	60	
photocopy \$30 x 12	360	
misc. office supplies		
\$20 x 12	240	660

Travel - 1 trip P.I. to San Francisco and Los Angeles		
airfare	600	
local travel	44	
subsistence - 12 days @ \$60	720	1,364

Other Expenses	toll telephone \$40 x 12	480	
	postage \$ 8 x 12	96	576

TOTAL COSTS	\$20,000
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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### A. The Evacuation

During the spring of 1942, some 115,000 Japanese Americans, citizens and enemy nationals, were incarcerated by order of the U.S. government. They had not committed any acts of treason or espionage, and indeed there was never any evidence that any of them contemplated such activities. But they had been the object of venomous propaganda from political organizations, politicians, and newspaper columnists. After confining them in extremely overcrowded assembly centers, the military and civil authorities decided to ship them to "relocation centers" in isolated sections of the West and Midwest until circumstances should permit their release. During this process many Japanese Americans suffered irreparable economic losses.

Despite the efforts of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the civilian authority set up to administer the centers, life within the relocation centers was, for the most part, uncomfortable and humiliating.

In July of 1943 the Tule Lake Relocation center was selected for the segregation of "those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who by their acts have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities". A "man-proof" barbed wire fence with watchtowers was erected. Meanwhile, six thousand people refused to leave Tule Lake (4,000 of these were not classified as "disloyal") and in September and October some 9,000 of the scheduled 12,000 segregants were sent there.

### B. Resistance and Suppression

In mid-October, A Japanese farm worker was killed in a farm truck accident. The other farm workers went on strike. Block meetings were held and the people elected representatives to a body called the Daihyo Sha Kai



(Representative Body). A Negotiating Committee of seven men met with the project director and it is possible that a viable relationship between the segregants and the administration might have been worked out. But on the night of November 4, a fight broke out between a group of Japanese youths and a few WRA employees, who, the youths thought, were transporting project food to the strike breakers. The project director turned the jurisdiction of the center over to the Army. The Army built a "man-proof" fence separating the evacuee from the administrative area and drastically cut many of the essential work crews. Meetings between the Army and the Negotiating Committee were unsuccessful and on November 13 the Army declared martial law and began to arrest and confine the leaders of the "uprising" and many other persons suspected of being "agitators". In protest, the residents went on a partial strike. By January of 1944 more than 200 men had been arrested. A stockade (with another man-proof fence and watchtowers) was built to confine them.

#### C. Accommodation

For the residents, martial law and the partial strike meant impoverishment, boredom, and depression. But the WRA wished to reassume its responsibilities and, in late December, administrators made advances to segregates inclined to a collaborating attitude. Among these were officers of the Co-op (the general stores). On January 11 a popular referendum was arranged and the residents voted to abandon their partial strike by a plurality of 473 out of 8,713. Martial law was lifted and the management of Tule Lake, except for the stockade, was returned to the WRA. The WRA officially recognized seven of the men who had advised them as the Coordinating Committee.

While many people were relieved that the strike had ended, most people told me that the men in the stockade ought to be released and many suspected that the Coordinating Committee were inu, that is, stool pigeons or betrayers.



For its part, the Coordinating Committee pleaded with the WRA for "full employment" and for "justifiable release of stockade detainees". But their requests were met only with promises.

#### D. The underground Resegregationists and assaults on "informers"

Meanwhile a small underground group denounced the committee and the executives of the Co-op as "gamblers, bootleggers, and betrayers of the Fatherland (Japan)". In early April, members of this group circulated a petition asking for the signatures of persons who wished to go to Japan as soon as possible and who, meanwhile, wished to be "resegregated" in Tule Lake from those not so inclined. The Resegregationists claimed 6,500 signatures, but many of the names were those of children, appended by their parents.

On May 24, a Japanese worker returning to the project was shot by a sentry. He died the next day. The people were very disturbed and afraid. Very few believed that justice would be done. In this atmosphere of anxiety and frustration, almost everyone began to complain about the inu (informers). "Every place you look you can see one!" Then, on June 12, the brother of a "Number One Inu" was severely beaten. In rapid succession five more men were assaulted, and, on the night of July 2, the manager of the Co-op was found with his throat cut. The murder produced a state of panic. The key officials of the Co-op and the entire Japanese police force resigned. The police force was never properly reconstituted.

A few weeks after the murder the temper of the people changed. Some expressed remorse and bewilderment over the manner in which they had reacted to the beatings and the murder.

#### E. Resistance to the Resegregationists

On September 24 the Resegregationists brought forward a new petition and claimed that they were preparing a final list of repatriates and expatriates.



Now, however, many of my respondents began to criticize the "super-patriots" and some complained of intimidation and coercion. Four elderly and respected men, who had advised people not to sign the petition and had publicly urged young men to abstain from violent and radical activities, were assaulted and severely beaten. None of the beaten men would name their assailants for fear of reprisals on their families.

Several courageous men continued to oppose the violent tactics of some of the Resegregationists and at the end of November the respected leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai (who had been released from the stockade in August) began openly to oppose the Resegregation movement.

#### F. Renunciation of American citizenship

But at this crucial time, John Burling, the representative of the Department of Justice arrived at the center to open hearings for persons who wished to renounce their citizenship. The Resegregationists intensified their demonstrations, conducting their noisy pre-dawn militaristic exercises as close to the administrative section as possible. Burling warned them that if they did not stop their Japanese militaristic activities, they would be interned. They drilled more ostentatiously than ever and on 27 December seventy of the leaders and officers were interned. This act of official recognition encouraged the Resegregationists. And when, on 5 January 1945, the WRA released and distributed an official pamphlet in which Dillon Myer reaffirmed that it was the WRA's intention to close all of the centers and return the evacuees "to private life in normal communities," many of the non- or anti-resegregants fell into a state of great anxiety, fearing that if they did not renounce their citizenship they would shortly be forced to relocate. As the panic intensified, renunciation became a mass movement. During January, 3,400 young persons (40% of the citizen population) renounced their citizenship. By March, 70% had renounced.



In sum: The Nisei and Kibei had been deprived of human and civil rights which their education in American schools had led them to believe inviolable. Charged with no offense they had been confined for almost three years behind barbed wire. They had been stigmatized as disloyal on grounds often far removed from any criterion of political allegiance. They had been intimidated by ruthless pressure groups in camp and were forced to live without adequate police protection. They had become terrified by reports of the continuing hostility of the American public. In ignorance and desperation, <sup>seven out of</sup> many finally ~~renounced~~ <sup>ten Nisei and Kibei</sup> their American citizenship.

## 2. Unpublished Data in My Possession

*to here*  
Early in 1942, social scientists at the University of California at Berkeley undertook a study of the evacuation, detention, and resettlement of the Japanese Americans. This study, I was told, was, in part, supported by research funds given to the University by the Rockefeller Foundation. For almost two years -- from July of 1943 to May of 1945 -- I was employed as a field researcher by this study, working first at Gila Relocation Center and subsequently (beginning February 1944) at the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

During the fifteen months I spent at Tule Lake I visited, talked with, and interviewed as many Japanese Americans as I could. Since most of them expected me to write down what they said, I recorded their statements verbatim. In all, I prepared over a thousand pages of single-space typewritten fieldnotes (approximately 460,000 words) and as soon as I had "typed my notes" I sent copies to D.S. Thomas, the Director of Evacuation and Resettlement Study. For many years I assumed that my fieldnotes had been deposited in the Bancroft Library at the University of California, along with the other materials collected and written by the staff researchers. But two years ago, when I was contemplating preparing a biography of one of my respondents, I learned that my fieldnotes



had not been given to Bancroft and, since D.S. Thomas is deceased, I have no idea of what happened to them.

Last year, when I began the task of editing my personal carbon copy of these notes so as to make them available to historians and social scientists, I was impressed by the fact that during the fifteen months I lived at Tule Lake, I spent much of my time making weekly or fortnightly visits to some twenty-five individuals, recording their current opinions, grievances, fears, and, in many cases, their freely given advice and suggestions as to what might be done to alleviate the confusing, frustrating, and at times, agonizing or terrifying aspects of their situation. Many respondents regularly gave me advice on what the Administration ought or ought not to do and many, at frequent intervals, offered perceptive socio-political analyses of the constantly changing situation within the center. The collected statements of some individual respondents would cover 200 to 300 pages.

I was also impressed by the poignancy, power, and frankness with which most of my respondents expressed their opinions and emotions as they became increasingly aware of their powerlessness, their insecure future, and of the fact that many of the administrative staff and the American public regarded them as untrustworthy, dangerous, and as objects of hostility.

It occurred to me that, with minor editing, many of these chronological verbatim statements could be presented as instructive, illuminating, longitudinal, oral case histories dictated by a variety of individuals undergoing an extended period of extreme restriction and confinement.

Thirteen of my respondents whom I visited frequently and regularly were women and twelve were men. Eleven were Kibei (American citizens who had received some education in Japan), twelve were Nisei and two were Issei. Seven of my respondents repatriated to Japan, where one of them was to become the



Chairman of the Board of Tokyo Railway Company. Four repatriated and subsequently returned to the United States. Fourteen remained in the United States. I continue to correspond with some of them to this day.

