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CHAPTER II

Part I

THE TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTERHistory of events prior to arrival of field worker

The situation at the Tule Lake Segregation Center was distinctly less favorable to ^{field work} ~~sociological investigation~~ than that at the Gila Center. The evacuees confined in Tule Lake were segregated from the other Centers in September and October of 1943, because they had indicated that their loyalties lay with Japan. The criteria used as the basis of segregation were chiefly an application for repatriation or expatriation and / or a negative answer to Question 28 on the Military Registration Questionnaire which asked the evacuee to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and forswear any allegiance to the Emperor of Japan and, if he were a citizen of the United States, to swear willingness to defend the United States from attack.¹

The Tule Lake Center had begun its existence as a Relocation Center. When the policy of segregation was adopted, those residents of Tule Lake who were considered loyal to the United States were transferred to other Centers while some 6000 individuals, considered disloyal, remained. Approximately 8,600 persons were moved into Tule Lake from the nine Relocation Centers.² All the segregees, however, were not technically disloyal. A large number of "loyal" children had accompanied "disloyal" parents and many "loyal" parents had

1. The criteria of segregation were quite complex. See Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., pp. 85-87.

2. In February and May of 1944 some 3,600 additional segregees were sent to Tule Lake.

accompanied "disloyal" children.]

On their arrival at Tule Lake the incoming segregees were confronted by a sight which they had not seen in their original Centers of residence: a newly constructed, formidable, man-proof, barbed wire topped fence, along which watch towers manned by armed soldiers were spaced. *with barbed wire like the one which surrounded the* The Army guard was much larger than at the *German* Relocation Centers. *concentration* No fence, however, separated the administrative buildings from the Japanese quarters.

Housing quarters were allotted amid great confusion, for many of those segregees who had been pre-segregation residents of Tule Lake had, without consulting the administration, moved into the better barracks as they were vacated by the loyal residents transferred to other Centers. They had also appropriated furnishings and even wall board from the temporarily empty barracks. *Some* Some of the barracks were extremely dirty. To the newcomers, almost all of the facilities of their new Center of residence appeared inferior to those of the Relocation Centers. This was interpreted by many as evidence of ill will on the part of the administration. The administration, in fact, had been busily occupied in the enormous labor involved in facilitating the egress and ingress of thousands of people. In any case, resentment against the administration increased, and complaints were heard on all sides.)

The Farm Strike uprising -- Residents attempt to gain concessions from the administration -- Deadlock between the United States Army and the residents

On October 15, two weeks after the first contingent of segregees arrived, a truck transporting Japanese workmen to the project farm turned over.¹ Some thirty men were injured, several severely. One died within a few days.

1. The farmers at work were also under the surveillance of armed soldiers.

The Japanese farm workers refused to return to work. The residents, under the guidance of leaders who had attained some prestige in the Relocation Centers from which they had come, selected a representative body. This body determined to use the farm work stoppage as a means of obtaining a mitigation of the grievances of the entire population. In this, they had strong support from the residents, who believed that the housing, food, sanitary, and hospital facilities of their new center of residence were in great need of improvement.

When the farmer's death was announced, several groups of evacuees approached the administration and requested the use of the high school auditorium for a public funeral. The administration refused. In defiance of the administration, a public funeral was held on the outdoor stage customarily used for entertainments.

On October 26 a Japanese Negotiating Committee approached the administration with a long list of the peoples' grievances, stating that the farmers were resolved to continue the work stoppage until the administration gave assurance that their complaints would receive attention. The Project Director ^{met with them} promised to do what he could to ^{relieve} relieve the situation. However, ~~without acquainting the representative body or the residents with his intention,~~ he brought in "loyal" Japanese from the Relocation Centers to harvest the crop. This action deprived the residents of their only important bargaining point ~~the ripe crop which would spoil at great loss if not harvested immediately.~~ Moreover, it was widely viewed as a breach of trust on the part of the administration. Hostility against certain higher members of the administrative staff and the Japanese strike-breakers became intense.

On November 1, Dillon Myer, National Director of the WRA visited

1. The "loyal" farm workers were housed in tents at some distance from the living quarters of the segregates.

the project. Seizing this opportunity to appeal directly to him, the Negotiating Committee engineered a mass demonstration during which several thousand residents surrounded the administrative buildings. The behavior of the great mass of the crowd was most orderly. However, a group of young roughnecks entered the hospital and were ordered to leave by the Caucasian chief medical officer, who was an extremely unpopular man. They attacked him and beat him severely. When order had been restored, the Negotiating Committee again presented its list of grievances. Mr. Myer promised to investigate the complaints and take action if they were justified. The crowd then dispersed quietly.

Three nights later a fight broke out between a group of young Japanese and a few Caucasians, who, it was thought, were attempting to transport food from the project warehouses to the strike breakers.¹ The Project Director ^{(possibly in the report), that he is not a strike breaker} fearing ~~violence~~ against his person, turned the jurisdiction of the camp over to the ~~United States~~ Army. The Army arrested several young men who were found in the administrative area and confined them.

This encounter had been accompanied by little noise and ~~many~~ ^{many} residents were ignorant of the fact that the Army had taken over the camp. The next morning, therefore, about 1000 people proceeded as usual to their work in the Administrative section.² They were met by a cordon of soldiers and a barrage of tear gas. Angered and bewildered, they returned to their apartments.

The construction of a man-proof fence separating the administrative buildings from the evacuee quarters was begun immediately, and a similar fence built around the hospital. All work was suspended, since all residents were confined to the Japanese section.

1. This fracas was known as "the riot" or the warehouse fight. It is referred to repeatedly in the discussion to follow.

2. Up to this time only the farmers had stopped work.

Within a few days the Japanese doctors and nurses aides and reduced garbage and coal crews resumed work as a result of a conference between the Army and the Negotiating Committee. The Army, however, wished to keep potential trouble makers behind the fence and would allow no one to return to work until his record had been examined. The delay that ensued made matters very difficult for the Negotiating Committee which was caught between the Army's stand and the attitude of the residents, who did not see why some persons should be allowed to return to work while others were not. Nine days passed during which the tenuous rapport between the Army and the Negotiating Committee decreased. Both parties then agreed to hold a mass meeting at which the Lieutenant Colonel and members of the Negotiating Committee would speak, each explaining the situation to the residents.

When the matter was put before the larger representative body a factional dispute arose, certain members holding that the Army was not allowing the Japanese sufficient time to speak. Despite strong opposition from Mr. Kuratomi¹, the chairman, the anti-mass meeting faction swayed the body into voting not to attend the mass meeting. Messages to this effect were thereupon sent to the blocks.

The Army, however, was not informed of this decision. At the appointed time, the Lieutenant Colonel and the regional director of the WRA entered the camp with a strong military escort and took their places on the outdoor stage. Not a person came to hear them. They delivered their speeches nonetheless, the Lieutenant Colonel reading a proclamation announcing complete military control of the Center and imposing a curfew.

The next day the Army began to arrest the members of the Negotiating Committee and other men suspected of being leaders of the

1. Almost all of the Japanese names used in this paper are pseudonyms. I have employed the names used by Thomas and Nishimoto in The Spoilage.

Farm Strike uprising. ~~It was hoped that with the leaders apprehended, the people would return to work as jobs were distributed.~~ The residents, however, now refused to return to work until the apprehended men were released. A partial strike ensued, and only those Japanese whose work was necessary for the welfare of the residents, i. e., mess workers, coal and garbage crews, doctors, block managers, continued to work. The Army continued its efforts to root the leadership out of the Center and arrests mounted to the hundreds. A special stockade, located at some distance from the Japanese quarters, was built to house the detainees.

For over two months the residents maintained their partial strike. However, as the weeks passed, the monotony of a life without employment or recreation, the strict curfew, and the hardships imposed by the loss of the monthly pay check and clothing allowance¹ markedly decreased the enthusiasm of the earlier period of the uprising. It became increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that the situation was hopeless.

In a desperate attempt to bolster the weakening morale of the residents, certain unapprehended members of the representative body called upon the board of directors of the Center's Co-operative Enterprise and demanded that the Co-op cease selling all "luxury items" such as ice cream, soft drinks, cosmetics and dress goods. The Co-op stores were the only legitimate places inside the Center where a resident could spend money, and the representative body hoped that with this source of temptation removed, the hardships of the strike would be

1. Employed evacuees were paid salaries ranging from 12 to 19 dollars a month plus a clothing allowance. An unemployed individual was obliged to appeal to social welfare for a clothing allowance. Since only food and shelter were furnished the evacuees and since the clothing allowance was suspended during the strike, the lack of a paycheck was a considerable hardship, particularly to families with a number of small children.

easier to bear. However, the Co-op board members, most of whom had not been enthusiastic about the strike, were hostile to the proposition.

The Rise of the Co-ordinating Committee under Army and Administration sponsorship -- The end of the strike

In mid-December, a new group of Japanese leaders among which were some high ranking Co-op officers responded to the advances of the WRA administration and, with strong administrative assistance, attempted to influence the residents to abandon the strike. The members of this new body of leaders, which was known as the Co-ordinating Committee, were promptly stigmatized as inu of the vilest type by the more vociferous supporters of the uprising. In mid-January ~~another~~^a ballot was arranged through the combined efforts of the Co-ordinating Committee, the WRA administration and the Army, and the residents voted to abandon the strike by the barest majority. The Army withdrew and the WRA resumed control, using the Co-ordinating Committee as a liason body. Many evacuees returned to work and were now allowed to enter the administrative section with a pass, submitted to the armed soldier at the gate and supplied only for legitimate business.

Many residents, however, seethed with resentment against the administration and against the Japanese Co-ordinating Committee. Almost half of the people had been in favor of continuing the strike. Many of those who had voted to abandon it had little desire to cooperate with the administration beyond the alleviation of the uncomfortable strike situation. Some of the unapprehended minor leaders of the uprising and their ardent supporters applied themselves unceasingly to the recovery of the power which had slipped from their hands. Their chief occupations were spreading propaganda to discredit the Co-ordinating Committee and agitating to obtain the release of the men detained in the stockade. The residents, on the whole, had little respect for these "trouble-makers," but disliked the Co-ordinating

Committee and were of the opinion that many of the men confined in the stockade were innocent. Consequently, the agitators, though not popular themselves, received considerable support from public opinion.

Hostility and distrust toward Caucasians and hatred of the inu were far stronger than they had been in the Gila Center. The fear of becoming known as an inu was all pervading. A Caucasian who entered the Japanese section of the camp without legitimate reason was commonly thought to have only one motive: to spy. A Japanese receiving a Caucasian in his barrack was in danger of being labelled an inu on the spot.

This was the state of affairs when the writer began work in the Tule Lake Center in February of 1944.

History of Events after Arrival of Field Worker

Struggle between the Co-ordinating Committee and the underground group --

Undergroup ^{and} group becomes Resegregation Group -- The first petition

During the months of March and April 1944, the major political phenomena of the camp was a struggle between the Co-ordinating Committee and the unreconciled adherents of the November uprising, who were now working underground to avoid arrest. This underground group was considerably strengthened ~~XXXXX~~ by the arrival of certain men from Santa Fe, the Department of Justice Internment Camp, prominent among whom was a certain Mr. Mr. Yamashita. These men from Santa Fe had contributed to anti-administrative disturbances in Relocation Centers before their internment and were agitators of experience and some prestige. In addition, the underground group established a connection with Mr. Kira, a powerful gang leader from the Manzanar Center.¹ Kira was reputed to have been the moving spirit of a pre-evacuation gang on Terminal Island, California, and was also credited with having instigated much of the violence which occurred in the Manzanar Center

1. The major contingent of segragees from Manzanar did not enter Tule Lake until mid-February of 1944.

(the Manzanar riot).¹ He was a very clever man, however, and possessed a genius for using other people as cats-paws. Though the authorities may have suspected his connection with unsavory activities, they were never able to obtain evidence. Moreover, his status as a United States citizen and a veteran of World War I was considerable protection.

These experienced agitators joined forces with the underground group and continued the propaganda campaign against the Co-ordinating Committee. They spread rumors to the effect that the members of the Co-ordinating Committee were inu, that they were not "true Japanese,"² that they had betrayed the people to the administration and that had the Committee not initiated the referendum vote of January, the people would have triumphed in the strike. They added to the constant stream of rumors that the members and supporters of the Co-ordinating Committee were being paid large sums of money by the administration and that they were making large profits in graft at the expense of the residents and with the connivance of the administration. The officers of the Center's Co-operative Enterprise, who had supported the Co-ordinating Committee's political coup, were particularly singled out as inu and grafters par excellence.³

1. See Ch. II, footnote on page 74.

2. Although no one ever defined clearly what the term "true Japanese" meant, it was to become the accepted overt ideal of the Center residents. The pressure groups used the amorphous term incessantly in their attempts to influence the residents. Anyone who counselled even a modicum of cooperation with the administration or spoke against the policies of the pressure groups was stigmatized as "not true Japanese." In fact, if one individual developed an antipathy to another, it was not uncommon for him to find or invent evidence and begin a whispering campaign, pointing out that whatever the disliked person was doing was not "true Japanese."

3. It will be remembered that the underground group bore the Co-op a grudge. The Co-op board of directors had not cooperated with the Farm Strike Representative Body, when the latter group attempted to keep the residents to the strike. Moreover, several members of the Co-ordinating Committee were ex-officers of the Co-op.

The Co-ordinating Committee countered with propaganda to the effect that the activities of their opponents were "un-Japanese" and that "true Japanese" were people who behaved in an orderly manner and did not bring hardship and misery upon their fellow residents.

The propaganda of the undergroup group was by far the more effective. General hostility against the Co-ordinating Committee steadily increased. This, interestingly enough, was not accompanied by popular approval of the underground agitators who were generally feared and disliked. The residents, in short, were predisposed to repeat and, to some extent, believe almost any rumor about the "inu." They did not, however, want any more "big trouble." In fact, it is probable that most of the residents did not know the source of many of the rumors.

In April of 1944 the undergroup ^{had} group, using a minor leader as spokesman, asked the administration for permission to circulate a petition. They argued as follows:

It was obvious that there were two groups of different mind in the Center. One group was represented by persons who wished to return to Japan as soon as possible. During that period in which circumstances forced them to remain in America, this group wished to lead a Japanese life and educate their children in the Japanese manner.

The other group was represented by persons who were "fence-sitters", loyal neither to Japan nor the United States, who wished to remain in the Tule Lake Center until the end of the war and then make up their minds with which country they would cast their lot.

