

OUTLINE OF THE TULE LAKE REPORT

Chapter I. Introduction.

- A. Setting of the Community.
 - 1. Physical plan of the Tule Lake Project.
 - 2. Population characteristics.
- B. Tentative Project Policies.
 - 1. Site selection and local opposition.
 - 2. Utopian characteristics in initial policies.

Chapter II. General Policy of the War Relocation Authority

Chapter IV. Evacuee Migration to the Tule Lake Project.

- Optimism*
- A. The Opening of the Project.
 - 1. Early transfer movements.
 - 2. First efforts at organization.
 - 3. The interlude of optimism.
 - 4. Conditions promoting cooperation.
 - B. The Sacramento Group.
 - 1. The Background of conflict.
 - 2. Consequences of the Sacramento conflict.
 - 3. Initial adjustments of the Sacramento group.
 - C. The Late Movements to Tule Lake.
 - 1. The Marysville movement.
 - 2. The "White Zone" movement.
 - 3. The Pinedale movement.
 - D. Migration Differentials and Problems.
 - 1. Differences in the time of movement.
 - 2. Sectional differences.

Chapter III. Inchoate Community Organization.

- A. The Structure of Administrative Organization.
 - 1. Organization chart of the Tule Lake Project.
 - 2. A bureacratic community.
- B. Tentative Adjustments.
 - 1. Proliferation of interests and the selective process.
 - 2. The theory of self government and self expression.
 - 3. The tentative structure of social relations.

Chapter IV. The Emergence of Unrest.

- Unrest*
- A. The Sources of Discontent.
 - 1. Sectionalism.
 - 2. The scrap lumber issue.
 - 3. The censorship of mail.
 - 4. Mess hall problems.
 - 5. Procurement difficulties.
 - 6. Disorganization in the Work Corps.
 - 7. The canteen issue.
 - 8. The recreation department conflict.
 - B. The Process of Growing Unrest.
 - 1. Complaints: The index of discontent.
 - 2. Conditions preceding rebellion.
- food*
- working conditions*

Rebellion

Chapter V. Rebellion.

- A. The Farm Strike.
 - 1. Background of the farm strike.
 - 2. The farm strike.
 - 3. Aftermath of the farm strike.
- B. The Strike as Panacea for Community Ills.
 - 1. Force: A method of social control.
 - 2. Popularization of the strike principle.
- C. Reaction to Dictation.
 - 1. The coal crew strike.
 - 2. The construction crew strike.
 - 3. The medical staff conflict.
 - 4. The warehouse strike.

Chapter VI. Reform Measures of the W.R.A.

(52 p)

- A. Changing Conceptions of Project Administration.
- B. The New W.R.A. Policies.
 - 1. Implementation of the W.R.A. tentative policy statement.
 - 2. The beginning of the relocation emphasis.
- C. Efforts to Re-Vitalize Community Organization.
 - 1. Educational programs.
 - 2. Morale programs.

Chapter VII. The Ascendancy of Issei Power.

(149 p)

*Issei-Nisei
Conflict*

- A. The Overseas Broadcast Issue.
 - 1. The nature of the issue.
 - 2. Nisei versus Issei.
- B. The Theater Project Issue.
 - 1. The nature of the issue.
 - 2. Nisei versus Issei.
- C. The J.A.C.L. Bid for Control.
 - 1. The role of Walter Tsukamoto.
 - 2. The J.A.C.L. versus the community.
- D. ~~October~~ Strikes. *Minor strikes and disturbances*
 - 1. The mess hall strike.
 - 2. The furniture factory strike.
 - 3. The packing shed strike. *Hot water bb. line problem*
- E. Recognition of the Issei.
 - 1. New political functions of the Issei.
 - 2. Dissolution of the Temporary Community Council.

(45)

*Chap VII
The End of Rebellion*

Chapter VIII. Stabilization within Instability

(55)

Stabilization

- A. Institutionalization of Evacuee Control.
 - 1. The Permanent Community Council.
 - 2. The Planning Board.
 - 3. The tent factory proposal.
 - 4. The Tule Lake Consumer Cooperative.
- B. Propagation of the Relocation Policy.
 - 1. The procedure of leave clearance.
 - 2. Recruiting for the Army Language School.
- C. Removal of Project Director Shirrell.
 - 1. The Shirrell Administration in retrospect.
 - 2. The Policy of Project Director Coverly.
- D. Holiday Activities.

Chapter IX. The Registration: A Tragedy of Errors. (60 p)

- Crisis*
- A. The Plan of the Registration.
 - 1. The right to bear arms.
 - 2. Relocation and return to normal life.
 - 3. The procedure of registration at Tule Lake.
 - B. The Perverse Community.
 - 1. The confusion of issues.
 - 2. A community in tension.
 - 3. The search for solutions.
 - C. The Reign of Terror.
 - 1. The Block 42 incident.
 - 2. The Kibei coup d'etat.
 - 3. The inu beatings.
 - 4. The Nisei "Goon Squad".
 - D. Concluding phase of the Registration.
 - 1. Mass raids on agitators.
 - 2. The decline of opposition.
 - 3. The close of registration and aftermath.
 - E. The Significance of the Registration Issue.

Chapter X Segregation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Origin of the Tule Lake Project

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941, will be remembered as the event which suddenly and violently brought war to the United States, but only a small group in the total population, the people of Japanese ancestry who were then largely concentrated on the Pacific Coast, will remember the attack as the first of a series of events leading to a unique mass evacuation and transformation of their lives. The account of the developments that led to the decision to evacuate 112,000 people of Japanese ancestry, as well as the restrictions, hostile agitation, and confusion to which these people were subjected, must be presented elsewhere. Here it must suffice to mention that on February 19, 1942, slightly more than two months after the outbreak of the war, the President issued Executive Order Number 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War and appropriate Military Commanders to exclude from military areas, in the event of military necessity, any or all persons whom it was thought necessary to remove for the protection of the nation. The presidential order was immediately followed by a proclamation from Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, prescribing a military zone along the coastal and border region of the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded.

This and subsequent proclamations called for the removal of about 112,000 people. It was initially hoped that the excluded group would migrate voluntarily to interior points that were unrestricted, but despite the fact that the

Western Defense Command encouraged voluntary evacuation, relatively few responded. Moreover, it quickly became evident that there was public antagonism in the interior states to the unsupervised movement of voluntary evacuees. The policy of voluntary evacuation therefore was abandoned, and the Government undertook the task of a regulated evacuation of the people. Government officials were agreed that only the Army, with its organization and personnel, was in a position to carry out a mass evacuation, and the Army, which regarded the immediate evacuation of the people of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast as a military necessity, accepted the assignment. On the other hand, the Army was not disposed to assume responsibility for the relocation and re-establishment of the evacuees, which created the need to assign the latter problem to some other agency. It is in the light of these considerations that we may understand the organization and division of functions that were developed in the evacuation program.

On March 11, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt created the Wartime Civil Control Administration "as an operating agency of his Command to carry out assigned missions involving civil control."¹ Specifically, the function of the Wartime Civil Control Administration (otherwise known as W.C.C.A.) was to undertake the evacuation and supervise the temporary maintenance of the evacuated population in cooperation with other branches of the Western Defense Command. To fulfill the other need, of relocating the evacuees, the President issued Executive Order No. 9102 on March 18, 1942, establishing the War Relocation Authority in the Office for Emergency Management. The order authorized the Director of the new agency, who was to be appointed by and responsible to the

¹ War Department, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943. p. 41. This report contains a detailed account of the organization of the evacuation.

President, to perform the following functions, among others:

- (a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities.
- (b) Provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.¹

The authorization is couched in broad language leaving room for considerable flexibility in the formulation of a relocation program, but it is clear that by the time Executive Order No. 9102 was issued, the relocation of evacuees to public projects under War Relocation Authority supervision was contemplated. The choice of Milton S. Eisenhower as Director of the War Relocation Authority offers a hint of the possibility that was envisioned of relocating evacuees on undeveloped land and employing them at agricultural pursuits, for Eisenhower was Coordinator of Land Use in the Department of Agriculture immediately prior to his appointment. Further evidence on this point may be adduced from a statement by General DeWitt in his report in which he declares:

"As soon as specific evacuation plans had been initiated, it was foreseen that relocation facilities would have to be developed for virtually all evacuees. Accordingly, within a few days following March 12, site-selection parties were formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western Defense Command to seek sites for the development of the Relocation Centers.²

He further adds:

"Liaison was established between the Director, War Relocation Authority, and the Commanding General. Mr. Eisenhower returned to the Pacific Coast about the end of March..... Because of the primary interest of War Relocation Authority in the relocation aspects of evacuation, it

¹House Committee on National Defense Migration, "Fourth Interim Report, Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones." 77th Congress, Second Session, House Report No. 2124, May 1942. pp. 314-15.

²Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, op. cit., p. 44.

was agreed that the selection of Relocation Center sites by the Army would be suspended, and that all data collected would be made available to War Relocation Authority for its use."¹

The plan of the War Relocation Authority was to establish a number of relocation centers in each of which a community would be organized and the evacuees would be employed on public projects supervised by the W.R.A. Certain clauses in the Executive Order No. 9102 also indicate that there was then an assumption that the evacuees so employed would remain in the centers for the duration of the war. Sites were selected with these and other considerations in mind. Their basic requirements were:

1. The land must be part of the public domain and available to the W.R.A.
2. Water supply must be adequate for personal consumption, as well as for irrigation where necessary.
3. The climatic conditions must be suitable for habitation and for agriculture.
4. The soil must be suitable for agriculture, and the site favorable to the development of industry.
5. Railway and transport lines as well as electric power lines must be readily accessible.

Because of the relative scarcity of lands meeting these requirements that could be acquired by the W.R.A., it seems that site selection of relocation center areas proved to be an extremely difficult task. An illustration of the complications involving is suggested in a letter of June 5, 1942, sent by Director Eisenhower to the War Department when the former was requesting approval for an eleventh center. Eisenhower wrote:

Among the sites vetoed by the War Department are two which in our opinion would make very fine projects. One is at Cambridge, Nebraska, and the other at Beardsley, Arizona. The first was turned down because it called for some 22 tons of copper for a power line extension of 22

miles; and the second for military considerations. May I ask, in view of the urgency for completing the site-selection job and my belief that substitute sites necessarily must be greatly inferior to either of these, a reconsideration of one of these proposals.¹

Neither of the centers mentioned in the letter were even constructed, and the W.R.A. was restricted to ten centers. This decision had its bearing on the history of the Tule Lake Project, for it was about this time that the order was given to resume construction at Tule Lake expanding the center from the 10,000 evacuee capacity for which it was originally planned to one of 15,000. Events which later transpired seem to indicate that the largeness of the Tule Lake Project (it was the largest single relocation center, for Poston which had a larger population was separated into three distinct units and Gila River which had the third largest population had two units) was a factor contributing to the problems of maintaining community organization. A more heterogeneous population than in any other center was brought together within a single area; the channels of communication between the administration and the people were not increased in proportion to the increase of population; the centralized system of communal feeding and care of evacuees was heavily taxed by the size of the group to which goods and services had to flow. The turbulent history of Tule Lake, contrasted to the calmer circumstances at most of the smaller centers, invites speculation on the difference in the course of events that might have resulted had the population been limited to the original 10,000 for which the center was planned.

The Tule Lake relocation area was the first site selected by the War Relocation Authority, for though it was preceded in construction by the Manzanar and Colorado River Projects, the latter two projects were originally undertaken by the Army as "reception centers" for evacuees and were only later transferred

¹Letter, Milton S. Eisenhower to John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, June 5, 1942.

to the W.R.A. The Tule Lake Division of the Klamath Reclamation Project, where the site was located, had long been maintained under the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Work had been progressing for years in the drainage of Tule Lake, laying of irrigation ditches, and conversion of the land to farm use; it was only shortly before the outbreak of war that the Bureau of Reclamation issued informal announcements that the lands would finally be opened to private occupation. The local people, of whom large numbers were veterans of the First World War, pleasantly anticipated that they would be given first opportunity to acquire the land. Almost as soon as Eisenhower was chosen Director of the War Relocation Authority, he cast his eyes upon the Klamath Reclamation Project as a prospective area for the construction of a relocation center. From the standpoint of the considerations involved in the selection of a center site, the area was one of the most suitable for the purpose of the W.R.A. Through reclamation, a considerable tract of very fertile land had been prepared for immediate farming use; a large sandy lake bed had been drained and was well adapted to form the foundation of a camp; highway and railway lines as well as power lines were available; water could be secured by digging wells, and climatic conditions were relatively mild compared to some of the other proposed sites. Generally speaking, the Tule Lake area was one of the best sites for a relocation center proposed by the W.R.A. Its one major disadvantage was its location within the boundary of the state of California and therefore within the zone restricted to people of Japanese ancestry, for this inevitably placed the project under the closest supervision of the Western Defense Command, and subjected the center to the scrutiny of hostile elements within the state.

On April 1, 1942, representatives from the government bureaus of Soil Conservation Service, Forestry Service, Agricultural Economics Division, Office

of Indian Affairs, and Farm Security Administration, met with directors of the W.R.A. to discuss the Tule Lake Project as a site for a relocation center, and reported favorably upon the proposal. Very shortly thereafter, a verbal agreement was reached between Director Eisenhower and the commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation permitting the use of the land by the W.R.A., and the first draft of a memorandum of understanding was drawn by the Bureau of Reclamation on April 24, 1942. Although the final draft of the memorandum was not signed by the two agencies until June 24, 1942, the construction of the project was started in the meantime, and the center was ready to receive its first evacuees by the latter part of May.

Construction of the Tule Lake Relocation Center was begun on April 23, 1942; within a month the physical structure of the center was virtually completed. Barracks to house 10,000 evacuees, administration buildings, barracks and buildings for the Military Police, a hospital, warehouses, work sheds, personnel quarters, fire stations, and a sewage disposal plant, were all constructed during this brief period by private contractors under the supervision of army engineers. Facilities for the requirements of 10,000 people were installed and provisions for the immediate maintenance of the first arrivals were stored. By May 22, 1942, Acting Project Director Elmer L. Shirrell was able to write to the Regional Office:

"There is only one thing that is holding up my wire to you saying we are ready and that is the disappearance of four cars of rations which left Sacramento Quartermasters Depot day before yesterday."¹

The swiftness with which decisive events in the evacuation program developed during these months cannot be too strongly emphasized, for the emphasis on speed of execution affected the program as well as the evacuees in their efforts at

¹Letter from Elmer L. Shirrell to E. R. Fryer, May 22, 1942.

adjustment. Nothing reveals more clearly the rapidity of developments than a timetable of events from Pearl Harbor to evacuation.

Dec. 7, 1942	Japan attacks Pearl Harbor.
Feb. 19, 1942	Issuance of Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing prescription of military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded.
March 2, 1942	Announcements of Public Proclamation No. 1 by the Western Defense Command defining military areas on the Pacific Coast from which people of Japanese ancestry would be excluded.
March 24, 1942	Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 ordering removal of people of Japanese ancestry from Bainbridge Island, Washington.
March 30, 1942	First evacuation of Japanese by an exclusion order. Bainbridge Island people removed to Manzanar Reception Center.

To be sure, when the Acting Project Director of the Tule Lake center announced, late in May, 1942, the project's readiness to receive its first evacuees, the physical structure and equipment to meet only the barest needs of the people had been installed, and much of the finishing work had been left to the evacuees. Moreover, it was decided at the last minute to expand the capacity of the center from 10,000 evacuees, for which it was originally planned, to 15,000 evacuees. Nevertheless, the fact may be recorded that army engineers and private contractors succeeded in converting a silent, uninhabited lake bed into a community physically equipped to receive 10,000 people literally in less than a month, and that the War Relocation Authority was able to assemble at the same time a project staff which declared itself ready to receive the first evacuees. Had this rapid conversion been accomplished without creating conditions likely to result in serious later difficulties, it could also have been recorded an unprecedented achievement in engineering and administration. In the year that followed, the physical structure of the community stood up

reasonably well even in the severe winter months, but the lay-out of the center as well as the administrative structure for the maintenance of the evacuees' community soon showed flaws that were, perhaps, the inevitable consequence of their hurried establishment. It was not so much in the engineering of construction, but rather in planning, both of the physical lay-out as well as the administrative organization, that the emphasis on speed made the greatest concession to efficiency. In the last analysis, it was the human element in both the administration and the evacuees that proved the least amenable to drastic and sudden conversion.

Equally as important as the engineering and strictly administrative work of establishing the relocation center was the task of public relations involved in assuaging the local population in their suspicion of and hostility against the construction of a relocation project. Eisenhower was aware of this problem almost as soon as the site was proposed, for he wrote to one of his regional directors on April 5, 1942:

"I was told today that there would be considerable hostility to the establishment of a reception center at Tule Lake. Mr. Cooter told me that he could bring about a reasonable degree of acceptance through channels open to him. A little later Dave Davidson of A.A.A. told me that a Mr. Lane of his organization has been at Tule Lake recently and reports a growing sentiment in favor of Japanese relocation center there."¹

Even before the question of building a relocation center arose, there had been some difficulty in the Klamath Falls district when a Japanese family voluntarily migrated to the region to accept work as laborers with one of the local farmers. When the news of their arrival circulated, the farmers of the region protested the presence of Japanese, and meetings were held to discuss the issue of whether or not the family should be permitted to remain. The bulk of sentiment was clearly against their remaining, and when threats were made against

¹Letter, Milton S. Eisenhower to E. M. Rowatt, April 8, 1942.

their continued presence in the district, the family moved elsewhere. The issue raised in this case had its effect in crystallizing the public sentiment of the farmers of the region against bringing any Japanese into the area. The War Relocation Authority had to combat these opinions.

On April 11, 1942, the Klamath County Chamber of Commerce sent a resolution to Senator Holman (Oregon) protesting the establishment of the Tule Lake Project to house Japanese evacuees. They pointed out that the camp site was within two hundred miles of the coast and within the defense area, that important highways and railways vital to national defense traversed the area, that the project would be at approximately the center of the largest stand of Ponderosa pine timber in the United States and subject the forest to the danger of incendiary action, that the dikes and dams of the region necessary for the production of food important to national defense would be susceptible to sabotage, and that the citizens of Merrill and Tulelake, who were voicing violent protests, were almost solely war veterans who prided themselves on the native white composition of the local population. The resolution continued:

"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the Klamath County Oregon Chamber of Commerce that protests be lodged with the proper government authorities against the location of such a camp in this area, and,

"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that should this area be selected by the Government or the Agency responsible for the successful prosecution of the war to locate such a camp within this area, the Klamath County Oregon Chamber of Commerce respectfully requests that adequate guards be provided to protect all vital structures and industries from sabotage and that assurances be given that the camp will be completely disbanded at the conclusion of the present national emergency and that all persons who are confined to this camp be removed promptly from the area, and

"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that copies of this resolution be sent to senators and representatives of both Oregon and California, to the Commanding General of the Ninth Corps Area, and other governmental agencies concerned."¹

¹Resolution from the Klamath County Chamber of Commerce to Senator Rufus Holman, April 11, 1942.

A similar resolution was sent by the Tulalake Chamber of Commerce to Representative Harry L. Englebrecht (California) with the added complaint that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation had indicated their intention of opening the Tulalake Reclamation Project to private occupation. Appropriate answers were sent to Senator Holman and Representative Englebrecht by both the War Relocation Authority and the Bureau of Reclamation. They pointed out that the site had been approved by the Army, that the safeguards mentioned in the resolutions were being fully prepared by the Army; and that evacuees would not acquire any land rights and would probably be moved out at the end of the war, the lands reverting to their prior status. Commissioner Page of the Bureau of Reclamation wrote:

"On the Tule Lake Division this will mean the temporary suspension of an opening of lands which had been under consideration for announcement next fall. With so many of the younger men who ordinarily would be expected to file on these lands, in the Army or war industries, I am not sure but that postponement of the opening for the duration of the war may be the best procedure."¹

As long as the Tule Lake Relocation Project had the approval of the War Department and was being undertaken by government agencies, there was nothing the local people could do to prevent its construction. They accepted the project, though with considerable misgivings, and rather sought to gain the most out of an undesirable situation. Director Eisenhower suggested in one of his letters to these people that the evacuees might afford a source of farm labor of which there was great scarcity throughout California since the outbreak of war, but the plan was never successfully carried out because of the difficulty of using evacuee farm labor within the restricted area. There was hope among some of the local citizenry of profiting from the inflow of population that would accompany the construction and maintenance of a government project, and

¹Letter, J. C. Page, Comm. of Bureau of Reclamation, to Rep. Harry Englebrecht, May 7, 1942.

certain merchants undoubtedly gained by it. But despite various efforts of public relations officers in the War Relocation Authority to create a favorable public sentiment, they never succeeded in overcoming the underlying hostility against the project. During the construction of the center, the people who hoped to profit from the employment and the use of private facilities that would go with a large-scale job soon discovered that most of the profit was going to outsiders while little was left to them. On May 18, 1942, the Tulelake Grange protested this situation in a letter to Representative Englebrecht, saying:

"Tulelake Grange #468 at its regular meeting May 14, 1942, instructed their legislative committee to write you regarding the waste of labor, materials, and dollars in the construction of the Jap concentration camp here. While we realize some of this is unavoidable in war time, we also feel that the general attitude there is not conducive to the desired high morale of this community.

"In the hiring of local trucks there is evidence that some person or persons are getting a considerable rake-off of the earnings of certain amount of these trucks.

"Workers must join the Unions in order to work on this job. In this country, a democracy, it is certainly the height of inconsistency of something, when a man must submit to this form of legalized racketeering in order to serve his country in war time. A considerable part of the cost of this camp is going into the treasury of the Union, where it is neither open to inspection or liable to taxation."¹

From the standpoint of public relations with the local people and communities, the War Relocation Authority encountered at Tule Lake a bad situation from the beginning, and was constantly involved in an uphill struggle against public hostility. The building of the relocation center deprived the local farmers of fertile land that was to have been made available to them. The region was populated largely by war veterans who prided themselves on the white-American purity of their community. If the local communities could have profited from the establishment of the center through the sale of goods or the use of evacuee

¹Letter, Tulelake Grange No. 468 to Representative Harry L. Englebrecht, May 18, 1942.

farm labor, resentment might have been assuaged to a large extent, but very few of the farmers in the immediately surrounding area gained anything from the establishment of the center.

The generally hostile attitude of the local people toward the center and its administration had a significant bearing on the history of the community. The communities in the neighborhood became the most fertile ground for the development of rumors concerning the Tule Lake Project, and because of the national interest in the evacuation, some of these rumors gained widespread publicity. By their proximity to the center and the opportunity to observe some of its activities, the local people became useful tools of pressure groups antagonistic to the War Relocation Authority and the evacuees. Most important of all, the hostility of the local people was a significant factor in demoralizing the evacuees, for the evacuees were prone to assess Caucasian sentiment towards them in terms of their immediate experiences with the Caucasians, and they inclined to interpret the local antagonism as representative of the general public view. Moreover, the administration had to take special precautions to see that no incidents should occur in the center that would provide material for attacks upon the W.R.A., but these precautions inevitably led to greater restrictions upon the evacuees, which in turn aroused resentment from the latter.

In the establishment of the Tule Lake Project, the government agencies accomplished a remarkable engineering and administrative feat, of creating the physical facilities for a large community in the minimum of time. However, in the accomplishment of the feat, there were left numerous loose ends of unfinished business; as the pressure of administrative work increased under the constant inflow of evacuees from the assembly centers, there was never time enough to finish the work that had been left unfinished. It was only when the demands of circumstance required the administration to take up the unfinished business that attention was again directed to them, but the consequence was

that the administration was generally behind the social developments rather than ahead of them.

The Physical Setting of the Community

The Tule Lake Relocation Center was located in Modoc County in the north-east corner of California, only a few miles south of the California-Oregon boundary. Since the center was within the state of California, all of which was proclaimed by the Western Defense Command a restricted zone for persons of Japanese ancestry, the evacuees of this center (like those at Manzanar)¹ were inevitably under closer supervision and confinement than those in centers outside the restricted zone. The nearest city, Klamath Falls, Oregon, a busy little center of 16,497 people, with excellent transportation connections, was thirty-seven miles northwest of the relocation center. A highway and a single-track railroad running from Klamath Falls through Alturas, California, to Reno, Nevada, cut through the project area and provided the center with suitable communication and transportation lines.

The Klamath Basin where the Tule Lake Project is located forms a natural geographic area, but the characteristics of the whole region are not uniform. Most of Upper Klamath Lake, an enormous storage of water in the steep foothills of the Cascade Range, flows to the sea through the Klamath River, but there is also some drainage southward, apparently by subterranean channels, to Lower Klamath Lake and Tule Lake. The narrow valley of the Upper Klamath has an abundance of green vegetation, and the steep mountains on either side are well forested; the valley opens to the southward into an open plateau full of marshes, ponds, and lakes, found among broad fields of desert brush, except where the land

¹The Poston and Gila River Relocation Centers in Arizona were likewise in the restricted zone, but the restriction on this area was later removed. Moreover, Tule Lake and Manzanar were directly under the scrutiny of the California people who have the most powerful and best organized anti-Japanese groups.

MAP I
AREAS OF EVACUATION TO THE
TULE LAKE PROJECT



is cultivated by irrigation, and the mountains are rocky and barren. The drainage of water to the latter section of the basin has left there a heavy topsoil of peat and muck providing an extremely fertile soil for the production of such crops as potato and small grains, but the land requires irrigation due to the dryness of the climate. It was the purpose of the Klamath Reclamation Project to reclaim the rich lands of the Lower Klamath through drainage of the shallow lakes and marshes and the diversion of water for irrigation. Tule Lake was one of the larger lakes at the lower end of the valley that was being drained by the Bureau of Reclamation for conversion into farm land, and the project was close to completion at the time the War Relocation Authority took over the division as a site for the relocation center.

The elevation at Tule Lake is over four thousand feet. The average temperature in January is given as 27.7 degrees and for July as 65.2 degrees, which seem to indicate a rather mild climate, but due to the high altitude there is quite a variation of temperature between day and night that produces extremes of temperature greater than those the averages indicated. A breeze that sweeps up the valley occasionally makes the district uncomfortably windy, especially as it stirs up sand and dust. Rainfall is slight, the annual average precipitation being only about ten inches, and the summer months are extremely dry.


From the standpoint of climate and scenic interest, the site of the Tule Lake Project was one of the better of the ten relocation centers established by the W.R.A. The area was far from attractive, but the climate was not as severe or the surrounding as monotonously uninteresting as at some of the other centers. A range of low, barren mountains lay east of the project, one of which was named "Abalone Mountain" by the evacuees because of its appearance. Directly in front of the center, within the project area, was a rocky butte that rose several hundred feet above the level of the center which the evacuees called "Castle

Rock" because its contour had the appearance of a castle overlooking the project. There were fields of potato and small grains grown by local farmers living near the project, but the relocation area itself was a treeless barren spot at the time the project was started.

