

VI, B

BROADCAST AFFAIR

Tule Lake

Broad-
cast
Affair

Preliminary Report
(Confidential)

BROADCAST AFFAIR

I. Introduction

The Broadcast Affair was started with a special Council meeting on the afternoon of September 28. By the following evening the matter was dispensed with as far as the colonists were concerned. In that short time two council meetings, two block meetings, and one meeting of Issei representatives from blocks were held and a decision was reached that the colonists would not concede the request of the Office of War Information to send a shortwave broadcast directed at Japan. While some of the discussion was heated, the whole process was quickly settled. But the repercussions from this affair were great.

Up to this point there had been much discontent among the colonists, but most of it was directed toward the War Relocation Authority or members of the Caucasian staff. As a result of the Broadcast Affair, however, an obvious split was created between the Isseis and Niseis. The Niseis felt that the Isseis had not considered their welfare in settling the Broadcast Affair and the Community Council arrived at a decision opposite to the one resulting from a meeting dominated by Isseis. The matter was finally settled by referring it to block meetings, where Isseis usually dominated. As a result when the Theater Project came up for discussion in the Community Council soon after, the Council decided not to refer this matter to the block, and as a representative body voted in favor of the Theater Project. The antagonism of the Isseis toward the Councilmen was immediate and open. In this manner the traditional gulf between the first

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and second generation was brought out into the open. The Broadcast Affair was significant in bringing this about.

The following is a chronological account of the Broadcast Affair from the time the matter was first broached to the Councilmen at a special Council meeting until the final vote from the blocks was recorded at the regular Council meeting the following night.

II. Chronological Account

A. Special Council Meeting

On September 28, 1942, a special Council meeting was called to order by chairman Gerry Wakayama at 3:30 P.M. at messhall No. 1720 to discuss the possibility of having a broadcast of the Project given by the colonists. As guests of the afternoon the following were introduced:

Mr. Dennis McEvoy, Deputy Chief of Far Eastern Division, Office of War Information, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Charles O'Brien, Chief of Special Events Section, San Francisco Office of War Information.

Mr. Werner, Office of War Information, San Francisco.

Mr. Dunning, KWID, radio operator.

Mr. DeWitt, KWID, radio operator.

Although there were no advance notices at all, these men were in the Project on urgent and important business. They had come with permission from Washington D.C., and also with sound equipment and trained radio men among them, in order to ask the colonists for a broadcast of condition within the camp. The matter had to be settled immediately because they could not stay for more than a few days in order to complete this task of making recordings for the broadcasting. Perhaps they felt that it would

not be difficult to convince the colonists that it would be to their advantage to participate in this broadcast or perhaps they did not know the nature of the Japanese people or the feelings of dissatisfaction and suspicion they maintained about this time.

As the spokesman for the group from the Office of War Information, Mr. McEvoy explained his business to the councilmen. He said that Radio-Tokyo was spreading propaganda that the Japanese in the relocation centers were "being starved, beaten, murdered, and subjected to such brutality that unless stopped, Japan would take corresponding measures on the American people in the Far East." Mr. McEvoy believed that such propaganda could be spiked by transmitting to Japan by radio the truth as to what was actually going on within this WRA project. Mr. McEvoy asked the Council whether it was willing to aid the Office of War Information in their plea for cooperation. He said that the Office of War Information asked for "the Council's views, advice, and suggestions in achieving their end here."

Mr. McEvoy and Mr. Dunning explained how the recording was to be done. They desired to have recordings of various groups such as the Boy Scouts and children. They wanted programs given by the orchestra, hospital scenes and other phases of the project, which showed the true condition within the Project.

Mr. Shirrell, the Project Director, added the plea to that of the others, saying that it was necessary for the sake of the Americans in the Far East that the people in the Project cooperate with the request of the Office of the War Information.

In return the Office of War Information promised that they would do all it could to stop malicious rumors concerning the

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sabotage committed by Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the United States. While this visiting division of the Office of War Information was concerned merely with foreign war information, it promised to request the domestic Office of War Information to clear such malicious rumors through local broadcasts. It was pointed out that the cooperation of the Council would help the question of Nisei citizenship, through national and international publicity of this sort. The Council was again asked for its cooperation.

Evidently the councilmen felt that it was too sudden and too important a matter for them to decide immediately without consultation with their block advisors. Since the matter had been brought up so suddenly they did not know just where their block people stood on the question. A councilman suggested that Mr. McEvoy speak to the block advisors personally to present his urgent request. A motion was made and passed that councilmen confer with block residents and return the following morning at 8:30 A.M. to No. 1720 with the block advisory council.^{1/}

B. Block Meeting

That evening in most of the blocks some sort of meeting was held to discuss this matter of cooperation with the Office of War Information. In some blocks a meeting of all block residents was held. In others only the block advisory committee, usually consisting of one representative from each barrack, mostly Isseis, was called together to discuss this matter. In either case it is significant that most block meetings are carried on in Japanese (unless the block manager or the councilman find it too difficult

^{1/} Special Council Meeting, September 25, 1942.

