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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

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Mr. D. S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

Enclosed is a narrative report on the incident of November 4th, written by John Bigelow, Reports Officer at the Minidoka Relocation Center, who is here on detail. A more detailed map of the Administration area will be sent to you with in a day or so.

SIGNED

R. R. Best
Project Director



RBC

TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Occurrence of Thursday Night, November 4, 1943

(Report prepared by John Bigelow, Reports Officer
Minidoka Relocation Center)

On the dark, moonless, cold and windy night of November 4, around 150 young Japanese armed with sticks and clubs gathered in the warehouse area and at the Motor Pool and then moved into the Administration area to surround the Project Director's house.

They were discovered and fought three separate fights with Internal Security officers. Three Japanese were seized and one Internal Security officer was injured. The Project Director requested the Army to take control of the Project and soldiers captured fifteen more Japanese as the gang fled toward the colony.

BACKGROUND OF THE OCCURRENCE

Farm Situation:

A Japanese committee, which said they represented the colony and which became known as the Negotiations Committee, met with Project Director, Ray R. Best, and other administrative officials in Best's office on October 26, presumably to discuss the stoppage of work on the farm since October 16. The committee's spokesman, George Kuratomi, nisei formerly of the Jerome Relocation Center, presented during the course of the meeting the colony's stand on the harvesting of the farm crops. The Japanese residents would not harvest them. They were interested in producing food for themselves next spring, but they would not touch these crops. Furthermore, they did not want to eat food raised

at the relocation centers and they did not want any food from the Tule Lake Center to be diverted to the evacuees loyal to the United States.

Transfer of Food to Farm:

Mr. Best, R. B. Cozzens, Field Assistant Director at San Francisco, and Leland Barrows, Acting Director at Washington, D.C., worked out a plan to have volunteers from among evacuees in relocation centers and outside harvest the crops at regular wages. In view of the attitude of the committee, the Project Director did not inform the Japanese residents of this plan or any more than necessary of the appointed personnel. The same principle was followed in arranging for the transfer of 32,000 pounds of staple foods from project warehouses to the farm camp, which was moved by eight staff members on the night of October 29th. The following day the Japanese working in the warehouses saw that the food was gone and at about the same time Cozzens announced to the Press in San Francisco the plan for outside evacuees to harvest the Tule Lake project crops.

In the November 1, meeting of the Negotiations Committee with Dillon S. Myer, Director of the WRA, Cozzens and Best in Best's office, the committee sought to have the transfer of food from the project to the farm camp confirmed officially, and assurance that there would be no recurrence. They were told that the food was the property of the WRA and that no accounting of it had to be made to the Japanese colony.

Reasons for resentment over food transfer:

The colony's active resentment over the movement of food to the farm camp probably was two-fold:

a. The Japanese residents complained that the food being served in the mess halls was lacking in quality and quantity and they thought they were being robbed of the food so sent to the farm.

b. The majority of the Japanese residents were openly pro-Japan and they did not want what they considered their food going to evacuees loyal to the United States.

Course of Action:

When the committee received no assurance at the November 1 meeting that more food would not be transferred to the farm camp they probably assumed that more food would be moved and made their plans accordingly. Yamatane, chairman of the Communications Commission established to carry information between the colony and the Army, stated later that he heard Tsuda, head warden of Internal Security, tell the kibel boys to get the numbers of the trucks used to take food out to the farm and to find out exactly how much was taken, but not to go any farther. Perhaps Yamatane made this statement in an effort to absolve Tsuda from any part in the November 4 occurrence or he may have been relating facts.

Tension between Japanese and WRA Staff:

Tension between Japanese workers and appointed personnel increased at several points after Monday's mass demonstration. Several staff members stated they noticed surliness among the Japanese and a falling off in working efficiency. The social, cultural and circumstantial gulf that existed (as it does in relocation centers also) between the Japanese residents and

the appointed personnel was widened in many cases by an avoidance of personal contacts which in the past had been routine. in the course of normal activities.

Chester A. Failing, motor pool supervisor, stated that the two boys came to him on Wednesday (November 3) and said they did not want to work any longer in the motor pool because they did not think they could do their jobs the way he wanted them done. After he told them to do the best they could, they came back a second time and asked to be given truck drivers' jobs outside the motor pool. The Motor Pool did not seem to function as well as usual on Wednesday and Thursday.

The personnel meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday at which staff members expressed fear for their safety indicated that there was a strained feeling toward the Japanese pervading the administration area. One couple, Mr. and Mrs. B. E. Gerry, whose apartment was in a rather isolated location, spent each night from Monday to Friday outside the project.

Harry Kirkman, mess property and supply officer, stated that one of his Japanese workers told him that he was not popular with some people in the colony and that if he were threatened to let them know. Other staff members received little tips of impending trouble from their workers.

Arrangements to protect Administration areas:

After the mass demonstration on Monday the four members of the Internal Security Staff (Acting Chief Delbert R. Cole, Fenton Mahrt, Edward Borbeck and C. L. Payne) began nightly patrols of

the two principal areas occupied by appointed personnel, the residential area near the military area and the office and residential area southwest of the hospital. In addition, two guards (Ivan Buell and Myron Mordoff) were assigned to a 4 P.M.-to-midnight shift at the highschool area. Willard E. Schmidt, national chief of Internal Security, was on general surveillance and Theodore Lewis, chief of Internal Security at the Central Relocation Center, augmented the others. It was arranged for the Internal Security officers on patrol to check in every hour to the sergeant of the guard and officer of the day at the Army post and when a check-in was more than five minutes late the military was to investigate.

On November 1, Best and Lt. Col. Verne Austin, Commanding Officer of the Military Policy detachment, conferred on arrangements to prevent any unauthorized group of Japanese from reaching a strategic location. On this date Best issued an order prohibiting public gatherings in the hospital, administration, WRA residential and warehouse area. The Tulean Dispatch, mimeographed project newspaper, on November 4 issued a one-page supplement, half English and half Japanese, to the regular issue of that date and carried Best's notice. (See attached copies of Dispatch). Internal Security officers were instructed how to reach Best in case of emergency and arrangements were made giving any member of Internal Security authority to call in the Army if Best could not be reached.

On the night of November 3, Seymour Cahn, Acting Assistant Project Director in charge of administrative management, spent several hours driving around the project and observed many groups of Japanese in places where they would not ordinarily be

such as the warehouse area. On the morning of November 4 Best telephoned Cozzens in San Francisco and said: "This thing is going to break soon." He said that the proposed fence between the Japanese section and the administration area (details of which Cozzens had cleared November 2 with the U.S. Engineers at San Francisco) should be started immediately. Cozzens agreed.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE OCCURRENCE

8:15 P.M.

William T. Jarrett, farm superintendent, went to the Motor Pool about 8:15 P.M. to get three cargo trucks to be used to meet outside evacuees at Klamath Falls and transport them to the project farm where they were to work. There were four Japanese in the office and they ignored him. After about five minutes another Japanese boy came in, looked at Jarrett's requisition and said something in Japanese to the others. He then told Jarrett that the dispatcher would have to issue the trucks. When Jarrett asked who the dispatcher was he received no reply. He asked when the dispatcher would be back and again the Japanese ignored him. Jarrett then left to find G. E. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director in charge of operations.

8:30 P.M.

Mr. Cahn and Zimmer were driving around the warehouse and rail siding areas and at 8:30 P.M. talked with two Japanese Internal Security wardens on duty with a car near the rail siding. They saw no other Japanese until on their way back to the administration building they saw Tom Yoshio Kobayashi, an Internal Security warden recently segregated from the Heart Mountain Relocation Center, walking from the high school area toward the

motor pool. (Kobayashi is heavy set, weighs about 200 pounds, is about 5'10" tall, has a round face, high cheekbones, looks almost like an American Indian, combs hair straight back.)

8:45 P.M.

Best, Zimmer and Cahn parked at the rear of the administration building. They saw Schmidt and Jarrett, walking nearby and blicked the car lights to attract their attention. Borbeck, who was on duty guarding the administration area, came from the direction of the Recreation Hall and joined the group. Jarrett related how he had tried to get trucks at the motor pool.

Japanese at High School:

Buell, Guard at the High School, telephoned Cole at his apartment near the military area and told him there were some Japanese taking lumber. Mahrt, who was on duty guarding the staff residential area near the military area, was parked in front of Cole's house at the time. Cole sent him to the high school.

9:10 P.M.

Zimmer, Schmidt, Jarrett and Borbeck went to the Motor Pool. While Schmidt and Borbeck waited outside while Zimmer and Jarrett went in and presented the requisition for trucks. When the Japanese ignored them Zimmer and Jarrett went into the office and took the keys for the trucks off the dispatch board. The Japanese said nothing in English. Jarrett gassed up the trucks and left with two other Caucasian drivers.

Colony hears about trucks:

As Zimmer, Schmidt and Borbeck left the motor pool one of

the six or seven Japanese lounging in the office jumped into a truck and drove at high speed toward the Japanese colony. Anticipating reaction to the truck incident (in line with the colony's concern over the transfer of food to the farm on October 29), Schmidt went to the room of Theodore Lewis, Internal Security Chief of the Central Utah Relocation Center, and assigned him to watch the open area between the administration district and the colony for signs of large numbers of Japanese moving toward the administration area. Schmidt then went to the military area and informed the sergeant of the guard of the situation. He saw that they were ready to act on short notice. He went to a certain building in the military area where A. H. Brodie and J. K. Corbin of the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting an investigation of an illegal radio transmitter in the Japanese colony.

Assembly at Motor Pool:

Borbeck remained in the vicinity of the motor pool and from a point near the staff recreation hall saw six or seven trucks drive up and unload men. He saw flashes of light in the warehouse area as if from flashlights.

Going to his post Lewis walked close to the Motor Pool and also observed the unusual amount of activity. He estimated that at least 50 Japanese were congregated there. He saw a covered Dodge convoy truck accompanied by a black pickup (identified as one of the trucks assigned to the electrical department) drive up and unload men. Both then sped away. He saw the pickup make a second trip to the colony and back with men. (This black

pickup was seen on three different occasion later in the evening and each time it was driven by Kobayashi. A few days previously Kobayashi had tried to run down Jack Best, 15-year-old son of the Project Director, with this pickup in the administration area and it was also reported without confirmation that he had tried to run down two soldiers and several civilians on other occasions.)

Encounter with Japanese:

Mahrt who had seen Japanese around the high school came along and picked up Lewis and Berbeck on the road near the staff canteen. Lewis and Berbeck got into the back seat. They drove down by the high school area to tell Buell that it was not safe for him to stay there. A couple of I. S. wardens were helping him chase some Japanese back toward the colony. In the gate of the fence at the east end of the warehouses they saw six or seven young Japanese with clubs. Lewis thought one was a three-foot length by two-by-four and another a four-foot cane with a large knob on the end. When Mahr asked them what they were doing one Japanese replied that they were looking for a couple of friends in the warehouse district. When Mahrt replied that they would find the friends and send them back to the colony, the Japanese said they would find them themselves. Mahrt told the group they had better go back to the colony, but they did not move. The three Internal Security officers drove around the high school building and contacted Buell, advising him to drive up to the administration building. From there they drove back around the school to the road along the end of the warehouses.