Since the Center was inhabited by two groups of different mind, friction would never cease.

Therefore: let the administration remove the "fence-sitters" from the Center.

The means for distinguishing those "loyal to Japan" from those "loyal to America" was provided by the petition itself. All who would

sign it were loyal to Japan; all who would not sign it were "fence-sitters."

The administration, without consulting the Co-ordinating Committee, gave permission for the circulation of the petition with the proviso that it was not to be regarded as official or as a guarantee of any future policy. Though reliable data are lacking, it does not appear that the framers of the petition kept to the proviso. Instead, they presented the petition as a legitimate, approved means of determining who wished to be resegregated and who wished to remain in Tule Lake. Hearing of this, the administration published a strong statement, denying that the petition had any significance beyond means of allowing residents to express their views.

This petition formulated a decision which many if not most of the residents did not wish to make. As the framers of the petition correctly pointed out, the Center was full of fence-sitters who desired to remain in their place of refuge until the end of the war. But should they refuse to sign the petition, they would stigmatize themselves as "un-Japanese" and possibly as "inu." Moreover, the petition was presented as if it had official sanction. Therefore, reasoned the evacuees, it might well be an administrative device toward a future resegregation and all who did not sign it would be ejected from the Center. If they signed and later changed their minds, they would probably be allowed to retract, as had been possible with the Military Questionnaire. Great excitement and confusion prevailed. Thousands of people signed the petition. Everyone stated forcefully that the fence-sitters ought to get out - but no one was willing to admit that he was a fence-sitter. When, a few days later, the administration published its statement denying the petition official sanction, the excitement slowly abated.

In addition to stirring up a great deal of excitement and confusion,

the petition put the harassed Co-ordinating Committee out of existence. The members of this body resigned, bitterly resenting the fact that the administration, without consulting them, had recognized their fanatical opponents to this extent.

The Resegregation Group, the name now given to the underground organization, frustrated in the attempt to force action from the administration, now turned its energies to activities calculated to keep the Center in a constant state of tension and thereby prove to the WRA authorities in Washington that trouble would not stop until a resegregation took place. The leaders continued to pour out propaganda against the now ex-members of the Co-ordinating Committee and other so-called inu, who were usually individuals who counselled a modicum of cooperation with the administration. Fantastic accusations of graft at the expense of the residents were levelled against certain men who held high positions in the Co-op. A story was circulated to the effect that the recently arrived residents from the Manzanar Relocation Center, many of whom lived in a group at one end of the camp, wished to start a separate Co-op, and that Mr. Noma, the General Manager of the Tule Lake Co-op had attempted to bribe Mr. Kira, the alleged gangster and Resegregation Group leader,¹ with a large sum of money to put his influence behind bringing the residents from Manzanar into the Tule Lake Co-op. In truth, it is probable that Kira wanted to dominate the Co-op himself and was frustrated in this attempt by Noma and other board members.

This propaganda was very effective for the people were bored and disgruntled. The stories were embroidered in the manner of folk-tales and probably were not always originated by the agitators. Hostility against the inu rose during April and May of 1944, until the talk of their evil doings was the dominant motif of camp conversation.

1. See Ch. II, pp. 47-8.

Simultaneously, the Resegregation Group carried on a feud with Mr. Tada, the ex-chief of police and alleged vice-king of the Center. The feud arose owing to the fact that both Tada's faction and the Resegregation Group leaders were attempting to get the leaders of the Farm Strike uprising out of the stockade. Tada, who was a close friend of Kuratomi, the chairman of the Farm Strike representative body, had been released from the stockade in April. After his release, he incurred the disapproval of the Resegregationists by refusing to sign their petition. Yamashita is said to have approached Tada and to have urged him to join the Resegregationists, saying: "We have 9000 people (signatures) here now and great power. If you should belong to a power like that you can do yourself very nice."¹

Tada, however, did not wish to become a cog in the Resegregationist machine. He did not sign the petition and he continued to work independently to get his friends out of the stockade. The Resegregationist leaders thereupon began to circulate rumors to the effect that Tada was an inu, pointing to the fact that he visited the administrative area frequently as, indeed, he did, to plead and intrigue for the detainees. The Center residents were becoming increasingly obsessed with the idea that inu were spying on their every word and deed, and soon almost the entire Center believed that Tada too was an inu.

When Tada became aware of the rumors he guessed the source and called on Mr. Yamashita, the powerful underground leader of the Resegregation Group, threatening to beat his head in if he did not stop the canard. Yamashita denied any knowledge of the matter. Tada did not carry out his threat. The Resegregationists did not attempt to beat him -- for an excellent reason: Tada, like Kira, had a gang who could be counted upon to avenge him.

1. Verbatim statement from Tada, Field Notes, Mar. 6, 1945, p. 7.

In late May of 1944, a Japanese was shot and killed by a sentry under circumstances which made it appear very doubtful that the sentry had been given provocation. The residents were shocked, grieved, and very bitter. The WRA personnel handled the incident with intelligence and consideration, and no evidences of a violent mass protest appeared. It was rumored, however, that Mr. Kira had threatened that if the sentry were not punished severely, some Caucasian would pay with his life. The sentry was not punished and Mr. Kira did not carry out his threat.

In late May of 1944, the administration also attempted to foster the election of a new and permanent representative body to replace the Coordinating Committee. The Resegregationist leaders viewed this as a threat to their ambitions and did their best to sabotage the preliminary meetings. They scarcely needed to exert themselves, for the residents in general regarded the proposed measure with indifference and cynicism. When the meetings were held at which candidates were to be nominated, most blocks put up no nominees and some did not even hold meetings. This failure was received with great satisfaction by many of the residents. They held that such an election would comprise an act of disloyalty to the still imprisoned Farm Strike representatives and that no one would accept the position lest he be called an inu. Beneath these overtly expressed attitudes was, however, an equally significant covert sentiment: a thorough satisfaction in having frustrated, even if passively, a proposal of the disliked administration.

The Resegregation Group adds terrorization to agitation -- the inu beatings -- the murder of Mr. Noma

A series of mysterious beatings added to the mounting tension of May and June. Certain men, some of whom had openly criticised the activities of the Resegregation Group were attacked at night and

severely beaten. Mr. Noma's brother, who held a minor executive position in the Co-op, had his skull fractured. Several of the beatings were engineered by Mr. Kira. Each assault was followed by rumors that the victim had been an inu and satisfaction that another "dog" had met his just fate was widely voiced among the people. As the beatings continued there were whispers of black lists, on which the more guilty of the inu were said to be listed in order of importance. Simultaneously the fear of falling into this despised and dangerous category increased.

The attackers were not apprehended. It is doubtful that many residents knew that Kira's gang was responsible for some of the outrages. On the other hand, many probably suspected that a group of violently disposed members of the Resegregation Group were involved. For weeks gossip about the beatings, the evil inu, and the fact that the administration could not find the assailants, dominated conversation. A frenetic atmosphere of anxiety and unrest hung over the Center. The mixture of hatred, fear, and tension is illustrated by the statement of a Nisei woman, who, after expressing violent hatred of the inu, added: "I think everybody is nervous in here. This place gives me the willies."¹

On the morning of July 3, after the extreme tension had prevailed about six weeks, Mr. Noma, General Manager of the Co-op, who had been the subject of particularly vicious gossip spread by the Resegregation Group leaders, was found lying over the doorstep of a relative with his throat cut. The remaining members of the Co-op's board of directors received an anonymous communication to the effect that they would be next. About 15 of the most notorious inu, including the evacuee chief of police (Mr. Tada's successor) fled the camp with their families and were given quarters on the administrative side of the fence. Some two weeks later the Japanese members of the police force resigned in a body.

1. Field Notes, June 24, 1944.

58. a
During the course of which ~~that~~ all of them were hospitalized. ^{1 and from Aug 14 to 24 they were all finally released.}

The Resegregation Group leaders, therefore, decided to wait no longer to put their organizational plans into operation. On August 12 they organized a young men's group devoted to the study of Japanese history and culture. The intimate connection of this club with the leaders of the Resegregation Group was, however, carefully concealed from the administration ^{from many of} and the residents. Yamashita and Kira remained discreetly in the background. The nominal founder of the club was a young Buddhist priest ^{who believed}. The rather innocuous initial lectures, ^{on the spiritual aspects of Japanese culture,} delivered in the High School auditorium with the permission of the administration, ^{which} harmonized ~~ideally~~ with the prevailing Center ~~pattern~~ of attitudes which obligated all "true Japanese", i. e., all persons who did not wish to be dubbed "fence-sitters", ^{"fence-sitters" meant} to show interest in Japanese culture. Within a few weeks a membership of 600 to 800 young men was attained.

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A few weeks after this club was organized, the Farm Strike leaders were released. Now, at last, the Resegregation Group leaders had their long awaited opportunity to join forces with the "peoples' representatives" and face the administration with an organized front. Their plans, however, went awry. Kuratomi, the chairman of the Farm Strike Representative, and ^{Kai} ~~also~~, his friend and advisor, who had been the most influential Farm Strike leaders, fought shy of active participation in the Resegregation Group and resumed their friendship with Mr. Tada, the alleged vice king. Matters came to a head in mid-September, when the law enforcement authorities of the county made a belated attempt to solve the Noma murder by threatening to indict a number of prominent Resegregationists and Kuratomi, ^{Kai} ~~also~~, and Tada for plotting the murder. Greatly alarmed, these threatened individuals decided to ask assistance

1. This was the detainees second hunger strike. Six months before when several hundred men were still confined, they had attempted a brief hunger strike which was abandoned when the leaders could not control the reluctant members of the rank and file.

from the American Civil Liberties Union. Kuratomi took the initiative and suggested that all should sign the letter and all contribute to the retainer. The Resegregationist leaders, however, stated that they would not demean themselves by putting their names on the same piece of paper with a man of Mr. Yada's evil reputation. Each faction thereupon sent a separate letter to the A. C. L. U., the Resegregationists copying Mr. Kuratomi's original draft and sending it with their signatures attached. This made Mr. Kuratomi more irate than ever. Nevertheless, this quarrel remained on a personal rather than a public level for many months. Kuratomi and ^{Kai}~~the~~, who had a nominal connection with the Resegregation Group (because their wives had signed the April petition for them by proxy) did not ask that their names be removed. Nor did their friends and followers leave the organization. Outwardly, at least, the appearance of amicable relations was maintained.

Failing in this attempt to join forces with the only leaders who appeared to be potentially dangerous rivals, did not stop the Resegregation Group leaders. They determined to proceed, encouraged by the fact that the administration had not censured the formation of the Young Men's Group. They re-opened the issue of separating the "true Japanese" from the "fence-sitters" by circulating another petition, this time without asking permission of the administration. In the words of Mr. Yamashita, any person who refused to sign this second petition would "be known to be not loyal to Japan and would be told in public, 'You are not Japanese!'"¹

Unlike the April petition, this attempt at first caused no furor among the residents. Many regarded the document with indifference. Some made fun of it, at least before trusted friends. Thousands, however, signed it, just to be on the safe side. Since the administration immediately announced that the petition had no official sanction and

1. Field Notes, Sept. 21, 1944, p. 5.

rebuffed the Resegregationists, the residents did not believe they could be bound by their signatures. By signing, they escaped being called fence-sitters.

The Resegregationists now proceeded openly to form two dues paying organizations: one for all families who had signed the petition and thereby indicated their supposed desire to be Resegregants; another, for the young men of the "Study Group". The connection between this latter group and the adult Resegregation Group was now admitted, and the young men openly began to engage in Japanese nationalistic activities. They drilled in the early mornings to harden their bodies for the service of the Emperor; they purchased bugles and awoke the entire Center with inept Japanese bugle calls, they wore a uniform, consisting of a sweat shirt with the emblem of the rising sun on the breast. Open meetings were held in mess halls at which the leaders, emerging from their underground anonymity, pictured the advantages which membership in their organization would bring after the return to Japan, and voiced threats against those residents in camp who might attempt to resist their powerful organizations.

Resentment against these leaders and disapproval of their policies began to crystallize. Courageous individuals who had long been criticizing the policies of the Resegregation Group leaders with caution, now began to speak their minds openly. One elderly man named Itabashi spoke at a meeting of his church and pleaded with the young men to refrain from activities which would bring hardship on the women and children in camp. He held that the path of a "true Japanese" was one of order and decency and not one of foolish defiance of authority without just cause. Shortly thereafter, Kira's gang brutally beat Itabashi and two other elderly men who had also spoken against the Resegregationists. The victims refused to name their as-

sailants, fearing that the gang would take vengeance on their families. A few days after the beating, Mr. Kira, speaking at a Resegregationist meeting pointedly hinted at what might happen to other obstructionists by quoting a proverb: "The little insects must die so that the big insects may live."

Two weeks after the Itabashi beating, a young man, the son of a critic of Mr. Kira was knifed across the temple by Kira's chief lieutenant -- the same man who had led the beating of Itabashi. At the trial the victim gave confusing testimony and asked for clemency for his attacker. The attacker was given a 90 day sentence, for the authorities were led to believe that the incident represented only a drunken quarrel. Kira and Yamashita, pointing to the light sentence, boasted openly of the fact that they could protect their own.

Some of the members of the Resegregation Group, especially the more recent converts, began to perceive that they had been duped. They stopped attending meetings and thought up tactful excuses to make to the "hard-minded" boys who called on them and asked why they had absented themselves. Most of the members, however, did not dare to show this independence.

While the power of the Resegregation Group increased week by week, Kuratomi and Tada said and did very little. Kuratomi stated that he had resolved to lead a quiet life and that he was devoting himself to work in the Buddhist church. Tada pretended to be spending all of his time drinking and gambling.

On November 3 the Resegregationists organized a tremendous ceremony to celebrate the birthday of the Emperor Meiji. The Young Men's group marched and several thousand people stood motionless for over an hour listening to nationalistic speeches. At the close of the ceremony, the Japanese national anthem was sung and the assembly bowed to the rising sun (which was not visible on that overcast day)

to the tune of a Japanese bugle call.

Shortly after this ceremony Mr. Kira met his first major setback. He contemplated silencing opposition within the Center by a spectacular deed of violence in which several men were to be beaten in one night. A rumor of this plan came to a man named Oishi, who for many months had been watching Kira's career with anger and alarm. Oishi had evidence of many of Kira's past misdeeds and determined that he would stop the terrorism.¹ He sent a dossier of Kira's misdeeds to two Japanese friends residing outside of Tule Lake with the instruction that if he (Oishi) were killed or if he gave the word, this dossier should be given to the F. B. I. He then sent Kira an ultimatum: if Kira engineered another beating, he himself would denounce him. There were no more beatings.