The Tule Lake Relocation area covered about 32,000 acres of land straddling the Klamath Falls-Alturas highway, but the camp itself occupied only a small part of this land. A distinction was made between the project area, which was the total area of the project, and the project center, which was the site on which the camp was located. Map II shows the layout of the project area, and its distinctive features. To the west of the highway were a flooded area, the remainder of Tule Lake being drained by the reclamation project; the farm area of which about 2,500 acres was laid in crops by evacuees during the first year of the project; and "Castle Rock" Mountain, which was a favorite hiking ground of evacuees. On the same side of the highway, at the base of the mountain, a chicken farm and hog ranch were located. The camp site, or the project center, lay east of the highway and railway tracks.

The project center occupied an area of about one-and-a-quarter square miles and was clearly marked off from the rest of the project by a barbed-wire fence that encircled it. The main gate of the center was directly on the Klamath Falls-Alturas highway, and all the traffic going in and out of the center flowed through this gate. Until regulations were later changed to permit evacuee access to the whole project area, their movements were limited to the fenced-in area of the center, and evacuees were allowed to pass beyond the gate only with a work permit. While there were restrictions upon outsiders preventing a free access to the center. Indeed, a large sign on the highway instructed motorists not to loiter near the center, and prohibited the taking

MAP II
TULE LAKE PROJECT
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
PROJECT AREA AND CENTER




of pictures. The project center was in a real sense the world of the evacuees while they remained in confinement there; they had little first-hand contact with the outside world, and outsiders had little or no contact with the evacuee world.

The plan of the center clearly defined certain areas for certain uses. (See Map III) One corner of the center was restricted for the living quarters and recreation field of the corps of two or three hundred military police force that was stationed at the center. The area was fenced off and guarded under the regulation that the military police should remain out of the evacuee area except by order of the commanding officer, and that the evacuees should remain entirely out of the military police area. The rest of the center was roughly divided into four areas: the administrative section, the warehouse and factory section, the hospital section and the "colony" (living quarters of evacuees). Immediately inside the gateway was the Provost Marshal's office where all incoming and outgoing traffic had to register. Just beyond this office were the administration buildings and the living quarters of the administrative personnel. The industrial section, factories and warehouses, was placed close to the administration section but somewhat separated from the colony. The hospital buildings lay between the administration section and the colony. And separated from all the foregoing areas by a wide firebreak and occupying one large unit of space were the sixty-four blocks of evacuee living quarters, the section which was familiarly called the "colony" by the administration.¹

In the nature of the plan, the block was the basic unit of the evacuee community. Each block was composed of fourteen barracks divided into apartments

¹There was much disagreement concerning the term to use in indicating the evacuee community. Many of the administrators used the term "colony", but very few of the evacuees used the term. Some of the administrators felt that the term carried undesirable connotations, but there was no agreement as to what other term might be applied. The Director frequently spoke of the "cantonement", but the military term was not generally used by the rest of the people.



Evacuee Residence Area



Klamath Falls, - Alturas Highway and R. R. Tracks,

MAP III
PROJECT CENTER: LAND USE
TULE LAKE PROJECT

MAP IV
PLAN OF THE BLOCK
TULE LAKE PROJECT

to house approximately 250 evacuees, a common messhall of the block, a recreation hall, toilets and showers for men and for women, a laundry, and an ironing room. (See Map IV) Nine blocks were grouped together to form a ward, and each of the wards was separated from the others by firebreaks of two hundred feet width.

Food and general merchandise canteens were located in Wards II, IV, and V, as well as near the administrative personnel quarters. A dry goods canteen was located in Ward III and a shoe repair shop in Ward VII. Canteen number 1 in Ward IV (Block 7) was, in a sense, the business center of the community for the barber shop, beauty parlor, magazine and newspaper stand, and bank, as well as the general merchandise store, were all located there. Grammar school classrooms were scattered in various parts of the community to make them conveniently accessible to children, but the high school was originally located in Blocks 69 and 70, although school buildings were later built in the wide firebreak near Ward I. One of the dangers to the community that was constantly emphasized by the administration was the threat of fire in a congested camp of the kind. Three fire stations were placed at the points indicated on Map IV. The offices of the administration buildings were inadequate for all the administration departments, and several of the offices were scattered among the living quarters in Wards I and IV.

A four feet high barbed-wire fence encircled the whole project center. Guard towers spaced at even distances were placed near the fences and manned by the Military Police at night. Actually, anyone desiring to "escape" from the center could easily have made a getaway, but no one ever showed any desire to do so or attempted it.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the plan of the community influenced the life of the community, but of the fact of its influence, there can be no doubt. In a community that provided no transportation facilities

except for trucking, hospital and special taxi services, distances were necessarily measured in terms of the "pedestrian distance" (walking time and energy required). Moreover, the roads were poor; during the winters they were mucky and dotted with huge pools of water; during the summers they were rough and dusty. The distance from one side of the center to the other was a mile or more. The length of a ward was about a third of a mile, and its width about a quarter of a mile. Such distances do not seem great, but in a community where virtually all movement took place on foot, and the roads were rough and the setting uninteresting, distances of this kind were definite barriers.

If spatial distance has any relation to social organization, it is evident that the plan of the project center at Tule Lake could have been improved upon to produce a more efficient community. Unlike other communities, the people of a relocation center were directly dependent upon a city administration of a highly centralized character, for all their means of subsistence, including jobs, food, clothing, shelter, and the public facilities, were controlled by the administration. Since there was this close relationship between the community and the administration, and the latter was necessarily centralized, it would have been desirable that the administration offices be spatially close to the community and be all located in one centralized place. A more far-sighted plan of the community would have reserved one of the centrally located wards, such as Ward I, for schools, the hospital, the library and other public buildings, as well as the community branches of the administrative offices. In the actual situation, the administration area was the farthest removed of all areas from the colony, and the sub-offices were widely scattered among evacuee living quarters in Wards I and IV. The public schools were mostly located in Ward VII at a considerable distance from the center of the project. The hospital was so placed as to obstruct the flow of traffic between the colony and the administration section, and occupied the one busy crossroad of the whole center. Most

Most unfortunate of all was the wide scattering of the administration sub-offices. The employment office was in Block 12, the statistics section in Block 8, the recreation center in Block 18, the community enterprises office in Block 7, and the civic organization office in Block 16. Inefficiency and confusion insidiously crept into the administration as a consequence of the inefficiency of the physical plan of the center. Since the evacuation and relocation was a regulated program affording opportunities for community planning, it was unfortunate that a more functional design of the relocation center was not devised.¹

Several illustrations may be cited to indicate the difficulties that arose as a consequence of the design of the center, but two instances will suffice to describe the nature of the problem.

The Social Welfare office in Block 16, in handling its various types of requests for aid, had to work in close cooperation with the employment office (Block 12), the clothing issue office (administration building and warehouses), the hospital service (base hospital), internal security division headquarters (administration building) and the Legal Aid office (administration building). There was only one telephone available at the welfare office, and the walking distance to most of the other offices was between a quarter to a half a mile over very poor roads. The Caucasian supervisor of the office, moreover, had one office at the administration building, where she spent part of her time, and another at Block 16. Very frequently, the work of the office would be interrupted by the need for authorization from the supervisor, who was often not at the office, or from one of the other administrative heads, or there would be need for information from one of the other offices. Much time was wasted in attempting to make contacts, in discussion over ways of overcoming the difficulty, in postponing immediate action, or in walking from office to office in pursuit of the needed authorization or information. It was not infrequently necessary to ask persons requesting grants of aid for old age or dependency to walk great distances from one office to another to get required affidavits proving their right to such aid.

¹ Here again, the speed with which evacuation was effected undoubtedly affected the time given to planning. The design of the relocation center was laid out by army engineers, and, as a matter of expediency, existing plans for army camps were applied with slight modifications to the relocation center. Evidently little consideration was given to the special problems of the latter type of camp. Furthermore, the W.R.A. administrators failed to anticipate future needs by keeping a block of apartments open near the center of the evacuee community for sub-office use.

The Community Activities (recreation) section had its office at Block 18, but the director of the section, Theodore Waller, had his desk at the administration building. During the initial period of organization, there were problems of procurement and approval of programs the authorization for which could be received only from the supervisor. There was a general complaint among evacuee recreation workers that Mr. Waller was "never around just when we want him; nobody knows what he's supposed to do." The secretary of the department added, "We can't chase down to the administration building every time we want to see Mr. Waller. It's a half mile walk from here, and we can't get a taxi whenever we want to." In the early period of organization, there was need for direction over much of the activity of the department, but the frequent absence of the supervisor from the recreation center office caused numerous interruptions that could have been avoided by a word or two from the head. On the other hand, the director of the section felt obliged to spend part of his time at the administration building where the rest of the Community Service Division was established. The difficulty of this office was partly due to the supervisor's failure to systematize his administrative work, but this failure was also in part due to the difficulties of spatial separation of the recreation center from the administration buildings.

The evacuees frequently complained of the need to walk long distances to reach various administration offices, and there were stories of individuals who spent half their day walking from one distant office to another to acquire a bit of information that might have been had in a few minutes had all the offices been located at one center. Part of the problem was the lack of adequate means of communication and transportation, for the administration sought to minimize the number of telephones on the project as well as the number of automobiles

in conformance with the national program of economy. There were even efforts to organize volunteer squads of messenger boys, though without success. But because of the lack of adequate means of transportation and communication, the inefficiency of the project design was doubly felt. Apart from the disgruntlement of evacuees over the need to walk great distances to get services, which they generally had time to do, the more significant consequence was that administrative processes were retarded and confused by the uncoordinated distribution of offices. The condition was a deteriorating influence upon the efficiency and industry of both administrators and evacuee workers, for the acceptance of the inherent inefficiency of the community design was tantamount to an acceptance of inefficiency.

It is impossible to assess the amount of disorganization that resulted in the project as a consequence of the non-functional design of the center. However, it is a familiar fact that highly centralized administrative systems require for smooth operation a well coordinated group of central offices. Moreover, the people who are administered in this way must have easy access to the administrators at some point in the system, which is usually accomplished by a ramification of centralized control through conveniently located branch offices. At the Tule Lake Center, however, there was no central locale for the main offices and no convenient distribution of sub-offices.

Another condition bearing some relation to the physical structure of the community was the separation of the administration and the evacuees. The physical distance that separated the administration personnel living quarters from the colony was in more or less degree a measure of the social distance existing between the administration and the evacuees. In a later chapter, the somewhat caste-like structure of the community that resulted between the two

groups as a consequence of this, and other reasons will be discussed. Here it will suffice to point out that the community of the evacuees and of the administrative personnel were two separate worlds between which physical space existed to insure the separation. A certain amount of workaday communication, as well as social relations, existed between the evacuees and the administrative personnel; nor is there any assurance that had the administrative personnel lived side by side with the evacuees, their relation would have been any better than it proved to be. However, there were frequent claims made by the evacuees, claims which seem substantiated by facts which will be produced later, that the administration often did not know what was going on in the evacuee community. The separation of the two communities and the consequent separation of the two spheres of living were, if not direct causes of misunderstanding, added barriers to an understanding of each other's mode of life and thought.

It was, perhaps, necessary that the evacuees should be segregated from the administrative personnel, for the positions of the two necessarily differed. The evacuees as evacuees occupied a special inferior status which could not be avoided by any amount of sympathetic participation on the part of the administration. Moreover, there may have been a suspicion on the part of the designers of the center that the evacuees might at some time express overt hostility against the Caucasian personnel, and that the segregation of the living quarters was necessary as a precautionary measure. Whatever the reasons for segregation, the physical separation of the two groups undoubtedly contributed to the social separation of the two groups.

The layout of the wards and blocks in the colony also had a determining influence upon the social organization of the evacuee community. Barracks and facilities were grouped in blocks with a capacity for an average of 250

evacuees to the block. The individual apartments were designed primarily for sleeping quarters; no kitchen, water faucet, bathroom, or toilet was attached to an apartment. For the latter needs, each block had a messhall with mass feeding facilities, a recreation hall that was originally intended for block recreational use, a public toilet and showerroom for men and for women, a laundry room, and an ironing room. In the nature of the plan, the block was the basic administrative unit of the project. The use of common facilities by the people of a block created bonds among them that distinguished them from the rest of the community; there were frequent contacts among the block people in the messhalls and the washrooms, and there were common interests that grew out of block problems and activities.

Because of the spatial unity of the nine blocks joined into a ward, there was some effort to use the ward as an administrative unit. But apart from the spatial proximity of the blocks in a ward, there was little of common interest to hold them together, and, in general, the ward tended to be a rather loose unit of the community. This was true despite the fact that, with the development of several elected offices in the community, the ward was used as the basis of representation. Formal ward relations could sometimes be developed, but informal relations in the ward were weak by contrast with those developed in the blocks or those cutting across ward lines.

The type of construction used for the evacuee living quarters was that which is known in the Army as "theatre of operations" construction, but with modifications. The barracks were 20' x 100' and they were divided into apartments of either 20' x 25' or 16' x 20' to provide for different size families.. The exterior walls and roofs of the barracks were shiplap covered with tarpaper. No inside walls or ceilings were originally planned, but it was later decided

that protection against the severe winter in the district was inadequate and evacuee construction crews put in firboard ceilings and sheetrock walls. Single floors of shiplap were used and proved to be a nuisance to the residents for the green lumber dried and buckled, leaving wide gaps in the floor that were difficult to sweep out. A single family was assigned to one apartment, but the unpartitioned apartments offered little privacy, especially in the cases of large families. It sometimes happened that families numbering eight or nine persons were housed in a single room of 20' x 25' size. A small proportion of the families gathered sufficient material to construct screens with which to section off the room, but many others strung blankets on ropes to gain privacy. No furnishings were provided by the W.R.A. except for a stove, which was unfortunately set in the center of every apartment, and cots, mattresses, and blankets for each resident. Each apartment had not less than three windows which gave adequate sunlight and ventilation.

House numbers were determined by the block, the barrack in the block, and the apartment in the barrack. For example, the address of a family living in apartment C of barrack 3 in block 15 was written in the form: 1503-C. In each block, the apartment bearing the number "07-D" (fourth apartment in barrack 7) was converted into an office for the block manager, an appointed evacuee worker whose function was to serve as liaison officer between the administration and the block people in all strictly administrative matters. At each block manager's office were the mail boxes for the block people, a bulletin board bearing administrative notices and posters, and tools and equipment held in custody for use by the block people. As a focal point of block activity, the office was also generally arranged with tables and benches to permit lounging and gathering.

Barrack 8 in each block, a long unpartitioned hall, was assigned for use as a recreation hall for the block people, but because of the lack of office space, the recreation halls were often appropriated for administrative offices. As a result of this condition, as well as the fact that most of the recreation halls were unequipped for recreational and social purpose, the recreation halls seldom were used as the social centers of the blocks, contrary to the intended purpose of these halls. More frequently, the block people gathered at the block messhalls or even the block manager's offices, the laundry rooms, ironing rooms, or washrooms, for social gatherings and meetings of the block people. Both the messhalls and recreation halls were located at the extreme end of each block, but the latter facilities were in buildings occupying the center of the block. This design of the block tended to draw block movement and attention toward the physical center of the block, and was an important factor in integrating the block people. Since each block was separated from adjoining ones by streets, and block activity tended to gravitate from the periphery toward the center, each block tended to be insulated from those surrounding it, and people often knew very little about the activities in the adjacent blocks. The significance of the block pattern may better be understood by contrasting the plan with that of the typical city community; in the latter the residences face outward toward the streets and the street is consequently the center of interest, but in the relocation center, the barracks were arranged in rows with the apartments facing each other. Since there were no obstructions standing in the way of movement toward the block center and most of the block facilities were located there, block interest was away from the streets and towards what is normally considered the alley way. This plan combined with the condition that all the block people used the same public facilities were important factors in making of the block the basic social unit of the community.

One of the irritating problems of the community was the frequent dust storms created by a breeze that would seep up the valley and stir up the sandy topsoil on which the center was located. The center was practically devoid of vegetation to hold down the soil, except for stubbles of desert grass, and a breeze of any strength would raise clouds of dust and sand that would seep into the apartments through the slightest cracks. In the initial stages, there was much talk of transplanting trees from the nearby forests and of sowing grass throughout the center, but this plan never developed beyond the point of discussion. While the surrounding countryside was not unattractive, there was little beauty in the center itself to set off the background scenery. The monotonously uniform rows of black tar-papered barracks, laid like so many boxes on a flat, gray, dried-out lake bed, was as colorless and somber as a petrified forest. Within this community, to be sure, was life as human in its comedy, tragedy, and drama as might be found anywhere, but it was perhaps inevitable that the oppressing dullness of the setting should, like the fine grains of sand carried by a wind, seep through every crack into the inner dwellings of the community.

Evacuee Population of Tule Lake

The peak population of the Tule Lake Relocation Center of 15,290 people was reached on September 4, 1942, through a series of evacuee movements, most of which took place between May 27, 1942, and July 24, 1942. The number of persons of Japanese ancestry entering and establishing residence at the project by October 31, 1942, is given as 15,548, but the total population of the center

TABLE I

EVACUEE POPULATION MOVEMENTS
TULE LAKE PROJECT
May 27, 1942 to July 24, 1942

Source: Bulletin 12, W.C.C.A.,
Statistical Division,
March 15, 1943.

was never as high as this for there was a certain amount of ingress and egress regularly taking place, particularly during September and October when large numbers left the center for seasonal work on sugar beet farms on the outside. Table I, covering the movement of population to and from the Tule Lake Project, reveals the rapidity with which the center was populated following its opening on May 27. Within a month after this date, the population had increased from zero to nine thousand, and during the month following, six thousand more evacuees were transferred there. It will be noted that during the height of transfer movements to Tule Lake, about 500 evacuees were being received daily at the center, the longest sustained period of daily migration being between June 15 to June 29, 1942, when about 6,500 evacuees arrived at the center from the Sacramento and Marysville Assembly Centers. The rapid influx of evacuees placed great strains upon an administration that had only recently been organized.

The bulk of migration to Tule Lake was accomplished through three types of movements: (a) transfer orders sending evacuees at the Sacramento, Marysville, and Pinedale Assembly Centers, and small groups from the Portland, Puyallup, and Salinas Assembly Centers, to the Tule Lake Project, (b) direct evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry from homes and institutions in the restricted zone to the Tule Lake Center, and (c) other movements most of which were individual transfer orders to evacuees at other assembly centers desiring to join their families at Tule Lake. Not included in the above categories are the entries from other W.R.A. centers, parolees from internment camps, those returned from furloughs, and births at the center. A summary of the three types of movements to Tule Lake, all of which was handled by the Army, is given in Table II.

Table II

Summary of transfers of evacuees from custody of the Army to custody of Tule Lake Project, War Relocation Authority¹

Type of Transfer	Number Involved
Transfer Order	11,742
Direct Evacuation	3,208
Other Movements	350
Total	15,300

It should be mentioned that evacuation directly from the home to the relocation center occurred in the cases of only four of the ten relocation centers, Tule Lake, Gila River, Poston, and Manzanar. In the other relocation centers, almost all of the population was received from assembly centers. At Manzanar the situation was unusual in that the Army initially administered the project as a reception center (with many features of the assembly center) and later transferred control to the War Relocation Authority. The people who were evacuated directly to the relocation center are of interest as a special class because they did not undergo the experience of an assembly center, as a result of which they were inclined to view the relocation center somewhat differently from others, at least initially, and tended to come from more scattered areas than those who were sent to assembly centers. The resulting difference in outlook is discussed at greater length in a later chapter.

The migration of evacuees to Tule Lake took place in six major movements and in several minor group and individual transfers. Table III indicates the

¹Data from Bulletin 12, Statistical Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, San Francisco, March 15, 1943. p. 128.

time table of the major movements and the dates of which they were made. The first evacuee arrivals at Tule Lake were 447 persons from the Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers who were transferred as an advance detachment on May 27, 1942. Both of these groups were city people, from Seattle and Portland respectively, including men, women, and children, who were sent to Tule Lake to help open the center in preparation for the arrival of the main body. Less than a week later, during a period of five days, 1,415 evacuees were evacuated directly from their homes in rural sections of Washington, Oregon and California to the Tule Lake Center. The evacuees from Washington were the Japanese in the Puget Sound area who were not included among those evacuated to either the Puyallup or the Pinedale Assembly Center, a group principally composed of farmers and oyster fisherman in scattered parts of that region. On the whole, relations with Caucasians in this region had been fairly good and among the evacuees in this group were those who had a number of friends among their Caucasian neighbors, but there were likewise many who had lived either as isolated Japanese families or in small communities of Japanese. The same was true of those from Oregon, mostly from southern Oregon in the region surrounding Medford, a group that included the balance of the Japanese in Oregon after excluding those who were sent to the Portland Assembly Center from that city or to the Pinedale center from around Hood River. On the other hand, the small group of Clarksburg, California, a farming district near Sacramento, apparently had had relatively little contact with Caucasians--had even been required to send their children to segregated public schools--and the group gave evidence of their somewhat segregated existence by their greater adherence to Japanese traditions.

Not accurate; needs revision

Table III
Evacuee Population Movements
Tule Lake Relocation Center
May 27, 1942 - October 31, 1942

Class of Movement	Date	Total Entering
Transfer Order, "Advance Crew" Puyallup and Portland A.C.	May 27, 1942	446
Direct Evacuation		
Medford, Oregon	June 2	39
Oregon	3	249
Washington	4	338
Washington	5	307
Clarksburg, Calif.	6	482
		<u>1,415</u>
Transfer Order Sacramento Assembly Center	June 16	498
	17	504
	18	512
	19	494
	20	497
	21	499
	22	509
	23	512
	24	545
	27	85
		<u>4,655</u>
Transfer Order Marysville Assembly Center	June 25	520
	26	499
	27	488
	28	490
	29	397
		<u>2,394</u>
Direct Evacuation, "White Zone"		
Chico, Calif.	July 10	319
Lincoln, Calif.	11	440
Marysville, Calif.	12	580
Lincoln, Calif.	13	387
		<u>1,726</u>
Transfer Order Pinedale Assembly Center	July 16	501
	17	503
	18	508
	19	515
	20	513
	21	515
	23	510
	24	446
Source: Bullet. 12, Statistical Division, W.C.C.A. March 15, 1943		
		<u>4,011</u>
		14,752

All of those arriving in these first two movements were located in Ward 1 at Tule Lake. This group, numbering somewhat less than two thousand people and constituting the sole population of Tule Lake until the beginning of the movement from the Walerga Assembly Center on June 15, made up the most heterogeneous population of any single ward in the community, for no other ward had as many persons from each of the three Pacific Coast states. It is noteworthy that this ward was less consistent than other wards in its opinions on major community issues, apparently a consequence of the mixed character of its population.

On June 16, the transfer of 4,655 evacuees from the Walerga Assembly Center began, and continued to the twenty-seventh of the same month when the last remnants of the group arrived at the Tule Lake Center. The bulk of the Walerga group was composed of people from Sacramento, the California state capitol, a people whose occupation had been principally in the small city trades. The Japanese in Sacramento had lived in a more segregated community than was characteristic of either San Francisco or Los Angeles, but the small Japanese community had maintained an active community life and produced through this experience several strong leaders, especially among the Nisei. Sacramento, however, was not a place receptive to the Japanese and its most widely read newspaper, the Sacramento Bee, published by the notoriously anti-Japanese McClatchey family, had been a constant threat to the peace of the Japanese in the city. With the Sacramento people at the Walerga Assembly Center were several hundred families from the farming region of the lower Sacramento Valley, in particular from the Delta Region communities of Walnut Grove, Florin, and Isleton, which were among the most isolated and conservatively Japanese communities of the Pacific Coast. Most of the people from the Walerga center were settled in Wards II and III.

Between June 25 and 29, immediately following the Walerga transfer movement, some 2,394 evacuees arrived at Tule Lake from the Marysville Assembly Center, most of whom were located in Ward IV with the excess overflowing into Ward V. This group came largely from the town of Marysville or the farming districts immediately surrounding the town, and were principally occupied in farming and in trades servicing the farmers. The Japanese around Marysville represented the upper rim of a heavy concentration of Japanese in the Sacramento Valley area, and they ranged from those who had had abundant Caucasian contacts to those who lived in small but highly organized Japanese communities. Among those sent to this assembly center were also a number from a vicinity immediately south of Sacramento who were a part of the strongly organized Japanese communities of the region. To a certain extent, the community in Sacramento dominated the other Japanese communities throughout this area, and, likewise, at Tule Lake there seemed to be a dependence of the rural groups upon the leadership of those from Sacramento. On July 4, a small group of 105 evacuees were transferred from the Salinas Assembly Center to Tule Lake.

In the first proclamation issued by General DeWitt announcing the military zones from which the people of Japanese ancestry would be excluded, it had been understood that the area lying east of Highway 99 in California would not be affected by the evacuation order. On the maps printed by the Western Defense Command defining the restricted zone, the unrestricted part of California, known as Military Area No. 2, was shown in white to distinguish it from the restricted zone which was shown in black. When a later proclamation redefined the restricted zone by declaring the whole of the state of California restricted to persons of Japanese ancestry, the Japanese in the counties of Military Area No. 2 lying north of Fresno were removed by direct evacuation to Tule Lake. Then 1,726

evacuees who were directly evacuated to Tule Lake between July 10 and 13 by this order were generally called the "white Zone" evacuees to indicate the fact that they had come from what had been thought to be the "safe" Military Area No. 2, the section shown in white in the original Western Defense Command maps. The bulk of this group came from the three counties near Marysville immediately east of Highway 99, namely, Placer, Yuba and Butte counties, and in this group were included a number who had voluntarily migrated to Military Area 2 in the hope of avoiding evacuation. Most of this group were farmers, but by comparison with other sections of rural California, there tended to be a higher percentage of Japanese farmers who owned their land and a smaller percentage operating on a tenant farm basis. Unlike other Japanese farmers of the Sacramento valley, there was a larger number operating orchards in Placer and Yuba counties, a fact which was of some importance in the later bitterness of these people since their trees deteriorated rapidly under the inadequate care of the Caucasian farmers to whom the orchards were transferred. In recent years, Placer county had been one of the most bitterly anti-Japanese of all counties in California, apparently because the area had undergone recent invasion by the Japanese farmers and because of the latter's tendency to buy up land. At the Tule Lake center, the White Zone evacuees, who were largely located in Ward V, constituted a relatively heterogeneous body by contrast with such a closely knit group as the Sacramento evacuees in Wards II and III and, the Marysville evacuees, tended to follow the leadership of the latter in political matters.