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to speak Japanese) and usually dominated by Isseis. It should be remembered also that at this time the persons who did most of the talking at these meetings were those who were generally termed "agitators" and not the quieter and more representative ones in the block.

According to a roll call taken at a council meeting, the following day, roughly 22 blocks were against the broadcast, 7 in favor of it without condition, and 21 in favor of it with certain conditions. In other words, the vote was split about evenly, with the final decision depending on the condition under which the broadcast would be permitted. The trend of opinion in one block which was opposed to the broadcast will be given to illustrate the kind of opinions that prevail in many blocks. It should be remembered that this block was probably among the most reactionary of all the blocks in the Project and represented an extreme stand on the matter.

A block meeting was called together on the evening of September 28 in the block manager's office. Most of the persons attending were Isseis. Among them were persons who had been opposed in the past to cooperation with the WRA administration. The councilman from the block gave a report on several items, including the Theater Project, but all of these issues were overshadowed by the Broadcast Affair. The councilman spoke in Japanese, and was not particularly desirous of expressing his own opinions for the Niseis, leaving the Niseis without any voice at all in this matter.

After the proposition by Mr. McEvoy was roughly presented and the floor opened to discussion, there was a great deal of animated talking. The greatest number of opinions expressed were of a suspecting nature. The persons giving these opinions

felt that it couldn't do the Japanese people any good to take part in such a broadcast. The recordings could be changed or misused or they could switch off the program whenever they desired and substitute whatever they desired. They doubted that they would be allowed to tell the truth in the first place. Even if the broadcast were to be done, they felt that they should hear the broadcast given in order to be sure that nothing was twisted. "Watch out for a pitfall," was the warning of one person when it was suggested that delegates be sent to a meeting the following morning.

Another feeling that could be inferred from the discussion was one of triumph because Japanese seemed to be winning in the present battle. Some felt that since Japanese were winning there was no sense in jeopardizing matters by doing anything. Someone said that it was all right if we are persecuted over here. Another person thought that the whole matter should be left up to Tojo and not meddled with by colonists.

A few persons seemed to be curious about what was actually happening in the Orient. They asked that we be allowed to hear the broadcast from Japan before we were allowed to do our own broadcasting. It was probably mostly out of curiosity that these people wanted to hear news from Japan. They had been kept in ignorance about happenings in Japan since the beginning of the year. Part of this request was based on the supposition that the truth of the claim made by Mr. McEvoy could be verified by listening to broadcasts from Radio-Tokyo.

A few men expressed the opinion that it was all right to broadcast if the truth were to be told. This was probably felt a good opportunity to broadcast to the world the sort of treat-

the Japanese in America were receiving. There was probably also the feeling that relatives and friends in Japan would be relieved to know that the colonists were still alive and not treated too badly.

All of the opinions, however, were mixed in with a feeling that this might be a trap of some sort. Even the few in favor of the broadcast insisted that full precautionary measures be taken to see that the broadcast was not twisted in any way.

The general trend of opinion in the block was "no." The Block Manager, however, suggested that since there was to be a meeting the following morning, all those who could attend the meeting should go and listen to what Mr. McEvoy had to say. With this understanding the meeting was closed.

C. Broadcast Assembly

On the morning of September 29, councilmen and representatives from the various blocks gathered together at No. 1720. The hall was packed, so that besides the 40 or 50 odd councilmen, about 250 others must have been in that hall. These latter were almost wholly Isseis, who had enough interest in the question to come to this meeting. It was probably a select group of people who had something to say or the type that would talk at other meetings. In all probability they did not represent the quieter type of Issei who were more likely to listen to reason instead of flaring up emotionally. For this meeting a public address system was set up in front of the hall.

Gerry Wakayama, chairman of the Council, acted as chairman for this meeting. While he was capable enough, he was not a forceful person who could keep a discussion to the point and under

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control. Since he was not too fluent in Japanese it was difficult for him to attempt to keep the emotions of the people from running away with the discussion. Since there was a large group of Isseis it was necessary for the speeches of the Caucasians to be translated into Japanese and the Japanese speeches translated back to English.

Mr. McEvoy was first given the floor to present his plea for cooperation. He made it clear in his speech that he did not wish to interfere in any way with the program presented by the Japanese people which was to be broadcasted. He stated that all they wanted was the truth about what was going on in the Project. He said that such questions as "is there forced labor under military supervision?" would be asked. He ended up by saying that "our enemies believe that the best propaganda is lies; we believe that it is the truth."