### 3. Research Proposal and Methodology

A. Using my fieldnotes as primary data I would prepare ten to fifteen longitudinal oral histories of the Japanese Americans who were my respondents and who experienced restriction and confinement in the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

B. Concurrently, I would like to interview some ten to fifteen of these respondents who are at present residing in the continental United States. If a respondent is deceased, I would try to arrange an interview with her or his spouse, sibling, daughter, son or friend. If the respondents consent, I would ask them how the experience at Tule Lake affected their lives and how it influenced them as human beings. Which of their experiences now appears to have affected them most deeply, which were traumatic, and which, if any were helpful? What did they learn about their fellow human beings? Would they care to describe the process by which they recovered from the experience? What suggestions would they, as persons who have experienced a particular extreme situation, care to offer that might be employed to assist the numerous people who today are undergoing displacement and the restriction of human rights?

Since I have kept in touch with a number of my respondents I should have no difficulty in reaching them and arranging interviews. Dr. William T. Liu of the Pan Asian Mental Health Center has assured me that he can give me the address of any living Japanese Americans who were interned at Tule Lake.

It should be remarked that unless these persons are interviewed about their experiences within the next few years, most of them will be dead or too enfeebled by age to participate.



I will interview no one without first obtaining their informed consent and I will present my final report in such form that the identities of respondents will not be revealed.

C. Using my Tule Lake fieldnotes and the contemporary interviews as data I would prepare an analysis of these extensive combined oral histories, placing particular emphasis on their relevance and application to contemporary situations involving displacement, confinement, impoverishment and the progressive abrogation of human rights. What lessons are to be learned from the people who underwent this experience?

#### 4. Brief Review of Literature

Several volumes contain histories of the Tule Lake Center: The Spoilage, D.S. Thomas and R.S. Nishimoto, 1946, pp. 84-361; Impounded People, E.H. Spicer, et al., 1969, pp. 169-186, 229-241, 267-276; Years of Infamy, M. Weglyn, 1976, pp. 156-173, 202-248. My own account, Doing Fieldwork, R.H. Wax, 1971, pp. 59-174, is largely focussed on the problems I encountered doing fieldwork in this difficult situation. None of these published works has focussed on the long-term effects of displacement and incarceration.

No Japanese American who was confined at Tule Lake has published an account of her or his experiences. No attempt has been made to apply the humanistic aspects of these profound longitudinal experiences to contemporary problems in human rights.

My presentation would be unique in that, for the first time, the voices of many hitherto silent Japanese Americans would be heard.



Title of Project: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL ORAL HISTORIES  
OF JAPANESE AMERICAN SEGREGATED AT TULE LAKE: 1943-45  
and 1981.

Project Director: Rosalie Hankey Wax  
Professor of Anthropology, Emerita

#### PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. Historical Background
2. Unpublished data in my Possession
3. Research Proposal and Methodology
4. Brief Review of Literature
5. Statements and Advice from Japanese American Respondents

#### 1. Historical Background

##### A. The Evacuation

During the spring of 1942, some 115,000 Japanese Americans, citizens and enemy nationals, were incarcerated by order of the U.S. government. They had not committed any acts of treason or espionage, and indeed there was never any evidence that any of them contemplated such activities. But they had been the object of venomous propaganda from political organizations, politicians, and newspaper columnists. After confining them in extremely overcrowded assembly centers, the military and civil authorities decided to ship them to "relocation centers" in isolated sections of the West and Midwest until circumstances should permit their release. During this process many Japanese Americans suffered irreparable economic losses.

Despite the efforts of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the civilian authority set up to administer the centers, life within the relocation centers was, for the most part, uncomfortable and humiliating. The barrack "apartments" to which the "evacuees" were assigned contained only one army cot per person and an unshaded electric drop light. The public latrines had no partitions between the stools. The food served in the mess halls was often poor. Insofar as center life developed a pattern, it was one of constriction, monotony, and exasperating, petty discomforts, broken at intervals by a humiliating experience with a "Caucasian" supervisor or by some new bureaucratic foul-up.

##### B. Registration and Segregation

Meanwhile the War Department was developing a program for voluntary induction of male citizens of Japanese ancestry into the Army, and the War Relocation Authority was developing a program to "release" or "relocate" the evacuees in areas of the United States where they would be accepted. In the spring of 1943 the Army program of "processing" citizens prior to



enlistment was integrated with a hastily devised WRA program of "processing" the whole adult program prior to resettlement, and it was jointly agreed that all persons 17 years of age or older were to be required to register their allegiance. Two questionnaire forms were prepared in Washington. The one for male citizens was headed "Selective Service System," the other, for female citizens and Issei of both sexes was headed "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance." The questionnaires were long and complicated, but the crucial questions were those in which male citizens were asked whether they would be willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, and whether they would forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor. Female citizens and Issei (non-citizens) of both sexes were asked whether they would be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC and whether they would forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor. Apparently the authorities assumed that almost all the evacuees would answer these questions in the affirmative and that this display of loyalty would make a positive impression on the American public. The young male evacuees could then be drafted into the U.S. Army and their families moved out of the camps.

But this plan went badly awry, in large part, it would seem, because the WRA did not give the registration program adequate explanatory publicity. In many centers the unanticipated and unexplained demand for total commitment - to the United States or to Japan - resulted in an uproar. Spontaneous mass meetings were held at which some of the younger people argued that the only sensible policy was to express loyalty to the United States. Other young citizens argued that the intent of the questionnaire was "to draft us from behind the barbed wire". Issei pointed out that if they renounced their allegiance to the emperor they would be people without a country, for the United States had not permitted them to apply for American citizenship. Some persons held that the evacuees ought to refuse to express loyalty to the U.S. until the U.S. gave some indication that it would make amends. Tension and hostility rose so high in some centers that a few men who expressed strong "pro-American" views were waylaid at night and beaten. About 28% of the male citizens and about nine percent of the male aliens gave negative answers to the crucial questions or refused to register. These persons came to be called "disloyal" as opposed to "loyal" or "No-No" as opposed to "Yes-Yes".

In July of 1943 the Tule Lake Relocation center was selected for the segregation of "those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who by their acts have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities". A "man-proof" barbed wire fence with watch-towers was erected. Meanwhile, six thousand people refused to leave Tule Lake (4,000 of these were not classified as "disloyal") and in September and October some 9,000 of the scheduled 12,000 segregants were sent there.

### B. Revolt and Suppression at Tule Lake

In mid-October, a Japanese farm worker was killed in a farm truck accident and the other farm workers went on strike. The people thereupon held block meetings and elected representatives to a body called the Daihyo Sha Kai (Representative Body). A Negotiating Committee of 7 men was selected and met with the project director and, on November 1 with the national director, who promised he would investigate the complaints and take justifiable



action. It is possible that a viable, working relationship between the segregants and the administration might have been worked out. But late on the night of November 4, a fight broke out between a group of Japanese youths and a few WRA employees, who, the youths thought, were transporting food from the project warehouses to the strike breakers. The project director turned the jurisdiction of the center over to the Army. Most of the residents did not know this had happened and the next morning about a thousand Japanese employed in the administrative section began their usual walk to work. They were stopped by a cordon of soldiers who apparently assumed they were demonstrators or rioters and threw tear gas at them. After several abortive meetings between the Army and the Negotiating Committee and after additional mishaps and misunderstandings, the Army, on November 13, declared martial law and began to arrest and confine the members of the Negotiating Committee, the Daihyo Sha Kai, and any others suspected of being "agitators". By January of 1944 more than 200 men had been arrested, and a special stockade (with another manproof fence and watchtowers) was built to confine them.

*Build all kinds of fence*  
*Reported to Army and Navy*  
*new fence*

D. Accommodation

*much part of the*

For the residents, martial law meant unemployment, impoverishment for many, and, as the weeks dragged on, boredom and depression. As for the authorities, the Army wanted to get rid of its responsibilities and the WRA wanted them back. The WRA made advances to those segregants who were inclined to take a collaborating attitude - influential Old Tulean block managers and officers of the Co-op (the successful and profitable general stores). With the help of these few men, the Army and WRA arranged a popular referendum (on 11 January) in which the residents voted whether they would maintain the strike or return to work. By the barest majority - a plurality of 473 out of 8,713 - they voted to abandon the strike. On January 15, the Army and the WRA officially recognized the seven men who had advised and helped them as the Coordinating Committee; while the Army announced the lifting of martial law, withdrew most of the soldiers from the center, and returned the management of Tule Lake, except for the stockade, to the WRA.

*Why?*

Many people were now permitted to go back to work and many were relieved that the strike had ended. On the other hand, almost half of the residents had voted to continue the strike. Many believed that the men in the stockade ought to be released and many thought that the Coordinating Committee were "a bunch of inu" that is, stool-pigeons or betrayers. For its part, the Coordinating Committee tried very hard to get the WRA to support its publicly proclaimed policy of "full employment and justifiable release of stockade detainees," but their desperate requests were met only with promises.

