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WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

Seventy-Eighth Congress

First Session  
On

S. 444

A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN  
FUNCTIONS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

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SENATOR WALLGREN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline this thing, as I remember it, from the Pacific coast, and the job we have done up to now on this entire evacuation problem to see whether it fits into the rather difficult situation. In the first place, there are 120,000 Japanese in the 3 West Coast States---

Mr. MYER. Approximately 112,000, I believe, in this area.

SENATOR CHANDLER. You got 106,000 in the centers.

MR. MYER. About that

SENATOR WALLGREN. Approximately 120,000. This caused considerable alarm among the Representatives and Members of the Senate from the 3 West Coast States, and we held a meeting of all of the congressional Members of those 3 States. We met for 4 or 5 days in an effort to finally work out a recommendation to the President, that he accepted all the way, that is, that he would set up, he would ask the military authorities to set up certain strategic areas out on the 3 West Coast States, and that Japanese would be moved out of those strategic areas immediately, and all military installations around power plants and bridge heads, and so forth, and they have started the movement of evacuating those areas, moving them into these reception centers such as Santa Anita, Manzanar, and many other cities along the 3 West Coast States. The Army took over that job, didn't they?

MR. MYER.-----

Now, going back to Manzanar, in December a Japanese by the name of Fred Tayama was beaten in his apartment by six people.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. Inside the camp?

MR. MYER. Inside the camp and in his apartment.

SENATOR HOLMAN. Will you tell us who the six people were--were they six Japanese people?

MR. MYER. Six Japanese people, that is right.

SENATOR HOLMAN. This beaten man, was he a citizen?

MR. MYER. Yes; he was a citizen of the United States. Tayama had been active in the Japanese-American Citizen League before the center ever came into being. As nearly as I can find out, there were certain old grudges involved in the situation. This is what happened:

On Saturday night, December 5, Fred Tayama, a former owner of a chain of restaurants in Los Angeles, unpopular at Manzanar because he was regarded as a "labor baiter" and F.B.I. informer, was severely beaten by six masked men. He named as one of his assailants Harry Ueno, a former labor leader, and personal enemy. Ueno was arrested and sent to the Independence jail in Inyo County.

On Sunday, December 6, about noontime, the Japanese evacuees called a mass meeting on the broad, open strip of the camp used as a firebreak. Observers estimated that between 200 and 400 people were present. A detail of evacuee policemen was sent to the meeting by the Chief of Internal Security. They returned and told him that they had been sent away. Thereupon, Mr. Merritt, the project director, and Mr. Gilkey, Chief of Internal Security, decided to go to the meeting. When they got there it was breaking up. Meanwhile, they had requested

Captain Hall, commanding officer of the military police detail, to stand by in case of trouble. From a bystander at the meeting, they were told the purpose of the meeting was to (a) protest the arrest of Ueno and demand his release, and (b) to "get" Tayama and other Japanese regarded as informers. They were also told that a committee of five had been appointed to represent the evacuees in talking with the project director. Mr. Merritt and Mr. Gilkey then returned to the Administration Building to await the committee of five.

The committee came almost at once, but not alone. It was marching at the head of a crowd estimated to contain about 1,000 persons, all men and boys. Captain Hall and about 12 soldiers arrived at the Administration Building at the same time. Captain Hall mounted machine guns. The project director, Mr. Merritt, Mr. Gilkey, the Chief of Internal Security, and Captain Hall walked out to meet the crowd. The committee came up to them and demanded the immediate release of Ueno. The project director refused to negotiate with the crowd and demanded that it disperse.

While the crowd was respectful to the project director and to Captain Hall, it was in all other respects surly and unruly. The committee of five spoke in a violent manner. There is evidence that agitators were scattered among the crowd to keep sentiment stirred up.

Recognizing its temper, Captain Hall sent for more soldiers to strengthen his detachment. In all, there were about 30 soldiers present.

It soon became apparent to Mr. Merritt that the crowd would not disperse. He believed there was imminent danger of bloodshed. The soldiers were being taunted and insulted, and some sticks and stones were thrown. Mr. Merritt then asked the committee of five to accompany him alone around the corner of a building to talk. After some discussion with the committee, he reached the following understanding with it:

(a) That Ueno would be returned to the Manzanar jail after the crowd dispersed but he would be tried in a manner decided by Mr. Merritt, the project director.

(b) The crowd was to disperse immediately.

(c) No mass meetings were to be held without specific authority.

(d) All future grievances would be taken up through recognized committees.

(e) The committee of five would help find the assailants of Tayama.

After this agreement was reached, Joe Kurihara, a soldier in the United States Army in the last World War, a member of the American Legion, but embittered by the evacuation, burst into a fanatical tirade in which he disclaimed loyalty to the United States and threatened death to all F.B.I. informers. He apparently expressed the sentiment of the crowd when he said that "It was not right to punish people for beating informers like Tayama." Kurihara then spoke to the crowd in Japanese. After some applause, the crowd dispersed, and the soldiers left taking their guns with them.

It was said by some that Kurihara misinterpreted the terms of the agreement <sup>what</sup> and that/he said in fact was that the committee had won a victory over Mr. Merritt and he was going to do what they asked. No one appears to remember exactly what Kurihara said. Japanese questioned said he tried to explain the agreement.

Within an hour after the crowd had dispersed, it is reported that football games were going on and children were playing in the street, so, Ueno, in accordance with the agreement, was returned to Manzanar and placed in that jail.