The leaders of the Farm Strike uprising and the "gamblers" rise against the Resegregation Group

In late November the Kuratomi-Tada faction rose against the Resegregationists. The Resegregation Group leaders brought this open declaration of hostilities upon themselves. Once their organizations were well under way, they decided to purge themselves of unworthy members. Most of Kuratomi's and Tada's followers were nominal members of the Resegregation Group and, in the opinion of the Resegregation Group leaders, these men, whom they stigmatized as "gamblers and sake drinkers" were a blot on their membership list. They, therefore,

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1. Oishi was himself a renowned agitator, having been chairman of a negotiating committee at the time of the uprising in Manzanar. After an imprisonment in jail and a subsequent detention in the Moab and Isuppe Centers for Nisei "trouble-makers" he had given the authorities his word that he would avoid all political activity. He was the writer's best informant and will appear frequently in the discussion to come.

began yet another propaganda campaign which contrasted the stoic Japanese virtues for which they stood with the vice for which they said Kuratomi and Tada stood, voiced the intent to "clean up the Center" and when they thought they had obtained the sympathy of the general residents, sent Kuratomi and Tada's followers curt notices of excommunication.

Much as the so-called "gamblers and sake-drinkers" ^{disliked} hated the Resegregationists, they grew furiously angry at being ejected from membership in this ^{insulting} manner. On the evening of November 19th, when a crowd of several hundred people had gathered to bid farewell to a number of families who were on their way to join interned members in the Department of Justice camp at Crystal City, Tetsuo Kodama, a ^{very strong and strong} noted black belt judo champion¹ and a ^{close} friend of Kuratomi, ^{and Tada} approached Mr. Yamada, the ^{dancho} leader of the ^{Hokoku nenren-dan} Resegregationist Young Men's group.

Yamada was also a black belt champion. Before this large assembly Kodama accused Yamada of having called him an inu. This ^{might be led to} was an ^{an all out war fight before Kodama's words to say - fight} outright challenge to a fight. Yamada, however, backed down, denied having called Kodama an inu, and surrounded by young men of his organization, ^{he} withdrew from the field.

The Anti-Resegregationists ^{the Anti-Resegregationists} were overjoyed at this development, and the general residents were excited and pleased. The Resegregationist leaders were ^{he was and upset} close to panic. Despite the power of which they boasted, they feared this organized and unpredictable foe. ^{I was told too} Groups of young men guarded the apartments of the leaders day and night. The ^{Hokoku} Young Men's Group drilled harder than ever. They also instituted a regulation whereby ^{the} all loyal male members shaved their heads in imitation of the Japanese Army. Many timid residents also shaved their heads,

1. The black belt is an honor gained by few. It implies not only top rank excellence in judo, but also the possession of a high moral character.
2. Yamada had replaced the Buddhist priest who founded the Young Men's Group.

and when questioned by ~~astonished~~ friends admitted that they did it for camouflage. ^{but} The followers of Kuratomi and Tada, ^{and Kuratomi, my 2nd son,} however, allowed their hair to flourish as luxuriantly as possible. The two factions were commonly known in the Center as the "long-hairs" and the "shaved-heads" or, more derogatorily, the "bald-heads". Among the residents there was considerable speculation as to what the next move of either faction would be. Many anticipated a gang war and took the attitude of spectators about to see a champion they did not particularly admire attack an enemy who had been terrorizing them for months. Mr. ^{Kuratsune} Oishi voiced the hope that in the event of a violent fight the administration would finally be forced to imprison the Resegregationist leaders "and then the people could get rid of the gambling group."

The people did not have long to wait. Three weeks after the narrowly averted duel between the judo champions, ~~actual violence~~ broke out. An irate member of the Kuratomi-Tada faction, discreetly followed by about 15 friends among whom was Tetsuo Kodama, the black belt man, entered the block in which the Resegregationists had established their head-quarters. The ^{angry} ~~key~~ man, a Nisei about 30 years old, accosted the male secretary of the Resegregation Group and demanded the reason for his expulsion from the organization. The secretary crossly told him to go away. ~~Angry words were exchanged.~~ The Nisei picked up a piece of wood from a convenient wood pile. The secretary picked up a mop, ^{the fellow who was in looked like a punk for Nisei were also to surround} and the two men had at it. ^{Kodama's friend} The members of the ~~escort~~ also picked up pieces of wood and surrounded the two fighting men ^{"Common" keep the} in order to keep their friend from being mobbed by the angry members of the Resegregation Group, who, with curious residents, ^{5 or 6 men} arrived by the hundreds. No one interfered. The sight of Kodama, holding an enormous stick with a long nail in the end, was ^{downed to the ground} ~~detering~~. Neither fighter was seriously injured and after the

secretary had retreated, the Nisei victor made a half hour speech to the assembled crowd, denouncing the Resegregationists as gangsters who were ruining the youth of the Center and degrading the true Japanese spirit. He and his escort then ~~rapidly~~ withdrew.

The Resegregationist leaders hurriedly held a consultation and decided that their best policy was to bring American justice down upon the perpetrators of this hoodlumish act. They thereupon swore out warrants for 11 of the members of the Kuratomi-Tada faction: some of the charges were assault, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, and mayhem. They plastered the latrines and laundry rooms with mimeographed leaflets describing the brutality of the assault and their own subsequent commendable activities. They voiced vicious threats of what they would do if they were not given justice.

The trial which took place a week later was characterized by humor and drama rather than by dignified legal procedure. Kuratomi and Tada had asked for and received permission to act as quasi-attorneys for the defendants. The project attorney carried on the case for the plaintiffs. Mr. Yamashita attended every session and interrupted frequently. The 11 defendants, all with noticeably long hair and neatly dressed, sat in one corner of the room with something of the air of college boys about to be reprimanded for a prank. The Resegregationist witnesses appeared with shining newly shaven heads, wearing their grey sweat-shirt uniforms bearing the emblem of the rising sun. With baleful eyes, and expressionless faces they stared across the room at their enemies. Resegregationist witnesses, however, were ill at ease and testified poorly. Witnesses for the defense were more fluent. Almost without exception the witnesses apparently suffered from some optical defect. Though they remembered seeing the party they did not favor

strike the other man, they had glanced away, gone to the latrine, or just not noticed if their friend struck his opponent. According to the project attorney, both sides committed enough perjury to warrent a number of severe sentences.

Mr. Tada, one of the quasi-attorneys for the defense, caught the secretary plaintiff in a flagrant lie by clever cross-examination. He led him into relating in detail what his attacker did during the fight although he had testified previously that his glasses had been lost at the first blow and he could see nothing. At the close of the trial, the judge repremanded the witnesses of both sides for their inaccurate testimony and stated that it would take some time for him to come to a decision about the sentence. Meanwhile, he set the defendants free in the Center.

The rage of the Resegregationists was great. They denounced American justice and voiced terrible threats of reprisals if the sentences were not severe. "Bombs and tanks won't stop our boys, if we give them the word," said Mr. Yamashita's wife.¹ None of these fearsome eventualities came to pass. The representative of the Department of Justice came to Tule Lake, observed the marching, bugling, and the shaved heads, questioned the leaders of the Resegregation Group, and promptly interned them. Mr. Yamashita went to his internment with a final noble gesture, writing a stirring farewell message to the Resegregationists on a long strip of toilet paper. He told his guard that this was an apology to a friend who was giving a banquet, which, because of his sudden internment, he could not attend. The message, after translation, was delivered.

The remainder of the Center's history, which was tragic in the extreme and of great sociological interest, need not be related here. Suffice it to say that the combination of the WRA decision to close

1. Ibid., Dec. 18, 1944, p. 5.

all the Centers by January of 1946, the Denationalization Act, the repeated internments, and the increasing fanaticism of the Resegregationists remaining in the Center produced a state of panic in which the greater part of the residents became involved. All possibility of the people of Tule Lake developing their community into a unit in which some order and security prevailed was lost.¹

Summary

At first glance the difficulties facing a student of the Tule Lake Center appear largely as intensifications of those already met in Gila, i. e., intensification of the distrust of Caucasians, in-group solidarity, the fear of being stigmatized as an inu. In fact, the fear of becoming known as an inu became so violent on occasion that field work had to be temporarily discontinued. Nevertheless, Tule Lake presented certain advantages absent at the relatively peaceful Gila Center. Most significant was the disappearance of one of the major areas of delicacy and restraint between informant and field worker. It was no longer taboo to speak favorably about Japan before a Caucasian. Rather, behaving like a "true Japanese" became a social necessity. Moreover, while the factional disputes contributed greatly to the tension and complexity of the investigational situation, they too offered compensatory advantages. The quarreling politicians needed support and, in general, were not overly particular where they obtained it. They were not disposed to scorn friendship with a Caucasian if the friendship promised to give them an advantage over their rivals.

1. See Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., p. 333 ff. for a history of subsequent events.

PART IITHE DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD TECHNIQUES IN THE
TULE LAKE CENTERPreparation for study in the Tule Lake Center

In February, March, and April of 1944 I made three short visits to the Tule Lake Center. Between these visits I continued work at Gila. In mid-May of 1944 I took up permanent residence in Tule Lake and remained there for a year.

I had begun to lay the foundation for a study of the Tule Lake Center many months before my first visit by attempting to obtain data on the attitudes of potential segregees before they left the Gila Center. This information was at first very difficult to get. The first steps in the process of segregation were initiated only six weeks after field work was begun. I was not permitted to attend the hearings which were being held in an effort to determine where the loyalties of the evacuees lay. Rapport had not been established with any potential segregees. Moreover, the non-segregates usually did not care to discuss their segregate friends and acquaintances with me, preferring to give a Caucasian the impression that they were not having much to do with the "disloyal element." Consequently, I could get no introductions.

Close to desperation, I decided to visit the potential segregates without an introduction and chance whatever reception might be given to a complete stranger who walked up to a door and asked an evacuee why he was going to Japan. I made my usual introductory statement on the objectives of the Study and added that I suspected that many of the things people were saying about the segregates were untrustworthy and that I had called on them in the hope that they might be willing to give a student an account of why they had

*First real reason for existence.
a proposition and reporter*

had decided to go to Japan.

A few persons politely refused to discuss the subject. Some said little more than that they were disgusted with the way America had treated them and that no matter how tough things might be in Japan, they couldn't be worse than the treatment anticipated in the United States. In over half of the interviews, however, the potential segregees were courteous and attempted to explain in detail why they had decided to turn their backs on America and go to Japan. They urged me to return and at each succeeding visit gave ^{more eloquent} franker statements. One young man took the trouble to write a 20 page essay expressing his attitudes in written form.

At this time I did not clearly understand why certain of these potential segregees were so responsive to a direct approach from a stranger. The reasons are somewhat complex. The potential segregees, having committed themselves to disloyalty to the United States, had little to fear from the authorities if they expressed their views frankly. In fact, emphasizing the strength of their sentiments toward Japan was a means of ensuring their segregation. As one free spoken Nisei remarked, "Heck, I'm going to Tule Lake anyway, so why shouldn't I say what I think?" Moreover, most of the segregees were convinced that their motives were misunderstood by the administration and the American public, because, as they expressed it, they were not disloyal to America but were going to Tule Lake for economic reasons, because they had no future in this country and because they had lost faith in America.¹ Consequently, they were glad to tell their side of the

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1. No one in these first interviews admitted the strength of one of the most powerful motivations of the Nisei and Kibei: escape from the draft. The evacuees guessed that those Nisei and Kibei who did not become segregees would be drafted into the United States Army. They were right. Nisei were drafted some five months after segregation. Nor did anyone mention one of the strong motivations of the Issei: the conviction that Japan was going to win the war and would recompense those Japanese citizens who had showed loyalty to Japan.

story to a sympathetic listener. Finally, many were secretly dismayed at the potentialities of their decision and were by no means certain that they had acted wisely. Several of the men became so moved while trying to explain their predicament, they had difficulty in keeping back tears. In this disturbed state of mind they welcomed the opportunity to repersuade themselves by overtly expressing their arguments and to convince at least one American citizen of Caucasian descent that their decision to become segregees did not imply hostile intentions toward the United States.

Assumed that as friends

Had not the situation included these and other factors, the direct approach would have failed. In fact, no situation as uniquely favorable to the rapid establishment of rapport appeared in the remaining period of study.¹

After the segregees left the Gila Center, contact was maintained by occasional letters. Then, shortly after the Farm Strike demonstration had been given inaccurate publicity in the press, a "loyal" resident of Tule Lake was transferred to the Gila Center.² I met him through a mutual friend. The Tulean was spilling over with the story of what had "really gone on" in Tule Lake. Despite his loyalty to the United States, he was heart and soul behind the strikers. His account differed so completely from the fantastic newspaper stories and the bizarre rumors which had percolated from the Tule Lake Center and was, moreover, so dramatic, that I received a great desire to study these interesting phenomena. Shortly thereafter I received letters from segregee friends, explaining that there had been no riot and giving detailed accounts of what the ~~correspondent~~ *described* had observed or what he thought had occurred. I sent some of these

1. With the possible exception of rapport gained in Tule Lake with certain of the stockade detainees after their release.
2. This young man was apparently among the few "loyal" key men who had remained in Tule Lake for a short period after segregation to assist in project maintenance.

friends modest boxes of candy at Christmas and was surprised to receive moving expressions of gratitude. One Kibei stated that he would not forget this kindness as long as he lived. I did not know that by Christmas the bitter strike had brought the ~~residents~~ ^{several} to a nadir of depression ~~and misery~~, that there had been no holiday celebrations in the Center, ^{that no one had any money,} and that this small gesture of friendliness ^{and trust (growth of some)} to people who had been pictured in the press as perpetrators of all manner of bloody outrages would strike sensitive individuals with peculiar force.

The first visit to Tule Lake -- advantages of well established friendships -- difficulties with the administration

When, in February of 1944, it was possible to make a two day visit to Tule Lake, I did not regard the opportunity with optimism.¹ This was the period immediately following the abandonment of the strike and the withdrawal of martial law.¹ After the anti-WRA newspaper publicity which followed the November uprising, censorship had been very strict, and the head of the Study shared my curiosity as to what might be transpiring. I, however, did not think that a two day visit to a community from which martial law had just been withdrawn promised much in the way of data.