0 E. The Underground and Assaults on "Informers"

Meanwhile, a small underground group began to denounce the committee and the executives of the Co-op as participants in a "dark stream of sinister plot" to deceive the segregants and called them gamblers, bootleggers and "betrayers of the Fatherland (Japan)". In early April, members of the underground circulated a petition asking for the signatures of persons who wished to go to Japan as soon as possible and who meanwhile, wished to be "resegregated" in Tule Lake from those not so inclined. (An assistant project director had given them permission to make a survey, but they dis-



regarded and mistranslated that qualification and his text.) Most of the residents did not want to go to Japan immediately, nor did they wish to be moved again. Some 6,500 persons signed the petition, some because they desired to repatriate, others because they believed the signatures were not binding. (Among these names were those of many children, appended by their parents.) The harassed and overburdened Coordinating Committee, who had not been consulted about the petition, took this opportunity to resign.

For about six weeks the camp enjoyed a relatively tranquil, if apathetic period. By May 18, 264 of the men in the stockade had been released and only 55 were still "detained". But on May 24, a Japanese construction worker returning to the project was shot by an armed sentry and died the next day. The people were at first shocked, then very angry, and afraid. Then almost everyone began to complain about and denounce the inu. The rumors became increasingly unreal and fantastic: "Every place you look you can see one!" On June 12, the brother of the general manager of the Co-op was waylaid and beaten so severely that he suffered a concussion. In rapid succession, five more men were violently assaulted, and on the night of July 2, the manager of the Co-op was found on his brother's doorstep with his throat cut. (Five of the seven men beaten or murdered had criticized or opposed the underground resegregation group.) The news of the murder produced a state of panic. The key officials of the Co-op and the entire Japanese police force resigned, and the camp was filled with rumors of rape and violence. After a time, 60 blocks elected "wardens" who, however, refused to act on any matter which might offend the residents or which might be remotely connected with politics, i.e. the activities of the resegregation group. Twenty-four blocks elected no wardens at all.

During August resegregationist leaders gave "educational lectures" at small block meetings, assuring their listeners that Japan was winning the war and interpreting Japanese reverses as a strategic trap into which the American forces were drawn. They also emphasized that "for those who desire to return to Japan, the discipline and education of our children adapted to the system of wartime Motherland are absolutely necessary" and they proceeded to establish an organization devoted to the study of the Japanese language, history, culture, and political ideology. About 500 young men joined this organization which was called Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan (Young Men's Association for the Study of the Mother Country). Meanwhile, Resegregationist leaders tried and failed to join forces with the prestigious leaders of the November uprising, Reverend Kai, George Kuratomi, and Mr. Tsuda. The latter, however, remained politely aloof.

#### F. Resistance to the Resegregationists

On September 24 the Resegregationists brought forward a new petition for the signatures of those who wished to return to Japan immediately. A pamphlet accompanying the petition stated that the group was preparing a final list of proposed repatriates and expatriates to be presented to "both the American and the Japanese government". The Resegregationists claimed 10,000 signatures, but more than half of these were of persons 17½ years or younger. Moreover, many residents now began to criticize the "super-patriots" and some complained of intimidation and coercion. On October 7,

*Nar, hms*



an elderly anti-Resegregationist was knocked unconscious. On October 15, three elderly Issei, who had urged the young men in their church to abstain from violence and radical activities, were assaulted and badly beaten. On October 21, Mr. Kira, one of the most prominent leaders of the Resegregationists spoke at a Sokoku ceremony and incited the young men to violence, promising that he would take care of them if they got into trouble. He also quoted a Japanese proverb which may be translated as: "To help the great cause, we have to kill those who stand in its way." On October 30 Mr. Kira's right hand man knifed the son of a block resident who had criticized Kira.

Mr. Kurihara, A Hawaiian born Nisei, was outraged by the beating of his friend, Mr. Tokunaga, but he took no action because the victims feared for the safety of their families. But when the assaults on anti-Resegregationists continued, Mr. Kurihara let Mr. Kira know that he would denounce him to the authorities if there were any more beatings. There were no more beatings. And at the end of November, the Kai-Kuratomi-Tsuda faction began openly to oppose the Resegregationists. They did this so ably that some members began to submit their resignations.

F G. Renunciation of American citizenship



Last year I applied to the National Endowment for the Humanities for funds to edit and annotate my extensive fieldnotes on the Tule Lake Segregation Center. I enclose copies of some of the letters and statements written in support of this application.



# SUMMARY PROPOSAL BUDGET

ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS					FOR NSF USE ONLY		
Washington University Lindell & Skinker Blvds, St. Louis, MO 63130 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR/PROJECT DIRECTOR Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.					PROPOSAL NO.		
					DURATION (MONTHS)		
					PROPOSED	REVISED	
A. SENIOR PERSONNEL (LIST BY NAME; SHOW NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN BRACKETS; SALARY AMOUNTS MAY BE LISTED ON SEPARATE SCHEDULE) GPM 205.1b					NSF FUNDED MAN MONTHS	FUNDS REQUESTED BY PROPOSER	FUNDS GRANTED BY NSF (IF DIFFERENT)
					CAL.	ACAD SUMR.	
1. P.I./P.D. Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.					4.5		\$ 20,000
2. CO P.I./P.D.							\$
3. CO P.I./P.D.							\$
4. CO P.I./P.D.							\$
5. CO P.I./P.D.							\$
6. ( ) SUBTOTALS A1 - A5							\$
FACULTY AND OTHER SENIOR ASSOCIATES (ATTACH EXTRA SHEET IF NECESSARY)							\$
7.							\$
8.							\$
9.							\$
10.							\$
11.							\$
12. ( ) SUBTOTALS A7 - A11							\$
B. OTHER PERSONNEL (LIST NUMBERS IN BRACKETS)							\$
1. ( ) POSTDOCTORAL ASSOCIATES							\$
2. ( ) OTHER PROFESSIONALS							\$
3. ( 1 ) GRADUATE STUDENTS 50% time							\$ 3,300
4. ( ) UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS							\$
5. ( 1 ) SECRETARIAL - CLERICAL 50% time							\$ 3,750
6. ( ) TECHNICAL, SHOP, OTHER							\$
TOTAL SALARIES AND WAGES (A+B)							\$ 27,050
C. FRINGE BENEFITS (IF CHARGED AS DIRECT COSTS)							\$ 1,957
TOTAL SALARIES, WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS (A+B+C)							\$ 29,007
D. EQUIPMENT (LIST ITEMS AND DOLLAR AMOUNTS FOR EACH ITEM)							\$
N.A.							\$
TOTAL EQUIPMENT							\$ 00
E. MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES							\$
Photocopying (1,000), computer tapes: Three 2400' reels @ \$15 each (45), office supplies (1,000)							\$ 2,045
F. DOMESTIC TRAVEL							\$
N.A.							\$ 00
G. FOREIGN TRAVEL (LIST DESTINATION AND AMOUNT FOR EACH TRIP; GPM 731)							\$
N.A.							\$ 00



## SUMMARY PROPOSAL BUDGET

PROPOSAL NO.

52500	H. PUBLICATION COSTS/PAGE CHARGES	\$ 00	\$
62315	I. COMPUTER (ADPE) SERVICES <u>Computing facilities services @ \$15 equivalent CPU minute</u>	\$ 7,200	\$
	J. CONSULTANT SERVICES (IDENTIFY CONSULTANTS BY NAME AND AMOUNT; GPM 516)		
	N.A.		
		\$ 00	\$
	K. PARTICIPANT SUPPORT COSTS, IF ALLOWED BY PROGRAM GUIDE (ITEMIZE) GPM 518		
	1. STIPENDS \$		
	2. TRAVEL \$		
	3. SUBSISTENCE N.A. \$		
	4. OTHER - SPECIFY \$		
	5. TOTAL PARTICIPANT COSTS (K1 + K2 + K3 + K4)	\$ 00	\$
	L. ALL OTHER DIRECT COSTS (List items and dollar amounts. Details of subcontracts, including work statements and budget, should be explained in full in proposal.)		
	Postage \$ 200		
65001	TOTAL OTHER DIRECT COSTS	\$ 200	\$
	M. TOTAL DIRECT COSTS (A THROUGH L)	\$ 38,452	\$
	N. INDIRECT COSTS (Specify rate(s) and base(s) for on/off campus activity. Where both are involved, identify itemized costs included in on/off campus bases in remarks.)		
	84% of salaries and wages (provisional as of July 1, 1979)		
74100	TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS	\$ 22,722	\$
	O. TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS (M + N)	\$ 61,174	\$
74500	P. LESS RESIDUAL FUNDS (If for further support of current project; GPM 252 and 253)	\$ 00	\$
75000	Q. AMOUNT OF THIS REQUEST (O MINUS P)	\$ 61,174	\$

## REMARKS

Washington University will cost-share in accordance with the National Science Foundation policy as stated in the September 3, 1970 important notice No. 31.