Then, on Sunday evening about 6 o'clock, Dr. Goto, one of the Japanese doctors at the hospital, telephoned Mr. Merritt, who was at his apartment, that a large crowd had gathered in the firebreak near block 22, which is immediately across from the hospital, and that he had learned that this crowd was being organized in two parts--one to go to the hospital and "get" Tayama; the other to go to the police station and release Ueno. About the same time, Mr. Williams,

Assistant Chief of Internal Security, notified Mr. Merritt by telephone that a large crowd was marching toward the police station. The project director instructed Mr. Williams to call Captain Hall for a military guard. This is what happened at the hospital: Between 200 and 300 persons marched on the hospital and demanded that Tayama be turned over to them. They were prevented from entering by 3 Japanese girls employed as nurses' aides. While this crowd was said to be orderly and polite, it was insistent in its determination to get Tayama. Meanwhile, before the crowd arrived, Dr. Little, who is in charge of the hospital, asked the military to send an ambulance and remove Tayama. Believing that this had been done, he agreed to permit two or three members of the crowd to enter and search the hospital. The search was made and Tayama was not found. It developed that the ambulance had not come, but Tayama, hearing the crowd outside, badly beaten though he was, crawled under a bed and hid there. Upon failing to find Tayama, the crowd went away.

This is what happened at the police station: The second crowd marched upon the police station about 6:50 p.m. Observers estimated there were approximately 500 men and boys in the crowd. There were no women. This crowd was headed by the same committee of 5. They rushed into the jail and released Ueno who refused to leave the jail, saying he wanted the project director to release him. Mr. Merritt in the meantime had remained by his telephone, and, when Mr. Williams, assistant internal security officer, advised him to the true nature of the situation, he was instructed by Mr. Merritt to telephone Captain Hall and ask him to take command.

The military police came, about 135 in number, and were deployed in front of the police station. Machine guns were mounted. Mr. Merritt then tried to join Captain Hall, but was not allowed to pass through the sentry lines, so returned to his apartment where he could be near the telephone so he could communicate with Mr. Williams.

Captain Hall talked to the committee of five in the police station. He reminded them of their agreement of the afternoon and ordered the crowd to disperse. The temper of the crowd is uncertain. Captain Hall reported it was quiet when he talked. On the other hand officers under his command reported that the attitude of the crowd was insulting, ugly, and menacing. Captain Hall finally decided the crowd would not disperse, so he decided to use gas grenades. The crowd ran in all directions. Some ran toward the soldiers, and, although no order to fire was given, three shots were fired from shotguns. The soldiers did this on their own initiative. These men were all trained in military police duties. During the melee, a driverless automobile was released by the crowd and headed for the police station. It struck a corner of the station and ran into a Government truck; as it careened toward the soldiers, one of the lieutenants opened fire on it with a submachine gun. When the smoke and dust cleared away, the injured were lying on the ground. Some were removed by the evacuees into the police station, and all of them were later removed by the ambulance to the hospital. One boy was killed instantly and 10 others were injured. One of the injured died on December 11.

While the camp was awake all Sunday night, there were no demonstrations of any nature on Monday, December 7.

And that, gentlemen, in brief is what happened at Manzanar.

SENATOR WALLGREN. How many arrests were made?

MR. MYER. So far, 16 people have been removed from the center. Most of them are in this isolation camp I told you about. Two or three families were permitted to move to other centers. There are still others who will be picked up after our investigations are completed. Manzanar has been quiet for quite some time now. People went back to work about Christmas time. Thus, the center is gradually getting back to normal.

SENATOR CHANDLER. Was there not some demonstration against the United States Government?

MR. MYER. Well, in the first place, let me say that the riot was not in any sense started as a Pearl Harbor demonstration. It started December 5. It was a development from a whole series of things that gradually---

SENATOR WALLGREN. No, come on to December 7.

MR. MYER. On December 7 the incident was over, and Manzanar was quiet.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Was it December 5th or 6th?

MR. MYER. The 5th is when this thing started. Now, there was a statement made by someone it was a Pearl Harbor demonstration. I think that was incidental.

SENATOR WALLGREN. You know, a Jap would be an awfully good dog right up to the point that he can pull something. Naturally he is going to be a very, very obedient prisoner or evacuee. He will be just as nice as he possibly can be in order to get an opportunity to do that job that he wants to do for his country. The boys have had a lot of experience over in the Phillipines. They are having them right now over in the Solomon Islands. They will use very trick in the world in order to throw you off your guard, and then they will stab you in the back, and we had an experience at Pearl Harbor that ought to really be a lesson to anyone, and yet we are going to still continue to grant them leaves of absence where they might be able to go out some place and blow up maybe Coulee Dam or Bonneville or maybe some large munitions plant. I think we are taking a chance, and I don't think we should take chances right at this particular stage of the game.

SENATOR GURNEY. May I ask you, Senator O'Mahoney, there-- you say they cannot do it unless Congress authorizes them. Haven't they done it?

SENATOR CHANDLER. They have already done it. They have pulled them out of their homes.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. The military did that.

SENATOR GURNEY. The President did it, under war power.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. The military did it, and it was a very stringent act, no question about it, and I think a very desirable act, a thing that should have been done. Now, the policy was to take them out of the area where a danger was conceived to exist and remove them to an area in which a danger did not exist.

This bill is an effort to suggest a somewhat different policy from that which the W. R. A. has undertaken.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Not necessarily.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. And it seems to me the question before this committee is not whether we should argue what the policy is or ought to be, as it is to find out just what they are doing.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Senator, I asked the question of Mr. Myer as to whether or not aliens were permitted leaves of absence as well.

MR. MYER. Yes; they are, Senator.

SENATOR WALLGREN. See?

MR. MYER. Some of them.

SENATOR WALLGREN. I think that is wrong.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. I might agree with you.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Now, when it came to a matter of evacuating these Japanese from strategic areas in and along the west coast, the idea was to protect them as well as to protect our own Nation.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. Sure.

SENATOR WALLGREN. I think they knocked off about 150 of these Japs out there, the Filipinos and the Chinese, up to the time that they put them into camps, and by the time a few more of these boys are brought back in baskets from the Solomons the people of this country aren't going to feel any too good about any Japanese they see.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. But there are two things which are incomparable. There are Japs in the United States Army today who are loyal soldiers.