This was translated by a Nisei who had been selected in advance for this purpose. After giving the translation, he asked Mr. McEvoy whether it was likely that the translator would be blamed for not translating correctly. Mr. McEvoy replied that he was perfectly satisfied with the translation. The chairman was not certain as to how to proceed with the discussion. He asked whether he should ask questions by wards or should take the questions by aisles. Someone demanded that the discussion be open to everyone. It didn't make any difference where the questions came from, he continued, because all Japanese were the same. The chairman decided to throw the floor open to everyone.

The first man to speak was clearly emotionally aroused. He had a son in the Army and had every intention of bringing up his children as good American citizens. He had heard, however, that

there was talk in Congress of depriving Niseis of citizenship, which distressed him a great deal. He said in part, in Japanese:

What I felt now is that we do not feel any physical hunger. but we have received much spiritual . If they are going to broadcast only the good part, I am against it, (Great applause) for the past 40 so many years we have labored hard to bring up splendid Niseis. I hear they are trying to take away their citizenship. I was hoping that they would be able to fight for America. (Big applause) I would like to show our real feeling to the whole world. (More applause.)

There was no one to translate this speech. Mr. McEvoy, who understood a little Japanese seemed to have gotten the drift of the speech. The translator already selected did not want to undertake the job of translating the speech of the Japanese into English. Noboru Honda, a Nisei Block Manager, was called upon to translate speeches made by Japanese from this point on. Mr. McEvoy, however, replied to the first speech in the following manner.

I would like to say this. There have been mistakes. This is not part of the discussion today. We are not the Government officials responsible for whatever goes on within these camps. We are simply a Government agency engaged in radio work, the voice of the Government of the United States. I hope that this conversation today can be limited to questions of the matter at hand. All that we are asking is the facts in this particular War Relocation Center. That is all, the facts. So far as the spiritual side goes, that too is important, but all we are here for is for facts. The case of the gentleman was adequately presented, but we are not here to discuss that.

The air was tense with emotion. The chairman called for quiet, and everyone kept still. It seemed a triumphant moment for the Japanese who could say what they really felt. The translator for Mr. McEvoy replied that the plight of the Japanese, so far as the Japanese people were concerned, was partly the responsibility of any American. He thought that Mr. McEvoy could not say that it was not his responsibility that the Japanese were put in a camp. If Mr. McEvoy meant that only the good part of the camp was going to be broadcasted, he felt that

he was against it. In fact, he thought that there would be no use in carrying the meeting on any further.

Because of the language difficulty there was some confusion for some moments. Mr. McEvoy evidently learned from someone else that the first speaker had mentioned the fact that the citizenship of the Niseis was to be taken away. He came forward and said that this rumor was not true. Someone asked that they hear from Mr. Walter Tsukamoto, because he probably knew more about it than anybody else.

Walter came forward and said that he had made an announcement at a Council meeting that a bill depriving Niseis of citizenship was passed in the House of Representatives. There was a telegram to Dr. Jacoby saying that this was not true, he said, but he did not know because he had not seen the telegram. Anyway, there were other bills pending which still meant to take the citizenship of the Niseis away. At this defense by Walter of his own position because of an erroneous announcement he had made, Mr. McEvoy and Mr. Shirrell seemed to be angry. Mr. McEvoy referred the matter to Mr. Shirrell.

Mr. Shirrell took the opportunity to say what he wanted to. After reassuring the Japanese that every effort would be made to fight any bill attempting to disenfranchise the Japanese, he went on to point out the necessity of the Japanese people to help the American because if they were to receive better treatment. He said in part: "This morning we had trouble, weakening the hands of the WRA. The farmers refused to cut and pack vegetables because of this citizenship matter. They will not supply the American public. I have to say that my colony will not pack food for Americans. People who are enemies of the Japanese people will

say: 'I told you so!' They are playing with dynamite. I cannot defend such action against the outside people. We are playing into the hands of the enemies if we refuse to sell food to the outside world. I am satisfied that there are definite agitators who are working against the WRA, but even if the F.B.I. is called in, we must find them and send them out of this center. The way to fight the citizenship bill is not to stop producing food. We are to stop the brutality directed against Americans in the East by broadcasting the facts of treatment here in the WRA colonies." This speech was translated by Mr. Honda.

The chairman called attention to the fact that they were getting off the topic. Next a World War veteran, an Issei who had been given citizenship, evidently, came up. He said that conditions in the Tule Lake Center were tolerable, but that other centers did not seem to be as good. He said that he and his block were against the broadcast if only Tule Lake was going to be broadcasted.

Mr. McEvoy answered that it was their intention to deal first with Tule Lake only and then possibly deal with other centers later on.