NOTE: SIGNATURES REQUIRED ONLY FOR REVISED BUDGET (GPM 233). THIS IS REVISION NO.

SIGNATURE OF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR/PROJECT DIRECTOR	DATE OF SIGNATURE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND TITLE Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D. Professor of Anthropology
SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	DATE OF SIGNATURE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND TITLE H.S. Leahey Grant & Contract Administrator

## FOR NSF USE ONLY

INDIRECT COST RATE VERIFICATION			PROGRAM OFFICER APPROVAL			
Date Checked	Date of Rate Sheet	Signature				
Grant Number	Amend No.	Institution	Organization	Fund Acct.	Program	Object
Proposal Number		Dur.	Chg.	Award Date	Proposed Amount	Propd. Dur.



# DETAILED BUDGET

September 1, 1980 - May 31, 1981

## I. Direct Costs

### A. Salaries

#### Academic

Wax, Rosalie H., Ph.D. Emeritus, Project Director

Academic year, 50% time \$20,000

#### Non-academic

Secretary/Administrative Asst., unassigned

Academic year, 50% 3,750

Graduate Research Asst., unassigned

Academic year, 50% 3,300

Total Salaries 27,050

### B. Fringe (annuity and social security)

1,957

Total Personnel 29,007

### C. Consumable Supplies

Photocopying (1,000), computer tapes - three 2400' reels

@ \$15 each (45), office supplies (1,000) 2,045

### D. Other Expenses

Postage (200), computer facilities services @ \$12 equivalent

CPU minute (7,200) 7,400

Total Direct Costs \$38,452

## II. Indirect Costs

84% of salaries and wages (provisional as of 7/1/79)

22,722

\$61,174



CURRENT AND PENDING SUPPORT

- I Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.
    - A. Current Support - None
    - B. Proposals Pending
      - 1. Current Proposal
        - A. NSF
        - B. Loyalties and Terrorism at Tule Lake Segregation Center: 1943-45
        - C. \$61,174
        - D. September 1, 1980 - May 31, 1981
        - E. 4.5 academic year
        - F. Washington University
      - 2. None
      - 3. None
- II Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.
  - A. None
  - B. None
- III Transfer of Support - N.A.
- IV Has been submitted to N.E.H.



PERSONS ESPECIALLY QUALIFIED TO EVALUATE THIS PROPOSAL

Tom T. Sasaki  
Professor of Anthropology  
University of Notre Dame  
Notre Dame, IN 46556

James A. Hirabayashi  
Professor of Anthropology  
San Francisco State University  
San Francisco, CA 94132

John Singleton  
Professor of Anthropology, IDEP  
University of Pittsburgh  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260



## Appendix I

### R. HANKEY - FIELD NOTES ON TULE LAKE - FEBRUARY 2, 3, 1944

I arrived at Klamath Falls at 7:40 the morning of February 2. Not being able to locate the car I had been told would take me to the camp, I took the Greyhound Bus. The entire camp is surrounded by a heavy "man-proof" fence twelve feet or more in height. At intervals along the fence are large watch towers capable of holding at least four men. These towers are visible for a considerable distance and are provided with high-powered search lights. Later, when I walked about the camp before sunrise and at night, I noted that at least these search lights near the stockade where the suspected agitators are confined were lit. During the day, these towers must have been manned by soldiers, for I saw smoke coming from one of the chimneys. The high, barbed-wire fence, bristling with watch towers, is very impressive.

[I did not here express the intense shame and fear I felt at first sight of this fence and the watch towers. My own government, I thought, is confining some of its citizens in what looks just like a concentration camp.]

A short distance from the entrance gate, guarded by armed sentries, I was given a visitors pass by a soldier who telephoned his superior officer to check my statement that I had been invited by Mr. Best, the Project Director. I then walked to a WRA office about one-fourth mile away to get another pass which admitted me into the premises of the Camp Tule Lake Military Area. A member of the appointed staff offered to drive me to the administration building. Arriving there, (after passing through another fence), I was told that I would not be allowed to enter the "colony" (that part of the camp in which the Japanese are confined) unless I was accompanied by an armed soldier. I went to see Mr. Harry Black, Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management Division. Mr. Wolter [who held the same position at the Gila Center] had recommended him to me, and I hoped that he would suggest some action which would allow me to circumvent the rule that I must enter the colony with an armed guard.

Mr. Black was very courteous but said I would not be allowed to enter the colony alone. I must take a soldier with me even into the barracks, or, I might have an "evacuee" brought to the administration building under armed guard and then interview him in the presence of the guard. This was a WRA, not an army policy.

\* \* \* \* \*

I was provoked by Black's insistence that I must be accompanied by an armed guard when I visited my Japanese friends. I said nothing, however, and decided to see Mr. Best (the Project Director) and tell him he had brought me to Tule Lake under false pretenses.

\* \* \* \* \*

Meanwhile, Mr. Robertson, former head of Leupp, (now Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations Division) entered his office which is opposite to that of Best's. He invited me into his office, closed the door and advised me that I would not do well to try to get the guard rule set aside.



But I might be able to employ the ruse he uses: go with a member of the Internal Security (WRA police) and ask them to stay in the car.

\* \* \* \* \*

Immediately after lunch I saw Mr. Best and impressed him with my disapproval of his conduct in bringing me here under such restrictions. I said that it was asinine to think that I could see my Japanese friends with a soldier breathing down my neck. Best apologized. Naturally [said he] he could not tell Dr. Thomas about the necessity for the armed guard. He did not say why, but intimated that he did not wish Dr. Thomas to know that matters were still so critical at Tule Lake. I did not comment upon the fact that if I saw that the situation was critical I would certainly tell Dr. Thomas. Best referred me to Opler, stating that Opler could probably arrange matters.



I returned to Opler. I told him that Mr. Best agreed to my entering the colony with a member of Internal Security who would remain in the car. [This was not true.] Opler telephoned Internal Security and arranged for the escort and the use of a project car.

Mr. Johnson did not know his way about the camp and I was obliged on several occasions to leave the car and ask Japanese for directions. When Mr. Johnson observed the courtesy I used while asking directions he soon picked up the cue and by the end of the second day was profuse with "If you please" and "Thank you very much" and remarked to me several times that he didn't see anything so bad about these people. I gathered that he was newly arrived at Tule and had not had much opportunity of seeing the Japanese in camp at first hand.

#### INTERVIEWS WITH JAPANESE

##### MR. AND MRS. KURUSU

[Mr. Kurusu was a Kibei, about thirty years old. He had attended school for 12 years in Japan, and, after his return to the United States, had graduated from Pasadena Junior College and then, for a year, had taken an extension course in engineering at California Institute of Technology. (Check this is Jan. or later.) He was a handsome and very serious young man and spoke English with a heavy accent.

I had approached him while I was working in the Gila Relocation Center and asked him if he would like to tell me why he had answered the military questionnaire in the negative. He talked to me for an entire afternoon and even wrote an essay for me, describing why he had felt obliged to say "No". After the segregation, he had his wife occasionally write to me. At Christmas time I sent them a modest box of candy. Mr. Kurusu then wrote me that he would never forget this kindness as long as he lived.]

##### The Kurusus' statement - verbatim.

Mr. K: "It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people want power. They say 'We are working for the people.' I heard a lot of rumors. I believe they're working for themselves. This new Coordinating Committee is all right."

(I asked how this Coordinating Committee had been selected.)

Mrs. K: "That's what I'd like to know! I think they were elected from each division head."

Mr. K: "Since November we have had another so-called negotiating committee. They took care of all the camp affairs. WRA and the Army did not recognize them as true representatives. They (WRA) think they were not elected properly."

"Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But their demands were more like orders than suggestions."



"Only a few people really know the inside story."

"More than two hundred people were put in the stockade. Seventy or fifty have already been left out. Some were taken before, but on November 26 we had the big search. We had a very nice soldier come in. Some were good and some bad. The one who came here was really nice." (Mrs. K. agreed.)

"Honestly, I'd like this center back to normal conditions, but if I said that to the residents they'd say I'm a dog. Since I took office two-three men came over and threatened some of the block representatives."

#### Interview with Bob Tsuruda

[Mr. Tsuruda was a Nisei about twenty-nine years old, married, and with one child. He had graduated from a junior college in Sacramento, Calif., and, before the evacuation, had worked in a drug store. When I approached him in the Gila Relocation Center and asked him if he would tell me why he had said, "No-No," he responded, "What the hell! I'm going to Tule Lake, so why shouldn't I tell you how I feel." He had talked to me, I felt, very straightforwardly, telling me that he would have enlisted if he had not been put "behind the barbed wire." But now, he felt that with a wife, child and elderly parents to support, the most sensible thing to do was to go to Tule Lake and "wait and see". After the segregation I had corresponded with him and he had invited me to visit him at Tule Lake.]

After we had exchanged amenities I told Bob that one of the chief points I would like to get straight was whether the first negotiating committee had been regarded by the people as their legitimate representatives. He replied as follows:

"That was one of the things that got the Japanese in an uproar. All of the respective people in the block elected them. When the Spanish Consul was here they went and made their requests. But there weren't any representatives who spoke real good English - their terminology sounded more like a demand. It made a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. The army flatly refused to recognize the representatives."