Kobayashi Appears:

As they were traveling toward the administration area the black electricians' pickup came down the wrong side of the road toward them, forcing Mahrt to stop. The pickup came bumper to bumper against the Internal Security car. Mahrt backed between two warehouses to turn around and the pickup followed, blocking the way the same as before. Kobayashi was driving the pickup.

When asked what he was doing there he replied:

"We're not letting any produce trucks out."

Mahrt asked:

"Who assigned you to that job?"

"Nobody, I assigned myself," Kobayashi replied.

There were some remarks made about why he was not wearing his warden's uniform and he replied that he did not wear it while doing volunteer work.

Borbeck reported one Kobayashi statement as follows:

"This thing makes me mad. We will find out where those trucks are if we have to get the guy that knows."

Lewis stated that he saw ten or twelve Japanese armed with clubs and sticks standing in the shadows between the next two warehouses and 25 to 35 around warehouses near the butcher shops. Kobayashi finally got in the pickup and backed out allowing the Internal Security officers to drive to the administration building. They went into the telephone office and called Cole.

Zimmer starts for Klamath Falls:

After leaving the motor pool Zimmer went to the administration building and sat in his office talking with Best and Cahn.

Zimmer kept looking at his watch because he wanted to leave for Klamath Falls at 9:30 P.M. About that time he got into a car and drove to his apartment, 211 $\frac{1}{2}$ -1, near the motor pool, picked up his overcoat and drove around the motor pool to the project gate. He noticed an unusual number of young Japanese men congregated at the motor pool and trucks coming and going. Instead of leaving he came back to Best's house to discuss the situation and stood with Best and Cahn outside Best's house looking at the activity at the motor pool and noticing groups of Japanese drifting around in the shadows. Having decided that nothing was going to happen immediately Zimmer returned to the gate. Cahn went out to the gate to see him on some matter and then started back to Best's house.

Zimmer saw another car coming up from inside the project and moved his car to the side to let the other man pass. The driver of the other car, Buell, the high school guard, came up to him in a state of excitement and reported that he had gotten out just in time, that hundreds of Japanese were coming toward the administration building armed with sticks and clubs. Zimmer pulled his car to the side of the road and walked back to the gate.

9:25 P.M.

The Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped suddenly at about 9:25 P.M. and Schmidt thought it might be a signal of some kind. He left the military area after advising the soldier on guard in front of the officer of the day headquarters to inform the sergeant of the guard that a request for the Army to move in would probably be made within a short time. As Schmidt drove toward Best's house he stopped about

75 yards from the military area when a car came down the middle of the road toward him shining a spotlight in his face. Thinking it was an Army radio patrol car that had been informed of the situation and was making a check, Schmidt got out of his car and walked over.

Kobayashi again:

It was Kobayashi again driving the pickup with four or five Japanese in the back of it. After an exchange of questions and answers about what he was doing there, Kobayashi informed Schmidt that he (Kobayashi) knew about the trucks being taken and that he, as a leader, and his gang were going to see to it that the trucks were not going to leave the project; that he represented the people of the center and that they were going to give the WRA a lot of trouble. Kobayashi and another Japanese tried judo on Schmidt who outduded them and got back to his car, heading again for Best's house.

Schmidt in Fight:

Schmidt parked on the far side of the road from Best's house and had started walking over when he saw between 30 and 40 Japanese in the shadows around Best's house and between nearby barracks. They were armed with yellow-colored clubs two-and-a-half to three-feet long. They appeared to be round, but not as large as baseball bats. Five or six of the Japanese attacked Schmidt. He used the same hold on two of them, wrenching the left arm of one Japanese and the left arm of the second Japanese from their shoulder sockets. The scream of pain of one was heard by Zimmer at the gate, Cahn, between the gate and Best's house, and Best in his house.

"Get Best! Take Best!"

As Schmidt got back into his car during a lull in the battle he heard the Japanese yell in English: "Get Best! Take Best!". Best and Cahn also heard the words. Cahn was returning to Best's house from the gate when the Japanese were brought out of hiding by the fight with Schmidt. Cahn ran for Best's house, but the doors had been locked and lights turned off and in the excitement Best's son, Jack, could not get the door open. Cahn crouched in the shadows between the door and the screen door while the Japanese ran past waving clubs.

9:45 P.M.

Best had witnessed Schmidt's fight from a window, could see the Japanese milling around his house and therefore put in a call for Colonel Austen to ask him to take over the center.

When Schmidt started in his car for the military area to call in the Army, Kobayashi tried to cut him off with the pickup. Schmidt eluded him. Mahrt, Lewis and Borbeck, who had been in the telephone office and had heard Best call Colonel Austin (about 9:50 PM) went out to the main entrance to the administration building and saw Kobayashi drive down from the direction of the post office to the leave building and then circle around apparently when he saw the road was cut off by posts. As he turned back toward the postoffice and Best's house the three Internal Security men ran into the road and tried to flag him down. Kobayashi stepped on the gas and headed for them. Borbeck said: "We'd better get up there. It looks like they are going to get Best." They jumped to the lawn. He drove past the fountain, turned to the right and stopped.

Main Fight Starts:

Lewis opened the door on the right side, reached across to turn off the motor and picked up a copper-colored flashlight that was on the seat. Kobayashi jumped out the left side and began shouting in Japanese. There were three or four other Japanese in the back of the truck and they jumped down and started fighting with the Internal Security officers. Borbeck testified that he grabbed Kobayashi; that Kobayashi said he was going to kill him. Borbeck said he hit Kobayashi who ran screaming toward the motor pool. Mahrt reported that Kobayashi let out a weird yell, similar to that of a coyote, to call other members of the gang to his aid. The cry and the yelling of the gang in general was heard by several of the WRA staff who described it as similar to what is the general idea of indians on the warpath.

Mahrt stated that about 20 evacuees attacked them armed with clubs and wooden swords shaped like kendo swords. Borbeck said two boys attacked him with clubs while Mahrt fought one at the rear of the pickup and Lewis used a little one as a shield against a big one at the right side of the car.

Borbeck Injured:

Borbeck testified that he saw two other boys coming from another direction with clubs "which I believe were two feet long and after that I couldn't recall anything." Mahrt saw Borbeck trip over a large rock bordering the roadway and when he fell three evacuees with clubs jumped on him. Mahrt was unable to help him because "about 10 members of the goon squad, armed with clubs, were between us."

Mahrt stated that he struck one evacuee, wearing glasses, in the eye and felt the glass shatter. Another Japanese kicked Mahrt in the back while a third tried to choke him. He broke away and ran into the administration building where he met Cole. They grabbed chairs and went back outside.

Lewis, on the opposite side of the car from Borbeck, did not know what was happening except that Borbeck and Mahrt were also fighting.

Zimmer brings soldiers:

Zimmer, at the gate, saw the scuffle Schmidt had, which lasted perhaps 45 seconds, and saw Schmidt drive off. Zimmer saw the pickup circle around in front of the administration building and in the dim light saw that fight start. When he saw the Japanese beating Borbeck he shouted: "Come on, boys. They're beating a white man." Two of the four soldiers stationed at the gate ran forward with him. One soldier took out his pistol then exclaimed: "Hell, I forgot. It's not loaded." Zimmer and the two soldiers met Cahn who had slipped away from Best's house when there was general confusion among the Japanese surrounding the place when Zimmer and the soldiers started down the gate. The Japanese seemed to think that the Army was moving in. Lewis also went toward the gate unaware that Borbeck was seriously injured. He saw 15 or 20 men between barracks. They carried what looked like 1x6's, 4-feet long, split on one end to make a handle. When Cole and Mahrt came out of the administration building with chairs to help Borbeck they could not find him. The area was shadowy and dark. They returned to the building to learn that he

had come in unassisted. Dr. Mason was in the building and treated him temporarily until he was taken to the medical dispensary in the military area. Eight stitches were taken in a large gash on the top of his head, four stitches in a cut over the left eye and three stitches in a gash on his chin. He was bruised from head to foot. Schmidt had contacted Army officials when he reached the military area and had gotten to Colonel Austin just at the time that the colonel finished talking with Ray Best.

Three Japanese captured:

When Lewis entered the administration building, Richard G. Tracy, Assistant Fiscal Accountant, said that Borbeck had been beaten. He asked Lewis if the latter wanted a gun and receiving an affirmative answer went to a safe and brought out a .45. The magazine was full. Lewis stuck it in his belt and went out to the rear of the administration building. Mahrt had a baseball bat. Mahrt, Cole, Payne, Tracy and Lewis were there. Payne had a pistol and fired at the shadows of Japanese fleeing toward the colony. Three Japanese came out from behind a car or truck. One made a dive at Mahrt who sidestepped and swung the bat, felling the Japanese. The latter lay still a few seconds then rose to his hands and knees. A second Japanese made for Lewis who pulled his gun and told the Japanese to stop. He kept moving toward Lewis who finally stepped forward and struck him on the head with the pistol. Mahrt reported that he also hit this Japanese after he had recovered from Lewis's blow and stood up. The third Japanese was stopped by a blow from Payne.

This episode was witnessed by Best and Zimmer from the window of Best's office. These three Japanese were taken into the

mail room of the administration building where they stood with their hands above their heads. Captain Archer took charge of them there, at approximately 10:30 P.M.

Telephone Service not Disrupted:

The mail room is next to the telephone office with a glass partition and door between. Contrary to reports current after the incident, telephone service was not interrupted or endangered at any time. Mrs. Winifred Bolts, who was the operator on duty at the switchboard, stated that she saw no Japanese that night until some were brought as prisoners into the mail room. No telephone lines were cut.

Eighteen Prisoners:

In all, 18 Japanese were taken prisoners, all but the three mentioned above were seized by soldiers and brought into the administration building singly and in groups. Emily W. Light stated she saw five or six Japanese with their hands above their heads being taken to the administration building by soldiers who had guns at the back of the Japanese.

Kobayashi was captured near the hospital to where he had driven the pickup. Most of the Japanese were captured in the open areas between the hospital and the administration area and between the hospital and the colony. Several Japanese Internal Security wardens were picked up and were released after being cleared by Cole.

The prisoners were questioned individually by Army and WRA personnel in various washrooms and offices, with the mail room being used as a central assembly point. The Japanese stood with their hands above their heads except two who had cuts on

on their heads. They sat. About six soldiers guarded them.

All 18 were placed in the ^{project} hospital under guard since all had received injuries while being captured. Later they were moved to a stockade in the military area by the Army.

No Japanese shot:

No Japanese captured had been wounded by gunfire. There were two rumors current regarding this. One was that a running Japanese had been fired at point blank and had dropped instantly. The other was that a tank had run over a Japanese. No bodies were found.

Lewis estimated that the total number of Japanese around the warehouse, motor pool and administration areas was from 150 to 200 and he called this a conservative estimate.

Activities of other WRA Staff Members:

Beginning at approximately 10 P.M. appointed personnel living in the No. 200 barracks near Best's house, the administration building and the motor pool and the No. 300 barracks near the warehouses, the motor pool and the personnel recreation hall became aware that something out of the ordinary was happening outside. Several fixed the time by the fact that they were listening to the Richfield Reporter, a news broadcast from 10 to 10:15 P.M. The racket made by the Army light tanks and scout cars was the first indication of the happenings for many. Several looked out or went outside and the fact that many saw Japanese as well as soldiers indicates that as late as 10:15 or 10:30 many Japanese were still in the area, running toward the colony. Many staff members heard shots, but not more than six, and few heard

and few heard more than two or three, all from the direction of the colony where soldiers were capturing Japanese in the fire-break between the colony and the hospital and in the open area between the hospital and the administration area.