SENATOR WALLGREN. But we moved them away from the west coast.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. But they are in the United States Army and they are soldiers. They are citizens. They are on an equal basis with any other citizen. So we can't blame the W. R. A. people.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Then let's draft every one of them of a certain age and put them in the Army and take care of them.

MR. MYER.-----

We are hoping that with the help of the other Federal agencies and local agencies we can let those who are good citizens, or those aliens who associate with good citizens, even though it may be taking some chance, make their contribution during this wartime, always assuming that they are going to continue to live here.

SENATOR WALLGREN. That has nothing to do with this bill, especially. This bill here is just asking for better policing of these evacuees, more than anything else, during this war period. That is all we are asking for.

MR. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I continue my statement?

I am sorry, Senator; I will have to take issue with you, because I think it does have something to do with it.

SENATOR WALLGREN. You realize we are at war, don't you?

MR. MYER. I do, certainly.

SENATOR WALLGREN. And you realize we are at war with Japan?

MR. MYER. Let me make my point, if you will. It depends on how you approach this thing. There is a gentleman sitting back there; I hope he gets a chance to tell his story, which I think is important. There are 127,55 people of Japanese ancestry in the United States. They are not all in relocation centers. Many of them never were in relocation centers. Now it is a question whether we are going to make more fifth columnists by one kind of treatment or whether by another type of treatment we are going to make more good citizens.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Then, are you in favor of just abolishing these war relocation centers and then just taking care of the aliens?

MR. MYER. I am in favor of abolishing them just as fast as we can move these people whom we think are sound out into the public in collaboration with the Intelligence agencies, putting the rest of the people, as we sort them out, into internment camps as fast as we can get the job done.

SENATOR WALLGREN. That goes for aliens as well as Japanese?

MR. MYER. That is correct, because the families are tied together. I believe that we have got to take some chance if we are going to solve this problem, just as we have taken it with other aliens and with other people. And I believe definitely and sincerely that there is a contribution to be made by these forty or fifty thousand people to the manpower situation in winning this war.

SENATOR CHANDLER. You think it could be made with safety to the country?

MR. MYER. Yes.

MR. CHANDLER. I would like you to say that. You believe so.

SENATOR WALLGREN. I believe they can be policed and yet not be persecuted.

MR. MYER. I believe, furthermore, that a very large percentage of these people will not make a constructive contribution, but if given reasonable treatment will collaborate with us in every way.

SENATOR WALLGREN. We had some of those collaborators picked up by the F. B. I. in Seattle, outstanding citizens, outstanding students in the University of Washington. They were picked up with plenty of evidence to prove that they were tied up directly with the Government of Japan.

MR. MYER. Mr. Chairman, there are now between five and six thousand of these boys in the Army. It is my frank opinion that we ought to get more of them in the Army, and by so doing I think you begin to indoctrinate their parents. They know which side they are fighting for then. I think it is important that we understand that.

Now, it is a question as to which policy we are going to follow. It is important, I think, Senator Wallgren, that we make a determination on policy, because if we are off on the wrong foot, we need to be put straight by Congress.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Is it your underlying idea that the Jap, no matter how long he is here, will finally merge with our citizenship the same as any white man?

MR. MYER. My underlying idea is that since these people are going to continue to be American citizens, they will have to merge into our economy and be accepted as part of it, otherwise we are always going to have a racial problem.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Of course, you know that no Pacific States allow inter-marriage. They are always going to be brown men. Do you think they will finally merge and just be accepted in every way like a white man?

MR. MYER. Well, I can't predict that. I can say this, that there are a good many hundreds of the youngsters of college age and many who have gone to college in the past who have been accepted in the professions and otherwise.

Now, I think that you will find, other than color, that after about four or five generations these people will be living under the same standards as any other American citizens. They won't know anything else. I don't know what the ancestry of all the people around this room is. I know what my own is. We have been the melting pot of the nations here and we have accepted these people.

SENATOR GURNEY. I am foggy on a lot of regulations that must be in force. What happened to the property of these evacuees when they were taken away from their homes in Los Angeles? Who is controlling or handling the administration of those individuals' property?

MR. MYER. In most cases the individual has control, the evacuee himself. At the time of the evacuation the War Department asked the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration to give assistance to evacuees in either disposing of, leasing, or handling property such as real property. The Farm Security Administration assisted with the farm property in particular. The Federal Reserve bank assisted with their personal property and city properties. They provided storage if the evacuee cared to have things stored. They gave them any other assistance they could in finding buyers of lessees. We thought, up until about the middle of July, that the majority of these people had utilized the services of those two agencies. When W. R. A. began to take over these responsibilities, in August, we found that about one out of ten utilized the services of the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration. Most of the evacuees made their own arrangements with individuals. They had leased their properties and stored their goods with a neighbor or in a house or church. Personal property was left scattered all over the west coast in all kinds of states and conditions.

COLONEL SCOBEE. The War Department is not in favor of the bill. The War Department looks upon the measure as giving to it a responsibility which it is not particularly qualified to handle, because the objective to be accomplished is of a social nature rather than a military nature.

The War Department has a tremendous job on its hands. It needs all of its personnel on military projects rather than on social projects, as this is looked upon. That, basically, is the reason the War Department feels that it doesn't want to handle this job.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize briefly the initiation of this evacuation. I think I can state the purposes of the evacuation. At the time the evacuation was developed, the commanding general of the Western Defense Command had a serious problem on his hands. From a military strategic viewpoint it was not clear as to what might happen. No one knew exactly what the Japanese capabilities were, and there were indications, definite indications, that efforts were being made to make forays against the west coast. There certainly had been definite indications of raids, and in time of danger a military commander, being responsible for the security of his designated area, the people and the facilities of that area and his country, he doesn't want to take any chance whatsoever.