"Then, the first thing that happened, the army started to put people in the stockade. At one time I imagine there must have been from 125 to 150. That is a small estimate. In this block about six out of the block were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai. [Chairman of the Daihyo Sha Kai.]"

#### Jan. 11 - Vote on Status quo

"That election was held in every block."

"There was one vote that the army wasn't supposed to know anything about."



[Mr. Tsuruda is here describing a vote held "behind locked doors" on December 4, 1943. For many months the statement baffled me, for no other spoke of this secret meeting. It was, however, described in the minutes of the Daihyo Sha Kai given to me more than half a year later by Mr. Kuratomi and by Mr. Kato. See Thomas and Nishimoto, pp. 167-8.]

All of the Japanese met in their representative blocks and voted whether to go back to normalcy or adopt the status quo permanently or call a general strike. All the time this status quo was on the coal crew, the hospital bunch, the garbage and the mess halls were still working. At that time the vote came out that they should adopt the status quo instead of a general strike. They went against the return to normalcy because that would be an insult to the representatives barricaded in the stockade. All their work would be for nothing.

I came here to be left in peace. If they leave me alone I'll leave them alone."

"Anyway, people got wise that the longer they maintained the status quo they were going to yank them and stick them in the stockade. Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on the October checks. These fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income.

They had a referendum vote. Two soldiers were present. They took a vote of all persons over eighteen. The soldiers with one Japanese present counted and tallied the votes. There was a majority of over 400 (actually 473) voted to return to normalcy."

"A couple of days after that all those desiring of work could report to a place. The only trouble with this is they don't have enough work to go round. So many with large families have no way to get money. Under WRA arrangement, if you don't work, you can't get clothing allowance."

#### Bob's Prospects

(I asked Bob what he expected would happen in the near future.)

"I look forward to the end of the war. That's me. There's no future until I see what happens after it ends."

"In camp here, I believe I can truthfully say there will be one of two things."

"One: they'll either continue going back to normal and naturally, eventually the army will relinquish control - or there's only 400 people difference for status quo than against."

#### JOE KURIHARA

[Joseph Yoshisuke Kurihara was a Hawaiian born Nisei about fifty years old. In 1915 he had come to California



and in 1917 he had enlisted in the U. S. Army and served with an occupation unit in Germany. At the outbreak of World War II he was working as navigator on a tuna fishing boat. In January of 1942 he tried to enter the merchant marine but was refused. He then tried to obtain employment in two shipbuilding firms but was again refused. He wrote the following account of his encounter with the port master of San Diego:

"I went to see the Port Master in San Diego to get a permit to sail the sea. Seeing that I was a Japanese, he said, 'No permit for any Jap.' We argued awhile. Losing his temper he said, 'Get out or I'll throw you out.' So I told him, 'Say, officer, I wore that uniform while you were still unborn. I served in the U. S. Army and fought for democracy. I may be a Jap in feature but I am an American. Understand!' I saw fire in his eyes, but he had no further words to say." (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 367.)

Mr. Kurihara was one of the volunteers who went to the Manzanar Relocation Center to prepare the camp for the main body of evacuees who were to follow later.

"In spite of my experiences in Los Angeles, I was still optimistic enough to think and believe that, soon, the citizens amongst us would be given some kind of consideration, and not just herded about like prisoners of war."

As optimism was replaced by a deep feeling of grievance, Mr. Kurihara became an outspoken critic of the WRA administration. He also denounced the Nisei leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League, who, he felt, were meekly submitting to injustice. When one of the Nisei leaders at Manzanar was beaten and his accused assailant jailed, the residents of Manzanar staged a demonstration which culminated in the project director's calling in the army. Kurihara and several other men suspected of being agitators were arrested. He was sent first to Moab and later to Leupp isolation camps. Transferred to Tule Lake as a segregant in December of 1943, he was, at first, placed in the stockade by the army. Mr. Best, the project director intervened, and Kurihara was released from the stockade into the "Tule Lake colony".

During his confinement at Moab and Leupp, Kurihara had written several articles denouncing the evacuation, the living conditions in the centers, and the treatment of the Nisei by the U. S. government. He had sent some of these articles to The Saturday Evening Post and Collier's, but they were rejected. Mr. Robertson, (the man who had advised me to take a policeman rather than a soldier with me) had suggested that he send them to Dr. Thomas, head of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study.))



## Kurihara

I made my last call on February 2 on Joe Kurihara. He was in a large barrack room with two other men. The barrack was extraordinarily neat and I received an impression of business like order. With its tables holding neatly stacked papers, well-made cots and suspended lights, the room might have been a well-kept army-officers' quarters. One young man was reading a newspaper spread out on a table. Kurihara, a short, slightly bald, stocky man was extremely polite - politer than any other individual I met at Tule Lake. He invited me to be seated. I told him who I was, told him how much the study had appreciated his paper and stated I was glad to meet a man of his honesty and ability. As best I could, I described the aims of our study. I mentioned that Mr. Robertson had spoken highly of him and we agreed on the sterling quality of Robertson's character. "That is one man I really respect," said Mr. Kurihara.

Sensing that Mr. Kurihara would approve of a direct approach I explained that our study in attempting to get a true picture of developments in relocation centers naturally had difficulty in getting data from those individuals who were at the core of activities and that therefore any material from this source was of inestimable value. Anything that he would be kind enough to write for us would be received with gratitude and would be kept confidential.

Kurihara had not known that we had received his article. Fixing me with a steady gaze he asked me point blank why I personally had liked his article. I said that honesty shone out of it and that I admire honesty. I also realized that anyone who would make the statements he did must be very courageous or else crazy. He smiled. He then said that since he had been in Tule he had been watching, thinking, and studying. He would be glad to write an article on Tule Lake but needed time to get the truth and state it properly. I gave him the study's address on a piece of paper. He said he would memorize it and then burn the paper. We shook hands again and I left.

That morning I had committed myself to call on Opler after dinner. I felt extraordinarily tired but elated at the amount of information I had been able to get. I cudgelled my brain as to how I might avoid giving Dr. Opler confidential information and still remain on friendly terms. I had been given Dr. Pedicord's quarters and it was while I was in his bathroom that I got my inspiration. I decided that I would feign disappointment at my progress and play the part of a discouraged, puzzled, female anthropologist, whose hopes to get information had been frustrated. Since I felt ready to blow my top to the first intelligent listener this was difficult. Yet it worked out better than I had anticipated. When I said I had received almost no information he looked very satisfied and said, "Now I know by that statement that you're a good field worker." Thereupon he proceeded to show me how vast his knowledge of the situation was.



Appendix II

Sample of Notes in Present Condition

This conversation was held three days after a Japanese American construction worker was shot and killed by a soldier on guard duty.



May 27, 1944, p. 3.

the whole thing and did not release the verdict for months. I was so  
aghast I could not answer at first. "Is there any indication that they  
may try to do that?" I said. "That's how it looks to me now," said  
Robertson. "If they do," said I, "or if they set the soldier free,  
November 1 and 4 will look like a picnic."

5:00 p. m.

When I entered the colony this afternoon I noted that the soldiers  
were less in evidence than ever. Now they stay inside the sentry post  
and merely wave you in. I noticed one avocass who merely waved a piece  
of white paper (6 feet away) and was motioned on to go out of the camp.

I called first on some friendly pro-Causasian people. They were  
tense and worried and did not want to discuss the matter.

LONG TALK WITH "I" Takeuchi. (called I)

My good friend "I" however, was as uninhibited as ever. In fact,  
he was friendlier than usual. His sister Mrs. "A" <sup>Mizuno</sup> has just arrived  
from Gila yesterday. She said she had had a pleasant trip. The WRA  
escort, Mr. Martin and the soldiers had been very nice to her. The only  
difference I noted in "I" since the shooting was a tendency to make wry  
jokes and laugh loudly over them, laughter in which I, in my not entirely  
unnervous state, was glad to join.

Best has called a center wide holiday on the day of the funeral  
(day not decided yet.) They are also going to have a wake at the ~~High~~ <sup>High</sup> School. That's a darn good idea. It would be more or less  
ironical to have give the fellow a military burial - being as he's  
a repatriate and a ~~nono~~. (laughter)

A lot of how this goes is going to depend on how WRA handles it between  
now and the time the verdict is released. If WRA can prove to the people  
that they are sincere in their belief that the man who was shot was of  
no fault, ~~then they~~ and that they did their best to get justice then things  
might quiet down. But if they exonerate the man completely there's  
going to be a blow-off. They'll have to build a double fence around  
the Administration section.

The smartest thing that WRA could do is to start impressing the  
people now that the military is more concerned than WRA. After all,  
the man was a soldier. Under these conditions it comes under the  
jurisdiction of the War Department.



May 27, 1944, p. 4.

When the announcement was made in our mess everybody took it as a matter of course. Knowing the Military of Japan, they know how it was. The local and civilian authorities have to step ~~back~~ into the background.