Baker runs toward colony:

Several staff members saw the personnel mess hall baker run toward the colony, a white towel in each hand, his white apron and coat flying in the wind, as an Army searchlight played on him. He didn't stop.

Staff members living near the motor pool saw several groups of Japanese between 10:15 and 10:30 P.M. Robert L. Hill and Mrs. Ruth P. Breece saw one group of five or six carrying stout sticks and clubs run past from the direction of Best's house. R. D. Smith saw about 50 men armed with pick-handles or bats standing in groups near the motor pool and one group of eight or ten young men carrying clubs or bats came from the staff dining hall area, passed him and went toward the motor pool. He said: "Hello, boys", to them and one answered. They seemed excited.

Clarence Benz came out of the recreation hall about 10:15 P.M. and saw six or eight Japanese running toward the hospital which stands between the administration area and the colony.

Mary C. Durkin saw about 24 boys running toward the Colony, hands over head. She also saw one warden running and two wardens in a car.

See Japanese near Best's house:

Those living in barracks closer to Best's house saw in that area. Mrs. Marion Francis looked out the door shortly after 10 P.M. and saw figures carrying sticks running around the end of the barrack next to Best's house. -19.

About 12 others were silhouetted against the lights of the administration building. She saw these, all of whom carried sticks or baseball bats, huddle in the shadows of the administration building for a few minutes then break and run in the direction of the warehouses. A few minutes later while standing at the front entrance of the administration building she saw two Japanese drive up. They said they were wardens. Upon being told that the Army was taking over, they got into the car and sped toward the colony.

Frank D. Fagan, living in the barrack next to Best's house saw the pickup chase Schmidt toward the military area, circle back and stop midway between Best's house and the administration building. Through the darkness he could see some sort of commotion, heard some shouting and then saw boys carrying three-foot clubs running across the lawn of Best's house. Mrs. Zell Clark, living across from Fagan, saw about six teen-age boys with clubs run past her door.

Mrs. Margaret Green passed about 20 Japanese armed with clubs near the motor pool. They came quite close to her and she heard one say: "Let the lady go." She was not touched.

Ernest L. Hitt drove a car from his apartment near the military area to the front gate via the motor pool. Ernest L. Hitt drove a car from his apartment near the military area to the front gate via the motor pool. He followed the car of a neighbor (Mrs. Lauritzen) at a distance of about 50 yards. He saw several Japanese in front of the administration building, ^{six} five

or six close to the staff recreation hall and as he passed the motor pool from 12 to 14 Japanese, who had heard Mrs. Lauritzen's car go by, rushed out. One with a club in his hand rushed toward the car. Hitt instinctively ducked and the car swerved striking the Japanese. Hitt kept going and did not see what happened to the man he struck.

Move into Military Area:

Staff members in the No. 100 barracks near the military area saw no Japanese. They were sent into the military area with their families shortly after 10 P.M. and from there witnessed Army activity and heard two or three shots from the direction of the colony. At 10:05 P.M. Lorne Huycke heard a whistle from the military and saw soldiers emerging from barracks, guns in hand. Earlier in the evening Huycke was in the colony on business and about 7 P.M. saw a Japanese whom he had noticed being active in the directing the guards during the Monday mass demonstration. He identified one of the Japanese captured Thursday night as this man. While in the colony until 7:30 P.M. Huycke saw no indications of what was to occur later in the evening.

About midnight, just as the women were preparing to put the children to bed in the day room and old elderly room, the Army gave them permission to return to their apartments.

JAPANESE COLONY'S REACTION TO THE THURSDAY NIGHT (NOVEMBER 4)
EPISODE

Five issues of the Tulean Dispatch, mimeographed project newspaper, were published in the Japanese colony after the Army

took over on November 4. From information at hand it seems that WRA-owned mimeograph machines were still in the Dispatch office in the colony until November 9 and were used to put out the issues of November 5 and November 9. The issue of November 11 states: "Thanks to the Army our hand-cranked mimeograph machine has been restored to the Dispatch." The episode of November 4 was referred to in two of these five issues of the Dispatch, the issues of November 5, and in the first of two issues published on November 11. The first written account of the episode was given to the colony in the issue of November 5. This story called the episode in the administration area "a minor incident". It said a "number of tear gas bombs were thrown at residents standing by the zone limit." The story also mentioned the fence being built "to keep the residents away from the Ad. area." This first story printed the day after the episode was very brief. "The facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees", the article concluded.

A banner headline in the first of two issues put out on November 11 proclaimed: "DETAILS OF INCIDENT RELEASED BY COMMITTEE". The story speaks for itself:

SIX YOUNG MEN STILL HELD BY ARMY FOR INVESTIGATION"

'After giving the details of the incident which led to the intervention of the Army to the Spanish Consul, the negotiation committee released to the press the following story:

During the negotiation with Dillon S. Myer and Raymond Best, these two had promised that in case any food was to be taken out of the warehouse, they would do so openly. However, in spite of this promise, on the night of November 4 about 9:30 the internal security force spotted some Caucasian entering the warehouse.

During the resulting investigation, quarrel broke out between the young men who had accompanied the wardens and the Caucasian.

Fearing that the Caucasians were to be kidnapped, the WRA officials had called in the Army.

As a result of this incident six young men are still held by the Army for investigation. One of the six, Fred Fukui, was taken out of the center and the Army officials promised to give a full explanation of it today.

The extent of the injuries of these six are not known but it is reported that they are not serious.

In case the others are taken out of the center the Army had assured the committee that they will give full explanation of such action. '

FIRST-HAND COVERAGE OF THE NOVEMBER 4
INCIDENT BY NEWSPAPER REPORTERS.

One newspaper reporter, Nick Bourne of the United Press, San Francisco, was staying in the Center the night of November 4 as a guest of Ray Best, Project Director. When the attack was made upon the administrative area he was an eye-witness since his room was one barrack away from Best's house. He was not permitted to wander around the area at random. He telephoned a story and later was driven to Tule Lake about 1:00 a.m. by Mr. Franks, cost accountant.

Will Stevens, San Francisco Examiner staff writer, had been sent to the Tule Lake Center to investigate the demonstration of Monday, November 1st. At the time of the disturbance Thursday night he was in a tavern a few miles down the highway from the Center when a soldier's wife entered and exclaimed: "The Army has taken over the Jap camp!"

As soon as word of the Army's action reached the town of Tule Lake, Edwin Davis, editor and publisher of the Tule Lake Reporter, weekly newspaper, went to the Center with an American Legion official and a state patrol officer. Davis and the American Legion official demanded entrance in their capacity as deputy sheriffs. They were inside the center for a few minutes and then were escorted outside by the Army.

CONCLUSION

The motive behind the occurrence on the night of November 4 seems to be the determination on the part of the Japanese to prevent trucks from hauling food from the project to the farm. One group, as stated by Yamatane, perhaps did not want to try to stop the trucks, but simply to obtain information to be used in pressuring the administration into changing the mess situation. The kibel boys from Jerome and Topaz who had been using strong-arm tactics since their arrival and had shown contempt for law and order in the colony no doubt wanted to stop the trucks. They had been watching the warehouses nightly. When a messenger from the motor pool brought word on Thursday night that three farm trucks had been taken out they sprang into action. Trucks hauled squads of them from the colony to the warehouse and motor pool areas. When nothing developed at the warehouses the scene of action shifted to the motor pool. By this time the gang was keyed up. They had successfully pushed around the appointed personnel during Monday's mass demonstration. To their way of thinking the administration had high-handed their committees and no relief was in sight. They felt that the committee was getting nowhere with the administration and this gang was impatient for action.

No one knows at this time whether they planned ahead of time to try to kidnap the project director. It would seem that any group as well organized as this one appeared to be during the mass demonstration would devise a more successful method of abducting the project director, who was often out and around by himself, than by running around his house in numbers, yelling:

"Get Best! Take Best!"

It seems likely that when they left the motor pool and slipped into the area around Best's house they were not following any preconceived plan, but rather a scheme conceived on the spur of the moment to terrorize the appointed personnel, especially the project director, and to grab the project director if they had the opportunity.

The Thursday night occurrence probably disrupted the negotiation committee's plans to continue to apply pressure on the administration to force them to accede to demands. This committee has displayed enough intelligence and cunning to raise serious doubt that they would have sanctioned such an abortive exhibition of violence that gained them nothing.



##

TULE LAKE INCIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Report of the Army Search of the Colony November 26, 1943
(Prepared by John Bigelow, Reports Officer, Minidoka Rel. Center)

A week or 10 days after the Army took over the Tule Lake Center the Army decided, after negotiations with the colony's representatives had broken down, as shown by the November 13 mass meeting, they would take into custody the men who had played a prominent part in making demands upon the Army and WRA and who evidently were trying to get political control of the colony and were misleading the colony regarding negotiations between themselves and the Army.

There were four such men not in custody: Shizuo Kai, 31, formerly of Fresno, California, and the Jerome Relocation Center; Ichiro Hayashi, 26, born in Japan, formerly in Sand Island internment camp, Hawaii, formerly of the Jerome Relocation Center; Mitsuho Kumura, 27, American citizens, formerly of Englewood, California, and Jerome Relocation Center, and Toshio Kuratomi, 28, American Citizen, formerly of San Diego and the Jerome Relocation Center.

At a meeting with the block managers and delegates on November 16, an Army spokesman asked them to produce the four leaders so that a peaceful, normal community could be achieved. The four were not produced.

Army Makes Search:

When the Army moved into the colony shortly after daylight on Friday, November 26, the Japanese residents probably thought they were looking only for people, especially the four ring-leaders. On the contrary, the Army looked for contraband and seized food and objects not commonly called contraband.

The Army had two principal teams which worked from each side of the camp towards the center firebreak. A heavy fog covered the colony all day reducing visibility to 60 to 75 yards. The Army used a large number of soldiers to insure that no colony resident could slip back into an area that had been searched. Small squads of soldiers searched every barrack, top to bottom. Boxes were examined. Space between the ceiling and the roof was looked into. Floors were tapped and in a number of cases cellars were found.

Large quantities of saki were found in various stages of production from fermenting mash to the finished distilled product. One large distilling operation was uncovered with nearly two truckloads of finished liquor.

Because rice is used in making saki the Army confiscated all rice found in barracks. The total has been estimated at 11 tons. Some of the rice was in bags bearing Quartermaster markings. Canned goods in boxes marked with the Quartermaster symbol were taken when found in private rooms.

Wood canes, carved and polished, were picked up by the dozens. Radios with dials which had short-wave bands were confiscated without any attempt being made to determine whether the radio still had short-wave receiving equipment. Scores of radios were taken. Knives with blades more than six inches long were confiscated. About a dozen double-edged axes and several hatchets were found and picked up. A pair of field binoculars and a camera were confiscated. Locked boxes and suitcases were taken along to be opened later if the owner was not present to do it at the time of the search.

All confiscated articles were labeled with the owner's address and for some pieces, such as radios, receipts were given to the owners. Much of the sakamash was dumped and the barrels left. The finished product was taken to the Army warehouse. WRA personnel and Army personnel worked together to try to establish ownership of such items as rice and canned goods.