The next speaker was rather outspoken. He started out by remarking thus: "If we lose we will be despised and if we win we will be despised again. I believe that it is best that we suffer winning." When he said "we," he meant the Japanese, of course. He said that if the broadcast were to be only a matter of answering questions about food and shoes, he was against it. He thought that the Japanese people should be allowed to make up their own program and be allowed to say what they pleased. He felt that if the program were not for the good of the Japanese people, then they should not do any broadcasting.

Mr. McEvoy probably saw that he was fighting a losing battle. He explained once more that this request was urgent. It meant the protection of the lives of allied soldiers and civilians in the Far East. He said that there has been mistreatment in the past. He feared that if the falsehood of brutality of relocation centers were allowed to continue, Japan would use it as an excuse to mistreat the allied soldiers more severely. He ended by saying: "We call upon all patriotic citizens to help protect the lives of soldiers over there. We ask that they simply tell the truth. We are simply asking you to state the truth. It is a vital matter to every American and to anyone who is interested in maintaining a civilized standard."

Mr. McEvoy's attitude had become rather icy. His mention of civilized standards and acts of brutality, however, aroused some interest in favor of the broadcast.

One person, doubting Mr. McEvoy's statements to the effect that Japanese were mistreating her prisoners asked for details of conditions in Japan. This Mr. McEvoy gave in vivid detail. He said that conditions in the relocation centers were nine thousand times better than overseas. He ended by saying: "We can save the lives of those people over there and will prevent discrediting Japan to the world as a civilized country." On hearing of these brutalities, the people in the audience seemed to quiet down considerably. It seemed as though their soft nature was appealed to, but there were still doubts as to the truth of Mr. McEvoy's reports. The same fellow insisted on hearing the broadcast from Japan in order to learn the truth. He also mentioned the fact that at the time of farmers' strike they had only two toasts for breakfast.

Mr. McEvoy's patience was evidently being tried. He said: "If you don't trust what I tell you, that is entirely your affair. I want to explain one thing about the project. Nobody would be told what to say. The people who wanted to speak of medical care will be free to do so. Those who are against it, will be free to speak. In any community there is bound to be some mistake. I give you my word of honor that nowhere in the Far East is their physical treatment equal to this place. The cooperation of this group means more than just for this group. We are representing a government office affiliated with the Armed Forces. We have asked for a cooperation on the basis of truth of this camp. It is up to you to decide." There was a note of threat in Mr. McEvoy's last words.

Someone else brought up the fact that his block was in favor of a broadcast only if they were allowed to hear broadcasts from Japan first. Mr. Shirrell replied that for the condition in the Far East the people had to take someone else's word for it. He said that he would see what could be done about hearing the broadcast from Japan, but he said that people were not allowed to have shortwave radios on the Project.

Someone else brought up the fact that reports from others could not be trusted because the propaganda from Hawaii saying that Japanese were sabotaging the place were not true. Mr. McEvoy merely replied by saying that the true story of Hawaii could be told from here. He would also try to get it broadcasted more widely through Washington. With these words the Caucasians left the hall, leaving the Japanese to decide the matter for themselves.

After the Caucasians left, the discussion continued. One Issei got up and made several interesting remarks. He said that up to this point Nisei councilmen have been deciding all

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of the matters of the community. He thought that Isseis should also take part in any project of the community. In this matter of the broadcast he felt that the Isseis should play the major role. Then he said that any broadcast was bound to be used for propaganda purposes for the United States Government. He thought that if the Japanese Government desired to know anything about the condition of the camps, it would seek information through the proper channels. He thought that through the Spanish ambassador this matter of finding the real condition within a camp could be learned. He thought that it would be sufficient to say that the people are well if a broadcast were to be given, but to say that details should be gotten from the Spanish ambassador. This man received a good applause, and several persons backed him up by saying that the Office of War Information was looking for propaganda material.

Another man then got up and said that he was definitely against the broadcast. This in itself brought him a lot of applause. Then he went on to explain that it wouldn't be well for us as Japanese to make a broadcast which might weaken the Japanese position by saying, for instance, that the Japanese people here were being well-treated. With an air of finality he said that there should be other means of getting news to Japan than by means of a broadcast from the Japanese. This man received a great deal of applause for his fiery speech.

Time was becoming short. The mess hall would soon have to be vacated to prepare the lunch. The chairman pointed out this fact and concluded that there were three suggestions:

1. Absolutely against the broadcast.
2. For the broadcast.
3. To reveal the conditions here through the Spanish ambassador.