The last major movement to Tule Lake occurred between July 16 to July 24 when 4,011 evacuees from the Pinedale Assembly Center arrived at Tule Lake and were assigned to Wards VI and VII. All of these evacuees were originally from the Pacific Northwest, but they had been evacuated

to the Pinedale center near Fresno, California. The group was largely rural in background coming from the farming district immediately south of Seattle and from the Hood River Valley in Oregon, but there were also about eight or nine hundred people from the city of Tacoma, Washington. In both Washington and Oregon, because there had been less of a tradition of anti-Japanese agitation from the majority group, there had been a less acute consciousness of race prejudice as a factor in social relations with the majority group than among the Japanese in California. The condition served to ease relationships with the majority group, especially at the second-generation level, and the maintenance of a strong Japanese community organization was not as strongly a part of their practice as among the Japanese farmers of the Sacramento Valley area. At Tule Lake, the Pinedale evacuees consistently tended to be more "cooperative" with the administration than was true of the rest of the population.

By the end of the Pinedale transfer movement, and including several individual and miscellaneous group transfers, there were 14,966 evacuees at the Tule Lake Relocation Center. In less than two months after the first transfer movement to Tule Lake, a community of 15,000 evacuees was aggregated. From the standpoint of the locale from which this population had been drawn, the evacuees from each of the three Pacific Coast states as Tule Lake had. The brief descriptions that have been presented of the community backgrounds from which the population was drawn indicates that, at Tule Lake, there were brought together those who had lived in the most isolated, segregated Japanese communities in America (Delta region of Sacramento Valley) as well as those from the most loosely organized Japanese communities with the most favorable relations with the majority group (e.g., Hood River Valley.) While it is difficult to state

specifically the sectional differences of Japanese drawn from various parts of the Pacific Coast, there can be no doubt that conditions of livelihood for the Japanese varied in some degree from district to district. The extent of Japanese concentration in a given district and region, the degree of anti-Japanese hostility expressed by the majority group, the kind of economy practiced, and the intensity of Japanese community organization that resulted from those conditions, were all factors entering into the experiences of the Japanese and determining their customary practices and their outlook. While it is unwise to emphasize too strongly the sectional differences of background characteristics in the Tule Lake population, it is equally unwise not to recognize the differences. To the extent that there was heterogeneity in the population, the people of Tule Lake who were suddenly brought together faced a problem of adjusting their differences and of creating a common outlook.

CHAPTER II

General Policy of the War Relocation Authority

Few assignments to government agencies could offer less prospect of gratitude than the job which was given the War Relocation Authority. Broadly speaking, the agency was assigned the task of caring for about 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry for the duration of the war in such a manner as not to impinge on their rights, and yet to maintain them under strict economy through productive employment that would serve the country's welfare, while making the evacuees self-supporting. The program was involved from the outset in circumstances which made it difficult to determine the purposes and policies of the agency with any clarity.

In the first place, the War Relocation Authority inherited all the doubts and confusion that were a part of the decision to evacuate the people of Japanese ancestry. There had been no uniformity of opinion regarding the necessity of evacuating the group among the government officials, the military leaders and the public who were discussing the question. There was, in fact, not even a uniformity of understanding as to the nature of the issue, for into the discussion were injected numerous questions such as the areas to be evacuated, the extent of loyalty or disloyalty of the people in question, the actual military need of evacuation, and the relationship of the democratic principle to the evacuation, for which no conclusive answers could be given. It was decided that in the last analysis the question of the need for evacuation was a military problem, and it was left to the Military Commander of the Western Defense Command to determine that such an evacuation was necessary. The justification offered for the evacuation was that there were grounds to suspect the loyalty of a sizeable group among the people of Japanese ancestry, that it was impossible to distinguish and separate the loyal from the disloyal, and that military necessity required the removal of the whole group to safeguard the defense of the Pacific

Coast area. Yet, it was admitted by government officials investigating the problem that the bulk of evacuees were probably loyal to the United States, and that the majority were required to suffer evacuation only because of the impossibility of distinguishing them from the undesirable minority.

From the first discussion of the question, there was involved this fundamental issue: If the United States is fighting a war to preserve democracy, how can this government pursue the undemocratic course of condemning to evacuation a group whose guilt had not been proved? The articulate portion of the public in the area from which the Japanese were to be evacuated loudly proclaimed the need for evacuation, but, there was also a small but vocal element who insisted that the whole procedure was undemocratic and unnecessary. They raised doubts as to whether the evacuation was being undertaken as a matter of military necessity, but rather as a measure to satisfy the racial and economic prejudices of the majority group. General DeWitt's decision to evacuate the people of Japanese ancestry brought to rest only the discussion of whether or not evacuation was to take place; it failed to resolve any of the other questions which had been raised in connection with the evacuation.

Evidently, in the early thinking about evacuation, the Army was principally concerned with the removal of the people of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast area, for General DeWitt publicly advised the Japanese to evacuate voluntarily to interior states where they could enjoy the freedom allotted all other Americans, except access to the restricted zone and the limitations applying to enemy aliens. The policy was discarded when it quickly became evident that the antagonistic public sentiment of the interior states as well as the hesitation of the evacuees about moving indicated the ineffectiveness of the voluntary evacuation program; the alternative policy selected was that of a regulated evacuation and confinement of the people in restricted centers. Whatever the circumstances that dictated the need for this change of policy, there was a

wide difference in the guarantee of freedom offered in the former conception of evacuation and relocation as compared to the latter conception.

Thus, the W.R.A. was assigned the task of administering over a people of indefinite status. They were not prisoners of war, they were not refugees of war, and they were not internees specifically charged with acts or intentions of acts dangerous to the welfare of the government. Two-thirds of the group were citizens of the United States, the legality of whose evacuation by military order or whose restraint in centers against their wishes yet remained to be proved. It was assumed that the bulk of the evacuees were innocent of any crime or intent of crime against the nation, but it was also assumed that there were unknown numbers who were guilty of such tendencies of action. Since the "innocent" as well as the "guilty" were to be evacuated together, the W.R.A. could only treat them uniformly until such time as a segregation could be effected. It was left to the W.R.A. to determine what kind of treatment should be accorded the evacuees.

On the whole, the War Relocation Authority followed the principle that the relocation centers should be administered as democratically as possible and with as little disturbance to the normal course of Japanese-American community life as the exigencies of war and evacuation permitted. In pursuing this policy, however, the Authority was constantly required to take account of the public's reaction to its action, particularly as it was a public agency administering over and expending public funds for the maintenance of a group of people who were identified, in the public eye, with the treacherous enemy who had bombed Pearl Harbor. The directors of the W.R.A. must have been thoroughly cognizant of the readiness with which politicians would use the Japanese question in America as a whipping post to serve other political ends. On the other hand, the Authority was assuming responsibility for the administration of a people who were bound to be embittered by the evacuation and its resulting losses.

It was across these tortuous passages that the W.R.A. was expected to seek its way. The general policies of the agency as well as the problems which it encountered in attempting to carry out the policies should be understood in the light of these background conditions.

No policies or rules had ever been written for such an undertaking as the W.R.A. was embarking upon; the program had no precedent in American government experience. There was neither the time nor the background information for the W.R.A. to draw up a detailed blueprint of its program before the opening of the first project, but by May 29, 1942, Director Eisenhower was able to issue his "War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement" wherein he indicated the general aims which he desired the agency to accomplish. In the Foreword, he states:

"The evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry and their relocation inland on Federally supervised projects should not be confused with the program under which enemy aliens suspected of acts or intentions against the national security are interned. The present WRA program is concerned with a group composed mainly of American citizens and loyal individuals who have been removed from their homes for reasons of military security and for their own bodily protection. The objective of the program is to provide, for the duration of the war and as nearly as wartime exigencies permit, an equitable substitute for the life, work, and homes given up, and to facilitate participation in the production life of America both during and after the war.

"More specifically, the WRA aims to provide in each project a setting in which normal activities of life can go on as nearly as possible like those of an ordinary American community. Restrictions will be imposed only to the extent and for the time made imperative by war conditions."¹

This statement of general policy was in itself a no mean accomplishment for the W.R.A., for considering the welter of arguments pro and con which were heatedly put forth by various groups discussing the question of the treatment that should be accorded the evacuees, the W.R.A. took a courageous step in

¹War Relocation Authority, "War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement," May 29, 1942. p. 1.

choosing the most liberal view of the evacuees. Interpreting the W.R.A. by the foregoing statement, it seems evident that the agency accepted the course of regarding an evacuee as not guilty until proven guilty. Its view was the democratic liberal's answer to the proposal of a large majority of the West Coast public that the evacuees be treated with suspicion and the strictest supervision. It should be added that the War Relocation Authority pursued and held to this aim even when the agency was under pressure of powerful political groups which were demanding that a more stringent supervision of the evacuees be effected.

More specifically, it seems that the W.R.A. thesis on evacuee administration was that the highest degree of cooperation would be received from the evacuees only by giving them the greatest amount of trust, responsibility and opportunity compatible with military security. Moreover, the W.R.A., as with other agencies connected with the evacuation, was intent upon minimizing the hardships of evacuation. In the detailed portions of the policy statement, it is declared:

"Each relocation area is intended to provide every able-bodied resident with an opportunity for productive work and for participation in a well-rounded community life. The WRA offers cooperation, not paternalism, to evacuees."¹

"Project regulations will be imposed only where necessary, and center residents will be given every possible freedom in the conduct of their lives."²

"The project management and the evacuees themselves should bear jointly the responsibility for making the community life of each relocation center as normal and complete as possible. The War Relocation Authority will provide the basic essentials of living. The evacuees will be encouraged in every way to build on this base."³

"The residents of each relocation center will be responsible within the limitations imposed by military necessity, for the organization and administration of their own local self government."⁴

¹Ibid, p. 3

²Ibid, p. 3

³Ibid, p. 3

⁴Ibid, p. 6

"Each community will establish procedures for dealing with violations of the law, and will subject offenders to arrest, trial, and punishment."¹

"Along lines determined by the evacuees, complete freedom of religion is to be enjoyed at all relocation centers."²

In general, these statements illustrate the basic mode of approach to the problem of administering the relocation centers that the W.R.A. selected. The democratic liberal approach to the evacuees may be considered the fundamental attitude underlying all the policies of the War Relocation Authority. While this is perhaps no place to launch upon an analysis of this ideology which the Authority established as the cornerstone of its policies, it should be noted that the view is primarily based upon an appeal to the better qualities of human nature. In this ideology are the assumptions that every individual has the right to the fullest development of himself as long as his development is in accord with the welfare of society, that such a development is to be achieved through the participation of individuals in social responsibilities, and that control over the process may be maintained by appeals to reason through discussions rather than by coercion. The success of the W.R.A. policies depended to a large degree upon the validity of their assumptions. It will later be seen that the W.R.A. encountered its greatest difficulties at the point where the evacuees or the majority public refused to accept reasoned discussions as the basis of control.

However, if the W.R.A. was an agency created in an atmosphere of confusion and dilemma, it is hardly to be expected that its policies should be a straightforward elaboration of a single clearcut principle, and a study of its policies does reveal inconsistencies that arose out of the situation. Despite the emphasis on the democratic rights of evacuees, the W.R.A. was created specifically to administer over a group possessing a special limited status in America.

¹Ibid, p. 6

²Ibid, p. 7

Nor was the agency in any position to question whether the status assigned the evacuees was justified or not; its assignment was to accept the status of evacuees as defined, however indefinite the definition might be, and to administer over them accordingly. In the policy statement of the W.R.A. the dilemma is recognized, but it remains unexplained.

"The present WRA program is concerned with a group composed mainly of American citizens and loyal individuals who have been removed from their homes for reasons of military security and for their own bodily protection
.....

"For protection of the evacuees and of the communities immediately surrounding the relocation projects, each project is being established as a military area with a military guard around the exterior boundaries.
(Italics mine) This does not mean, however, that every activity of the evacuees is to be under close supervision. It is expected the project directors and others responsible for local interpretation of Authority policy will see the wisdom of placing the greatest possible reliance on the evacuees in the administration of community affairs."¹

In the actual administration of the centers, however, the issue of the status of evacuees proved to be one of the most important questions requiring clarification. The evacuees were inclined to raise, as a fundamental issue, doubts about just such an inconsistency as appears in the above statement. If the group is "composed mainly of American citizens and loyal individuals," the evacuees would say, why is there the need "For protection of the evacuees and of the communities immediately surrounding the relocation projects" and to establish each project as "a military area with a military guard around the exterior boundaries." The reply was, of course, that there existed no just method of separating the "loyal" from the "disloyal" and that certain minimum restrictions had to be imposed upon the whole group as a precaution, but the answer seldom satisfied the evacuees. On the other hand, the majority group public was inclined to accept the evacuation as de facto proof of the guilt of the whole group of evacuees and the W.R.A. was repeatedly faced with public

¹Ibid, p. 1

condemnation for failing to administer over the evacuees as a "disloyal" group. Here, the reply was the reverse of that given the evacuees, that precautions against the disloyal ones were being taken, but that the bulk of evacuees were loyal to the United States and could not be treated as disloyal persons.

This feature of the W.R.A. policy, that is distinguishable from the ideal aims outlined earlier, was a direct result of the function that the agency was designed to serve within a wartime governmental system. That function was to relocate and maintain a population that had been evacuated from a military area because of military necessity, though the W.R.A. was free to choose the means of realizing its function. Under the circumstance, not only was there the need of the W.R.A. to accept the fact of evacuation as a military necessity and construct its policies accordingly, but, as a part of a governmental system, there was also the practical necessity of conforming to regulations applying to government agencies.

If the relocation centers had been natural communities that developed out of the actions of free citizens, their structure would have been drastically different from that which resulted under the government's supervision. For one thing, the financial outlay for the communities was not determined by free interplay within a competitive economy, but it was strictly limited by budgetary appropriations determined by the Government. Considering the tremendous financial needs that were being felt by the Government to meet its military demands as well as the fact that the War Relocation Authority was accepted by Congress as a further financial burden only because there was no alternative, it seems evident that the W.R.A. was pledged to keep its expenditures at a reasonable minimum. There is in the tentative policy statement, repeated mention of the need for strict economy in the administration of W.R.A. One of the clauses states:

"Strict economy in the expenditure of funds and maximum effort

to place relocation areas on a self-supporting basis at the earliest possible date are imperative."¹

It is further suggested that relocation center staffs of government employees be kept small, and that wherever possible qualified evacuees should be used to fill positions, even in the administrative and executive branches. The statement discourages waste of food, water, electricity, gasoline, and further adds, "Materials with war priority must be conserved and substitutes utilized whenever practicable." The primary means of economy at the centers, however, was to be through the productive use of evacuee labor in agriculture, public works, and manufacturing projects which would not only make the centers self-supporting but also produce for the war effort and national wealth.

If evacuee labor were to be efficiently used for the ends outlined and the Government were to act as an employer, the only means of accomplishing this was by mobilizing all the evacuee workers into work corps as in the Civilian Conservation Corps or the Works Project Administration. With this in mind, the War Relocation Work Corps was established and any evacuee desiring employment at the centers was required to enlist in the Work Corps. The terms of the enlistment agreement were that the enlistee would serve the Corps for the duration of the war, remain loyal to the United States, perform all tasks assigned him by the Authority, accept in full payment for his services whatever cash and allowances the Authority may provide, and accept responsibilities for loss, destruction, sale or disposal of any property issued to him by the Authority. In return for the voluntary acceptance of these obligations, the W.R.A. agreed to provide both the enlistees and their dependents with adequate shelter, food, education, and health services. Furloughs were also to be granted for limited periods permitting evacuees to work outside the center under private employment or attend to other personal business. It should be added that despite the emphasis given to

¹Ibid, p. 2.

the Work Corps idea in the early formation of W.R.A. policy, it was never put into effect at any of the centers because of the refusal of evacuees to bind themselves by the agreement.

The point of this discussion is not to elaborate the employment program of the W.R.A., but to indicate the way in which W.R.A. policy was inevitably influenced by practical considerations arising out of its position as a government agency administering over a community of evacuees. Very frequently, the policies which were formulated in terms of the function of the W.R.A. were in direct contradiction to the ideal aims stated in its policy. If, in one sentence, the W.R.A. proposed "to provide in each project a setting in which normal activities of life can go on as nearly as possible like those of an ordinary American community," in the next sentence it was necessary to set severe limitations upon the realization of such an aim, as, for example, by proposing a labor regimentation system of a kind that no workers would normally accept. Or, if it was stated that "the WRA offers cooperation, not paternalism, to evacuees," it was difficult to effectuate this desired relationship in a situation where the evacuees were wholly dependent upon the W.R.A. for food, shelter, and employment and had little recourse but to accept what was offered them. It is certain that the directors of the W.R.A. sincerely sought to make life in the relocation centers as normal as possible for the evacuees, but it is equally certain that the circumstances of the W.R.A. set impossible handicaps to the realization of their hopes.

A third major consideration that influenced the policy of the W.R.A. was the public hostility to the evacuees and to their treatment under any other conception than as suspected internees. One important consequence of this influence on W.R.A. policy was to force the wage payments to evacuee employees to a minimum.

"In addition to the shelter, food, medical and hospital care, and education, provided to all center residents, enlistees in the Work Corps will receive work clothing as previously indicated and cash advances at the rates of \$12, \$16, and \$19 per month. The \$12 category will include unskilled and semi-skilled labor and persons undergoing vocational re-training; the \$16 category will be for skilled labor, some technicians, responsible clerical employees, and some administrative and supervisory and service employees; the \$19 category will include the professional and highly skilled technician occupations and the most responsible supervisory and administrative positions occupied by enlistees."¹

When some Pacific Coast newspapers publicized the rumor that evacuees would receive more wages than American privates (privates were then receiving \$21 per month), there was widespread criticism directed at Director Eisenhower for permitting such an un-American discrepancy. Senators and congressmen sent numerous letters to Eisenhower inquiring into the truth of the rumor and criticizing such an ill-advised use of public funds. The W.R.A. wage scale had not yet been determined at the time of this publicity, altho some W.R.A. administrators had already submitted recommendations for wage rates higher than those that were finally determined, but if higher wages were contemplated, it is certain that the public sentiment aroused over the rumor forestalled further consideration of any wage rates higher than that of privates.

The extent to which considerations of public opinion influenced the W.R.A. in the formation of policy and program, of course, went far beyond the determination of wage rates. This was especially true after the centers were under actual operation and cranks, race agitators, uninformed citizens and reactionary newspapers began to accuse the W.R.A. of "coddling" the evacuees. Incidents in the centers were made the basis of various national and state investigations of the W.R.A. centers; the biased reports of most of these investigating committees were frequently given prominent notice in the newspapers, and the W.R.A. was often called upon to defend its administration against these criticisms. But

¹Ibid, p. 9

even before the W.R.A. was established, the evacuation of the Japanese was an important public issue, and it was scarcely possible for the agency to avoid inheriting the public attention that was directed to the whole evacuation program. There is evidence that Eisenhower was keenly sensitive to the trend of public sentiment toward the evacuees, and there is every reason to believe that his tentative policy statement was formed with scrupulous attention to the possibility of public criticism.

The W.R.A. policy that has been outlined was applied with very few alterations to each of the projects as they were opened, and in their application the policies began to show more clearly the inconsistencies inherent in them. On the whole, the W.R.A. never deviated from its fundamental aim of trying to treat the evacuees with fairness and understanding, but this is not to say that the method of achieving the aim was not frequently reinterpreted, for the actual administration of the projects quickly brought to light the virtual impossibility of creating anything like a normal American community life within the relocation centers. Both the idea of the War Relocation Work Corps as a means of mobilizing evacuee workers for the duration of the war, and the assumption that the evacuees would remain in the centers for the duration of the war, had to be discarded when it became evident that the relocation centers would never be anything but abnormal communities. By the end of the year, the basic thesis of W.R.A. policy was no longer the idea of creating a well-rounded community life within the centers, but rather of resettling evacuees as rapidly as possible in the normal stream of American life outside the centers.

Looking at the tentative policy statement in retrospect, it may now be readily seen wherein the chief weaknesses of the statement lay. Most of the features of the policy were successfully carried out almost literally as it was originally suggested, but it was in the fundamental purpose of attempting to build a self-supporting community that the greatest difficulties and failures

were encountered. It was precisely in those features of the policy and program where the W.R.A. policy had to pay special attention to possible public reaction, or where it was limited in its scope of action by regulations applying to government agencies, that W.R.A. policy proved least effective within the relocation centers. In such matters as of providing the evacuee with the strict essentials of living, with some form of self-government, with some kind of employment in the centers and furloughs for temporary employment on the outside, there were technical problems of administration but no problems requiring fundamental changes of policy. But when the public criticism was aroused because the W.R.A. was "coddling" the evacuees, permitting the evacuees "to run" the administration, paying "exorbitant" wages to evacuee workers and organizing productive enterprises that were in competition with American business, W.R.A. policy was under attack and it was necessary to alter or defend it. Correspondingly, the evacuees, in their effort to create a normal community life in the centers, demanded more than the bare essentials of living, a voice in the government of the community, increase of wages, and the right to produce for the open market, and the W.R.A. had to meet these demands in one way or another. As an added limitation upon its policy formation, the W.R.A. was required to conform to customary government practices and accept the conditions of the evacuation and the relocation center as they were turned over to the agency.

Any government office that deals with matters of public concern is subject to the types of difficulties that have been discussed in connection with the W.R.A. policy, but the W.R.A., administering over the most vulnerable group of people in America during the war, was itself the most vulnerable government agency of all. In the last analysis, there was no way for the W.R.A. to avoid the inconsistencies of its policy, unless the Authority had chosen rather to destroy the evacuees. The dilemma of the W.R.A. was the dilemma of the evacuees, both of which were the products of the dilemma of the evacuation. And if the problem of resolving the inconsistencies was acute in the central administrative office of

the W.R.A., the problem was doubly acute at the project level where the inconsistencies were daily encountered in the everyday relationship of the administrators and the evacuees.

The history of the Tule Lake Project is an account of the elaboration of these inconsistencies.

W.R.A. Policy at the Tule Lake Project

In making up the administrative personnel for the projects, the W.R.A. selected and trained its personnel with the intent of constituting a body that would most effectively carry out W.R.A. policies. One of the important qualifications for acceptance was that the applicant have no strong racial prejudices, and, in general, it seems that persons of a liberal outlook were preferred. In some positions, such as in the public works or the agriculture and industry divisions, technical training and experience were the important criteria of selection, but in other positions where frequent contact with evacuees was a significant part of the job, as in the community services division, it seems that greater emphasis was placed on the applicant's attitudes. Despite the selection of personnel, however, it was inevitable that there should be on each project administrative staff all kinds of personalities each possessing different attitudes toward the question of evacuation and toward the evacuees. It is worth noting that on most of the projects there tended to develop a cleavage of the administrative personnel into two groups: one group popularly known as the "sociologists" who were distinguished by their desire to administer by understanding the culture and psychology of the evacuees, and a second group that might be labelled the practical administrators, or "economists" as one project director liked to speak of them, whose main interest was to put into effect tested, sound administrative practices. To be sure, most of the administrative

personnel failed to fit neatly into either category, and there were, furthermore, sub-groups within the main divisions, such as the so-called "reactionaries" who were declared to be prejudiced against the evacuees. In the application of W.R.A. policy to the centers, it made a difference as to which group held the strongest voice in the administration, for, as has been pointed out, WRA policy possessed varying facets that could easily be emphasized in different degrees, and the project government could be liberal, strictly practical or even reactionary depending on the relative strength of the groups. The project director, as the person chiefly responsible for the interpretation of W.R.A. policy at the center, was a significant influence in determining what point of view should dominate project policy.

It was not until about a month after the opening of the Tule Lake project that the appointment of Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell as project director was confirmed, but in the meantime he served as acting project director with full responsibility for supervising the project. A native of Santa Barbara, California, and a graduate of the University of California in 1914, Mr. Shirrell had been employed in various capacities. After the World War, in which he served as a Sergeant in the U.S. Army, he worked in a rehabilitation program for veterans of the war, instructed in political science, which was his major field of study, at the University of Oregon, and was an agent for the publishing house of Doubleday Doran and Company prior to his appointment with the W.R.A. He had visited the Poston center for field training in relocation work, and had been at the Tule Lake Project since April 23, 1942, the day on which construction of that camp had begun. He had had some contact with the Japanese in America through his experiences on the Pacific Coast -- in fact, one of the men serving under him in the First World War had been a Japanese -- and he was known to be sympathetic to the problems of the evacuees.

A man of rather definite character, Mr. Shirrell was a type whose main features of personality were at once an asset as well as a deficit to his work as project director. An outstanding trait was his abundant energy and a great enthusiasm in the pursuit of his function, a trait that displayed itself in his drive to "get things rolling" and a tendency to promote several lines of activity all at once. He had a keen personal interest in the human problems of the evacuees, an interest that almost verged on paternalism, and he liked to make himself accessible to evacuees so that he might gain a personal understanding of their problems as well as their confidence in him. He was an idealist who apparently held a firm and sincere belief in the democratic rights of man, but he was also a pragmatist prepared to consider a variety of means to gain his ends. Underlying his whole approach to his administrative duties, there seemed to be something of the pragmatic educator's interest in making out of the relocation center a training ground for the successful post-war rehabilitation of the evacuees. From the standpoint of his outlook on life, Shirrell was well suited to carry out the policies of the W.R.A. His main shortcoming as administrator was his impatience with bureaucratic procedure and his inability to hold others strictly responsible for duties delegated to them.

By the week before the opening of the Tule Lake Project, a majority of the Caucasian personnel who were to make up the administrative staff at Tule Lake were already assembled at the project. At that early date there was no conflict of opinion among the personnel regarding policy; in fact, it was generally felt that the W.R.A. policy of giving the evacuees as much responsibility and freedom as possible within the center was sound. Some concern was shown over the fact that they would be administering over a group of people whose habits and customs were somewhat strange to them, but there was faith in the belief that fair treatment would call out a cooperative response from the evacuees.

Because of the nature of the thinking that prevailed among the staff, it was the group who felt most at home in this mode of thought, the so-called "sociologists" or liberals, who gained leadership in determining policy on those matters directly bearing on the relations between the administration and the evacuees. Among the staff there was a group who, by training and experience, were most inclined to champion this point of view, and during the early stages of the project, they met little opposition in promoting their philosophy of center administration. Perhaps the most influential of this group was Dr. Harold L. Jacoby, Chief of the Internal Security Division, who had been professor of sociology at Pacific College before he took the position with the W.R.A. At Pacific College, both his wife, who was an active Y.W.C.A. worker, and he had known a large number of Nisei students and they closely followed the political trends in California leading up to the evacuation of the Japanese. At college, his courses were popular among the students. His political outlook was typically that of a progressive who is interested in labor movements, cooperative movements, and social reforms. He, more than anyone else on the staff, could appropriately be called a "sociologist" for that was his field of training, and it was a natural impulse with him to consider the social circumstances of the evacuees in understanding their behavior.