An inventory of what was confiscated, how many stills were found, how many cellars were uncovered, etc., is not available at present from the Army. The FBI and the Army are making a close scrutiny of all items picked up.

Leaders Not Found:

The four leaders were not picked up. Andrew Sugimoto, formerly of Poston and who was ranked fifth after the four leaders, was found hiding in the corner of a room which was not his home. The writer of this report happened to be present when he was identified and placed in an Army car near the place where he was found.

In response to questions Sugimoto, who had been active as the man who prepared the report on food conditions for the Spanish consul and others, said that he knew he would be caught and that he had remained in hiding only to allow time for the Spanish consul to arrive. He said that the other leaders had "scattered" and that he had not seen them for several days.

Speculations about the four not found ran to various theories: That they disguised as women; that they hid in a tunnel, an attic or under a floor; that they dug under the fence in the fog and remained outside the project during the search.

About 90 persons were picked up, about half of whom were people without Army identification cards which were issued to all residents of the colony when it became the segregation center. The other 45 were persons in the Hawaiian Kibei group who were wanted by Internal Security.

Attitude of the Colony Residents:

The search was conducted without an outbreak of any sort.

The soldiers in general showed consideration for the residents and did not tear up rooms more than necessary. Soldiers were observed playing basketball with Japanese youths while waiting for other squads to catch up.

There have been reports of soldiers taking money and jewelry from rooms.

The colony-wide search was completed about 5 p.m.

#

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION PUKE LAKE INCIDENT

Report of Talks, Copies attached, by Col. Verne Austin and R. B. Cozzens at outdoor stage in Japanese Colony November 13, 1943.

(Prepared by John Bigelow, Reports Officer, Minidoka Rel. Center).

Mass Meeting Called:

In the belief that Negotiations Committee was not giving the Japanese residents the true facts about its meetings with Army and WRA officials, Colonel Austin and Mr. Cozzens decided to make clarifying statements at a mass meeting of Japanese residents at the outdoor stage in the colony at 2 P.M. Saturday, November 13. This meeting was called on November 10 and announced in a Tulean Dispatch, mimeographed project newspaper, on November 11.

The Dispatch story gave the impression that the meeting was called by the Negotiations Committee: "With the understanding and approval of the Army officials, a mass meeting of the entire center residents will be held on Saturday, November 13, at 2:00 P.M. at the outdoor stage.

"The negotiations committee will make a report of the proceedings of the conferences with the WRA officials at this meeting.

"According to the committee, explanations of the details of the negotiations for the return of the workers will be announced by the WRA officials tomorrow.

"All coal workers and garbage disposal workers went back to work today."

Work Crew Difficulties Develop:

The warehouse crews failed to report for work Thursday because they did not like the Army's determining how many were to work, who was to work and where.

On Friday the block delegates met and voted unanimously, according to the Tulean Dispatch of November 13, to cancel the mass meeting scheduled for Saturday afternoon.

The Dispatch story, which indicated again that the Japanese took the attitude that they were running the mass meeting, read as follows:

"Feeling that there wasn't any necessity for a mass meeting, the sixty odd block delegates present at the representative meeting held yesterday afternoon at Mess 18 voted unanimously to cancel the meeting scheduled for this afternoon at the community stage.

"The negotiation committee had planned to make a detailed report to the entire residents as to the proceedings of the conferences. However, with the temporary termination of the negotiations with the Army officials, the committee members felt that there wasn't any report to be made to the center at such a meeting.

"The committee reported to the elected delegates present that the negotiations with the Army had been cancelled because the Army did not recognize the committee as true representatives of the people.

"According to the committee, the Army felt that they knew how many workers were needed in each division and the WRA having worked with the Japanese should know who should work in each division.

"The entire congregation expressed unanimous accord that there wasn't any necessity for negotiations if the Army had taken such an attitude."

Colonel Austin and Cozzens Keep Schedule:

A few minutes before 2 P.M. Colonel Austin and Mr. Cozzens drove into the Japanese section, down the main firebreak to the outdoor stage. Army units had moved into position earlier. As they reached the stage about 30 foot soldiers formed in a circle around the stage at a distance of about 50 feet from it. Soldiers at the front of the stage fixed bayonets. Scout cars and soldiers took up positions in and along the firebreak at a distance of about two blocks from the stage. Armored scout cars and jeeps patrolled the streets of the entire colony.

No Crowd Assembled; Playing goes on!

No crowd was assembled in the firebreak. There were several baseball and football games in progress. These continued without interruption while the soldiers and Army vehicles were taking their positions. A scout car in taking its position moved into the middle of a football game and after a few attempts to carry on as before, passing the football and such, the players moved away and walked north, apparently to go to the next firebreak.

Japanese were in evidence along the streets on both sides of the firebreak, but there did not seem to be a concentration of people. Those in sight seemed to belong where they were.

They were sitting in the doorways of their barracks, squatting on the ground in close proximity to the barracks, standing in the doorways, looking out of windows. There were some people standing in the spaces between barracks, but on the whole very few. There was no movement between barracks of people coming to the firebreak from other blocks.

Colonel Austin Speaks!

When Colonel Austin began speaking over the loudspeaker system at the stage, nearly all activity among the Japanese stopped. The ball games that had been continuing even while soldiers moved in and around the players stopped. People who had been walking along the streets stopped.

There were a few instances of Japanese deliberately turning their backs to the stage and walking off. There was one group of perhaps 15 to 18 young men who did this. Some of them could be seen a few minutes later peering around the corner of the barrack that they had walked behind. Nearly all the Japanese who were observed deliberately ignoring the speakers were of young kibe age. The others were old men who kept on doing what they were doing, hauling water, pattering around their barracks.

It is not meant to imply that all in the teen age group ignored the speakers. On the contrary, many listened. A group of young girls standing at the nearest barrack were obviously listening and similar groups of young men were seen. From the firebreak at a point about 15 feet in front of the stage what appeared to be the Japanese emblem of a red ball was observed through the open door of a barrack in the second line of barracks from the firebreak. It was apparently painted on a screen.

No Reaction to Speakers:

No reaction whatsoever to the speakers could be observed on the faces of the Japanese listeners.

When Mr. Cozzens finished his talk there was no action or noise from the Japanese. There was no difference in the reception of the Army

speaker and that of the WRA speaker.

Return to Military Area:

At about 2:13 P.M. the speakers got into their car and returned to the military area with their escort. While there was no demonstration of any sort individual Japanese smiled, laughed, pointed and stared at the departing Army and WRA people. (WRA was represented by Mr. Cozens, Project Director Ray R. Best, E.H. Spicer, community analyst on special detail to the Tule Lake Center, and John Bigelow, reports officer from the Minidoka Relocation Center on special detail to the Tule Lake Center.

Estimated 2000 Heard Talks:

It is not certain how far the loudspeakers carried. Persons at the gate between the Japanese section and the hospital area could not hear the speakers. The distance is something under a half mile. Perhaps 2000 Japanese heard the talks which were given in English and not translated.

Hunger Strike Called:

The Negotiations Committee's response to the Army curfew of 7 P.M. to 6 A.M. (See Colonel Austin's speech) and other Army regulations was an order to the colony to begin a hunger strike at noon on Sunday November 14, and to offer passive resistance to the Army and WRA.

The Negotiations Committee's notice read as follows:

"Because of the actions of the military, as self respecting persons, there is no other way for us to take than the following:

1. All inhabitants of center offer passive resistance to both WRA personnel and Army personnel.
2. From today noon, all mess halls are to be closed, and a hunger strike will be instituted. The present food supply will be, as far as possible, given out to the people of the various blocks.
3. If the military come to your door, do not open the door yourself.
4. The canteens will be closed.

From the Committee Headquarters."

Opposition to Hunger Strike:

Opposition to the hunger strike sprang up immediately and was the first setback suffered by the Negotiations Committee in the colony. The opposition came from Ward 7. P. A. Weber, Chicago relocation officer at Tule Lake Center temporarily, was unable to make a complete translation of this notice, but he could determine that it was against the hunger strike. It stated that plans acted upon by the Central Committee were hasty and immature and it stated that the mess halls shall not be closed. Five names and seven addresses were written on the back.

No mention was made of the other points in the Negotiation Committee's notice calling for passive resistance and the closing of the Co-op stores.

On Monday, November 15, the Co-op board of directors met and decided that the stores would remain open.

Colonel Auston and Mr. Corzons met in the colony with the block managers on Tuesday, November 16, and discussed the possibility of a visit by the Spanish consul and representation of the colony at such meetings.

The final meeting in the series between Japanese representatives and Army and WRA officials took place Thursday, November 18, in the administration recreation hall. The communications committee and the block delegates were represented. Spokesmen for these two groups said they wished to make it clear that the colony was in full support of the Negotiations Committee. The meeting was devoted to a discussion of details such as shoe ration stamps and the possibility of a visit by the Spanish consul.

C O P Y

SPEECH BY LT. COL. AUSTIN AT TULE LAKE CENTER 13 NOVEMBER 1943

On the night of November 4, 1943, at the request of WRA, the military assumed control of the Tule Lake Center. The purpose of this action was to provide for the safety and welfare of every resident of this Center. Upon assuming command, I issued a proclamation to all of the residents. I shall read it again in order that you all may be informed of its content:

Camp Tulelake, Tulelake, California, 6 November 1943,
Proclamation: The Army having taken over control of the Tulelake Segregee Center at the request of the WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any properly selected representative committee to discuss any problems relative to the administration of this Center. Verne Austin, Lt. Col., GMP, Commanding.

It is the job of the Army to see that the Center returns to normal operations. At present, operations providing for the obtaining of food, shelter, and warmth are of first importance and are being maintained. The providing of these essentials shall be directed so that it shall benefit the greatest number, but in the manner as prescribed by the military.

Certain of your group have called upon me with demands and suggestions as to how this shall be done. Until such time as I am convinced that the situation demands, and that respect for constituted authority returns, I shall be the judge of how this job will be done. I shall continue to welcome visits and suggestions from representative groups of your numbers.

The sooner normal center operations, including the operation of schools and community projects, can be resumed, the better.

The time is entirely up to you. Opportunities for work will be provided in the following manner: With reference to employment procedure, we deem it advisable to proceed in the following manner: That we request the number of evacuees needed from time to time in each operation and will increase the number of employees as we increase operations. However, we will make the determination of the number who are to be employed in each operation. All employees entering the main gate must be on the employee list.

Immediate relatives of patients in the hospital will be allowed to visit during regular visiting hours designated by the military.

Cooperation is necessary to bring about a full resumption of Center activities.

I know that the majority of you want peace and the opportunity to live unmolested by hoodlums and goon squads, as well as others who apparently lack respect for order.

I expect to see to it that you have it

Those who instigated and participated in the disorders leading up to the Army's occupation shall be dealt with.

Additional measures deemed essential during this emergency are contained in a proclamation now posted in your mess halls. I shall read it for your information. Headquarters, Camp Tulelake, Tulelake, California, 13 November 1943. Proclamation Number 2. To the residents of Tulelake Center: By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commanding Officer and in order to provide for safety and security, it is ordered:

1. That between the hours of 7 P M and 6 A M all persons of Japanese ancestry, except as directed by the military, shall be within their place of residence. This shall not be interpreted to prevent access, however, to laundry and lavatory facilities.