On arriving at the Center my spirits sank even lower. No past experience had prepared me for the depressing appearance of Tule Lake. The bristling, barbed-wire topped fences which, at first view, had the aspect of a labyrinth,² the great watch towers, manned

1. See Ch. II, pp. 46.

2. This is an exaggeration. In truth, however, one had to pass through five gates to enter the Japanese quarters. Two of these gates were guarded by the military and one by the Caucasian WRA police. A pass had to be exhibited at each of these three gates. Moreover, one ward of the Japanese quarters had been fenced off as a possible place of residence for whole families of "trouble-makers". In addition, there was the formidable stockade, where the leaders of the Farm Strike Uprising and other suspicious characters were still confined.

by armed soldiers and equipped with powerful search lights which flashed unceasingly in the night, were a sight which had to be seen to be appreciated. The Japanese residential quarters, with their seemingly endless rows of rusty black tar paper covered barracks, with not even a little tree or bush giving promise of relief in the Spring, made the Gila Center appear like a blooming paradise by comparison.

I was still more disturbed by the attitude of the Caucasian staff workers. I was, of course, an uncharitable and ignorant newcomer. I had not witnessed the impressive demonstration of November 1 and the staff panic which followed it.¹ Still, with all of these formidable evidences of protection, it was difficult, at first glance, to understand why the staff should appear semi-paralyzed with fear.

More unpleasant surprises were to come. On entering the administrative building, I was greeted by a ~~staff member~~ ^{the community analyst} who invited himself to accompany me on my visits to informants. I was astonished at this presumption and the lack of perspicacity it betrayed, and told him that I could not allow this. I explained that the presence of a strange Caucasian would inhibit what chance I had of obtaining information, but promised to call on him before I left the Center and discuss my general impressions of the situation. Proceeding to the office of the Project Director I was told for the first time that I could not enter the Japanese area without a military escort. This was discouraging news indeed, for interviews carried on with a soldier sitting by with a gun would be worse than none at all. Recklessly and somewhat rudely, I asked the Project Director why he had not advised me

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1. I never observed a WRA staff at a time of great panic. What I saw during mild periods of excitement convinced me that the description of a major panic given by A. Leighton in The Governing of Men, pp. 4, 5, 175-6, 183-5, 190-1 is accurate. The reader is referred to this work if curious as to the effect of an uprising upon the members of a dominant group.

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of this regulation before I wasted train fare on a useless trip. The director looked unhappy, but explained that he had not wished the head of the Study to know how serious the situation still was in Tule Lake. Seeing that he had no intention of yielding, I suggested that he give me a member of the "Caucasian" police as escort, gambling on the possibility that this escort might be a good natured man who would be easier to handle than a soldier acting under orders. The Project Director agreed. The gamble paid off, for the escort was a new employee, rather bewildered by the situation, who agreeably accepted the pulp magazines I offered him and remained in his car while visits were made.

The affection and pleasure with which my segregated friends greeted me compensated for all of the preliminary difficulties. Some appeared to be almost bursting to explain "what had really gone on." As at the pre-segregation interviews ^{it} was possible to take down extensive approximately verbatim statements, for some persons obviously desired that their long narrations and explanations be recorded. ^{All had to do to start a segment} Those who were reticent were induced to ^{express an opinion only to be sure} speak more freely by the implication that no intelligent person could believe the statements printed about the Japanese at the time of the so-called riot and that part of the object of the Study was to correct these fallacious ideas. Of course, much of the information given was not accurate and some was deliberate understatement. ^{"secret file"} This mattered little, for the object of the visit was to determine the attitudes of the residents, whether they had on the whole supported the strike, what they thought about the Co-ordinating Committee which had just come into power, what, in short, was the existing state of affairs. This proved surprisingly easy. When the Co-ordinating Committee was introduced into the conversation, one man remarked with a sneer, "Oh - the Co-ordinating Committee,

A line

the so-called men with ability." Another informant, when asked how the Co-ordinating Committee had been elected, replied, "That's what I'd like to know. Nobody knows." The frankest comment came from a Gilan girl who was serving as secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee.:

"The people say that we're inu!"¹

At the very first interview an informant voiced what was to become the most potent instrument of social pressure in the Center:

"The people are forgetting the United States now. They say, 'We are Japanese.'"²

In two days these informants clarified the dominant Center attitudes, expressed the major issues, and provided a perspective which enormously facilitated future field work and the making of new *acquaintances and friends* ~~contacts~~. It is no exaggeration to state that during this first two day visit to Tule Lake more relevant data *was* ~~was accumulated~~ *was* ~~than in the~~ first two months of work in the Gila Center. Not until many months later did *my Tule Lake friends* ~~these informants~~ confess that tension was still so severe at this time that they had been greatly frightened by my visits and had taken the precaution of informing their neighbors that a Caucasian who was an old friend of theirs was going to make a purely social call.

An extremely fortunate contact was made during this first visit with a man who was soon to become my best informant and a loyal friend. This was the noted agitator, Mr. Oishi³, a Hawaiian Nisei about fifty years old. Oishi had played a leading role in the

1. Field Notes, Feb., 1944, pp. 13, 25, 30.

2. Ibid., p. 9. The reader will recall that the pressure groups constantly played upon this attitude in their attempts to influence the residents. See Ch. II, pp. ~~49-50~~, 52.

3. See Ch. II, p. 61.

December 1942 Manzanar riot¹ and after his imprisonment had written a series of blistering articles, denouncing the policies of the WRA and the treatment which the Nisei had received from the United States government. He had sworn eternal loyalty to Japan. The articles had been sent to the Study many months before by a Caucasian acquaintance of Oishi's and served as my introduction.

Oishi was a short, partly bald, heavy set man. He spoke with simplicity, sincerity and force, and gave an impression of great integrity and dignity. After ~~greetings had been exchanged and the~~ ^{I explain} object of the Study ~~explained~~, he asked me for my personal opinion of his articles. I groped vainly for a ~~courteous~~ ^{timid} remark on these ~~smoking Philipines~~ ^{the war with the U.S. for he was in Japan before}, while looking at this man who had volunteered for service in the first world war, served overseas, and after his discharge had educated himself as a Certified Public Accountant and then as a navigator. After Pearl Harbor he had offered his services as navigator to several air transport companies and was harshly refused. He then volunteered to go with the first work crew to the Manzanar Center. Later, the people of Manzanar had selected

1. The so-called Manzanar riot followed a pattern somewhat similar to the Boston strike described by Leighton in The Governing of Men. Certain men accused of being inu were beaten. Suspects were arrested, taken from the Center and confined in jail. Oishi, who was certain that innocent men had been arrested (perhaps he knew who the guilty men were) was instrumental in organizing a protest demonstration. As chairman of a negotiating committee, he asked that the arrested men be returned to the Center. The administration temporized by bringing the men back to the Center and confining them in the camp jail. The people accepted this concession and dispersed. That evening, however, an evacuee mob stormed the jail. The soldiers shot into the crowd and killed two Japanese. Oishi, though he had done his best to stop the mob and had even begged the imprisoned men to stay in the jail, was imprisoned by the authorities. Later he was sent to the Moab detention camp and subsequently to the Leuppe detention camp for Nisei trouble-makers. In December of 1944, he, with other Leuppe detainees who wished to expatriate, was sent to Tule Lake.

him as chairman during the Manzanar uprising. ^{for this,} He was imprisoned for many months and then, after segregation to Tule Lake, had insisted on paying his income tax. I said, "I thought the man who wrote those articles was honest. He must either be very courageous or crazy."

^{from} Oishi laughed and we ^{and they were better than mine} ~~were friends from then on.~~

Before leaving the Center I called on the ^{com. A.} ~~staff worker~~ who had wished to accompany me on my visits. I did not look forward to this interview, fearing it might turn into an interrogation. I had, of course, no objection to discussing general attitudes as they were revealed in interviews, ^(from D. T. M.) but I had no intention of giving the names of informants, ~~or betraying anti-administrative activities.~~ The interview did, in fact, begin like an interrogation, for the first question asked was, "Well, have you gotten any leads as to who the ringleaders were?" ~~Deciding that it would be wise to play for time in which to discover whether this member of the administrative staff could be trusted,~~ I replied truthfully that I had no such leads, but falsely added that all of my contacts were reticent and would not discuss anything significant. "Now I know by that statement that you're a good field worker," said the ^{CA} ~~interrogator~~, ² ~~assuming the role of a discouraged and rather incompetent female investigator, I placed myself in the position of learner and listened to a long explanation of past events, a background which was most welcome, since strict censorship had masked all Tule Lake developments since the~~

1. Though I was categorically forbidden to do so by the head of the Study.
2. Field Notes, Feb. 1944, p. 17.

publicity which followed the "riot".¹

The second visit to Tule Lake -- obtaining new informants --
modifications in technique -- the advantage of German descent

The second visit to Tule Lake was longer, lasting from March 14 to March 23. This visit was devoted to gaining additional data, making new contacts and becoming familiar with the differences in attitudes which might necessitate some modification of techniques.

Additional data were easily gained. Interviews with old friends indicated that tension within the Center was increasing. Even conservative residents, i. e., those who did not support the underground pro-strike pressure group, voiced attitudes like the following about the Co-ordinating Committee:

"That bunch is a bunch of inus and Sasaki (the chairman) is the biggest inu of them all. He'll probably get his brains beat out one of these days."²

Mr. Sasaki himself appeared close to a nervous collapse. When I asked him what the Co-ordinating Committee had accomplished since my last visit, he replied, "Nothing whatever."³

Another conservative resident while discussing the administrative opinion that the leaders of the Farm Strike uprising had gained

1. Later I was occasionally asked by this man and by other members of the administration for my opinions of Center attitudes. I answered frankly for the situation was so grave that it was not possible to maintain silence and self-respect simultaneously. Since, however, my opinions were almost invariably pessimistic, while the administration held staunchly to the view that conditions were improving week by week, these conferences were not very fruitful. In March of 1944, for instance, I was laughed at for predicting the rapid downfall of the Co-ordinating Committee and a possible wave of violence. Field Notes, March, 1944, pp. 45-6.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 23.

their power by terrorism and the use of "goon squads" (gangs of young men), picturesquely expressed the ambivalent sentiments held by many of the residents toward the imprisoned leaders. Assuring me that the representatives had, in truth, been elected by the people, he went on to say: "Of course, a lot of their requests (made by the representatives) as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense. . . . The Army flatly refused to recognize them. Some guys (representatives) went and hollered louder. They get picked up." When asked if, nevertheless, it was not a fact that a certain amount of terroristic pressure had been exerted on the residents to force them to attend the public funeral and the demonstration, he replied defiantly, "They might have been goon squads, but they were our representatives!"¹

I was repeatedly assured that the abandonment of the strike did not indicate any increase in confidence in the administration:

"Feeling toward the administration hasn't changed at all. The only thing that has changed is that people in the Center have more or less realized that to try to go against the administration would be hurting themselves. They're getting smarter."²

A number of new contacts were made, owing to the fact that a number of residents of Gila were anxious to have an eye witness report of how their segregee relatives and friends were faring in Tule Lake. In consequence, I was employed as gift and message carrier. If, however, a logical excuse for additional visits could not be found, these contacts came to nothing. Many persons indicated that they did not wish me to visit them again. Nevertheless, several first rate informants were acquired in this way, one man on the strength of a letter written by his brother, another family because I was able to visit them several times and talk myself into their

1. Ibid., p. 41.

2. Ibid., p. 40.

good graces, and a third, the most valuable of all, the leader of an alleged pro-Japanese pressure group in Gila, a young man whose entire family was remaining in the United States and who, sensing that he might never see his mother again, asked me to visit her in Gila and assure her of his good health and the fact that he was staying out of trouble.

The possession of a few excellent informants and the long period of initiation in Center patterns of behavior gained in Gila were pre-eminently responsible for the rapidity with which satisfactory work was initiated in Tule Lake. Still, a number of important modifications in technique were necessary. Most of these were, of course, learned through the revealing remarks and attitudes of Japanese friends.

The technique of obtaining initial interviews was modified in that Red Herring Studies similar to those which had been so helpful in the initial period of investigation at Gila were seldom used. Fear was so extreme that such ruses would not have been successful. Instead the need to get data on the spectacular series of events which occurred before my arrival was used as an excuse for a first visit. It was, however, mandatory to stress those aspects of the uprising which informants did not feel hesitant to discuss. Here, experience gained in Gila was most useful. The grievances against the administration, the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the representative body, descriptions of various elections and block meetings, the mass demonstration of November 1, were all acceptable subjects. On the other hand, any attempt to find out who had been responsible for the fracas at the warehouse which had resulted in the entrance of the Army was taboo. It was, however, quite permissible to discuss how individuals or groups had reacted to this event. Even the beating of the Chief Medical Officer on November 1

could be discussed at length, if the subject were confined to what people thought about this doctor or what they thought about the beating.

While these animated narrations were carried on, it was almost inevitable that an informant would reveal some of his current attitudes. Moreover, the phenomena of the Farm Strike uprising were so complex that a student could not possibly learn all about them in one interview. If, therefore, fair rapport had been established at the first visit, I could always return with a few new questions.

Opening an acquaintanceship in this manner had another advantage. It was possible to begin to take down verbatim statements at the first interview. Since I proceeded cautiously and appeared to write down only innocent statements, informants became so accustomed to dictating to me that I obtained almost a thousand pages of verbatim statements before the end of the study. Rash remarks I memorized, in so far as was possible, and recorded them later. When, for instance, an underground leader told me that his group would kill the Project Director if he showed his face alone in the Center, this was not written down. When, however, he drew himself up and delivered a pronunciamiento on the noble aims of his group, he expected this to be recorded.¹

Occasionally Red Herring Studies were employed after the confidence of an informant was partly won. An entertaining investigation of the ancient outlaw bands of Japan was pursued

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1. Japanese co-workers on the Study have expressed astonishment that I was able to obtain such voluminous, frank statements, many of which were distinctly incriminating. I myself am at a loss to explain why certain informants became so reckless. Perhaps they became so accustomed to my scrabbling away, chortling over their witty and spirited remarks and saying, "Wait a minute; that's so good I've got to get it down," that they came to take the ubiquitous notebook for granted.

and many anecdotes collected about Banzuin no Chobe and other leaders, whom legend describes as "fighting for the people against the lords" and whom informants variously termed "gangsters" or "guys like Robin Hood or Jesse James."