Closely associated with Jacoby in these views was Don Elberson, who at the time held no specific position in the administration but was later appointed supervisor of community enterprises. After doing graduate work in economics at Stanford University, Elberson had more recently been very active in the cooperative movement, and one of his purposes in joining the Tule Lake staff was to establish a consumer's cooperative at the project. Unceremonious and blunt as he was in his mannerisms, he yet had a knack for gaining the confidence of the evacuees and proved to be one of the best liked of the Caucasian personnel.

Ted Wallter, supervisor of community activities (recreation), was another of this group although his erratic habits prevented his gaining the respect of the evacuees in the degree that the other two men did. He had taken public administration studies at the Universities of Chicago and California and possessed the liberalism characteristic of students of these universities. Morton Gaba and Robert Yeaton were two others fired by the same spirit of trying to understand the position of the evacuees, but they played relatively unimportant roles in the development of the Tule Lake Project since they were transferred to other centers very soon after the opening of the project. All of those mentioned were young men not long out of college. The one older man belonging to this group was Paul Fleming, head of the community services division, who was a close adviser to Shirrell. Fleming had long been in the educational field having taught in the Education Department at the University of California, and served as vice-principal at the progressive Oakland Polytechnic High School. He was a quiet but a very well poised person, not easily flustered by any situation, and it was characteristic of him to be inconspicuously present in various meetings, either of administrators or evacuees, making brief comments or suggestions on the subject of discussion.

The basic attitude of this group was that prejudices against the evacuees should be fought, that insofar as possible the latter should be treated as equals, that their community should be allowed to develop through direction of the natural impulses within the group, and that the administration should assist as far as possible in meeting the needs of the people. Their view might be compared to that of the colonial administrators who seek a deep understanding of the people over whom they administer, and abhor the methods of either the bigoted "missionaries" or the colonial administrators who spearhead imperialism. This view was unchallenged in the early history of the project and other members of the administrative staff were equally interested in understanding the evacuees

and treating them fairly, but with the latter group it was not as natural a part of their thinking as it was with the former.

During the week prior to the opening of the project, a three day conference was held among the staff members to discuss the procedure for receiving and settling the first evacuee arrivals, and also some of the basic policies to be followed at the project. Most of the discussions were concerning procedure and the minutes of the committee meetings do not reveal many references to policy. On the whole, the project administrators were attempting to carry out W.R.A. policies as they were already stated. The statement of one committee, "The Committee on Promotional Training of Colonists," however, was a specific effort of Tule Lake administrators to interpret W.R.A. policy and elaborate along the line of their own thinking. Members of this committee included three men who have already been mentioned, Theodore Waller, who was chairman of the committee, Don Elberson and Paul Fleming. Also included were Dr. A.B. Carson, chief of medical service, Gilbert L. Niesse, head of the administrative division, and Joe O. Hayes, who was subsequently chosen assistant project director. It is evident that an effort was made to get representatives from various departments on the committee.

The problem with which the committee was concerned was that of making the relocation center experience of the evacuees as profitable as possible to them. The solution to the problem is stated in the following manner:

"We feel that everyone concerned with the operation of the Project should come to regard Relocation in a large measure a training program. Since the most effective training is usually to be found in a real work situation, there can be no conflict between the training and the production functions of the Project."¹

The Committee made certain recommendations as the means of achieving the end stated. All work activities were to be conducted "in such a manner that a maximum amount of specialized training will result from every work assignment."

¹"Committee on Promotional Training of Colonists Throughout the Project," Tule Lake Relocation Project, June 9, 1942, p. 1.

To realize this objective, it was held imperative that all supervisors from division chiefs to foremen think of the project as a vast training program in which "individual colonist's interests, capacities and vocational objectives must be motivating factors in assignment, transfer, rotation and general supervision." To implement these purposes, it was recommended that division chiefs institute a series of brief staff meetings covering the policies and procedures of the project and division, that related training courses be developed, that a system of well-planned job rotation be organized, and that some single staff member serve as coordinator to supervise promotional training in all the sections and divisions. The closing paragraph of the recommendations brings out explicitly the nature of the problem that was being treated:

"We feel that this program should not be presented as a phase of formal education and that the coordinator should not be a person whose present primary concern is education. It is our recommendation that promotional training be presented as an integral part of basic Project operation. It is the opinion of the Committee that in the long run the possibility of the Project becoming either self-sustaining or capable of war production will depend upon the effectiveness of the training program."¹

The recommendations of this policy is a confession of the difficulties felt by the Tule Lake administrators concerning the basic inconsistency of the general W.R.A. policy. The W.R.A., as we have pointed out, was eager to see that the evacuees received just treatment at the hands of the agency, but it was also constrained to urge that, for the sake of economy, every project develop productive enterprises that would make each project as self-supporting as possible. But these enterprises were to be accomplished through employees hired at the rates of \$12, \$16, or \$19 per month. Whether the members of the committee were explicitly or only implicitly aware of the lack of incentive for productive work in the wages offered by the W.R.A., the function of the promotional training policy was to offer a substitute for monetary incentives because higher wages

¹Ibid, p. 3.

could not be paid. If the evacuees could be made to feel that they were profiting by their experiences at the center, if not financially, at least in the training received and the new skills developed, then the W.R.A. program could succeed despite the difficulties inherent in its policies -- such, evidently, was the underlying thought of the Committee on Promotional Training. Given the conditions of employment stipulated in the tentative statement of W.R.A. policy, no more prophetic statement could have been made than the concluding declaration that, "It is the opinion of the Committee that in the long run the possibility of the Project becoming either self-sustaining or capable of war production will depend upon the effectiveness of the training program."

The ideal of the Promotional Training policy was a part of the atmosphere of the project during the summer of 1942 when newly arrived evacuees were seeking employment, and some efforts were made to see that "individual colonist's interests, capacities and vocational objectives be motivating factors in assignment, transfer, rotation and general supervision." On a small scale, some of these objectives were realized. But, on the whole, supervisors sought workers for their division who had training and experience, rather than those seeking training and experience. Moreover, a bulk of the work at the project was only of unskilled or semi-skilled nature where little worth-while training or experience could be received. Most important of all, in a community suffering from shortages of facilities and material and operating under the restricted economy peculiar to relocation centers, the level of training that could be offered was generally very low. Project Director Shirrell, who was seriously interested in the policy and felt its need as an incentive and a morale builder to the community, occasionally attempted to revive the idea, but never succeeded in doing so in the face of difficulties.

The promotional training idea, as such, must be regarded as only a minor current in the thinking of the Tule Lake administrators for the policy was never

fully put into effect, but the fact that it was considered of significance at the time it was formulated is of interest in attempting to understand the views of the administration when the project was first opened. In the first place, there is explicit recognition in the statement of the committee of the difficulties that might be encountered in attempting to make the Tule Lake Project a productive community unless some incentives toward productive employment could be offered the evacuees. It seems that the administration was not entirely unaware of the problems that might arise in the peculiar circumstances of the relocation center. Of further interest is the type of planning that was being done to circumvent the anticipated difficulties. In retrospect, it is evident that the plan was unrealistic and too hopeful, for its realization required a type of situation that was not offered in the relocation center and also assumed a reformation of the habits of both supervisors and workers. But faced with such a dilemma as the problem of administering a relocation center offered, it was perhaps to be expected that much planning would be done and that large errors of probability would appear in the plans.

Finally, there is implied in the promotional training policy an attitude of enthusiasm and faith in the future of the project that was definitely a part of the current mood of the administrators. It was the general understanding of the W.R.A., at the time, that the evacuees would remain in the relocation centers for the duration of the war, and most of the plans were laid with that understanding in mind. While it may not have been generally true of the administrative staff, there were some among them who held visions of establishing at Tule Lake a "utopian" community; the tragedy of the evacuation was to be used as a ladder to a new and better life for the evacuees. It may be added that these hopes were not limited to the Caucasian personnel; a great many evacuees held similar hopes for the relocation center. Whether the hope was of establishing a utopia, or of merely a smoothly functioning community, there was high enthusiasm among the

personnel in the activities they were undertaking, and anticipation of successes in the future. There is no doubt that the relocation center offered a challenge to pioneering ingenuity. What is striking is that there was a relative absence of doubts and pessimism regarding the future of the project in view of the administrator's partial recognition of the fundamental inconsistencies of the W.R.A. program; difficulties which were native to the evacuation situation, which the W.R.A. had inherited, and which the agency would hardly avoid.

If there was this blindness to the unsavory prospects of administering the Tule Lake Project, it was probably a result of the fact that W.R.A. administrators were not in a position to question the conditions that were the reason for the W.R.A.'s existence. There was no means of remedying to the evacuees the losses which they suffered in the course of evacuation; that was a part of the condition of evacuation which the evacuees had to accept as their fate. Nor was it permitted for the W.R.A. to pay wages for employment at the center that was greater than twenty-one dollars a month (the rate for the lowest-paid private), for public sentiment was opposed to such action. As for starting productive enterprises under government sanction and control that would be in competition with individual producers on the outside, this again was likely to bring loud public criticism even if it would give the evacuees the incentive for production that was so badly needed. But as it has been pointed out, these were doubts about their situation which W.R.A. administrators could not raise even to themselves, for it was this very attitude in the public of unwillingness to treat the Japanese in the same manner as the rest of the people that had been the basis of evacuation, and the evacuation was the raison d'etre of the W.R.A. If the W.R.A. administrators were in a position to choose for themselves the conditions under which an efficient, productive, harmonious community of evacuees was to be created, they undoubtedly could have been much more realistic about the means of accomplishing such an end. Actually, the reality was that they could not choose their own conditions; they

could only accept the conditions and hope that it would likewise be understood by the evacuees as the unalterable condition of their life at the center.

As the day for the opening of the project approached, the administrative staff worked energetically preparing for the successful initiation of the first evacuee arrivals. The task was to settle the evacuees as comfortably as possible in their new homes, provide them with their basic needs, get the basis of community organization under way, and, most necessary of all, create friendly understanding between the evacuees and the administration. If the road to success in the management of the project was not clear at the moment, it would be found, it was hoped, in the course of the actual work of the administration.

CHAPTER III. EVACUEE MIGRATION TO THE TULE LAKE PROJECT

The history of the Tule Lake community begins with an enforced mass migration of evacuees. To be sure, the history of every community begins with a migration of a group of settlers, but migration as an initial phase of community evolution requires emphasis in the present instance because the evacuation, as a special form of migration, resulted in unique problems of post-migration adjustment.

As in the case of any migration, the uprooting of evacuees from the local culture of their old communities disrupted their customary relationships and modes of behavior. The fundamental problem of evacuee adjustment was that of establishing a new social order adapted to the conditions of a relocation center. However, unlike migrants who move to pre-established communities, the evacuees found no pre-existing community in the relocation center; the community, in fact, came into existence only with the arrival of the evacuees. In a sense, the evacuees entered upon an amorphous frontier within which it was necessary that they create some kind of order. On the other hand, there was the ambiguity that they lacked freedom in creating the kind of society that they desired. Numerous limitations and restrictions--of resources, of opportunity, of movement--were imposed, so to speak, by external authority to considerably restrict their initiative. The initial problem of the evacuees was to clarify their conception of the unprecedented relocation program,

to learn the limits of their freedom through trial and error experience, and to reorganize their relationships on the basis of these understandings.

But the problem of evacuee adjustments was not merely one of adapting to a new community; there was also the problem of re-interpreting the relationship of the evacuees to the majority group. Prior to the evacuation, the people of Japanese ancestry looked upon themselves as accepted members of American society, at least symbiotically if not socially. However, the evacuation as a mass ejection of this single class of the civilian population effected by the majority group necessarily disturbed the evacuees's conception of their status in American society, and there was the consequent problem of defining the meaning of evacuation. Some represented the evacuation as strictly an expression of the Caucasian people's hostility towards other racial groups, and concluded that the desired status of the Japanese could be regained only through violent subordination of the Caucasians. Others represented the evacuation as the work of an agitating minority within the majority population, and concluded that a vigorous protest should be launched against them and the ideas which they fostered. Still others represented the evacuation as an inevitable military necessity, and concluded that it should be accepted as a historical fact and attention be turned to the more immediate question of rehabilitation. In general, there was very little certainty, even within the individual evacuee, as to the proper interpretation of the evacuation as a gesture of the majority group, and while the question was a fundamental

evacuee pre-occupation, the bulk of evacuees evidenced no real conviction on the issue.

However, some interpretation of the character of the majority group was necessary to the evacuees in directing their behavior at the relocation center, for center life constituted a continuing, though strained, relationship between the evacuees and the majority group. The impulse was consequently strong to unify evacuee opinion on this issue, and thereby permit an efficient, "correct," collective reaction to the majority group. At the time of the evacuee transfer movements to Tule Lake, the shock of evacuation was still fresh, and there had not been time enough to achieve any degree of agreement on the proper line of collective action. During the initial phase of the community's history, there were notable and wide differences of attitude toward the majority group, and interesting vacillations from one view to another. The problem of evacuee adjustments was not only to organize relationships within the community, but also to clarify vague attitudes toward the majority group and organize them so as to enable collective action.

To some extent the process of organizing attitudes was started at the assembly centers where most of the evacuees entering Tule Lake spent one or more months. The background of assembly center experience therefore had a direct bearing upon the initial adjustments of evacuees to the relocation center.

One of the big issues that appeared following the transfer movements was the inequality of opportunities resulting from the differences in the time of arrival of evacuee groups. Since it

was impossible to transfer all of the 15,000 evacuees scheduled to go to Tule Lake at one time, it was necessary to stagger the movements over a period of about two months. The first arrivals enjoyed the advantage of easy access to preferred jobs and of an abundance of such resources for home-making as scrap lumber; but the latest arrivals, while not completely shut out from jobs and other opportunities, encountered a poverty of opportunities. If the transfer movements had been voluntary, no issue could have been made about this inequality, but since the evacuees could not choose either the time of movement or whether they should move at all, resentment was aroused over the fact that certain groups were arbitrarily chosen to be moved last and thus to suffer the disadvantages of their late arrival at Tule Lake.

The period from May 27 to July 24, 1942 when the transfer movements to Tule Lake were occurring was one of rapid change in the character of the project. It was a period during which the community was confronted with the problems indicated above, and some of the initial attempts to adjust to them appeared.

A. The Opening of the Tule Lake Project

Early Transfer Movements

On the morning of May 27, 1942, an advance detachment of 447 evacuees from the Puyallup (Washington) and Portland (Oregon) Assembly Centers arrived at the Tule Lake Project. These evacuees were a group of volunteers who had been recruited at the assembly centers for the following purpose:

"If the transfer was to a Relocation Center which had not yet received any evacuees, a small advance detachment of about 200 persons was sent at least six days in advance of the main movement. This advance detachment consisted of the key evacuee personnel necessary to receive, feed, house and provide medical service for the evacuees of the main body as they arrived."^{1/}

Selection to the group was based on the ability of the individuals to serve in certain capacities, but since the group was recruited from volunteers, another form of selection resulted from the type of individuals interested in leaving with the earliest detachment. Those in responsible positions at the assembly center, those satisfied to remain with the main body and those who feared to separate from their friends, were least inclined to volunteer. The participants in the advance group were the evacuees who were most dissatisfied with the conditions of the assembly center, felt themselves squeezed out of desirable positions in the early political maneuverings, and anticipated special advantages in arriving early at the relocation center.

From the outset at the Puyallup Assembly Center, there existed a general resentment of the control over the center exercised by the leaders of the Japanese American Citizens Leagues (J.A.C.L.), particularly as it was thought that this group had "sold out" to the Caucasian authorities in order to gain personal favors. Before the evacuation of the Seattle Japanese

^{1/} Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. p. 287.

to Puyallup, the local Army authorities chose the Seattle chapter of the J.A.C.L. to act as the liaison agency in carrying out the evacuation, and by virtue of their favorable position, the J.A.C.L. was also able to gain supervisory control at the assembly center. A Japanese headquarters staff was established whose personnel was selected by the J.A.C.L. leaders. All directives to the evacuees in the center were processed through the Japanese headquarters, and most of the business of the evacuees with the Caucasian authorities (of the Wartime Civil Control Administration) had to be referred first to the Japanese authorities. No election was held to determine the people's choice of leaders, no Issei were represented on the headquarters staff, and no representative body existed that would permit the airing of popular views. The organization was patterned after a military form of government, and to the extent that the leaders abided by the system, it was dictatorial. A widespread discontent developed against the "self-assumed and arbitrary" leadership of the J.A.C.L. as well as against the policy of cooperation with the evacuation announced by the National J.A.C.L.^{1/}

"Hell, the J.A.C.L. gang are nothing but puppets of the Army and the W.C.C.A. They ought to do something about the conditions in this center, but they're too damned scared to protest to the authorities. All they know is how to bootlick the Army guys. It gripes me like anything to have them order me around; one of these days I'm going to tell them off some of those boys."^{2/}

"It makes me sick to see those J.A.C.L. people strutting around and looking so important. Back in Seattle not a one of them was anything, but now that they've been given a little power, it's gone completely to their head. If they really have authority, why don't they do something about the conditions here. Why, this place isn't fit for animals to live in."^{3/}

Conditions at the Puyallup center were poor, especially in Area D, the largest of the four sections composing the center. There were no

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, May 15, 1942 to June 15, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, June 4, 1942.

^{3/} Miyamoto Notes, May 19, 1942.

bathing facilities during the first weeks, mess accommodations were so limited that the evacuees sometimes stood in line from one to two hours before they were fed, and the quality of the food was a source of constant complaint. A Nisei who joined the volunteer advance group, later remarked:

"It really made me mad when I saw old Issei having to stand in long mess lines at Puyallup as if they were so many beggars. I knew those Issei never stood in a bread line before in their lives. It burned me up to see the way they had to take it when they got pushed around that way."^{1/}

One of the worst conditions of the center existed in the bachelor's quarters, a couple of large, barn-like buildings without sunlight or proper ventilation where two hundred men were quartered. Takatsui, a Kibei, organized a protest against these conditions among the bachelors, and though he was unsuccessful in gaining any improvements he was blacklisted by the W.C.C.A. with the approval of the J.A.C.L. leaders. Takatsui joined the advance group to Tule Lake.

The conditions described were, perhaps, the most unseemly aspects of the Puyallup Assembly Center, and not everyone shared the views recorded above. The conditions at the Portland center were superior to those at Puyallup, and there was apparently a less acute consciousness of the unsavory aspects of the former center. But in both centers, if concerted protests against the conditions did not become more prominent, it was because the evacuees looked upon the situation as a temporary one and assumed that the real struggle for advantages would take place at the more permanent relocation centers. One lesson learned from the experience was that the first ones to arrive at a center and establish contact with the authorities had advantages both in acquiring needed facilities and in the struggle for power. It is not surprising then that widespread interest developed when

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, July 15, 1942.

the request for volunteers for an advance group to the Tule Lake Project was announced.

The advance group was far from being composed entirely of dissident element. For one thing, if a single family member volunteered, it was necessary that all the remaining family members join the advance group in order to prevent the split of families, or even despite disagreement. Moreover, friends who feared separation often decided as a group whether to volunteer or not. However, the chief motives to volunteer were those arising out of discontent with the conditions and the achievable status at the assembly center, and the hope of gaining advantages by transferring early to the relocation center.

The first impressions of the Tule Lake Project experienced by the advance group were in general outline the same as those experienced by the later arrivals. After the much rumored beauty of the Northern California countryside, some of which the evacuees had seen from the train, the treeless, grassless, dry lake bed on which the center was located was quite a disappointment. The dull barrenness of the countryside and the non-existence of the much talked of lake were the first disappointments to the new arrivals. The size of the project was unexpected, and it required of the evacuees that they revise their conception of a relocation center. The barbed-wire fence and the armed guards, the two bitterest symbols of the relocation center, were the most obvious features of the center to the trainloads of evacuees arriving at the railhead.

Once the evacuees were transported to the processing point within the center, they passed into an isolated, distinct world of their own. Disappointments and resentments generally gave way to curiosity and even some enthusiasm about the new homes. Processing included the task of registering each new arrival, giving brief preliminary instructions and informa-

tion about the center, giving a cursory medical examination, and assigning apartments to family groups. As families found their assigned apartments, they generally expressed satisfaction about their new homes. Viewed under different circumstances, the small unfurnished rooms offered little to elicit pleasure from home makers, but these apartments were superior to the flimsy structures that had constituted their living quarters at the assembly centers. Moreover, each block had a mess hall, a laundry room, an ironing room, a recreation hall, and shower rooms and toilets, which, in contrast to the limitations suffered at the assembly centers, seemed a definite improvement.

There were also conditions that drew forth irritation and dissatisfaction. The evacuees were herded into lines and required to wait at the processing center. Baggage was not systematically sorted out, and there was some trouble in bringing together each family's belongings. Some families found themselves crowded into too small apartments for the size of their group; others desired reassignment for other reasons. Stoves were not installed at the time of arrival of the first group, and the rooms which were also then without ceilings were extremely cold. These complications were the invariable accompaniments to the initial adjustments of newly arrived groups.

A letter from the Acting Project Director, Elmer L. Shirrell, to the Regional Office of the W.R.A. reporting the activity on the project during the first day offers an excellent account of the manner in which Tule Lake received its first evacuees. While the letter is written from the administrative point of view, the estimate of the evacuees offered in the letter is fairly accurate.

"Yesterday Tule Lake Project received its first skeleton crew of 447 people. I was more than delighted with the way the staff functioned. There were but a few minor instances and these did not

impede the program materially. Fortunately for us the storm subsided during the time of the arrival so that we could work without discomfort to the staff and colonists.

"We had previously lined up all the personnel's cars, the one sedan belonging to the War Relocation Authority and the rented cars. We also had two CCC trucks with benches in them. Even the wives of staff members drove cars. These cars shuffled back and forth from the train to the processing center which was an empty mess hall. Our plan, agreed upon with Lieutenant Christianson of the Quartermaster Corps and the Southern Pacific Company officials, was to unload at our own railhead, making the presence of the Military Police unnecessary as this railhead is inside our own grounds. Five minutes before the train arrived Southern Pacific announced a change in plan and decided to unload at the railroad in front of our main gate. This necessitated a hurry-up call to Capt. Patterson for help in blocking the highway. His men functioned perfectly and I saw nothing but kindness on their part as they assisted elderly people off the train. Two of them even carried small children. We unloaded in forty minutes which military officials in charge of the train tell us was a record. Before the next arrivals Capt. Wilkes assures me that he will fill in the land and build a landing platform next to the railroad track.

"The processing at the empty mess hall proceeded smoothly with excellent cooperation from the Japanese. I knew that our own staff would be amazed at the competence and good spirit of the colonists and today I notice that they are all smiles because of the very able group who will now help us plan for the next group and who are already taking over numerous jobs in the camp. The only break in the processing was in the medical examination room as Dr. Carson was all alone. We finally discovered one Japanese nurse and from that time on things went a little faster. There were thirty-nine infants amongst them and with the assistance of Mrs. Hall, Assistant Community Worker, plans were quickly made for getting formulas. The doctor handled this from the base hospital and with the help of Japanese messengers correct formulas were sent to the various apartments of mothers during the day and night.

"The Placement Bureau began functioning early in the afternoon, enlisting colonists and, as I told you in a wire just now the only difficulty was in Paragraph 3, sentence 2, "I may be transferred from one relocation center to another as determined by the Authority from time to time." The objection to this was that they were fearful of being separated from their families. This fear is a logical one based upon the disturbed conditions which have existed since Pearl Harbor and their fear of losing track of members of their family. It was almost pitiful the way they clung together. We shall have to have some advice and interpretation immediately or our entire War Relocation Work Corps program will be endangered.

"At the end of the day we found that instead of averaging 250 people to a block as we had planned, we had spread out over three and one-half blocks. A check up last night showed us that we had

but one large family and that was nine. The families average seem to be about three and one-half persons which I presume will be typical. We discovered also that we had no call for the use of the single women's dormitories. The single women had grouped themselves in parties of five or six and had been assigned the family apartments. In the three and one-half blocks we had only about thirty single men. This means that throughout our entire cantonnement we will have the single men's and single women's dormitories practically vacant. Even the single men quartered in the dormitory would have preferred going in groups of six. The dormitories are 20 x 100 and without partitions of any sort. I am asking Capt. Wilkes advice on this subject and will probably ask you for authority to have either the Army Engineers or the War Relocation Authority to negotiate with the contractor to make these dormitories into apartments. Because of the need for smaller apartments we are planning to cut these buildings into six apartments approximately 15 x 20 rather than four-family apartments. Families consisting of man, wife, and one child would then have plenty of space. Such alterations should not be difficult and would involve breaking one window down into a door and putting in five dividing partitions. I will get the result of this conference to you at the earliest possible moment because I feel these partitions should be made before we take our next group.

"The mess hall functioned perfectly with the Chief Steward, Mr. Stults, and the trainee, Mr. Hawes. They were well organized and the contractor, Ford J. Twaits Company and Morrison Knudsen Company, Inc., very kindly offered the services of their cooks and waitresses so that by one-thirty all the colonists had had an excellent dinner. I am sending a note to the contractor expressing our gratitude. By the evening meal the Japanese cooks took over and I watched both supper and breakfast this morning being served and they functioned like a well oiled machine.

"Block managers were selected yesterday afternoon on a temporary assignment and Mr. Jacoby and Mr. Fleming were giving their instructions today. The plan for block managers is proving to be very sound. Mr. Jacoby organized his wardens and they started walking their beats last night. They took over from the Military Police the night watch for everything except the warehouse, base hospital and administration area. As soon as we get our next group the Military Police will be relieved of all internal work and will handle only the external and main entrance gate.

"Mr. Bauman, the Safety Engineer, moved in very quickly on the fire situation, establishing himself in the fire house which houses the temporary equipment which we have. He has picked some likely looking men to form the nucleus of the Fire Department and when our two engines promised by Captain Wilkes arrive on June 1st, we ought to be in good shape.

"Mr. Smith's and Mr. Friedman's plans for assignment to quarters and keeping the records functioned very smoothly. We know where every colonist is settled and this morning will work out the locator and cross index files. In this connection, I hope Regional Office is planning a visible index system so that we can quickly locate any family or individual.

"I was fearful of not having someone on duty at the Administration Building all night so for the time being have assigned Mr. Chambers to

night duty there. He will keep contact with the Military Police at the gate and will be prepared for any emergency which might arise in the colony itself. He will also be on duty should we have bus loads arriving during the night.

