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Internal Security
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
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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Colorado River Relocation Center
Poston, Arizona

FINAL REPORT

INTERNAL SECURITY

December 3, 1945


Chief, Internal Security

PROTECTION OFFICE

INTERNAL SECURITY



FINAL REPORT - INTERNAL SECURITY

A. ORGANIZATION OF THE SECTION

Effective September 1, 1944, the present Chief of Internal Security was transferred from the Tule Lake Segregation Center. The former chief at Poston and all but one member of his appointed staff had resigned due to internal difficulties. The Unit I evacuee police department had dissolved and Internal Security matters were not in good shape. A survey of the situation revealed the need for a juvenile delinquency control program, a traffic safety program, revision of the records and reports system, abatement of the wide misuse of government equipment, a police training program, good public relations, and adequate equipment and personnel to successfully cope with all problems.

Recruitment of evacuee police began early in September with candidates being carefully selected for their integrity, judgment, and adaptability. Cooperation of the community council was enlisted toward recruitment. By November a full complement was functioning efficiently on a 24 hour schedule.

The duties of the section included general patrol, traffic, guard, juvenile matters, minor investigations, and related functions. Each of the three unit police departments was in charge of an evacuee chief who was directly responsible to the Chief of Internal Security for the smooth functioning of his unit. The relationship between the evacuee police and the Internal Security Section was harmonious and cooperative.

1. Evacuee and Appointed Personnel

One evacuee police officer with the rank of sergeant was detailed to work with the Chief of Internal Security as confidential investigator, interpreter, and general contact man. This particular officer was a valuable asset to law enforcement. He was loyal, conscientious, honest, and intelligent. His sources of information always proved reliable and his trustworthiness was unquestioned. All sources of information were held confidential and protected with the utmost scrupulousness.

Additions to the Internal Security staff were requested and granted. The quota, as of September 1944 was: one chief, three assistant chiefs, one internal security officer, five guards, and one secretary. The problem of appointed staff was at first a serious one but with the newly established quotas, recruiting and training brought satisfactory results despite a fair turnover. The staff quota at present is: one chief, three assistants, six internal security officers, twenty guards, and one

secretary. In addition, one evacuee secretary was assigned to assist the staff secretary. However, at no time was the section up to its full quota. Since September 1944, six staff members resigned rather than face disciplinary action arising from charges of neglect of duty, misconduct, failure to cooperate, etc.

2. Duties

Each new staff member of the Internal Security Section was required to familiarize himself with all rules and regulations and administrative instructions immediately following his personnel processing. He was then interviewed by the Chief of Internal Security and instructed in the various phases of his official duties after which he was assigned to his detail under the supervision of an older and more experienced officer. It was mandatory for each member of the Internal Security Section to attend the regular training classes which were held for from two to three hours each Saturday morning. The merit system was employed in promotions of guards to Internal Security Officers and Internal Security Officers to Assistant Chief. All positions above that of guard have been filled by in-service promotions. It was felt that this plan contributed largely to the morale of the section.

The duties of Internal Security Officers and Guards embraced investigation of case reports, motor patrol, foot patrol, fixed post guard, traffic, juvenile control, and performance of related duties.

B. FACILITIES FOR OPERATION

Early in the present chief's regime, the Internal Security Section moved from offices in the Administration Building to its own building across the street. The new building comprised: front offices with counter; waiting room and secretary's office; chief's private office; assistant chief's office; store rooms for equipment; evidence and found property; squad rooms; a library; coffee shop; and washrooms. The new building has proved very satisfactory. An improvised jail was constructed at Camp I but this was seldom used. The Indian Service jail at Parker, 17 miles north of the project, was designated as the official project jail. Practically all sentenced prisoners served their time in the county jail at Yuma, Arizona. Prisoners charged with Federal offenses went to Phoenix, Arizona and were incarcerated in the Maricopa County Jail at Phoenix.