The military authorities were cognizant of the fact that there were dangerous Japanese among us, among those living on the west coast. At the same time they were also cognizant that there were loyal Japanese. Many of those Japanese had evidenced their loyalty to this country in various manners that I think can be best detailed by Commander Coggins. I will not attempt to go into that.

Unfortunately the military had never made a detailed study of these people, 110,000 or more. They were not all cataloged. But time was of the essence in the military situation and it was immediately necessary, under the existing conditions, that some measure be taken to insure that in case of a raid or an attack on the west

coast there were no fifth column activities and no collaboration by hostile or pro-Axis Japanese.

We recognize that actually some of the most dangerous of our people out there were not Japanese, they were other agents--German and Italian agents. They were collaborating with Japan, and with the Japanese.

Another reason, we felt, in view of the killings that had occurred out there, for the safety of the Japanese themselves we should get them out. The Western Defense Command and staff made a study of the situation and planned the evacuation. They set up assembly points and announced to the Japanese that they were to be evacuated. I don't believe we have on record a single instance of active opposition to that evacuation. Certainly, the Japanese collaborated remarkably well with our efforts, and may I say to this committee that the record shows the finest spirit in most instances, in nearly every instance. That was a remarkable thing to the War Department, and that collaboration contributed largely to the success of the evacuation, which caused the Army to get, I believe, a very good record on its processes in the evacuation.

Having evacuated these people from their homes and from their property and assembled them in these assembly centers, they then were turned over to the War Relocation Authority by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of the Civil Affairs Division of the western defense commander's staff. Having done that, the War Department had accomplished its mission in the evacuation and ceased to have further responsibility for the Japanese except by agreement with the War Relocation Authority whereby the War Department agreed to station at each relocation center the necessary military police to insure that the surrounding neighborhood was not molested by Japanese, and that in case of necessity Japanese were controlled within those centers, a security measure which we felt was desirable and which has proved to be of value.

SENATOR CHANDLER. Do you think it is adequate?

COLONEL SCOBIE. We have studied the question from every angle and we think, we believe, that the force we now have present at these centers in each instance is adequate. We look upon these Japanese as being unarmed, and certainly the majority of them having no desire to enter into any disturbances or engagements. The disturbances that have developed have been stresses within the center themselves, and our records show no instance where there has been any opposition or hostility exhibited toward the surrounding localities.

We are prepared, in case of emergency, to reinforce any particular military police company at any particular center. In other words, our plans are developed to that end by the Provost Marshal General of the Army.

SENATOR CHANDLER. Colonel, if this committee decides to turn the project back to the Army, you all will undertake it and do a good job of it?

COLONEL SCOBIEY. We will always take anything the Congress gives us. I think I would be justified in saying it would require us to set up an organization there that would--

SENATOR WALLGREN. How about that, Colonel? At the present time you have a police force, a military police.

SENATOR CHANDLER. At every one of them.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Why can't you have just an additional set-up there that would--

COLONEL SCOBIEY. We think we have too many military police now.

SENATOR WALLGREN. But write your regulations and restrictions along military lines.

COLONEL SCOBIEY. We think this is a social problem, Senator, if I may say so.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Oh, the social problem--you might as well farm these people all out and abolish your War Relocation Board. Farm them out. You can get rid of them.

COLONEL SCOBIEY. We would like to use these people as soldiers.

SENATOR WALLGREN. Sit around here and spend seventy or eighty million dollars with these people on your hands. Sure we can farm them out.

SENATOR CHANDLER. You don't think anybody has any objection to their fighting for this country if they will do it?

COLONEL SCOBIEY. I don't believe they would have any objection, if they will go out and get killed for us.

SENATOR CHANDLER. There has already been considerable time, and 70 percent of those are citizens of the United States, and if they will go to war there is nobody going to make any objection to that, for this country.

COLONEL SCOBAY. We hope to use them, some day, Mr. Chairman, in our military effort. As a matter of fact, Mr. Myer said we have 5,000. I think the figure is about 4,000 that are presently under arms in this country. We have a combat battalion now.

SENATOR WALLGREN. They had to move them all off the west coast.

COLONEL SCOBAY. We did move them all off the west coast, and I intended to explain that, Senator Wallgren, by saying that at the moment we could not differentiate between the men that we knew or thought were loyal and the disloyal. We did not take the time to conduct an investigation.

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SENATOR WALLGREN. I am thinking a little bit about this problem, that day after day these boys are going to be returning from the South Pacific, and we just don't know what the feeling is going to be of our own American citizen to have to see either his son or his brother or some close relative die at the hands of a Jap. It is something I think we should think about. We have got to not only protect our own nation but we have to protect the Japanese as well that live here in this country, and that was the idea of that proclamation of the President, creating strategic areas and moving those people out.

SENATOR CHANDLER. I would like for us to hear the commander while he is here. Colonel, we may call you again. I want to ask you if you think you fellows are sufficient and did do a satisfactory job at Manzanar, when they had the riot. Did you think they handled that situation?

COLONEL SCOBIEY. The results speak for themselves, the box score. The mob was broken up.

SENATOR CHANDLER. Not without killing and wounding.

COLONEL SCOBIEY. They took no chances. They fired when the mob moved toward them. It is not clear whether the mob was charging them to escape the gas or whether they charged them to overrun the police. The indications are that the mob was charging to escape the gas, by reading the report, but the military police, having no knowledge of why they were charging, took no chances and fired. You have the report, I think, Senator. I sent it to you.

SENATOR WALLGREN. At the outbreak of this war we had 120,000 Japanese in the three West Coast States of California, Washington, and Oregon. A great many of these people were residing around certain strategic areas, such as Terminal Island, in Los Angeles, around San Pedro, and around a great many of our airplane factories, power installations, and so on. There was considerable alarm among the people on the west coast and all the representatives as to allowing these people to live in such close proximity to these strategic plants, and so on.