2. No outdoor meetings or gatherings shall be permitted without express military approval.

3. Normal Center operations shall be maintained, insofar as is practicable, under direct military control and in the manner prescribed by the military authorities.

4. Persons of Japanese ancestry desiring to engage in useful work at the Center shall be accommodated as promptly as the situation permits.

5. No incoming or outgoing telephone or telegraph messages will be permitted without prior military approval.

6. Failure to observe strict adherence to all military regulations will result in disciplinary action forthwith.

7. All persons of Japanese ancestry shall reside in the apartments assigned to them by the WRA.

This proclamation in no way limits or restricts the statements of 6 November 1943, wherein by proclamation it was announced that the military authorities had taken over control of this Center. Additional regulations and orders will be proclaimed depending upon the situation. Cooperation of all center residents is solicited, Verne Austin, Lt. Col., CMP, Commanding.

Depending upon the degree of cooperation in this emergency will be the future course of this center. The military is prepared to meet any and all situations.

Speech by R. B. Cozzens
at Tule Lake Center

November 13, 1943

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to meet with such a representative group of the Tule Lake Center. I think it is important that all of the colonists in this Center understand many of the events that led up to the incident which occurred on Thursday night, November 4, and why it was necessary for the War Relocation Authority to request that the army take over.

Many of you have lived in this Center for over a year. Many of you have worked diligently and well with the WRA administration. It was our belief that operations in the Center would gradually be much better than they had been in the past. We believed this to be true because early in August we have moved Mr. Best to Tule Lake as Project Director. Mr. Best was selected as the Director of the Project because he is an able administrator, he is well conversant with the problems which confront you and the Center, he is a man who deals fairly and squarely with everyone concerned, and he is not swayed by pressure but makes his decisions fairly and upon the facts. Many of you remained at Tule Lake and went through the segregation period with Mr. Best. You know through experience that he is the type of individual whom I have described.

Immediately following the completion of segregation, however, it was our observation that a few people from the colony attempted to cause as much trouble and discord as possible.

As you all know, the War Relocation Authority has operated under certain definite regulations. Following the truck accident in October, no contact between any representative group in the colony and the Director on the Project was made until October 26, at which time a group, who stated they represented all of the people within the colony, called on the Director and made some very definite demands. They were told by Project Director Best that he could meet no demands but that he would be pleased to meet with any committee to consider the facts of each particular case and make decisions upon those facts. At that same meeting on October 26, this committee who stated they represented all of the people within the colony told Mr. Best that the colony was not interested in harvesting this year's crop and that they were not interested in harvesting any crop or trading any produce with any other Center. That being the case, other arrangements were made for the harvesting of this year's crop--a crop which had been grown with the assistance of many of you.

Between October 26 and the time of the meeting on November 1, many of the subjects which were discussed with Mr. Best on October 26, were being investigated by him. Plans were not being made, however, to meet demands, as the whole colony knows that WRA was not in a position to operate on that basis.

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Since that time, the military has continued in control of this Center. Upon assuming command, I issued a proclamation to all of the residents. I shall read it again in order that you all may be informed of its content:

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Depending upon the degree of cooperation in this emergency will be the future course of this center. The military is prepared to meet any and all situations.

- A. Internal Security employees Schmidt, Cole, Borbeck, Mahrt and Lewis. Two additional Internal Security employees made no physical contact.
- 16-Q. Were Best's telephone wires cut and if so, when?
- A. No.
- 17-Q. What personnel other than Borbeck were attacked Thursday?
- A. Schmidt, Cole, Mahrt and Lewis.
- 18-Q. What W.R.A. staff members have actually resigned and why? Specify whether resignations requested by W.R.A. or motivated by fear.
- A. Albert R. Tinker, Ernest R. Rhoads, John Stubbs, Orville Dalton, Maynard Johnson, Clifford Payne, Dr. John Mason, Corabelle Harris, Jack Williams, James Prince, Charles Dunlay, Gertrude Ludwig, all resigned account of fear. Ralph Peck terminated.
- 19-Q. Give fullest possible details on any damage to Government property or to property of caucasians visiting Center. Rancher Wilkinson quoted as saying his auto "Seriously damaged."
- A. Rancher Wilkinson reported to newspapers that sun visor torn off and one door glass shattered in corner. Other damage included radio aerials on two cars. One car door handle taken. Windshield wipers removed from a dozen cars. Two cars reported scratches on paint. Air let out of several tires. No other property damage.
- 20-Q. Are volunteer farm workers now harvesting Tule crop fully protected from possible harm by agitators?
- A. Volunteer farm workers are fully protected and are under no contract.
- 21-Q. Were any knives stolen from hesshalls?
- A. No. Not to our knowledge during the incident. Have reports that some knives did disappear prior to my administration.

R. R. Best
Project Director

Speech by R. B. Cozzens
at Tule Lake Center

November 13, 1943

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Many of you have lived in this Center for over a year. Many of you have worked diligently and well with the WRA administration. It was our belief that operations in the Center would gradually be much better than they had been in the past. We believed this to be true because early in August we had moved Mr. Best to Tule Lake as Project Director. Mr. Best was selected as the Director of the Project because he is an able administrator, he is well conversant with the problems which confront you and the Center, he is a man who deals fairly and squarely with everyone concerned, and he is not swayed by pressure but makes his decisions fairly and upon the facts. Many of you remained at Tule Lake and went through the segregation period with Mr. Best. You know through experience that he is the type of individual whom I have described.

Immediately following the completion of segregation, however, it was our observation that a few people from the colony attempted to cause as much trouble and discord as possible.

As you all know, the War Relocation Authority has operated under certain definite regulations. Following the truck accident in October, no contact between any representative group in the colony and the Director on the Project was made until October 26, at which time a group, who stated they represented all of the people within the colony, called on the Director and made some very definite demands. They were told by Project Director Best that he could meet no demands but that he would be pleased to meet with any committees to consider the facts of each particular case and make decisions upon those facts. At that same meeting on October 26, this committee who stated they represented all of the people within the colony told Mr. Best that the colony was not interested in harvesting this year's crop and that they were not interested in harvesting any crop or trading any produce with any other Center. That being the case, other arrangements were made for the harvesting of this year's crop--a crop which had been grown with the assistance of many of you.

Between October 26 and the time of the meeting on November 1, many of the subjects which were discussed with Mr. Best on October 26 were being investigated by him. Plans were not being made, however, to meet demands, as the whole colony knows that WRA was not in a position to operate on that basis.

It was my pleasure to arrive at the Project on Monday, November 1, with our National Director, Mr. Myer. We had only been on the Project a short time when two representatives of the committee wanted to know when we could have a meeting with the committee. The representatives were advised that Mr. Myer would meet with the committee on Tuesday afternoon, November 2. According to information we have here, the residents of the colony were notified in the mess halls on Monday at noon that you should all proceed to the administrative area to hear the National Director talk. This announcement on the part of the committee, or whoever called this meeting, was in direct defiance to the Director and WRA. It was a breach in faith to you people as a whole and placed all those on the Project staff and the whole colony who were not in on the plans in a very delicate position.

I want to make definitely clear that a meeting at which could have been attended by everyone had been arranged for Tuesday, November 2. You people were called to the administrative area on Monday, November 1, in direct defiance of that arrangement. The Director of

the Authority did not call in the military to stop such a meeting, knowing you were on your way to the Administration Building -- many of you wives and children -- and that you did not know a meeting had been planned for the following day. Many of you did not know that while you waited outside of the Administration Building the committee, which stated it represented all the people, sat inside with Director Myer, Project Director Best, and others and attempted to use the group outside of the building as a pressure group to force WRA to meet demands which were beyond their control and which could not be met.

I want to compliment everyone of you who were in that crowd for the orderly manner in which you conducted yourselves when you did not really know the purpose behind your presence at the meeting.

Following Monday's meeting, the colony was rather quiet until Thursday night when some 300 to 400 young men of your community formed in the motor pool area, attempted to surround Mr. Best's residence, and attacked a number of internal security officers. This again was in direct violation of the instructions issued by Mr. Best --that no more meetings or gatherings were to take place in the administrative area. These acts made it necessary for Mr. Best to request that the military take over immediately.

It appears unfortunate to me that a few people among you who are of the hoodlum type and wish to cause trouble are forcing the majority of people in this Center to live under the present conditions.

I wanted you to have the truth of exactly what the representative committee had attempted to demand. I wanted you to know definitely why the military was called in. It is our belief that the majority of the people in this colony do want to live in peace and harmony, that many of you are willing to work and carry on the necessary services, but that a few, in order to gain power for themselves, have attempted to gain such power through force. As long as it has been necessary for the military to take over, it is also necessary that I refrain from making any statement concerning operations at the present time.

R. B. Cozzens

TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Report on Activities of Appointed Personnel
(Prepared by John Bigelow, Reports Officer, Minidoka Relocation Center)

Petition for Fence:

A petition dated August 26, 1943, was circulated by L. L. Thayer, Assistant Procurement Officer, among the appointed personnel at Tule Lake Center and was signed by 54 persons out of the staff of 177 permanent and 19 temporary employees. The petition addressed to C. E. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director, read as follows:

"The attached list of signatures of appointed Caucasian personnel at this project hereby register a protest against the proposed fence now being constructed in that Caucasian personnel quarters will be included with the Japanese, while the military area is being fenced to be on the outside of the area.

"It is respectfully requested that this protest be submitted to Washington by telegram and the originally proposed fence, that is, excluding the Caucasian personnel from the Japanese, be reinstated immediately"

The Segregation Center Fence:

When Tule Lake was designated as the segregation center late in July, 1943, plans were developed jointly by the Army, U. S. Engineers and WRA for additional control of the Japanese segregees by increasing the strength of the Military Police troops stationed here and by constructing additional fences.

The fence plan included a nine-foot manproof fence on steel posts set in concrete completely surrounding the center area including the WRA administration and residential areas, but excluding the military area. A fence between the administration area and the Japanese colony was considered, but was not favored by administrative officials for three principal reasons:

1. The military police provided sufficient protection for the administration area.

2. Checking of the movement of Japanese workers and other Japanese into the hospital, the administration area and the warehouse area would require so much time and additional manpower that it would not be feasible as long as the WRA operated the camp.

3. Administration of the project on a peaceful basis would be more easily obtained without such a fence on the basis that points of friction between the Japanese and the WRA would multiply in direct relation to the number of additional restrictions placed upon the Japanese. Furthermore, the status of the Japanese at the Tule Lake Center had never been

changed from simply that of evacuees. As such the United States Government did not want to emphasize their being treated as internees or prisoners of war. Such a fence would symbolize the warden-prisoner situation.

November 1, 1943. Incident Prompts Some Staff Members to Act:

There was increased nervousness among certain groups of the staff prior to the November 1 incident. Carrie D. Driscoll, a teacher, told in her statement of several instances: A Japanese man had come two or three weeks previously to the apartment of Jane Zink, librarian, and another teacher and had asked them to let him get warm. They let him enter and plied him with questions. He left shortly telling them that he was new on the project. Bessie Burton, a teacher, one night saw someone looking into the window of Miss Jones' apartment. One night, near Hallowe'en somebody ran past Miss Burton's apartment, pausing to open the door as they dashed by. Seemah Battat testified that a young Japanese had come to her apartment one night, said he wanted to enter that he had held his feet in the door until she forced him to leave.