The role of learner was played to the hilt. The fact that the behavior patterns of Tule Lake demanded an outward pretense of extreme interest in all things Japanese facilitated establishing rapport by listening to long explanations of the complex significance of loyalty to the Emperor and to the family, and equally lengthy dissertations on certain of the tenets of bushido, the code of the samurai. Particularly useful was the concept of giri,¹ for it was applied by certain of the residents to their imprisoned representatives. In fact, all I had to do was ask about giri and valuable statements about the "representatives of the people" would inevitably follow.

"Giri is simply obligations. Those former Negotiating Committee are in the stockade. Suppose right now we elect another representative. In that case, we double-cross them (the imprisoned representatives). We admit that they had criminal intention. . . That's why we cannot elect new representatives now unless the WRA release those men."²

A very potent advantage which had been of only minor assistance in the Gila Center was the fact that I am partly of German descent and can speak the German language. In truth, I am a mongrel conglomeration of four northern European ethnic groups

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1. See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., (1946), for the most comprehensive explanation of the Japanese sense of obligation available in the literature. She defines giri as obligations which must be repaid with mathematical equivalence to the favor received. See also I. Nitobe, Bushido, The Soul of Japan, (1905), p. 25.
 2. Field Notes, June 20, 1944, p. 2.

and am third generation at that. Nevertheless, informants seized on my German name and informed me that the reason I understood the plight of the Japanese so well was because my parents had been Germans and had suffered persecution during the first world war. I did not deny this romanticism, for it increased rapport and to some extent separated me from the dominant group.

Consciousness of the advantage of German ancestry was gained during an interview with a Nisei who had been one of the block representatives during the Farm Strike, but had escaped arrest. This young man was visited in the presence of his parents and gave a great deal of information. As he began to speak fluently, his mother interrupted him, saying in Japanese, "Don't tell that Caucasian anything." The young man replied, ^{in Japanese:} "It's all right. She's a German Nisei."¹

Most informants limited their interpretation of my national loyalties to the assumption that German descent increased my insight into their attitudes. Very few assumed that my loyalty to the United States might be affected thereby. On one occasion, however, a young man, interviewed at the request of a Caucasian missionary, carried the matter a little too far. The interview did not open well. The young man accused me of being an inu and an employee of the F. B. I., and threatened to split my head open with a hatchet if he were arrested after this visit. This provoked me and I gave him my room number so that he wouldn't split the wrong head. Somewhat mollified, he began a discussion of the Germans, lauding the spirit of the Nazis. When I did not contradict him, he remarked, perhaps as

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1. In the summer of 1944 a rumor circulated through the Center that a German Nisei hired by the State Department was investigating the WRA. This rumor did me no harm, except that a few of the more naive staff members believed it.

a veiled insult, that people like me would be well situated after the war, i. e., Germany was going to win and I, as a fifth columnist, would be in an advantageous position. I lost my temper and gained a perverse revenge by quoting one of the German verses from a song of the Spanish civil war. The young man sat in fascinated silence as the sonorous denunciation of Fascism rolled past his ears. "German is certainly a wonderful war-like language," said he.

At the third visit to Tule Lake, in April of 1944, the administration decided to dispense with my armed escort, providing I would take the responsibility for any danger I might incur.¹ Freedom from this escort was a great relief, for it was in truth far more dangerous to enter the Center in the company of an unpopular representative of authority than to go in alone. From this point on, I did all of my visiting on foot - a rather arduous procedure, sometimes necessitating walking six to eight miles a day.

Permanent field work at Tule Lake -- additional modifications in technique -- obtaining data on events which occurred before my arrival

In May of 1944 when full time field work was substituted for brief visits, it was found that the pattern of making calls which had been employed in Gila required additional modification. In Gila, once I had obtained the status of a friend, it mattered little how frequently I visited informants. In Tule Lake, however, even those

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1. At this period I was in no danger whatever. Even during periods of pronounced hostility against Caucasians, I stood in little physical peril. Because I was a woman I was less likely to be considered a spy. In fact, I visited the most isolated sections of the Japanese quarters for over a year -- regions where Caucasians appeared so rarely that dogs barked at me and parents pointed me out to toddlers -- and never suffered worse than rude remarks from a group of young toughs who, on being given a stern glance, beat a precipitous retreat into a latrine.

informants who regarded me as a trusted confident were fearful of being visited too often lest they be called inu. Calls were therefore spaced at least two weeks apart.

Visits were also modified in accordance with the section of the Center in which the informant resided. In the almost complete absence of any kind of community organization (except the underground group) the blocks and wards tended to become socially isolated. Consequently, when an informant lived in a "peaceful block", he might be willing to risk rather frequent friendly talks with a Caucasian. When, however, he lived in a "bad block", i. e., one dominated by the agitators, he could be visited only every three or four weeks and then only at a time when the call was least likely to be observed. In these cases the frequent inclement weather was turned to advantage and timid individuals were visited during the severe dust storms, the bitter winter weather, or during periods of thaw when parts of the Center were almost impassible to a person not wearing heavy boots. Certain informants came to view this habit of mine humorously and would remark, "We were expecting you. When this rotten weather came along we knew you'd show up."

The isolation between the different sections of the Center and the general air of secrecy which appeared to diffuse from the tension, led me into a general practice of never discussing one informant with another. This had not been necessary in Gila and, moreover, would have been impossible there, for Gila was a relatively well knit community. In Tule Lake, however, many informants were isolated from friends and acquaintances and apparently were reluctant to speak among each other of a contact with a Caucasian. The degree of isolation may be judged from the fact that three separate families who were well acquainted with each other were used as informants for eighteen months before any of them discovered our mutual friendship.¹

1. In almost any other field situation this would be incredible. The connection was revealed by accident, one man consulting his friend on a problem and the friend suggesting that he contact me.

Later, when the factional disputes reached a climax of hostility, I had reason to be grateful for this policy. Since the identities of most of my informants were not known, few could check up on my sympathies by comparing notes with others.

Another precaution was necessary. In the Gila Center I had learned some painful lessons in patience. In Tule Lake it was necessary to carry this virtue to an extreme. For instance, it took eight and a half months to get reliable information rather than vague hints that Kira's gang was responsible for much of the terrorism in the Center. Certain details of the less creditable activities of the Resegregationist leaders were not revealed to me even by their bitter enemies, until months after these dangerous men were interned and informants felt safe to speak. Another wait was made necessary by the long imprisonment of the Farm Strike leaders, who could not be contacted until after their release. In fact, it was not until March of 1945 that I was able to induce Kuratomi and Tada to give me some of the intimate details of the organization and intrigues which had taken place 18 months before.

Patience was applied on three levels. One concerned the individual informant. This involved waiting until sufficient rapport had been developed to make the discussion of certain topics possible. It also involved waiting -- perhaps for six months or more -- until an informant, under emotional stress, would begin to discuss a topic which I had never dared to introduce.¹ A second level involved waiting until men who had important information were available, i. e., not imprisoned in the stockade. A third level involved waiting until a crisis had passed before attempting to get certain specific information. During a tense situation the development of current attitudes was

1. For example see Yamashita's explanation of the plans of the Resegregationists and Oishi's and Itabashi's information on the activities of Kira, pp. 119-121, 123.

*Curious as to what in 2
unclear farm strike
not took about me*

recorded with as much detail on the actual events as it was possible to obtain. The "inside stories," the identities of the leaders, the violent or incriminating statements they had made, were ~~filed for future reference~~ and obtained later when informants' tension and fear were no longer so intense. In general, informants were inclined to speak more frankly and be more specific in naming individuals in rough proportion to the time which had elapsed since the event under discussion. I waited five months to get an eye witness account of the warehouse fight, when a group of young Japanese engaged in a free for all with certain Caucasians because they thought that food was being taken to the strike-breakers and the Army was called in to quell the disturbance. This was furnished by a young Nisei girl, a nurses' aide. This young woman was not "disloyal" but was planning to leave Tule Lake to enter nursing school as soon as she could get her mother's permission. Before telling her story, she had expressed strong disapproval if not hostility toward the Kibei "trouble-makers," the "geta boys,"¹ a number of whom were arrested by the Army on this night. Her account therefore is not only interesting because of its vivid content but because it reveals the power of in-group solidarity even over a young Nisei, whose chief object in life was to get out of Tule Lake and adjust herself to a future in the United States.

"On November 4th a man walked in (to the hospital) with blood gushing from his face. He was a canteen watchman (Japanese). We put him on a table.

"Then an awful banging came on the doors. We had to open the doors. Some soldiers walked in and told us to stand where we were. . . Oh boy, those soldiers were scared, I tell you. They were actually shivering. They even went around looking under the beds. The poor patients didn't know what was going on.

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1. So-called because they were supposed to wear geta (wooden-clogs) about the Center as an expression of their pro-Japanese sentiments. However, I did not observe that these boys wore geta more frequently than anyone else.

"Then they started bringing in the (Japanese) boys who had been hurt. All of the boys had to hold up their hands all the time. They brought in Sadao Endo¹. He had to hold up his hands all the time and meanwhile the soldiers would poke him in the back with a gun.

"The soldiers - maybe it was the psychological effect - they seemed so glad. They'd laugh and say, 'Huh, you Japs, we'll shoot you.' Then they'd laugh and laugh. It seemed so childish.

"Later they brought in boys who had had their arms twisted. One boy had his ribs fractured. Their heads were all bashed up. . They didn't look as if they had fought man to man. They looked beaten. . . They were such young kids.

"Some motorcycle pool boys² came in too. We pretended they were hospital boys so they wouldn't be arrested. We put them to washing dishes.

"We were terminated (discharged) as of November 4th, so we never got paid for all the time we worked overtime then."³

Male and Female Informants

As in the Gila Center, I had about an equal number of male and female informants. I used no important specific techniques on female informants, though the common status of sex was sometimes employed to good effect. The one marked difference in approach to the sexes was one of role and applied mostly to the leaders or agitators. Women, with the exception of rare individuals like Mrs. Tsuchikawa, a female agitator, could not be lured into giving imprudent information by being treated as if they were individuals of extraordinary power and importance.

Women, in general, possessed a virtue as informants which to some extent bore out the accusation frequently leveled against them by Japanese men -- they were inclined to talk too much. They did

1. Sadao Endo was Mrs. Tsuchikawa's brother. Mrs. Tsuchikawa, an ardent Resegregationist, was one of my most helpful informants and is referred to frequently in the latter part of this chapter.
2. Young Japanese employed in the Caucasian area and therefore liable to arrest by being mistaken for the "rioters."
3. Field Notes, Aug. 24, 1944, p. 3.

not actually utter more words than the men but they gave more direct information, especially on tabooed matters. Women were also more inclined to give specific and personal information than men and would sometimes interrupt the flow of generalities which their more reserved spouses were uttering with a pointed and too revealing remark which would bring a concerned frown to the brow of the member of the superior sex. Women were, in fact, the best source of pithy comments which could be quoted as expressions of popular or real rather than ideal attitudes.

With some married couples it was found helpful to make occasional visits when the husband was not at home. The conversation could then be turned to some of the topics which the husband had discussed at a previous interview with the wife sitting by in respectful silence. Frequently the wife, with her husband absent, would remark, "When you and William were talking last time, he didn't mention this," and proceed to a more detailed and often very valuable statement.

Women, however, had certain disadvantages as informants for the particular interests of the Study. Except for unusual individuals they were not interested in the intricacies of politics. They did not attend many of the meetings, and as they so frequently remarked, "My husband doesn't tell me about those things." While they were excellent factual informants, they were not so prone to attempt to trace the development of a phenomenon or analyse the factors involved as were certain of the men.

On one occasion when I was discussing the meetings at which no representatives had been nominated¹ with a young man, he remarked indifferently, "I didn't go to the meeting. Everything just slid.

1. See pp. 53.

Nobody was nominated." His elder sister, who was sitting near by, pricked up her ears and asked, "What's that? The senjin?¹ Hell, the senjin are good for nothing,"²

On another occasion I had had a fruitless discussion with Mr. Wakida, my ex-agitator friend from Gila, concerning the attitudes prevailing among the people on the day of the November 1 demonstration. Because of his past notoriety, this young man was often reluctant to commit himself on a delicate matter. A few days later I called again and found only Mrs. Wakida at home. Uninhibited by the cautious presence of her husband, she explained how angry the people had become when they found conditions so unsatisfactory in Tulsa Lake and with growing excitement went on to describe the spirit which prevailed in her block before and during the demonstration. "When we were told in the block here that we were going to see the Project Director, you should have seen the line! We marched there. We thought we had gone early but the place was already jammed with people."

I then began to talk about current sentiments in the Center. The informant, who was a teacher in one of the Center's Japanese schools, expressed an attitude which, though common, was rarely voiced, and concerned the growing doubts of the younger people in camp as to the wisdom of remaining "disloyal to the United States" in the face of the increasing number of American victories in the Pacific: "My students are asking me, 'Sensei (teacher),' they say, 'What would you think if I got leave clearance and got out of here?' They (the young people) believe all they read in the papers."

1. I do not know the exact translation for this word. It probably means block meeting.

2. Field Notes, May 27, 1944, p. 5.

They say, 'Saipan was taken, this place and that place was taken. Gee whiz, what's going to happen to us?' I really don't blame them."¹

During my first visit to Tule Lake I called on a couple whose acquaintance had been made in the Gila Center. The husband, a dignified Kibei, took over the conversation and proceeded to express disapproval of the violent activities which accompanied the Farm Strike:

"It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people want power. They say, 'We are working for the people.' I believe they are working for themselves."

Knowing that the informant was a cautious man who seldom voiced approval of agitation or disapproval of the administration, I had anticipated that he would express this attitude. I desired, however, to know how he felt toward the Co-ordinating Committee and therefore asked him what "the people" thought about the "new representative body." He replied that in his opinion they were all right. I had reason to doubt that he was speaking frankly, having received numerous indications that the Co-ordinating Committee was distinctly unpopular. I thereupon asked him by what method the Co-ordinating Committee had become the representatives of the people. Before he could reply, his wife remarked with acerbity, "That's what I'd like to know!" Her husband rapidly changed the subject.²

1. Ibid., July 19, 1944, p. 3.

2. Ibid., Feb. 1944, p. 8. See also p. 117 for another revealing statement made by a woman.

The Oblique Approach

The Oblique Approach was probably the most useful interviewing technique developed during the period of study. It consisted of introducing delicate or tabooed topics into a conversation by indirection, after a preparatory period of conversation during which the informant had been induced to talk fluently. Its ultimate origin lay in the fact that a number of informants had told me that Japanese are inclined to reveal significant information by indirection.¹

I became so accustomed to watching for hints and oblique statements that I unconsciously began to camouflage my remarks and questions with obliquity. After several months of experience in Tule Lake, this habit developed into the practice of preparing for an interview by making a list of suitable topics, based on the state of rapport with the informant, his interests, and the current Center situation. Some of the topics were relevant to the collection of data and some were not. These topics were arranged in order, the most interesting (to the informant) and innocuous coming first. This list, of course, was subject to instant readjustment, depending on the trend which the informant wished the conversation to take.