Formerly the section boasted but two pieces of motor equipment for appointed staff and three for the evacuee police. This was increased to five pieces of motor equipment for the appointed staff, and three for evacuee police. Each evacuee police unit had one truck for a patrol wagon and all official purposes. The other equipment was used as follows:

One chief's car
Three patrol cars, one for each camp
One car for supervision, traffic, investigation, and emergency duty

An adequate supply of tear gas (CN and DN) was secured for mob control and other emergencies but there has been no occasion to use gas grenades. The chief possessed a complete fingerprint outfit and other scientific equipment. Each member of the section was issued a night stick, badge and flashlight. No fire arms were issued. The chief, his assistants, and one or two officers possessed pistols which were their own personal property but these, as a rule, were not carried but kept available in a locked place for use if necessary. Two 22 automatic rifles were secured for the purpose of shooting predatory animals. A gun locker was provided in the squad room where rifles, shot guns, grenades, and other equipment were stored.

No call boxes were provided for men on patrol. Each man on duty was required to check in by telephone at least once each hour during his tour of duty. There was no regularly prescribed uniform. However, most of the men, especially in warm weather, wore suntan clothing and sun helmets.

C. PROGRAM

The Colorado River Relocation Center embraced three camps $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant from each other. It normally housed about 16,000 evacuees. The project covered an area of 70,000 acres and had within its boundaries approximately 45 miles of streets and roads. The administration area, housing area, warehouses, motor pools, schools, hospitals, etc. represented many millions of dollars of government property. To properly protect life, limb, and property and to maintain law and order, a 24 hour patrol of all exposed places was necessary. Frequency of patrols varied according to manpower and equipment conditions. We were mindful of the theory that constant patrol is considered the most effective crime deterrent and concentrated on continuous and efficient patrol of the project. Under the old regime there was very little if any patrolling done by appointed staff and no Internal Security

officer was on duty after midnight. Occasionally there was one officer on duty up to midnight.

The Internal Security Section inaugurated a new and more efficient gate system with the cooperation of the Military Police and the section since the departure of the Army has assumed the responsibility of manning the main gate. The section also assumed responsibility for the issuance and control of all 24 hour gate passes for evacuees, appointed personnel, and others. These functions were formerly performed by the Project Director.

All escort duties for Finance and other sections were performed by the Internal Security Section. This included escort of evacuees with private cars to be impounded. In conformance with administrative instructions an officer would meet evacuees with private cars at the main gate, escort the cars to the evacuee's residence, giving them an opportunity to remove baggage and personal effects. The car was then escorted to the motor pool and impounded and the key deposited in a locked cabinet in the office of Internal Security. No evacuee was permitted to drive his private car on or off the project without an official permit from the Chief of Internal Security. All unauthorized persons desiring admittance into the project limits were interviewed at the main gate by an officer on duty before a pass was issued.

Practically every project case required a separate investigation and follow-up. Project case investigations were conducted only by men above the rank of guard. All Confidential investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence and sheriff, were handled solely by the Chief of Internal Security.

Traffic safety duties embraced: education, periodic vehicle inspections, surveys of conditions, posting of stop, speed limit, and warning signs along the roadways, patrol and enforcement. The organization and supervision of school safety patrols was established in collaboration with the school authorities. Traffic collisions were kept to a minimum with no fatalities or serious injuries. All privately owned dogs were inoculated against rabies and an inoculation tag and license tag were issued and records kept by this section. Strays and predatory animals were impounded and/or destroyed.

An investigation of vice conditions in all camps was conducted and it was found that there was commercial gambling being con-

ducted in Camps I and III but none in Camp II. Raids were made resulting in approximately 35 arrests. Fines totalling over \$1,000 were collected and evidence and equipment were confiscated. No prostitution was discovered during the present chief's regime. Six liquor law cases, manufacture, and/or sale, were prosecuted. All other liquor cases, possession and transportation, were handled as infractions of project rules and regulations.

