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"Report"

Reports

# INTRODUCTION

This report of the work of the Center Liaison Section is submitted in accordance with the request that reports be critical and analytical. It does not stress the good which was accomplished nor the successful procedures developed. Thousands of families benefited by the relocation summaries sent to the field offices. Many hundreds more returned to their former homes after preparations had been made for the solving of dependency problems. Anyone studying the work of the War Relocation Authority will find the good points. They will easily find the individuals whose contributions were outstanding. This report fills the gaps and presents the thinking of the section. It is directed toward an analysis of mistakes and omissions in order that any similar job in the future may have the benefit of our positive and negative experiences. The tone is therefore on the pessimistic side.

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Head, Center Liaison Section



### Chronology of Events Related to Center Liaison Section

- July 1, 1943
  - Center Employment Division reorganized into Relocation Division
  - Initial organization of Center Liaison Section in Washington
- September, 1943
  - Mr. Luther T. Hoffman became Head of Center Liaison Section
  - Relocation team begins visits to Centers
- December, 1943
  - Interviewing program was planned
  - Preliminary interviews to fill out 329's suggested
- January, 1944
  - Welfare Section begins interviews on 329's at some projects
- Feb. - June, 1944
  - Staff of Relocation Division increased by Relocation Advisers and Assistant Advisers
- April, 1944
  - Mr. L. T. Hoffman became Project Director at Topaz.
  - Mr. Robert Dolins, acting head of section
  - Mrs. Eleanor Moore assigned to help set up Relocation Libraries
- Sept. 1, 1944
  - Mr. Hugo W. Wolter, former Assistant Director of Gila River became Head of Center Liaison Section
- Sept.-Nov, 1944
  - Emphasis on Office organization, central files, streamlined Leave Office, Relocation Libraries.
- Nov.-Dec., 1944
  - Entire staff preparing for raising of Exclusion Orders - procedures, manuals, etc.
- Dec. 18, 1944
  - Raising of Exclusion Orders
  - Announcement of Center Closing
- Jan.- 1945
  - Visits to all Centers
  - Mr. Winston Stephens detailed to C. L. S.
  - Mr. Russell Derrickson added to Staff
- March, 1945
  - Dr. George Young added to staff
- Jan.-Nov., 1945
  - Constant center contacts and visits
  - Promotion Recruiting of staff
  - Information
  - Reorganization of some staffs



## REPORT OF THE CENTER LIAISON SECTION

The Center Liaison Section was established in the Relocation Division to provide technical advice for the setting up and operation of Relocation Divisions at the relocation centers and to provide a clearing ground for problems arising between the center Relocation Division and the Relocation Field Offices. The Center Liaison Section thus had a responsibility for the promotion of relocation within the centers and for the establishing of agreeable relationships with the field offices. Information was to be channeled from the field to the centers and from the centers to the field so that a mutual understanding would exist.

At the inception of the Section, it was thought wise to develop a relocation team to go to the centers and to bring opportunities which relocation in various areas of the country provided. This team was made up of representatives of the field offices with specialists from various areas. The team visited all of the relocation centers hopefully. Results were not up to expectations. The reception which the team expected at the centers was not present and the appeal of relocation fell both upon empty seats and unreceptive ears. Something was wrong. In some projects no preparations were made and in others those that were made were ineffective. The "mind-set" of the centers was largely against discussion of relocation.

An analysis of the results from the various centers showed that individual interviewing would probably be more effective than the high pressure activities of the relocation team. A new approach was therefore developed. This was properly called the advising or interviewing system. Its purpose was to establish rapport with each family within the center; to study their particular problems and to recommend relocation solutions to them. Mr. Robert Dolins was the "wheel horse" of the interviewing program. It was recommended that each center hire a group of interviewers called Assistant Relocation Advisers. Their qualifications could be varied. The main requirement was a knowledge of human beings and the knowledge of the relocation program. They were to be supervised by a Relocation Adviser. The Adviser was to be more particularly able in the field of social counseling and to handle more difficult problems.

Before this program came into full swing, it was deemed advisable that a more through study be made of every family at each center. Form 329 was developed in Washington as a check list to aid in the speedy evaluation of the evacuees' attitudes toward relocation. This hurried group of interviews was carried out to a large extent by the then employed Welfare counselors. It was thought that the background of welfare work and social work training would more easily break down the rationalization of the evacuees and secure a more accurate report.

It was at this point that differences of interpretation by various members of visiting Washington staff created problems at the centers. Although the task was primarily one developed by relocation, the use of the welfare staff created the impression that Welfare was handling the interviewing program of relocation. At some centers a



question of "what is a Welfare case" created the impression that all relocation problems were necessary welfare cases because they involved family planning. At least in one center a tremendous increase in welfare load was noted. At others, friction developed between the welfare and relocation staff. In still others, the case by case approach resulted in a tremendous lag in fulfilling the objectives originally intended.

The development of Assistant Relocation Advisers in order to assume some of the load did not bring about too pleasant relationships. These differences of opinion ranged from Washington straight down to the project. There was no unanimity of thinking about purposes of the interviewing program since each section seemed to be interested at this time in its own prerogative.

This lack of unanimity served as a rationalization to the evacuees. They did not know to whom to go to discuss relocation problems and therefore, did not go to anyone. Reports were slow in coming in. It became evident that relocation and service to the evacuees was not the primary objective within the centers. There was a great lack of information concerning the overall program. There was fumbling and lack of office organization in the relocation divisions. There were no central current files.

It might be well to review briefly the development of the Relocation Division within the centers in order to provide a background for this muddled approach to the overall problems.

In the early days of WRA, relocation at the centers was viewed as the securing of a job. Many of the Relocation Officers were, therefore, chosen because they had had experience in employment counseling--that is, job referrals and job matching. They were sincere but did not see the human problems involved in job placement. Briefly stated, the philosophy was this: here was a job in "x" city. Here was a man or woman who could fill that job. The obvious conclusion is that the man should go to that job.

Many people had relocated on that philosophy. When family situations became more important than the matching of jobs and persons, the philosophy of the Relocation Officers had to be changed. The extreme of this change was illustrated in the handling by the Welfare Section where "Welfare cases" were often developed out of every relocation problem. It was only natural then that conflict should exist between the philosophy of the Relocation Division and the philosophy of the Welfare Section. This became one of the primary jobs of the Center Liaison Section. Technical advice was not sufficient. Representatives of both the Welfare and Center Liaison Sections visited the project in order to dissolve this conflict,



but sufficient preparation had not been made on the Washington level concerning the handling of overlapping situations and there were still considerable feeling toward the usurping of prerogative by one section or the other. As these interpretations involved the project, it became evident that neither was absolutely correct and that a middle road had to be developed. Every family that relocated was not necessarily a "problem family", nor could problems be resolved by the simple expedient of employment. In September and October of 1944, representatives of the Center Liaison Section again visited all the centers in order to try to dissolve this conflict. Meetings with the Relocation and Welfare staffs were held, trying to develop the overall purpose of WRA and to show how each section had a function which was not diametrically opposed, but which should be integrated and that each section should cooperate with the other. In so far as possible, details of specific cases were studied and Joint Case Committees recommended to assign border line cases. This method was largely successful where personalities did not prevent cooperation. Administrative Notice No. 246 finally straightened out responsibilities at most centers.

It was one of the primary tenets of the Center Liaison Section that community organization within the project involving Block Managers, Council, Relocation Commission, and all other organized representative groups had a definite stake and a definite contribution to give to the relocation program. The staff of the Center Liaison Section was particularly trained by past experience in this field. It was evident, however, that community organization, in as far as relocation was concerned, was not a separate problem but involved the entire project administration. A relocation commission could not operate unless there was a mutual understanding between the administrative staff and the evacuees. It was urged that these relocation commissions be established in every project and that they be closely allied and integrated with the entire relocation program. It was felt that their function was one of disseminating information concerning relocation and bringing to the Relocation Division the problems of the people. But where philosophy and project management did not accept the principle of participation as other functions, the development of the relocation commissions was exceedingly difficult—even impossible.

An analysis of each of the centers indicate that Topaz had an extremely difficult problem in community organization. There was no interest in relocation. Nor was there an interest in having an evacuee group report the community on any problems. We will not discuss the background of community government except as it relates to relocation. It was extremely difficult to talk to any of the evacuee groups and to give them the last minute news on relocation opportunities. Channels simply did not exist. At Colorado River, community organization had been developed somewhat further but the knowledge was not accurate. The survey of relocation possibilities was not accurate because of a breakdown in the information program and because of incorrect information which better suited the mental attitudes of the evacuees. This specifically included the retention of Poston as a permanent camp and the development of an area which would be turned over to evacuees when



the necessity of the center had been dissolved. Cooperation with the people was much easier. They were willing to listen to opportunities but in an offhand sort of way. Relocation was not especially for them. Their opportunities lay in staying at Poston.

The Gila River evacuee organization was quite complete and participation was developed to a high degree. The greatest problem here seemed the ineptness of the relocation staff to work with the evacuee organization. The Program Officer had been one of the former employment specialists and had little understanding of the human problems involved. Several of the evacuees were more capable than the Program Officer. The extreme cooperativeness of the Welfare Section and the close relationship between the relocation advisers and the welfare supervisor was fortunate. It avoided many difficulties although it did not follow the accepted channels. Information was fairly well distributed although there was need for organization for the handling of the information.

Granada had a problematic community council and an independent planning commission. The council and the project administration were usually at odds with each other and the commission had determined upon its own method of securing results. They frequently and openly discussed relocation but discussion was dominated by several individuals who were trying to promote their own particular plans. It was, therefore, not effective because the more intelligent evacuees saw through the scheming. In contrast to Poston where group planning included remaining in that particular section of Arizona, the commission at Granada was attempting to plan group movements to other areas. This did not involve the majority of the people because as stated before, the leaders of the planning commission were looking out for themselves. Information was not widely distributed but Granada was fortunate in that it was located near a through railroad and the attitude of the surrounding country was not too antagonistic. There were many outside contacts.

At Heart Mountain the community organization refused to consider relocation. It was dominated by a chairman who was definitely antagonistic toward any mention of relocation and consequently, there was no channel by which information could reach the people. This lack of community contact was extremely evident in the final windup of Heart Mountain. The Relocation Program Officer was again an employment man whose knowledge of people was extremely limited. The method of closing before it was stopped by Washington was a shuffling of cards or papers irrespective of the wishes of the people. It is interesting to note that the council at Heart Mountain refused to have a planning commission or relocation commission because it did not want to enter into such a "controversial" issue.



At Manzanar, community organization entirely centered in the Block Managers. No attempt was made to organize further. In fact, it was the opinion of the Project Director that nothing further was desirable—much less necessary.

At Minidoka, community organization was also at a low ebb. The council and Project Director were at odds with each other the greater part of the time and relocation was a matter which the evacuees never gave the staff the satisfaction of discussing. There was, however, an interesting underground movement conducted by Father Clement of the Catholic Church and by Father George Kitagawa of the Episcopalian Church. These two leaders recognized the necessity of relocation and did all in their power to urge people to take opportunities to get out. Although there was not formal organization, the Relocation Program Officer looked upon his work as a service and when backed by the work of these two church people, gave unstintingly of his time and effort to expedite the departure of people from the center.

Rohwer provided an interesting study of community organization. Because of some unfortunate previous experience, the council was not willing to let it be known that they were interested in relocation. No real relocation commission had been organized, but it is interesting to note that a commission actually did exist although unknown to the administrative staff. Why they felt that they should not work openly is still a mystery, except that they feared being labelled as stooges. Relocation information was filtering out to the people. Informal discussions were held weekly by a group of approximately 20 people. This spirit of such a volunteer group unfortunately was limited since they did not provide a direct channel for information.

The above brief outline of the situation of community organization at the projects presents some idea of the difficulty of establishing relocation commissions and of channeling information to the families. It is impossible to contact every family and every opportunity. This must be done by interested groups and by discussions within the families within the blocks and within areas of the camp. The Center Liaison Section felt that this could be best and perhaps only be done by organization of some kind.

The Center Liaison Section had no authority to organize community participation. This had to be done by the Community Management Division.

In order to compensate for the lack of organization, it was suggested that the relocation staff be assigned districts within each project and that if possible, they develop miniature relocation commissions within each block so that particularly good relocation opportunities possibly could be channeled quickly to the people and that the people could then come in to discuss the situation with their particular advisers. There was much resistance on this suggestion but individual visits to each project following a memorandum of suggestions developed a districting system within all of the projects except Heart Mountain and Granada. In some, it came at a late date. Even Heart Mountain established a districting system a month before the closing of the



center. The visits to the projects were one of the essential operations of the Center Liaison Section. Without criticizing the intense interest of the Washington staff, correspondence could not always be handled with the proper results. The Chief of the Division was largely concerned with field problems and recommendations to the projects by the Center Liaison Section had to be made through the Chief of the Division, then through the Director of the Authority, finally to the Project Director and to the Program Officer. Trivial things could not be adequately explained by mail and yet the trivial problem might be the proverbial "monkey wrench" in the machinery.

The organization of the Relocation Division at the centers was based on not too logical reasoning. Increasingly, the pressure of relocation showed that a Relocation Division involved much more than the organization had originally planned. It became a function related to every phase of community life. In some of the projects, Welfare did as much relocation as the relocation office, and the relocation office became primarily a processing office. As we learned more about the rationalization and the excuses for not relocating, the function of the Relocation Division spread across the entire Community Management Division. Adult Education took up relocation. The schools became relocation conscious. The Community Analyst devoted his time to studying resistance to relocation. Community Activities stressed participation in American activities in order to assist in relocation. The Cooperative stores carried goods which could equip people for relocation. The Community Councils became relocation conscious.

The Welfare and Health Sections had to do with the dependency cases and health problems, each one of which affected the relocation of not only the dependent and the ill, but all members of their families. In some centers, the counselors and advisers were working with the same family without reference to the work of one another. Since contacts with these sections should theoretically be made through the Division Chiefs, conflicts arose as outlined previously. The same conflicts were reflected on a national basis.

But the Community Management was not the only division involved. The Administrative Management which had to process the travel and relocation assistance grants was very much in evidence. Red tape developed in the handling of finances created bottlenecks in the relocation program. Additional checking and counter checking increased the interviewing load and annoyed people. The transportation Section was involved in that it had to pick up baggage, pick up the freight, and pick up passengers.

The Reports Division played an important part in relocation. It was in charge of the publication of the project newspaper which was the most direct medium to the people. The reports people were not always interested in the problem of relocation and did not have access to the field reports from Relocation Officers or to specific information relating to relocation. A very large hiatus existed between the known facts as they existed in the Relocation Office and the information which finally reached the people.



Evacuee property was shifted back and forth. It was a fifth wheel to the wagon. On July 1, 1943, it landed in the Community Management Division. On January 1, 1944, it was placed in the Relocation Division. Its problems were closely intertwined with the legal Division as were many of the problems of the alien relocatees. This intermingling and interdependence of relocation upon the many other sections made it imperative that the Project Director take an active interest in relocation. This was not always true. In fact, relocation was only one of the problems with which he was concerned and since he was chosen for the job of maintaining and operating the centers, his interests did not lie in the liquidation of the center. Where the vision of the Project Director was such as to see relocation as the only real final objective of the operation of the center or where he appointed a coordinator recommended in January, 1945, to do this, all sections of the project eventually worked into line and the relocation office became largely a service agency.

In some centers, the greatest lack of integration was overcome by joining the Welfare and Relocation staffs. This was done at Topaz and Poston. At others, a close personal relationship between the Relocation Program Officer and the Welfare adviser overcame many difficulties. This was particularly true in Gila.

After the experimental work of 1943 involving the relocation team and the definite report that more personal contact should characterize the program, the Center Liaison Section devoted its efforts to the interviewing program. During the entire year of 1944 this program was stressed by repeated visits to the projects. As stated previously, the lack of organization for the promotion of relocation within the centers was particularly difficult to overcome. The division was not set up as an integrated unit but had lines of interest in other parts of the project management over which it had no control. The Center Liaison Section developed a plan for office lay out and office organization. It suggested relocation libraries and information services. It attempted to coordinate the work of all sections with the Relocation Division. Through all this, relocation was viewed as a persuasive program since all relocation was voluntary and return to the West Coast was impossible.

One of the contributions of the Center Liaison Section was the analysis of lists and recruiting of qualified evacuees for positions in various government agencies. A review of all center residents was set up in code portraying the background and abilities of all residents, particularly in reference to their ability in the Japanese language. Hundreds of names were drawn from these lists and turned over to the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and to the Army and Navy intelligence services. Qualified people were then interviewed by the representatives of these agencies and many were hired for highly secret and confidential government work. Some of this work was



so confidential that members of the agencies knew nothing of what was going on. At one time, the section was recruiting for five different branches of the Office of Strategic Services and making arrangements with projects for visiting representatives to interview probable candidates. The language schools of the government located at various universities drew upon the information available and recruited the teachers to assist in the program of language training so important for infiltration and occupation.

It is highly interesting to note that these recruits came to Washington or other training centers and practically disappeared. They were sent to all parts of the far east and as casual reports filtered back from Army and Navy sources were highly effectual in saving the lives of thousands of soldiers. Their story has not yet been written but it is a matter of pride with many of them including the Issei that by such work they had gained the privilege of wearing the uniform and make themselves eligible for citizenship in the United States. In order to illustrate the above material, I would like to report on the story of a man from Gila, Mr. John Fukushima. Mr. Fukushima was born in Japan and came to this country to complete his education. He was a graduate of the University of Southern California and an extremely able and intelligent person. He was fluent in both English and Japanese and had a fair knowledge of French and German. He was a philosopher, a poet and a writer. His talents had never been allowed to be expressed on the West Coast. He made his living as a farmer and produce merchant. He had four children. He was critical and analytical, not easily swayed one way or another. He was proud that his children were American citizens and wanted that privilege for himself.

Evacuation was a severe blow to what he thought America stood for. He vowed to himself that he would not shave until the stigma and cross of what he considered undemocratic action should be removed. He was a very familiar figure around the Gila Relocation Center - a rather tall man dressed in overalls, old shirt and straw hat. His face was covered with a long black beard. Under the bushy eyebrows his eyes searched and pierced the thoughts and attitudes of people. His outspoken criticism, never antagonistic, came to be much feared and respected. During the year of 1944, one branch of government service needed an extremely capable man to go into the far eastern theater. Mr. John Fukushima was recommended. He had stated that he would do anything that he possibly could in order that his children could say that their father was an American citizen. He was thoroughly investigated by all investigating services and was finally offered a position with this agency. He would eventually wear the Army uniform and be eligible for citizenship provided he could pass the physical examination. He was fifty years old at that time. I never saw a happier man than Mr. Fukushima when he was told that he had passed the physical examination perfectly and that he would be accepted for the position. Within thirty days he left the country. Where he is and what he has been doing, I do not know.



Although this was the story of only one man, there were literally hundreds who one way or another felt the same way. They were looking for an opportunity to show the American public that they were truly Americans although they had been born in Japan or were of Japanese parentage.

During the month of October, November and December of 1944, the Center Liaison Section was busy developing and re-writing policies and procedures to go into effect upon the raising of the Exclusion Orders. These were days of tense excitement because the raising of the orders was momentarily expected. The normal process of securing suggestions from the centers in the development of policies was not practical, for such a move would have resulted in unfounded rumors. The program had to be developed without benefit of conferences with those who would be most greatly affected. December 18 marks the day of change in the attitude of the entire Authority toward relocation. On that day the Exclusion Orders were raised and relocation no longer was voluntarily, but became a matter of necessity for every person. Plans for the closing of centers were announced and everybody was notified that the WRA would close all of its center operations by January 1, 1946.

This change in program placed tremendous responsibility upon the Center Liaison Section. The omissions in the program which had been noted previously now had to be speedily filled.

Because of the tremendous task facing the Center Liaison Section, permission was granted to increase the number of staff members. On January 2, 1945, Mr. Russell C. Derrickson was assigned as a Special Relocation Officer and in March, Mr. George P. Young also became a Special Relocation Officer. The staff previously had been a Section Head, a Relocation Officer CAF-12 and Relocation Officer CAF-9.