The informant was always given the initiative in the conversation, though usually he courteously gave me this privilege. The verbal fencing began with an exchange of the latest gossip. If conversation lagged, I introduced a new subject, calculated to maintain the flow of discussion. When half an hour or more had been spent in preliminaries and the informant was relaxed and somewhat off guard, I put out a cautious feeler, indirectly referring to some delicate topic. If the informant ignored the hint, the subject was dropped and conversation resumed on the first level. Later, other feelers were put out, which might or might not be taken up by the informant.

1. See pp. 16-7.

Sometimes, of course, an informant brought up a delicate topic himself. This technique was used more extensively in Tule Lake than in the Gila Center, chiefly because it took long practice to acquire sufficient skill.

It is difficult to present an accurate reproduction of the use of the Oblique Approach because I did not ordinarily record verbatim the long interchange of gossip with which an interview was begun. Moreover, phrasing a feeler correctly and picking the propitious moment to introduce it into the conversation involved considerable subtlety. Such intangibles as the expression of an informant's face, his tone of voice, or, if several informants were present, the mood of the conversation, were more important than the words uttered either by the informant or by me. Nevertheless, some insight into how this technique was applied may be gained from an account of the first interview with Mr. Itabashi, the man who was later beaten by Kira's gang.¹

Itabashi was recommended to me as a potential informant by Oishi. Oishi gave little of Itabashi's background except to state that he was an Issei, a segregee from Manzanar, and that though he and Itabashi were good friends, they frequently disagreed in their opinions concerning the policies of the Japanese government.

The interview took place on July 24, shortly after the murder of Noma, the resignation of the Co-op Board of Directors and the resignation of the Japanese police force. I hoped to obtain Itabashi's attitudes on these events. I also hoped to discover how he felt toward the Resegregationists, for I was on insecure ground until I learned whether an informant were strongly pro- or anti-Resegregationist or was attempting to remain neutral.

Itabashi was a small, spry, and rather frail elderly man. He received me in a friendly manner and appeared predisposed to accept

1. See p. 59.

my statements concerning my work as truth. (It was obvious that Oishi had given me a good recommendation. Itabashi explained that he understood the significance of a scientific study since he had kept up his studies all of his life and was preparing to lecture on the United States after his return to Japan.

After a short chat on scholarship, Itabashi, with no prompting at all, began to discuss general administrative policies. The gist of his remarks was that he disapproved of administrative vacillations as to whether the residents of Tule Lake should be resegregated. Apparently he did not approve of the Resegregationists (although he did not mention the Resegregation Group by name) and remarked:

"In the other camps we lived with some extremely pro-American and pro-Japanese people. Then we lived at peace as long as they didn't spy on each other."

Since Itabashi came from the Manzanar Relocation Center I hoped to get him to discuss the general attitudes of the "Manzanites" who had not come to Tule Lake until February and May of 1944 and had been housed together in one ward. I had received hints that they were prone to regard themselves as superior to the other segregees and were inclined to be stand-offish. When, however, I asked Itabashi how he, as a Manzanite, viewed Tule Lake, he immediately embarked on his version of the Manzanar uprising, explaining matters in considerable detail. Since this event was far in the past, I took out my notebook and diligently wrote down Itabashi's statements. I was not getting what I wanted but Itabashi was enjoying himself.

I then threw out another feeler and asked Itabashi how he thought the new Co-op Board of Directors was being regarded by the people. (This body had recently replaced the men who had resigned after the murder of Noma.) Itabashi answered without hesitation that the people "feel it's better than it used to be" but that the new board was going to have a difficult time. To shift the discussion from the Co-op Board

to the resignation of the evacuee police was easy. Itabashi freely voiced the opinions that the major difficulty was that the residents had regarded the Japanese members of the police force as "spies for the administration" and that "there also were the gambling gangs who were protected by the police." He then added the most significant statement he had made so far: "In this camp no really able man will show his face because so many narrow minded fanatics are in camp that you can't honestly co-operate with those fanatics. Even your safety cannot be guaranteed."

This was a valuable hint that Itabashi was anti-Resegregationist and was, moreover, an unusually frank statement for an Issei to make at an initial interview. I took advantage of the emotion which I suspected had motivated this statement and introduced a very delicate topic, the murder of Noma. Itabashi immediately became cautious and remarked briefly, "I have not heard a single man say, 'I'm sorry he's dead.'"

Itabashi then changed the subject, returning to the ever popular topic of what was wrong with the administration. He explained that the administration was trying to control the residents by encouraging them to fight one another. I, however, desired more specific information on the residents' reactions to the recent mass resignation of the Japanese police force. The administration had issued a statement that the residents of each block were responsible for the nomination of two men to assume police duties. I already had some data that this proposal was resented and that the recruitment of a new police force was not proceeding smoothly. When Itabashi paused in his explanation of the errors of the administration, I approached my goal obliquely by asking him if the current rape rumors had any connection with the resignation of the Japanese police. He replied that he thought the stories were rumors and added: "I think they are rumors made up by the administration to make people form a police department." He then

proceeded to discuss other rumors, stating, "About four weeks ago there was a rumor rife in the camp that the exchange boat was coming (to exchange Americans interned in Japan with those Japanese segregated or interned in the United States). I got a letter from the Spanish Consul on July 12 saying that there wasn't the remotest possibility of an exchange boat. Why does the administration start rumors like that?"¹ I then asked Itabashi how the nomination of the new police officers was proceeding in his block. He assured me that each block in his ward had elected two men and that he thought the project would succeed. "Most of them hate to take the job but if they understand the new system I think we can get police." I suspected that this was too optimistic a picture and asked Itabashi how the two nominees in his block had reacted. His answer was revealing: "One man we elected might take the job and the other refused for personal reasons."

I was by now quite pleased with the manner in which the interview was proceeding. Itabashi appeared to trust me and had already expressed himself with unusual frankness when he hinted at the terrorism which silenced "any able man". I was strongly tempted to introduce the subject of the Resegregation Group and attempt to learn whether Itabashi specifically connected this group with the beatings. This, however, would have been pushing my luck too far and since Itabashi had been very cordial in his invitation that I return for other chats, I put off this delicate matter until the future. Returning to a safer topic, I tried to get more data on the segregates from Manzanar. I approached the subject in round about fashion and asked Itabashi about the significance of giri (duty or obligation).² He apparently knew nothing of the connotation which this concept had taken on in -----

1. These rumors, of course, did not spring from the administration.

2. See p. 41.

the Center and I was forced to explain how it had been applied to the stockade detainees. Itabashi then willingly gave his opinion of the Farm Strike leaders and added: "We newcomers are trying to keep aloof from the affairs of the past (the Farm Strike and the political friction which succeeded it). Because of what we were informed of the past trouble, some was so extreme that we could not co-operate with that."¹ Although this statement gave little specific information, the implication of "aloofness" was valuable and was later corroborated by considerable additional data.

variability

The Oblique Approach was extraordinarily effective. Some informants regarded it as a kind of sport. They were free to decide how much they wished to reveal and much information was given by circumlocution or implication. Many sophisticated informants, particularly those who had been educated in Japan understood this technique far better than I did. In time, an agreement, never overtly expressed, developed, in which the informant appeared obliged to reveal what he could simply out of friendship and appreciation of the involved preliminaries. After a very successful interview with Mr. Kuratomi, one of the important leaders of the Farm Strike Uprising, Kuratomi remarked, "I wonder which of your clever techniques you have been using on me today to get me to tell you all this?" I bowed and replied, "With a person of intelligence, techniques are not of much use."

While the Oblique Approach was a most helpful device, occasions arose in which a direct approach could be used without injuring rapport. Individuals like Mr. Oishi who, though interest and friendship of long standing had voluntarily decided to act as

1. Field Notes, July 24, 1944, pp. 1-4. For additional examples of the use of the Oblique Approach see pp. 117, 126.

unpaid informants could be asked outright for certain current attitudes. Leaders could be asked outright to explain certain of their past activities. On certain topics, however, the Oblique Approach was maintained with all informants. No one, for example, was ever asked for the names of individuals implicated in anti-administrative activities.

Example of an unsuccessful interview

No mention has as yet been made of errors in the selection of a technique or in its application. This does not mean that after my arrival at Tule Lake I ceased to make mistakes or that I had no difficulty whatever in obtaining informants. By no means every individual I visited was won as an informant. The fear and suspicion inherent in the situation were so great that often I was not able to progress beyond the first interview. It may be of some help to describe an initial interview which went very badly indeed. The informant, Mr. Fujii, was a pre-segregation resident of Tule Lake, who had been foreman of the farm workers prior to the Farm Strike.

In August of 1944 after six months of work, I still had next to no reliable information on the political activity of the crucial period before the accident which had precipitated the Farm Strike. I was told that Fujii knew a great deal about these matters and was advised to get an introduction to him through Mrs. Tsuchikawa, the Resegregationist agitator, because Mrs. Tsuchikawa was Fujii's neighbor. I did this and thereby committed an initial error. Fujii was a conservative and an anti-strike man (which I did not know at this time) and he was very much afraid of the Resegregationists. He was therefore inclined to be doubly cautious. He would hesitate to say anything which might be repeated either to the administration or to the Resegregationists.

The interview began badly. Fujii insisted on using an interpreter although his English was adequate. The Nisei girl he called did not improve matters, for she obviously regarded me as a nosy spy. While I was explaining my work, I observed that Fujii was most ill at ease and anxious to get the business over with. I saw that if I got any data out of him at all, this interview would probably be my only opportunity. Since an interpreter was being used, I could do little but ask questions and was robbed of the opportunity to build rapport by preliminary conversation. Moreover, whenever I asked a question Fujii and the interpreter went into a consultation in Japanese over what would be the more politic answer and after Fujii had made a statement of five or six sentences, the interpreter would translate it in a few words.

Faced with this frightened informant and his hostile interpreter, I phrased my first question very carefully, asking him why such a short time had elapsed between the arrival of the segregationists at Tule Lake and the Farm Strike. In previous interviews with other informants this opening gambit has been uniformly successful. The informants would launch into long explanations of the grievances of the incoming segregationists, warm to the subject, give me the opportunity to sympathize, and thereby lay the foundations of rapport. Fujii, however, saw this question as a trap to make him betray the agitators. He answered briefly: "As a resident of this Center, it's definitely impossible to answer that question at this time."

This cautious reply indicated (as I discovered later) that the Farm Strike had been preceded by considerable anti-administrative agitation about which Fujii dared not talk. The fact that Fujii had not launched into a denunciation of the administration suggested that Fujii had held anti-strike sentiments. I reasoned that if this were so he might like the opportunity to tell me (a snooping

Caucasian) how law-abiding he had been. I threw out a feeler by remarking that my data indicated that some of the "Old Tuleans", those pre-segregation residents of Tule Lake who, like Fujii, had remained there to become segregationists, had not approved of all of the aspects of the Farm Strike. This was a second error for Fujii suspected that I was on too cordial terms with the dangerous agitator, Mrs. Tsuchikawa. He replied blandly and falsely: "I was under the impression that most of them (the anti-strike group) came from other Centers."

"Well," I thought, "If he wants me to take a good report to Mrs. Tsuchikawa, I'll let him take a crack at the ex-Coordinating Committee." I thereupon asked him why the Co-ordinating Committee had had difficulty in winning the confidence of the residents. Fujii, however, was determined to commit himself to nothing. He replied, "I wish them (the Co-ordinating Committee) well," and added a falsehood, "I haven't heard any report that was contrary to that." This was an outrageous lie, for it was inconceivable that any resident of Tule Lake had not heard a single criticism of the Co-ordinating Committee. I was startled and disturbed, for informants almost invariably preferred to misunderstand a question or answer with an incomprehensible ambiguity rather than tell an outright lie. I gave up the attempt of getting Fujii to talk on the Farm Strike period and turned the conversation to current topics. For some time he talked fluently and honestly on why the people had refused to nominate a new representative body. I then threw out a final feeler and asked why the people had supported the Farm Strike so strongly, despite the misery and inconvenience it entailed. This time Fujii lost some of his caution, spoke with heat, and at least showed clearly on which side of the fence he had been on:

"We weren't angry because they put the men in the stockade. We got mad because the Army came in that night with sub-machine guns and threw tear gas. We were all willing to go to work but they wouldn't let us go. They took our civil rights away. That's what made us mad!" "We weren't for the strike -- we were against it."

When I left, Fujii apologized for his reluctance to give information. "Perhaps in six months," he said, "I'll be able to tell you much that now I must keep to myself."¹

I did not attempt to contact Mr. Fujii again, deeming it hopeless. Besides, I was able to obtain other informants who, like Fujii, had disapproved of the strike but were willing to talk about it. Many months later, I discovered why Fujii had been so extremely close-mouthed. Before the farm accident of October 1944, the farmers had considered a work stoppage. In fact, many of them did not want to go to work on the morning before the accident occurred. Fujii, as foreman, had cajoled the farmers into going to work. Consequently, many residents held him responsible for the accident. In the words of two informants, "Fujii was scared to death."

Errors of Bias

The graver problems encountered in the Tule Lake Center did not concern field techniques per se. Once I had managed to get a logical excuse to interview an evacuee -- either a good introduction or the known fact that the potential informant had knowledge of phenomena which in-group sentiment did not forbid him to discuss -- I usually was able to develop ^{some} rapport. The process often took a long time and involved great delicacy and patience. All of the techniques already mentioned and probably a number of others which I have not been able to conceptualize were used. It was, however, imperative that they be used at the correct time, in the correct context, and that they be adjusted to the personality and status of each informant.

Nevertheless, this fair amount of skill, for which long practice and exposure to Center society were responsible, did not keep me out of difficulties. On a number of occasions I fell into serious errors of

1. Field Notes, Aug. 14, 1944, pp. 2-3.

bias which were in part the result of too close association and identification with certain groups or factions within the Center.