At this point, Mr. Suzuki, a councilman, seeing that the decision was going to be against the broadcast, asked that the Council reconvene in the afternoon in order to settle this matter more orderly. A vote was taken, and the majority signified their desire to settle the matter immediately. Another councilman asked for a short conference of delegates, but this too was voted down in favor of an immediate decision. The meeting had started to become disorganized. The chairman called for a roll call by blocks. As the no of each block was called out, someone from the audience answered. Nothing was done to ascertain that a responsible party answer for the block.

In answer to the roll call, 32 blocks answered no, 25 yes on condition, and 4 remained undecided. Up to block 25 the answer was overwhelmingly no. This was undoubtedly the result of the pressure of the whole assembly, which voiced mainly opinions overwhelmingly against the broadcast. The chairman hesitated to announce that the "no" vote had carried. Someone pointed out that the "no's" were in the majority. The chairman asked if it were all right to consider the matter settled. A cry of approval arose, and when it was decided that the matter was settled, a triumphant cry was heard throughout the crowd. One person was heard to shout "Banzai" as the crowd streamed out of the hall.

After the meeting a small group of people dissatisfied with the results of that gathering clustered outside of the mess hall. Most of them were councilmen, but a few Isseis were present too. They argued that the other side didn't have a chance to voice their opinion. An Issei remarked that people with reasonable opinions could not be expected to express himself in a meeting of that sort. What was discussed was not the broadcast, but the dissatisfaction the people felt against the American people. Some of the

Isseis felt that for the good of the community it was best to cooperate in a matter of this sort. The Niseis definitely felt that something terrible was going to befall them because they had not agreed to cooperate with the Office of War Information. They wanted to hold another meeting and discuss the matter over again without the interference of the Isseis. A special meeting of the Council in the afternoon was hurriedly planned.

D. Councilmen's Decision

If the morning meeting dominated by Isseis was ruled by a spirit not unlike insolence, the afternoon meeting of councilmen was dominated by fear. Underlying the discussion was a fear that unless more cooperation was shown to the Office of War Information there would be reprisals against the Japanese people in general and that the Niseis would have to shoulder most of the burden of such results. Up to this point councilmen had avoided a direct clash with Isseis, but this time the older people came in for rather severe criticism. The decision made in the morning was reversed by the Council, and as a result of the meeting the blocks were called upon again to vote on the Broadcast Affair.

The chairman, Gerry Wakayama, opened the meeting with the remark that in the morning the Isseis were against the broadcast and now he wanted to hear the opinion of the Council. He had evidently spoken to Mr. McEvoy about the morning's results and probably blamed the Isseis for making such a decision. He was told by Mr. McEvoy that even if this matter did not go through, he would not hold this against the Niseis.

Two councilmen said that their block was for the broadcast if both the physical and spiritual sides of the picture of the camp were

given or if the script used could be first approved by both Isseis and Niseis. Then said one of the speakers: "The Second Generation should think about this matter because if we give the impression that we are not going to cooperate something terrible is going to happen later. This broadcast should be backed up by the people here because it will be for their benefit. They will receive better treatment."

The position of the councilmen and other Niseis was well summed up by Yoshimi Shibata. He said that even though the broadcast

was an important international problem, emotion rather than reason had ruled in the morning meeting. The Isseis had control of the meeting and Niseis had no voice in the matter. He felt that this problem was just as much the problem of Niseis as it was of Isseis. He did not feel that under the circumstances Niseis should necessarily agree with Isseis in their decision on this vital matter. He brought out Mr. McEvoy's reasons for asking for a broadcast:

1. Because of past brutality in the Far East.
2. To avoid future brutality in the Far East.
3. Because reports on the treatment within the relocation centers are erroneous.

He said that if we did not broadcast and Japan retaliated by mistreating American soldiers, the sentiment of the public against the Japanese people here could be aroused and conditions made worse for us. He brought out the fact that the condition of the Japanese and American prisoners could be improved by broadcasting the true condition within this Project. Above all, he asked that the councilmen reason this problem out and not become emotional as the Isseis had been in the morning.

Walter Tsukamoto then got up and made a more impressive and emotional appeal. He took a more extreme stand against the Isseis and in support of cooperation with the United States Government.

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Roughly he said: "There was no one in my block that was against the broadcast if they could tell the truth. There was a feeling that they should not be responsible for the suffering of American prisoners. I was surprised this morning. The Isseis felt that they are patriots. They felt that they were doing something loyal to Japan and did not give a thought to the citizens here or their children. They didn't think of the retaliation on the part of the American public. I don't think those people were representative of the Isseis. They are breaking down rule and order. Those people are being looked upon as heroes here. The record should be kept straight that the Council merely acted as mediator. I am 100% opposed to their decision. None of us have been beaten or starved. The only right we have been deprived of was by being evacuated. All other rights are given to us, and I think that we should be grateful for these things. The great majority of the American people are trying to be fair with us. We should not foresake our Government. Responsible government men are not in full accord with the treatment we are being accorded."