Supervision of guards and evacuee police was maintained 24 hours daily. The government warehouses in Parker were guarded from 4 p.m. to 8 a.m. daily. Juvenile delinquency control was made a major program due to past conditions. Gangs were broken up and numerous arrests were made. Junior Police squads were organized and gang leaders, potential gang leaders, juvenile delinquents, and per-delinquents were especially enlisted as members of this club. Their former depredations were ignored, and in fact, not mentioned to the boys. Athletic and social activities of all juveniles were supervised by the Internal Security Section. The cooperation of parents, project officials, school teachers, evacuee police, and responsible adult evacuees was secured to assist in the juvenile control program. Juvenile delinquency on the project was conspicuous by its absence about the first of January 1945 and gangs which were formerly in evidence had completely disappeared.

D. SERVICES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Training

The regular training classes were attended by both evacuee police and the Internal Security staff. A record of attendance was maintained by the chief and the chief gave all instructions. The classes ran from February 1945 to September 1945 and the curriculum of the course embraced the following subjects: basic duties and attitudes; law of arrest, search and seizure; elements of criminal law; statutes and project rules and regulations; evidence and court procedure; patrol and observation; traffic control and public safety; psychology and treatment of evacuees; self defense and physical training; use and care of equipment; juvenile control and juvenile law; public relations and relocation; report writing and records.

Although numerous arrests were made, prosecution did not follow in all cases and in many instances minor infractions were handled arbitrarily by the chief of Internal Security,

especially where juveniles were concerned. In all cases where juveniles were "called on the carpet" by the chief regarding minor depredations, the offender was unofficially placed on probation to some responsible adult and in not one of these cases was there a repeat of the offense. In other arrests, the defendants were sometimes released on their own recognizance pending their hearing and at times it was felt advisable to incarcerate the offender, either at the Indian Service Jail or the Camp III detention room.

The discretion of the chief decided in which cases official case reports should be made. Case records were kept of all offenses whether officially reported (Forms 2460247) or not. All intelligence work which was handled by the chief in cooperation with federal agencies was strictly confidential and cannot be represented in this report.

2. Types of Arrests

An analysis of Internal Security statistics shows a high frequency of burglaries, violations of project rules and regulations, and thefts. A number of arrests were made and convictions obtained. However, with the limited authority for search and seizure allowed to the Internal Security Section under administrative instructions, it was practically impossible to prevent stolen property from passing through the main gate and being taken off the project. A gang of boys in Camp III committed six burglaries and five automobile thefts before being apprehended, but these arrests stopped any further crimes of this nature in Camp III. Two arrests for burglary and two for theft of government property in Camp I resulted in convictions of the perpetrators. In these cases the arrests were made within 24 hours after the offenses were committed, the loot recovered, and sufficient evidence secured for prosecution. These arrests had the effect of reducing thefts materially. Most of the infractions of project regulations were misuse of government equipment. These offenses became fewer and the situation in due time was considered to be under control.

In September 1944 a 24 year old evacuee girl was murdered by her former sweetheart. The girl was stabbed 33 times and the suspect made his escape into the desert. The Internal Security Section was notified 35 minutes after the escape of the suspect and immediately organized a posse. All outside law enforcement agencies were notified and an intensive search was made for the suspect. To this date he has not been found and it is felt that he perished somewhere on the desert as it seems improbable

that he could have successfully made his escape into any community or other hiding place.

3. Special Security Problems

As the present chief did not take over his official duties until September 1, 1944 there were no registration or segregation problems. A number of arrests for selective service were made and these cases turned over to the U. S. Marshal. On September 8 and 9, 72 renunces were apprehended by the Internal Security Section and taken to an especially provided barracks and guarded, fed, and cared for and turned over to the U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service for transportation to an internment camp at Santa Fe, New Mexico. The round up of these renunces was performed without ostentation. Not one slight incident occurred and the performance was 100 percent complete. No riots, work stoppages, strikes, unlawful assemblies, or mass demonstrations occurred during the present chief's regime.

4. Effectiveness of Program

All programs previously mentioned in Paragraph A were in operation and good results were achieved. This section offered assistance to practically every section on the project at some time or other. The morale of the section has been very good generally and public relations were excellent. The evacuees showed respect and confidence in the Internal Security Section and good working conditions with the evacuees prevailed. The policy of the section was one of strict and intelligent law enforcement, tolerance and fair treatment toward everyone.