The first serious error in bias was a fallacious characterization of the "Old Tuleans", those residents of pre-segregation Tule Lake who had become segregees and remained in the Center. These individuals were generally very unpopular with the segregees from other Centers. They were termed spineless cowards and fence-sitters because, it was contended, they had not supported the Farm Strike uprising as strongly as the newcomers. Though this accusation held a grain of truth, it was by no means the clear cut generalization voiced by informants. Most of my early informants were newcomers and since I too "came from another Center" I accepted this bias as fact and looked upon the Old Tuleans as meek creatures. This error, however, was fairly easy to correct. As soon as Old Tulean informants were obtained, many proved to be anything but spineless. Moreover, additional data showed that some Old Tuleans had played active parts in the uprising and that their general ill reputation was based largely on the jealousy of the insecure incoming group against the "old timers" who were striving to maintain vested privileges.

The second bias was far more grave and concerned my personal antipathy to the inu. From the beginning of my stay in the Centers, I had adopted the current attitude of dislike toward the so-called stool-pigeons. When informants ranted against the inu, I enthusiastically agreed with them, even though I knew quite well that many people were put into this category who had never done any informing. When however the great wave of hostility toward the inu arose in Tule Lake in the spring of 1944 and culminated in beatings and murder, I myself became infected with group hysteria. The frenetic atmosphere of the Center, the rising tension, the mixture of sadistic pleasure and ominous anticipation of even more shocking things to come with which the news of

each beating was received, were potent drugs. I succumbed to these influences to the extent that I lost almost all objectivity and spiked my current reports with blood-thirsty personal remarks expressing strong personal satisfaction whenever an inu had his head bashed in.

Even the murder did not alter this bias appreciably. I interviewed my old acquaintances on the Co-ordinating Committee, who, in fear of their lives, had fled from the Center and taken refuge in the hospital; they had been refused food by both the Japanese hospital mess staff and the Japanese staff which cooked for the Caucasians; they sat in stupified terror, scarcely daring to talk above a whisper; if they ventured out of doors, Japanese who caught sight of them barked at them, because they were "dogs".

I knew that most of these so-called inu had not been informers. Still, I had become so prejudiced that I did not see these persons as human beings caught in an agonizing predicament, but as stool-pigeons who had betrayed their own people and were suffering as they deserved; the sooner they got out of the Center the better.

This lack of objectivity and compassion might not have been scientifically so objectionable had I not assumed that most of my informants felt exactly as I did. I did not perceive that while many, in truth, shared this unreasoning hatred and contempt for the inu, they were simultaneously terrified lest they do something which would cause them to be called inu, and that one of the ways to avoid this danger was to approve loudly of any violence perpetrated upon these objects of social disapproval. I had, in fact, adopted the attitude of the fanatical agitators. By so doing, I lost insight into the attitudes of the general residents.¹

1. See pp. 186-7 for additional remarks on the dilemmas caused by bias.

Field work after the Noma murder

The murder of Mr. Noma presented no new problems in field investigation. Rather it required an intensified application of established techniques and an ability to guess what the Center reactions would be. I guessed that even the friendliest informants would fear a visit from me, lest they be suspected of giving information which might betray the murderer. Therefore, after getting the details of the murder itself from informed staff members, I wrote a letter to Mr. Oishi, telling him that I was leaving the Center until the excitement had abated sufficiently to permit me to resume work and asking him to let me know when he thought it safe to return. I then went to Berkeley for a conference with the head of the Study.

Life in Berkeley, however, appeared very dull and after a few days I became restless to return and watch developments. My superior and co-workers were reluctant to allow this, especially after a letter arrived from Mr. Oishi bluntly telling me to stay out of the Japanese residential section. Nevertheless, after a week I returned, reasoning that at least I could observe the effects of the murder on the administration and the progress, if any, toward its solution. This proved wise, for two days after my return Mr. Oishi sent word that I might resume my visits. He asked me, however, not to call on Saturday or Sunday when the Center streets were filled with people attending baseball games or other recreational functions which would make my visits observable to many residents. At my next visit Oishi explained that a "certain man" had boasted that he intended to kill a Caucasian if the sentry who had killed the evacuee, Okamoto, were not punished severely.¹ Oishi believed that I was in a vulnerable position, since I was one of the few Caucasians who habitually went

1. See p. 53.

about the Center with no protection. Several months later he told me that the man who had made the threat was Kira. Why Oishi concluded that it was safe for me to resume work, he did not explain, except to state that he had decided that Kira's boast was nothing but bluster. He assured me that he personally was not afraid of any social opprobrium or physical danger which my visits might bring upon him, but did not wish to get his room-mates into trouble.

Other informants were not so courageous as Oishi. Before making any other visits I wrote letters to my friends asking for permission to call. Most people asked me to wait a while before visiting them. Two of my best informants put me off with excuses and I was never able to resume work with them. Both of these families lived in "bad blocks" where the underground pressure group was strongly entrenched.

Relations with the administrative staff

Aside from the difficulties of avoiding biases, the major problem attending field work in the Tule Lake Center entailed getting along with the administration. The gulf between the Caucasian staff and the segregates was enormous. Administrative attempts to bridge this gulf were inhibited by the fear that any friendly contact between Caucasians and Japanese might receive publicity and result in accusations that the WRA was "coddling the Japs."¹ Moreover, certain higher members of the administration stood in great fear of the underground agitators, some of whom were kept under fairly constant

1. These fears were justified. The accusations which certain pressure groups and publicity seeking members of Congress made against the WRA are well known. The fantastic length to which these accusations were carried is illustrated by the fact that a newspaper accused a middle aged high school teacher in Tule Lake -- a woman of extreme respectability -- of running a "love cult". Occasionally she had had a high school club in which Japanese students of both sexes were represented meet in her room.

observations by the project police. In view of this situation, my cordial and friendly relationships with Japanese in general and with the agitators in particular were viewed with concern and suspicion by a number of the influential members of the administrative staff.

In the ordinary run of affairs, I found that the wisest policy was to keep my presence in the Center as inconspicuous as possible. I avoided staff gatherings and kept away from the administrative buildings. Complying with the request of high ranking staff members who stated that they feared the rumors spread by staff gossips more than the evacuee rumors, I avoided as best I could the incessant queries of certain staff members. Despite these precautions on one occasion I was in some danger of being asked to stop work. This came about through an upsurge of fear and insecurity which fell upon the staff after the death of the Japanese shot by the sentry.¹

When this tragedy occurred, the higher ranking staff members behaved with consideration and intelligence. Their actions produced as salutary a state of mind among the general residents as was possible under the circumstances. Unfortunately, the staff did not know this and certain members continued to anticipate a violent outbreak from the Japanese.

I had been very busy and also very disturbed over the task of gathering data on this painful situation. When a Caucasian friend told me in confidence that the Project Director was considering asking me to leave the Center I was at my wits end. The only obvious reason for such a request was that in the event of a grave outbreak among the Japanese, the administrators might not welcome the presence of an experienced reporter who was not a staff member. I knew that the Caucasian chief of police, who had great influence with the Project Director, had been heard to make remarks indicating that the Center

1. See pp. 53, 102.

would be better off if I were gone. This man, according to rumors widespread among both the staff and the evacuees, had treated the Japanese arrested after the warehouse fight of November 4th with extreme brutality. He may have feared that I would publicize these rumors. Furthermore, Mrs. Tsuchikawa, the notorious Resegregationist, whom I was visiting frequently at this time, had a brother who was alleged to have been severely beaten on the night of November 4th.¹ Mrs. Tsuchikawa was watched closely by the police and it is probable that my visits were observed and reported to the administration.

I was more disturbed by this situation than by any in my field experience. I spent several miserable days thinking up and discarding plan after plan of positive action. It appeared that the best policy was to do nothing and stay in the Center at all costs. It would be far more difficult to force me to ~~leave~~ than to refuse me permission to re-enter. I immediately stopped my visits to the agitators, letting them know that I was in danger of ejection and thereby increasing rapport with them. I scarcely left my room, tried to work on reports, but spent most of my time worrying. Most difficult to bear was the fact that I could discuss my problem with no one. I grew so fearful of police espionage that I destroyed some of my notes and hid others in what I conceived to be ingenious places.

After a week of hermit existence I could bear the suspense no longer. I selected the complimentary verbatim statements which informants had made about the excellent speech which the Project Director had delivered at the funeral of the evacuee who had been killed, and called on the Project Director, letting him know by indirection that he had handled the situation admirably and that so far as I could see there was no danger of an anti-administrative demonstration. The Project Director asked how my work was progressing.

1. See pp. 43, 85-6.

I replied that I had a great deal of data, much of which still had to be written up. He then suggested that it might be wise if I stopped my visits in the Center and took a vacation. I told him that I intended to cut my visits to a minimum in order to catch up on my reports but that I was not going to leave the Center. For three weeks I followed the "advice" of the Project Director and did little work with informants. My Caucasian sources of information then let me know that the pressure was off and I resumed work.

In the months that followed I was able to mitigate the suspicion of the administration by fortuitously acquiring the reputation of a carouser and a heavy drinker. This was no deliberate plan on my part but came about accidentally. Several higher ranking members of the WRA staff were replaced by men who formed themselves into an exclusive binge society. Having been invited to one of these functions I astonished all present including myself by equalling the champion in liquor consumption and exhibiting the additional virtue of a wide knowledge of the type of song in which anthropologists excel. Oddly enough, this not particularly dignified social activity appeared to mitigate the suspicion with which I had formerly been regarded. The straight laced staff members shook their heads in disapproval when I rolled to my room at breakfast time but the administrators perhaps reasoned that if I spent my time in dissipation I would not have the energy to plot against them.

The study of factionalism

The study of the long drawn out factional disputes which were carried on during most of the Center's history was a complicated task.¹

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1. Only the major factional disputes have been mentioned in the brief historical sketch at the head of this chapter. The minor inter-factional and intra-factional disputes would overburden this paper with complexities.

It involved gaining and maintaining the confidence of important leaders in each of the factions over an extended period, despite the fact that some of these men hated each other bitterly. Simultaneously, the effect of the factional activities on the residents had to be observed and recorded.

In undertaking this study I was extremely fortunate in the friendship I was able to develop with the formidable Mr. Oishi. Oishi was a solitary man who studied constantly and allowed himself little recreation. His interests were varied. Though he was a certified public accountant and a navigator, he wrote poetry and studied the war chants of the samurai. He maintained a strong interest in Center politics and usually managed to find out what was going on behind the scenes.

Oishi appeared to enjoy my visits and I came to have a deep respect for him. After a few months of acquaintanceship, he became a kind of tutor in Center politics. He frequently gave me helpful hints about the activities of the Resegregationists without naming names. He probably did this partly to assist me and partly because he became so incensed over the machinations of the Resegregation Group leaders that he was obliged to express his indignation to someone whom he could trust.

Oishi introduced me to Itabashi, the man who was later beaten by Kira's gang. Itabashi also became a helpful informant. Had I not known these two men very well I would never have learned many of the significant details of Kira's program to terrorize the Center. I would not, in fact, have learned who beat Itabashi or why he was beaten.

Another very important contact was made in March of 1944 when I was able to secure an introduction to Mrs. Tsuchikawa, a fanatical Resegregationist, whose husband stood high in the hierarchy of the

underground group. This contact was made through Mr. Green, a staff member at Tule Lake who had developed extraordinary rapport with the underground group.¹ Mr. Green and I became friendly soon after my arrival at Tule Lake, a friendship which I valued highly, for he was a man of unusual integrity and insight. He suggested that I visit Mrs. Tsuchikawa, whom he knew to be actively involved in the underground group, which at this time was attempting to discredit the Co-ordinating Committee. Mrs. Tsuchikawa was regarded by the administration and the Co-ordinating Committee as one of the Center's most dangerous agitators. Green asked me not to use his name as a recommendation, since this would give Mrs. Tsuchikawa the impression that he was not treating her confidence with sufficient trust.

I visited Mrs. Tsuchikawa and found an attractive young woman who received me with fear and suspicion. Denied the assistance of a good introduction, I stated that I had heard her name mentioned by Co-ordinating Committee (as indeed I had as "that agitator, Mrs. Tsuchikawa") but that my studies had convinced me that the status of the Co-ordinating Committee in the community was very insecure. I pointed out the obstructions in the way of obtaining reliable data in the Center and the difficulties of distinguishing truth from misrepresentation and falsehood. I added that from what I already understood of the situation, I would lose respect for a person who "told me anything" without first satisfying himself that I was trustworthy.

Mrs. Tsuchikawa, the Madame Chiang Kai Shek of Tule Lake, as the lady was called by evacuee enemies, was not reassured by these statements. She denied any connection with the leaders of the Farm

1. "Mr. Green" is a pseudonym. An explanation of how he accomplished this difficult feat is given on pp. 163-7.

Strike Uprising, although I had not implied that such a connection existed. She stated that she could not be a person of importance since she was only a high school graduate and that all of her past activities had merely constituted standing up for her rights. Her brother had been placed in the stockade unjustly; she was tired of being grilled by the F. B. I. and the Caucasian police; she was glad that I was not behaving as they had. After a lengthy discussion on democracy and free speech, I left with an invitation to return for another talk whenever I chose to do so.

Mrs. Tsuchikawa immediately got in touch with Mr. Green and questioned him about me. She was reassured and later became an extraordinarily fine informant on the activities and attitudes of the underground group. When, for instance, the Resegregationists circulated their April 1944 petition, Mrs. Tsuchikawa no longer attempted to conceal her connection with the underground. Instead, she attempted to propagandize me and gain my support. When asked to explain the significance of the petition, she spoke with fanatical intensity:

"We don't care which (country) wins or loses. We're going to stick to Japan. We cannot raise our children overnight to become Japanese subjects. . in this camp full of draft evaders and fence-sitters." I asked her how her group proposed to distinguish between those residents who were truly loyal to Japan and those who were not. She stated categorically, "Those guys who won't say 'Yes' to the petition are the guys who are going to stay here." When asked what was to be the fate of the thousands of people who had not signed the petition but yet were by no means inu, she replied coldly, "Those other people - they didn't stick up for us in the crisis - it's not our business to worry about them." When I turned the conversation to the possibility that there might be more serious trouble in the

Center, Mrs. Tsuchikawa became a little more cautious and spoke in the third person, "Some people say they'd like to have another riot and see the WRA get out of here."¹

Late in May Mrs. Tsuchikawa suggested that I call upon "a very important man," who would be able to explain far more of the Resegregationist ideology than she could. This man was Mr. Yamashita, an ex-internee from the Department of Justice camp in Santa Fe, and the "brains" of the Resegregation Group. The first visit to this gentleman was made on a Sunday morning and was an unforgettable experience. The Yamashitas' small apartment was crowded by five dignified Issei visitors who were deep in conversation with the host. I retired to a corner and talked with Mrs. Yamashita. Soon another visitor arrived, none other than Mr. Tada, the gentleman of evil reputation. He joined the group of men. After about twenty minutes I was taken into the conversation. Yamashita revealed that he was a graduate of Stanford university and stated that he approved of the study. He voiced the aims of the Resegregationists in idealistic language and closed with the solemn statement that "every man in this room is going to be an important man in Japan some day, and it will be very fine to have a record of what we have done in Tule Lake." Some of the dignity was taken from this statement (at least as far as I was concerned) by the fact that Mr. Yamashita had large protuberant eyes and a luxuriant moustache, which gave him an incongruous resemblance to ^{Jerry Colonna} ~~a well known radio comedian~~.