It was recognized that information to the people had not been developed. Mr. Myer, therefore, suggested that a coordinator of information be appointed at each of the projects. His function would be to see that all information, policies, changes in program would be distributed to all involved and that all sections would be given knowledge of the program. Representatives from the Director's office were sent to each of the camps in order to assist in the interpretation of the revised policies. Their reports became the basis of further developments in the program.

The change in the visiting procedure was suggested. It was a well known fact that increased visits could be expected with the change in program. We wanted to avoid burdening the centers with this and yet make use of the value visits had in promoting relocation. A rather cumbersome but apparently effective visiting procedure was worked up. Refunds were made to those visitors who succeeded in



relocating members of their family during the course of, or subsequent to their visit. This later became a bottleneck when almost everybody was relocating.

The reports of the project visitors showed that information had not been reaching the people. The booklets and pamphlets which had been sent out periodically through the cooperation of various Washington sections were not located accessibly. In some projects, they were neatly placed in storage; in others, they served as readily inflammable material for starting fires. Mrs. Eleanor P. Moore was, therefore, sent to all of the centers to re-establish relocation libraries and to see that the supplies of material gave complete coverage. In order to do this work, members of the Reports Division suggested that they might be able to handle much more of the relocation information than they had been. It was, therefore, agreed that the promotion material should be handled by the Reports Division and by the Reports Officers at the centers. This change in job could not be made effective unless there was a follow through. This difficulty between Welfare and Relocation also needed integrating. It was, therefore, agreed that a training program should be set up and that teams should visit each of the centers in order to interpret and to follow through on the entire relocation work. The following teams were developed: Minidoka, Heart Mountain, and Granada—George P. Young, Lloyd Webb, and Allan Markelley; Topaz, Tule Lake, and Poston—Robert Dolins, Vera McCord, and Russell Bankson; Gila, Manzanar, and Rohwer—Russell Derrickson, Russell Bankson, and Frances Steele.

Information was required about the activities of the field offices and what they could provide. There was an excellent program suggestion written into the manual and handbook but there was a lag in the development of these suggestions. The people in the centers wanted to know what each city had to offer. The Reports Division worked closely with and under the Relocation Division and the field offices and developed an excellent series of booklets more applicable to the post exclusion days. There was great interest in the West Coast and what was going to happen there. Immediately, informational releases on incidents was needed in order to calm the spirits in the centers. There was also the realization that the resistance to relocation was largely a matter of rationalizing supposed difficulties. These and many other things were studied in the training conference. The attached outline represents the scope of the training and shows the integration of interest and planning on the Washington level.

These teams then visited all of the projects in order to set up an overall relocation program which would be integrated with the necessity of maintenance and operations. It was, of course, only possible to make recommendations to the Project Director. The training conference had worked out specific recommendations for each project. It was not possible to put these into complete operation because the



Director felt that each Project Director should have the privilege of carrying out the program in the way he saw fit. The attached material represents an outline of steps suggested for each project. It was necessary to try to develop the steps recommended by personal contacts with the Project Director. It can readily be seen that this was difficult without the written backing of the National Director. To a large extent, these visits were successful and credit must be given to the salesmanship of the representatives. Where these recommendations were carried out, the program moved along smoothly. Where they were not carried out, repeat visits became necessary and finally emergency visits in order to correct situations which could have been avoided.

From then on during the entire summer and fall of 1945, the majority of the Center Liaison Section staff was continually in the field. This method proved most effective in assuaging the worries of the staff and of the people. Constant contact was kept with the Washington office so that the staff usually knew ahead of time what information was likely to reach the projects.

The most difficult tasks which the Center Liaison Section faced was to persuade the project personnel that the WRA program was actually liquidating. Although physical preparations had been made for pressure program, the mental attitude was one of "business as usual". This was by no means universal at all of the projects, but was at those which later developed difficulties. In July, Poston sent an SOS requesting a tremendous increase in staff to handle their interviewing program. Other projects likewise suddenly realized that the interviewing program was a necessary prerequisite of relocation. Previously, the Center Liaison Section had contacted many of the social agencies and public welfare departments in the eastern and central parts of the United States to recruit capable interviewers. These contacts had to be renewed and additional help secured. Mr. Robert Dolins and Miss Mary Smithburg must be given much credit for their work in securing the many qualified people for the interviewing program.

One of the functions of the Center Liaison Section was the reviewing of budgets submitted by the centers. The relocation budget often failed to look ahead, particularly the budgets submitted for the first half of the 1945-46 fiscal year. As stated previously, the importance of a pressure program had not been realized. Additional personnel was recommended and additional funds were recommended.

Everybody was watching relocation figures. Tentative schedules for relocation were set up. Budget figures were adjusted and plans were made to anticipate emergencies. Fortunately, only a few of these developed.

The story of the interviewing program which was carried out in the various centers represents a special chapter in the Center Liaison Section work. At its inception the program consisted of



contacting each family in a friendly discussion of relocation. The word "discussion" was used because in translation into the Japanese language, interviewing represented a sort of third degree and pressure program. The outstanding example of the development of the discussion program was at Gila. Here the welfare counselor and the relocation adviser Miss McCarthy had worked closely and were intensely interested in successful family adjustments. Form 329 was merely the basis of an interview. The assignment of cases by districts made it possible to follow through on 329's and to develop a chronological study of changes in the attitudes, changes in problems, and changes in possible solutions. The staff visited the families at their homes, became familiar with the home setting and enjoyed the privilege of being guests and visitors in order to discuss relocation on a friendly and personal basis. It was not often that a door was closed on them. The residents were flattered by the attention given them and by the fact that one of the "Hakujin" or Seiojin would come to visit their humble homes. This was not all accomplished at once. The people had been prepared by a series of block meetings held by members of the relocation commission. They were told about the interviewing program; they were told its purposes; they were told that it was a matter of discussion in trying to solve the eventual problem which each of them must face. As a general rule, if people were opposed to relocation, they still respected the interest of the advisers in coming to their homes to discuss their own problems with them. This spirit was felt throughout the project. The job of preparation was not so well done at Canal as it was at Butte because of a resistant evacuee group. There were, however, two factions. The cooperative group was represented by a central block manager who through his very able and subtle manner infused an independent thinking into many of the people.

Mr. Yahanda is a character worthy of character study. He might perhaps epitomize the "unscrutable Japanese". He was a college graduate, the owner and operator of a cleaning and dyeing establishment. He had worked himself up to his own business through many types of employment. He was not well to do but he was capable of being independent financially. He was a well known Christian leader in his own community. It was said that he never smiled; that he controlled his emotions perfectly. In the many contacts which I had with Mr. Yahanda, we found him to be the most human of human beings. He would not laugh visibly but there was a twinkle in his eyes which one learned to recognize and there were many times when tears rolled down his face when discussing the problems of families and individuals in the center. He believed so thoroughly in relocation that his every movement was to assist. He was never given credit for the work which he did but I have known him to go quietly evenings to the families of boys who might refuse induction into service and to point out the value of American principles to them. He was a leader who could always be relied upon to interpret America to people who misunderstood the forces behind evacuation and the necessity to relocate. He was only unscrutable to those who failed to recognize the tremendous



control Japanese culture places upon emotional expression. The culture cannot control emotion itself, however. The interviewing program received his complete support and together with some other evacuees, they overcame the negative attitude of some of the council members.

Mr. Frank Sasaki, the editor of the Japanese section for Canal and Mr. Laida coordinator of the activities program and many others were instrumental in carrying the word of relocation to the families.

The greatest factor in the development of this program was the number of personal attachments which developed between the members of the interviewing staffs and the families. It is not at all surprising that the relocation commission representing the two camps recommended early in 1944 that relocation would be vastly assisted if the Project Director would authorize the use of block clerks both as distributors of information and as interpreters for the interviewing program. This did not develop until 1945. It is, however, indicative of the cooperative spirit. It might also be mentioned here that relocation was not something suddenly thrust upon the population but was one of the first objectives of the Community Management Division. In May, 1943, a relocation committee was organized. This preceded the permanent community council and finally became a part of the council. Although Gila is scheduled to close on November 15, all reports indicate the involuntary movement of people will not have to be resorted to. Transportation may slow up the process but the will of the people to relocate cannot be doubted.

It would be difficult to analyze the next most favorable attitude at any of the projects. Poston had a difficult time because of the idea that Poston would remain a permanent colony of Japanese somewhat similar to the Indians on the reservation. This was not a haphazard development. It had been fostered by a number of the project staff. Poston was in further difficulty because, in the early days of the project, there had been a tendency upon a part of the Welfare staff to identify themselves with the problems of the evacuees rather than to attempt to find solutions for them. There was an attitude that "the government can't do this to me". These subtle influences on the community cannot be measured accurately but it is significant to note that relocation figures at Poston did not begin to jump until there had been a revamping of the program and a tremendous increase in interviewing staff. It was necessary to stress that there were three points necessary in interviewing for relocation. These three were, "Where do you want to go?", "What problems have you been unable to solve?", and "When can you leave?"



The situation at Topaz was not one of an easy exchange of ideas but was also somewhat of identification with the people. Relocation had not been discussed. It was taboo and when the pressure program developed, channels were not ready. It was stated by one of the staff members not later than October of 1945 that scheduling would not be done and that people would not be forced to leave the centers. This person was highest in the Relocation Division. It is not difficult to foresee ineffectual methods in such a statement. A member of the Center Liaison Section had been assigned to this project for several months but since such a representative was purely in an advisory and technical capacity, he could only bring the matter to the Project Director's attention. The Project Director was in sympathy with his viewpoint but felt that he could not overstep the Relocation official's position. He and a Center Liaison Section representative went to various families in the camp discussing scheduled departures with them. He had a well planned program but to carry out such an emergency measure would not have been necessary.

The interviewing program at Granada was well planned and technically correct. It lacked much of the preparation which characterizes the Gila setup. There was not too much human interest expressed at Granada. The personality of the Project Director played a great part in relocation. He was extremely human himself and people did not hesitate to come to him. He would take a firm stand. His personal interest and thoroughly personal persuasion of relocation did much to influence the program. The relocation staff itself presented the opportunities as people came to the office. The fact that Granada was the first center to close and that the program was without any special incident shows the general organization and planning to have been effective. Granada had a large percentage of its population leave the center before the fall months. It had its share of welfare problems which were well handled by the Welfare Section.

The paradox of relocation is undoubtedly Minidoka. From all reports and statistical reports, it would seem that the interviewing program at Minidoka was largely superficial. This is not entirely true. The interviewing program went on behind the scenes fostered by personal contacts with the Welfare Section, Relocation Program Officer and Adult Education Supervisor. In all outward appearances, there was a complete rejection of relocation and yet Minidoka continued to lead in percentage of people relocated. There was a tremendous lag in reaching the general population but it is undeniably true that the underground railroad of information and relocation enthusiasm was operative. When involuntary scheduling became necessary, and Administrative Notice 289 was sent to all projects, the Project Director instituted a peculiar type of informational forum. On the



basis of interviews and Form 329 the population was separated into various groups according to those who were favorable to relocation, those who were unfavorable, those who had special problems which made them unfavorable to relocation and finally those who were absolutely resistant to the thought of relocation. Each group was called in to a series of educational meetings. If no plans for relocation were made and the people did not come in to attend these meetings, an Internal Security Officer was sent out to get them. Forced attendance at educational meetings involving relocation and persuading people to relocate is a questionable procedure. It would succeed in closing the center but it is a question whether there would be some after effects of this regimented type of thought. A program recommended by Center Liaison Section had never been put into effect although all questions in regard to districting, interviewing, etc., were answered favorably. There was simply a lack of understanding as to what these procedures actually meant and an inability to appreciate the subtle psychology and emotional factors involved in the recommended plans.

Heart Mountain offers another side commentary in the interviewing program. There had been an average of five interviewers assigned to relocation. Up until October, they had not been "busy". The Relocation Office was not greatly concerned about personal problems. No attempt was made to summarize information nor to meet the people half way. It was their problem to get out of the center and if they did not get out voluntarily, arrangements would be made to get them out. In justice it must be said that this was not the Project Director's idea but was the Relocation Program Officer's. When questioned as to his planning etc., he readily stated that plans had all been made. This was true insofar as he was concerned, but was absolutely false as far as the evacuees were concerned. The interviewing program was pretty low except for those who voluntarily came into the office to discuss their problems. Community organization and channels of information had completely disappeared. Information was sent door to door through the work of the Reports Officer. The Program Officer hoped that by actually scheduling the families for departure, he had accomplished the program. Case loads had been assigned haphazardly. There was no districting program and no check up on total coverage. A week of intense work on the part of the Center Liaison Section was required to correct the planning aspect but could not correct the lack of personal contact. It is to the credit of the evacuees there that they faced their future squarely although many times hopelessly with the simple feeling that if they had to go, they would go. They did not know of opportunities or were not persuaded by Relocation for their benefit.

The situation at Manzanar was one which Center Liaison Section feels unqualified to comment upon. The interviewing program was not carried out; the office organization was not carried out. We leave the project simply with the statement that the Project Director had



his own plans and that we assisted in recruiting staff at his request. We hope that the paternalistic program which he followed will not do too great harm but that "our father", as the Project Director was called, will have the ability and the resourcefulness to meet the problems of his several thousand children.

The Rohwer Center follows quite closely the Gila plan. There is close coordination between the various sections and a tremendous interest in the people. The one thing which it lacks and has lacked is the strong community council and relocation commission. It is unfortunate that the leadership in the relocation commission was inclined to look for its own opportunities rather than for the people in general. Their interviewing program has been fairly successful. A small number of people did an excellent job. There may be slips before the center closes but none of them will be serious. The attitude of the Project Director and his foresight in balancing of the personalities in the Relocation staff have all been to the credit of the relocation program.

The work at Tule Lake still remains. The physical setup and the organization of the staff has been completed. Welfare and Relocation will work closely together as a division or as closely coordinated section and division. They will have one person in charge of the relocation program whose duty it will be to plan and coordinate Reports, Welfare, Health, Transportation and all other related work.

There is a peculiar technical problem to which the Center Liaison Section fell heir and for which it has a certain amount of responsibility at the centers. Since the section works with the Relocation Divisions at the centers and since the Evacuee Property Section is a part of the Relocation Division on the center level, it was necessary to work very closely with the Evacuee Property Section at Washington. The lines of authority are not at all clear, but it has been possible to maintain good relationships and to assist wherever possible. The personality of the Evacuee Property Officer at Washington fortunately is one which is cooperative and easily worked with. In any future organization, this peculiarity of organization should be rectified. One can easily imagine a question of property coming up through the Relocation Program Officer and to the Center Liaison Section without any channels through which the answer can be obtained.

The Evacuee Property Office has been an orphan in project work. Beginning as a comparatively minor unit, the section finally became transferred to Community Management in July, 1943, then was switched to Administrative Management and finally rested in the Relocation Division. It would seem that the importance of property was not adequately recognized. At the beginning it was closely allied with although not definitely assigned to the Project Attorney. At that time legal problems seemed to be very important. When the human



aspect became recognized it was shifted to Community Management. When the financial interests were recognized, it was made a part of Administrative Management. And now that its effect upon relocation has been recognized, it has finally landed in Relocation. It would seem that something so important should have the status of a division all its own and be coordinated on the project level under the Project Director.

As a final comment on the work of the Center Liaison Section, it is easy to speak of its objectives but very difficult to speak of its functions. The work with the field offices was important and yet there was little to be done to assist the field offices. The handbook and the manual suggest the organization which should be carried out in communities. This was an extremely adequate and well developed plan. Much of the work in the centers depends upon community organization on the outside. It was hoped that the liaison work of this section could be carried out between community councils, relocation commissions and the relocation committees in outside communities. This did not actually develop. There was an exchange of problems between the relocation commission and the relocation office in the centers and the personnel of WRA in the field offices. Seldom, in fact, with only one exception that comes to my mind at the present time, was there an actual exchange between members of a committee in a community and the people of the project. This was in the New Hartford setup. Attitudes were so important in WRA. Personnel was distrusted. Direct contacts, even if channelled through WRA offices would have done much to create greater interest in relocation east. Although there was an attempt to perform the liaison function by an exchange of staff, this was only partially successful. A liaison function cannot be performed unless the gears for which it is the grease both move in the performance of the same duty. There must be a meshing and they must be geared to the same pace.

In any future development, the experience of the Center Liaison Section would undoubtedly recommend a different organization. The section was given the responsibility of promoting relocation. This was not the responsibility of a section. It was the responsibility of the entire authority. It seems unfair to expect a comparatively minor unit far removed from the top authority to carry out the real function of the entire agency. This was and is the War Relocation Authority. Much credit must go to Mr. Myer for keeping the greater problems in view. Without his determination, it is doubtful whether we could have retained the word Relocation in the name of the agency. I believe it would have been advisable to stress the responsibility for relocation with all members of all project staffs and do this by creating a deputy director in charge of relocation just as we now have a deputy director in charge of center closing. It is a question of related importance and, certainly, successful relocation would accomplish the closing of the centers.



At the centers, the position of the Relocation Program Officer was not on a level with that of other division chiefs. If personalities were such that they could not accept the responsibility, or if training and ability were such that the Relocation Program Officer could not do the job, we should have sought help which could qualify. It is a credit to the members of the Center Liaison Section that they were able to persuade the Project Directors on many points on relocation. This was done without administrative authority and largely on a personal man to man basis. There was, of course, logic to the plans, but the necessity to carry out a program and having full responsibility for it without authority is something which ought to be avoided. This is a well known principle in administration. If a person cannot be trusted with the responsibility and the authority, it would be better to change personnel.

The work of the Center Liaison Section is over. With the exception of Tule Lake, the centers are closed. I gain no particular satisfaction from that statement. I do gain satisfaction from the fact that the majority of the people have been successfully relocated. I feel that many problems will develop as a result of inadequate interviewing and inadequate analysis of personal situations. Many people will desire to move eastward after harrowing experiences which could have been avoided. Personal contacts and the appreciation of government service will undoubtedly be a question in the minds of many evacuees. The job is not completed when the centers are closed. I am still proud of the United States and hope that the many problems which the evacuees must face will receive the understanding help from the field offices which unfortunately, they did not receive at the centers.

It is not out of place to offer an analysis of the entire relocation program from the Center Liaison Section viewpoint. Without doubt, it can be said that relocation was carried on "as well as could be expected under the circumstances". This is, however, a generality which is not satisfactory and which would not help in avoiding mistakes of any program in the future. It is my opinion that the major mistake in the relocation program was the fact that the emotional situation of the evacuees was not understood nor taken into consideration. We did a good job on the physical arrangements but we did not consider the spirit behind the man who had to do the relocating. As we learned later in the program, the emotional factors had not been scientifically analyzed although we had all the material at hand. We did not recognize that the excuses and resistance to relocation were merely the projection of fears. These we were not prepared to tackle. The spirit for relocation was absent not only in the evacuees but also in the staff.



We may say that the staff could have been the crucial factor in developing the emotional responses for relocation. This was not done. We can excuse ourselves by saying that the staff had to be hurriedly recruited, that there was no background of experience and that the program was without precedent. We can offer no excuses, however, for the lack of training given to new staff members. As far as I know, no attempt was made to develop an understanding of evacuees. Individuals were not examined as to their attitudes toward the Japanese until the final year. There were few staff meetings in which the problems were discussed or in which in-service training was the objective. Staff meetings, as such, were largely reports of decisions already made and asking that certain procedures be carried out. The little knowledge of the program which the majority of the staff at centers, had, came not from authoritative sources, but came from the newspapers - the same source which was so detrimental to evacuee attitudes. From this resulted a staff attitude which was very often antagonistic toward the evacuees. Prejudice increased rather than decreased. Every little incident in the center became a stigma upon the general character of the evacuees. There was little attempt made at personal friendships. There was rather a fear that a person would be branded by close association with the residents. In some centers, staff people were definitely forbidden to associate with residents.

This staff attitude worked in reverse as well. Just as any feeling of insecurity became projected, it worked in reverse. As the staff stood aloof from the evacuees, so the evacuees stood aloof from the staff. There were mutual suspicions. These became heightened where the demands of the administration were made for cooperation. There can be no cooperation when mutual distrust exists. This vital factor demonstrates itself in all personal relationships of all kinds and is axiomatic in its appearance.