The smartest thing to do would be to give the man twenty years and send him to jail. Send him to jail anyway and pardon him ~~after~~ after three or four years.

After all, he (the evacuee) was unarmed. If I were the sentry and had two rifles and automatic pistols I wouldn't shoot him. I'd bat him on the head with the rifle.

On Schmitt, Head of Police:

I saw Schmitt for the first time today. He impressed me as a man of not too much intelligence. I got the impression he wasn't too bright in the head but he did have some knowledge in a limited field, that connected with physical prowess. If he picked anybody on his staff with much sense he wouldn't be able to handle him.

Kai and Kuratomi

I don't think they should be let out of the stockade. Those fellows don't care whether they live or die. If there let out they'll certainly start another ruckus. Especially if the fellows who were gone over are let out. Do you think they'll hesitate to get back?

Best

He's learned a lot. He had to. He's more sensible with the people now.

The Japanese people are appreciative of that especially when it is an order given by the Project Director. It will mean more than any 500 or 600 words he can say.

Other Popular Attitudes

On the other hand, there are people who talk like this: Well, we can't expect justice from the army here inasmuch as we are disloyal Japs and their enemies. If that's the case and the man is exonerated, all we can do is learn his name (the soldier's name) and remember it until after the war and see which side wins. They want to bring it up at the peace conference.

Another faction says, You won't hear anymore about this until after the war. By that time they hope the people will have forgotten about it. Personally, I think if they drag it out and hope people will forget, I think there will be a lot less ruckus if they just come right out with it - even if he is exonerated.

You look at it this way. This is what affects the people now. ~~It's a damn shame~~ If that can happen and the man is exonerated, that will give the M. P's the impression that the lives of the Japs in here are not worth a hell of a lot. That's just asking for more shooting. Heck, I might walk though that gate next morning and the guy will take a shot at me. I'm dead. That's not going to help me any.

I feel this way. He's gone. I can't bring him back to life.



May 27, 1944, p. 5.

I heard that Austin had sent a special car to Heart Mountain to bring his relatives in for the funeral. That's the least they could do. It all depends on what the verdict is.

Meeting for Nomination of Representatives

I didn't even go to the meeting. Everything just slid. Nobody was nominated.

(Here Mrs. M. <sup>Mizuno</sup> interrupted violently: "What's that? senjin - Hell, the senjin are good for nothing!")

"I" continued: Here's what happens when you get representatives. They have to listen to a lot of small complaints from various people. Then when the representatives get called in on something big, they take it up before the board. Their English isn't so good as the people on the board and they get argued out of it. So they have to go back to the people and report a failure. They (the people) get hot and are liable to incite anything from a friendly feeling to a riot. Then people get stuck in the stockade.

The people are getting smart now. They've got a block manager appointed by the WRA as a liaison officer between the people and the Administration. Well, he's beyond being yanked into the stockade. You can't yank a liaison man for anything he reports. The people are starting to realize it would be a smart thing to have a good block manager and let them do all the representing because they can't be yanked.

On Daihyo Leaders in Stockade

There's some guys in there I wouldn't like to see let out. You look at it my way, they're out of circulation.

Back to Representative Question

With the Block Managers, there's less danger of filling the stockade. One thing didn't hit me right about this representative business. The suggestion came from the other end. (WRA) Just that mere fact that the suggestion came from the WRA offices; it had a rank odor, that's all. It's too much for the WRA to try to be helpful.

The only way the WRA is going to be able to dispel the feeling (of hostility) is to show somehow that WRA is able to trust the people and to make it as easy as possible in here, which is what Best says he's trying to do but there's a lot of difference between what he says and what he does.

I'd like to see the damn fence torn down, and remove the damn guards from the gate. Nothing will happen. It's just human nature. If you know your trusted you don't want to double-cross anybody. Let them go on picnics too.

More on the Shooting

The newspaper stories try to give the impression that the man misinterpreted the sentry's orders.



May 27, 1944. p. 8.

There's one thing they're going to have to look out for. What will Japan do about this? They're liable to figure that 10 Americans are worth one Jap. Pretty soon each side will be seeing who can kill them off faster.

As I left "I" remarked that the lid might blow off the camp in two hours and if that happened Mr. Robertson, Mr. Hayward and myself should come to his barrack, which would be the safest place for us.

(Neglected to note that I remarked that Dr. P. was in camp.

Pedicoord blew in last night and was offensively jovial in the mess hall.

"I" wanted to know if he hadn't learned his lesson. "If he has any sense he'll leave on the next train."

CALL ON OPLER - 9:00 p.m.

Opler remarked that the WRA office were trying like hell to keep the Army from whitewashing this shooting.

The funeral was scheduled for Thursday.

One of the Appointed Personnel who has recently lost a son went to see Mrs. Okamoto to offer his sympathy, taking the picture of his dead son with him. The mother kissed the picture, and dragged out her dead son's clothes to show the A. P. member.

Opler is sure that the present stockade sentiment in camp is not to let Kai and Kuratomi out, lest they start trouble. The "most sensible men" are telling him, "Let the others out, all except Kai and Kuratomi and then see if you can start a representative government."

He asked me if I were hearing much talk of "giri" (obligation to the Leaders) in camp. I replied some talked of it and some didn't. (Personally I do not know how much of the talk on giri is rationalization of hate toward the WRA.)

I then asked Opler if his staff objected to my seeing my block 54 informant in his office. He said he had asked them and they were all against it. Obviously, working for Opler, they are feeling themselves in an extremely insecure position in regard to colony sentiments.

Coordinating Committee: Opler states that his "most Sensible informants" tell him that the C. C. was a good idea. The only thing wrong with them is that they "stayed too long." (Didn't resign soon enough) This may be ~~an~~ a correct judgement but it is at present a distinct minority sentiment in camp.



Mr. Tachibana was the "behind the scenes" leader of the Resegregation Group. A few weeks later some members of this group were to threaten and assault persons who objected to group's pressure tactics.



SEPTEMBER 21, p. 2.

He has neglected his duty. The first time I met him, he tried to threaten us in this ward. He said, 'If you boys don't play ball with us, we'll be turned over to the Army. I said, 'I'm in favor of Army control in a concentration camp.'

Nurses Aides

Another issue. The hospital is very short of nurses aides. Mr. Fagan was at the last meeting and said it was a critical situation. Some of the nurses aides are quitting because the head nurse is very rigid and particular.

They asked us to co-operate, to tell the people, especially the girls, to go to the hospital to work. But we demanded transportation from this area. It's getting colder every day and the girls can't walk all the way to the hospital (The distance is at least 1 1/2 miles) We said, "You want co-operation, why don't you co-operate with us?"

Water and Japanese Baths

They've been telling us to save water and not water our vegetable gardens. I suggested they make a Japanese bath. The people will appreciate it and be thankful and in that way they will save 4/5 of the water now being used in the showers. He said, No. I said, "I'll pay for the cement. Can you furnish me the truck to haul the sand." He wouldn't give me a truck.

So I placed an order myself for the cement and the wire. It cost me about \$ 25.00.

TALK WITH U, EX-SANTA FE INTERNEE (Tachibana) called U.

I opened the conversation by relating all the latest gossip. I told about the petition. Said U:

Mr. Huyoko is not capable of holding that position. There is no excuse on the part of the Administration or WRA for putting in a man who is so incapable in that position.

Mr. U. then asked me about Schmidt's leaving. He said that the English version of the Howell Star had said he was going away on a month's leave, while the Japanese version said he was gone for good. I stated that Robertson had told me he was gone for good.

Mr. "U'S" second question was on Mr. Best's absence. He had not heard of his return and said that he had it on good authority that Mr. Best might not come back at all. I was forced to disappoint him by stating that Best had been back for about a week. He then asked me what possible change there was that Mr. Robertson might take Mr. Best's place, or failing that, that Mr. Robertson might take Mr. Black's place. I replied honestly,



SEPTEMBER 21, p. 3.

Saying that so far as I had heard, Washington contemplated no such changes.

"It would be very fine if Mr. Robertson took Mr. Black's place. He's more or less of a man of that capacity. He should be handling matters which deal with individuals, rather than working with material without life (operations).

"U" then asked me if I had heard of any repercussions on the speech he had given at the Sept. 8, meeting of the Sokoku Zenkyu Seinin Dan. I said I had not. (I hadn't known he had been the speaker.) He explained that the members, as long as they were here as repatriates, felt that they should be prepared ~~xxxx~~ for life in Japan. He seemed quite concerned about what the administration might think of the organization.

#### Indictment

I think Mr. Kuratomi spread out the rumor and everybody got worried very much. I told them if they are indicted they will have plenty of time. First of all they will be given a summons. Even if ~~xxxx~~ they are indicted they will be released immediately. After they are released, they can sue against ~~xxxx~~ Laderer and the Administration for indicting innocent people.

If I were in their position I would not have hired a lawyer because I know from my wise thinking that they will not send out a summons.

#### Resegregation

Resegregation is going to be something eventually. The philosophy of the majority of the residents here and hereafter will be changed....