"Colonel Meade, who was in charge of the train bringing the colonists, informed me that the two groups of four hundred each from San Joaquin County, California, had been re-routed to Manzanar and I wired you for confirmation of this. He told me that the next group which were due on June 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, from Oregon and Washington will be here on June 1st in all probability. Practically all this group will be picked up at their homes, will have had no medical examinations and no experience in an assembly center. We cannot handle medical examinations of this group with one doctor and I was delighted to get your telegram assuring us that more medical personnel would reach us. We shall have a little trouble with morale with this new group as they will not have been at an assembly center. The contingent arriving yesterday was so delighted with Tule Lake because of its obvious advantages of improved facilities over the assembly center that their morale is at a very high pitch.

"The storms continue and the wind is bitterly cold but with the added insulation we shall make everyone comfortable I know.

"The levee situation is serious and will be serious as long as our storms last and the high winds prevail. Instead of evaporating, the lake is rising. Mr. Slattery and Mr. Sheehan have taken over this problem with the assistance of some heavy equipment from the United States Bureau of Reclamation and we hope to hang on to our farming land. I gave Mr. Slattery first priority for labor and this morning we are sending a large force of colonists to help. Baled hay has been purchased wherever we were able to find it. Sacks are being filled with sand and we have not given up hope. It is going to be fearfully expensive, however.

"In closing I must repeat again to you how proud I am of the staff of the Tule Lake Project. They functioned like an organization that had been in existence fully a year. They are in excellent spirits after a very tough day and are on the job, doing their individual work and functioning as a team. Mr. Townsend, the trainee who arrived just in time to be in on the arrival of the train and subsequent settlement of the colonists, came to me last night to tell me that never in his experience had he witnessed such a smooth functioning organization and could not believe they had been together approximately a week.

"I want to take this opportunity of thanking all of you at Regional Office for your support which has made this good start possible".^{1/}

✓ ^{1/} Letter from Elmer L. Shirrell, Acting Project Director, Tule Lake Relocation Center, to E. R. Fryer, Regional Director, War Relocation Authority. May 28, 1942. Fryer was so well pleased by this letter that he circulated it among WRA administrators.

Despite the length of the letter, it is reproduced in full because it illustrates some of the recurrent problems encountered by the administration in handling in-migration and the type of activities engaged in at the arrival of each new group. The letter is of even greater significance for its reflection of the highly optimistic and enthusiastic mood of the administration, especially of the Acting Project Director himself, in their initial attack upon their duties. This view of the center and its population continued for some time among not only the administrators but also the evacuees, and definitely colored the mood and the activities of the Tule Lake Project for at least a period of three weeks. This fact suggests that a favorable first impression, once made, tended to persist as long as no radical changes in the situation occurred. It was only with the introduction of a new element in the population, the Sacramento evacuees, who brought with them a quite different conception of the relocation center, that a sharp shift from the initial enthusiasm occurred.

Between June 2 and 6, about a week after the arrival of the advance detachment, 1,415 people were evacuated directly from their homes in scattered parts of Washington, Oregon, and Clarksburg, California, to the Tule Lake Project. As the director had anticipated, those who were transferred directly from their homes to the relocation center without experiencing the assembly center were somewhat more demoralized than were the others by their initial experience with a relocation center. Instances of violent outbursts at the outrage of being placed in the restricted circumstance of the relocation center, which often occurred among evacuees in their initial contact with the assembly center, appeared among these newcomers. Most evacuees tended to see the relocation center as an improvement over the assembly center, but the latter group compared the relocation center unfavorably with the homes which they had just left. However,

these outbursts rarely had any lasting effect, for they were only isolated individual expressions that had little influence on the general attitude of the evacuees.

By the close of the second movement on June 6, there were almost 2,000 evacuees at the Tule Lake Project, all of whom were located in Ward 1. Except for a small group from Clarksburg, California, the arrivals up to this point were all from the Pacific Northwest. Sectional feeling evidenced itself in the hope that the evacuees at Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers, where the remainder of the Northwest people were mostly located, would soon join them at Tule Lake, and there were even expressions of a desire "to reserve" the center for their friends. Not only did the Northwest people wish to renew friendship with those from whom they had become separated by the adversities of evacuation, but they feared to be left a small group among a large population of California evacuees. During the lapse of ten days before any further movement to the center took place, one of the main concerns of the Ward 1 people was to see that the remaining Northwest evacuees joined them at Tule Lake.

First Efforts at Organization

The immediate concern of the freshly arrived evacuees was to create a home, and find employment. The elemental life needs such as housing, employment, meals, transportation service and medical care, were provided by the W.R.A., but the provision was only of a minimum subsistence level and it was left to the evacuees to provide themselves with anything beyond that standard.

On the second day after the arrival of the advance group, the employment office was opened and enlistment to the War Relocation Work Corps was begun. At the employment office, evacuees were immediately confronted with the request to sign an agreement by which they were enlisted into the Work Corps, a prerequisite to employment at the project. The question of sign-

ing this agreement was the first controversial issue that appeared at the Tule Lake Project.

The War Relocation Work Corps was established by Executive Order 9102, the same order authorizing the establishment of the War Relocation Authority. It was conceived as a means of mobilizing evacuee workers within a government agency.

..... The Work Corps was designed to organize and provide opportunities for work and income on Relocation Projects. The Corps will undertake all essential work on the projects, including development of natural resources, production of food, manufacture of needed articles, and operation of community services.^{2/1} (2/ WRA Press Release, May 15, 1942.) "1/

Expanding upon this principle, the War Relocation Authority developed an agreement (WRA Form 1) which every enlistee was to sign and which placed him under certain obligations.

"All employable evacuees, over 16 years of age, male and female, alien and citizen, were to be given an opportunity to enlist in the Corps. Enlistment in the Corps is voluntary and simply means that the enlistee is willing to do constructive work for his country and a community. Those who did not enlist, however, were to be barred from working on the projects, from participation in the community government and from sharing in the profits of the community fund. The enlistee was to assume a number of obligations: He agreed (1) to serve as a member of the Corps until 14 days after the end of the war. He swore that he (2) would be loyal to the United States of America 'in thought, word, and deed; that he (3) would faithfully perform all tasks assigned him by the Authority; that he (4) would accept in full payment for his service such cash and other allowances as he might be provided by law or by regulations issued by the Authority; he agreed that (5) he might be transferred from one Relocation Center to another as determined by the Authority from time to time; (6) any injury received or disease contracted while a member of the Corps could not be made the basis of any claim against the United States Government; (7) he would be subject to such special assessments for educational, medical, recreational, protective, and other public or community services and facilities as may be provided for in the regulations of the Authority or the ordinances of the community; (8) while on furlough for work in agricultural, industrial, or in other private employment he would pay for the support of dependents who might remain at Relocation Centers; (9) he would be responsible for any loss, willful destruction, sale, or disposal of any property issued to him by the Authority; (10) any infraction of rules or regulations of the Authority, or any act or utter-

^{1/} Morton Grodzins, Political Aspects of Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement. Chapter XV, pp. 53-54.

^{2/} Ibid., Chapter XV, pp. 53-54.

ance disloyal to the United States, would render him liable to trial and suitable punishment!1/ (1/ WRA, Enlistment Form, War Relocation Work Corps, April, 1942.) 2/

From the evacuee standpoint this agreement bound them to obligations which would enslave them to the W.R.A. The enlistee was required to serve in the Work Corps for the duration of the war, he had to accept whatever cash payments and allowances the Authority granted him, and worst of all, he was subject to transfer from one center to another "at the whim of the W.R.A."

"If you sign that thing, you practically sign your life away."3/

"The W.R.A. could send us anywhere it wants; even separate us from our family. We'd just get settled here and then we could be sent off somewhere else to try starting all over again. What are we anyway, prisoners?"4/

Viewing W.R.A. policy as a whole, it seems certain that the administration would not have forcibly required strict adherence to the agreement if there were reasonable grounds for leniency of interpretation, but many evacuees regarded the signing of such an agreement as a serious matter.

Of main concern to the evacuees was the section of the agreement subjecting them to transfer from one center to another as determined by the W.R.A. The Issei in particular felt the harshness of this threat. Among them, the feeling was widely expressed that they had been moved around enough ever since evacuation, and that they had no desire to be moved again. Ever since the outbreak of war their lives had been filled with indeterminacy and insecurity, the evacuation had uprooted them from their homes and communities, their stay at the assembly centers had been under-

1/ Morton Grodzins, Political Aspects of Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement, Chapter XV, pp. 53-54.

2/ Ibid., Chapter XV, pp. 53-54.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942.

4/ Ibid., June 23, 1942.

stood from the beginning to be temporary, during which much of their normal home life had been suspended in anticipation of further moves. They had come to the Tule Lake with the hope that there they might find permanency and security for the duration of the war, that they might reconstruct lives that had been seriously disturbed by the evacuation; but the third clause of the agreement was a denial of this hope. The Issei feared most the possible break-up of families, a fear that had been experienced in the pre-evacuation period when the F.B.I. frequently appeared suddenly to intern family heads. After the losses of the evacuation, the one tie left to them was that of family relations; since there was no longer even a permanent home address of the family, the separation of family members, it seemed, could lead to a complete loss of contact among them. The more distrustful spoke of the agreement as a diabolical scheme of the government to make of the Japanese an indentured group of migratory laborers.

The issue of the Work Corps agreement, however, was removed before it became a serious controversy, for the project administration decided to proceed with employment while the agreement was referred to Washington for further clarification. Subsequently, the Washington office of the W.R.A. decided against the policy of enlisting for the Work Corps, and the question was permanently dropped at the Tule Lake Project as well as at all the other centers.

When the Work Corps agreement was laid aside, the main barrier to employment was removed, and there was generally a rush of workers to get into paying jobs. The motives to seek immediate employment revolved around the fear of losing out in the competition for preferred positions, and also because of the strongly felt need in some families to replenish depleted savings. For the early arrivals there was no dearth of all types

of positions, and most individuals were able to get work, if such work existed, that corresponded with their training and experience. For some evacuees, the relocation center offered employment opportunities such as they had never enjoyed before. In the pre-evacuation communities, Nisei men trained in engineering, architecture, chemistry, agricultural science, and business administration, or Nisei girls trained in stenography, office management, dietetics, and social work, frequently had no opportunity to apply their knowledge in practical employment. For these people, the relocation center offered the first opportunity of gaining practical experience in their field of training, and their enthusiasm for work tended to be correspondingly high. On the other hand, the bulk of Issei whose training was largely in private enterprises of farming and small city shops had very little opportunity of finding similar work at the center, and they were mostly relegated to the less desirable positions of boiler firemen, janitors, farm hands, mess hall helpers, or to dependency upon their children. In the competition for preferred positions at the relocation center, the emphasis was definitely on American trained skills, including the ability to speak and write English, which excluded most of the Issei and Kibei from acquiring the better jobs. Some discontent over this situation existed among the latter groups, but, on the whole, they accepted the inevitability of these criteria of personnel selection.

Most of the work of the first weeks at Tule Lake were directed towards organizing the functions of the community and towards the preparations for the arrival of later groups. Emphasis was placed upon organizing procedures in the housing, employment and transportation sections which were primarily responsible for the reception of incoming groups. At the same time, all the work divisions of the community necessary for

its maintenance were intensely occupied with setting up efficient routines. It was also a period of planning for the future, for in the long-term conception of the project, numerous activities which were not yet being undertaken were expected to become the most constructive features of the W.R.A. program. In line with the W.R.A. conception of the relocation center as a war-duration affair, the hope was to have industrial and agricultural programs which would not only make the center self sufficient but afford some profit to the evacuees. Acting Director Shirrell was especially concerned to push the agricultural program at the Tule Lake Project, for considering the lateness of arrival of the evacuees at Tule Lake and the shortness of the growing season in that area, it was a race with time to harvest a crop at the project during the first season. Most evacuee workers found their time fully occupied by the work assigned to them, but worker morale was high and there were few complaints about the conditions.

One point of dissatisfaction to the evacuee employees was the failure of the W.R.A. to announce the wage scale on the basis of which the workers would be paid. In short, the evacuees were accepting employment without any knowledge of the amount of compensation they would receive for their work, but in this condition there was the dual indefiniteness of not knowing how much the individual worker would be paid, and of how his wage would compare with that of others. In the minutes of the first Community Council meeting held on June 16, 1942, at which all the delegates from Ward 1 were present, there appears the following interesting item:

"To maintain the morale and clarify the indefiniteness of the wage scale, Mr. Shirrell agreed to confer with Mr. Fryer, Coast Regional Director, and relate the council discussion. It was emphasized that the subject was not critical, but only reflected on

the morale of the employees."^{1/}

The matter was clarified ten days after this inquiry by an announcement of the W.R.A. wage scale in the Tulean Dispatch, the project newspaper.

Equally as important as the problem of employment to the evacuees was their concern to provide themselves with satisfactory home equipment. The housing provided by the W.R.A. availed them only of an unpartitioned room (called an apartment) in which the sum of the furnishings was a stove, and cots, mattresses and blankets for each resident. In evacuating the evacuees had not been permitted to take with them any household equipment larger than folding chairs and bridge tables. Moreover, in the confusion of evacuation, the announcement that household furnishings such as dressers, davenports and carpets which were left in federal storage would later be shipped to the relocation center at W.R.A. expense failed to reach the ears of most evacuees, ^{2/} and most of their baggage was at inaccessible places. Not only were the evacuees without household furnishings on their arrival at the center, but the W.R.A. provided no new lumber with which to make this equipment. What was available were piles of scrap lumber dumped in the firebreaks by the construction contractors who had built the center.

Little resentment appeared among the early arrivals over the failure of the W.R.A. to provide new lumber, for there was no shortage of scrap lumber in the first weeks and the evacuees were glad enough to accept what was provided them.

^{1/} Minutes of Council Meeting, June 16, 1942, p. 1.

^{2/} An announcement appeared in the Tulean Dispatch, July 1942, that evacuees who had stored baggage at federal storages could have it shipped to the relocation center at government expense upon request to the administration. The reaction of the bulk of evacuees was, "Why weren't we told these things before. Nobody told us the government would ship baggage to us later if we placed it in federal storage."

"When I arrived at Tule Lake on June 15, I was surprised at the great scrap lumber pile by the warehouse. My surprise was due partly to the fact that there had been practically no lumber available in the Tulare Assembly Center from which I had come."1/

The minimum requirement of each family was a closet, table, benches, shelves and a clothes line, but there was eagerness to provide other comforts as well. From the day of their arrival, the evacuees in Ward 1 streamed out to the scrap lumber pile which was initially located in the then unconstructed Ward 7 area. The greatest demand was for long smooth boards suitable for table tops, shelves, and wall facings, and sturdy straight posts that would provide the frame of porches, partitions, closets and laundry lines. The evacuees from the assembly centers were at first even interested in the small scraps and irregular boards for kindling purposes, because of their experience of kindling shortage at the assembly center, but this interest was rapidly forgotten in the competition for better pieces. Like a flock of scavenger birds, men, women, and children flitted about the pile combing the surface of the pile for the more desirable long, smooth boards, and later digging underneath the surface. A Nisei girl who, accompanied by her mother, arrived with the advance group declared:

"All I remember about the first weeks at the center is that we were awfully busy at the office setting up the time-keeping procedures, and then every minute of our spare time I'd go out with mother to gather lumber. Every evening after supper we'd rush out toward the lumber pile and bring back as much as we could carry which wasn't very much because the lumber pile was quite far. On the way we'd pick up nails where workers had dropped them because we couldn't get them either. Almost everyone had to go to work right away after getting there, so it was the same with them. Sundays were the big days; it used to look like the whole camp was out there. You could see them out there the whole day carrying lumber back and forth."2/

1/ James Sakoda, Tule Lake Report, "The Scrap Lumber Conflict," p. 1.

2/ Miyamoto Notes August 29, 1944

Families with plenty of male help available were at an advantage, for while the work of gathering the lumber together was not difficult, the task of transporting the pile to the residence was back breaking when mechanical means of transportation were inaccessible. The lumber pile in Ward 7 was almost five hundred yards from Ward 1 with no good road over the distance; later, a new pile was started in the firebreak near the warehouses only a short distance from Ward 1. Workers in the transportation division used their trucks to haul lumber for their families and friends, a source of envy and resentment to those without trucks; others brought out wheel barrows although they were difficult to maneuver on the rough roads when loaded with lumber; but most individuals carried the lumber in their arms. However, the families in Ward 1 had sufficient lumber for their needs, and many hoarded large piles of scrap lumber in anticipation of later needs or with the thought of saving it for friends among the late arrivals. In later months it was easy to discern the relative ease of access to scrap lumber which the Ward 1 people enjoyed compared to the people of other wards by the greater number of porches and lumber stocks at the residences of the early arrivals.

Under the circumstance of a plentiful lumber supply, the evacuees showed interest and ingenuity in furnishing and beautifying their homes. Men and boys, and even girls, tested their skill at making tables, chairs, lounging seats, book shelves, stands, partitioning screens and other useful home furnishings. The more skilled handicraftsment spent hours in making the more complicated pieces of furniture such as cabinets, fancy coffee tables, settees, chests of drawers, and study desks. The extent to which creative and competitive interests were aroused in furniture making and in beautifying the home was reflected in the large number of

participants who entered the scrap-lumber furniture contest promoted by the recreation department in the week of June 10, and by the public interest in the display of the submitted articles.

The work of the womenfolk in making the home attractive and comfortable required no less ingenuity. There was, to be sure, considerable variation among families as to the standard of living quarters desired, but all the families had the common problem of creating a homelike atmosphere within the limited space of a single room and with limited means to furnish it. Two days after the arrival of the advance group, a canteen selling food and general merchandise was opened in Block 7. As its stock was increased, the dry goods, hardware and foods counters were crowded with customers; housewives bought yards of material for window and closet curtains and for frills to add attraction to the plain, standardized apartments. Where the customer was dissatisfied with the canteen goods, he turned to the Montgomery-Ward and Sears Roebuck catalogues for sundry equipment.

During the period of settlement at the center, families bought quite heavily considering their small incomes, for though they watched with one eye the dwindling of their savings, they saw with the other the minimum needs for which purchases had to be made. The interesting consequence of the pressure of the two-fold need, to save on the one hand and to purchase needed goods on the other, was to give an impression of abandoned purchases among the evacuees. Scattered complaints developed about the "high prices at the canteen," and there was some interest in the then vague question of the store's ownership and operation. It was understood from information passed out by the Acting Director that the store was to be owned and managed by the evacuees themselves through some cooperative organization,

and that the W.R.A. would have nothing to do with it just as soon as the people were ready to take it over. There was much talk from the administration of making of the relocation center "a cooperative venture," and even some suggestion that if the evacuees succeeded in showing a profit on the goods which they produced through their industrial and agricultural projects, that some equitable division of the profits would be made to the evacuees.^{1/} Two weeks after the opening of the project, Mr. Don Elberson, a W.R.A. staff member with a background in the Co-op movement, spoke before a meeting of the evacuees in Ward 1 on the possibility of organizing the community enterprise (canteen) into a consumer cooperative. The understanding of the program, however, was extremely vague among the evacuees, and no immediate steps were taken among the evacuees toward taking over control of the canteen despite some continuing discontent with the prices at the store.

"I heard Mr. Elberson talk, but, gee, I didn't understand what he was talking about. I think my husband got more out of it than I did; you might ask him. He was explaining something about the cooperative movement, and was telling us that the canteen here could be organized into a Co-op so that everyone would profit by it. But I didn't get the point of his talk at all; it was too complicated."^{2/}

"What he (Mr. Elberson) was talking about is like the marketing Co-ops that the farmers use to have. I think it would work out here, and it would be a good thing."^{3/}

Although there were faint rumblings about the high prices at the canteen, there was no concerted opinion among the evacuees as to the nature of the difficulty or the mode of eliminating it, and doubts were temporarily silenced by the administration's promise that the people should in time have

^{1/} Morton Grodzins, op. cit., Chapter XV, pp. 53-58. Also see Chapter XVI, pp. 2-6. The W.R.A. viewed the extremely low wage scale, established only as a concession to public opinion, as unfair to the evacuees. They hit upon the producers' cooperative idea as a means of profit to the evacuees, and some general plans for effecting such a program were considered at Washington. The idea was later discontinued as impracticable.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, June 18, 1942

^{3/} Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942.

full control over the enterprise.

The initial impetus toward community organization was almost entirely initiated by the W.R.A. One of the first acts of the administration on the arrival of a new group was to select a "block manager" who was to serve as a liaison administrative officer between the administration and the evacuees of his block. During the pre-opening project conferences held in May, 1942, by the W.R.A. staff of Tule Lake, the "Committee on Block Managers" made the following recommendations concerning the role of the block manager in the project organization:

"2. Functions of the Block Manager.

The Block Manager should be an American Citizen, male, between the ages of 21 - 40. Preferably he should have college training and be thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language. His personality should be such to inspire the sympathy and confidence both of his own people and the administration, and he should be experienced in dealing with the Japanese public. In short, it is felt that the Block Manager should be the person best fitted to be the liaison officer between W.R.A. and the Japanese populace of each block.

3. His main functions may be listed as follows:

- A. Distribution of information for various departments of the W.R.A. Administration
- B. Securing of information needed by various departments.
- C. Receiving and distributing mail.
- D. Acting as agent for all Administrative Departments which do not have specialized appointees within the block, and cooperating with departmental appointees and department heads.
- E. Acting as agent for the referral of inquiries and related matters which should be brought to the attention of the Administration.
- F. Acting in advisory capacity in recommending block residents for duties as requested.
- G. Acting as contact man in locating individual block residents.
- H. Checking on safety precautions in each apartment.
- I. Being aware of the needs and welfare of the block residents, interpretating those needs to the Administrations, and suggesting ways and means of securing the maximum of comfort and happiness for the block residents.
- J. Acting as primary agent for the reporting of all emergency matters."^{1/}

^{1/} Tule Lake Project Conferences, May 21, 1942. "Memorandum of Committee Meeting on the Subject of 'Block Manager'."

The appointment of the evacuee block manager was to be made by a Board of Selection composed of several administrative staff members, and the appointments were to be temporary awaiting further developments. It seems that the first appointments were based on the recommendation of the committee, that the block manager be a Nisei (American citizens), but this conception was quickly revised probably due to the lack of Nisei applicants who qualified for the position. Complaints that developed against one of the first block managers selected, and the administration's evaluation of the same man, indicates a contrast between the administration and the evacuees's (especially the Issei) conception of an "ideal" block manager. The W.R.A. staff officer responsible for the block manager organization declared of this individual:

"I think George is one of the best block managers we've got. He's had union organizer's experience, and he's got ideas of how to handle the people. He knows what's going on in the block, and although he's blunt, I think once the people get used to his ways he'll get along very well."1/

Of the same individual, an evacuee declared:

"For one thing, he doesn't understand the Japanese people. Besides, he's extremely lazy and won't do anything for the people when they ask for things. He doesn't go down to get the mail from the post office early as the other block managers do, and then doesn't deliver the mail to the apartments but makes the people come to his office for it."2/

In another block, the evacuees who were quite satisfied with their manager, said of him:

"Jimmie is young and quiet but he's a very good block manager. The first few days he worked awfully hard passing mops, brooms, soaps, and things around among the block people. He was very helpful and the people appreciated him."3/

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 28, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, June 25, 1942.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, June 25, 1942.

If home making, employment and other activities related to getting subsistence were the first needs of the evacuees, there was no less interest in recreational and creative activities. Baseball games and socials or dances appeared spontaneously. One department of the administration, the Community Activities Section, headed by Theodore Waller, was to devote itself to recreational service, and it very quickly swung into action. During the first week after the project opening, Mr. Waller called two meetings to discuss with the evacuees their recreational interest, a summary account of which is given in a report.

"These meetings developed many ideas bearing on activities and have, in fact, given the program its general direction. They were relatively inconclusive in the area of organization, there being much discussion as to whether recreation should be organized by block, by ward, on a project basis, or by activities. It was finally decided that preliminary organization should be by activities, but the decision was made by a very close vote."1/

Viewed in the light of later events, there is a certain freshness and naiveness about this summary, for while the question of the basis of organization was an important one, the real difficulties of the department were to develop around the problem of procuring necessary recreational equipment and the problem of inter-personal relations among the leaders. It was difficult at that stage to visualize the scope of the recreational program that might be established, for there was no budget allotment made for recreation, but the promoters of recreation were hopeful of stimulating enthusiastic interest among the populace because of their belief that recreation was an important factor in maintaining the morale of a group such as the evacuees. By June 4, Mr. Waller reported ten activities under way in his department 2/, and by the

1/ "Report on Community Activities," June 4, 1942. p. 1.

2/

14th of the month, the list of specific activities had been expanded by three or four times.^{1/} Among the activities instituted by the latter date were fourteen softball teams, clubs, choirs, nurseries for younger children, a library, dances, knitting and sewing classes for older women, entertainment for the Issei, and craft classes for the young. In describing the activities of her department, the secretary of the section declared, "There was more enthusiasm than organization."

Religious activities were initially under the supervision of the Community Activities Section, but it was very quickly removed from W.R.A. control to avoid the possibility of unequal treatment of the different religious groups. The Christian church was one of the first organizations to be started voluntarily by the evacuees. Sakoda gives an accurate account of the first meetings of the Christian group at the Tule Lake Project.

"When the first voluntary group of 447 arrived in Tule Lake from North Portland and Puyallup Assembly Centers, there was no Christian minister among them. Physical facilities for church services consisted only of empty recreation halls, with possibly a bench or two. On May 31, however a group of young people, under the leadership of Tom Uyeno and Tom Okabe, observed Sunday. Through Ted Waller, head of Recreation Department, Rev. George Almond, minister of the church of the nearby town of Tule Lake was invited to deliver the sermon.

"In the second large incoming group, which arrived June 2 from Salem, Oregon, and outlying districts, was a certain Rev. Andrew Kuroda.....Rev. Kuroda called a meeting of young people from various districts on June 4, and made plans for the following Sunday. As a result, for the children, Sunday School was held. The worship service for adults attracted about thirty Issei. In the evening Donald Dodd from a nearby town spoke to about fifty young people who attended the service for them."

"Another meeting of the leaders of Christian young people was held soon after, and Perry Saito was chosen to handle the young people's service, while Mrs. Kuroda was selected as the Sunday School Superintendent. By the third Sunday after Rev. Kuroda arrived a definite schedule of church services was announced in the Tulean Dispatch."^{2/}

^{1/} Sakoda report, "The Christian Church in Tule Lake." pp. 1-3.

^{2/} op. cit., p. 1-3

Due to the absence of Buddhist leaders among the early arrivals, the Buddhist group did not organize until after the arrival of the Sacramento group.