Following the mass demonstration on November 1, there was considerable discussion among the persons who were openly concerned about the amount of protection and measures of security for themselves and their families. This was certainly not unanimous state of mind, but it was true of a large number of the staff members. One group was out-spoken, another was not so out-spoken, yet expressed relief when the Army moved in and the third group was not concerned.

On Monday night following the mass demonstration in the afternoon there was much discussion among the appointed personnel about the matter of protection. One couple, Mr. and Mrs. B. F. Gerry, whose apartment was rather isolated in the residential area facing the colony, did not stay on the project Monday night and also every other night until after the Army had moved in. After Monday several staff members reported unpleasant changes in the attitude of some Japanese workers toward appointed personnel.

On Tuesday, November 2, Project Director Best called a staff meeting for 4:30 P.M. in Ward E at the hospital. This was a new factor in the discussions concerning protection of the appointed staff. Following the beating of Dr. Pedicord at the hospital Monday there were some expressions from the staff in general that the Caucasian nurses should not return to the hospital. On this line of thought it was deemed unsafe for the staff to gather at the hospital for a staff meeting. Discussion gathered momentum until by the time lunch was over it was decided that an impromptu meeting would be held in the staff recreation hall.

Staff Holds Own Meeting:

About 60 or 70 persons attended this meeting. Kent Silverthorne, Project Attorney, was asked to act as chairman and declined. Daniel Cox, Personnel Officer, then acted as chairman and a committee of four was named: Cox, Gerry, Guy H. Booker, Highway Engineer, and John C. Stubbs, Cost Accounting Clerk.

For 30 to 40 minutes the group aired its sentiments and then decided to ask Myer and Best to come to the meeting. Although they were just sitting down to lunch Myer and Best immediately went to the recreation hall.

Myer, in what several staff members described as "fatherly" tone, told the group that they could expect pressures to be exerted on the staff by the evacuees and that anyone who could not take it had better resign or at least live off the project for a while. He discussed fear, its causes and effects.

Cox, speaking for the group, covered three principal points:

1. Myer and Best knew about the Monday mass demonstration 45 minutes in advance and did not advise the staff.
2. Although the character of the Japanese population of the camp had changed and external security measures had been taken accordingly, there was little or no change in WRA administrative procedure in the Center and no new restrictions on the evacuees inside the project.
3. The Japanese residents should not be allowed to enter the warehouse, administrative and staff residential areas at random. Pilfering and vandalism which had taken place before segregation could be expected to increase and yet no new measures were taken to safeguard property.

Gerry asked if he could speak for the group and when they applauded he told Myer that it was not a question of fear on the part of the employees but that the employees thought that it was foolhardiness on the part of WRA administrative officials not to face the facts and provide better protection for the administration area. Gerry stated that Myer's attitude was stupid.

Myer repeated that if anyone could not live and work on the project under these conditions he should leave or at least get off the project for a while. He said that the personnel would have to place their confidence in Best and that in a short time he hoped to be in a position to give more concrete assurance that steps had been taken for adequate protection of the appointed personnel.

An incident was reported, more or less jointly by Gerry and Booker, of the Booker's 12-year-old daughter being insulted by a group of young Japanese sometime after segregation. This group of 10 boys, ranging in age from 8 to 15 except for two at least 20 years old, cut through the staff residential area near the military area en route to the colony and passed by the Booker's apartment where their daughter and another girl were playing. Mrs. Christenson told Mrs. Booker that she heard one of the boys say, using obscene language, that he would rape the Booker girl.

Stubbs made a statement that was remembered by all those questioned about the first staff meeting. Stubbs said that compared with Dillon Myer, Nevill Chamberlain was an amateur.

Ernest Rhoads, fire protection officer, declared that he could not fulfill his sworn duty to safeguard the lives of the staff members under present conditions and that he was resigning. He declared that the hospital was not a safe place to hold the staff meeting called for 4:30 that afternoon because the staff could be surrounded and cut off. He said that he absolutely refused to permit the meeting to be held there.

George B. Leuck, assistant fire protection officer, said that he doubted Meyer's sincerity of statement. This declaration and a comment of Myer, reported by some, that there would be no meeting cancelled the 4:30 meeting.

The meeting broke up without further action.

Caucasian Hospital Staff Leaves:

Tuesday morning the nurses had noticed a decidedly unfriendly atmosphere in the hospital on the part of Japanese nurses and doctors. After the staff meeting at noon the nurses and doctors held an informal meeting and Alma K. Folda, Chief nurse, Helen K. Shipps, medical social worker and acting hospital administrator, went to see Myer. They did not see him, but through Harry Black, assistant project director, they were told that they should not return to the hospital from then on and those who had been living at the hospital were lodged at the Golden Hotel, Tule Lake.

Staff Committee Meets with Best:

On Wednesday morning, November 3, at 9 A.M. the appointed personnel's committee met with Best. W. A. Leigh, fiscal accountant, replaced Cox on the committee at this time because of Cox's disagreement with the committee's plan of action. The committee was told that plans being formulated for adequate protection of the appointed staff could not be divulged at the time and Best was emphatic in his assurance that the

Japanese could not again assemble in the administration area as they had done Monday. This meeting was interrupted by the arrival of the Spanish Consul from San Francisco.

The committee returned to Best's office at 2 P.M. when discussions were along the same line

STAFF Meeting on November 3:

A meeting of the appointed personnel was held Wednesday night, November 3, at the recreation hall to hear a report from the committee. From 90 to 100 persons attended. Gerry was the principal speaker and to follow his report there was a general discussion of the situation.

Truck Drivers in High School:

Three Caucasian truck drivers working on the farm were housed in a room in the high school building. When they went to this room between 12:30 and 1:00 A.M. on November 4, night of November 3, they found their beds upset and blankets and mattresses strewn about. Several beds, mattresses and blankets were missing. The room had been equipped with nine or ten beds and bedding. The door was locked with a common lock.

Two of the three men were robbed--J. B. Stephens and Marvin Powers. The third man, F. R. Rundle, found nothing missing. Stephens' suitcase, containing ration books, clothing and shaving articles was taken. Powers lost about the same.

The three men left the school area and were housed in the administration area that night.

One man (Powers) resigned the following day. The other two were housed at the farm.

Twelve members of the staff resigned after the Monday mass demonstration on November 1 and before the Army took charge on the night of November 4.

During the week November 1 through 7 there were 20 resignations, but not all of these were related to the immediate condition. An additional person resigned and then cancelled his resignation and the cancellation was accepted.

Of the 20 at least 13 resigned because of fear for their personal safety or some other reason related to the Monday incident, or other conditions directly connected with the situation existing at the Tule Lake Center.

Building of New Fences:

When R. B. Cozzens, Field Assistant Director, returned to San Francisco on November 2, he contacted U. S. Engineers and made all arrangements for the construction of a man-proof fence separating the Japanese colony from the administration area. The morning of November 4, Best phoned Cozzens: "This thing is going to break soon. We'd better go ahead immediately with the fence."

That night the Army took charge of the center at Best's request. The next morning, November 5, construction was begun of two nine-foot man-proof fences on wooden posts set in concrete, one cutting off the Japanese colony from the entire administration area and the other cutting off the hospital from the rest of the administration area.

REACTION of Appointed Personnel to Army Control:

The morning after the Army moved in, one male member of the staff sat on a desk, clicked his heels and exclaimed happily "Now we're safe."

While this was an extreme reaction, the general attitude of the staff toward the Army's taking over seemed to be one of relief. Several commented that they did not realize the strain they had been under until the Army came in and they experienced a great feeling of relief.

One woman teacher, accused of pacifist views, expressed displeasure over the sight of soldiers and equipment in the center.

There were also those who had not been apprehensive about any lack of protection and to these the Army's new situation did not mean the first sound sleep in many nights as it seemed to mean to a large group.

TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Report on the Beating of Dr. Reece M. Pedicord,
Chief Medical Officer, at the Tule Lake Center, November 1, 1943
(Prepared by John Bigelow,
Reports Officer, Minidoka Relocation Center)

BACKGROUND

The project hospital has been the object of complaints on the part of the evacuees and the cause of friction on several WRA projects. The complaints are generally of the same nature: not enough attention paid to patients, minimizing, by Caucasian Doctors of the necessity for medical treatment, and poor ambulance service. A contributing factor was that Japanese doctors, who held positions of respect and esteem in their pre-evacuation communities, were reduced to the common level of barracks and communal living and a wage of \$19 a month in the relocation centers. Many evacuee doctors would not cooperate under such conditions.

Dr. Pedicord's Attitude:

These conditions were present at the Tule Lake hospital and there were additional ones. Dr. Pedicord took charge of the hospital on January 15, 1943. There were 867 employees in the hospital and he proceeded to whittle the number down to 227 by accepting resignations and by not filling these positions. Dr. Pedicord has the reputation of being a strict administrator. In his testimony before the California State Senate Fact-Finding Committee he stated: "I demonstrated....they (the Japanese) could be handled and were more efficient in their work if they were given to understand instructions that were given were orders and not polite requests." His associates know him to be this way and they also believe that his stern manner resulted in an efficient hospital.

However, while his methods were approved by most of the Caucasian staff and some of the Japanese, they did not go well with other Japanese, and those seeking political power did not hesitate to use this general disgruntlement among the Japanese to further their aims to gain control of the project, including the hospital, from the WRA.

This report makes no attempt to decide whether the complaints and criticisms of the Japanese were justified. The fact remains that the Japanese did make charges and whether their charges were true or not they produced a state of mind among the Japanese that led to the eventual beating of Dr. Pedicord.

Japanese Complaints:

George Kuratomi, at the negotiations Committee's meeting with Dillon Myer, national WRA director, and Project Director Ray R. Best on November 1 made specific charges:

- a. Deplorable conditions at the hospital have caused the ire of the center residents.
- b. Dr. Pedicord made two appendicitis patients wait until it was almost too late.
- c. A person suffering from meningitis was refused care by a Caucasian doctor.
- d. A pregnant woman was given morphine injections which resulted in a still-birth.
- e. It has been said that some of the Caucasians doctors don't have licenses to practice medicine.
- f. Dr. Pedicord allows only one ambulance on Sunday for 18,000 people.
- g. Caucasian doctors neglected a two-year-old boy who had been scalded and as a result he died.

Kuratomi summed up the hospital situation in this way: "It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this center and more or less see people die from day to day they cannot stand to see such a thing exist. So it was decided last night to ask the resignation of each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feel so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had big practices and lots of responsibility."

Kuratomi, speaking for the committee, disclaimed any responsibility for the beating of Dr. Pedicord which had been reported just as the meeting started. Kuratomi added: "Let me say this, Mr. Myer, I don't want to see any violence. However, unless you remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such a time as an investigation has been held I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors." Later he said: "Whatever might have taken place over there (At the hospital) and to Dr. Pedicord in particular might be justified and some of the boys couldn't wait until the conference is over."

The Story of the Beating

Strangers in the Hospital:

Shortly before he left the hospital for lunch on November 1, Dr. Pedicord was approached by Sam Morimoto, X-ray technician who had backed the doctor's position in the hospital. Morimoto told him that there was going to be trouble at the Administration building in the afternoon, "but I don't think there will be any at the hospital."