(Here to my astonishment, "U" showed me a three page petition which had been prepared by him or by his group which stated the case of the people in camp who desired status, and called upon all the residents to make up their minds once and for all whether they wished to stay in this country to be loyal to Japan. It was very well written up and did not ask for ~~xxxx~~ resegregation - only for a statement of intention. This petition, said "U's wife, was going to be put up in every mess hall, probably Monday, - and if possible, a copy will be sent to every barrack. U said he had thousands of copies. I was so started by this amount of trust placed in me, that I could hardly pull myself together to write down "U"'s remarks.)

This petition will tell the Administration exactly what we are, and what we should be under the circumstances. We are certain that the Administration and WRA cannot distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal people congregated in



SEPTEMBER 21, p. 4.

this camp. Even though it is for disloyals, it is different from other centers. This is the reason for so much restlessness and unfortunate disturbances in camp.

We residents, the wiser people, cannot wait further anymore for the Administration to save the camp like this. The time has come whereby the Japanese residents wish to formulate and determine their belief of themselves.

"U" then asked me for my honest opinion of the petition and whether I thought presenting it now would be followed by the apprehension and incarceration of those who sponsored it. This was a stumper. However, the petition was sensibly worded and ~~unambiguous~~ in no way arrogant. It was moreover, very clear. I read it twice carefully, and said that I saw nothing which could give offense to a just administration. However, I added, Mr. U knew as I did, that Mr. B. was easily terrified and that this action would threaten the calm ~~plant~~ condition of the camp for which he takes so much credit. If he became too excited about it, no one could predict what he would do. "U" seemed satisfied with my remarks and continued:

You know that the people behind this have been working underground for a long time. Anyone who would have come out openly would have been put in the stockade. We have been working on this since April, awaiting the moment, but he had to keep it a secret. Now the time has come.

We are of the opinion that we cannot be loyal to two countries. As long as we are living here, why not make up our minds to be real Japanese or not? As long as this is fully impressed on the residents, this camp will become more peaceful than ever.

If the Administration recognizes this movement, we will have a good mutual understanding. Besides Mr. Myer sent us a letter and recognized this movement through Mr. Black.

If this proceeds successfully the time will come when the others (the fence sitters) will go out and proceed according to WRA policy. Therefore the time will come when we can accomplish our re-segregation purpose by such a procedure. It will not be direct re-segregation (but a process of re-segregation by loyal persons leaving camp.)

Those who refuse to sign this will have people asking them, "Are you loyal to Japan or not? If you are not loyal to Japan why don't you go out? Naturally, those loyal to Japan will stay here until the war ends.

This way - the people will have to realize this - because as long as their appearance is Japanese, they will have to sign this. Being loyal to Japan is a very serious matter.



SEPTEMBER 21, p. 5.

If they don't sign this they will be known to be not loyal to Japan (and will be told in public, {You are not Japanese. Why don't you go out?

Of course, many people who ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ don't want to go back to Japan will sign this, but then they will go in a corner and keep quiet.

(The title of the petition is, "What is re-segregation and what does it mean?)

You know, 99 people out of 100 are taking the attitude and stating, "I'm loyal to America," they are telling a lie. Those people aren't really loyal to America. They are loyal to their properties. It is just a selfish wish because they have an ice-box or a stove outside.

(I expressed proper gratitude to Mr. U for trusting me in this matter and received his promise to give me a copy of the petition when it is circulated. For a long time I have suspected U, as a powerful behind the scene worker and now he shows himself in his true position as the guiding brain of the "Q" pressure group. It will be most interesting to note how this petition will be received by the people and by the Administration next week.)

#### STORY OF BANZUIN NO CHOBE

(Wishing to follow up the fragmentary remarks I have heard of the carp and Banzuin no Chobe, I thought I'd ask "U" who seems to know everything. "U" was very happy to relate the story and became so enthusiastic and went into such detail that he went right over the lunch hour and had to send his wife out to get his lunch.)

"Banzuin was actually placed in the position of that particular carp.

"The story was like this: Banzuin no Chobe was a person who was not a member of the chivalry or knight hood. He was head of a group which had followers all through Japan. He was also head of a great gambling outfit.

But Banzuin no Chobe happened to be a very capable person. He spent his energies helping the people outside of the group of knight hood. He helped the common people, the farmers, merchants, the fishermen and the outcasts.

As you know, Japan was at one time exactly like the chivalry of Europe. The samurai were very dogmatic. They considered themselves the only human beings. Other people were treated as worms. That's how tyranny and oppression became predominant in that age.

"Banzuin no Chobe was such a brave man that he fought the feudal lords and their knights. KKK He fought wherever he saw their oppressions the



SEPTEMBER 21-, p. 6.

innocent other classes. Lots of times he risked his life to help the common people. But he was so determined that the feudal lords were unable to take his life. The feudal lords were afraid of him.

He had a quarrel with a feudal lord, ~~very~~ a very powerful lord named Mizuno Jurozemon. Mizuno was one of the feudal lords who taxed the people heavily. He taxed the people of the provinces over which he ruled and the people suffered very much. But the same as the feudal lords in the feudal age in Europe, the common people couldn't do anything about it. They would have been hanged or their neck would have been out in no time.

These two men happened to be at a Japanese tea house. This feudal lord, Mizuno, hated Banzuin very much and heretofore he had actually sought an opportunity whereby he could kill Banzuin.

(The feudal lord in Japan is even more powerful than the feudal lord in France.) Parenthesis at Mr. U's suggestion.

They had all sorts of followers and knights. They taxed the people so heavily that they were more than multi-millionaires in a money way, and very strong militarily, because they had thousands of knights under them.

Banzuin, of course, didn't mind the action taken by the feudal lords, but he also wanted to help the oppressed common ~~people~~ subjects.

At this tea house, they exchanged sake cups which is a Japanese custom. They hated each other. Therefore the feudal lord began to hand Banzuin the little ~~sake~~ sake cup with his toes, saying, 'You drink this.' Also he actually spit in the cup and handed it to Banzuin to drink.

But a great man like Banzuin never shows his resentment/ and indignation, and pretty soon in their conversation Mizuno requested Banzuin to bring a five feet large carp to him.

(A carp, of course, of five feet, you cannot find.)

By a five foot carp, Banzuin understood that Mizuno meant himself, instead of a carp - man size. Mizuno, being the feudal lord, that everyone of the people on his province he controls him and obeys his order. And Banzuin is such a great man, he has such a big mind, that even though he can refrain from bringing a carp of such size (himself) he wanted to obey. And he understood that a five foot carp, means, 'Mizuno wants to take my life.' This was because he had tried to help the common people many many times.

A day came and Banzuin asked his wife to bring him his formal kimono and dress. He wore white, a spotless white undergarment and on top of that his formal kimono with his family crest on it.

His wife, without asking, she understood very well why her husband was wearing such a dress. His wife was also a great lady. She made up her mind that her husband is going to be killed by somebody. Also his followers knew that their master was going to be killed and that he was to be killed for that he's sacrificing his life for the benefit of the common people.

So at his departure, his immediate old follower said to him, (Of course Banzuin didn't tell anything about this to anybody), his man told him, 'Maybe in a few hours I'll carry a coffin on my back and go after your



This statement reflects the fear (expressed by many) that they were about to be forced to leave the camps. Some felt that the only alternative was to renounce their American citizenships.



JANUARY 3, 1946, WEDNESDAY, p..1.

CALL ON MRS. MAKANO, nisei woman 30-35 years old.

The somewhat disjointed statements Mrs. Makano made on the matter of leaving camp are the most numerous I've yet received from any one person. She was much more willing to talk about it today than when I ~~of~~ visited her last.

Pick-ups

"The people were excited. Nobody knows why it was done. The way I understand, they were all interviewed by the FBI and they had all the inside information so they said they had a spy in the cabinet.

"~~They~~ The people picked up say they're glad. They say we (people left in camp) are going to be kicked around while they will be safe and sound.

"The membership itself was huge. But they couldn't trust anybody. They said that when they were interviewed they were shocked. The administration knew everything.

"One thing I liked about them, they ~~didn't~~ left us alone. When Kai had his group - they dictated to us. We had to sign this or that. They (Hooshi-dan) left us alone and didn't tell us that we had to join the organization.

We feel this way about it. Why should we whoop everything up and stir everybody up. The calmer we stay the better for all of us.

This place is getting too much mob psychology - the youngsters fight all the time - you've heard about the basketball games?

On Leaving Camp

I don't know what's going to happen to us. It's very confusing. I think everybody feels that. They don't know what's what yet. They don't like to listen to rumors. I personally would like to know what's what myself.

"I think this is going to be a slow process. They can't say: 'Zimex' 'Get out by a certain time. We'll give you 25¢ and carfare.' In the first place, why do they want to kick us out? It was their business we came here.

Since the people have been in camp three years their funds are exhausted. Frankly, it's all right for people who can afford it.

To tell you frankly, I'm in such a confused mind. Everybody is like that. California is the last place I'd want to go back to, with all I've been reading. We all feel, if somebody is going to go back let's watch and see what happens to them.