It was clear that Walter did not have the support of all of the other councilmen. One man brought up the fact that there was no way of knowing whether the things that Mr. McEvoy said about Japan were true or not. He said that if a broadcast were to be held, someone should be allowed to listen in to make sure that the true message was sent out.

Walter retorted that they would not have come to the people if they wanted to twist information around. He saw no reason why the truth should not be broadcasted.

Koso Takemoto then got up and opposed Walter. Koso calmly brought out the fact that broadcasts by prisoners in Germany, for

instance, were thought to be false and forced. He stuck to the realistic view that, while it was all right to cooperate with the Office of War Information, care should be taken to insure that the information released was used against the Japanese. "I am not against telling the truth if the proper means are taken to be sure that the truth is extended," he said.

This opinion that care should be taken to see that the broadcast would not be changed prevailed, and it lead to a discussion of the conditions under which the broadcast should be allowed.

Mr. Shibata, in the meantime, asked for a roll call to see how the blocks had voted last night. He suspected that some blocks had changed their vote under the pressure of the atmosphere of the morning's meeting. Of those blocks that were represented it was discovered that 30 had voted "yes" on condition, 2 yes, 23 no and two were undecided. This result was just the opposite to the one obtained from the morning meeting where the answers were supposed to have come from delegates of the blocks. The morning result had been 32 no, 25 yes on condition, and 4 undecided.

An analysis of the result of the roll calls revealed that the wards were for the broadcast in the following wards:

Wards VII, V, VI, III, II, I, IV.

One interesting note on sectional differences is the fact that people from Pinedale who are located in Wards VII and VI are toward the head of the list. This has been found to be true in other issues. Pinedale people have been willing to cooperate more willingly than any other group. Wards II and III, which are populated by people from Walerga are less cooperative, but tend to follow in the middle. Ward IV (Arboga) and Ward V (White zone) are less

predictable. Ward I is the most interesting because of its contrast to Wards VI and VII. In spite of the fact that they are from the same Northwest, Ward I tended to be uncooperative in community matters. It is of interest that Ward I had the most undecided votes and made the greatest number of changes in answer to the roll calls in the morning and in the afternoon. In the morning there were 2 "yes," 5 "no" and 2 "undecided." In the afternoon there were 5 "yes," 1 "no" and 1 "undecided." Ward I seems to be characterized by lack of unity and harmony.

Since it was discovered that the majority of the blocks were in favor of the broadcast under certain conditions anyway, the Council proceeded confidently with its plans to find out what conditions should be asked for of Mr. McEvoy and what conditions would be granted by him. In the meantime Mr. McEvoy was sent for.

After some discussion the following four conditions under which the broadcast would be permitted were suggested:

1. A script be approved by both Isseis and Niseis.
2. The Japanese be allowed to choose their own men to participate in the broadcast and they be allowed to say the truth.
3. The broadcast be listened in by representatives of the colonists.
4. The broadcast be handled through the Spanish Ambassador.

Somebody then moved that the personal opinion of the councilmen be taken to find out just where they stood on the matter. After the vote was to be taken, Walter got up and demanded a roll call.

It was curious that the high pressure method which was objected

to in the morning meeting was being employed in a similar manner to make the councilmen vote for the broadcast issue. With the implication that anyone who voted against the broadcast would be considered disloyal citizens, councilmen were not free to vote no even if they so chose. On top of that the conditions were not considered at all, and the councilmen asked to vote either yes or no. There was hesitation on the part of some, but most of them answered yes. There 48 yes, 3 no's, 1 who refused to vote, and 7 who were absent. After the vote was taken, Walter triumphantly got up and said: "I suggest that that be given to Mr. McEvoy as the Council's opinion."

Mr. McEvoy arrived on the scene, and he took the spotlight until the meeting was over. First he read a teletype that he had sent out to Washington, D.C. asking about the citizenship bill and also affirming the loyalty of the Nisei. He also read a confirmation of the fact that no bill depriving Niseis of the citizenship had passed the House of Representatives. On hearing this Walter got up and said that there were still two more bills before the House. He said that councilmen, as leaders of the Niseis, should be vigilant against any future action.

The four conditions were then explained to Mr. McEvoy. To two of the conditions he objected. First, about the Spanish Ambassador, he asked why he should be asked to stand between two groups of American citizens. The third party would imply, he said, that the Japanese here were under the Japanese flag, since a third party was used only in dealing with representatives of any enemy power. It would also take too much time. He wondered if he couldn't get a group of Isseis and Niseis who were sympathetic to the United States cause to put this program over..