The first efforts at organization were attended by a condition of relative accessibility of preferred jobs and of scrap lumber, but the data shows that it was also a period of groping towards community organization both on the part of the administration as well as the evacuee residents. On the whole, the administration saw more clearly than the evacuees the direction toward which all the organizational activity was moving for they were the ones to initiate most of the activities, and the effort of the evacuees was largely directed towards trying to understand and follow the leadership of the W.R.A. The administration, to be sure, repeatedly attempted to consult the evacuees regarding their desires in community organization, but the evacuees had but the vaguest conception of what was possible within the W.R.A. organization. The inclination was to trust to the judgement of the administrative officials in the broader aspects of planning, and throw themselves with enthusiasm into the immediate tasks of adjustment confronting them.

An Interlude of Optimism

The period during which the evacuee population of Tule Lake consisted only of the 1,800 people in Ward 1 lasted less than three weeks, from May 27 to June 15, 1942; but as brief as this period was, it was sufficient time for the people to create and become aware of a dominant mood in the community. This is not the same as saying that the evacuees possessed a clear and generalized conception of their organizational movement; on the contrary, they had only the vaguest idea of the specific ends toward which their activities were directed. The War Relocation

Authority itself was uncertain of its program, for as a new government agency it had no tested and established practices and policies by which to standardize its activities, and it was necessary that it start with blind, hesitating thrusts in one direction and another in search of successful methods and policies. The evacuees, too, lacking experience in the unique characteristics of a relocation center community, required time to adjust to the new way of life. Numerous problems appeared under this circumstance, some of which have been described in detail, and rough adjustments were made as the first steps toward solutions. But in the attack of both the administrators and evacuees upon these problems, there tended to appear a common mood of optimism and an attitude of willingness to cooperate in seeking solutions. The period may be called a brief interlude of optimism, for it was the one bright interval in the history of the community which was otherwise largely dominated by misunderstandings, demoralization and conflict. It was the one period during which the idea of cooperation between the evacuees, as well as between evacuees and administrators, seemed to hold any real possibility of realization.

In part, the mood of hope and enthusiasm was communicated from the administrators to the first evacuee arrivals, and the local administrators were in turn recipients of the mood from the national office of the agency. The War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement circulated to project officials from the national office on May 29, 1942 was a design for a "utopian" community in each of the relocation projects^{1/} and, initially, the W.R.A. personnel at the Tule Lake Project was intent upon fulfilling the general aims of the policy. Indeed, the hope of the local officials was to outrace the other projects in accomplishing the desired goal, and their own words are evidence of the fact that they believed an efficient,

^{1/} Grodzins, op. cit., Chapter XV, pp. 46-58.

cooperative community could be created. A Caucasian divisional supervisor driving through the project on a clear sunny morning in the third week after the opening observed:

"Do you see the truck cutting across the firebreak and raising all the dust? We've been trying to teach those fellows to stay on the roads where they won't stir up all that stuff. They'll learn in time, but we have to keep after them, you know. Right now the dust problem bothers us, but we're going to get all that straightened out. We're working on plans to lay all this ground in grass. There's plenty of water for irrigation, and you couldn't want better gardeners than the Japanese to do the work. It gets mighty hot here in the summer time, but we plan to bring in trees and plant them all around the camp. Then the kids can play under the shade, and the old folks can sit around outside. We'll encourage every family to have its own garden. Won't it look nice when this whole area is green with trees and lawns, and there are flowers blooming in every garden? This can be a mighty fine place to live if it's all fixed up."1/

Perhaps the other administrators did not share the idyllic optimism of this individual, but the same trend of optimism was general in the staff. The administrator's estimate of the evacuees tended to overstress the better qualities of the evacuees and to underestimate the latent hostility towards Caucasians present in evacuee disposition. One Caucasian remarked:

"It's amazing how the Japanese people have adapted themselves. They are cordial and helpful. It's a pleasure to work with them."2/

A Nisei doctor who tried to forewarn a Caucasian medical officer against an undiluted enthusiasm about the future of the base hospital reported:

"I tried to tell Dr. A. that he's got to expect a lot of trouble in the hospital, but I don't think he understood. Running a clinic like the one here isn't like having your own office. Any time you bring together a lot of doctors with independent ideas, it's not going to be easy making them work together, I don't think he fully realizes what he's getting into."3/

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942

2/ Shibutani Report, "Social Changes and Chronology of Events," p. 5.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, June 19, 1942.

The Nisei doctor had the advantage of experience in organizing a group of Japanese doctors both before the evacuation and at the assembly center.

There was reason for the administrators to feel optimistic. The evacuees of the early transfer movements responded with enthusiasm and gratitude to the friendly efforts of the administrators, and those coming from the assembly center frequently commented on the superiority of conditions at Tule Lake compared to the W.C.C.A. assembly centers. Outsiders visiting at Tule Lake who had also visited other centers, often spoke in praise of the Tule Lake administration and compared it favorably with others. The expectation was that the greatest administrative difficulties would be encountered during the early months of the project and that the problems would be gradually eliminated with time and experience, but the program met with immediate cooperation from the evacuees which must have been thoroughly gratifying to the administrators who had not been sure of what to expect from the evacuees. Considering the seeming success of the project during the first weeks, the administration could hardly be blamed for holding high hopes of what might be accomplished when the remainder of the evacuee population of the project had been settled.

The evacuees, on their part, were grateful that the conditions of the relocation center were not worse than they were. Those from the assembly centers continually spoke of the excellence of the meals and the friendliness of the staff, contrasting these conditions with those of the assembly center. A Nisei who arrived with the advance group declared:

"When we first go here, the morale of the evacuees was very good. The W.R.A. staff was a lot friendlier and more intelligent than the W.C.C.A. staff had been. The food was far better than the stuff we'd been fed at the assembly center. Everybody was enthusiastic about the conditions, and the Issei actually asked me to convey to the administration their appreciation of the kind treatment they were receiving."1/

Those who had been directly evacuated from their homes without experiencing

assembly center life were thankful of the friendliness of the Caucasian administrators after the shock of rejection by other Caucasian groups.

Evacuees were heard to comment:

"Of course, it's not like home, but in time we'll be one of the best centers of the W.R.A." 1/

"You can't complain about a few inconveniences. We're lucky to have what we have. These Caucasians are here living with us to help. We should in turn cooperate with them." 2/

"The people in the next block think they have a good mess hall, but ours is cleaner. Besides we have the best cooks in the camp." 3/

"We've been getting wonderful meals. There's always plenty of milk, we've had steaks and roasts almost every day, and we get fruits for breakfast--why, they even passed out paper napkins for the first two or three weeks." 4/

These expressions are typical of the dominant attitude that prevailed among the small group of evacuees concentrated in Ward 1. There were murmurs of discontent about some of the conditions, but they were lost among the more widely articulated expressions of hope for the future of the center. In accepting the cooperative attitude, the evacuees were essentially submitting to the fact of evacuation, at least in their relations with the W.R.A., and were primarily seeking to reconstruct their disrupted lives with the latter's aid. The appearance of this accommodative reaction, however, is not self explanatory, for considering the bitterness felt by the evacuees at their loss of economic means as well as political rights, it could hardly have been anticipated that they would cheerfully accept the conditions of the relocation center however superior it might be to the assembly center.

The accommodation to Tule Lake did not in any sense mark the complete erasure of the bitter memories of evacuation; it merely reflected the

1/ Shibutani Report, op. cit., p. 3.
2/ Shibutani Report, op. cit., p. 3.

3/ Shibutani Report, op. cit., p. 4

4/ Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942

sublimation of individual bitterness to the community purpose of creating something worthwhile at the center. In the day-to-day conversations there still continued references to the injustices of evacuation and to General "Nitwit" (DeWitt) who had ordered it. It is in the conditions entering into the sublimation of individual resentments that we have an understanding of why a cooperative attitude was possible, but it should be added that the conditions differed for the three major classes of evacuees, the Nisei, Kibei and Issei.

The Nisei were fundamentally at a loss as to how they should interpret the evacuation. For the most part those less than twenty-one years of age possessed little independence of thought on questions of this nature and tended to lean upon the leadership of the older people. They sensed the injustice of their evacuation, but they held no clear conviction of why it had come about and of what should be done to remedy the condition. Many of the younger Nisei looked upon the evacuation as an adventure, in which new friends could be made, new experiences might be had, and romances might occur. The immediate popularity of sports and dances at the relocation center is an indication of the channels into which their interests were directed. The older Nisei viewed the evacuation more seriously and their resentment was sharper, but there was considerable disagreement among them as to how the evacuation had come about. For one thing, they inclined to be discriminating in their evaluation of the Caucasian group; there were "good" Caucasians as well as "bad" ones, and people like the W.R.A. staff officers who were trying to help the evacuees were considered in the former class. On the other hand, there was no agreement in identifying the "bad" Caucasians, and even less agreement on how the Nisei as a group should attack them. Among the early arrivals at the project, there were relatively few Nisei leaders who could lead the others in more clearly defining their position.

It will later be seen that political authority among the evacuees rested primarily with the Issei group; this was true in the pre-evacuation communities, and this condition had not essentially been altered by the evacuation. The youthfulness of the Nisei and the smallness of their politically articulate members, the greater homogeneity and dogmatism of Issei opinion by contrast with the uncertainty and confusion among the Nisei, and the traditional parental authority of the Issei over the Nisei, were sufficiently significant factors to insure Issei control over the Nisei. The Kibei were, of themselves, too small a group to wield effective power in a Japanese community. Considered in this light, the initial willingness of the Issei to accede superior employment and political opportunities to the Nisei, which appears as a contradiction of expected behavior, offers an understanding of the Issei's position.

In a community controlled by Caucasian authorities, the ability to use English with facility was at a premium, and there was little anyone could do to alter this condition. Very few Issei could qualify for administrative positions because of their shortcoming in this respect. Furthermore, despite the similarity of treatment of both citizens and non-citizens of Japanese ancestry in the evacuation, the restrictions upon the non-citizens (the Issei) were noticeably greater than for citizens ever since the outbreak of war, and the Japanese population was conscious of this differential treatment. The W.R.A. policy was, in some respects, intentionally framed to give a certain degree of superiority to the citizens, as, for instance, where they stated: "Eligibility to hold office in the temporary organization (of self government) will be restricted to those who are citizens of the United States and are 21 years of age or older."^{1/}

^{1/} War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement, May 29, 1942.
p. 6.

A more specific deterrent to Issei activity was their fear of internment. Since the outbreak of war, a number of Issei had been removed from every Japanese community by the F.B.I., and considerable anxiety was aroused in all those families which had Issei family heads who might be subject to arrest. A certain amount of mystery surrounded the charges on which the apprehensions were based, though it was believed that the Issei who were officers in Japanese organizations, who were leaders in their communities, or who possessed wealth, were the ones being picked up. The imminence of this threat to family solidarity and personal freedom was a strong reason for the Issei to exert caution against any action that might bring them under the suspicion of government authorities.

But the docility of the Issei was in no sense an indication of a fundamental change in their sentiments, feelings and opinions about the relations between Japan and the United States--that is, the view that Japan was right and the United States wrong in the stand taken by the respective nations on the issue of international relations in the Far East. In June 1942, the Japanese offensive in the Pacific and the Orient was still progressing with sufficient success to be cause for considerable alarm to the American newspapers, but the Issei at Tule Lake generally interpreted this trend as a sign of certain ultimate victory for Japan over the Allies. Many Issei were predicting that the Japanese would be victorious within six months. These people believed that the Japanese evacuees could then return to the Pacific Coast and dictate their own terms in recovering the losses suffered during the evacuation. The hope, indeed, the belief, that Japan would be victorious over the United States within a very short time, was in itself a factor in the willingness of the Issei to accept their situation at the center, for accord-

ing to this view, their stay at the relocation center would be only of short duration. Even the less optimistic Issei were inclined to accept an ultimate Japanese victory as highly probable.

The character of Issei thinking can best be understood from a striking rumor that appeared almost within the first week of settlement at Tule Lake and continued for over a year as the most persistent and widespread of all project rumors. The rumor in its simplest form, without taking account of the variations upon it, was this:

"Tule Lake is only a reception center (as opposed to a relocation center) and we're here only temporarily. The Tule Lake evacuees will be moved to Arkansas as soon as that center is completed."1/

Various reasons may be suggested for the appearance of this rumor, some of which are only inferred but others which are directly related to its appearance. One of the first experiences which the new arrivals at Tule Lake encountered was the W.R.A. request that they sign the Work Corps agreement containing the clause subjecting them to transfer from center to center at the determination of the W.R.A. The Issei reaction to this threat directed against their need for stability and security has already been discussed. But to the Issei, the appearance of this clause in the agreement was virtually an open admission by the W.R.A. that they contemplated further moves of the evacuees. Moreover, some of the Issei were informed that Manzanar Relocation Center was a reception center, a temporary assembly point from which the evacuees would be relocated to other areas, but they were not informed that the Army had turned the Manzanar center over to the W.R.A. on June 1st making of it a permanent place of settlement. Because Tule Lake, with Manzanar, were the only centers (other than

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 19, 1942.

assembly centers) within the restricted zone of the State of California, the conclusion was drawn that if Manzanar was a reception center, Tule Lake must also be one.

In the first week of June 1942, two events occurred which gave impetus to the idea of further transfers. The first was the bombing of Dutch Harbor, Alaska, on June 3, by the Japanese air force, and the other was the occupation of Attu and Kiska by Japanese forces on June 7. The belief developed quietly but rapidly that Japanese forces had already occupied Alaska although the United States would not admit it, and some Issei believed that the Japanese invasion of the Pacific Coast was imminent. The assumption was that if California were invaded, the government would take steps to move the evacuees further inland, and the farthest relocation centers from the Pacific Coast were those in Arkansas.

Director Shirrell immediately denied this rumor in the project newspaper and assured the evacuees that, as far as he knew, there would be no further transfers of the Tule Lake people, but as in the case of most rumors, official denial did little to prevent its further spread. The wide currency which this rumor eventually received among the Issei, however, constitutes an important revelation of the subjective state of this group, especially as these inner feelings were not so clearly perceivable in their external behavior. Their suggestibility to the rumor brings out significant elements in their state of mind: (1) their crying desire for stability and security after the disturbing experience of evacuation, (2) their unexpressed, pessimistic anticipation of harsh treatment from the Government and their underlying distrust of the Caucasian people, and (3) their belief in the ultimate victory of Japan over the United States

based on indoctrinated opinions and sentiments, a desire for vengeance, and a hope of recovering their losses. It must be emphasized that these elements in Issei thinking, particularly of the latter two factors, varied considerably within the group, but they indicate a tendency that was generally capable of being aroused when their life was seriously disturbed. Under the relatively favorable center conditions of the early period, the rumor received only slight attention. From a slightly different point of view, the same mentality is expressed in the statement of an elderly Issei woman who declared:

"When we went to Tule Lake, we had no idea of what kind of place it was to be or what fearful experience we might encounter. That is why we were quite happy when the conditions were not as bad as we had feared and the administrative people treated us with kindness and respect."^{1/}

The Kibei constituted a mixed group; the fundamental difficulty of defining a "Kibei" affirms the wide variation of characteristics within the group. The Kibei who are of interest in the present discussion were those who identified themselves as a Kibei group, who tended to act together as a Kibei, and this group was initially a small one. In the pre-evacuation communities, the Kibei, as Kibei, had been somewhat of an out-group that received little recognition, and this status tended to persist during the initial period of settlement at Tule Lake. They lacked the traditional authority of the Issei to wield political power in the center community, and their inability to use English with the same facility as the Nisei as well as their lack of training in specialized fields were barriers to recognition from the administration. For the most part, they sought employment as cooks, helpers or waiters in the mess halls, as wardens in the internal security division, or as manual laborers in the farm and construction crews. In part because of this customary

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 29, 1944.

discrimination against them, the Kibei group at Tule Lake were more sensitive than either the Issei or the Nisei to the political discrimination of evacuation and reacted with a cynical distrust of the Caucasian authorities.

Very soon after the opening of the project, a Kibei named Ken Takatsui who had arrived with the advance group from Puyallup, started to organize the Kibei on the project. He took a job as a warden (police) and with a nucleus of his friends from Puyallup attempted to recruit all of the Issei and Kibei among the wardens into an organization that subsequently became known as the "Kikusui" group.^{1/} The fundamental program of the organization was the promotion of Japanese nationalism, and through this ideology to organize the people of the center in a protest movement against the white man's discrimination of the Japanese. Takatsui met with little success in organizing on a large scale, but a small secret society was formed. Some individuals who avoided enlistment into the organization declared:

"Takatsui asked me to join his group, but I've stayed away from them."^{2/} (A Kibei who identified himself with the Nisei.)

"One reason I quit the warden work was because of his group. He was trying to get everybody to join, but I didn't want to get mixed up with them."^{3/} (A young Issei who resigned as a warden within two weeks of the project opening.)

It is evident that Takatsui started organizing almost immediately after

^{1/} "Kikusui" (water chrysanthemum) was the emblem of the royalist forces of Minamoto no Yoritomo. During the Hojo Period in Japanese history, certain daimyos were seeking to dethrone the emperor. Minamoto brought his forces behind the emperor and successfully waged war against the rebels. The implication in the Kibei group's choice of "Kikusui" as the name of their society is that they were supporters of the Japanese emperor and of the true Japanese nationalism.

^{2/}

^{3/}

his arrival at the project, and that he attempted to recruit members on a fairly large scale. There are also indications, in the avoidance reaction of those who failed to join, that a certain amount of social pressure existed toward joining the organization. Moreover, the unwillingness to talk about the group of even those who refused to identify themselves with the group because of its "dangerous" character is probably an expression both of fear of violence at the hands of the Kibei and of in-group solidarity among the Japanese. The failure of the organization to gain any real hold on the community at this early stage is itself added evidence of the strength of the contrary mood, that of cooperating with the administration, that prevailed at the project during this time.

Except for the program of protest initiated by a small Kibei group, there was no organized protest movement, or even any widely expressed disposition toward one, developed among the early arrivals at Tule Lake. Such evidence as has been offered regarding the subjective state of the Nisei, Issei, and even a large section of the Kibei group seems to show that they possessed widely varied and confused feelings about the evacuation and the relocation center. There was generally a bitterness about the evacuation, a feeling that something should be done to correct the wrong done the people of Japanese ancestry, and a desire to seek vengeance and retribution for the losses suffered; but there was also uncertainty as to the cause of the evacuation, feelings of helplessness about overcoming the will of the majority group, fears of even worse treatment from the majority, and even some tendency to see in the evacuation and relocation center life a new experience. In the absence of a unified protest attitude and program, evacuee energy was directed rather toward a hope upon which they were agreed, that of creating at Tule Lake a utopian community. The favorable conditions at the center during the initial period gave support to this hope.

Conditions Promoting Cooperation

Special significance must be attached to the cooperativeness of the community during the initial period of settlement at the Tule Lake Project for the mood was never again recaptured in later months. It raises a question concerning the conditions that made possible the existence of these attitudes, and the difference in later conditions that destroyed these attitudes. For one thing the evacuees of the advance detachment were still congratulating themselves on having escaped the limitations of assembly center life. Moreover, there was intense activity during the initial period--evacuees were kept busy equipping and beautifying their home, competing for placement in desirable jobs, and in organizing activities where no organization had existed previously--, and there was little time left for the group to sit around airing grievances. Difficulties and barriers to organization quickly became evident as shortages in equipment and administrative red tape were encountered, but the evacuees accepted the administration's assurance that the difficulties would be removed as soon as procedures were smoothed out. Life in Tule Lake was still fresh, the evacuees were kept busy starting their life anew, and both the administrators and the evacuees looked with hope and optimism upon the future possibilities of the center. There had not been time enough for monotony and dissatisfaction to develop.

But these were characteristics of the community that prevailed after later migrations as well, and did not distinguish the earlier conditions of the community from later ones. The striking feature of the early period was that favorable attitudes about the project were expressed, particularly with regard to the living conditions and the administration, while it was much more difficult to elicit expressions of this kind later.

Letters received at the Puyallup Assembly Center from evacuees who re-
✓ located from there to the Tule Lake Project indicate considerable enthusi-
asm about the housing and the food available at the latter center; some went
into great detail about the size and pattern of the apartments, the sheet-
rock boards with which the walls were finished, and the public facilities
available in the blocks. There was even greater emphasis upon the high
✓ quality of the food that was served in the mess halls. The people spoke
of the meat, milk and fruits as if it were an unexpected stroke of luck
✓ that these things were available. There were, of course, complaints
✓ about the dust and the cases of diarrhea which resulted from the high min-
eral content of the drinking water, but the tone of the letters were un-
deniably enthusiastic.

Not only was there satisfaction with the living conditions offered
at the Tule Lake Project, but there was also the feeling that the admin-
istrative staff represented a very capable group who were seriously inter-
ested in helping the evacuees. A girl writing about the W.R.A. staff ex-
presses an enthusiasm typical of the period.

✓ "Dr. Smith, head of the Japanese Relocation work, gave a very in-
spiring talk to both old and young people. Afterwards, he told us
that the administration officials here are the nicest and most con-
siderate he has met anywhere; and he's been all over. They are cer-
tainly a group of highly intelligent and refined people. In my
daily association I've found that to be very true. They treat us
just like one of themselves and are always asking us our opinions
about what we would like to do or have done. Dr. Smith says in
some places the Japanese are treated like prisoners of war, I
mean, about the strict rules and regulations."1/

Other visitors to the center likewise voiced high praise for the ad-
ministrative personnel, and the comments of the outsiders served to increase
the evacuee confidence in the administration. C. E. Rachford, who was ori-
ginally named to direct the Tule Lake Project but was transferred to the

1/ A Nisei Letter, June 15, 1942.

Heart Mountain center before he ever assumed active responsibility, stated in his parting speech to the community council his approval of the Tule Lake administration. The minutes of the meeting state:

"Mr. Rachford has been transferred to Denver, Colorado and Mr. Shirrell will definitely remain here. The regional officer commented on the efficiency of this colony, and declared that this colony is considerably better off than other colonies."1/

Following the severe experience of evacuation, the evacuees strongly desired recognition of equal rights from the majority group. The policy of the W.R.A. Staff at Tule Lake was to make a special effort to befriend the evacuees and the understanding, and gratification of this desire did much to promote a sense of well being among the evacuees.

The underlying condition determining the favorable circumstance of the early arrivals was the smallness of the center before the beginning of the large Sacramento movement. Before June 15, 1942, there were less than 2,000 evacuees on the Project. In spite of the newness of the administrators to their positions, and the groping and experimentation that was required during their initiation to their work, the problem of administering over a small group was infinitely less complex than was the case when the total population of 15,000 had arrived. Because the community was small and the administrative work was less pressing, the administrators initially had more time to acquaint themselves with individual evacuees and with the community's problems. The personal relations established between evacuees and administrators under these conditions gave a firm basis of confidence in their relations of a kind that could not be recreated when the project became larger.

Coupled with the smallness of the center, another condition that per-

1/ Minutes of Council Meeting, July 23, 1942. p. 2." L. Shirrell visited homes of several prominent leaders from Sacramento. He was accompanied by Mrs. Shirrell." This was a practice which the project director and

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page)

his wife maintained throughout the period of evacuee movements to the center, and evacuees accepted these calls as a sign of good will on the part of the project director. The area of contacts established in this way, of course, was quite limited.

mitted a favorable impression of the project lay in the time of arrival of the first group. Because they were the first arrivals, the early transfer groups met the least difficulties in acquiring a stock of scrap lumber or in getting preferred jobs. Moreover, the administration had stocked up on the basic necessities in anticipation of the project opening, and they were rather free in dispensing food, blankets, brooms, soap, and other commodities. As the population increased and the supply of goods decreased, the administration became more and more careful in dispensing these goods, and when unexpected shortages of some of the articles appeared, the administration even went to the evacuees to ask for the return of some of the distributed articles. If the W.R.A. had been able to ✓ maintain the original abundance in the distribution of goods, one source of resentment for the later arrivals would have been removed.

The relationship between the indefinite predisposition of the evacuees, which has already been described, and its response to varying situations at the center is illustrated in a very interesting way in the career of one Issei. This person, who was a farmer with a large family in a conservative Japanese rural community in California, proved to be a most energetic worker for his block. He was also apparently one of those individuals with an honest but rather simple view of his world; the type who would offer an abundant hospitality to his friends and reveal a violent hostility to his enemies. The observer who followed his career says of him:

✓ "When we arrived here in June, Mr. Kato who came in with one of the early arrivals, was the hardest worker in our block. He was always doing something for the block, repairing the road or cleaning out the "can". I met him in the washroom one day and we got to

talking. He said to me, 'The evacuation has hit all of us alike, and we're in this thing together. We've all got to pitch in and help each other out. If we all cooperate, we can make this a harmonious and successful community. We want to have the best relocation center of all.' Kato really thought we could have a fine community if we worked at it, and he was one guy who wasn't afraid to work. Now, of course, he's one of the noisiest trouble-makers in the block (three months after the first observations), and he's always the first guy in the block to object to anything the W.R.A. proposes. It's amazing how that guy has changed."1/

1/ Miyamoto Notes, October 13, 1942.

B. The Sacramento Group

A Background of Conflict

The movement to Tule Lake of people from the Sacramento Assembly Center (also known as the Walerga Assembly Center) began on June 16, 1942 and continued at a rate of about 500 evacuees a day until June 24 bringing the total population of Tule Lake to 6,625. The bulk of the new population was placed in Wards 2 and 3, and because the Sacramento people were located in a single contiguous area of the center and inclined to some degree of group identity, these two wards were often referred to as the Sacramento wards. The evacuees from the Sacramento center were largely from the city of Sacramento, California, but they also included a number of families from the very conservative Japanese farming communities of Florin, Isleton, Walnut Grove, and Elks Grove, which were located near Sacramento. The latter groups were concentrated in certain blocks within Ward 2, and again, in each case inclined towards a group identity of their own.^{1/} While the rural groups undoubtedly had some influence on the character of the Sacramento group, this influence was greatly overshadowed by the larger Sacramento city population which tended to dominate and lead not only the Wards 2 and 3 but also the evacuees of the whole project as well.

With the coming of the Sacramento group, a noticeable change in the atmosphere of the center occurred. The cooperative attitude of the earlier arrivals no longer dominated the community; doubts about the Caucasian administrators and resistance to their supervision became increasingly

^{1/} The daily journal of an observer living in a Walnut Grove block of Ward 2 indicates some of the differences from the Sacramento people felt by the Walnut Grove people. For instance, the Issei from the farming community express fears that their young people will learn the "wild ways" displayed by the cityfied Sacramento youths.

apparent. The same observation is made by Shibutani who reports:

"Thus, we can see that during the period of initial adjustment, on the whole, the colonists were cooperative. However, after the arrival of Sacramentoans in large numbers, dissension began to arise and those who questioned the wisdom of cooperating made known their opinions. Goals to make Tule Lake the "best relocation center in the country" were set, but by the end of June, sectionalism and suspicion of the keto crept in as threats to the realization of that goal."^{1/}

The change was noticeable in the increase of complaints to the administration, the appearance of minor but significant conflicts among the people, and the displacement of the cooperative attitude by a more segmental, individualistic interest. These changes may best be described and understood by tracing out the background of the Sacramento group, for the tension which this group added to the Tule Lake community was largely a product of their pre-evacuation and assembly center experiences.