There was a further tendency on the part of the same staff people to take advantage of the gullible group among the residents. There were frightened and afraid of the Caucasians and because they were in his power, the Caucasian often took advantage of them. This was done by the use of their personal services. The example was here set by the very low pay offered for working. They were argued out of property rights. They wanted to be agreeable with the staff and this agreeableness often kept them from expressing their own opinion in regard to financial and other transactions. Some of the staff felt that anything they could gain to their advantage at the expense of the Japanese was all right.

The evacuee attitude toward this was just the same. If people could take advantage of them, they could likewise take advantage of the Caucasian and of the Government which he represented. There was an epidemic of pilfering of Government property. A game developed in



which Government regulations, not always too logical in themselves, were avoided. The project administration was unable to carry out regulations against black market work, for instance. There was no authority under which barbers who cut their neighbor's and sometimes the staff people's hair, could be prosecuted. At least, the results of such prosecution could be worse than the original offense. There were dentists who carried on a lucrative private practice. Of course, it was definitely forbidden to make dental plates unless they were essential for health reasons. There were dressmakers who developed a very sizeable business of keeping the feminine part of the project well dressed. These were all the results of private initiative and private initiative was something which the American idea of Government fostered. It was this private initiative which helped many a family to relocate. But if regulations had to be carried out, the project administration either had to avoid the belief in freedom of work or it had to close one eye to these activities. The easiest way, of course, was to close one eye and thus show to the evacuees that there were certain things which could be done in the background. The game thus continued to develop. It had a final effect of creating a distrust of and in general policies.

A second major factor might be stated as a lack of understanding and faith in America. Here the staff itself was woefully weak. There was no recognition on the part of most staff members that the Bill of Rights had anything to do with the life in the relocation center. There was no idea that the pendulum might finally swing back to normal. There was a complete ignoring of the fact that the population could understand these factors. The evacuees were faced with diametrically opposing ideas. The Nisei had studied American principles in school and found them violated in the activities which affected their own lives, not only in evacuation as a total problem, but in the small incidents in the center life itself. The fact of control by administrative authority was a constant irritating factor to the youngsters who had learned to appreciate what they thought American life was. The complete lack of faith in the eventual freedom of the evacuees was everywhere present. Those young men and women who maintained that our Civil Rights had been violated were given little chance to discuss those thoughts and compromise with the necessity of a war situation. They were therefore completely at sea in what they should and should not do and the breezes of public opinion within the center easily swayed their decisions. In very few centers was there determination to make those centers American cities. There was a determination to squelch pro-Japanese and pro-Japanese activities but little thought was given to substitute equally satisfying and security giving American activities. Thus, while we took the emotional stability of adherence to culture away, we did not stress and develop substitute cultural activities.

The intelligent evacuees sought in general for an understanding of what democracy meant. Little was done in either Education, Adult Education, or in general forums and discussions to show that democracy




was not a static form of Government but that it was dynamic, continually growing, and that evacuation was one of the growing pains by which the residents had secured a responsibility in helping prove democracy as a form of Government. This lack of appreciation on the part evacuation could play in the eventual development of a democracy as envisioned in the Bill of Rights entered few of the staff members minds. Instead, they themselves vacillated between prejudice and identification. These unstable attitudes and lack of personal persuasion on the part of the staff had very definite repercussions among the center residents. They particularly frustrated those people who had been brought up in the early frustrating pattern of Japanese culture. It was almost like added insult to injury and many times it was indeed insult. For further discussion of these emotional factors, I should like to refer to Psychiatry, A Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Inter-personal Relations - Volume 8, No. 3, Page 319-342, "Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient - The Japanese" by Weston Le Barre.

These two factors seemed to indicate that as a national policy and as the local project policy, we were more afraid of a negative public opinion than we had courage to express our American principles. It is of credit to Mr. Myer that he has maintained his American attitude in the face of criticism both public and from project staffs. The significance of maintaining our objectives in spite of small criticism is especially important in the international situations. Human beings are human beings--it makes no difference what their sex, age, racial background or the color of their skin is. Scientific principles must be applied as directly to the science of human life as they are applied in the physical world. These principles work whether they are used by one race, one nation or any other.

The Center Liaison Section tried to create the will to relocate. That was its final objective. To quote Le Barre, "If freedom is more essentially human and humane than slavery, Americans must see to it that freedom prevails among their erstwhile enemies. At the risk of seeming rationalization, one must state that any other course is disloyalty to the very forms which have shown the American system strong and superior." (Page 342 - Psychiatry Journal - Volume 8, No. 3) If this be true of our enemies, it must certainly be true of ourselves - including our fellow Americans of Japanese extraction.

In concluding this report the Center Liaison staff is not at all satisfied or happy over the job done. Physically the people have relocated. Many are more happy than they have ever been. Many good results can be seen. The omissions and failures loom up as ghosts of the future. There are so many "if's" and "might have been's"! Had it been possible to get a really strong staff at all of the projects and to train them in basic material it would, in our opinion, have been possible to relocate the entire population without the use of Administrative Notice 289.

November 30, 1945

  
Head, Center Liaison Section



### SUPPLEMENTARY DATA AND REPORTS

The following material is documentation for the opinion expressed in the body of the report. The reader will have to do his own cross reference. Many topics are just touched upon and inferences will have to be made from the sample material.

1. Justification for Additional Staff in Center Relocation Divisions  
June 12, 1944
2. Letter on Field Trip October 1944
3. Report on Field Trip in detail - copy of talk to centers Nov. 16, 1944
4. Plans and Personnel needs for Center Operation when West Coast opens  
(December), November 1, 1944
5. Criminal Code of Japan and Comments - January 1, 1945
6. Evacuee letter concerning opening of West Coast Jan. 9th, 1945
7. Report on Field Trip - February, '45
8. Request for Reclassification February 15th, 1945
9. Evacuee letter on response to field trip - March 7th, 1945
10. Outline of Training Sessions March 30th, 1945
11. Outline of Emotional Factors affecting relocation - April 1, 1945
12. Recommendations to all centers as a result of training April 4th, 1945
13. Comments from Field Office on interviewing - May 25th, 1945
14. ~~Use of photographs for promoting relocation March 28th, 1945~~
15. Report on Field Trip - April 1945
16. Recommendations to Division Chief on Community Organization - July 1945



## MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1944

TO: Harold James, Acting Personnel Officer

ATTENTION: Gladys Pearson, Classifications Officer

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Additional Appointed Personnel  
Positions in Center Relocation Division

As a result of our recent experiences with the family interviewing, counseling and relocation advising program at the centers, we are recommending a continuation of this program on the basis of the joint responsibilities between the Relocation Division and the Welfare Section as outlined by the Director in the Special Counseling memorandum of November 9, 1943, Emergency Instruction of March 22, 1944, "Recording information on Relocation Prospects" and the Emergency Instruction of March 24, 1944, "Outline for Family Relocation Summary." In order to carry out the continued responsibility of the Relocation Division for family interviewing and relocation advising, it will be necessary to have additional appointed personnel positions on a permanent basis.

We suggest the establishment of permanent positions as Asst. Relocation Advisers, grade CAF-7, to take care of the family interviewing and relocation advising and the special work created by Selective Service. In addition, we recommend the establishment of a CAF-4 Secretary to the Relocation Program Officer. For each center the number of Assistant Relocation Advisers is as follows:

Colorado River:	6 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 7
Gila River:	5 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 6
Heart Mountain:	4 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 5
Minidoka:	3 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 4
Central Utah:	3 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 4
Granada:	3 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 4
Rohwer:	3 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 4
Manzanar:	3 (FI and RA) ± 1 (Selective Service) - 4

This will place major responsibility for advising in the hands of the appointed personnel. Evacuee interviewers will concentrate on acting as interpreters and aides to the Assistant Relocation Advisers and as interviewers in handling the filling of special job opportunities. Attached are copies of revised job descriptions to cover these rearrangements, one for the appointed personnel to be called Assistant Relocation Adviser, one for the evacuee to be called Junior Relocation Adviser, and two for the employment program for evacuees to be called Relocation Interviewer and Assistant Relocation Interviewer. Also attached is a suggested chart for the organization of the Relocation Division at the center.



In making recommendations for the number of new personnel needed, the following factors were considered:

1. The performance of the centers to date shown that, at best, we can not expect to complete the initial family interviewing for more than 50 per cent of the families at the center by July 1. In most of the projects it will probably be below this figure. The transfer of approximately 1800 families from Jerome to other centers will increase this load. Attached is a chart showing the population of the different centers as of May 1, the estimate of the number of families already interviewed as related to the request for staff at these centers.

2. The experience in the interviewing program has shown that the population is responding favorably to the service and that an average of 80 to 85 per cent of the families given appointments are keeping these appointments. Of those being interviewed, 20 to 50 per cent of them, depending on the particular center, indicate an interest and developing relocation plans in the near future. The average would run toward the higher figure for all centers.

3. The amount of new interest shown in relocation planning is resulting in the development of the follow-up loads which will increase as more families are interviewed. In addition, follow-up interviews will generally consume more than one contact with a family. Such figures can not be tied directly to the family totals estimated under the interviewing program, but they give some idea of the number of second and subsequent contacts that will occur. Attached is a table showing the number of follow-up interviews which the Relocation Division had with families during the month of April, 1944.

4. The general experience seems to indicate that an average of six new contacts a day is all that an Adviser can carry with time allowed for necessary administrative and clerical work developing from the interviewers. As each Assistant Relocation Adviser develops a follow-up load, in order to adequately take care of the second and subsequent contacts, it might be necessary to cut down the new contacts to four a day.

5. In regard to Selective Service, Central Utah has already had a special position approved for them to handle these matters. Minidoka has indicated that this has been taking about 80 per cent of the time of the Assistant Relocation Program Officer averaging 200 to 300 interviews a week of four to five minutes duration. Colorado River indicated 144 interviews for the week of May 15 to 21 with an average length of six minutes per interview.

6. The increasing responsibilities of this Division require a continuity in the office of the Relocation Program Officer especially in view of the fact that he is expected to spend a good part of his time contacting evacuee groups in the community. Due to relocation of persons of secretarial caliber, it is difficult to have this continuity. At times the office is completely without secretarial assistance. In addition, there are many confidential matters, particularly relating to leave clearance which require special handling. Relocation Program Officers unanimously recommended the need for such a person at our recent conference at Chicago.



We must begin to prove adequate staff to carry through the individual work with each family in helping them to work through their future plans, particularly around relocation in the near future. Our arrangements to date have tended to emphasis "survey aspects" of the interviewing program. The present temporary staff has shown itself to be inadequate to carry both the initial interviewing and relocation advising aspects with subsequent detriment to the follow-up work. Relocation advising must be looked upon as a permanent aspect which will remain until relocation centers are closed.

The load described above can not be taken care of through the appointment of additional evacuee interviewers. Firstly, there is already a shortage of such personnel at the centers and we can expect this to continue because of the relocation program which is resettling many qualified evacuees. Secondly, evacuee interviewers have shown themselves to be generally unable to carry through discussions with other evacuees around their relocation resistances. This is due to the fact that they themselves are personally involved in the problem and do not want to be in a position of pressing in areas where the community itself has some feeling about relocation. As a result, it should be anticipated that evacuees can make their best contribution as interpreters and aides to the Assistant Relocation Advisors and in directly assisting evacuees in selecting specific job opportunities.

In terms of the overall program of the Relocation Division at the centers, we find that a Relocation Program Officer and Assistant Relocation Program Officer have both been unable to undertake their fuller responsibilities because they have had to become directly involved in contacting individual families due to the insufficiency of their interviewing staffs. Office routine has kept the Relocation Program Officer from concentrating on organization work among the evacuee groups. The Assistant Relocation Program Officer has been unable to relieve the Relocation Program Officer of the executive and supervisory responsibilities. The new staff arrangements suggested in this memorandum should make it possible for each member of the Relocation Division at the centers to be able to undertake his specific responsibilities.

Edwin G. Arnold  
Chief, Relocation Division

Attachments  
EDolins:sjo  
Rewritten 6/12 - emw



~

October 27, 1944

Mr. Rex Lee  
W.R.A.  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Robert Dolins

Dear Rex:

Since my correspondence must be in longhand please have it typed at our office.

This has been a very interesting trip. It has confirmed many of my previous contentions. These I hope can be put into writing for the development of policies and procedures.

During the trip so far I have met with several hundred leaders in the three camps. Most of these meetings have been the forum type with plenty of discussion. They have continued from 2 to 5 hours.

The most important point evolves around the total W.R.A. Most of the people and many of the staff members know nothing of the purpose of W.R.A. except as a control. They have never been exposed to the Ex. Order establishing the agency nor to the terms of agreement between the Army and W.R.A. I have used the Byrnes report extensively. A general comment has been, "Why hasn't somebody told us these things before?"

An interesting sidelight appeared in a meeting on Wednesday evening with a group of Issei. There in broken English one of the men used evacuation and relocation anonymously. I believe it is advisable, if not imperative to change the name of our Division to something which is not subject to this Issei misunderstanding. I have used "Resettlement Services" with much favorable comment. In the issei mind relocation places itself in the same forceful frame of reference and evacuation. I think it is further important that we stress the work "services". We want the people to see the benefit of early resettlement and to take the initiative. This interpretation brought the following comment from Heart Mountain., "We thought you people were going to tell us what we had to do and that would be all there was to it. WE've thought a lot about resettlement, but never had a chance to express our opinions. Yes--you said we should--on paper, but no one ever meant that."



Mr. Rex Lee-2-

In my talks I have followed the following outline:

1. History of W. R. A.

A. Its original purpose

1. Ex. Order
2. Byrnes Report
3. Voluntary evacuation

B. Relationship with Army

1. No complications or delay to evacuation
2. To relieve army of "maintaining and resettling a dislocated people."
3. Administrative control from time of centers only

C. Demands of public before resettlement could proceed

1. Clearance - checking of loyalties
2. Registration - by military
3. Segregation - by Senate and Congress order

D. Public acceptance

1. Attitudes created in center
2. Work of boys in Army

II. The Change

A. Reinstitution of Selective Service

B. Italian front, Burma, etc.

C. Resettlement reports

D. Supreme Court cases and general change in public attitude

E. Only one hurdle left - West Coast

III. The Future

A. W.R.A. can now go back to its original purpose

B. Problems more complicated

1. Youth has left old age & children in camp
2. Financial resources dissipated
3. Community adjustments more complex because of language

C. W.R.A. not a permanent agency

1. Life depends on budget
2. Budget depends on need
3. Need depends on military
4. If West Coast opens-no need, no budget, no W.R.A.
5. People must use it now if they want help

D. WRA's plan to help

1. In the Centers
  - a. Family interviews
  - b. Necessity of true family plan
2. In the new communities
  - a. Community organization
  - b. Community invitation
  - c. Position of Relocation Adj. Advisor



IV What people must do:

A. Think

1. Of their own future in U.S.
  - a. If not interested in U.S. - W.R.A. not interested - Dept. of Justice affair
  - b. "He who is not for us is against us."
  - c. Citizenship in Japan not determining factor - "Matter of mind and heart" - People in Japan who hate militarism, too, There must be an agreement of ideals.
2. Of what they had on Coast and what they need.
  - a. Be realistic
  - b. Public won't stand for "dog in the manger" attitude.
3. Alternatives
  - a. Resettle now and help in the winning of the war - gain favor as being "with us".
  - b. Wait - and what Americans will say to that.

B. Act

1. Make a family plan - include everything
2. Ask W.R.A. for help  
If we know what the problems are, we can help. W.R.A. now a service agency for all who want U.S. to be their home.

V. Conclusion

- A. W.R.A. must go out of business sometime.
- B. Now it can help - plan now and use it.
- C. Tell us how we ought to improve service.

The outline of community organization 130.6 has been enthusiastically received, particularly the fact that the committee is volunteer and W.R.A. paid! No matter how much is said, the people on the whole do not trust us and do most emphatically have a bad opinion about field offices. The bad reports have been publicized by the underground and the good are not believed. It is most essential that we develop these resettlement committees now. It is further essential to tie up and real planners in the centers with the Relocation Division.

That statement seems like a paradox, but it is true. There is a great deal of planning in spite of the Div. and very seldom because of it. At Minidoka almost all of the plans are underground, behind the scenes. In Heart Mountain there is an official group and an unofficial one. The latter is placing much confidence in the analyst, Mr. Hansen. In Granada the official group is working on its own and has its own office. This situation is good but needs some expert guidance.



Mr. Rex Lee-4

The cooperation existing or not existing is based upon two factors: Confidence in attitude and confidence in ability. At Minidoka there is neither - not only toward the Relocation Division but also toward the majority of the staff. Three top people have some rapport with the community - Ed Huberman, Elmer Smith, and McLaughlin. Anderson is accepted very well and is making headway as Relocation Advisor. Beeson was not trusted altho he had quite a few friends. His "super salesmanship" was the main objection. Mr. Stafford does not know the people and they do not know him. This is even true of some new members of the staff. Huberman has a superiority attitude toward the staff. He "tells them what to do." No staff meetings on relocation are held. There is no joint planning.

At Mt. Mt. there is a great respect for the ability of the top staff. There is some lack of confidence in the attitude. There is no joint planning and no staff committee. Mr. Rowertson urges the various divisions to discuss matters as a division. There is a good feeling toward the Relo. Div. but that Div. has not contacted the real planners. Mr. Carrol does not live on the project and Mr. Gilmore is not of a social nature with residents.

At Granada the residents have real confidence in Mr. Lindley. He calls many by their names and has an open office. He works a great deal in and around the community and can be seen anywhere and everywhere. As an organization the camp is not strong, but there are not real hostilities. There is little confidence in Community Management but the attitude is good.

A common fault in all of the centers I've visited is in the physical set-up of the Relocation Division. There has been no centralization of information, and no plan to contact the problems of all the families. Mt. Mt. has the best, but lacks space for the relocation library and interviewers.

I would appreciate very much if the office would send out letters offering a \$5.00 prize (I'll contribute that) to any person who will offer the best method of streamlining the physical set-up of the Relocation Offices and another \$5.00 (same proposition) to streamline the handling of procedures. The situation here at Granada is terrible. Equally bad at Minidoka. Even with expert help none of these offices could handle the situation when the West Coast opens. It would be a sad commentary if we cannot correct this physical situation. I believe we should send out a suggested standard plan and let each center modify it to fit the buildings available. Most staff people are not experienced in administrative organization. The Division in the Centers is very "topsy" it just "grewed."

Group relocation is being very much discussed. The W.R.A. policy is not favored. The Issei see no way of reestablishing themselves under the present dispersal plan. They understand the advisability but



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object to it on two counts. First: Why should they be forced to undertake a more difficult future when the U.S. is made up of small groups? They have been more dependent upon each other because they could not be citizens and now need each other to readjust. Secondly: The speedy liquidation of the centers means that they must plan in groups. They cannot leave widows and bachelors out. They can contribute some labor to a group when they could not contribute at all in a strange population group. The comment has been often made, "We'll take care of the problems ourselves if we can go out in groups of 20 to 100 families."

There are many real plans being formulated. One group here in Granada has an association in Calif. There are about 200 families. All of these own property and have it leased under a trusteeship. Seventy-two of the young men are in the Army. Leases on the property expire Nov. 1st. They have a very difficult problem. I have advised individual requests to return and a submission of a plan for the whole family, every family in the group. This will be one of the first to work on in California.

Another group is planning on Louisiana. There are just innumerable small groups from 10 families up - most of whom have a very definite place and plan. We will have to play ball with them and prepare the new communities for them. Relocation on an individual or single family basis is dropping to a trickle. The group plan is the only way I see that broken families can be resettled except by force and I'm opposed to that.

The situation in regard to family counseling is not at all favorable. The difficulties are: 1. Inadequate central files to secure advance information; 2. Inadequate space; 3. Lack of understanding of the purpose; 4. Differences of opinion between Welfare and Relocation regarding responsibilities. It seems necessary to rewrite the entire manual on this point.

So much at present. I'll probably not have time to write a similar report on Rohwer. I stayed in Lamar to get this done and to get a little additional rest to carry me over. Three large meetings are scheduled on Sunday - Emphasis on youth in the morning, family planning in the afternoon, and Issei in the evening. There are many points I've not mentioned, but it would take forever to write them all now. We must make plans for a conference and if possible include a representative from the evacuees. This would have a very good effect in reestablishing confidence in the real interest in W.R.A.