Mr. Imazeki, editor of the Dispatch, pointed out that Isseis probably felt like enemy aliens here. Mr. McEvoy came right back and said that if they felt that way why didn't they go back to Japan. He made it clear that he believed that if they were not loyal to the United States they should be in a concentration camp. This sort of assumption which would seem grossly unfair to most Japanese was the same one under which Mr. Shirrell seemed to conduct his business, and one which was at the root of many of the misunderstandings and conflicts that occurred within the Project. Whereas in the morning meeting Mr. McEvoy had been careful to be as polite as possible, with the Councilmen he seemed to be taking a more dominating attitude.

Concerning the approval of a script by both Isseis and Niseis, Mr. McEvoy said that this could be arranged. He suggested a small group with which he could work. After some discussion, three Isseis and three Niseis were decided upon. From the Council, Messrs. Tsukamoto, Tsuda and Takemoto were chosen. There were some discussions as to how to choose the Issei members to serve on this committee. It was finally decided that a representative from each block would be chosen to meet and decide upon the three Issei members of the committee to approve the script.

Mr. McEvoy also said that the committee would be free to include whatever they pleased, as long as it was not subversive material.

A snag was hit when the most important condition -- that of listening to the broadcast--was presented. Mr. McEvoy pointed out that the permission of the Army would have to be gotten for this, and he hinted that the Office of War Information wanted as little to do with the Army as possible. He said that he thought it would not be done, but that he would try. Mr. McEvoy was not too convincing in his desire to please the colonists on this point. Other neutral agencies friendly to the Japanese could have been

asked to listen in to the broadcast for the people. Mr. McEvoy suggested this himself, but he was not convincing enough, and did not satisfy the councilmen on this point. A question was asked whether there was any assurance that these records would be used again at some other time against the Japanese people, but no satisfactory reply was presented by Mr. McEvoy.

At this point, Mr. John D. Cook, head of the Information Division, stepped up and tried to explain why these gentlemen were here. He had written scripts for the radio, and probably felt that this was a good opportunity to parade himself before the councilmen. The chairman, however, told him that he was out of order. Mr. Cook said that as an advisor to the Council, he had some right to speak. The chairman bluntly insisted that Mr. Cook was out of order, and refused to let him speak.

Another person pointed out that the type of broadcast for domestic and foreign consumption would be different. It would be all right to make records for broadcasts to the Far East, but he questioned the wisdom of allowing a domestic broadcast based on the same recordings. Mr. McEvoy said that different programs would be used for domestic and foreign broadcasts, but to make the matter simple, he would limit this coming broadcast to the foreign one only.

With two of the four conditions found not acceptable, the discussion was brought to a close. Councilmen were instructed to return to their blocks to call a meeting to determine the stand of the people in that block on the broadcast issue in light of the two conditions granted. The answer was to be brought back to the regular Council meeting to be held that night. Also, an Issei representative was to be sent to another mess hall that same evening

where they would choose three members of the script committee. The hope of the Council, of course, was that the people in the blocks would vote for the broadcast. They seemed to have overlooked the fact that one of the most important conditions was eliminated.

Conclusion

That evening right after dinner or shortly after, meetings were held in various blocks to reach a final decision on this matter. The councilman from the block presented the two conditions under which the broadcast would be done. In some blocks there was very little discussion because the minds of the block people were already made up. In other blocks there were heated arguments between Isseis and a few Niseis who spoke in favor of the broadcast. Some councilmen tried to present the Nisei side of the picture, while others did not bother with it at all and let the people in the block make the decision as they wished. Issei representatives were sent from each block to attend a meeting to elect three members of the script committee in case the broadcast was to be given.

At the meeting of Issei representatives a few Isseis got up and made emotional speeches on why the broadcast should not be held. Mr. Oshima and Mr. Fukuyama, the councilmen who were appointed to take charge of this meeting, were evidently called upon to answer for the Council reversing the decision reached by the Isseis in the morning. A few persons were arguing in little groups why the broadcast should be held. Then a messenger arrived from the Council meeting being held at the same time conveying the message that the broadcast would not be held and that it was

unnecessary to chose a script committee. The results had been

33 definitely no
16 yes, with conditions granted
1 definitely yes
4 undecided
8 absent at time of vote

When this was announced a triumphant shout went up and everybody struggled out of the meeting.

A sizeable group of Isseis went over to the messhall where the Council meeting was being held and listened in to the proceedings. This was the first time that there was more than one or two Issei visitors at a Council meeting. The Council was clearly under suspicion in the eyes of some of these Isseis. At the same meeting Sumio Miyamoto got up and said that there was no percentage in the job of a councilman. All he did was to go to a Council meeting to report what was discussed at a block meeting and then go back and hold another meeting with the block people. As it was, the power of the Councilman was not clearly defined. When he asked the chairman for a clarification, Mr. Wakayama shrugged his shoulders and remarked that he was in the same boat. Members of the Council had begun to feel the helpfulness of the Council to make decisions when they took each problem to the blocks to be decided upon. This was one of the important repercussions of the Broadcast Affair.