When Dr. Pedicord returned from lunch he noticed, in the hospital corridors, a number of young Japanese men, some of them rough in appearance, who were not hospital employees. Since it was not a visiting day and because the colony residents sometimes went through the hospital as a short cut from the colony to the administration area, Dr. Pedicord asked these outsiders to leave the hospital. Seven or eight of these small groups of two to four

persons left at his request, but others appeared and finally he asked Dr. Mason to stay at the front entrance and not to admit anyone except hospital personnel.

Others on the hospital staff noticed these outsiders. Dr. H.K. Marks, Dr. Martin Loebman, Miss Alma K. Folda, chief nurse, Mrs. Myrtle R. Johnson, dietician, Miss Helen K. Shipps, Medical social consultant, Elizabeth M. Curren, supervising nurse and others commented on them.

Dr. Pedicord met Dr. Marks in the hallway and after commenting on the presence of strangers in the hospital told Dr. Marks to lock all doors on Ward A so outsiders could not get into that section.

En route to Ward A, Dr. Marks met five young Japanese men coming in through the requisition wing and he asked them to leave the same way. They talked in Japanese until one of them suddenly shoved Dr. Marks out of the way and they all ran toward the main wing with Dr. Marks in pursuit.

Gang at Entrance:

Miss Folda, whose office faces the front of the hospital toward the administration building, saw two or three boys standing by the front steps and they seemed to be waiting for someone or something. Evidently they were waiting for other boys because within a few minutes from 10 to 12 young Japanese men 18 to 25 years old assembled there and then walked up the front steps and into the hospital, pushing past Dr. Mason who was stationed at the door.

Beating of Dr. Pedicord:

Dr. Pedicord had been in his private office only a few minutes (it was between 1:15 and 1:30 p.m.) when he heard his Japanese secretary cry out from the reception room: "Doctor Pedicord! Come here quick!" He went out and found about 12 youths of the type he had seen around the hospital grouped in a semi-circle around the hallway door. His secretary was gone. (Later it was learned that she had fled to the laboratory and had stayed there all afternoon.)

Dr. Pedicord said: "What's the matter here?" and walked over. When he came within reach one of the group reached out and snatched the doctor's glasses (and carefully put them on a nearby shelf). Dr. Pedicord retaliated by knocking him down and the fight was on.

In the general melee that followed, the gang forced the 63-year-old doctor back into the room as he tried to keep away from their kicks and blows. Finally, one managed to get behind him and using a strangle hold cut off his breathing. He slumped to the floor with the Japanese still choking him. Another Japanese kicked

at his face. Dr. Pedicord saw the blow coming and turned his head slightly. The kick landed at the corner of his left eye producing a painful injury and one which could have affected the sight of that eye. Another Japanese jumped with both feet at his stomach. Dr. Pedicord rolled as he saw the blow coming and tensed his muscles. As a result the blow landed on his side and amounted to a bruise similar to the dozens of others that covered his body when the gang was through with him. In the struggle a swinging gate in the corridor was half broken off and left hanging.

Dr. Pedicord was carried out the front door of the hospital in a semi-conscious condition and put on the ground where further abuses were starting when Miss Elizabeth Curren, a nurse, and others rushed out. The attackers dispersed and Dr. Pedicord was assisted into his office where he received treatment. Dr. Marks, chasing the Japanese boys, came on the scene at this time and went into Dr. Pedicord's office to assist in treating his injuries.

The information about the beating of Dr. Pedicord was telephoned to Best as he and Director Myer were preparing to begin a meeting with a committee of 17 Japanese in Best's office. Willard E. Schmidt, national chief of Internal Security, who was also attending the meeting, was sent to the hospital. Schmidt was accompanied by a Japanese, supposedly one of the guards stationed around the administration area during the mass demonstration. Dr. Pedicord told Schmidt that the hospital situation was under control and that he did not need assistance. Schmidt then returned to the administration building.

Japanese, apparently at the direction of the negotiations committee, were stationed at the doors of the hospital to admit only employees and they also restricted the use of at least one telephone.

The Japanese hospital personnel did not exhibit curiosity about the attack upon Dr. Pedicord. Only one or two nurses aides asked about his condition, according to Miss Folda. Miss Folda also reported that two Japanese physicians who had been off the active list for several days prior to their transfer to relocation centers suddenly appeared dressed in their white hospital suits.

Outsiders in Hospital:

Japanese who didn't belong in the hospital continued to enter and move around. This probably was connected with the mass demonstration at the administration building, as many women from this crowd said they wished to use the hospital toilets. Some then left by the back door to return to the colony.

Mrs. Johnson had received, during the preceding week, large numbers of women visitors who were alarmed over the interruption in shipments of condensed milk to the mess halls. A shipment to the project was delayed in transit and when the routine deliveries stopped the people of the colony feared that a shortage would result. When she saw the people streaming toward the administration building and also saw many outsiders in the hospital, she thought that they

might be connected with the milk incident. (The deliveries of condensed milk were interrupted for about one week). As she watched the crowd from the diet room, or kitchen, one of her Japanese workers said to her: "I wouldn't go back to your office. Don't go back to your office."

Phones Restricted:

The restriction of phones did not apply to the phone in Dr. Pedicord's office. The Japanese did not go there.

Mrs. Ella Webber was in the front hall when the telephone there rang. When Miss Curren asked the Japanese guard why he did not want them to answer the phone he said: "You might tell the Army." When the telephone continued to ring this group of women, Mrs. Pedicord, Miss Kiger, a nurse, Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Weber, decided that it should be answered. One of the Japanese boys said harshly: "No, don't answer it." When he was asked: "Who gave orders not to use the telephone?" he replied angrily, "The Japanese!"

Strained Atmosphere Tuesday:

The next day Caucasian doctors and nurses noticed a different atmosphere in the hospital. Usually courteous, friendly Japanese hospital workers did not speak to them. Some of the Japanese expressed surprise that the Caucasians were back on the job. Some were bolder than others in expressing their feelings. Miss Folda noticed the marked silence and derisive attitudes. Dr. Loebman reported that one Japanese girl who had never used Japanese in his presence spoke in Japanese to other girls on Tuesday morning.

Dr. Marks noticed an attitude of disrespect on Tuesday morning and said that the Caucasian nurses reported "a definite air of hostility."

Staff Meeting:

A meeting of all appointed personnel was held at the staff recreation hall at noon and at this meeting the idea was expressed that the hospital was an unsafe place for Caucasians. Mr. Myer, when he was contacted later, agreed that the hospital staff should not return. They did not go back Tuesday afternoon, November 2, and stayed away until Friday, November 26, when they all returned. Dr. Pedicord recuperated in a Klamath Falls Hotel for four days and then returned to the Project. He accompanied the special segregation train out of Tule Lake, November 10.

Conclusion:

It cannot be stated from evidence at hand whether the attack upon Dr. Pedicord was premeditated or not.

It is possible that the groups of outsiders moved into the hospital shortly after lunch as their part of the mass demonstration around the administration building to keep the hospital under control. When Dr. Pedicord told them to leave, their antagonism toward the hospital which he headed, boiled up and they decided to express themselves by beating the doctor.

On the other hand, Miss Folda saw a gang of boys meet at the steps as if they had a pre-arranged plan in mind and go into the hospital. This apparently was the gang that called on and attacked Dr. Pedicord.

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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Project
Newell, California

Sep. 12, 1944

Tule Lake Report No. 33

History of Area B at Tule Lake - "The Stockade"

Why Area was Established: The need for a place where trouble-makers and those suspected of troublemaking could be segregated temporarily from the rest of the Japanese colony in the Tule Lake Center suddenly arose on the night of November 4, 1943, when gangs of young evacuee men swarmed through the administration area brandishing clubs and attacking WRA appointed personnel. The Army took control of the camp to restore order at the request of Project Director R. R. Best. A few days earlier, on November 1, a crowd of several thousand evacuees congregated at the administration building under the direction of certain leaders to back up the negotiating committee in their pressure tactics in a meeting with Mr. Myer and Mr. Best.

Eighteen Japanese were caught in the administration area the night of November 4. The next day the Army, at the request of and upon information furnished by the Internal Security, started picking up other men in the colony on suspicion of being connected with the incidents of November 1 and 4, of inciting trouble or of carrying on subversive or obstructive activities.

At the time it was contemplated that the men picked up would be held temporarily in the isolation area and eventually the citizens would be transferred to Leupp or to a section of the Tule Lake Center fenced off from the rest of the camp and the aliens would be turned over to the Department of Justice or likewise isolated in a special section of the Tule Lake Center. A few months later the prospect of liquidating the entire population of the isolation area grew strong enough to cause the abandonment of these plans.

Administrative Authority for Area B: Administrative regulations for Area B were issued April 26, 1944, as Manual Section 110.15, which stated in part:

at hand

"In order to promote the orderly administration of the Center and to maintain peace and security for the residents, it will be necessary from time to time further to restrict the movement and activities of persons whose influence or actions may be dis-

ruptive of the operation of the Center. Such persons, after investigation and decision by the Project Director, will be transferred either to a separate area within the Center, designated herein as Area B, or to an isolation center outside the project. Since further separation of individuals is a purely administrative arrangement to secure the peaceful and orderly administration of the Center, only such investigation need be made as is requisite for an administrative determination by the Project Director."

Fact-Finding Committee: To make this investigation the Manual established procedure for setting up a Fact-Finding Committee consisting of the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, the head of the Internal Security Section and the Project Attorney. In practice, the Fact-Finding Committee was more concerned with transfers out of Area B than with transfers to the area.

The Manual further states (110.15.2) that "residence of any individual in Area B or in an isolation center shall be for an indefinite period."

Mail Censored: All mail going into and coming from Area B was subject to censorship under the Manual regulations. Likewise no visitors were permitted to persons in the area except by permission of the Project Director.

Army in Charge November 5 to May 24: The Army, which assumed charge of the center on the night of November 4, was in charge of Area B until May 24. After the WRA assumed full charge of Area B, the Army continued to man watchtowers at three corners of the area. During Army control of Area B, the WRA Fact-Finding Committee and Internal Security made recommendations to the Project Director on the transfer of evacuees into and from Area B. The Project Director acted on such recommendations.

Growth of Area: The isolation area, officially called Area B and commonly called the stockade, was situated at approximately the same location northwest of the hospital for the entire period of its existence, November 5, 1943, to August 24, 1944. It grew in size from one Army tent to five barracks, a mess-hall and a bathhouse. The final site covered about two-thirds of an acre. It was enclosed by a high wire fence.

During November 209 male evacuees were picked up and placed in Area B. In December, 107 were isolated in the area; in January, 41; in February, 22; in March, 2; in April, 5; and in May, 10, or a total of 396.

Transferring of evacuees from Area B back to the colony

was started as soon as investigations could be made. In some cases the wrong person was picked up and he was immediately returned to the colony. Early release of other persons after examination of their dockets also took place. When it appeared that an individual could live peaceably in the main residential area, he was accordingly transferred. On May 31 the number in Area B had dwindled to 62 men.

Analysis of Occupants: These 62 probably comprised a cross-section of the total Area B population. On the basis of evidence the administration had considered it advisable to hold them in Area B for several months. Nearly all of them were suspected in connection with the November 1 and November 4 incidents, the exceptions notably being 12 agitators from Block 54 picked up in May.