Sincerely yours,

Hugo W. Wolter



The following is submitted as a general report on my field trip made to Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Granada and Rohwer during the period beginning October 6 and ending November 8, 1944.

General organization of the Relocation Division at Minidoka:

The Relocation Division at Minidoka required a complete reorganization. The Acting Relocation Program Officer was hesitant in assuming control of the Division since he felt that the position would be superseded by a new appointee.

The Relocation Program Officer's office is in a building removed from the general work of the Relocation Division and gives him no privacy. He shared the office with the Assistant Director, Community Management Division; Supt. of schools and Director of Adult Education. The Relocation Office itself contained the telegraph equipment operated by the Cooperative and also cluttered with a tremendous amount of dead job offers and other obsolete material. The Relocation Advisers had no privacy in conducting interviews, in fact, had literally no place to work. There was no clear-cut processing although the receptionists attempted to direct people to the proper desks. Between 90 and 95% of the time is devoted to seasonal leave. Files were not kept up to date and there was no way of knowing whether an applicant for indefinite leave had recently been out on seasonal leave since this filing had not been done. Definite recommendations were made as follows:

1. A change was recommended for the entire office organization so that the personnel would have adequate space in which to work.
2. It is recommended that the telegraph office be removed from the relocation office.
3. It is further recommended that the obsolete files be taken out and that one person be assigned to keep the current filing up-to-date including the information received and, more important, the personal files of the families. In a conference with the Welfare Section, Statistics and Relocation Division, it was agreed that a central file would be established under the general supervision of the Relocation Advisers and that all sections and divisions would be required to submit information in their files or if such information was considered too confidential to submit, a statement summarizing the information would be submitted stating that details are available. The Relocation Division definitely needs more space. The Relocation Library is located in Block 22 and has not been used to a great extent.



The Family Interviewing Program. It seems that the purpose of the Family Interviewing Program has been largely misinterpreted. From the viewpoint of the people it was just another survey designed to extract information which might be detrimental to them. The community had not been prepared. The results of the initial interviews are not satisfactory from the standpoint of accuracy or comprehension. The reason for this will be stressed in evacuee attitudes and interest in relocation in later paragraphs. Although the figures showed that the great proportion had been given the initial interview, the material collected is of little value in the developing of family summaries. It was rushed through and children were asked to give the material when other members of the family were not available. Consequently, the "letter of the law" was fulfilled but the spirit was entirely missing. It is now necessary to recheck all these interviews in the process of getting the family plan established.

The staff seemed at a loss to know just why the Family Interviewing was started. Either the instructions are too obtuse, too lengthy, too complicated or we in the Washington office have fallen down in indicating the importance of this program. I am inclined to believe that we did not make the importance of the program evident to the relocation staff.

Evacuee participation. To all appearances, the participation of the evacuees in the relocation program is almost nil. There was no Relocation Planning Commission except on paper and the opinion was expressed that it wasn't worthwhile to meet. They thought that it might be advisable to make a new Relocation Planning Commission at some time but felt that the matter was not sufficiently pressing to exert themselves. The Community Council had their separate office in Block 22 and showed every evidence of being on its own. I was particularly interested to know whether or not groups had been discussing relocation and found that there was a great interest and that individually people would express an interest in relocation but in a group it was definitely that they were not interested. I was impressed by the fact that the officers in the Community Council seemed to have a definite limit beyond which they could not go in discussing any matters with the appointed personnel. By meeting with several groups in their homes, I learned that there was a very strong influential organization which directed the activities of the nominal leadership. This group was made up of parolees. They recognize that the problem of relocation was their own problem and that they were going to solve it in their own way. They misinterpreted the entire WRA program and felt that any suggestion from WRA implied the use of force to relocate. It was reported that Pfc. Niga's appearance at the high school merely created the impression that it was another WRA attempt to put something over, this time using school children. A great resentment was expressed by the school students themselves.



It seemed necessary that the entire position of WRA be clarified and to that end I have developed an outline with a speech submitted herewith to inform the people about past, present and probably future of WRA. A number of general meetings were held at Minidoka. I also met with the Community Council and with several small groups. The result increased the interest in WRA's effort in behalf of the residents and following this through might bring about active participation by the Relocation Commission. My opinion, very frankly, is that for one reason or another the general population of Minidoka distrusts WRA and all of its employees. It is going to take sometime before we can expect real contributions from the group. As stated before, individually there is an interest in resettlement but an organized effort to spread information will not at present be developed. A few sidelights might be expressed by the following information. The building of the school auditorium had lagged there, and an attempt was being made to speed it up so that the auditorium might be used for the winter school program. A report given to me by evacuees was that the appointed staff went down and worked on the building without discussing the matter with them or asking their cooperation. In their minds, it was an "attempt to show them up" and they resented it. When the Tooele Ordnance Depot offer came, no one was interested but the members of the appointed staff delivered posters from door to door. Reaction to this was interesting. On the one hand, the fact that the appointed staff spent Saturday afternoon in doing a more or less menial task showed to some of the evacuees that they were very much interested. The fact that the work was for an ordnance depot created a different reaction with others, that the entire staff was interested in seeing them get out to a place where they might be blown up. It is evident that there is a extreme lack of communication between the appointed personnel and the community. There is definitely a lack of confidence.

If the Washington staff is to assist the project staff in overcoming this difficulty, which I believe is the function of the Washington staff, we should provide the necessary background material in readable and understandable form as quickly as possible in both English and Japanese. It is certainly necessary that any change in policies and regulations be interpreted to the people, preferably in writing over Mr. Myer's signature because with the exception of a few people, the residents in Minidoka will not accept a statement from the relocation staff nor from the other appointed personnel. The main point here is that they appreciate the statement of certainty. They would rather have a direct "no" than a promise.



There has been some dissension between the Welfare Section and the Relocation Division. It seems that there was no clear-cut understanding about whose responsibility various problems were and at one time five minors were relocated without a reference to or consent of the Welfare Section. The responsibilities of each section had to be definitely outlined. This was done with the entire staffs of the Relocation Division and the Welfare Section plus the chief of the Community Management.

Particular credit should go to Father Joe Kitagawa who in a quiet way has assisted much in the relocation program, to Father Tibesar of the Catholic church who has worked very closely with many of the members of the church and who has made a very significant contribution to the relocation program. Both of these gentlemen and their fellow workers in church groups plus Rev. Nakagawa of the Buddhist church had been the mainstays of the indefinite leave program. The Buddhist Reverent was tremendously interested in the Family Counseling Program and promised his cooperation in seeing to it that the members of the Buddhist church through his own efforts and other priests would be informed of the far-reaching significance and purpose of the family planning.

#### General organization of the Relocation Division at Heart Mountain:

The general organization of the Heart Mountain Relocation Division might be termed very good. The building in which the Division is housed had been rebuilt in order to provide for the needs of the Division. At the time this remodeling was done they did not, however, include sufficient space for the Relocation Library or for the interviewing program. A great deal of work had been done in streamlining the procedures in letting people know where to go. A number of forms had been developed. In general, these forms are very adaptable to the systems which they have installed. Everyone seems to know his job and the limits of those responsibilities. The leave procedure is especially well organized. Mr. Newton there should be given credit for handling his section so that even a newcomer can step in and see the processes required. Seasonal leave has again occupied much of the time and the organization was set up primarily to take care of the rush of seasonal leave and incidentally to take care of indefinite leave. A few minor changes were recommended to make it possible to develop a better relocation library, provide for the interviewers and to lay most stress to the indefinite leave program.

Here also the importance of a central file was stressed and the Project Director agreed to develop a central file of information as soon as possible.



The Family Interviewing Program. Unfortunately again the value of the Family Interviewing Program in planning for the entire future operation was not understood at Heart Mountain. The survey aspect had almost been completed in the opinion of the Relocation Program Officer and his assistant. They felt that they did not need the additional two interviewers recommended for Heart Mountain, however, after the importance had been pointed out, both Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Robertson agreed to additional staff members. Unfortunately Mr. Carroll had been subpoenaed to appear at the sedition trial at Cheyenne and was at that time attending a relocation meeting in Denver. Cordial relationship exists between the Welfare Section and the Relocation Division, but there was evidence of a distrust of the ability of the Relocation Adviser to interpret Welfare summaries. I would not say that the feeling was not unfounded. With the reinterpretation of the family program and the beginning of a central file under the supervision of the Statistics Section, a plan was developed to put a great deal of stress on the family planning under the interviewing program.

Evacuee Participation. A tremendous amount of interest was expressed by various groups in relocation. A number of negative factors appeared which might be summarized as experiences of people out on one or other types of leave. There was an experience by one very influential young man in the Chicago Area. He had been a wealthy farmer and was interested in buying a comparatively large farm and reestablishing himself in the midwest. The unfortunate experience with the Chicago office in the lack of interest in farming possibilities made him very bitter toward statements of help and services professed by the War Relocation Auth.

There was a very antagonistic feeling between the Washington office and the evacuees. In informal meetings with various older men, one particular gentleman said, "Well, you want to know how we think you can help, we would like to know what you do, we see no evidence but your writing regulations and more regulations, just what is your job?" I was happy to have him blow off steam in this way because he was a recognized leader. I had no objection in giving him the outline of the job of the Relocation Division, part of which was my individual responsibility. It gave me an opportunity in the discussion to say, "Oh yes, this is another thing which is a part of the job which I didn't mention before", so that everytime a new suggestion was made I could say we were or were not working with it and who definitely was responsible. Although this was done in the presence of only a small group, it was in an influential group and the interest in discussion picked up almost immediately. The Council, the Block Managers, and individuals made arrangements for separate meetings through the co-operation of the Community Analyst. There were a number of heart-to-heart sessions. A significant analysis shows that the Relocation Division at



the project level had been taken into the confidence of the group but was looked upon more or less with a questioning attitude. I believe one reason for this is that the Relocation Program Officer does not live on the project and therefore does not have the opportunity of sitting down with some of the older people on an informal or social basis during the evenings. These informal "bull sessions" by various members of the staff have a tremendous influence on attitudes. It was almost impossible to get away from the project because of the many questions which were being asked by the time my visit came to a close. It was also evident here that there were a number of groups planning relocation and which had not indicated this desire in any way previously. They felt that the statements from WRA in regard to group relocation obviated any assistance they might be able to get and therefore their plans for ten or more families had to be completed without help. It was beginning to get very evident that whether we liked it or not, groups were planning to resettle. Throughout the visit at Heart Mountain, I again felt that no matter how bad a report might be to the people, that if there was certainty in it, they could face it. They didn't want promises, they wanted to know exactly what WRA could or could not do and what they could or could not do and within that frame work they would operate. It was at Heart Mountain that one of the older Issei expressed the viewpoint which I think is significant. He unquestionably used the term "relocation" for evacuation. This would indicate that in the minds of the Issei the work relocation and the interpretation of the policy which they believe to exist fits in the same plan of reference as the evacuation program.

The Relocation Division, particularly the interviewing section, gave a farewell party to one of its members during my stay at the project. This was held in the appointed staff mess. The fact that the residents were free to be invited into the appointed staff mess for the purpose of a party for an evacuee created a very favorable impression; on the other hand, there is a tendency on the part of some of the appointed personnel to exclude evacuees from the appointed personnel recreation hall. It is hard to estimate the influence such small items may have on the entire population. It can perhaps be best expressed in terms of interest or non-interest on a social level in the development of the life of the residents.

#### General organization of the Relocation Division at Granada

The general organization of the Relocation Division at Granada leaves much to be desired. The offices are cramped. There is no provision for a general flow of applicants for indefinite leave from one place to another. The office layout is not conducive to constructive work. It is undoubtedly necessary that additional space be provided somewhere if the program is to be developed efficiently. Unfortunately Mr. Knodel was absent at hearings in Denver for failure of people to report for induction in Selective Service. There is considerable misunderstanding about the family counseling program



which led to confusion in general procedures. Members of the staff were studying the individual paragraphs of the Manual but failed to grasp the total significance of the family program. The staff was interested and was doing what it thought best under its interpretation. Changes in the office setup were recommended by the members of the staff in order to facilitate the new understanding of the program and I believe the changes will meet the increased requirements.

Here also the idea of service to the evacuees which is a primary factor in the family interviewing program had not been grasped. The survey element had been stressed and a large number of charts and co-operative relationships have developed. There is a very optimistic outlook as has been expressed by a great number of people. Evacuee participation was excellent although it did not appear in the suggested form of the Manual. The Amache Resettlement Association had its own office which contains the library material. This could be improved. There was a place at which people came to discuss problems with fairly well informed members of the group. They too expressed the desire to have the pertinent Manual sections interpreted into Japanese. There was an excellent spirit of support with the majority of the staff. Mr. Lindley himself was genuinely interested in resettlement and had the confidence of the people.

The greatest amount of interest centered in group resettlement. Fully a half dozen groups had made plans, some tentative, some definite, largely without the knowledge of the Relocation Division, again because they felt existing policies were against this type of resettlement. A group from Livingston had planned to return to California almost to the last detail. This group included members from Cortez and Merced involving well over 100 families. They are members of a trust and all land was either owned or leased. With leases and contracts terminating on the first of November, since I was unable to give them any definite knowledge of the opening of the West Coast, leases were renewed for another year. Another small group planned resettlement in Hollywood and arranged to make contracts with former employers. The Buddhist church groups and Christian church groups have also made plans. The Amache Resettlement Association itself was fairly interested in group relocation in Louisiana. It appreciated the fact that WRA could not be a loan agency and that no additional help could be given residents of the centers that can not be given other citizens and groups in the United States. The leadership of this group is very interested. For the sake of the group and also their own, if the leadership should relocate before consummation of any plan, the entire group resettlement plan might die out. I talked to about seven or eight hundred people at



Granada and each successive meeting had a great attendance. There was a tremendous interest in resettlement and what people could do to assist. Following some of the talks, the people would appear at the relocation office and submit their own family plans as they had worked them out. This development is extremely interesting because of the spontaneous insistence on advice and counseling. I rather expect the office will be jammed rather than have to go and stir up customers. A tremendous interest was shown in possible development of adult education in such things as study of governmental agencies and what they do; financial assistance, government and private; farming bulletins and other material which was spontaneously suggested wherever the possibility of adult education as immediately important to resettlement was stressed. The Granada plan of group resettlement was discussed and the various difficulties explained.

It is unfortunate that at Granada Mr. Noel is also the Relocation Officer for that district. It places him in a difficult position in regard to reinduction. According to instructions, he is to make recommendations as Relocation Officer and then he must himself receive these recommendations and act upon them. The same situation is true of Mr. Carroll at Heart Mountain. I believe this should be changed.

The general feeling of mutual understanding and responsibility which prevails in the center has its definite effect on resettlement. If this can be expanded to overcome the language difficulty, I feel that relocation at Granada will almost take care of itself.

#### General organization of the Relocation Division at Rohwer:

Rohwer has recently been completely reorganized as far as the staff of the Relocation Division is concerned. The staff is almost all new. It has expanded office facilities and at present it seems to be operating with a great willingness to do the job but doubtful as to what it should be doing. Recommendations were made as to the physical organization of the office, room for interviewers, etc., and the establishment of the central file in the Statistics Section. Mr. Price, the present Relocation Program Officer was determined to do a good job. He does not have very much other support but his staff is interested and willing. Following an outline as to what their job was and how it might be accomplished, the group dug in with great vigor and purpose. The interviewing program had also been misinterpreted at Rohwer. Its general purpose was not clear. In an interpretation of this and its dovetailing into the community organization plan brought a tremendous amount of response from the people. Here each succeeding mass meeting brought group attendance and more specific



questions. It didn't seem to make much difference when the meeting was held: morning, afternoon or evening. Considerable discussion arose from the floor in regard to the Rohwer Colonization Plan. The reasons why it was not feasible were explained. Satisfactory to all but one, this gentleman has a peculiar quirk to his thinking and will undoubtedly submit additional recommendations along the same line. In spite of all sorts of explanations, he still insists that WRA can accomplish just what it wants to accomplish and the reason that it was not interested in this plan was because they are only interested in the dispersal and breaking up of the Japanese groups in this country. This was not felt by other members of the community in the same group.

Although the Community Council had a Relocation Commission on paper this had not been meeting for some time. I was informed at one of the discussions that there was, however, a very strong relocation committee working not because of any staff cooperation but in spite of it. This group numbering twenty-three had been meeting every week for a considerable length of time. They had felt too that relocation would have to be done by themselves and that any attempt on WRA's part to gather information was just another negative aspect and would result in discrimination. They, therefore, were planning on their own program. Explanation of Manual Sections in regard to family counseling, particularly in regard to community organization showed that our interest was on their behalf and that they could be more helpful to themselves if they cooperated openly. Several group plans are developing here.

#### GENERAL COMMENT

Every project expressed a very definite interest in having seasonal leave eliminated. This is true both from the viewpoint of the staff and the groups contacted. Seasonal leave is viewed as an hindrance to resettlement rather than an aid, as this causes the majority of the people on seasonal leave to not want to work upon their return to the project. Definite requests would no doubt be arriving from various relocation commissions to abolish seasonal leave as quickly as possible.

At none of the projects has there been consideration of the evacuee property problems on the part of the relocation commission. Most of them agreed that it was very important and that they would probably recommend permission to be granted to representatives to look into this matter for various groups.

It is most evident that the means of communication between the Washington and the projects and project staffs and residents be improved. The project staffs in general do not know the Manual on relocation and in many instances although they have attempted to interpret it clearly, they have misinterpreted the instructions. This has raised



a series of questions of disagreement and has developed considerable correspondence between residents in various centers. This misinterpretation has caused further misinterpretation by the residents themselves. The language difficulty is extremely hard to overcome. After much discussion on this both with project staffs and with the people it would be my recommendation that the bulletins and Manual Releases be written as simply as possible and that illustrations be used in place of words in order to make translation into Japanese easier. An example of this might be the new Japanese translation of "When you Leave a Relocation Center." This booklet although it contains all the information is not attractive and does not invite a person to read. Inasmuch as it is our responsibility not only to place this information at the disposal of the evacuees but actually to see that they comply with the regulations, we should present our material in such a way that people wish to read it.

A great deal of interest is expressed in a series of posters or cartoons which would interpret the family counseling program, the community organization program and the communities on the outside, the original development of WRA, etc.

In none of the projects were there any difficulty with discussions in controversial matters. The policy of WRA was stated, the reason for its policy was given and by the large accepted. A few hecklers did attempt to ask questions beyond general policy but the older groups usually squelched any attempt to discredit the effort to give actual information. I was greatly impressed by the very sound and sane attitude which the older Issei reflected in all instances even where matters of loyalty were definitely brought out.

In each of the projects I discussed the Ordnance Depot propositions. All objections were freely expressed including:

1. What will happen to our Japanese citizenship?
2. We would be the first to get the blame if any act of sabotage was discovered or if there were explosions of any kind.
3. We don't want to be frozen to our jobs so we can't return to California.
4. We don't want anything to happen to members of our families still in Japan.



The importance of cooperation in the war effort on the part of the Issei parents to the splendid effort of the 442nd was explained. At no time did any unpleasant situation arise in any small or large meeting.

There was in Rohwer a man named Mursi, a former editor of the Japanese newspaper, "The Farm Journal", read by almost all Japanese farmers on the West Coast. He might very well be used in the information program. He now carries on a current news program at the Rohwer center and is highly respected for his integrity. I had several conferences with him and believe that he could be of great help to the Reports Division in the Washington office.

The matter of the exclusion of school children unless they pay tuition in Idaho was brought up. This matter has had more publicity than it warrants. At least it has had an incorrect twist. The same restrictions applying to relocatees' families apply also to children of the personnel at the veterans hospital. They too must pay tuition until they have established residence in the state. Since coming from the federally owned project, they are not considered to be the bona fide residents of the state of Idaho. The project staff at Granada was not permitted to vote in the recent election unless they had established residence outside of the center. People living on federal projects in the state of Colorado are not considered legal residents.

11/16/44



October, 1944

General talk given to the various groups at Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Granada, and Rohwer.

Variations naturally occurred to meet the situation at each project.