After several hearings held among the members of the delegations of the three West Coast States we made recommendations to the President that he create certain strategic areas in those three States and evacuate those areas, not to declare martial law but just sort of license these people to remain within the area, and then revoke the license of anyone he thought should not be in the area.

This finally evolved itself into a plan to create evacuation camps, and they were created in such places as Manzanar, Santa Anita race track, and places of that sort; so the Army started in immediately to evacuate these strategic areas by presidential proclamation. So these Japanese were all brought into these camps-- man, women, children, citizens, Japanese born in this country, and so on, were all brought into these camps, and under the direct supervision of the Army.

For a time this operated very nicely, and then the President, I presume, decided to place this all in the control of the War Relocation Board for the purpose of trying to relocate these people. That has been in operation now for several months, and during that period of time they have had in their entire population a great many Japanese who have been trying to incite the others and causing many disturbances. There has been no effort on their part to segregate them, to separate them. I presume they have made some effort to relocate some of these people, but the testimony up to now is to the effect that there are at least 2,000 of these

Japanese who have been out on furloughs, you might say, that have not reported back to headquarters, and one of the things that I would like to know is whether or not you believe that we can take a chance in allowing these people a great deal of freedom under existing conditions.

It isn't my idea to persecute these people by any means. I would like to help them. But with this war going on and with all the bitterness that might be created because of the loss of sons and brothers and relatives over there in the South Pacific, it might not be any too safe to allow some of those people too much freedom, and it might be for their own protection to keep them under strict supervision and under some sort of protection on our part.

On the other hand, I contend that it might be advisable for the Army and for the F. B. I. agents, through any sort of system they may have, to determine a program of segregation, to try and take these men out of the camps that might be causing us trouble, and place them into a strict internment camp, and then in turn try and farm these other people out into spots where they might be able to help us out with our manpower problem.

That is about the size of it, although we would like to know just how our people are treated over in Japan, whether or not you feel that the Japanese that are in this country could be loyal to this country under any conditions.

MR. GREW. Mr. Chairman: In the first place, Senator, are the 120,000 Japanese you speak of all Japanese subjects, or are some of them Nisei?

SENATOR WALLGREN. There are about 60,000 Nisei.

MR. GREW. Frankly, this is a subject to which I have not had any opportunity to give careful thought. It is essentially a domestic problem, and I have been dealing almost exclusively since my return with problems connected with Japan direct.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, without any hesitation, that under war conditions, we must allow nothing whatsoever to interfere with our war effort, to endanger the war effort or our security in any way. That is just plain common sense that goes without saying.

Taking that as a basic principle, the question arises whether it is not going to be possible to segregate the sheep from the goats. In other words, I believe myself that there are many thousands of so-called Nisei, American citizens of Japanese descent, whose loyalty can be depended upon 100 percent. I don't have the slightest doubt about it. I think probably a very small percentage could not be depended upon; and here you have this large element of Nisei who are actually American citizens. I conceive that they can be a healthy element in the country, and I should hate to see steps taken which would so alienate them that the measure taken by our Government would drive them into the other camp against their will. I think that is a possibility, and I think it is a matter which should be given consideration.

The whole thing seems to me to boil down more to a question of method than anything else, the method of segregating the sheep from the goats, the method of ascertaining who can be depended upon and who cannot. I don't know whether that is for the F. B. I. or what organization would undertake it, but I think a primary consideration should be that we must take no chances at all in allowing anybody who could conceivably interfere with our war effort, who could conceivably undertake espionage against us, to remain free. Having that in mind, I would like to see on the other side efforts made not to antagonize and alienate this very large proportion of the Nisei who are held in these camps.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. Would it be a justifiable conclusion to say that there are substantial elements in Japan which, if they were not controlled by the military machine, would be amenable to our ideas of social existence and political control?

MR. GREW. Without any shadow of doubt, Senator, I would say so.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. So that there is nothing inherent in the Japanese nationality which would lead anybody to conclude that those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are now in these various war relocation camps cannot be trusted, generally speaking?

MR. GREW. There is nothing that justifies those conclusions.

SENATOR O'MAHONEY. In other words, we ought to follow the policy not of condemning all of these Japs, but of seeking to find out those who cannot be trusted.

MR. GREW. I feel so very strongly.

MR. GREW:

JAPANESE NATIONALITY IN CASES OF PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED  
STATES TO JAPANESE PARENTS

A Japanese domiciled in the United States but born in Japan is referred to in Japanese as an Issei(first generation); a Japanese born in the United States of parents born in Japan is referred to as a Nisei(second generation); and a Japanese born and resident in the United States but educated in Japan is referred to as a Kibei (returned to America).

The pertinent portions of Japanese law governing nationality in cases of persons born in the United States to Japanese parents are quoted below:

Japanese Law No. 66 of March 1899. As revised by law No. 27 of March 1916, and by Law No. 19 of July 1924, effective from December 1, 1924.

ARTICLE 1. A child is regarded as a Japanese if its father is at the time of its birth a Japanese. The same applies if the father who died before the child's birth was at the time of his death a Japanese.

ARTICLE 20. A person who acquires foreign nationality voluntarily loses Japanese nationality.

ARTICLE 20 (2) A Japanese who, by reason of having been born in a foreign country designated by Imperial Ordinance, has acquired the nationality of that country, and who does not as laid down by order express his intention of retaining Japanese nationality, loses his Japanese nationality retroactively from his birth.

Persons who have retained Japanese nationality in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, or Japanese subjects who, by reason of having been born in a designated foreign country before its designation in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, have acquired the nationality of that country, may, when they are in possession of the nationality of the country con-

cerned and in possession of a domicile in that country, renounce Japanese nationality if they desire to do so.