The hostility of these new arrivals was not primarily directed at the keto or the evacuation, but rather at the leaders of the Sacramento Japanese American Citizens League, and particularly at two personalities who were associated with this organization. One was Walter Tsukamoto, a successful Nisei lawyer from Sacramento who had gained prominence among the Japanese as a leader of the national J.A.C.L. The other was Dr. George Iki, a prominent and successful physician and surgeon in Sacramento, who was not a member of the J.A.C.L. due to his lack of citizenship but was closely associated with many of the organization's leaders. Tsukamoto and Iki, as well as their group, were accused of having established and maintained "boss rule" over the Sacramento Assembly Center, and what was worse, they were accused of having "bootlicked" the Caucasian authorities to obtain and retain this control. Even before their arrival at the assembly cen-

^{1/} Shibutani Report, op. cit., p. 8.

ter, however, hostility against Tsukamoto and Iki developed around the professional relations of these men with the Japanese of Sacramento prior to evacuation.

The first important conflict between the Sacramento Japanese and Tsukamoto and Iki appeared in the pre-evacuation period over the demands of the people that Dr. Iki reduce his rates for typhoid inoculations. The story of this conflict, as told by one of those opposed to Dr. Iki, is substantially as follows:

"After it was definitely established that evacuation would take place, the Sacramento people became very much concerned about getting injections for immunization against typhoid. Despite official announcements to the contrary, the rumor that adequate inoculation could be had at the assembly center spread among the people of the community. So concerned were the people that even those who could not afford the injections at the rates asked by private physicians strained their purses to get this service. Most of the Japanese doctors were asking a fee of five dollars for the necessary three shots; Dr. Iki's rate was seven dollars and a half.

"Harry Mayeda, a young lawyer in the city, became concerned about the tendency of the people to pay for injections that they could not afford. "Of course," he declared, "the W.C.C.A. announced that they would provide preventative inoculations at the center, but the people were so frightened that many who couldn't afford it were straining themselves in order to get the injections." Mayeda sought some means of providing the injections at low cost to the people, and upon inquiry learned that the county public health service could provide the typhoid serum very cheaply if bought in quantity. He thereupon went to some of the doctors with the proposition that the serum be bought in quantity from the county and the injections be made on a mass basis at low cost with the aid of all the Japanese doctors in the city. These doctors were agreeable to the idea, but only if Dr. Iki were to cooperate, for they were unwilling to oppose the will of a person with as much influence in the medical circles of the city.

"Dr. Iki, however, refused to cooperate with Mayeda's plan. Iki argued that the fee of seven dollars and a half that he charged was already a reduced rate, that Caucasian doctors of the same standing would charge considerably more for the same service, that there were professional standards to maintain, and that the people had a free choice of deciding whether to get inoculated from private physicians or at the center and had no obligation to come to his office. Iki's refusal resulted in the withdrawal of all the other doctors."

"Mayeda was intent on carrying out the plan. He gained the support of two young doctors of the community who were willing to cooperate even at the risk of opposing Dr. Iki, arranged for the purchase of the typhoid serum from the county, and acquired the use of a church hall as the place to carry out the mass injections. An announcement was made in the Sacramento Japanese language paper of the date of the first injections and the reduced rates at which the inoculations would be given. Mayeda and his friends went to the church with soap and hot water to scrub out the rooms and strung up clean new sheets. The chief of the Sacramento public health office had given his approval of the program, and everything was set for the announced date.

"The day before the mass inoculation was to start, the city public health office called Mayeda to say that permission to perform the injections had been revoked. Mayeda rushed to the public health office to learn from the head of the office the reason for the sudden change of heart. All the medical official would say was, "Dr. Iki has informed us that the place where you intend to carry out the injections is unsanitary. Dr. Iki is a very good doctor respected by all his colleagues, and I must take his word for it. You had better see Dr. Iki about this question." At the same time, the American Medical Association of Sacramento called to say that any medical practitioner who participated in Mayeda's plan would be blacklisted by the organization. The two Nisei doctors who had been willing to oppose Dr. Iki were afraid to risk the wrath of the A.M.A. and withdrew from the program.

"Mayeda then went to a Caucasian doctor who was his friend asking for help, and the doctor consented to cooperate. However, the same pressure was brought to bear upon the Caucasian doctor until he too withdrew from the plan. There was nothing that could be done except to announce in the evening newspaper that the plan of inoculations had been postponed indefinitely. The people of the community who had looked hopefully to the program to get their injections were very much distressed by the postponement and wanted to know the reasons for it. Very shortly, rumors spread throughout the community that Dr. Iki had been instrumental in preventing the program by calling both the public health office and the American Medical Association and asking them to put a stop to the program. Dr. Iki, it was said, had been making considerable profit by charging exorbitant rates for inoculation, and he was afraid to lose this lucrative business. This information was even published in the local Japanese language paper and caused a flurry in the community. The hostility to Dr. Iki became so intense that there was scarcely a good word said for him after these announcements came out.

"Because of the serious situation which developed following the publicity regarding Dr. Iki's role in preventing the mass injections, Walter Tsukamoto, representing Dr. Iki, sought out Harry Mayeda and his group for a conference to straighten out the problem. While condemnations were tossed back and forth at these meetings, the result was that Dr. Iki decided to cooperate with the mass inoculation program at the reduced rate, and even assumed leadership in carrying it out. New dates were set, and the mass injections were accomplished as originally planned."^{1/}

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, December 20, 1943.

Unfortunately, Dr. Iki's stand on the issue has not been recorded. Evidently, he viewed the problem from the accepted professional standpoint, that a medical practitioner had as much right to offer his services on a strictly competitive basis as a business man as long as there was no breach of professional ethics. In fact, the professional view tended to support Dr. Iki's position, for mass inoculation at "cut rates" was virtually a concession to socialized medicine. Moreover, many business men and professionals in other fields were earning profits from the sale of goods and services required for the evacuation, but none were interfering with their right to determine their prices of fees.

The Japanese community, however, did not view the issue in the same light with Dr. Iki. In the first place, many Japanese in the Sacramento community had long suspected Dr. Iki's interest in the welfare of the Japanese because of his wide association with Caucasians. His very success as a physician and surgeon, the nature of his personality which enabled him to mix easily with Caucasians, and his inclination to limit his contacts with the Japanese community to a few friends of a professional class, were all factors in a latent resentment of his position within the community. A former Sacramento resident expressed this resentment in this way:

"Dr. Iki had relatively few patients among the Japanese; he was more a consultant to white doctors. Of course, Dr. Iki is a very fine doctor, but he didn't have the interest of the people at heart.. . . . Dr. Iki has always tried to be on good terms with the whites. He takes a superior attitude toward the Japanese, but he kowtows like anything to the whites. Although he has very many friends among the white, they're the wrong kind; they're not the kind that would help the Japanese in a pinch."^{1/}

^{1/} Miyamoto Journal, Sept. 15, 1942.

From the community's standpoint, the function of a doctor in a crisis such as the evacuation was to give freely of his service for the welfare of the people. The evacuation, it was felt, was a tragedy striking at the whole Japanese community, and it was therefore a time for all Japanese to stand together in mutually helping and protecting each other. Dr. Iki's interference with Harry Mayeda's plan "to reduce the cost of typhoid inoculations for those who can't afford to pay the customary rates" was interpreted by the people as an act of selfishness that threatened to disrupt the solidarity of the group.

While Walter Tsukamoto did not become involved in a similar incident, his position in the community was somewhat like that of Dr. Iki's. Because of his long standing friendship with Dr. Iki and his representation of the latter in the case cited above, many of the accusations against Dr. Iki included aspersions upon Tsukamoto as well. However, even before this incident, there were rumors in the community that Tsukamoto was taking advantage of the evacuation to earn large profits for himself. Federal restrictions imposed upon the Japanese after the outbreak of war and the requirements of evacuation created a great many legal problems which, in Sacramento, were largely taken to Tsukamoto for his advice because of his position as the leading Nisei lawyer of the city. Tsukamoto was inclined to charge what were considered exorbitant fees for his service, and several individuals were enraged at the price he asked of them. 1/

1/ Whatever the justification or lack of justification for the accusations made against Tsukamoto's fees, it must be said that the Japanese professional always had difficulty in his community. In these immigrant communities where the people were unaccustomed to paying large fees for professional service, it was generally necessary to keep the fee rates much lower than in the general population in order to satisfy the Japanese clients. On the other hand, the Japanese accepted the higher rates of Caucasian professionals when it was necessary to seek their aid.

"Hell, that guy cleaned up thousands of dollars on the Japanese around Sacramento just before the evacuation. My brother went to him for help in filling out Form TFR 300 and Tsukamoto soaked him plenty for a little thing like that. I know other people who got hooked for plenty. That guy hasn't anything to worry about financially."1/

Another and an equally important reason for hostility against Tsukamoto was his recognized leadership in the J.A.C.L. While there was no widespread popular hatred of the J.A.C.L. prior to the evacuation, hatred against the organization developed after the evacuation principally because it was felt that the leaders of the organization had been unnecessarily weak about protesting the evacuation. This feeling crystallized in the assembly centers among a large portion of the evacuee population, and Tsukamoto's long standing identification with the organization caused him to be singled out as the symbol of the organization at Sacramento and therefore an object of distrust.

At the Sacramento Assembly Center, Iki and Tsukamoto's activities served only to intensify popular hatred against them. At Sacramento as in almost every other community, the W.C.C.A. and the Army accepted the local J.A.C.L. organization as the liaison agency of the Japanese community to assist in the evacuation, and as the evacuees moved out to the assembly center, Tsukamoto and his group were in a strategic position to gain control of the evacuee administration of the center. Unfortunately, the Sacramento J.A.C.L. leaders were needlessly dictatorial in their management of center affairs. No elections were held to determine evacuee office holders; Tsukamoto and Iki simply assumed political leadership, and with the aid of their J.A.C.L. friends, selected a staff largely from their own group to administer the center. Actually, the Japanese staff had relatively little power in managing the center. Nevertheless, the fact that the Japanese administrators were self appointed by the J.A.C.L. and that they failed to establish any organ for the expression of representation

1/ Miyamoto Notes, July 14, 1942.

sentative opinion left the J.A.C.L. office holders open to the accusation of dictatorial authority.

It was claimed that Walter Tsukamoto, Dr. Iki, Dr. Goro Muramoto, president of the Sacramento J.A.C.L., and a small clique surrounding them "ran the whole show" at the Sacramento Assembly Center with almost no attention to democratic procedure. One individual remarked with some bitterness:

"Anyone who wasn't one of the Tsukamoto-Iki clique or a member of the J.A.C.L. just didn't have a chance of getting any of the more desirable positions at the assembly center. I think some of the accusations made against them are unjustified, but they brought criticism upon themselves by the high-handed manner in which they handled the camp organization."1/

The evacuation and the upheaval in the status relationship of the Japanese which it brought produced a condition favorable to the arousal of hitherto unstimulated political ambitions among the evacuees, particularly among the Nisei, and, under the circumstance, the failure to keep competition open for leadership positions was bound to arouse criticism and resentment.2/

To add to the discontent, the Sacramento Assembly Center was one of the poorer assembly centers from the standpoint of the living conditions which it offered. The evacuees not only blamed the W.C.C.A. for this condition, but they criticized with even greater vehemence the failure of the Japanese administrative staff to improve their lot. Public facilities were generally inadequate. The low quality and quantity of food was a major subject of complaint, and there were accusations of graft directed at the Caucasian mess supervisor. Some of the worst complaints were directed against the medical service in the center, of which it was said

1/ Miyamoto Notes, July 23, 1942

2/ In the pre-evacuation Japanese communities, political opportu-

ities were extremely limited. Except for isolated instances, no one dreamed of participating in the local politics of the majority group community; and Japanese political organizations held relatively little authority in the community. The assembly center provided the first opportunity in Japanese experience to view for important political positions, positions which apparently gave its holder large amounts of control over the community. It is in this sense that the evacuation stimulated hitherto latent political ambitions. This was not so true of the Issei, as least at the time of evacuation, for they were made to feel the government's suspicion of them as enemy aliens and the circumstance was unfavorable to their seeking political offices. The resulting dependence of the Issei upon the citizen Nisei was itself a further stimulus to the latter to assume leadership among evacuees with the intent of "helping their people in a time of crisis." Political ambitions were not limited to those who had previously been active in the J.A.C.L. or other political and semi-political organizations, but in the reshuffle of status relationships caused by the evacuation, every type of person who had any experience of leadership in any organization tended to show interest in the "new politics" of the Japanese community. On the other hand, the situation was favorable to the breeding of resentments among those who saw "persons no better than we were back home" assuming important roles in center management.

that it was impossible to get medical attention even if a person were seriously ill, and much of this criticism was directed at Dr. Iki, who was supervisor of the hospital, and Dr. Goro Muramoto.

A further elaboration of Dr. Iki's role as medical supervisor is necessary, for some of the bitterest memories of assembly center experience preserved by the Sacramento evacuees were concerning certain incidents that occurred in relation to medical service. On the whole, the evacuees were of the opinion that Dr. Iki, and Dr. Muramoto to a lesser degree, were more interested in playing politics than they were in attending to the needs of the hospital. Dr. Iki in particular was attacked for his political activities because of its alleged interference with his supervision of the hospital.

"If Dr. Iki had stuck to the work in the hospital, he would have been all right. After all, he's a good doctor. But the trouble with him at Walerga was that he was more interested in being a political figure in the camp than he was in being a doctor. He had a big enough job running the hospital, but instead of keeping his mind on his work, he was all the time running around to one political meeting or another messing around with Walter

Tsukamoto and his gang. You could never find him around the hospital when you wanted him."1/

"All that guy (Dr. Iki) was interested in was in going around "bootlicking" the white W.C.C.A. administrators. He never did a damn thing for the nihonjin, but he was sure fixing it up for himself all right."2/

The hostility of the people toward Dr. Iki reached its peak when an Issei died of heart failure because, it was claimed, Dr. Iki failed to respond soon enough to calls for medical assistance. The story as reported by a girl holding a rather low opinion of Dr. Iki reflects the popular version.

"Dr. Iki is a very undependable person as far as the Japanese go. The Sacramento people have always had a lot of difficulty with him. For instance, we had trouble with the medical staff that he was heading. One day while a group of us were standing in the shade of a building one of the boys with us suddenly pointed to something in the distance that looked like a crumpled pile of clothing and said, 'Isn't that a man on the ground?' We couldn't be sure but when we went up to see, we found that it was a man who was unconscious. We immediately called for a doctor, and after the longest time an ambulance came. But Dr. Iki wouldn't come; he wanted the patient sent up to the hospital. One of the Caucasians in the crowd said the man couldn't be moved because it would be fatal to him, so the ambulance went back to get the doctor, but he still wouldn't come. In the meantime, we tried to warm him by wrapping clothing about him, and also the camp director came and called Dr. Iki so he finally came. When the doctor arrived the man was dead. The man was known to have a weak heart and it was expected that he might die any time, but it was the way he died that made everyone mad. Dr. Iki could at least have sent a doctor immediately to see what could be done for him."3/

The man's death was attributed to Dr. Iki's failure to respond promptly to the call for help, a negligence of duty that was traceable to his lack of interest in helping the Japanese people. Condemnation was also directed at Dr. Goro Muramoto who was declared to be Tsukamoto and Iki's 'stooge'. The same incident reported by a nurse who worked with Dr. Iki at the hospital presents a quite different version of the incident.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, September 15, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, September 23, 1942.

3/ Miyamoto Journal, September 15, 1942.

"I worked in the hospital under Dr. Iki at Walerga, and was there when he was ill for two weeks. Dr. Iki was quite ill--he strained himself during the evacuation and the time he was using all his efforts to set up a decent hospital--, but all the time that I was with him, he was always a gentleman. I think he's a gentleman through and through. A nurse can tell quite a bit about a man's character when she works with him, and I was favorably impressed by Dr. Iki.

"I think the stories people tell about his failure to save the man who died of heart failure are viscious. Dr. Seto had examined that man not long before his death, and he told the man to be careful of his weak heart. He warned the man of the danger. I was there when the death occurred and I know exactly what happened. It was early in the morning and I was going down to the hospital to see how things were going even though it was Sunday and I was off duty. The hospital was so understaffed that we hardly had any time to rest, but I thought they might need me so I went to check up. I saw the crowd gathered around the unconscious man, so I hurried over to see what I could do. I took his pulse, but his heart had already stopped."

"We sent for an ambulance and Dr. Muramoto. But Dr. Muramoto, who was on duty that morning, happened to be way off at the other end of camp making a house call and couldn't be reached immediately. In the meantime, Dr. Iki, who was still sick in bed, heard about the accident, and though he was still pretty sick himself, he put on his bathrobe and started out for the accident. When he was part way over, he saw Dr. Muramoto return on the ambulance and go toward the accident, so Dr. Iki decided that Dr. Muramoto would tend to the case and he went back to bed. Of course, by the time the doctor got there, the man was dead, but he was probably dead quite a bit before then. There was nothing that could be done for him. Even in spite of the warning that Dr. Seto had given the man, he had tried to pick up a big two by four lumber and bring it home. I think that Dr. Iki did everything that could have been done under the circumstance."

"There were only three doctors down at Walerga (total population, 4,753) and it was impossible for the staff to take care of all the cases, especially when Dr. Iki was sick. Because it was a free clinic, people kept coming for petty services that they normally wouldn't go to a doctor for. We wouldn't have had any equipment if Dr. Iki hadn't brought all his instruments and things. The Sacramento people don't realize it but they owe a lot to him."^{1/}

Considering the typical experience of medical staffs at other assembly centers, and the popular misconceptions about the laziness of evacuee doctors that often prevailed, there are reasons to believe that the second account is substantially truer than the first. Medical service in all the

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, September 17, 1942.

assembly centers was a difficult and hazardous business because of understaffing, the lack of equipment, the disorganization of the initial period of establishment, the administrative regulations binding hospital service, and popular demands upon free clinical service. Nevertheless, the popular version of Dr. Iki's failings as medical supervisor is significant, for it indicates the willingness of the people to believe the worst of him once the seed of distrust had been laid. The above-mentioned death was not the only one for which he was held responsible; there were other widely believed stories associating the death of evacuees with his negligence of duty.

By the time the Sacramento people were moved to Tule Lake, there existed among a bulk of the population, a profound distrust of the J.A.C.L. leaders and a fundamental conflict between the majority of Sacramento people and a small group of J.A.C.L. leaders (including Dr. Iki). In summary, the accusations against them were: (1) they lacked the courage and intelligence to protest the evacuation vigorously, and because of their weakness and mistakes, evacuation resulted; (2) they waved the banner and "bootlicked" the whites, but never raised a voice against them; (3) they followed this tactic in order to safeguard their private interests and provide for their personal well being; (4) they were dictatorial in their dealings with the evacuees in contrast to their unctuous behavior toward the whites; and (5) they practiced favoritism, showed inefficiency in camp management, put on airs as a consequence of their newly found status, and generally displayed all the weaknesses of corrupt political organization and its leaders, but most Sacramentans were uniformly critical of the undemocratic methods by which the assembly center was organized.

The one overt act of violence resulting from this hostility occurred during the transfer to Tule Lake. A group of Sacramento youths who were

immediately assigned to the transportation division upon their arrival, intercepted the incoming baggage of Walter Tsukamoto, Dr. Iki, and Dr. Muramoto. These youths not only refused to transport the baggage of these three families to their apartments, as was done for all incoming families, but they marked up each piece with "all kinds of nasty words" and otherwise damaged the baggage. There is no record of the apprehension of the youths for their misdemeanor.

In the face of the very evident hostility toward the J.A.C.L., Tsukamoto, Iki, and Muramoto, as well as other J.A.C.L. leaders, were rather cautious upon their arrival at Tule Lake not to create further cause for criticism. No effort was made to organize the J.A.C.L. at Tule Lake for some time. Iki and Muramoto tended to avoid the community, and restricted their activities largely to work at the hospital. Tsukamoto, while still a potent political figure, contented himself with remaining in the background of Tule Lake political activity for a time. However, immediately upon his election to the Temporary Community Council at Tule Lake, he personally undertook through this organization a vigorous campaign to get for the Sacramento people the family allowances that were promised but never paid to them. This was principally an effort to clear himself of the unfounded but widespread rumor that he had pocketed for himself the family allowances of the people.^{1/}

^{1/} The rumor of Tsukamoto's "graft" appeared after the Sacramento people arrived at Tule Lake and learned from people of other assembly centers of their receiving the family allowances.

Tsukamoto and the Council's efforts to gain payment of the family allowances for both the Sacramento and Marysville people failed. See the correspondence between Walter Tsukamoto and Major W. F. Durbin, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, July 22, 1942 to August 15, 1942. In explaining their policy, Major Durbin declared: "The reason the residents

of the Marysville and Sacramento Assembly Centers failed to receive allowances was because their need was not found to be so pressing as was the need of residents in other centers; and, their transfers took place prior to completion of the mechanical requirements of distribution..... It was also decided that in the event transfer was made prior to any distribution of funds that such allowances were not retroactive." (Letter of Major W. F. Durbin to Walter Tsukamoto, July 28, 1942.)

In replying to Major Durbin, Tsukamoto very cleverly pointed out that no surveys were ever made, "which could be made the basis of any comparison of the relative 'needs' of evacuees residing in the numerous Assembly Centers....." He further showed in replying to the argument that allowances were not to be retroactive in the event transfers of evacuees were completed prior to the distribution of such funds, that payment of back wages earned at the Assembly Centers (though not of family allowances) was made two weeks after the transfer of evacuees was completed. Tsukamoto concluded, "If funds in the form of wages can be paid after transfer is completed, the theory of inability to pay because such payments would be retroactive is contrary to the actual facts, and there appears to be no reason why funds in payment of family allowances cannot be similarly made." (Tsukamoto's letter to General J. L. DeWitt, August 8, 1942.)

Allowance may be made for the complicated problems that confronted the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army in undertaking the evacuation, their greater concern with the wider defense problems than evacuation, their desire to minimize the cost of evacuation, and their consequent inability to keep the evacuation and assembly center program strictly consistent. From this point of view, Tsukamoto's arguments may have seemed to the Army as so much sophistry. Nevertheless, this was an instance of inconsistency, and these inconsistencies were multiplied several times in the whole program, with the result that serious demoralization occurred among the evacuees.

The evacuee administrators of the assembly centers were caught between the inconsistencies in the program and the demands of the evacuees such that they were rarely able to satisfy the needs of the evacuees. Their position by its nature was subject to much criticism. The problem of the leaders was to create among the evacuees the feeling that the leaders were on their side and fighting for their welfare. It is evident that Iki, Tsukamoto, and the J.A.C.L. leaders at the Sacramento Assembly Center failed to achieve this united front with their evacuee population.

The breadth of difference between the views of the Sacramento people and the Iki-Tsukamoto group may in some degree be judged from Dr. Iki's explanation of his own position.

"I can't understand people who go about thoughtlessly damaging other people's property. I had a whole case of medical equipment sent up from my office in Sacramento thinking it might be of some use at the hospital, but some boys dropped the case (purposely)

and ruined the whole thing. I didn't want the equipment for myself; I wanted to contribute it for the use of the whole staff because I knew there would be a shortage of equipment. Some of the instruments are awfully hard to get these days, but you just have to have them for certain types of medical work. It didn't matter to me if they became worn through use, or even if I had to throw them away at the end of the war; I thought they would be more useful here than laying around in storage in Sacramento. But some people can't seem to understand that kind of an attitude."

"After the evacuation was announced and it was known that the Sacramento people would be evacuated to the Walerga Assembly Center, I went up there to see what the medical set-up was like, and to see if I could be of any help. When I went up there, I found everything in a rather sorry state; nothing was ready, and there was no one around to organize the hospital. When the project director asked me to come and help, I agreed to do so, and I went to work there several days before evacuation. There was practically no medical equipment on hand, and the orders were coming in very slowly. I decided that instead of storing all my own equipment, I would lend it to the center hospital for their use. There was about \$4,000 worth of instruments, drugs, even an operating table, and such, but I thought all of it would be useful, so I have a van back right up to my office door and move it right out to the assembly center. When the evacuees started to arrive, we found use for my things right away. For instance, in making typhoid injections, the army requisition for needles hadn't come through and we couldn't have gone ahead with the inoculations, but I had a whole set of needles in my outfit so we were able to take care of the situation very nicely. When we closed up the hospital at Walerga, I decided there was no use shipping all that equipment back to Sacramento for storage, and I knew there would be some use for it at Tule Lake, so I had the stuff sent out here. The boys who damaged that case of medical equipment don't seem to have realized what they were doing."^{1/}

.....

"A lot of people accuse me of being too friendly to the Caucasians, but I see nothing wrong with cooperating with them. I've always had a lot of friends among the Caucasians, and some of my best friends are back there in Sacramento. I feel that a good part of the misunderstanding about the Japanese on the West Coast arose because the two groups never had a chance to get to know each other. At Walerga, I spent a great deal of time working with the Caucasian administration entertaining them, but that was, I felt, the best way of getting their cooperation in improving the conditions of the camp. Those men down there were all right; all they needed to was to understand the problem of the evacuees, but you couldn't get them to understand by arguing with them and trying to force things out of them.

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, July 16, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, September 13, 1942.

It would be fruitless to examine the motives of the Tsukamoto-Iki group, to determine whether they were really altruistic or selfish ones. This much is certain, that they were acting in a manner that they felt would be to the best interest of the people, but that their view of the proper approach to the center problems did not correspond with the view of the bulk of evacuees. The chief failure of the Tsukamoto-Iki group was in their under-estimation of the force of popular opinion and their unwillingness to keep more in tune with it. At the same time, there was an over-evaluation of the ends that could be achieved by cooperation with the majority group. The desire of the people was to have strong leadership in protesting the evacuation and the undesirable conditions of the assembly center, but the J.A.C.L. leaders chose rather to suppress these tendencies toward protest. Moreover, the kind of leadership the evacuees were seeking was symbolized in a type of "selfness" individual who would raise his voice in loud and sharp protest against the injustices performed by the majority group, without thought for personal safety, and would dedicate his life to bettering the welfare of the evacuees.

"The Nisei couldn't organize against the J.A.C.L. For one thing they were too young. They wanted someone to come out for their rights, but they needed leadership and there was no one to lead them. It was because the J.A.C.L. was so weak and willing to give in to the Caucasians that they were mostly griped about the organization. Of course, the J.A.C.L. could always come back and say, 'Why don't you do something about it yourself?' and there wouldn't be any answer to that. But most Nisei didn't feel they could do anything themselves. What they wanted was to have a strong leadership of the kind that would go out and fight for them."