Introduction usually given in Japanese asking to be excused for my inability to speak to the group in Napanese and introducing the interpreter. Minasan kombanwa. Watakushiwa nihongowo adimasen. Gomen kudasai. Arigato gozaimasu.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

At various times it seems necessary to go back over the history of WRA in order to have a mutual understanding of the past. People in the centers have criticized WRA and have felt that it often unjustly controlled their lives. Very few have ever studied its origin or its purpose. I would like to call your attention to a report given to the Senate of the United States by the President in September, 1943. It is called the Byrnes Report and gives a complete picture of the beginning and development of WRA. (Senate Document No. 96)

I would like to have you go back with me this evening to the days before evacuation and to think of the difficulties and dangers on the West Coast. It was in February, 1942, that the President signed an executive order giving the authority to the commanding officers of military areas to exclude any people whom they considered dangerous to national defense from those areas. This was known as Executive Order 9066. Following that order the West Coast area was closed to all people of Japanese descent and the way was laid open for voluntary evacuation to inland states. This was a time of great confusion and there was danger to the people of Japanese descent. They were not welcomed in large masses in the neighboring states. It was then that the President and his advisers realized that there must be some way of assisting these people to resettle and the War Relocation Authority was authorized.

x x x Pause for Interpreter x x x

The primary function of the WRA was, therefore, to assist in the resettlement of dislocated people. You will remember the freeze order, the involuntary evacuation and the decision to establish assembly centers under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration. The Army took charge of the mass evacuation, assisted by other government agencies. The people evacuated, you among them, were very resentful of this action although you complied without any difficulty. You had several months experience in the assembly centers. Very little was done at that time to assist in resettlement; in fact, there is a statement in the agreement between the War Relocation Authority and



the Army which definitely limited any attempts to resettle during the process of evacuation. Leave was limited to agricultural needs. Moreover, the War Relocation Authority had to build itself and be prepared to take over the operation of the centers. The War Relocation Authority took charge only after the Army delivered the evacuees at the relocation center gates. The Centers were definitely established to be temporary homes. They were way-stations between the West Coast and new resettlement areas. At no time was it ever intended that either the War Relocation Authority or the centers should have permanent status.

It was during this period that leave clearance proceedings were developed. These also caused much resentment, particularly among the citizen group.

In order that we might understand the reason for leave clearance and for some of the other things that had to be done, I wish to report to you the general opinion of the American public as I have seen it previously and particularly on my last trip. The American public doubted the ability of the people of Japanese descent to become citizens. They felt race and nationality were welded together. It was only the other evening at Lamarr that I talked to a traveling salesman who said, "I don't believe that this group out there at camp (Granada) can be really citizens in their hearts"--and he had visited the camp. Of course, I pointed out to him that there were a great many boys in Service, and some of the other things I shall mention later, but the main point is that his first impression was a doubt. These doubts can be cleared up because we definitely, as citizens and as responsible government officials, cannot release anyone who might be harmful to the war effort or dangerous to the internal security of our country. Leave clearance also provided any person who left the center with a record of his investigation. It showed that his records had been checked--that there was nothing against him in either the FBI offices, the Provost Marshall Office, or the Office of Naval Intelligence. His record was, as far as could be determined, clear; but I will speak more about that in a few minutes.

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Shortly after the camps were established the military authorities carried on a military registration. This also caused much resentment within the camps. It raised many questions of loyalty again and made leave clearance proceedings even more necessary. It did show quite definitely that citizenship was not a basis for loyalty. Then in August and September of 1943 there was a large segregation program and the sailing of the Gripsholm. I am sure that all of us can go back in our memories to the very difficult time during the segregation hearings. It wasn't any fun! The personnel of WRA was not and is not trained in investigations, but we did our best,--did it to prove that there were a large number of loyal evacuees within the camps and that they, the loyal, should have every assistance.



Tule Lake was begun and large groups of people were sent there from every center. This program was primarily carried on as a benefit to those evacuees who wished to remain in the United States as loyal law abiding residents and citizens.

I mentioned before that citizenship cannot be substituted for loyalty. I wish to illustrate that from my experiences at Gila. In the segregation movement there were 628 citizens over the age of 17 who went to Tule and 623 aliens over the age of 17 who went to Tule. Although there were other factors involved, under American standards it is considered that a person of 17 or 18 years of age has the right to make his own choice. They chose to go to Tule for a number of reasons. The fact remains that they did choose to go rather than take their part actively in favor of the war effort of the United States. It was difficult for those of us who were trying to help in the public relations program to interpret these moves to Tule Lake to the general public. Every person who went to Tule was considered disloyal and a potential danger. We knew that that was not entirely true, but the difficulties at Tule Lake, played up by the press, again made the job of interpreting the loyalty of those who remained in the center very difficult. It was not possible to do a great deal about leave clearance and to establish the fact that people with a record of loyalty should be assisted in resettlement.

Although these various parts of the program caused much resentment and much distrust of WRA within the centers, they were established and carried out for the eventual good of those evacuees who wish to continue their lives in the United States. These things had to be done. Although the segregation program had been planned by WRA itself it was definitely ordered by the Congress and Senate on July 6, 1943. These things had to be done before WRA could carry out its original function of assisting people in resettlement. You looked upon us as controlling agents--almost as a Gestapo. We did make mistakes, but they were mistakes which were intended to serve both the country and the loyal evacuees.

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In January of 1944 Selective Service was reinstituted and boys were called again to fulfill their duties to their country. Many people felt that it was unwise and discriminatory to have segregation units. Petitions were sent to Mr. Myer and to the Director of Selective Service. Whether by forethought or not, this practice of keeping the boys of Japanese descent in one unit has been of great service to the evacuees. I need hardly mention to you the wonderful record of the 442nd and of the 100th. It would not have been possible for these units to exist had the boys been scattered throughout all of the Army services. The story of their record in Italy has been carried by all the papers. The reports from Burma and the South Pacific have also helped. This has proved that people of Japanese descent can be and are loyal Americans. It has made it possible for us in WRA to fight more openly because we now had definite proof of what we thought existed.



Within the centers you have also shown your backing of your servicemen and women. You have established Servicemen's Relatives Associations; you have donated honor rolls and monuments in honor of the men and women in service; you have established branches of the USO; you have contributed to the War Fund; many homes now proudly display service flags and there are a number of Gold Stars in the centers. All of these things together have changed the viewpoint of the American public. They see that a great many people of Japanese descent are interested in the United States. They see that much manpower, much goodwill, and much productive ability is being lost. There are standing invitations in many communities and thousands of jobs.

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We are now at a turning point. WRA can go from the work which it had to do in maintaining centers, to its primary job "to relieve the military of the burdensome and difficult task of maintaining and re-establishing a dislocated people." WRA can now become a service agency. It offers to help and assist in a variety of ways--not to control the lives of people, but to re-establish them in normal American life.

I wish to say a few words to the aliens particularly. Many of you in facing the future have felt that it is a disgrace to be an alien. It is no disgrace to be an alien. It is no disgrace to be a Japanese alien, but in my opinion it is a disgrace for any honest human being to willingly join up with the totalitarian and militaristic regime of either Germany, Italy, or Japan, or any other country. Everyone respects the citizen of any country whether he be Japanese or not, if that person believes in the rights of man over the rights of conquest. The United Nations fought fascism in Italy, but not Italians as a group. The United Nations fought France, but not Frenchmen as a whole. We are now fighting the Czechs and Poles, and Yugoslavs, not because they are Czechs or Poles or Yugoslavs, but because of certain ideas and policies under which they joined up with Hitler, and we are also fighting Japan because of certain policies. We are fighting the militaristic, we are fighting its policies of aggression and expansion. I personally, and I believe every American, has no interest in any person of Japanese descent, or anyone else, who willingly and knowingly lines up with the present ruling group in Japan. I personally would not do one bit to assist anyone except under the rules of the Geneva convention. But there are among you, and I might say the majority of you are, people who believe in the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; who believe in peace over war; who believe in the freedoms as outlined by President Roosevelt. You and I have a common loyalty of ideals, a common ideology. You cannot stand on the side lines and watch your sons or your husbands fight for those same things, nor could you wait idly by and watch your own and your neighbor's house burn. The United Nations are calling you to actively assist in putting out the fire of aggression throughout the world.



But you say "what about my Japanese citizenship?" I would reply in this way--"when the United Nations invaded Italy there was an Italian underground that prepared the way for peace; when the United Nations entered France, there were the Frenchmen of the French underground that prepared the way; and when the United Nations enter Japan there must be Japanese who will prepare the way. I believe that a person can still be a citizen of Japan and believe in freedom, but that very belief makes it necessary for him now actively to take a part in preparing the way of freedom." The question is not, "What about my Japanese citizenship?" but "What about my ideals?" That is the question which the United Nations ask and the one which you will have to answer in connection with your future.

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Now what about the future. In my opinion there are four groups of people left in the camps; those who want to go out immediately; those who would like to go out, but feel that they can't because of various problems; those who are fence-sitters; and those who say they won't. To the last two groups, those who are fence-sitters and those who won't resettle, I would like to say very simply and very directly--those who are not for us are against us. There is no time for indecision or opportunism. If this war is to accomplish anything, it needs positive action and not sitting on the fence. It is true that many Americans are using the war to further their own ends financially or otherwise, but when the future of an entire people is at stake no one can hang back. I personally would not move my finger to help anyone who is just waiting to jump to the most opportune side of the fence.

To those who want to go out, but who feel that they can't because of various problems, I would like to explain the plans under which WRA is trying to be of service to you. There are two parts to these plans: the one is in the center, the other in the outside community (blackboard is used to illustrate). In the centers we call the plan the family counselling or family interviewing plan. Many people have resented the fact they have been asked more questions; they have resented being called in to talk about the future. The family counselling plan is not just another interview, another attempt to gain information about your lives. The purpose of the family plan is to furnish you with people who are experienced in interviewing and counselling so that you can tell them the difficulties which you face in planning resettlement. Let me re-emphasize that it is a service to you so that your difficulties can be made a matter of study, and so that WRA can assist in meeting your problem. These problems very likely fall into several classes. There are health problems, economic problems, old age and dependency problems; there are property problems and welfare problems. We need to know just what problems exist so we can plan.

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As you know, WRA is not a permanent agency. It will have to close its doors sometime. The only factor which makes it impossible to liquidate WRA now is the West Coast restriction. When that is lifted there is no further reason for the maintaining of people within the center. They are free to go back to the coast. We know that the years spent in the centers and the time at the assembly centers have changed your lives, that new problems have arisen and that assistance will have to be given to many people to help re-establish their lives. WRA is an agency set up to assist people during emergency period and to be the grease between the gears of people's problems and permanent government agencies. No doubt the budgets of other agencies will have to be increased to meet many dependency problems and special difficulties. For this reason, it is necessary that every family have a plan for its future so that we may know what we have to plan for in the way of finances and services, and what we have to ask other government agencies to assume. Now I ask--is it too much that each family cooperate in this? When you are called for an interview please consider it as a service. You do not need to accept the service if you do not wish to. You may make your own family plan. We do ask that you make it and that you let us know if you need any help. Before WRA can close its doors, every person will have to be resettled. The life of WRA is definitely limited, depending upon the West Coast restrictions. Please make your plans now!

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When you have completed those plans, there is another group of interested people in the communities throughout the United States. They represent resettlement committees. They have various names, but they are the groups interested and willing to help you. They represent people who know housing, who know health facilities, who know education, who know business, employment, religion, welfare, recreation, etc. When you have determined what plan you want for your family and where you want to go your plan is sent to this lay committee, and I emphasize that resettlement committees are not on the WRA payroll - they are made up of permanent residents. If you don't trust WRA and its employees, you can trust these residents because they wouldn't be doing resettlement work if they were not interested. The field offices of WRA cooperate with them and in the coordinating agencies. Your family plan can be studied by this group and arrangements can be made according to the available facilities to meet almost every need. If your plan cannot be met in one community, it can be met in another.

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I know that many of you feel that you want to go back to the West Coast and that you want to wait until the coast is open. There are now, however, opportunities that I can't help but emphasize. Those opportunities are with the Army Ordnance Depots. The Sioux Depot is open to aliens as well as citizens. It is most important



that as many as possible utilize this opportunity. Any person who wishes to make the United States his home and who believes in the principles of freedom should feel that he is contributing to the future by going to the depots. It is very important that the alien make a comparable record in war production to the record of the Nisei on the Italian front. We cannot promise anything for the future, but if people of Japanese descent wish to be accepted throughout the United States there is no greater contribution that they could make than to at once accept the invitation of the Army and put their energy into war production. Who can say how important it will be to the future of each one of you if you can put on an employment blank, "I worked for the \_\_\_\_\_ Ordnance Depot during World War II"?

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Now what can WRA do? At various times people have asked for all kinds of assistance and have said that if WRA was to help them in any way--could give them anywhere from \$5.00 to \$50,000 a piece, they would be very happy to resettle. I can say, "So would I!" Much wishful thinking is being done. WRA can do no more for the evacuees than can be done for any other group of people. A large number of people have lost property because of the war. I know from personal contact that the area which was used for training for the Africa invasion was taken over by the Marines, and the property matters were settled at a later date. The group that I represented had leases on camps down in the Quantico area. We were given 24 hours notice to get our equipment out of there. We were simply told that the military needed the space. We might expand that to the area covered by camps throughout the United States.

To get to facts, Government agencies have been set up to help people in need. They have not been set up to help particular groups. A man asked me the other day for \$50,000. I looked very much surprised. He said, "Yes, if I had \$50,000 I will resettle." I asked, "What did you do before evacuation," he replied, "I ran a restaurant." "Where did you live?" "I lived behind the restaurant." "How many could you serve?" "About 20 people." "You want \$50,000 to re-establish that business?"--"I would too!" Many requests are equally wishful. There are a number of government agencies that can help. There is the Farm Security Administration, the Farm Credit Association, the Farm Loan Bank and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. WRA cannot promise that these agencies will make any loans to anybody. Every loan is made to a particular person at a particular place for a particular job and for a particular time. Applications must, therefore, be made to one of these agencies by each person. The United States Employment Services are available to everyone. As a special service the President has set aside a considerable sum of money for the Social Security Board to take care of the needs of people dislocated because of the war. This aid runs all the way from \$5.00 up to \$1,000 as reported from Boston. This happened to be the case of a young girl who took sick with meningitis on the train to Boston. All of her expenses were met including convalescent care and that was \$1,000! Doesn't that show that if people need it they need not be afraid to ask for help? No one is going to be left starving or destitute in



any rooming house provided they will follow through and ask us for those services. That is the purpose of WRA, but we must have cooperation from your end. We are not mind readers.

x x x Interpreter x x x

There are so many problems that come up in resettlement that we have asked your Community Council to set up resettlement or relocation commissions. We want them to plan with us and advise with us on how we can be more helpful. We ask that they give to you the information that already exists. We have further asked that relocation libraries be established and have sent out much material, but people don't use it. Let me emphasize this fact that WRA is not a permanent agency. Every person must eventually be resettled and the sooner plans are made the happier all of us will be. Your resettlement commission can help people plan. The future is not indefinite--it is very definite under the limitations which I have set forth. There are many things that can be done--many things that must be done! I have tried to show you what WRA can and what it cannot do. If there are any further questions I shall be very happy to stay any length of time this evening to answer them. I don't want anyone to feel that we are trying to put something over on the people. I will try to give you an answer to every question that you ask. If I do not know the answer I will tell you so.

I thank you for your presence here this evening and for the privilege of speaking to you.



H. Rex Lee, Acting Chief, Reloc. Div.

11/1/44

Robert Dolins, Acting Head, Ctr. Liaison Section

Personnel Needs for Center Operation When West Coast is Opened

The following is our estimate for staff needs:

1. Center Relocation Division

a. We estimate that our staff at the center will have to be doubled. This is based on the following points:

1. The average relocation for two typical centers for the six-months' period of April through September, 1944, were Heart Mountain, 220 and Rohwer, 285. This is also our best period of relocation during the year. If we roughly estimate that on X day there will be 50,000 persons remaining at the center to be relocated within one year's time, this would call for an average relocation per center of 525 people or roughly double the rate of Rohwer.
2. We can anticipate decreasing the amount of technical evacuee personnel whose work will have to be assumed by appointed personnel.
3. The problems of the families remaining at the center and the dovetailing of their planning with parts of the family already relocated will call for much more extensive interviewing and counseling.

b. The typical center will then have the following personnel:

- 1 CAF-12 Relocation Program Officer
- 1 CAF-11 Assistant Relocation Program Officer
- 1 CAF-9 Leave Officer
- 1 CAF-7 Assistant Leave Officer
- 2 CAF-9 Relocation Advisers
- 8 CAF-7 Assistant Relocation Advisers
- 1 CAF-4 Secretary
- 1 CAF-3 Assistant Secretary

For Poston and Gila River the size of the staff would have to be slightly enlarged as follows:

Poston

- 1 CAF-12 Relocation Program Officer
- 1 CAF-11 Assistant Relocation Program Officer
- 1 CAF-9 Leave Officer
- 1 CAF-7 Assistant Leave Officer
- 3 CAF-9 Relocation Advisers
- 12 CAF-7 Assistant Relocation Advisers
- 1 CAF-4 Secretary
- 1 CAF-3 Assistant Secretary



Oila River

1	CAF-12	Relocation Program Officer
1	CAF-11	Assistant Relocation Program Officer
1	CAF-9	Leave Officer
1	CAF-7	Assistant Leave Officer
2	CAF-9	Relocation Advisers
10	CAF-7	Assistant Relocation Advisers
1	CAF-4	Secretary
1	CAF-3	Assistant Secretary

For the second quarter of the fiscal year 1944-45, a CAF-4 appointed secretary has already been approved. In view of the additional workers involved in the Division and the importance of filing and recording system at that time, an Assistant Secretary, CAF-3 will be necessary.

2. Center Liaison Section Washington Office

In order to handle the increased responsibilities in the office and to maintain a more constant progress in the field visiting the centers, we would suggest the addition of at least one CAF-12 and one CAF-11, Relocation Officer; the minimum addition should be one CAF-12, Relocation Officer.

The Center Liaison Section staff will then be as follows:

1	CAF-13	Relocation Officer (Section Head)
2	CAF-12	Senior Relocation Officer
1	CAF-11	Relocation Officer
1	CAF-9	Relocation Officer
2	CAF-4	Secretaries



81 Every person who by conspiring with a foreign power has caused hostilities to commence against the Empire or who has joined an enemy power in taking action <sup>hostile</sup> against the Empire shall be condemned to death.

82 Every person who has delivered an enemy power a foreign camp body of troops vessel or other place for military or naval use shall be condemned to death.

Every person who has delivered to an enemy power ammunition or other goods for military or naval use shall be punished with penal servitude.

83 Every person who for purpose of benefiting an enemy power has damaged or rendered unfit for use a foreign camp vessel arms ammunition or other place or other place for military or naval use shall be condemned to death or punished with penal servitude for life.

84 Every person who has delivered to an enemy power arms ammunition or other goods which may be used directly or indirectly in the operations of war shall be punished with penal servitude for life or with a term of years.



Memorandum

5

To: H. Rex Lee, Acting Chief, Relocation Division  
From: Hugo W. Wolter, Head, Center Liaison Section

1/1/45

The following memorandum refers to the Japanese Criminal Code which may be secured from the Department of State library, K527.4:54;1936, Room 308, 17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, telephone Miss Deberry, State Department, Ext. 509.

The Criminal Code of Japan, Article II, states, "This law applies to every person who as committed (any of) the following crimes outside the Empire:

1. Articles 73 to 76. Crimes against the Imperial House.
2. Articles 77 to 79. Civil war.
3. Articles 81 to 87. External war.

Articles 81 deals with the conspiracy to begin hostilities against the Empire.

Articles 82. The delivery of fortress, camp, etc., military goods to the enemy.

Article 83. Damage of goods, communications, etc.

Article 84. Other things nor directly military but connected with the war.

Article 85. Espionage.

Article 86. "Every person who by methods other than those of the preceding five Articles, 81 to 85 has given an enemy power any advantage or has injured the interests of the Empire shall be punished by limited penal servitude of not less than two years."

Article 87. "Attempts of the crimes of the preceding six Articles shall be punished."

In perusing the Criminal Code I ran across another interesting article.

85 Every person who has aided a spy for an enemy power or has aided a spy shall be condemned to death or punished with penal servitude for life or not less than 5 yrs.