"They say the Army will back us up (in California). But that's only against mob violence, not what an individual might do. If some person beats us up we can't do anything about it.



JANUARY 3, 1945, p. 2.

I just dread it to leave here. I just can't understand why they want to kick us out when they feel we're disloyal.

After kicking me around they can't kick me out with 25 dollars and train fare, and say, 'Find yourself a job.'

Can people be thrown out even if they renounce their citizenship? Could they put you in the Army then? (if you renounced citizenship).

The people here aren't supposed to be trusted. What will the people on the outside think if they let us loose to run around?

They say they're going to find them a job and a place to live. Nobody will go out if they don't. This (Tule Lake) should be the last place to start. The other people (in relocation centers) are supposed to be loyal.

On the YWCA group Mr. N. planned to start

Now that things are like this, I thought I had better start with a small group.

Return to leaving Camp

"Some people feel this way, 'If we have to go out, let's go right away and take full advantage of the opportunities.' We'll let them go out. They don't know what side of the fence they're sitting on anyway."

Rumor on Kai

The people say that Kai is going with the WRA. The people don't have faith in him anymore and he can't make them follow him.

INFORMATION FROM MRS. D.

I learned from Mrs. D, the very capable social worker that an explanation of the pick-ups had been made by the Administration ~~xxxxxx~~ in the block managers' meeting this morning. What was said nobody knows but I'll find out. Also had corroboration for the statement Cook, head of I. S. made to me on Saturday night that Tule Lake, is being seriously considered as the center which will serve for a segregation center "for an indefinite time." This appears to be something more than a rumor.



# RESEARCH GRANT APPLICATION FACE SHEET

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Division of Research Grants, Mail Stop 350 Washington, D.C. 20506 (202) 724-0226		Date Received	Log Number
1. Program to which application is made: <input type="checkbox"/> General Research <input type="checkbox"/> Research Materials, Tools CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Research Materials, Editions ONE <input type="checkbox"/> Research Materials, Translations <input type="checkbox"/> Research Collections <input type="checkbox"/> Program Development <input type="checkbox"/> Publications		2. Project Director(s) (name and address) Rosalie H. Wax Social Science Institute Washington University St. Louis, MO 63130  Telephone, office: (314) 889-6650 home: (314) 721-6848	
3. Institution (name and address)  Social Science Institute Washington University Lindell & Skinker Blvds. St. Louis, MO 63130		4. Authorizing Official(s) (name, address) H.S. Leahey Grant and Contract Administrator Washington University St. Louis, MO 63130 Telephone: (314) 889-5720	
5. Budget Outright \$ 48,939  Gifts Plus Matching \$ ---  TOTAL REQUEST FROM NEH \$ 48,939  Institutional Cost-Sharing (Non-Federal Contributions) \$ 12,235 TOTAL PROJECT COST \$ 61,174		6. Payee (name and address) Helen Duncan Asst. Comptroller Washington University St. Louis, MO 63130 Telephone: (314) 889-5700	
		7. Dates of Requested Grant Period  9/1/80 - 5/31/81	
8. Project Title Loyalties and Terrorism at Tule Lake Segregation Center, 1943-1945			
9. FOR AGENCY USE ONLY			
10. Other Government Agencies or Private Foundations Considering This Proposal		11. Current NEH grants and applications None	
12. Signatures of Project Director and Authorizing Official <u>Rosalie H. Wax</u> _____ _____			
		Date <u>9/20/79</u>	



## RESEARCH GRANT APPLICATION SUMMARY SHEET

Project Director Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.	Total Request from NEH	Log Number H-
Institution Washington University	Grant Period FROM Sept. 1, 1980 TO May 31, 1981	
Project Title. Loyalties and Terrorism at Tule Lake Segregation Center, 1943-1945.		

## PROJECT SUMMARY

While confined in "Relocation Centers" during World War II, Japanese-Americans were asked to declare their loyalty to the US (and forswear loyalty to Japan). A significant portion of both the Issei and Nisei populations responded in the negative and were moved to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. As a fieldworker, Rosalie H. Wax worked in that Center for fourteen months (February 1944 - May 1945) interviewing its residents and staff and observing activities at first-hand. She has in her possession 1004 single-spaced, typed pages of notes amounting to about 406,000 words. Because of the delicacy of the situation (and the rise of terrorism within the Center), much of the material was converted to her allusively and indirectly. To be usable by other scholars, the notes must be edited and annotated and provided with appropriate "keys".

FOR NEH USE ONLY



<b>PROJECT BUDGET</b> National Endowment for the Humanities Washington, D.C. 20506	III. Date Prepared <u>September 15, 1979</u> <span style="float: right;">Page 1</span> <hr/> IV. Project Title <u>Loyalties and Terrorism at Tule Lake Segregation Center, 1943-45</u> <hr/> V. Project Director <u>Rosalie H. Wax, Ph.D.</u> <hr/> VI. Grant Period From <u>9</u> <u>1</u> <u>80</u> To <u>5</u> <u>31</u> <u>81</u> month day year       month day year
I. Type of Budget Submission <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> application budget <input type="checkbox"/> budget revision <span style="float: right;">grant or application number</span>	
II. Applicant Organization  <u>Washington University</u>	

VII. Project Costs (include all charges to NEH and cost sharing funds)

*Summary Budget for Entire Grant Period*

**DIRECT COSTS**

Salaries and wages

Amount

\$ 27,050

Fringe benefits

1,957

Consultant fees

-----

Travel domestic \$           

foreign \$           

-----

Supplies and materials

2,045

Services

7,400

Other

38,452

Total Direct Costs

22,722

**INDIRECT COSTS**

**TOTAL PROJECT COSTS** \$ 61,174

VIII. Project Funding for Entire Grant Period

(1) Requested from Endowment:

Outright funds \$ 48,939

Gifts to NEH -----

Federal Matching -----

**Total Requested from Endowment** \$ 48,939

(2) Cost Sharing

a. Cash Contributions

(list applicant's anticipated cash outlay and the sources and amounts of third-party donations, grants, etc.)

Indirect Costs \$ 12,235

b. In-Kind Contributions

(list each major item, source, and value)

\$                     

                    

                    

                    

**Total Cost Sharing** \$ 12,235

**TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING** \$ 61,174

IX. Estimated Outlay of Endowment Funds During Grant Period

1st twelve-month period ending 5 31 81 \$ 48,939  
   month day year

2nd twelve-month period ending                            

3rd twelve-month period ending                            

4th twelve-month period ending                            

5th twelve-month period ending                            

X. Authorizing Official



1. Salaries and Wages (supply names of principal project personnel; for support staff indicate title of position only and number of persons in brackets)

**Total Salaries and Wages** \$ 27,050

	rate	salary base	Amount
Annuity	<u>11.5</u> % of \$	<u>3,750</u> (sec'y only)	\$ <u>432</u>
	6.13	10,556	
Social Security	& <u>6.65</u> % of \$	<u>13,194</u>	<u>1,525</u>
		<b>Total Fringe Benefits</b>	\$ <u>1,957</u>

name or type of consultant	daily rate of reimbursement	no. of days on project	Amount
_____	_____	_____	\$ _____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
<b>Total Consultant Fees</b>			\$ N.A.

destination	no. of travelers	no. of days in travel status	average per diem rate	Amount
			(\$ )	\$
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
			(\$ )	
Total Travel Costs			domestic	\$
			foreign	\$ N.A.



type	basis/method of cost computation	Amount
<u>Photocopying</u>	<u>Approximately 29,000 copies @ 3½¢</u>	<u>\$ 1,000</u>
<u>Computer Tapes</u>	<u>3 2400' reels, \$15 each</u>	<u>45</u>
<u>Office Supplies - Stationery,</u>	<u>Approximately \$110 a month</u>	<u>1,000</u>
<u>envelopes, file folders,</u>		
<u>pencils, etc.</u>		
	<b>Total Cost of Supplies and Materials</b>	<b>\$ 2,045</b>

6. Services (list each major type and cost computation)

type	basis/method of cost computation	Amount
		\$ _____
		_____
		_____
		_____
		_____
		_____
		_____
		_____
<b>Total Cost of Services</b>		\$ <u>N.A.</u>

7. Other (list each major type and cost computation)

type	basis/method of cost computation	Amount
Postage	Approximately \$20 or so per month	\$ 200
Computing Costs	Computing Facilities services @ \$12 equivalent CPU minute	
	600 minutes	7,200
	Total Cost of Other	\$ 7,400

### INDIRECT COSTS

**DIRECT COSTS**

1. Rate(s) established by negotiation with Federal agency: Amount

84 % of \$ 27,050 (Provisional as of 7/1/79) \$ 22,722

       % of \$                                          

Name of Federal agency: DHEW

Date of negotiation agreement: 6/20/78

2. Rate requested in attached indirect cost proposal or estimate of indirect cost rate if submission of indirect cost proposal will be delayed:

       % of \$                      \$                     

**Total Indirect Costs** \$ 22,722