Persons who shall have renounced their nationality in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph lose Japanese nationality.

ARTICLE 24. Notwithstanding the provisions of article 19, article 20, and the preceding three articles, a male of full 17 years of age or upward does not lose Japanese nationality, unless he has completed active service in the Army or Navy, or unless he is under no obligation to serve.

A person who actually occupies an official post, civil or military, does not lose Japanese nationality notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding eight articles until after he or she has lost such official post.

ARTICLE 26. If a person who has lost Japanese nationality in accordance with the provisions of article 20 to article 21, inclusive, is domiciled in Japan, he or she may, with the permission of the Minister of the Interior, recover Japanese nationality. But this rule does not apply to cases in which the persons mentioned in article 16 have lost Japanese nationality.

It is understood that the expression of intention of retaining Japanese nationality, provided for in article 20 (2) must be made by the parent within 2 weeks after the birth of the child, if the child is to retain the Japanese nationality acquired at birth under article 1. In this connection reference may be made to the provisions of article 2 of the Japanese regulations (Ordinance No. 26) of November 17, 1942, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

"ARTICLE 2. Those desiring to preserve their nationality in accordance with the provisions of clause 1 of article 20 (2) of the Nationality Law, and being those who are required to submit a report of birth by clause 1 or clause 2 of article 72 of the Census Domicile Law, shall file a report to that effect, together with a report

of birth, within the period set forth in article 69 of the Census Domicile Law."

The period for the registration by the parent of the birth of a child, provided in article 69 of the Census Domicile Law, is 14 days.

From the foregoing provisions it would appear that a person of Japanese parentage born in the United States is regarded as a Japanese subject only if he has been declared a Japanese subject by his parents within 14 days of his birth.

While it might appear that the provisions of article 24 would preclude any Japanese male from divesting himself of Japanese nationality unless he has completed military service or has no obligation to serve, and while this provision is expressly applicable to article 20, the Department has been informed that it is not applicable to article 20 (2), which is regarded as a separate article.

MR. GUFLER. The Spanish Government protects Japanese interests just as the Swiss Government protects our interests in Japan, and we just recently took Spanish representatives around to the relocation centers. I took some of them to eight centers. Of course, they were only interested in the fact that there are Japanese subjects there. They were very much impressed, and I have every reason to believe that there will go out to Tokyo from the Ambassador here a very good report on our treatment of those people.

We have never submitted to any undertaking that those relocation centers are internment camps, and that this Geneva Prisoners of War Convention which we are applying, and the Japanese are, to prisoners of war and to internees, shall be applied to the centers. One argument we have always had is that this ~~is~~ a separate organization; we have just moved the people. This is not a thing of our military or a thing of our police.

Now, if anything happens that clamps the convention onto this, or gives the Japanese a chance to say "We won't give your people the benefit of the convention unless all these people in the centers get it," it will tie our hands somewhat, because in certain respects we can give actually more Spartan conditions to people in the centers, saying to them, "You boys, this is your sacrifice for the war, and if you don't have this or that that prisoners of war should have, that is your sacrifice for the war." We can get a little more out of them, actually, in some respects, and make more calls on them, than we could if they were ever definitely drawn under that convention.

Also, of course, it would be embarrassing for us to have people under an international convention in a camp where there were both Americans and foreigners.

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

*Subcommittee of Senate Military Affairs Committee*  
(Chandler Committee)

A subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee was established during the first session of the 78th. Congress to investigate S444. This bill provided

"That all functions of the War Relocation Authority and the Director of the War Relocation Authority which relate to the removal of persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas in the States of California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona, or to the relocation, maintenance, and supervision of such persons, are hereby transferred to the Department of War and shall be administered by the Secretary of War."  
(Report of Subcommittee to Investigate Japanese War Relocation Centers, p. 1)

Senate Resolutions 101 and 111 authorized the Senate Committee on Military Affairs or any subcommittee of it to visit Relocation Centers. (Ibid., p.1)

The members of the Subcommittee were Chairman, Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky; Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming; James E. Murray of Montana; Mon C. Wallgren of Washington; Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Chas. Gurney of South Dakota; and Rufus C. Holman of Oregon. Among the topics to be considered were the results of policies then in effect at relocation centers, the adequacy of internal and external security provisions, the adequacy of housing facilities, etc. Information was acquired through hearings conducted in Washington and at various points in or near relocation centers, and from material submitted by various governmental departments. Among the witnesses called were WRA officials, governors of states containing relocation centers, ex-ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, and interested civilians. (Report, p.2) The hearings began on January 20, 1943 and the final report was submitted to the Military Affairs Committee on May 7, 1943.

At the first hearing on January 20, WRA Director Myer was questioned on the general background of evacuation and the Manzanar riot of December, 1942. At that hearing Senator Wallgren of Washington made a statement which is characteristic of his outlook on the Japanese problem:

"You know, a Jap would be an awfully good dog right up to the point that he can pull something. Naturally he is going to be a very, very obedient prisoner or evacuee. He will be just as nice as he possibly can be in order to get an opportunity to do that job that he wants to do for his country. The boys have had a lot of experience over in the Philippines. They are having them right now over in the Solomon Islands. They will use every trick in the world in order to throw you off your guard, and then they will stab you in the back, and we had an experience at Pearl Harbor that ought to really be a lesson to anyone, and yet we are going to still continue to grant them leaves of absence where they might be able to go out some place and blow up maybe Coulee Dam or Bonneville or maybe some large munitions plant. I think we are taking a chance, and I don't think we should take chances right at this particular stage of the game."  
(Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Military Affairs Committee, S. 444, 1/20-28/43, p. 41)

Again Senator Wallgren, with complete disregard for the facts, said:

"I think they knocked off about 150 of these Japs out there, the Filipinos and the Chinese, up to the time that they put them into camps...."