86 Every person who by methods other than those of the preceding articles has given an enemy power any advantage or injured the interests of



the empire shall be punished with  
imprisonment for not less than  
2 years -

87 any attempt of the same of the  
proceeding shall be  
punished.



Article 218. "Every person who has deserted an aged person, juvenile or deformed or sick person whom he (she) is liable to protect or fail to give such person necessary protection for existence, shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than three months nor more than five years.

When the crime has been committed against a lineal ascendant of the offender or a lineal ascendant of the offender's spouse, he (she) shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than six months nor more than seven years."

Both of these Articles may explain some of the problems which we have to face in the liquidation of the centers.



From several of the project reports, we have received information that the attitude toward relocation has been handicapped by knowledge of and reference to the Criminal Code of Japan. Without a doubt this factor must be faced with certain individuals or groups of individuals at every project. The Criminal Code states in Article 1 and Article 86, "Every person who by methods other than those of the preceding five articles, 81 to 85 has given an enemy power any advantage or has injured the interests of the Empire shall be punished by limited penal servitude of not less than two years." Article 87 states, "Attempts of the crimes of the preceding six articles shall be punished".

A very broad interpretation of the Code could be made to include relocation and even cooperation with the administration at the centers. We do not question the probability that Issei who have been cooperating with the administration and who have taken their stand in assisting relocation might have been and are being reported to Japanese authorities through representatives of the Spanish government. Be that as it may, the Issei in the camps must face the proposition squarely and decide for themselves.

The Issei are now residing in the United States. They are bound by the United States law. Since they came to this country voluntarily and have accepted the law of the United States, they must declare themselves and rely upon the justice of American principles irrespective of their status in Japan.

What the law of Japan is does not concern us. It ought not now to concern people who are interested in the development of people's rights and liberties throughout the world.

It is not possible for the principles of Japanese law to be evoked unless there is also a recognition of the family ties and Shinto ties to Japan which place government by organization over and above government by principle. This fact has been one of the most important factors in the mistrust of Americans for people of Japanese descent. Where ties of loyalty have been built upon ideals such as the women and men of the armed forces have displayed toward the United States the question is eliminated. Our government has repeatedly said that war is not being waged against people but against certain ideologies. If the Issei at the center voluntarily accept the law promulgated by Japan and are influenced by an ideology contrary to the principles which we in the United States believe, the responsibility is entirely their own. They must then face the dilemma of living up to the dictates of Japan and facing probable punishment here if they do or living up to and participating with the principles of the United States and facing probable punishment here if they not.

The procedures governing the life at the centers definitely state, "anyone who interferes with the program may be expelled from the camp".



The Project Director is under orders to do that. Such expulsion may satisfy the dictates of the individual's conscience in avoiding voluntary participation in the relocation program. It would not, however, soothe the suspicious nature of some people. When a person has been expelled from the center, he leaves the protective custody and is entirely on his own. He may be interned as an enemy alien or he may be imprisoned for having violated a public law. Before expulsion from a center the Project Director may upon proof of the disturbing quality of a particular person's presence imprison him for not more than thirty days for any single act.

The simple facts are then that the desire to cooperate with Japan even in the minutest sense in fulfilling the Criminal law can not be a deterrent to relocation. The use of the Criminal Code as an explanation of certain project attitudes violates the spirit under which haven was supplied at the relocation centers. The American public in general is understanding. Very often it is gullible but when once aroused, its spirit is unmistakable. People who wish to invoke the Criminal Code of Japan at the same time invoke the power of American public opinion; between the two they must choose. Nor further action, on their behalf or on the behalf of the war effort, will then be taken.

At one center it was requested that twenty or thirty thousand signatures be secured in order that centers might remain open. Such a request is entirely beside the point and is a violation of the principles of personal freedom. It is like a person being unjustly placed in prison and then signing a petition to remain there. No court in the United States would permit such an action. Neither would any court in the United States or any branch in the United States government tolerate a restrictive life within a center on a voluntary basis when the way is now free for people to move throughout the United States. The Centers were developed on the basis of need, they are no longer necessary; therefore, no one may voluntarily restrict themselves to restrictions of center life. It is psychologically unthinkable for the American mind to voluntarily remain as government wards and not to reestablish oneself as a private entity as soon as possible. The War Relocation Authority is attempting to provide the means for meeting every problem which would handle such reestablishment for that is the American way. We simply ask that people let us know their problems so that we may find ways and means of solving them. The solutions in no way admit of life in a center. We are as willing to wage a psychological warfare for the principles of liberty within this country to maintain its constitutional freedoms as we are to fight for them on foreign soil.

The Issei may rationalize these things as they please and they may salve their own conscience in whatever form and mixtures as they wish but the purpose of the War Relocation Authority is clear. Since the raising of the exclusion order, no one who has the privilege of moving throughout the country shall be or can of his own authority be retained within a center. Everyone not specifically detailed must reestablish himself or be reestablished as a private citizen with all privileges as quickly as possible.



January 9, 1945

Dear Mr. Wolter:

May I express my thanks for your kind remembrance and season's greeting which I received a few days ago. We, too, wish you and your family very happy and prosperous new year.

During past few months which I have not written you many things happened both in the center and outside as well. One of the biggest happenings was opening of the west coast for the persons of the Japanese Americans. Since the announcement of it by the army, of course, there have been much talk among residents on this subject especially as to the closing of the centers within six to twelve months. As it has been anticipated, there are already spread wild rumors most likely originated by those who do not want to relocate or by those who are not able to relocate due to their individual case or status. For your reference I am submitting you below in outline form my observation of residents attitude toward this subject;

On the basis of their opinion on the subject of lifting of the Exclusion order and eventual closing of the centers the residents of this center can be divided into following groups;

1. Majority of the residents feel that is not wise to go back to west coast in immediate future but wait and see because of the following reasons;

- A. Public sentiment on the west coast is not good.
- B. Housing condition is very difficult.
- C. Economic adjustment such as job opportunities will be very hard.
- D. No financial resource to start rather risky establishment of new life outside.
- E. Fear of possible repetition of Exclusion Order whenever war between American and Japan becomes critical stage.

Many of the residents express that they will not be forced out of the center when there are no houses to live outside, and no possible chance of making living due to high cost of living.

2. Small percentage of residents who own properties in California, and who have very close relationship with such as former domestic workers whose return to their original jobs are welcomed, are planning to leave the center and go back to California within few months.

3. Good number of residents in the center will look forward in finding opportunities in midwest and eastern states through contacting with their already resettled relatives and friends and plan to relocate before closing period of the center.

In my conservative judgement, 7 to 10% of the residents of this center will return to west coast in six months, of course, it will depend largely upon public sentiment there in west coast. If it will be unusually good which we can not expect then another 7 to 10% will go back. 25 to 30% of the residents will relocate in states other than west coast, within six months. By July or August of this year, about 40% of the people



would have left the center and about 60% will be remaining. To what extent of this remaining group will leave the center before December, 1945, is something which I can not predict at this time but certainly the following group or type of the people will be remaining until very last;

1. Old aged single men who need public assistance.
2. Old aged couple with young children.
3. Large families.
4. Those who have such attitude as "Government put us into this camp why should we leave the camp, see whether government can force us out".

One of the toughest problems will be the relocation of old age group for the reason that there are so many of this type of men, economically and socially they can not simply resettle in American communities, prior to evacuation they were most problem group of people even in Japanese colony, failure in handling this group of people will create social problem as well as international problem the detail of which I may discuss at some other time.

In giving above opinion it may sound rather dogmatic but I believe I expressed my frank opinion based upon my past knowledge and experience of our own people in the United States



MEMORANDUM

To: H. Rex Lee, Acting Chief, Relocation Division  
From: Hugo W. Wolter, Head, Center Liaison Section  
Subject: Report of Field Trip 2/16/45

I. All-Center Conference.

At each of the four projects visited, attention seemed to center on the forthcoming all-center conference to be held at Salt Lake. It is evident from all reports that the focusing of attention on this conference has and is retarding the relocation program. It has formed a so-called focal point for the anti-relocation groups. It has been said that through demands made at this conference, there will be increases in grants, there will be demands for the continuation of the center operations, there will be demands for reparation and other similar statements.

At Granada, the group had not crystalized during my visit. The letters concerning the conference had been directed to the Project Director who refused to transmit them to the chairman of the Council. When the correspondence had been rerouted, interest developed. There was some criticism in some of the other centers on the action of the Project Director.

At Topaz, the originator of the idea, the sentiment was definitely divided. A group that had been grouping with the administration felt that the all-center conference should be directed toward constructive measures. A negative group centering around segregation appears to have the idea that demands should be the focus of attention.

Manzanar town hall reported to Mr. Merritt that they were not interested in sending a representative.

The development at Gila may characterize some of the thinking in regard to the conference. In trying to decide upon representatives to send, the Canal group held an election in which 46 representatives were appointed. They were requested to nominate a group of people from whom one would then be elected to send to the conference. The majority of the people were not interested but since the general idea was sponsored by Mr. Ben Fukuzawa, the chairman of the Council, they carried out the recommendation. The anti-relocation group and the stay-in-camp group crystalized and took the lead. Mr. Fukuzawa was elected. A recommendation made by the block managers from each block indicated that from 70 to 90% of the residents contacted wanted to stay within the camp. Mr. Fukuzawa interpreted this that his attendance at the conference



meant that he would have to represent this group. (Ben Fukuzawa is a politician. He told the Project Director that of course he, himself, was interested in relocation and that he wanted to do what he could for it but since he had been elected to represent the people, he would have to take the view of the people who elected him to the conference.)

At a meeting of block representatives, approximately five from each block, I had the opportunity of explaining the entire resettlement program to them. Mr. Fukuzawa was chairman of the meeting. He refused to interpret since the talk did definitely take away much of the lack of knowledge responsible for the interest in the all-center conference. One of the clergy, a fairly good personal friend and one in favor of the relocation program, arose after part of my talk and asked the chairman, Mr. Fukuzawa, whether or not he was going to interpret. He said, "The things Mr. Wolter has told us is very important for every person. We want them said so that every person here can bring the message back." I had been forewarned to this situation and played my cards accordingly. Most of the group could understand English. Mr. Fukuzawa was forced by the public sentiment in the group and although he squirmed and wiggled and tried to avoid a too positive interpretation of the resettlement assistance program, he did carry it out. Since some of the people at the meeting were definitely of the anti-relocation group, I thought it opportune to mention the all-center conference and to point out how it might be constructive. I pointed out that the definite time for the closing of the centers was set and that no variation was possible. I pointed out that the demands for increased grants were not intelligent and that the resettlement assistance program would do much for them then could possible be done by straight financial aid. I then charged them with the responsibility to see to it that the all-center conference would carry on constructive suggestions rather than make impossible demands, and that we would welcome suggestions which would assist relocation. Mr. Fukuzawa was definitely on the spot. I then asked him directly to represent the majority of the people. I hoped to hedge him in in such a way that the political outlook would be directed by constructive groups.

This type of thing showed itself in each of the projects. The report from Poston inviting the representatives of the Spanish government to the conference, you have already had. Mr. Eberhart explained to them at Gila that this was purely an American situation and had nothing to do with the Japanese government. Other indications point to the fact that the segregation group would do everything in their power to control the representative sent to the conference in order to give them status and to gain recognition by demanding certain things of the United States government either to remain in the centers or to relocation under very advantageous circumstances.

It is my recommendation that we take the ground right from under any anti-relocation group, first, by recognizing the principle of equal opportunity which the raising of the exclusion order has again made



possible. I would particularly recommend the elimination of formality connected with daily passes except for detainees (such resentment is felt because the raising of the exclusion order has in the minds of the evacuees created further restrictions at the projects). I would further recommend the elimination of the Advance Approval idea for relocation anywhere. The frame of reference in regard to the relocation procedure now is similar to that following military registration where further restrictions are considered to have been made rather than opportunities offered.

The group that seems most interested in making demands is actually or closely correlated with the bachelor groups in the centers. They are fighting for a means of security for themselves. They are not satisfied with the plan of permanent welfare assistance. In order to take the force out of their arguments and to beat them to the draw, I would suggest the establishment of the idea of an old folks home for those older men who are not eligible for any old age assistance in their pre-evacuation state of residence. This home could be set up in the south, away from a relocation center and viewed merely as an extension of welfare services to those people who have no other resources and who have suffered because of the restrictive action of the government. This home should be operated by some other governmental agency although its immediate development would take away the support of this old age group and eliminate the criticism of the closing of the centers.

(I spoke of this matter to Mr. Lewis and to Mr. Arne. There is an area about sixty miles north of New Orleans about 170 acres containing 24 buildings capable of housing about 600 to 700 people. It is called Convent, Louisiana. It was formerly a large Catholic institution but has since been abandoned. It was used as a NYA training center. It is now immediately available either by sale or lease. I would recommend that this place be leased and that a group of the older men who are still capable of some work but not sufficient of self support be sent there to do the necessary reclamation. I would then suggest that a Buddhist priest be attached to the group in order to provide religious leadership which we have not considered for the older people. The presence of this priest in this area would serve also as a psychological factor in developing further relocation in the south. The old group might be able to a few hours of labor on the farms of the nearby area when those are established. It would appear to me to be a slight expenditure of funds to do this immediately and to focus the religious thinking outside of a relocation center. This program would correlate with the development of agriculture in the south.)



The second group representative of Gila will probably be Mr. Harold Asami. Mr. Asami is an outstanding American with an excellent flow of language in both English and Japanese. He is not afraid to be positive. If preparations are needed for leadership in discussion, I would recommend Mr. Asami as a strong person to work with the Director in constructive influence at the all-center conference.

## II. Relocation Outlook

A person might be discouraged or enthused about the relocation outlook depending upon the people contacted. I personally do not see the aggressiveness and dynamic leadership at all of the centers and feel that much leadership should have to be furnished by the Center Liaison Section. The organization in each of the centers is beginning to shape up after the visits of last fall, but there is still much doubt as to how to proceed in the idea that it is our responsibility to move every family on a voluntary basis before the end of the year has not soaked in. The main question that I was asked in every center both by the staff and by the people was, "Are the centers really going to close?" The people seemed to grasp it more thoroughly. The staff gave intellectual acquiescence but did not transmit that into action. Procastination seemed to rule.

The situation at Granada is good with considerable disorganized organization. There still must be developed a great deal of coordination among all parts of the project, administration and the people in order to gain the greatest and speediest results. Both the staff and the people in general are considering relocation but their horses are not hitched to the same wagon. During the course of my visits, I believed we pulled together many of the loose ends. Additional visits will be necessary in the near future. Leadership is not strong nor does it have vision. An excellent plan of action has been worked out independently by the relocation and welfare sections and will need the cooperation of the community. This plan involves a detailed chart on the wall, of every family in the center and marking it with colored pins according to the progress of their relocation plan. If this were combined with the work of the Relocation Planning Commission and definite assignments be made, I believe that Granada would step forward. As I see it, the problem is largely one of aggressive human understanding.



Topaz. A positive direction of work at Topaz is evident. The people themselves are beginning to get relocation information which they should have had a year ago. Discussion is going on and the gradual process of informing and reading is developing. In general, the spirit is good. The relocation staff in spite of the leadership of Miss Dickinson is weak. There is a large amount of stability but very little dynamic force. This may be due to the fact that there is no Assistant Program Officer, and no relocation adviser. I have made arrangements to secure Mr. Mario Vecchio from Granada to go there. I have left the responsibility in the hands of Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Lindley to carry through this suggestion. I believe Mr. Vecchio would add the spark which would help the program. Additional staff is definitely needed although Miss Dickinson was fully aware of the job which lies ahead. By that, I mean that she has an intelligent understanding of it but had not gone ahead in making definite plans in covering every family in a constructive way. She is agreeable to all suggestions and I am sure will go ahead as soon as additional help is secured. The Community Management Division with the exception of welfare has not been helpful. Mr. Sanford is weak, has no particular interest in relocation but evidently seems more interested in shooting deer and trapping coyotes. The responsibility for meeting with the community falls largely upon the Project Director himself and upon Miss Dickinson. Mr. Hoffman is going to need considerable assistance from our office in correlating the entire program and furnishing him with the aggressive help necessary to put it over.

Manzanar. My first impressions of Manzanar are definitely negative. I spent about an hour with the Project Director and learned all of the reasons why the program did not work with no suggestions as to how it might be done. The psychology is definitely on the side of continuing the centers. The criticism for not having a completely free program set up with the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Army before the closing of the centers was announced. I left Mr. Derrickson there in order to get a detailed report of the entire situation and therefore hesitate to state further details now. I missed entirely the constructive thinking of the people and felt that there was something holding them back from an early consideration of the problems of their own future. There seemed to be a feeling in the air that the great white father of the WRA could not and would not let them down. Mr. Derrickson was to bring them the details of the relocation assistance program and to try to swing some of this negative thinking.



Gila. In writing this report about Gila, I shall try to be as objective as possible although much of my personal work is involved in the progress of the program. It should be remembered that the Relocation Planning Commission was organized as early as May of 1943, and that the process of drawing out the disorganized and better groups had gone on through Community Government for almost two years. The composition of the Relocation Planning Commission alone is a guarantee of the effectiveness of the early cooperative work. I hope that the praise I will have to give Gila will not be interpreted as self emulation but the contrast is so outstanding that I cannot help but enlarge on it. In general, the staff and the people are relocation minded. There are no specific points of differences. All constructive suggestions have been made by the people through the Relocation Planning Commission through the Community Council or through the Executive Board and through the block managers. For example, in discussing the welfare cases and the difficulty which we expect in trying to meet the needs of the welfare cases, the block managers themselves willingly grouped in securing the family summaries from five families in each block. This was their suggestion. The block managers themselves have recommended to the Executive Board that they be given additional help on their regular work so that either they or someone else might act as a relocation information expert and family adviser in each block. They stated that the people were interested in doing a good day's work but that if they did it, they couldn't sit down and talk relocation because the offices were then closed. Even the Mess Supervisors and Farm Supervisors met to discuss relocation plans.

In a three hour meeting with the Planning Commission, not one negative word was said. The entire time was given over to the discussion of methods of completing the task. This was such a contrast to other meetings that I was flabbergasted. They felt that the resettlement assistance program was so important that at least fifteen people from every block should have the first-hand information. The group, block Managers, Council, Planning Commission, called the meeting in a high school assembly. This meeting was attended by more than 700 people and lasted from 7:30 pm to 11:30 pm. Interpretation was carried on by two members of the group. Only one heckling question was raised and that was, "Which is more important in the eyes of WRA, resettlement or closing of the centers?" Another indication of the spirit of relocation was evidenced by the continual, constant flow of requests to meet with groups from 8:00 in the morning until midnight. Individuals, groups of families took other time. There was free discussions publicly and privately. A general plan of organization finally evolved from all the conferences and meetings was recommended by the Project Director.

First, that he accede to the request of the Relocation Planning Commission for a relocation person in every block, that the Relocation Program Officer be instructed to train these people to their jobs.



Secondly, that the advising staff together with Welfare and Relocation be assigned to work certain hours in definite spots within the camp to take up problems which the advisers bring to them. Thirdly, that every family of the entire camp be chartered according to its progress similar to the Granada plan. The fourth, that all people on the staff be drawn into the relocation advising program. Fifth, that they establish immediately an extension of their central files to include all the files of the projects concerning individuals.

An outstanding bit of cooperation is being carried on between welfare and relocation. The operation is practically that of one division. There are many conferences, there is a free exchange of ideas and remarkable cooperation. There is no particular difficulty with any staff member although there should be greater coordination in the supplying of information by other sections. The evacuee property staff was understaffed until Mr. Reynolds was assigned to it. Legal matters outside of relocation are taking up the attention of the Project Attorney. The one difficult spot in the relocation program is the difficulty of securing daily passes in leaving the center. This procedure is as same as it has been. The reasoning behind it, based on transportation has not been explained to the people. I feel that at Gila, the restrictive action could easily be removed and relocation would continue to increase. The all-center conference retarded things for perhaps three weeks. Following my appearance there, an explanation of the resettlement assistance program was given. There was an immediate pick up in terminal leave. I would say that Gila could be closed by September 1 if the recommendations concerning the old age homes for the bachelors could be followed.