An analysis of these 62 showed that about half of them (28) were under 30 years old. All but three of the 62 had been to Japan and all but seven had received some education there. Twenty-one were born in the United States, 12 in Hawaii and 29 in Japan. Only three of the men under 35 years old were born in Japan. Seventeen, including most of the leaders, came from the Jerome Relocation Center, 11 from Heart Mountain, eight were originally Tule Lake residents and seven were from Colorado River. The other centers were less represented.

Negotiating Committee Leaders: The leaders in Area B were the leaders of the Negotiating Committee which in November had attempted to pressure the administration into giving them control of the hospital, mess operations and other functions.

Prior to giving themselves up to the Army and the WRA on December 1, Kai and Kuratomi contacted their hand-picked representatives in the colony and pledged them to maintain the "status quo" and to continue to obstruct the administration. The "status quo" was a term which was soon accepted as representing those evacuees who did not want to do other than the bare minimum of work for the WRA, simply the essentials necessary to keep the mess halls functioning and the stoves going.

After entering Area B, Kai and Kuratomi continued to stimulate support for themselves in the colony by staging demonstrations. Their first move was a hunger strike.

First Demonstration by Men in Area B: This first demonstration of any consequence staged by the men in Area B started on New Year's Eve, December 31, 1943, when a written declaration signed by the 199 men in the area stated that they were henceforth refusing to eat until all were released simultaneously and unconditionally. There was evidence at the time that all of the men were not in accord with the

hunger strike and they were forced into it by leaders living in what was called "headquarters barrack." These leaders were the now-familiar names - Kai, Kuratomi, Uchida, Sugimoto, Mori, etc.

The leaders asked the colony to show their support and since a camp-wide hunger strike was not practical they were told to take three steps: Have all block managers resign, close all the canteens, and close all the offices.

However, none of these steps was taken although there is little doubt that the colony in general was in sympathy with the men in Area B rather than against them.

Hunger Strike Ends: The hunger strike ended at 6 p.m. on January 6 without any formality. One of the principal reasons apparently was the belief held by many that the leaders were cheating by eating fruit, candy and vitamin pills. This was never proved, but orange peels and candy bar wrappers were found around headquarters barrack and not around any of the other four.

During the hunger strike the Army held a medical inspection daily of the men. Some were growing weak at the end of the week's demonstration.

Leaders Retain Authority While in Area B: Through the numerous releases of men from Area B to the colony the leaders were able to maintain adequate contact with the colony. It appeared that these leaders wielded considerable influence in the colony in relations between the colony and the administration such as the voting over the return to work in January which resulted in a formal split of the colony into two factions, the "status quo" and those who favored employment by the WRA to the fullest possible extent. The vote was 60-40 in favor of going back to work. (After the murder of Y. Hitomi, Co-op. general manager, on July 2, there were rumors in the colony that the leaders in Area B had engineered the crime. These rumors were a further indication that the colony considered that the men in Area B had political authority and powerful support.)

The Area B group did not attempt further pressure tactics until after the area was taken over by the WRA. When releases continued at a slow rate and it appeared to the leaders that they would not be getting out of Area B for some time, they decided to try pressure once again.

Second Hunger Strike: The second hunger demonstration was started on July 19, 1944, the last previous meal having been supper on July 18. Although there were 16 men in Area B at the time, the cases of two had been previously reviewed and they were transferred out of the Area two days later without regard for the hunger demonstration.

The hunger strike was not recognized as such by the administration for several days. In the first place, there was no formal declaration as there had been in January even though the leaders were the same as then. Secondly, there was an undetermined amount of food in the Area B kitchen and missing supplies were unaccounted for. The administration had no way of knowing whether any of the men were eating as the Internal Security did not check minutely the food left at all times in the kitchen nor did they comb the premises of Area B, about 175 square yards, and they did not consider it important to do so and thereby build up a situation that harrassed the administration. Thirdly, it was hoped that the demonstration would be short-lived if no official recognition were taken of it.

On July 24, the 14 men were pursuing their fast and the Project Director and Reports Officer decided it was time to release the information to the public. This was done and thereafter the newspapers were informed of developments. The story was not given undue prominence in any paper.

Unlike the Army, the WRA did not make daily medical checks of the men in the area. It was decided to consider the men in Area B on the same basis as the other evacuee residents of the Tule Lake Center. The WRA considered Area B a part of the whole center, not a place of imprisonment to which a man was committed for a definite length of time. The Internal Security called roll every six hours and the men were asked if they wanted anything. When medical attention was requested for any of the group, he was taken to the hospital where the doctor on call examined him and gave the only diagnosis possible. If the man from Area B refused to accept hospital treatment, which meant eating, he was returned to the area. If he accepted treatment he was hospitalized and later discharged on the same basis as any other patient.

During the demonstration, six men were taken to the hospital, usually at the request of others in the group who told Internal Security officers that they appeared in need of treatment. Of these six taken to the hospital, all but one refused treatment until all went to the hospital on July 29. The one exception, Toko Yamane, entered the hospital on July 25, and was discharged to return to Area B, on July 28. While he was in the hospital two others stayed overnight in the hospital and returned to Area B without accepting treatment.

First Break in Strike: On July 29, the Project Director and the Reports Officer decided that the administration could not continue to recognize the hunger strike as genuine for two main reasons: First, the quantity of food in Area B unaccounted for; second, the presence in Area B of Yamane who had continued taking nourishment after returning to Area B from the hospital.

A news release to this effect was issued. Later the same day all of the men in the area asked to be taken to the hospital. They were all hospitalized that night. It appeared that this was to be a face-saving conclusion of the demonstration. Also, they had a chance to learn from Yamane of the good food and attention he received at the hospital.

They remained in the hospital for different lengths of time, all at least a week, and some longer, depending upon their recovery from the effects of the fast. Although they received excellent food and careful attention their recovery was retarded by their poor cooperation with hospital authorities, by refusal to stay in bed, and by walking around. While Internal Security men guarded them, colony contacts were made by evacuee nurses and nurses aides.

Resume Fast: All were back in Area B by August 7 and they immediately resumed their hunger strike. Because the administration could not establish definitely that they were going without food, it took the position that Area B was a part of the center and what the residents in it did without causing disorder was of no exceptional concern to the administration.

Officials Contact Men: From the start of the hunger strike on July 19, Willard E. Schmidt, Chief of Internal Security, and other Internal Security and administration people had made numerous contacts with the men in Area B. They first told Mr. Schmidt that they were not going to eat until they saw Mr. Best. After George Kuratomi, as spokesman, had been taken to see Mr. Best, the group said they would not eat until released from Area B or until told exactly when they would be released. This was in line with the Area B leaders' insistence on regarding their residence in Area B as a jail sentence. They professed to be ignorant of the reasons for their isolation in spite of detailed explanations by the WRA.

Release of All Planned: The administration was considering the release of all the men in Area B at the time they started the hunger strike. Without making any promise and with no attempt whatsoever to bargain with the men, Mr. Schmidt tried to get them to see the futility of the demonstration. It was probable that the men, when they started their fast, wanted to continue it until the representative of the Spanish Consul, Captain Martin, visited the camp July 28 and 29. He was not given permission to visit them since all were American citizens. On July 29 the men asked to be taken again to the hospital for treatment.

Relatives Visit: Wives and children of several of the men were taken to the Area B office for visits. It is interesting to note that even after the strike had been on for 10 days, men

were able to pick up children weighing 30 to 40 pounds and hold them. Some of the wives urged the men to eat.

Strike Ends Again: About 9 p.m. on August 12 the men in Area B sent for Mr. Schmidt. They told him that one of the men was in bad condition and should be taken to the hospital. Mr. Schmidt told them that none could go to the hospital because they had refused to follow the doctors' orders after leaving the hospital the previous time. The men then told him they would confer further. In ten minutes they said they had decided to end their demonstration. Dr. J. C. Sleath, Chief Medical Officer, supervised the preparation of hot cereal at the hospital which was taken to Area B about midnight. After the men had started to eat, the man about whose health the others were concerned was taken to the hospital. The men continued to eat and, after getting over the initial discomfort of ending a prolonged fast, recovered rapidly. The administration heard that the men saved face by telling the colony that they had come to a satisfactory agreement with the administration and thus could end their fast.

Divided Opinion on Extent of Fast: At the time the whole group went to the hospital on July 29 opinion was divided among doctors and nurses as to whether or not the men had been on a total fast. They dieted on water, but supposedly ate nothing. Some nurses and doctors believed some had been eating and others said it was too difficult to determine. The men were weak and upon breaking their fast suffered visibly from cramps and upset stomach.

Support of Second Hunger Strike: This demonstration appeared to receive divided support from the colony. When it came to a choice of supporting the Area B group or of being on the administration's side, the colony probably was united behind the Area B group. However, there was little active support of the course they were pursuing. The hospital staff, for instance, very carefully avoided any political entanglements over the matter of treating the Area B men and the latter were treated by the doctor on duty regardless of whether he was evacuee or Caucasian.

Small Group of Women Active: Eight or nine women with close attachments to men in Area B (wives, sisters, sweethearts, future mothers-in-law, etc.) were very active in trying to arouse the colony on behalf of the men in Area B. A petition which appealed sympathetically for transfer of the men to the colony because they had been separated from their families so many months was circulated during the hunger strike, but did not reach the administration. It was reportedly burned by Mrs. Kai, Reverend Kai's wife.

These women staged a sit down in the project attorney's

office on the morning of July 28. The project attorney called in Mr. Schmidt who talked the women into going home shortly after noon.

A singular sit-down was staged by Singer Terada, George Kuratomi's girl friend, at the Internal Security office on Saturday, June 10. She said she would not move until George was released from Area L and they could be married. Since she was expecting a baby, every effort was made to get her to go home. Even her doctor, an evacuee, tried unsuccessfully. About 3 a.m. Sunday morning, June 11, she finally consented to be taken home. On Tuesday her baby was born.

Signally to Colony: When the men returned to Area B from the hospital, the wallboard which had been placed on the fence of Area B on the side facing the colony had been removed for use in the construction of the new Area B in the west corner of the military area. This enabled the men in Area B to be seen by evacuees standing in the colony area. The women and others frequently appeared in the evening to signal and to write in the air to the Area B men who signalled back.

Women Make Threat: On August 11, at about 10 p.m., eight of these women appeared at a small gate in the colony fence close to the Internal Security headquarters. They used abusive language to the Internal Security men on duty, threatened their lives and made the threat that if the men in Area B were not taken to the hospital by the next morning, the women would bring an organized gang to the administration area and do something about it.

The next morning they appeared at Gate 3, the main gate to the colony. Since they had attempted a sit-down strike in the project attorney's office, these women were not given permission to go to the administration area. After a couple of hours they left the gate and nothing eventful happened. The same night, August 12, the men ended their fast.

Rev. Kai One of First Transferred: Rev. Kai, leader of the Negotiating Committee, was transferred from the stockade on August 17 with another man. This was in the nature of a strategic move on the part of the administration to deflate Kai's ego and discredit his leadership by transferring him ahead of the others. On August 24, George Kuratomi, spokesman for the Negotiating Committee, and two others were transferred. The next day the last seven were transferred together.

Since the return of the recalcitrant 14 to the colony they have not been evident in any activity in relation to the administration and have been peaceable and on the whole unobtrusive.

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/s/ Harry L. Black

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