The Washington Star of January 27, 1943, stated that ex-ambassador Grew would be asked to verify reports that two thirds of the Japanese were loyal. <sup>It</sup> They quoted Sen. Chandler as saying that "If this is true, something should be done to separate the loyal Japanese from the avowed enemies of this country in those camps. At the January 28th. hearings, Mr. Grew made a strong case for the loyalty of most of the Nisei."

"In other words, I believe myself that there are many thousands of so-called Nisei, American citizens of Japanese descent, whose loyalty can be depended upon 100 percent. I don't have the slightest doubt about it. I think probably a very small percentage could

"not be depended upon; and here you have this large element of Nisei who are actually American citizens. I conceive that they can be a healthy element in the country, and I should hate to see steps taken which would so alienate them that the measure taken by our Government would drive them into the other camp against their will. I think that is a possibility, and I think it is a matter which should be given consideration."  
(Ibid., p. 10899)

Later, Senator O'Mahoney asked Mr. Grew:

"Would it be a justifiable conclusion to say that there are substantial elements in Japan which, if they were not controlled by the military machine, would be amenable to our ideas of social existence and political control?"

Mr. Grew: "Without any shadow of doubt, Senator, I would say so."

Sen. O'M. "So that there is nothing inherent in the Japanese nationality which would lead anybody to conclude that those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are now in these various war relocation camps cannot be trusted, generally speaking?"

Mr. Grew: "There is nothing that justifies those conclusions."  
(Ibid., p. 112)

WRHAN

The inquiries resumed on February 11. Mr. Myer was again a witness. He was questioned particularly on the segregation program and general provisions for indefinite leave. During the morning Senators Chandler and O'Mahoney became involved in a ludicrous argument as to whether the WPA or the Army were responsible for the evacuation program in the early stages. Senator O'Mahoney correctly contended that the Army had been responsible but had requested the WPA to assist in the management of the camps during the Assembly Center period. Senator Chandler contended that the WPA was in control. This discussion covers five pages of the printed hearings.  
(Ibid., pp. 135-139)

Subcommittee members visited relocation centers in February and March. ~~Before the visits, Senator Chandler said that he did not want to visit the~~

camps at a time which would interfere with the registration program. He hoped that Director Myer would accompany him. Without any warning to Mr. Myer, Senator Chandler <sup>appeared</sup> was in Los Angeles anxious to visit camps. The visits did coincide with the registration period. Mrs. Chandler accompanied the Senator and more than once made anti-Japanese statements in the hearing of evacuees. (Interview Myer-Grodzins, 10/12/43) *over*

*Throughout the hearings, Com. members made statements to the press, sometimes contradictory, frequently before & subs to the tent. In his first statement to the press since the start of the investigation, Senator Chandler stated that at one camp he found 60% of the evacuees disloyal. These disloyal, he said, were ready to commit "almost any act for their Emperor.... There is no question in my mind that thousands of these fellows were armed and prepared to help Japanese troops invade the West Coast right after Pearl Harbor, but thanks to the fine work of the FBI they were rounded up immediately." (Washington Post, 3/9/43) *meeting were completed.**

Senator Chandler's statement is correct, justification of evacuation becomes exceedingly difficult. *newsp. quoted in this discussion of the Chandler If Com. are quoted in N R F releases*

Many other statements in regard to the extent of disloyalty were made to the press before the submission of the subcommittee's official report to the Military Affairs Committee. The Arkansas Gazette of 3/14/43 reported that the results of the "Chandler Registration" showed that "20% of military age were disloyal". After his visit to an Arkansas camp, the Dermott News of 3/18/43 quoted Chandler as saying that "...the majority of the actually loyal Japanese fear their own people who are not loyal to America and are afraid of the people outside the centers. The group that is disloyal to this country are afraid of nothing, not even death, and form a danger for the loyal Japanese citizens, and may endanger the lives of Americans at any time." Ray Richards in the Los Angeles Examiner of 3/25/43 quoted Senator Chandler as saying that 40-50% of American born

He Japanese men of draft age had certified themselves as not loyal. ~~It~~ further quoted Chandler as saying that his trip had destroyed "his belief that all but a few of the American born Japanese in the camps were loyal to this country". The Sacramento Bee, in reporting the Chandler investigations, placed <sup>the</sup> number of disloyal at from 30-40%. (Sac. Bee, 4/1/43) The Rocky Mountain News on 4/9/43 quoted Chandler as stating that "Half the citizens of Manzanar are disloyal to this country, while only 2% are disloyal at Minidoka Camp in Idaho." (Rocky Mountain News, 4/9/43) The all time high estimate of disloyalty came from Senator Robertson's secretary who said that Sen. Robertson estimated disloyalty at Heart Mountain at 80% and that He didn't want any "Japanese internees left in Wyoming after the war". (Washington Post, 5/1/43)

Concerning the loyalty of the evacuees, the Arkansas Gazette reported Senator Murray as follows:

"He said that such Japanese are in their present predicament because they failed to publicly declare their loyalty to the United States and to prove that they are proud of their American citizenship.... When Japan made its treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor, those Japanese-American citizens had a golden opportunity to publicly show their love for this country. They could and should have held meetings denouncing Japan ~~xxxxx~~ ~~They~~ and offering their services in any capacity to aid the United States. There were few if any meetings by American born Japanese denouncing Japan.... They showed disloyalty in their refusal to accept agricultural employment when offered, the senator said. He said an authorized agent now is trying to obtain recruits from Rohwer and Jerome camps for work in North Dakota but is finding difficulty in obtaining the number desired. 'I learned that only 29 ~~xx~~ Japanese out of 1,600 between the age of 18 and 38... volunteered for military service. Recently in another state there was a serious shortage of farm labor. In that state there was a large Japanese camp, however, for the most part the Japs declined to accept employment. That is evidence of disloyalty to the United States.'" (Arkansas Gazette, 3/17/43)

Californ Senator Murray apparently failed to read the California press in the weeks immediately following Pearl Harbor.