The records and reports system was divided into case reports (segregated by camps), a docket, cross index files, memo files, correspondence files, and chief's files. All files were confidential and kept under lock and key. The guide to the present records system is "Uniform Crime Reporting" as prescribed by the Committee of Uniform Crime Records International Association of Chiefs of Police and the F. B. I. Department of Justice. The Modus Operandi system was employed where practical.

E. COST OF OPERATION

Not available at the time this report is written.

F. PUBLIC RELATIONS

The Internal Security Section cooperated with other sections and

and divisions on the center, and its relations with the Community Council and Judicial Commission were good. Cooperation was extended to all federal, state, and county agencies and personal contacts with members of these agencies were always friendly. The Chief of Internal Security on several occasions gave talks before the Federal Employees Union, the A. F. of L. at Parker, Arizona, the American Legion at Phoenix, and the project staff. Each member of the section was designated as a public relations medium because of his continual contact with people on the project and elsewhere.

G. PARTICIPATION IN CENTER CLOSURE

During the closing of Camps II and III it was found necessary for the Internal Security Section to apprehend and eject 6 or 8 recalcitrant persons who refused to make relocation plans. After a few ejections there were no further cases of this nature and the section did everything possible to assist in the resettlement program.

It was found that a number of temporary appointed employees who replaced evacuee employees during the liquidation program required the attention of the Internal Security Section. It was necessary to terminate 18 or 20 of these employees, most of whom were of the laboring class, because of drunkenness and disorderly conduct. At this writing, however, these conditions have improved greatly.

Recent instructions from Washington are that all Internal Security Officers and assistant chiefs are terminated as of December 15, 1945, and the Chief of Internal Security is terminated as of December 29, 1945. The guards are to remain until further notice under the supervision of either the property section or the Operations Division. As practically all of the remaining guards are inexperienced and untrained men, the writer believes that this may create a grave situation so far as law enforcement is concerned. The guards require a great deal of expert supervision 24 hours daily and it is doubtful whether a member of any other section can properly supervise guards in police work. In the event of a crime of any nature, where arrest and prosecution is desirable, there would be not one experienced man to properly supervise the guards or handle the case in a professional manner. The administration should give some thought to this situation and consult with some law enforcement official for opinions and advice.

H. SUMMARY OF CASES

The following statistics are not altogether accurate due to some cases still being open, as well as numerous cases not being reported on official case reports. These figures represent statistics from September 1, 1944 to November 15, 1946:

- 1 felonious homicide
- 2 aggravated assaults (felonious)
- 21 burglaries
- 87 thefts (petty)
- 6 automobile thefts
- 9 misdemeanor assaults
- 1 forgery and counterfeiting
- 1 offense against family and children
- 6 liquor law (manufacture and/or sale)
- 1 drunkenness
- 6 disorderly conduct
- 2 gambling
- 1 drunken driving
- 9 road and driving infractions
- 1 other traffic case
- 15 miscellaneous offenses
- 4 suspicion
- 8 lost persons
- 16 other lost cases
- 4 found persons
- 30 other found cases
- 8 motor vehicle accidents (no fatalities)
- 1 street accident
- 1 home accident
- 1 drowning
- 5 miscellaneous accidents
- 3 suicides
- 3 suicide attempts
- 3 sudden deaths
- 4 mental cases
- 2 contraband
- 20 cases infraction of project regulations
- 26 other (miscellaneous) cases
- 65 cases in which arrests were made
- 196 arrests (including 72 renunces)
- 14 cases referred to Project Director
- 22 cases referred to Judicial Commission
- 16 cases reported to outside officials
- 5 cases referred to Selective Service
- 30 to Internal Security
- 36 persons convicted by Project Director

1 person dismissed by Project Director
7 persons convicted by Judicial Commission
16 persons dismissed by Judicial Commission
5 persons convicted by outside officials
(Other cases by outside officials, no disposition)
372 Project cases handled with 196 arrests

Submitted by,

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