In general, the outlook is very good. I am very much encouraged that the thought of the people has shifted and they are now seeing relocation as something of benefit to them. Where this thought does not exist, the Center Liaison Section still has a big task to do. As long as there are segregates in the camps and as long as there are possible focal points, we will have to wrestle with this problem instead of devoting our time to development of methods within the centers. It is almost necessary for someone of the Washington staff who has the over-all picture to be present 50% of the time. The staff within the centers has a definitely restricted viewpoint and unfortunately reluctantly face their own relocation. They themselves do not know what the outside world is like. They do not see the coordination required and the visionary thinking that goes into the total relocation. The Center Liaison staff will have to work with Project Directors, Asst. Project Directors and other top staff members to continually show the opportunities of the outside to them and to the leaders of the people. We would have to furnish the spark while they are still concerned with the internal operations.



### III. Excluees and Parolees.

Technically, we can forget about the presence of segregates within the center until the Department of Justice takes action. Actually, their presence in the center retards relocation in reverse proportion to the degree of cooperation which exists between the staff and the people on the general relocation problems. Excluees and parolees are a repetition of the problems which military registration brought about in 1943. It is again a question of status. Psychologically, that group may swing for or against relocation depending upon the care with which it is handled at the centers. Since the parolee group which was previously the outstanding group of Japanese merchants, produce men and community leaders delays in granting them release status creates an active negative group which exerts influence on people who still look to them for leadership. The less said about the excluder program the better. The inequalities and capriciousness are known better to the people in the centers than to us. Outstanding negative minds have been freed and outstanding cooperative minds have been excluded. Appeals are being made but the time for hearings has not arrived at the centers. It is only because of the calm sense that there hasn't been more difficulty about this situation.

It bears a great relationship to the all-center conference. It has swung public sentiment among some toward the Japanese government, not on a political basis but just as something definite. The question in regard to excluded areas is also very important. The military police at Gila have received orders not to release excluders whose destination was in the eastern or southern defense command. One gentleman had relocated to the excluded area and returned to the center to relocate his family. The military police would not permit him to leave the center. Since he was an actual illegal visitor, as far as the project was concerned, great anxiety was felt concerning methods of solving his problem. I did not meet the situation in any other center. Evidently orders had not gone to the military police in line with Post-Exclusion Bulletin No. 4.

### IV. Cooperation with other sections

Although Mrs. Lane and I had planned to have member of our staff team up in visiting the centers, it was impossible for our section to meet the schedule. We did meet with Miss McCord at Topaz and Mr. Derrickson met with her at Manzanar. Previously we had discussed with both of our staffs the general plan for cooperation. At no center that I visited was there any difficulty. The Joint Case Review Committees were working quite well and with the exception of Topaz, material was being sent out promptly. At Topaz I ran into the difficulty of having



the Assistant Project Director, Community Management, wanting to review all welfare cases that were passed on to relocation. This resulted in a about a week's delay.

The Evacuee Property sections were cooperating very well. Some were further advanced and were handling more problems than others. Some had been taken into the confidence of the residents and were really being overworked in trying to take care of the many demands made upon them. At Granada a possible bottleneck may result because of the painstaking care of the Evacuee Property Officer. Topaz was conservative; Gila, enthusiastic.

The Legal Divisions at all projects were very cooperative. The interesting solution for the problem of securing liability insurance was offered at Gila by the Evacuee Property Officer. A company at Denver, Pioneer Mutual Comprehensive Company, J. B. Henry, Manager, although small is reinsured 80 per cent with Lloyds. He also suggested that the Power of Attorney might be given to a Caucasian to handle the insurance on evacuee property. In this way, the Caucasian would be empowered to appear in court for any suits and to handle all insurance matters.

The Reports Officers are cooperating very well in the program. Through the papers, information is being offered to the people. Topaz was devoting almost the entire space to relocation information. With this cooperation, it would seem unnecessary to develop any further project information bulletins.

Community Activities Supervisors responded very well to the suggestion of incorporating travelogues, historical films and similar relocation aids as shorts in the regular movie program.

Statistical Sections were very willing to develop the central file on individuals and requested that an Administrative Notice be sent out to cover this. I understand this was done during my absence.

At no other projects except Gila did Mess Supervisors and Farm Supervisors meet to discuss with me their relocation plans on a constructive bases. These are usually considered to be the most anti groups.

In general the staffs cooperated very well with the relocation program although they themselves did not know what they might do to be of the most value. They lacked information on the total program. More concise and simply written information on the Post-Exclusion program is indicated.



## V. Community Cooperation

In general, the cooperation of the people has been excellent. I indicated previously that there were certain resistance groups. Resistance was developed gradually around lack of information concerning the handling of categorical and dependency cases and fear of the outside. The teletype on the handling of the Doi case was very effective in dispelling some of the fear. Personal reports by people who had gone to California were very effective. The report of Mr. Myer's reaction to coast attitudes was also effective. An explanation of the resettlement assistance program melted much of the resistance which some had felt. At Granada, I was more or less put on the spot by the Community Council which had gathered questions from all the blocks to be presented to Washington as a protest. A copy of the list given me is attached. The final list as developed in the meeting contained 19 \$64 questions. The only one to which I could not give an answer was the following. "What will happen to the land now operated by an Issei for his son serving in the Army if there are no other children and if the son is killed in action?"

The group at Granada seemed to feel that the Washington staff had not considered the human side of their problems and were convinced that the questions submitted could not be answered by the project and probably could not be answered by Washington. An explanation of the resettlement assistance program, the agreements reached by the various cooperating governmental agencies and the methods of procedure satisfied them although they requested that the answers I gave them be later submitted in writing. Since I had no secretarial help to take down the questions and they did. I asked that I might be kept informed of further problems.

The question of farm loans by the Farm Security agency was faced squarely. Mr. Floyd Higby happened to be at the project at that time and stated that there was a tremendous backlog of applications totaling nearly \$6,500,000. He recommended to me at the project that a similar arrangement with the Farm Security be made as had been made by the Social Security Board, that a farm resettlement program be developed similar to the resettlement assistance program. Undoubtedly in the meeting of the Council, there were people present who had a final rationalization for not closing the centers in appeal to the penal code of Japan. When such an attitude was indicated, I read the code and gave a straight forward statement of our American attitude. A general feeling of surprise swept over some of the faces and no question was thereafter raised.



## VI. Summary

It is my opinion that relocation is preceeding very well at Granada. If welfare summaries could be developed and handled. I have no doubt that the center can be one of the first to be liquidated.

Topaz is conderably behind time in its general development. Much ground work has to be done before relocation will be speeded up to a point where voluntary center closure willbe indicated. The relocation staff needs strengthening although the program officer is a very capable, self-assured person. She has not reached groups to which a man in the organization might appeal.

Manzanar is a big question mark in my mind. The thinking is not correct and is not progressive. At present I am not hopeful of any favorable results that we might be able to predict.

At Gila the general situation is excellent, especially in the Butte camp. The staff is working excellently with the people and the Relocation Commission is taking the lead and subtly directing the relocation program and policy. One stumbling block is the very conserved attitude toward daily passes and visits to Phoenix. The general run of the staff but has not become evident with the Director as yet. Because the lead is being taken by the people and since they understand his attitude, there are not detrimental effects present. If all things proceed as indicated, Gila will be able to close its gate on a voluntary basis before any of the other camps.

## VII. Group Relocation

After a meeting with Mr. Jesse Lewis, at Granada, and discussing detailed plans of moving into the southern area, I made it a point to be an ambassador of the South at the other centers. A tremendous interest was shown by groups at Manzanar, Topaz and more particularly Gila. The group at Granada have agreed to go down to the Crystal Spring area at Mississippi. I am not too hopeful of this group because the leader, a Mr. Sugita is merely awaiting the time to return to his holdings in California. After hours of discussion and explanation of the resettlement assistance program, we learned that he was actually a wealthy man and had approximately \$150,000 in case available. He also owns forty acres of land and was leasing 400 additional in California. A group at Gila including the son of the lettuce king, Minami, and the Aratani group is very much interested in securing big holdings in the South. They are making special arrangements with Mr. Lewis to come down and secure either by rental or purchase an area approximating 10,000 acres. They are picking best farmers of Gila and will offer them the proposition of going with them into the south. They are interested mainly of managing their farm. They do not lack in capital or ability. I discussed this



group with Dr. Koh Murai at New Orleans in whom they have great confidence. He, in turn, expressed a confidence in them, and will make his research knowledge of the South available to them. Manzanar was interested in the West Feliciana Parish but the thought of moving to the South seemed new to them and they were not ready to move immediately. It is very possible that a group can be developed in six weeks if constructive attitude is maintained at the center.

/s/ Hugo W. Wolter  
Head, Center Liaison Section

2/15/45



H. Rex Lee, Acting Chief, Relo. Div.

2/15/45

H. W. Wolter, Center Liaison Section

Request for Reclassification

Since the Center Liaison Section is actually operating as representatives of the WRA Director in its contact with the project, we respectfully request a consideration of the classification of the Head of the Section and Mr. Dolins who is also eligible for promotion.

The following outlines the contacts made during the course of my field trip in justification of this request. (In approximate hours)

Center Length of Visit	Granada 3 days	Topaz 3 days	Manzanar 1 day	Gila 4½ days
	plus mtg.			
Project Director	3 hrs.	8 hrs.	1½ hrs.	4 hrs.
Asst. Proj. Dir. (Com. Mgn.)	0	2½	1	6
" " " (Operation)	1½	2	1½	-
" " " (Adm. Mgn.)	2	1½	-	in staff mtg.
Reports Officer	1	2½	-	3
Project Atty.	1½	3	-	5
Property (Evac)	1	2½	-	4
Analyst	2	2	-	6
Com. Activities	1	1	1½	2
Staff Relo. Com.	(none)	2½	(none)	4
Coordinating Com.	3	(none)	(none)	4
Relocation Planning Com.	4	(none)	(none)	4 plus
Community Council	3	--	(none)	1
Block Managers	1	--	--	1½
Relocation Staff	6	8	5	5
Welfare Staff	4	5	--	5
Block & Com. Meetings	(none)	(none)	(none)	9
High School Assembly	--	--	--	1

Individual conferences to make an average 14 to 16 hr. day exclusive of social business engagements. In addition to the above contacts--War Manpower Commission representatives, War Food Adm. representatives, Farm Security, Immigration, F.B.I., Army, Naval Intelligence, Spanish Government representative, State Dept., Civil Service, etc. Because I represented Washington, I was called upon to explain many procedures, agreements, etc. The Project Directors were not acquainted with all material or background and questions would be shunted to me.

In community contacts at centers it is possible for a Washington representative to do and say things which the Project Director cannot, either because of his relationship or lack of information on the



particular subject. e.g., the Japanese Penal Code, Resettlement Assistance Program, Welfare assistance, cooperation with other Federal Agencies, resistance care groups, field offices, etc. It is especially difficult to overcome rationalizations based on fears of retribution and pro-Japanese cultural and political sentiments.

In addition there are places for group relocation developing which require a knowledge of field organization and community organization in cities. We will have to work with such groups, front for them until and field offices can handle the situation. Fear of the outside is still a very potent anti-relocation factor.

The organization of this Section which I think can assure coverage is:

- 1 Asst. Chief--Relocation Division, CAF-14
- 1 Head, Center Liaison Section, CAF-13
- 3 Relocation Officers, CAF-12
- 1 Relocation Officer, CAF-9

We can then team up with Welfare on almost a person to person basis and meet all contingencies. This is impossible at present. No amount of interest and enthusiasm can last under the terrific pressure of 14 to 16 hour days at centers, night travel, and another seige of center work immediately.

With such an organization I visualize the following development at the centers.

Project Director (Center Liaison R. R. as special  
adviser.)  
Relocation Division  
Project Attorney  
Reports Officer

Asst. Dir. (Com. Mgn)

Welfare Section  
Education Section  
Health Section  
Community Act. Section  
Community Act. Coop.  
Cooperative Enterprises  
Community Analyst's Section  
Community Government

Asst. Proj. Dir. (Operations)

Transportation  
Crating and Boxing (Proj. Main. Crew)  
Farm  
Block Managers



Asst. Proj. Dir. (Adm. Mgn.)

Evacuee Property

Accounting

Statistics (Central Files)

Property (cost etc.)

Coordinating Committee

All staff members will have a part in relocation according to their abilities. Each block will be outlined and each barrack occupant listed.

<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>12</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>13</u>	<u>2</u>
	<u>1</u>
	<u>Rec Hal 1</u>
BLOCK 72	

TANAKA			
Seichi	46		
Sumie	38		
Sadase	18		
Mary	16		
Tosh	14		
W-Bryce			



Each apartment will be coded. W=Welfare, Bryce is counselor. Cross indicates interview, yellow would indicate relocation plan—red, relocated; black, no plan, etc. Each block would also have an evacuee relocation advisor—preferably Issei, trained by the R.P.O. who would have all information. He would take relocation opportunities to the family. He would be supervised and assisted by an appointed assistant relocation adviser. "If the mountain does not come to Mohammed, we must take Mohammed to the mountain."

This plan working with the analyst and other staff will make it possible to cover the entire camp individually. Gila is ready for this. In the others, a strong relocation group must still be organized. Since it has not been done, more aggressive outside leadership is required. This must come from the Center Liaison Section. Your consideration is respectfully requested.



9

March 7, 1945

Dear Mr. "Socrates":

Most gratefully I acknowledge the receipt of a volume of profound treatise, "The Challenger". The story of the hero, Ben Kuroki is not only very interesting but also it is extremely timely one. Without doubt, the venture of this nature would do an unestimable good in the field of public relation.

How are Mrs. Wolter and Baby? I hope they are all very well.

Your recent trip has caused a tremendous effect upon general mood of evacuees about the problem of the closure of center. Until that time since the announcement of lifting exclusion orders, many evacuees actually confided that if they sit tightly in the camp, the govt. may unable to relocate them; that they would be in the position where they want indefinitely. But your blunt statement with sympathetic understanding almost eradicated above feeling. They are now convinced that the camp will be closed within the year; and therefore they should make definite plans for relocation before too late. I am tickled pink to see tremendous result of your trip.

Your speeches were like warm spring rain that has awakened nature from a long wintry hibernation to bloom. General sentiment in Gila (in regard to relocation) is beginning to bloom now. And rich harvest is rest assured in coming months.

Mr. Myer, your boss, paid three days visit with us last week. He came here last Saturday and left Monday. He made many convincing speeches. His approach, sincerity, amiability and general attitude left a great impression of him among us. In addition to your trip, Mr. Myer's visit may accelerate the movement without doubt.

I am still being lost in the air so far as Washington proposition is concerned. I will wait remaining few days of this week. But should I don't hear at all in that limited time, I will forget Washington for good and start planning my own relocation.

Please give my best regards to Mrs. Wolter. I will ever be praying for your health and for success of a mission (not work) in which you are being engaged.

Yours truly,

/s/ John Fukushima



# TRAINING SESSIONS FOR RELOCATION CONSULTANTS

March 30 - - - April 3

1945

**Purpose:** To more thoroughly prepare the relocation consultants to speak to project personnel on all matters pertaining to relocation; to prevent variations in interpretation of policies and procedures; to combine efforts in completing the relocation job.

**Who to attend:** Center Liaison Section and all others who make regular center visits at the discretion of their supervisor.

**Outline of Sessions -- General Chairman -- Hugo W. Wolter**

**Friday, March 30**

**A.M.**

Basic Policies	9:00 Relocation Outlook - Peterson
and	9:30 Policies and Field - Choate
Considerations	10:00 Other government agencies - Marks
and	10:30 Detainees, Excludes, Hawaii & Alaska - Stauber
Organization	10:30 - 12:00 Discussion

**P.M.**

Information	1:30 Salt Lake Conference questions - Tozier
and	Final Reports - New center information setup
Reports	(Discussion)

**Saturday, March 31**

**A.M.**

	9:30 Physical Property - Utz
	10:30 Community Management Div. - Provinse
	Schools, activities, etc.
Liquidation	11:00 Personnel - Brooks - Monday
	11:30 (Discussion)

**P.M.**

Special Reloc.	1:30 Property - Pitts (Castleberry)
Problems	2:00 Legal - Ferguson
---	(Discussion)
Relocation	2:30 Health--Pressman
Assistance	3:15 Relocation Assistance Program - Marks, Lane

**Monday, April 2**

**A.M.**

Approaches	9:00 Meeting the Psychological Situation - Spicer
To	10:30 Evacuee Organization and Participation - Kimball
Evacuees	11:15 Group Discussions - Stephens
	11:30 (Discussion)

**P.M.**

Center	1:00 Planning to "Reach Every Family" - Dolins
Relocation	Physical Organization (space-staff)
Division	Relationship to Welfare Section and others
Organization &	Relocation Libraries - Moore
Procedures	Relocation Summaries and Form WRA-341 (Monthly Center Report)
	3:00 Personnel - Brooks



Monday, April 2 (con't)  
P.M.

Central Family and Individual Files  
Job Analysis & Efficiency  
(Discussion)

Tuesday, April 3  
A.M.

Loose Ends

9:30 Student Relocation - Miss Paul  
10:00 Activity Leadership Courses - Mr. Stalley

(Organization for Americanism to combat the anti  
Panel (and disorganization which accompanies relocation -  
(Kimball, Viles, Young, Barnhart.

P.M.

Continued discussion and outline of plan for action at  
each center

Wednesday, April 4

Send-off - Mr. Myer



11

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL FACTORS TO  
BE CONSIDERED IN RESETTLEMENT

The remaining task of the War Relocation Authority is largely psychological. We have seen from the analysts' reports, other center reports, and particularly from the report of the All-Center Conference that method and technique is not important. We have seen that there are many psychological and emotional blocks to relocation which make methods and techniques fade into insignificance.

The first psychological and emotional block is that of personal security. It shows itself in as many forms as individuals. Each person expresses himself in terms of what appears to be at the moment important to him. It may be "no security of life or limb", "housing", or difficulties of one kind or another. It is significant to note that the factors change within the person himself thus showing that they are not basic but are symptoms of the same emotional problem.

We have had frequent references to "changing policies", and that too has become an expression of personal insecurity. The cause is always external from the individual's point of view. He can then adjust himself and justify himself and his actions by a series of rationalizations.

- "If we were guaranteed protection."
- "If we had a definite loan."
- "If we could be assured of acceptance."
- "If we had definite housing."
- "If we had protection for our children."
- "If we had insurance."
- "If we could establish our business."

In reality we see from the above that the individual is the real cause and the adjustment is projected to the "outside".

What then makes up the individual and what can we do about it?

Personal security is made up of (1) a feeling of importance, (2) a feeling that his own life is worthwhile. The greatest crime in the entire story of evacuation is this degrading of the individual. Every step up until the present has largely been directed at a mass of people and not the individual. When a person loses his identity as a person and becomes a number, he no longer respects himself. Numbers are cold. The general stigma attached to alliance with pro-Japanese elements has lowered the self-esteem of the pro-American and American group. We might elaborate on all the negative factors from now ad infinitum, but let us place more emphasis on the future.

What can we do?

1. Eliminate every vestige of distrusting people. Distrust engenders distrust. We ought to act as though we believed the people were free and not add more red-tape.



2. Take the people into our confidence and have them share in the responsibility. Believe that each will and can help--and then trust him to help.
3. Personalize our efforts--go to see the individual as a friend with full respect for his opinions. Build confidence first.
4. Permit friends to visit at will. The event of having guests from the outside enhances the ego. Any check should be routine. Note: Visiting charges could be made routine for two weeks giving the host the chance to pay in advance as well as the guest. One week advance notice might be required.
5. Urge people to use daily passes with full understanding of problems. Again, trust them. Don't be a paternal protection unless you are prepared to do that all of their lives. Paternalism is the worst form of robbing people of their initiative and self-esteem. It breaks down personal security.
6. Develop a background of knowledge on every point of interest including controversial topics. Opinions exist whether we like it or not. The basis for opinion is the only way to change to right from wrong.
7. Urge the continuation and development of a religious philosophy. When all human life is in such flux, the ability to develop and grasp something permanent in the form of "diety" is very wholesome. Buddhist religious advisers should go with the Buddhist people--in fact should precede them. To the great mass of all people the assurance of divine protection in life and heaven or nirvana after death is a very potent factor in facing life. It is significant to remember that our country was build first on religion (personal security) and then on economics. People will sacrifice endlessly for "their church". They will endure hardships, deprivations, war and death in order to maintain their faith. The centers have epitomized the Buddhist faith. We must make it possible to secure a "faith center" in the normal communities.