At Rhower the committee heard complaints from local citizens requesting military control of the camps. Senator Chandler said that recommendations had already been made to Washington for a better guard system at the centers. (Arkansas Democrat, 3/14/43) He was also quoted as saying "...more than 25% of the guards on duty at the camp are incompetent to meet a serious emergency because of physical or other deficiencies...". (Dermott News, 3/18/43)

Quite early in the investigation, Senator Chandler proposed abolition of the relocation centers. He was said to fear "the perpetuation of the relocation program would result in a situation not unlike the administration of Indian affairs". (Tucson Star, 3/12/43) After the Arkansas visit, Senator Chandler was reported to have said that the Japanese "...will be deported or placed in communities that want or ask for them". (Dermott News, 3/18/43) The Los Angeles Examiner on March 26, quoted him as urging the abolition of the relocation centers with "...Army supervision over all males of military age". He was also reported as favoring the "farming out" of older aliens for farm labor. n Chandler, according to the Denver Post, felt that relocation centers were "fomenting hatred" toward Japanese Americans because they were expensive, ~~prize~~ pampered the disloyal, and ~~just~~ kept the remainder in idleness. (Denver Post, 4/21/43)

After visiting five centers, Senator Chandler was quoted by the Seattle Post Intelligencer as follows:

"There is too much coddling of the openly anti-American Japs. Police forces at the camps are inadequate.... WRA payroll is outrageously high. I believe that our FBI can screen out the loyal evacuees...loyal Japanese Americans who are qualified for service in our armed forces should be drafted.... The evacuees are receiving what I would call handsome treatment.... They don't have to work at the centers, but if they do work our government pays them."

(Seattle Post Intelligencer, 4/1/43)

"WRA is made up of professors and social workers who are sincere and earnest and good fellows, but I do not believe they have handled the Japanese problem properly." (Chicago Tribune, 4/3/43)

Senator Chandler was reported by the Sacramento Bee to have called the present system of operating relocation centers "A complete bust... The cost was more than \$700 per prisoner and no work was exacted from the prisoners". (Sacramento Bee, 4/7/43) The entire population of the relocation centers seem to have acquired the status of prisoners.

Tentative conclusions were given to the press as early as March 12. On that date the Arizona Republic gave these as the committee's tentative conclusions:

- 1) Completion of voluntary enlistment program with selective service ~~for~~ those of military age and tests of loyalty by the army.
- 2) Internment of disloyal; disloyalty to be determined by army tests.
- 3) Gradual release of loyal with some surveillance by civil authorities.

(Arizona Republic, 3/12/43)  
*Chandler*

The report of the <sup>Chandler</sup> subcommittee to the Military Affairs Committee contained twelve "findings" and four "recommendations". Among the more important of the findings were:

"That over a period of 12 months since the date of the agreement of transfer... transferring the internees to the Authority, no effective effort has been made to separate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

That under the present policy the centers have all the earmarks of permanent institutions, and appear to be pointed to an expansion rather than to a curtailment of their activities.

That the registration by the War Department has been completed, and that out of the 105,750 internees in the 10 relocation centers 19,963 Japanese male citizens of military age (17-37)

were registered. Six percent, or 1,181 volunteered, and 24 percent, or 4,783 answered 'No' to the loyalty question. That the percentage answering 'No' was highest at Manzanar (just above 50 percent) and lowest at Minidoka (approximately 2 percent). That the percentage of volunteers was highest at Minidoka (20 percent) and lowest at Heart Mountain (2½ percent). Approximately 4,650 Japanese have asked for repatriation.

That the reaction was convincing from directors of the centers, outside witnesses and the Japanese themselves, that the draft law should apply, with the Army screening out the disloyal....

That the reaction was likewise convincing from the same groups that the remaining loyal Japanese should be allowed to go out and perform some useful service....

That both the internal and external security are inadequate and loosely administered....

.... They are well fed and well housed, considering the type of housing, and schools, hospitals, and recreation facilities are good, but in trying to fit the supervision to the good and the bad evacuees alike, it does not fit anyone. It is probably more than the good ones need, and the bad ones get away with very nearly anything, including intimidation and even physical beatings of other residents of the centers, without being properly apprehended....

*(See footnote below p. 4 & 5)*

~~The recommendations were substantially the same as those given to the press at an earlier date. They were:~~

"That the draft law be made to apply to all Japanese in the same manner as to all other citizens and residents of the United States.

That those who answered 'No' to the loyalty question and those otherwise determined to be disloyal to the United States be forthwith placed in an internment camp, and that such determination should be made at the earliest possible date; and that the cases of those asking for repatriation should be disposed of at the earliest possible date.

That the loyal able-bodied Japanese be allowed to go out to work under proper supervision at the earliest possible time, in the areas where they will be accepted, and where the Army and Navy authorities consider it safe for them to go. The designation of such areas should precede any movement of the evacuees.

(Report of the Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to Investigate Japanese War Relocation Centers, pp. 4 & 5)

In conclusion, the report stated that "There can be but one definite objective of the Japanese relocation centers, and that is, complete dissolution at the end of the war". (Ibid., p.6) They went on to say that "...the committee believes and strongly recommends that the regularly constituted arms of the Government, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Army and Navy authorities should assume full and complete responsibility in the determination of loyalty or disloyalty in the cases of all Japanese citizens and aliens included in this report for the purpose of making the recommendations effective. They have proved their efficiency in this field, and no other arm of the Government is in a position to train and support an efficient personnel for this purpose." (Ibid., pp. 7 & 8)