When the Council again took up the Theater Project which had been momentarily forgotten because ^{of} the broadcast issue, it selected an investigation committee to make a report. When the report was given, Koso Takemoto suggested that this matter too be taken back to the block because it was an important issue. But the majority of the councilmen were in favor of deciding on the matter in the Council, and the Theater Project was approved. This brought down the wrath of the Isseis on the Council, and

further helped to widen the split between Isseis and Niseis.

The citizenship rally held by Niseis a week after the Broadcast Affair was settled was another manifestation of the growing split between the Isseis and Niseis. Although this rally was planned as a result of the rumor about the citizenship of Niseis being taken away and was not very successful as a rally, the broadcast issue probably gave it some impetus.

Several weeks later when the Community Council began to work on the new Community Charter, the election of Councilmen was arranged so that councilmen would no longer be responsible directly to the block but to the ward. These were repercussions which followed the broadcast affair and which can be considered to have been caused by it at least in part.

III. Analysis

The most significant aspect of the Broadcast Affair was that it made the split between the Isseis and Niseis obvious. Up to this time most of the dissatisfaction had been directed toward the Caucasian personnel, and there was an attempt made by both Isseis and Niseis to keep together as Japanese. "We're all Japanese, there should be no differences between Isseis and Niseis" were common assertions. When the broadcast issue was settled, Howard Imazeki was reluctant to print the details of the result. He feared, for one thing, that it would not be a good thing to have such a thing publicized on the outside and he did not want to write an editorial on the matter because, he said, he did not want to be the one to cause the split between Isseis and Niseis.

Two factors, which cannot be separated, seem to have operated to cause the open break between Isseis and Niseis. The one was

the loss of respect for Isseis by many Niseis because of the manner in which the broadcast issue was settled. While it is true that the issue was of a nature which required the two generations in general to take opposing sides because of their sense of loyalty to different countries, the problem could have been settled amiably, it is believed, either for or against the broadcast. The one thing that angered many Niseis was the fact that at the general assembly outbursts of dissatisfaction and consideration of Japanese interest dominated the meeting, and no consideration was given to the welfare of the Japanese in America, especially the welfare of the Niseis. The Isseis who spoke did not handle the matter as parents who had the future of the Niseis in mind. This was partially due to the fact, of course, that the meeting was dominated by the type of Issei who was less likely to give concessions to the Nisei point of view. The more compromising sort of Issei found it difficult to get up and air his views on the question. The same sort of thing happened at most block meetings. After the issue was settled many Niseis claimed and many Isseis acknowledged that the Broadcast Affair had been mishandled by Isseis.

The other factor was the fear of Issei control over community matters through their control of block meetings. The broadcast issue served to make Niseis aware of the fact that Isseis were deciding many of the issues. Since the Broadcast Affair was handled in a manner which was detrimental to the future welfare of the Niseis, they were put on the defensive against Issei control of community matters. Up to this time there had not been complaints among councilmen and other Niseis about the fact that the block meetings were controlled by Isseis. This fear of Issei control resulted in the Theater Project not being taken back to the block, and the Community Charter

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making four councilmen responsible to a ward instead of to the block. In some blocks this fear of Issei control lead to the organization of the Nisei in the block in order to present a more solid front against the Isseis.

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The so-called "agitators" were active in the farm strike and other divisional strikes and in block meetings when such issues as the coal situation were brought up in block meetings, or appeared in Issei entertainments. The height of emotional *satisfaction* however, was probably reached during the discussion of the broadcast. Japan was winning obvious victories at the time and the spirit of the allied forces was low because of lack of victories. These people had the pleasure of defying the Office of War Information and sending them home without any concrete results. Somewhere between the Broadcast Affair, the Theater Project controversy, and the messhall strike that followed one after the other, the activities of these so-called "agitators" declined. They seemed to have lost the support they formerly had among the people, and the role of "agitator" became less desirable within the community. What this decline was due to is difficult to say. It may be that the Broadcast Affair served to point out to the people just how these people were controlling some community activities and that it would not be for the good of the community to allow this control to continue any further. Fear of the F.B.I. stepping in and making wholesale arrests may also have served to quiet these people down somewhat, giving the quieter type of Issei and Nisei more opportunity to voice their opinions. At any rate, the Broadcast Affair, together with the Theater Project Controversy, will stand out as landmarks in Issei-Nisei relationship in the history of the Tule Lake Project.

Completed November 26, 1942

Sources: J.S. Journal Sept. 28, 29, 1942
Council Minutes " 28, 29, 1942
Interview with F.M.