Note: Suggestions 1 and 2 are inherent in the development of community councils and so-called "evacuee participation".

Suggestion 3 is inherent in the counseling and interviewing program--when properly done.

Suggestion 6 is covered in the adult and vocation committees discussion memoranda.

Suggestions 4 and 5 require slight adjustments in policy.

Suggestion 7 requires an adjustment in field technique.



A second insecurity expressed by the various reports, although definitely secondary, is economic security. From a purely psychological point of view, there is benefit in the following suggestions:

1. Moving household goods from door to door. The inability to face the transaction of business which might bring refusal is very great for many of the people. They just feel that they can't do it emotionally. The financial part is the rationalization which people can usually understand. If the financial part is explained, the next answer is--"well, why should I pay?"
2. Investigation trips. I would suggest that we offer to pay subsistence at regular government rates if the relocation of three families takes place--that is, offer reimbursement. Psychological reasoning; eliminate the psychological block toward investigating and create a group which has a part and interest in urging resettlement. The best salesmen would be benefited and people would look upon resettlement as their job.
3. Establish old people's home--the mere fact of establishing one will overcome much of the psychological blocking. (cp. the plans to establish a Detention Home at Gila did much to prove to youth that the parents meant business.) This should be actually established with all entrance requirements etc.--again to overcome fear more than anything else.
4. Employment of people of Japanese ancestry--again an excellent psychological move. "He is one of us." The request for this shows the basic insecurity and feeling of inferiority. The Caucasian government worker is not of the same caste and therefore "doesn't understand us".
5. Readmissions into the centers--I would suggest that a committee of residents act on requests for readmission.
  - (a) Will offer opportunity to show how problems can be met.
  - (b) How facilities are being overcrowded.
  - (c) Interpret American way of handling problems.

H. W. Wolter

April 1, 1945



12

Dear Mr.

First: Evacuee participation in relocation planning is an absolute essential. Everything possible must be done to develop and maintain their participation. I refer you to WRA Handbook 130.26.1 for details of how some of you have done this. If evacuee participation has not been developed to the fullest extent responsibility for this should be assigned to the most capable person on the staff irrespective of other assignments.

Second: Each and every staff member has a definite contribution to make in relocation planning for all families and individuals. Those divisions, sections and units most actively involved should be coordinated in a staff committee as outlined in 130.26.6. The membership will depend upon the personalities and capabilities of the various people. The staff committee should meet regularly so that all the ramifications can be considered. Such a committee can develop good planning and coordination which will eliminate headaches later.

Third: Shortly after December 17, I recommended that you appoint a coordinator of information on the Post-Exclusion program. That position and the committee are no longer necessary because the Reports Officer is now responsible for relocation information and the committee can merge with the Relocation Executive Board.

It is essential, however, that the function of all units involving relocation now be coordinated. I recommend that this coordinating function be handled by you or by one of your assistant directors who will have full responsibility and authority to direct the relocation functions of all divisions. He should be known as the Relocation Coordinator. His appointment should be officially made by you so that the entire center staff is aware of his relationship to you and his responsibility in connection with the total resettlement program. The Relocation Coordinator should be the Chairman of the Staff Committee and of the Executive Board; the Relocation Program Officer should be the Executive Officer.

In considering the job to be done at \_\_\_\_\_ and thinking in terms of the best possible utilization of available staff, I recommend that, in case you do not wish to assume this responsibility that you consider \_\_\_\_\_ as Relocation Coordinator. Under this arrangement I can see the total resettlement job headed up in one person whose responsibility will be to develop and maintain smoothly functioning relationships between the units concerned. The merit in this type of staff organization will, I believe, be directly reflected in a closely coordinated program.

Fourth: The overall program from now on out represents a joint effort in which the total appointive staff and all the evacuees



work toward a common objective--resettlement. The Executive Board as outlined in 130.26.6B can accomplish this. We originally recommended that the Project Director be the chairman. This may now be delegated to your Relocation Coordinator in order to free you for the overall project operations. I am sure that you will recognize the importance of continued participation on the part of the staff and the evacuees and of the functions performed by the Coordinating Committee being incorporated in the Executive Board.

Fifth: We cannot wait for people to come to us, we must go to them on a definitely organized plan. We must explain and make available relocation service to every family as quickly as possible. I understand that at the Welfare unit has already taken a step in this direction by assigning caseloads on a district or geographical basis. I think that such a working plan is highly advisable. I am urging all the centers to work out a district plan for both Relocation and Welfare Units at the earliest possible date. Such a plan will mean that the Welfare Counselors and Relocation Advisors will be assigned in teams to a specific district. In carrying out this plan Welfare will continue to have primary responsibility for those cases presenting particular dependency or welfare problems. This will eliminate duplication of effort on the part of both units. When all preliminary plans on dependency cases have been completed the services of the total Welfare staff will be utilized in connection with the overall resettlement program.

Sixth: A central file is essential to successful planning for resettlement of families and individuals. In my opinion there is no need for the large number of duplicate copies and for checking in six to twelve places for pertinent information for a family. All records belong to WRA and not to divisions, sections, units or individuals. The procedure is outlined in 120.8. You or your Relocation Coordinator should see that this is followed immediately.

Seventh: Information has not been reaching the people in all projects. I have recommended a procedure on which the Reports Officer has primary responsibility for this as outlined in Manual Release No. 179. He should work under your Relocation Coordinator in this matter.

Eighth: Staff training for all interviewers should be continuous. Every pamphlet and every new situation, approach, or answer should be a subject for discussion. People do not always read and fully understand the written work--it should be the basis for discussion. Since so many new contacts with other agencies are being made and so much information is being disseminated, you should use the Center Liaison staff and other consultants from Washington to help in this aspect of training.



Ninth: Some of the centers have tried to develop discussion groups. This plan has resulted in varying degrees of success. Discussion should eliminate confusion and misunderstanding and that end will be accomplished if all staff members as well as evacuee leaders have correct information in order to keep the discussion in line with truth and reality. These discussions need not be formalized. This operates whenever two or more people get together whether it be over a cup of coffee, a bridge table, in the mess halls or any other social or official gathering.

Tenth: Relocation summaries must be completed according to the outline in 130.27.4. For children it is essential that membership in national organizations be included.

Eleventh: Continuing efforts should be made to promote the American ideals. We must be continually positive in our interpretation lest there be a crystallization of anti-relocation by those who do not understand the purpose of relocation. I would suggest that the six points made in my speeches be referred to constantly.



Excerpt from Field Report of H. S. Choate 5/25/45

"(1) for instance, the revamping of the Relocation Libraries as live, adequately placed and staffed affairs is now effectively under way in the centers through the work of a national office staff member under Mr. Wolter's direction in the Center Liaison Section. I found that this immediately improved the possibilities for our written material, and if properly nurtured from the area level we can have the continuous service of an informed and enthusiastic interpreter in the person of these newly sponsored librarians.

"(2) attitudes of members of the appointed staff are changing in the centers which I visited. Typical of what this can mean to relocation if thoroughly integrated at our area level is a circumstance regarding the Welfare Section. Again, it was the immediate result of effective work by a member of Mr. Wolter's staff in the Center Liaison Section, and the Relocation Program Officer, whereby geographical divisions of the center were made to coincide in Relocation and Welfare. Immediately old barriers seemed to dissolve. Each geographical division of the center was the common problem of one Welfare Counselor and one Relocation Adviser. Together these paired staff members began referring potential candidates to me. I was thereupon able to fraternize with Welfare personnel without thereby being automatically so thoroughly discounted in Relocation. The potential capacity of both sections began to be felt. This is highly important as the residue of the evacuees will increasingly involve Welfare issues.



Hugo W. Wolter, Head, Center Liaison Section

4/12/45

Russell C. Derricksen, Center Liaison Section

SUBJECT: Report on Field trip to Gila - 3/7/45 to 3/12/45

At Gila I was given a rather indifferent welcome by Mr. Bennett, Project Director, but good cooperation on the part of all other staff members.

When I arrived, some much needed construction was under way in order to improve the physical setup within the relocation office, which, unfortunately, had to be stopped when word was received disapproving the work. However, I understand it was later approved and the work completed, which should improve the physical setup considerably.

Mr. Huso, the Relocation Program Officer was preparing to leave for a trip to the West Coast but did, however, give me ample time to discuss with him his program at Gila. He was very much opposed to any plan for districting the center on a geographic basis and assigning specific districts to Assistant Relocation Advisers in order to reach every family on the project and develop all the factors necessary to develop interest in relocation on a block or district basis. He felt that he could not deal directly with evacuees and told me that their experience on the project had proven that you get further and accomplish more by using the indirect method. With this I disagreed and asked him to think more about the plan. I also talked briefly with other members of the relocation staff and asked them to give the idea some thought. Perhaps by the time I visit Gila again they may be able to consider the advantages of such a plan.

Mr. Lee Marsa, Relocation Officer in the Detroit Area was on the center attempting to develop interest in Michigan farm opportunities. He was working hard but did not seem to be getting very good results. Interest in Louisiana which had been developed by Mr. Wolter was almost dead. Mr. Huso explained that the group at Gila had been primarily interested in the Ford Plantation and that when they had failed to receive further information concerning it they had lost interest. He also stated that when the group at Gila heard that Koh Muari was participating in the Louisiana deal they had completely lost interest because they did not have any respect or confidence in Mr. Mursi.

Plans for a series of meetings on relocation to be carried out in the Adult Education program had just been completed with the cooperation



of Dr. Young of the Education. It seems like a worthy project to attempt and although no one would make any predictions as to whether it would be successful, it was well planned and advertised.

The relationship between the Welfare Section and the Relocation Division is very good at Gila. Miss Swiggum, head counselor, is a competent and cooperative person and it seems to me deserves most of the credit for cooperation between the two sections continuing at a higher level. Miss Francis Steele, Welfare Consultant, was visiting Gila at the same time and we worked together in setting up a case review committee. We also reviewed ten cases along with Welfare and Relocation staff members and after thorough discussion and consideration of these cases, wired recommendations to Washington on most urgent cases. We tried to utilize these case discussions as examples of how some situations might be avoided by skillful handling at every stage of the case situation development.

I had several discussions with Dr. Gordon Brown, the Community Analyst who seemed to have a wide and deep understanding of the entire situation at the center. He pointed out that the Issei attitude toward relocation was quite negative and at the same time tied up with the progress of the war. He felt that a great many of the Issei were disconcerted by developments in the Pacific theater of war and were losing their hopes of Japanese victory but developing strong desire for negotiated peace.

I had a discussion with Mr. Terry, the Project Attorney, concerning the gate procedure which was in effect at Gila. The gate procedure is in line with the visiting policy but at the same time violates the spirit of the policy. Mr. Terry felt that this was a problem for the Washington office rather than one for the center. Knowing that a new visiting policy was being developed, I did not press for any change in the written procedure at Gila.

It seems to me that the administration and great majority of the evacuees are pretty far apart. Underneath the surface there is a growing dissatisfaction and distrust of the administration as a whole and I believe that our efforts in the future must be given to developing more evacuee participation and closer relationship between evacuees and appointed personnel. The relocation program will need constant stimulation and assistance in developing a direct and open approach to evacuees which is needed to develop confidence on their part.

cc: Readers File  
Desk Copy  
CLS 831

RGDerrickson:om 4/12/45



7/5/45

To: H. Rex Lee, Actg. Chief, Relocation Div.  
Dillon S. Myer, Director

From: H. W. Wolter, Head, Center Liaison Section

In the weekly reports from centers there are indications of similar situations which I feel deserve some comment. I refer to the closing of mess halls, blocks, curtailing of various other services, and the discontinuation of community government.

In analyzing the total situation we are faced with the following real situation:

1. People must leave the centers.
2. Centers must close and be disposed of.
3. WRA must go out of business.

There are indications that some projects would like to proceed as in the liquidation of a business--get rid of the stock by any method at all. We all know that the task of removing people presents a different problem. Our entire governmental philosophy objects to treatment of people as "dumb driven cattle", and our knowledge and experience has shown that force creates more problems than it cures.

There is only one sure way of reaching an objective in interhuman relationships--that method involves both feeling and thinking. If people look upon relocation in the same frame of reference as evacuation--a forced move, the problems are just beginning. We must continue our information and leadership programs until every person is persuaded that he wants to relocate. We are interested in getting a desire to relocate because he both feels right about it and understands it intellectually.

In other words, there must continue to be participation on the part of the evacuees in every move. I most strongly urge the continuation of the community councils in spite of the decline in calibre of the members. As long as one person remains there ought to be an official channel of conference with the administration. If councils are eliminated by official fiat we take away our claims of being a "service" agency and leave only the administrative or control. We cannot be a service agency unless we continue to have contacts which can bring the wants of those served to the attention of the agency. Actually the greatest need is for the continuation of such a channel so that the people will be a part of relocation. It must continue to be their program. This was tersely expressed by a center resident, "Which is more important--to get us out, or resettlement?"



Every welfare agency, every doctor, every psychiatrist known and proceeds on the fact that people who help themselves out of a difficult situation are better off than those who are helped. This "insight" is so valuable that it costs some people thousands of dollars to get--thousands of dollars to know how to help oneself!

Is the entire liquidation of WRA an administrative problem or the problem of the evacuees? Very definitely it is both. Both must then participate as in the time of a disaster. (Liquidation of WRA is just that in the minds of some evacuees.) Things maintain the proportions of disaster until the "victims" can themselves see their way out. People can be forced to follow a line out of a cave in which disaster has occurred, but there is no line out of mental disaster except the one which the person himself creates.

There is no better way of helping people to help themselves than close personal contact by relatives and friends who can objectively see the problem. WRA employees, unless of Japanese extraction can never be close friends because of the long distinction of status. The community council offers a line to the people--it is the backbone of the relocation commission, it is a symbol of the people expressing their will. Until it falls of its own weight and we can find no shoring material strong enough to support it, I believe the community council should go on. Under no circumstances should we encourage dissolution. In most centers it is an ideal--we should not tear it down or dispose of any remains until every speck of life and hope is gone.

Several projects have indicated that the council is becoming anti-relocation. This is quite possible and normal. As those whose fear is greatest continue to remain they will rationalize and be "anti". Forceful measures will only increase fear. Since they undoubtedly are the leaders, it is more important that they be persuaded in the same manner as previous relocatees. Force and fear will make even a rabbit fight. Fear and insecurity bring about children's temper tantrums, so also will we have problems with the remaining groups. Friendly counsel and guidance are necessary to avoid trouble.

The curtailment of all other services should also be approached in a cooperative basis. We dare not be arbitrary or unmindful of people's feelings. All of us know what has to be done and what can be done. We have eliminated all the possibilities, but the evacuees have not. We must provide channels for the elimination of ideas and literally lead people into them. As long as any possibilities for wishful thinking exist, the people will put their hopes on them. We must work with them to eliminate the hopes engendered by such wishful thinking.



In this recommendation I am not unmindful of the criticism heaped upon me by permitting a vote on beer at Gila. Although the matter was under way, I saw no reason for not assisting in getting a negative vote. With the question eliminated without invoking the authority of WRA, it was squelched at the source. Had it not been permitted to come to the people, it would have remained in the realm of wishful thinking--if only WRA would let us!

We now face "if WRA would let us have schools"--"if WRA would do this or that"--"if WRA would provide housing"--etc., etc. These factors can be eliminated by a very simple means of discussion and facing facts, e.g.,

First: Do the people really want schools here or do they want an education for their children?

Second: What is the best way to get what they want?

Third: If the answer is:

A. Schools here--every effort must be made to honestly explore all angles in view of deadline. I'm sure that a good discussion would show that schools here are impossible and that education elsewhere is not a hardship but an opportunity. The only time we cannot afford discussion is when our motive is in doubt. A secure person does not fear discussion.

B. Education--leads directly to relocation.

If the evacuees are accepted as taxpayers and therefore have the same vital interest in Federal finance, many of the difficulties disappear. This requires an understanding of government and their part in it. If only one person is persuaded in a presentation to the community council it is still worthwhile. The background upon which to build is very essential. Every day each person changes as the result of the day's experience. Only participation can make a good citizen. Participation includes responsibility, and if the evacuee accepts responsibility for his share in government he will not continue as a ward of the government.

The process of participation has even greater results. When you ask a person for assistance you indirectly say that he has something to offer. You set the lie to the idea of race superiority. As long as policies and closing procedures are purely dictated, the myth of Caucasian superiority is unconsciously continued. Participation raises the person's ego and makes him anxious to agree with you. The weaker he is the more anxious he is. If he is strong, he deserves to participate, because he may really have a better solution.



I am extremely anxious that in our enthusiasm to close center we do not forget that we are dealing with human beings who are interested in their own future. To blame everything on institutionalization is a bad policy because we brought that about. We must work doubly hard to develop participation in order to overcome the past. If there were to develop a real opposition to relocation we would be in a tough spot. We must always lead in the path of fact and not raise dams before the mountain stream of human emotions. We cannot outguess and outsmart 45,000 people. We can be sure of them only when we all share our common objectives. The community council still has a definite place in my opinion. The more the opposition, the more the need for a channel.

/s/ H. W. Wolter



Memorandum

7/6/45

To: H. Rex Lee, Actg. Chief, Relocation Div.  
From: Hugo W. Wolter, Head, Center Liaison Section  
Subject: Community Organization in Relocation

In the final analysis the paid government employee is gaining or losing nothing in the relocation program. He is neither the product nor the recipient, he is simply the middle man. Both ends of the line run better if he does his job well. If he fails both ends of the line suffer but he remains unaffected.

Our job is to secure a mutual adjustment between the evacuee and his relocation community. Just as in the case of the returning veteran, both the individual and the community must make an adjustment. There is no better way to develop this mutual adjustment than by an exchange of ideas. In the case of evacuees there must be a personal exchange on an organized basis because the evacuee is afraid of the community. The veteran is afraid of individuals.

Community organization for the assistance of the relocation program should be developed especially in the western communities. Such an organization is outlined in Handbook 130. The question is, "How to do it?"

1. The first requisite is belief in the WRA program. A person who believes in the program can make others believe in it too.
2. Recognition of a problem is the second requisite. People are willing to help when there is something to do. Too much of our relocation work has been done in the offices--too much feeling--"that's my job"--and "interference" was not welcome. The job ahead is not WRA's job--it is the job of the American people. Just be able people have always rallied around a cause, we can expect it in relocation. It is a principle for which people are willing to fight on the home front and certainly has the support of the armed forces.
3. Approach--my approach would be something like this: "Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, I represent the War Relocation Authority. May I have an appointment with you?"

When the time for appointment arrives I will thank him for giving me time to discuss one of the problems of our government and tell him the story, give him a set of booklets, etc. My final sentences would be, "Can you recommend some other good Americans who are courageous enough to help? Would you mind calling them and arranging for an



appointment? I'd appreciate it if you would join me."

When a list of interested citizens and agency representatives has been completed and contacted, the time has arrived for a general meeting. This ought to be held in a local agency's office.

At this meeting more facts should be discussed, a chairman and sub-committees appointed. There should be one on "office space", one on "personnel", and several others. The two mentioned are important because it makes the job their own. I would not appoint a local relocation officer without committee action and support. I would have them find the office space. My control is in the objectives and not methods. As long as the horse is on the right road, I don't care whether he has an English or a Western saddle although I might prefer one or another. To dictate to community committees in the small items loses their support in the large.

Other committees are formed as problems arise and there are jobs to do. There is no best way. When a problem arises the officers should talk it over with the chairman and the chairman decides what should be done. Perhaps a phone call will answer, perhaps a committee should be formed, and perhaps something else should be done--the important thing is the shift of responsibility from the employee to the committee.

We have attempted to carry a similar type of organization in some of the community councils. The complete shift was not possible. Outside communities can handle the majority of their problems, and in the mid-west and especially, resent being told what to do by government people. I have had considerable experience in this line from Boston to Arizona and could illustrate my points.

We have "right" on our side in every American sense, and I am sure that people will help. They want to do something about this problem--they need leadership but not orders from our relocation officers both inside and outside of relocation centers. I strongly recommend committees as outlined in Handbook 130.

/s/

H. W. Wolter  
Head, Center Liaison Section