"I think the Issei just felt that the Nisei had no backbone. At Walerga, I don't think they felt they had anything to say. But they did feel that the Nisei had a right to make demands, and they criticized us for not defending ourselves when our rights were being taken away."

"The thing is, Tsukamoto didn't understand Japanese psychology. The way the Japanese look at it, they want others to do something for them especially in a crisis like the evacuation, while the American way is for the person who wants something to go and ask for it. That's the difference, you see. If Tsukamoto had made an announcement in the newspapers at the time he was getting all the legal business that he was willing to offer his services to help the Japanese people in a time of need, the Japanese would have thought he was really a great man. The trouble was that instead they got the idea he was trying to make money off of them in the crisis."1/

Consequences of the Sacramento Conflict

It seems reasonable to expect that the experience of the Sacramento people with the "J.A.C.L. dictatorship" at Walerga influenced their initial adjustments to Tule Lake, but it is difficult to show the exact relationship of this experience with the decline of the cooperative attitude among the Tule Lake people. There is no data to indicate a precise correlation between the experiences at the assembly center and the initial adjustments to the relocation center. The best that can be said is that there existed a temporal relation between the arrival of the Sacramento group and an increase of disorganization on the Tule Lake Project.

In discussing the mood with which the Sacramento group arrived at the Tule Lake Project, one observer from this group declared:

"I wouldn't say that the Sacramento people arrived at Tule Lake with an uncooperative attitude. I think we had every intention of cooperating with the administration, and I believe we showed our willingness to cooperate. But after what had happened down at Walerga (reference to J.A.C.L. dominance) our one determination was that the same thing shouldn't happen again."2/

The above observer was one of those with political interests who was excluded from political participation at Walerga by the established leaders, and he may have been expressing a biased attitude. But there had been others with political ambition who had been caught in the same position. Moreover,

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1944.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, Dec. 20, 1943.

there is evidence that the evacuees reacted, in a general way, to the Walerga leadership after the transfer to Tule Lake. The damage inflicted upon the baggage belonging to Tsukamoto, Iki and Muramoto by a group of Sacramento youths in the transportation division was the first and most explicit expression of the hatred of the Sacramento people for the "J.A.C.L. clique", and, functionally, it was an act of control to prevent a repetition of their dominance at the relocation center. The fact that this act of violence was committed by a group of irresponsible youths is further evidence of what the Sacramento people as a whole thought of the J.A.C.L. leaders, for the youths were assuming the tacit approval of their act by the people at large.

One immediate consequence of the conflict at the Sacramento Assembly Center was that its evacuees arrived at Tule Lake with a fairly widespread anti-J.A.C.L. feeling. Following evacuation criticisms of the J.A.C.L. were a common feature of almost every center, but whe, as in the case of the Walerga people, their experience with the organization was associated with specific grievances against it, their reaction to J.A.C.L. policy tended to take on a clear-cut form. The nature of this reaction is brought out in some of the commonly expressed criticisms of the J.A.C.L.

"Maybe the J.A.C.L. or any other Nisei group couldn't have done anything to prevent the evacuation. But the J.A.C.L. didn't have to say that the Japanese would willingly cooperate with the evacuation. If you ask me, that's the biggest piece of hypocrisy. Who wants to cooperate with an evacuation when you stand to lose everything. Besides, the J.A.C.L. leaders are a bunch of suckers to think that the evacuation was caused by military necessity."1/

"In the assembly center, we were getting a starvation diet, but when we wanted them to kick to the administration about it, those J.A.C.L. guys told us not to kick or we'd get into trouble. All they know is how to bootlick the whites, and get what they want for themselves. What gets me is the way they go around claiming they represent all the Nisei. The keto get to thinking all the Nisei are like the "J.A.C.L."

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 19, 1942.

Lillies"; that's why they're not afraid to kick us around. If we'd yelled a hell of a lot more, they would have thought twice about trying to evacuate us."1/

"The trouble with the J.A.C.L. was that they were running things to suit themselves. No, it wasn't only the Nisei who were antagonistic to them; the Issei felt the same way. You could tell because of the dirty names the J.A.C.L. was called. They would say, "Those dirty so-and-so Jackals." "Jackal" stood for J.A.C.L. I heard the Issei say the same sort of thing, you know, about the shinikyokai (Citizens League) this 'n that. Most of the people didn't like the way the camp was being run..... The people didn't like the attitude which the J.A.C.L. took on the evacuation question. The feeling was that the J. A.C.L. should have tried to do something to prevent it. But they weren't fighting for our rights and that was what gave the J.A.C.L. such a bad name. There were some personal things, too, like Tsukamoto charging exorbitant fees for his law work."2/

"Sure the J.A.C.L. is to blame for the evacuation. If they hadn't gongd around saying that the Japanese would cooperate with the evacuation the Army never would have thought of carrying out such a plan."3/

The foregoing are Nisei expressions; it was the Nisei group who were principally concerned with the attack upon the J.A.C.L. The principal criticism of the organization is that it did not fight back sufficiently against the evacuation and against the whites; but they not only failed to fight back, they added insult to the self respect of the Nisei by representing themselves as reflecting Nisei opinion when they agreed to cooperate with the evacuation. The frequent and sneering reference to people who "bootlick the whites" is an indication of the sharpness with which this insult was felt.

To understand the widespread and vehement character of the J.A.C.L. criticism, it must be seen as a product of the Nisei's struggle with his own conscience about his personal behavior at the time of evacuation. The hatred of the J.A.C.L. was invariably related to the feeling that the Nisei had not sufficiently protested the evacuation, that not only the J.A.C.L. but they themselves as well had failed to place their protest against the injustices of evacuation on record.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, July 17, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1944.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, February 17, 1943.

"The trouble was that we didn't have guts enough to stand up for our rights when the evacuation talk started. If all the Nisei on the Coast had refused to cooperate with the evacuation, maybe we could have done something to prevent it. We have our constitutional rights. The Government hasn't proved a single case of sabotage or disloyalty against us. It was only because of a lot of propaganda and of vested interests that wanted Japanese property that got us kicked out of California. If we'd been united, they couldn't have done anything to us; hell, they wouldn't had had jails enough to hold all of us."1/

This was "second guessing"--the signs of boldness after the passage of danger--, but in the days immediately following evacuation, there was a great amount of talk of this kind. The essence of the psychology was a state of confusion in which were mingled an effort to understand and explain the disaster that had struck them, bitterness and resentment at the people who had caused the disaster, chagrin at not having anticipated the danger, and of self condemnation for having lacked the courage to protest the injustice. There was often an apologetic note about their explanation of their failure to react more vigorously against the evacuation.

"What do you think will be the Supreme Court decision on the test cases on the legality of the evacuation? I kind of wish I'd refused to be evacuated too, but you know how it is when you have your family and dependents to think about."2/

Discussion of the test cases were largely confined to the "Thinking" Nisei, but among a large number of Nisei the wish to have taken a more firm stand for a recognition of constitutional rights appeared as an afterthought.

Actually, at the time of evacuation, no one in the Japanese communities had any plan for preventing it, as much as this was desired, and there had only existed confusion, anxieties, unreleased resentments, and feelings of helplessness in the face of discrimination. What everyone desired at the time was for leadership that would somehow show a way for the people to avoid the disaster, but the J.A.C.L., the one organization that could have conceivably assumed such a leadership, had failed to take a strong stand against evacuation. It was this failure of the J.A.C.L. to do what everyone desired but

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 27, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, July 20, 1942.

felt too weak individually to do that made of it the butt of post-evacuation criticisms. In this sense, the J.A.C.L. may be compared to a leader who is given an almost impossibly difficult task to accomplish and is blamed for not fulfilling that task.

Issei criticism of the J.A.C.L. was less definite and was generally included as a part of the criticism of the Nisei in genera. As far as their own resistance to the evacuation was concerned, the Issei declared themselves helpless because of their alien status, but they felt that the Nisei with their citizenship had a right to protest and that they had failed to use this right. Commenting on his relations with the Issei, one Sacramento youth declared:

"They (the Issei) would say, 'Nisei-tachi wa ikuji ga nai (the Nisei have no strength of spirit)'. They criticized us for not finishing things we started when the going got tough. They said we were afraid to stand up against the hakujin (Caucasians), and that we always took the easiest way out. They're idea was that we'd let the Caucasians kick us around, take all our rights away, mistreat us in all ways, and we'd just docilely take it. I suppose what they said was true, but the trouble is that most Nisei are too young yet. When the Nisei get to be about fifty, they'll have more confidence and we'll learn to fight back, but when you're still young, you're afraid to fight back."^{1/}

The role of the Issei was not so much to act for themselves, at least during the early period following evacuation, but rather to "needle" the Nisei into action. The Nisei were keenly sensitive to Issei criticism of their group, and part of the tendency to criticize the J.A. C.L. for permitting the evacuation arose from their desire to cast the blame off themselves and to throw it upon a suitable scapegoat. Moreover, Issei "needling" of the Nisei was successful in arousing rebelliousness, as later developments in the community will more fully show, and at least a part of the reaction of the Sacramento Nisei to the Iki-Tsukamoto group must be ascribed to the effectiveness of this influence.

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1942.

Further evidence of the continuing effect of the Sacramento conflict after the movement of the Sacramento group to the Tule Lake Project is indicated in the restraint which J.A.C.L. leaders initially showed in their political activities at the latter center. It was previously indicated that both Dr. Iki and Dr. Muramoto, who were strong political figures at Walerga, withdrew from political activities at Tule Lake. It is true that Tsukamoto who more than any other individual on the project, was symbolic of the J.A.C.L. was elected a representative of his block to the Temporary Community Council of Tule Lake by the Sacramento people, but this was only because there was no other Nisei in the block with a comparable background of political experience who could be entrusted with the responsibilities of political leadership. Tsukamoto's election represents the suppression of the block people's distrust of him because of their desire to have a strong representative from the block in the community council; no Issei, it should be remembered, could hold an elected office at the relocation center. While he was elected to the council, Tsukamoto was careful at first to do nothing that would jeopardize his relations with the people. His discussions on the council floor during the early months indicated a scrupulous avoidance of statements that would antagonize the people. An instance of the caution which he exercised at the time is offered in the case of his refusal to speak at a public forum on "Nisei Citizenship" which was held on July 13, 1942.^{1/} Tsukamoto initially accepted the invitation to speak, but when he suspected that Shibutani might attack the J.A.C.L. in his discussion, Tsukamoto withdrew from the forum and it was necessary to get another speaker to replace him. Such caution was in sharp contrast to his open defense of the J.A.C.L. four months later when he was

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, the First Community Forum, 'Nisei Citizenship: How Can We Preserve It?'. July 13, 1942. It was only after Tsukamoto had met with the other speakers, Edward Ferguson, W.R.A. Regional Attorney and Tamotsu Shibutani, for a preliminary conference on the proposed discussion that he withdrew from the forum.

again asked to speak on the same subject with the same speakers, but his political position by the latter occasion had been strongly reinforced. No efforts were made during the first months to organize the J.A.C.L. at the Tule Lake Project.

Tsukamoto not only showed caution about further antagonizing the people, but his first public activity at the Tule Lake Project was an aggressive championing of the Sacramento and Marysville evacuee's demands for the payment of the family allowances by the W.C.C.A. Considering that there was vicious rumors of Tsukamoto having pocketed this money, it seem almost certain that an important motivation in this campaign was his desire to correct the misimpression that was being circulated. The letter which he wrote to the Western Defense Command on this question were of the nature of vigorous protests against the inequality imposed on the Sacramento and Marysville people, and the "agitation" which he carried on in the Community Council over the question was directly in line with the resentful mood of the evacuee at large.

The important consequence of the conflict at the Sacramento Assembly Center, then, was to intensify the aggressiveness of all the evacuees from that center. Those who were opposed to the J.A.C.L. leaders assumed increased aggressiveness to overcome the initial advantages gained by the latter group, while those associated with the J.A.C.L. leadership at Walerga found themselves at Tule Lake in a position which required that they justify their action at the assembly center, and in this effort moved likewise toward an attitude of protest against the governmental authorities. While it is difficult to produce concrete material showing the increase of aggressiveness among the Sacramento people as a consequence of the conflicts experienced at the assembly center, for the changes that occurred were noticeable more

in the shift of moods than in measurable behavior, one instance may be sited in support of the view that aggressiveness increased. A worker in the housing section who was in a position to observe the arrival of all the groups entering the project declared:

"We had more housing trouble with Wards 2 and 3 (the Sacramento wards) than with any others. It seemed that every other family had a complaint to make about the housing which they were assigned. Some of the Sacramento people who arrived first wrote back to their friends who were still at the assembly center about the housing set-up advising them as to the better and poorer apartments. That's why when they arrived at Tule Lake, they made all kinds of demands about which apartment they wanted, such as the apartments facing the south side because it received the most sunlight. Oh, there were all kinds of complaints, and it seemed that everyone wanted an apartment different from the one assigned them. I don't know whether it's scientific to say we had more complaints from the Sacramento people, but if I were to answer "yes" or "no", I would say "yes".^{1/}

That people wrote to their friends about the relative desirability of the various barracks in the blocks is an insufficient explanation of the greater amount of complaints from the Sacramento people, for the people arriving from the other assembly centers had the same opportunity to inform their friends about relocation center conditions. It is the fact that the Sacramento evacuees were predisposed to seek information about the relative merits of housing, and use this information in making demands to get what they desired, that sets off the latter group from the others and indicates their aggressiveness.

It is important to note that no organized reaction to the J.A.C.L. leadership developed in the Sacramento group either at the assembly center or during the initial adjustments to the Tule Lake Project. Discontent was aroused by the J.A.C.L. control and a wide undercurrent of rebellion against the organization's authority flowed through the group, but the rebelliousness was not channelized into any concrete opposition movement and it continued to exist only as individual discontent and expressions of hostility in informal

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1944.

groups. Therefore, when the transfer movement to Tule Lake occurred destroying the J.A.C.L. organization that had been established at the assembly center, the release from the system was a signal for the masses of the Sacramento group to seek individually a correction of the source of their discontent. Had there been an organized anti-J.A.C.L. movement, some of the energy of discontent would have gone toward the support of such a movement with the intent of crushing the J.A.C.L., but in the absence of such a movement, the unrest expressed itself in individual competition for advantages. The form of aggressiveness displayed by the Sacramento people was thus influenced by the absence of an organized channel through which the discontent could be expressed. One of the Sacramento evacuees declared:

"When I first arrived at Tule Lake, I looked on it as a place that would do for the time. I wasn't happy being in a center, but there wasn't anything you could do about it. Yes, of course, it was an improvement over the assembly center especially in the latrines and other facilities. But I didn't feel that it was a great improvement; conditions weren't a great deal better. I was living in Block 36. We didn't have such good food during the first month. Lumber was very hard to get. We had trouble with that all the time. The conditions of the center made everybody individualistic; they were out to take care of themselves, and to hell with the rest of the people.....that kind of an attitude. The same was true in employment. I remember there was a rush for the employment office, and the idea was to see Mr. Smith (the employment head) and take care of your own job. If you could carry away more lumber than the next fellow, so much the better."1/

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1944.

Initial Adjustments of the Sacramento Group

Two conditions which the earlier arrivals found highly satisfying deteriorated with the coming of additional population. On the one hand, the ease of establishing relations with the administration group experienced by the earlier arrivals tended to disappear with the coming of the Sacramento people; on the otherhand, the excellence of food that prevailed during the first weeks likewise declined. Change in the size of population was directly related to the change of these conditions. With the transfer of the Sacramento evacuees, 4,000 people were added to the Tule Lake population through daily arrivals of about 500 people for a period of eight days. This rapid addition considerably increased the pressure upon each administrative department both in maintaining the center population as well as in aiding the initial adjustments of the newcomers. There was not only less time for the administrative officers to mix informally with the new arrivals, but also in their official capacities, they gave less time and individual attention to the problems brought by the evacuees. In contrast to the high opinion of the administrators evidenced by the earlier arrivals, the Sacramento people showed far less enthusiasm for the staff. There was no hostility directed against them; there was merely an absence of the enthusiasm for the staff that was quite markedly present among the early arrivals. In replacing the earlier flexible relations between the administrators and the evacuees with a more formal, businesslike relationship, the possibility of personal understanding between the two groups was reduced.

A more concrete change was the decline in the quality of the food served in the mess halls. Before the arrival of the Sacramento group, comments about the food were generally favorable, but after June 16, the ration of food supplied each mess hall declined and there were increasingly fewer favorable comments. In part this may have been due to the increased problems of food

distribution with the trebling of the population. Moreover, the early arrivals had enjoyed a condition of abundance as the warehouse had been stocked in anticipation of the first evacuee groups, and the early standard of meals was higher than that received at Tule Lake at any later date. The comments of the Sacramento evacuees indicate little satisfaction with the food they were getting.

"This was the third time in ten days we've had canned sardines for dinner."^{1/} (Statement made on the tenth day after the beginning of the Sacramento movement.)

"I was going to catch a ride down to the warehouse one of these days and tell them, 'If you mean to let us live, why don't you supply us with enough to eat.'"^{2/} (A cook in a Sacramento block during an argument about his cooking.)

On July 6, 1942, ten days after the arrival of the last group from the Sacramento Assembly Center, a conflict broke out between the mess crew and the people of block 26 as a result of the people's complaints about the food. The block residents accused the chief cook and the mess workers of using the food supplies for themselves, while the chief cook, the same one quoted above, countered that the warehouse wasn't supplying him adequately.^{3/} Similar instances of discontent with the food were apparent in several Sacramento blocks.

Apart from the size and rapidity of the transfer movements as factors in the increasing difficulties of the project, an equally significant problem resulted from the time differential of the movements. The earliest arrivals enjoyed the greatest opportunity and choice in getting employment, housing, scrap lumber and other facilities, but even by the time of the Sacramento movement, the amount of opportunity was noticeably decreased. The competition that developed for scrap lumber and for employment is the best indication of the decreased opportunities.

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, June 26, 1942.

^{2/} Sakoda Journal, July 6, 1942.

^{3/} Miyamoto Notes, "Mess Hall 26 Controversy," July 6, 1942.

In part, the decrease of employment opportunities was more imagined than real, for the increase of population created many new jobs that did not exist before. However, with the broadening of activities and the sudden increase of applicants for positions, it required time to set up new procedures for assigning positions. It was also true that some of the key positions were filled by the first arrivals because of the need to get operations underway, a condition that was particularly noticeable in walking through the administration buildings where large numbers of the early groups were employed at preferred jobs.

"In walking through the administration building offices, I felt that everyone looked up to stare at me. They gave me a cold, almost defenseively hostile look, as if they saw in me a stranger that might contest them their position."1/

"That girl at the reception desk irks me. She treats all the newcomers as if we were so much dirt under her feet. I think there should be a receptionist at the front office who is pleasant and friendly instead of like her."2/

There was still some talk that job assignments were temporary until all the evacuees had arrived at Tule Lake, and that reassignment on the basis of merit would be made when everyone had an opportunity to compete for the positions. Established workers who felt uncertain of retaining their positions in open competition were hostile toward those who seemed interested in vieing for the same positions.

The competition for the better jobs was a focal source from which sectional conflicts developed. The bulk of the early arrivals were from the Pacific Northwest, and to the newly arrived Sacramento group, it seemed that the Northwesterners were not only installed in the best positions but were attempting to surround themselves exclusively with evacuees from their own group.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, June 28, 1942.

"You Washington people don't know, but at one time things got to the point where there might have been a real blow-up between the Sacramentans and the Northwesterners. Some of us from California were made enough to fight. For instance, I had to wait months before I got assigned as a lab technician in the hospital although I put in my application with Dr. Carson almost as soon as I got there. I didn't hear from him so I went down to see him about it, but the Secretary told me he was too busy and couldn't see me. I didn't think anything of it then so I said I'd come back another time. But every time I tried to see Dr. Carson, that Washington girl who was his secretary said he was too busy to see me, but that he would take care of the matter later. In the meantime, a lot of her friends who applied way after me got their jobs right away. She was saving all the positions for the Northwest people. That really burnt me up."1/

The Northwest people denied acting on the basis of favoritism, but in the keep competition for favored positions, it was easy to view others with suspicion. Each group agreed that assignment of positions should be based on competence, but the early arrivals had no desire to give up positions in which they were already installed, while the newcomers aggressively sought to displace those whom they regarded as less competent than themselves. Such a struggle occurred in office of the project newspaper where the incumbent editor from the Northwest, who had surrounded himself with people from his own group, sought to prevent an invasion of his office by the Sacramento newspapermen. A report of the incident reads:

"Another conflict broke out in the office of the Tulean Dispatch. The staff of the Wahgega Wasp went into the office of the director, Mr. Shirrell, with a letter of introduction from a Caucasian in Sacramento and demanded that they be allowed to take over the Tulean Dispatch since the paper was nothing more than a bulletin board in the hands of inexperienced newspapermen. When the staff from the northwest heard of this, they became very unfriendly to the Sacramentans and the editor refused even to speak to the newcomers. Members of the Caucasian personnel had to step in to settle the issue and to give everyone a fair chance on the basis of ability. One of the Sacramento boys remarked, "Most of the Washington guys are OK; it's just that dumb bastard Y. that gets me." Many of the colonists from Washington admitted that the paper was not too good and remarked that the editor was not particularly brilliant; however, they seemed to resent the manner in which the Sacramento boys tried to take over."2/

1/ Miyamoto Notes July 21, 1942.

2/ Shibutani Report, op. cit., p. 6.

In this instance, the Northwest editor in question was gradually eased out of his position, first by placing a Sacramento man in a status comparable to the former, and later by a series of incidents that alienated support from the first editor.

With the arrival of the Sacramento people, competition for scrap lumber was even more intense than for employment. Despite the rush for jobs, there was no scarcity of employment comparable to the rapidly diminishing of the scrap lumber stock. Within a week after the first Sacramento movement, the scrap pile near Block 4 was so depleted that only the poorest pieces and kindling wood were left, and it was virtually impossible to find the smooth longer pieces necessary for making household furnishings. About this time, a new scrap lumber pile was started in an open space near the Sacramento wards, and the construction trucks discontinued dumping at the original lumber pile. An observer who lived in the Sacramento block gives a detailed account of the increased activity that developed about the second lumber pile.

"The day after we arrived people from Walerga began to come into Ward II at the rate of 500 daily, first filling up Blocks 25, 26, and 27. At the same time, trucks stopped unloading scrap lumber by the warehouse near Wars I, and began to take it out to the open space on the north side of the Colony, beyond Fire Station 2, and by Ward II and III. The incoming people were in need of lumber to build shelves and furniture, but still the number out at the lumber pile was not very large. A few days after our arrival my brother and I wandered out to the new scrap pile and found several loads of scrap lumber which had been untouched, probably because everyone had gone to eat. There was a large pile of two-by-fours and another of one-by-fours. We brought as much home of each as we could carry on one trip, and did not bother to go back for more. We still felt that lumber would always be available, and there was no need to hoard any."

"For the next week we noticed increasing activity at the lumber pile. As the trucks unloaded the lumber, the better pieces were immediately snatched up by eager hands. The quickest ones got the best lumber. Many accumulated as much good lumber as they could into a pile and laid claim to it by putting their names on the pile. Several WRA trucks were aiding the colonists in carrying home their pile of lumber. Others used wheelbarrows, often making several trips. A familiar sight was a man wheeling a load of wood, while his wife pulled the wheelbarrow in front by means of a rope. Others just carried home what they could in their arms.

"But good lumber was rapidly becoming harder to get. Smooth lumber used in constructing additional units for the hospital was especially at a premium. There were also long pieces of two-by fours, one-by-six, one-by-twelve, and three-ply wood that people scrambled for. To get these I learned that you had to be there when the truck came in with them. At first, it has been related, people waited till the lumber was thrown off the truck before they grabbed it. One afternoon my brother and I decided that if we wanted lumber to make a closet and porch we would have to go and wait for the trucks, as the others were doing. When a truck did come in, I stood by the rear end, and grabbed good pieces as they were thrown off the truck, or pulled them out myself and handed them to my brother who piled them up. Then we waited for other trucks to come in, and did the same thing over again. When the pile on a truck became low, I jumped on with others and we began unloading the truck ourselves. When dump trucks came in, people were tugging at the lumber before they were unloaded, running the risk of being hurt. My sister sat on our pile and guarded it, and some of the Caucasian workers on the truck gave her some good pieces. That day we carried home three loads on a wheelbarrow.

Around June 21, the people in several of the blocks got together and made plans to store lumber for their winter fuel supply. Word was passed around that pretty soon construction within the Colony would end and the supply of scrap lumber would be exhausted. Men were recruited from various blocks to go to the wood pile and stack up lumber of any kind, and transport it back to their block. In our block, as in many others, it was stacked up between the restrooms. Where formerly it had been a scramble by individuals, collecting was now done on a wholesale scale of blocks. The scrap pile dwindled considerably, and soon nothing but little pieces could be got, unless one waited for the trucks. People were still coming in from Sacramento, but most of the 5,000 were here. Ikuo, a fireman stationed at Firehouse 2, describes the increasing competition for scrap lumber in the following fashion:

'At first the truck brought out the lumber and dumped it on the ground, and people picked it up from the ground. Then they began to pick up pieces off the truck before they were dumped. Soon some began to jump on the truck in order to pick out the good lumber for themselves. Finally, the more aggressive learned to jump on the truck at the edge of the field and throw off the good pieces while the truck was moving toward the scrap pile and have their relatives and friends pick up the pieces for them.'

On June 24, the day before the final group from Walerga came in, it was announced that colonists would be allowed to go after lumber only after six p.m. This was done probably because of the danger involved when colonists were jumping on the trucks and grabbing lumber before they were unloaded. It was obviously a fairer way, for more people would have an opportunity in getting at least a few good pieces of lumber, instead of the few aggressive ones snatching most of the good ones. That evening I went to see how the new system was working. I was too late to get it on the start. Some people were carrying home good long pieces, and others were running toward the piles. People were clustered around the pile like flies, and when

I got there, I looked in vain for decent pieces."1/

The foregoing account describes the increase of aggressiveness among the evacuees as the scarcity of scrap lumber became more and more a problem. With the increase of competition, there was also a breakdown of conventional restraints such as consideration for others, and with this decline of social control, primary concern for individual acquisition was increasingly expressed. If the Walerga experience tended to increase the individual aggressiveness of the Sacramento people, the competition for employment, scrap lumber, and other advantages, which they encountered served to reinforce this aggressiveness.

1/ Sakoda Report, "The Scrap Lumber Conflict," pp. 2-6.