I then turned to Mr. Tada, an extremely tall slim man, who looked like a Mexican movie villain, and told him that I was pleased to meet him because I hoped some day to discuss certain aspects of the early history of the Center with him. Tada replied suavely with some

1. Field Notes, April, 1944, pp. 9-10.

We don't show it by signing petitions."¹

Wakida now ^{for the first time} openly voiced the opinion that the Resegregationists were a menace. ^{shortly after} He attended their meetings, checked on the statements they released on the size of their membership, followed their activities as closely as he could, and relayed these data to me.

Mr. Itabashi, a kindly and candid elderly man, who through a recommendation from Mr. Oishi had become one of my franker informants, had a naive faith that right would prevail. He planned to lecture on the United States after his return to Japan. He told me that he had learned many of the "bad things" about the treatment of the Japanese in America, but asked me to get him some references about the "good things" done by various liberal organizations so that he might lecture fairly. He had no use at all for the petition and said: "The majority of the people are signing under intimidation or ignorance." He denounced Kira for his selfish ambitions and the trouble he was causing in camp. He spoke so frankly and boldly that I cautioned him, saying there were dangerous men in the camp. He was, after all (though I did not tell him this) a frail little man, almost 70 years old, and no match for Kira's husky gangsters. Itabashi laughed and said I should not worry about him. "These people are cowards. . . when the Japanese talk big, they don't bite."²

Visits to the Resegregationist leaders indicated that they were disappointed with the reception of the petition but were resolved to put a bold face on the matter. Mrs. Tsuchikawa said almost with fury, "We're going right ahead no matter how much the

1. Ibid., Oct. 2, 1944, p. 1.

2. Ibid., Oct. 10, 1944, p. 1.

people squawk."¹

Five days after Itabashi told me not to worry about him he and two other elderly men were beaten by Kira's gang. I learned of this beating from Mr. Oishi, who told me that he had investigated and found that men in Kira's gang were responsible. Oishi followed this story with a long specific account of Kira's gangster activities, which had begun on Terminal Island, California. I was so stunned by the account of the beating of my friend that I scarcely listened to this valuable data. I flew into a tremendous rage and swore that now I would beat up Kira myself. Oishi smiled and commented, "With your strength I think you could do it." He added that he himself had visited Itabashi and promised to punish Kira but that Itabashi had begged him to do nothing, lest the gang attack his children. I was in truth as helpless as Oishi for I could not break my promise of silence. Moreover, I had little confidence that if I should inform the administration could break Kira's gang with a speed and ruthlessness sufficient to make retaliatory violence against Itabashi's family impossible.

A few days later, muttering vague and impractical threats, I called on Mr. Kira. I found his outer office occupied by a bodyguard of half a dozen husky young men. Deciding rapidly that guile would accomplish more than force, I exchanged amicable greetings with the gangster. Kira told me a long tale of how he had frightened the administration into giving way on a housing regulation by having his "boys" appear at the propitious time and frighten the assembled body of block managers. I complimented him on his cleverness and we parted on the most friendly terms.

At my next visit to Mr. Oishi I gave him to understand that

1. Ibid.

henceforth I would use my rapport with the Resegregationists to obtain all the information I could get which might assist in the eventual liquidation of this menace. Thus, I, who four months before had hardened my heart against the inu became a kind of inu myself.

From this point forward, however, Oishi took me completely into his confidence and gave me information of extreme value, much of which was never learned by the administration and a great deal of which was known to only a few Japanese. We held long consultations, Oishi counselling patience and holding that Kira and the Resegregationists should be given more rope.

A completely unanticipated, bizarre complication now entered this already involved situation. Kato, in the month that has passed since the night he and Yamada had escorted me to the gate, had developed into an excellent informant. He rounded up additional documents for me, and while he was too vain to be trusted in his descriptions of his own activities, he possessed a talent for expressing the emotional overtones of a group assembly which was very helpful. We spent hours together, going over the confused and garbled minutes of the Farm Strike representative body, while Kato clarified statements, pointed out errors, and explained why certain policies had been followed. He gave vivid descriptions of the tremendous excitement and disorder of the early period of the uprising. I was, of course, delighted with these data and showed this very clearly.

Unlike Kuratomi, Kato and Yamada had responded to the overtures of the Resegregation Group. Kato had become an enthusiastic member and Yamada became the leader or dano of the young men's group. I had no difficulty in following these developments for Kato expressed his views frankly and the Resegregationist leaders told me how pleased they were with Yamada.

As the weeks passed Kato became increasingly confidential. He

Having told this tale with ^{much expression} ~~great emotion~~, Yamashita appeared to
feel better. I left ^{my heart in a coil} ~~delighted~~ with the fact that I had been
^{feeling} forewarned about the coming petition. I doubted, however, that the
general residents of the Center would view this move on the part of
the Resegregationists as an attempt "to help the people".

A few days later, when the petition was circulated, I was
astonished at the disapproval expressed by many of my informants.
I was not surprised that they disapproved but that they expressed
this disapproval so frankly and bitterly to me. Oishi, Itabashi, and
Wakida, the ex-agitator from Gila denounced it. Wakida, who lived in
a ward where the Resegregationists were very strong became furious
under the pressure put upon him by his neighbors. He told me: "I
say, 'Leave me alone and I'll leave you alone.' I'm Japanese -- no
matter what they say. If we swear to be Japanese we are Japanese."

1. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, pp. 4-5.

After some thought, I decided to see him less frequently and take my chances. ^{Memoranda} Allowing two weeks to pass I called on him and opened the conversation with a discussion of bushido, the code of the samurai. I held forth vaguely on my appreciation for this stringent set of moral precepts, stressing particularly my admiration for the great personal sacrifice which certain heroes had made to maintain their honor. Kato probably did not understand much of this ambiguous discourse, but he got the point. He did not mention his lack of affection for his wife again and rapport appeared uninjured.

After the Itabashi beating, tension rose within the Center.

Many residents were disturbed and afraid. Those who had not signed the petition feared the growing power of the Resegregationists. Whether they had signed or not, many feared that the increasingly nationalistic activities of the Resegregation Group leaders, which by this time were taking on the aspect of exhibitionism, would bring down the wrath of the United States government upon Tule Lake. The news of a beating did not spread through the Center like wildfire. Nor was a beating followed by expressions of approbation because some inu had received his just deserts. Instead, very few people mentioned the beatings. When they did, they lowered their voices. Often they added, "When are we going to get some peace here?"

I also fell into a state of apprehension. I had seen the Resegregationist leaders work their program once before and except for the difference in the attitude of the general residents and, it might be remarked, the difference in my attitude, the parallel was marked. More and more frequently, Resegregationist leaders told me, "It won't be long now. We are getting ready to strike." Kato was especially free with statements that something drastic was going to happen soon.

I discussed my impressions with Oishi. He corroborated my fears, said he too knew that something was brewing, but could not discover what it was. Oishi, however, was not taking any chances. He acquired several rocks the size of baseballs, which he used as paper weights. When he went out at night to his class in samurai war chants, he carried a black-jack.

Finally, I decided to take advantage of the susceptible Mr. Kato. I put on my best dress and silver earrings and paid him a call. Mr. Kato's wife, who though mild and meek was observant, saw the raiment, excused herself as usual, but instead of withdrawing to the next room, brought out the family wash and began to hang it up outside the door.

This precaution did not deter Mr. Kato. After a few minutes of conversation, he stated: "I shouldn't tell you this. Only three people in camp besides Mr. Kira and myself know it, but very soon twelve men are going to be beaten up in one night. That will show the administration in Washington that the Project Director is no good and they'll have to fire him." The idea was that if a sufficiently outrageous violence were committed within the Center, newspaper publicity would be unavoidable, Washington would blame the local administration and make radical changes which would be beneficial to the Resegregationists.

I lost no time in placing this information before Oishi. He received it quietly, thanked me, and made no comment. I then deliberately attempted to stir Oishi to aggressive action. I harangued him on the misdeeds of the Resegregationists, mourned over the miserable plight of the wretched and terrified residents and stated that it was about time that a man with guts did something about this situation. Oishi still said nothing and I left in great depression. I should have known better, since by this time I had repeatedly observed that when a Japanese becomes unusually quiet, one may expect violent or forceful action.

A few days later a rumor filtered through the Center that Mr. Kira had resigned his office with the Resegregation Group. I checked this rumor with Mrs. Tsuchikawa who explained that Mr. Kira's health was poor and that he was breaking under his numerous duties. At my next visit to Mr. Kato's residence I found that young man very discouraged and depressed. He told me that there wasn't going to be any "trouble" for a long time to come, because the important leaders had counselled waiting.

It took some time to discover what Oishi had done. He himself would not tell me much, perhaps because he thought that doing so would sound vainglorious. Mr. Itabashi and Mr. Wakida supplied the informa-

tion. Oishi, it appears, had hurriedly rallied his friends. He then sent a dossier of Kira's misdeeds out of the Center to several Japanese friends with the instruction that if he were killed or beaten or if he gave the word, this material should be given to the F. B. I. Next he sent word to Kira that he wished to talk to him.

Kira sent two go-betweens. The go-betweens argued with Oishi for five hours, telling him, "Why should you care what we do in the Center so long as we let you alone?" Oishi ~~in great rage~~ told them that he had concern for all of the residents of the Center, recounted the crimes of their leader to them, and told them to take Kira his ultimatum: if there were another beating in the Center, he himself would denounce Kira. Kira's resignation followed.

I was now placed in an embarrassing position with Mr. Oishi, for he wanted to know where I had obtained my information. I was afraid to tell him, for Oishi was a man of rigid personal integrity and extreme morality. I decided, however, to tell him the truth, for he had never lied to me. So, stating that he might think badly of me, I explained the vulnerability of Mr. Kato. When I had finished, Oishi said solemnly, "Do you think I will scold you when you saved my life?" Then the humor of the situation struck him and he added, "My, young men are certainly foolish."

It is very probable that Kira told no one of his reasons for resigning, for my rapport with the Resegregationist leaders was in no way altered by this turn of events. Indeed, the Resegregationists soon had so much trouble to cope with that they had little time to wonder about my good faith. The Kuratomi-Tada faction rose against them.

After the battle between Kuratomi's friends and the Resegregationist secretary¹ in which, if the Resegregationists were to be believed,

1. See pp. 63-4.

vice, personified by the gamblers had attacked virtue, personified by the Resegregationists, hostility between the rival factions became intense. My visits to the Resegregationist leaders were largely taken up with listening to denunciations of Kai, Kuratomi and Tada, and to fearful threats of what the Resegregationists would do to their rivals if American justice did not punish the "gamblers" and "hoodlums" with sufficient severity. Under these circumstances I thought it wise to stop my visits to Mr. Kuratomi. A violent gang battle was by no means a remote possibility. Moreover, the Resegregationist leaders were so incensed that my academic excuse for continuing my visits to Kuratomi would now have sounded feeble. Meanwhile, I hoped that Kuratomi would have the sagacity to appreciate my reasons for avoiding him.

Fortunately, this period of tension endured only ten days. The Department of Justice, whose representative had been investigating the role of the Resegregationists in the renunciation of United States Citizenship, suddenly interned all the officers of the organization. This internment profoundly affected my field work. I lost all of the informants who stood high in the hierarchy of the organization. I did not attempt to maintain contact with the wives of the interned men, partly because I feared they would incorrectly conclude that I had informed against their husbands and partly because I could no longer bring myself to maintain a false front of friendship. Many informants who had hurriedly resigned from the group after the internment or had never been in it, kept me informed on what the Resegregationists were doing and saying. In any case, it would have been virtually impossible to develop rapport with the insecure substitute leaders, even if I had been acquainted with them.

Developing rapport with Kuratomi and Tada

A few days after the internment I called on Kuratomi and found him quite cheerful over the turn of events. For the first time in our acquaintanceship he overtly though still cautiously criticized the Resegregationists, calling their organization a "monkey wrench" which made it impossible for the residents of Tule Lake to live in harmony. He commented on the internment, remarking that it had given the Center "the spirit of a holiday," but adding, "Of course, the families of the people picked up don't feel so good." He warned me that the remaining Resegregationist leaders were spreading propaganda to the effect that the internment constituted a step forward in achieving recognition as a Japanese national, and pointed out how dangerous it would be if this notion gained credence among the residents.¹

Kuratomi also promised to speak to Mr. Tada and tell him to give me certain important information of which Tada alone had knowledge. Tada had taken a prominent and rather peculiar part in the Farm Strike uprising over a year before when he had been chief of evacuee police. After the entrance of the Army he had carried on negotiations with the Army and the WRA virtually by himself. Data on what had occurred at this time were practically nil, for the Army had released no statements and Tada was the only Japanese who knew the inside story. With Kuratomi's recommendation, however, Tada felt free to speak. He proved to be an extremely able informant, possessing an excellent sense of time sequence and the ability to make clear both events and the attitudes they evoked. He also produced his elderly father to serve as chaperone, offering me either tea or sake to drink. I chose sake.

1. Kuratomi's prophesy of trouble was rapidly fulfilled. See Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., pp. 342-356.

As the weeks passed, rapport with Kuratomi grew apace. As we became better acquainted, I told him how my attitudes toward the Resegregationists had developed: how I had attempted to keep an open mind when the feud broke out in mid-September of 1944 and had lost all objectivity with the beating of my friend. Kuratomi, on his part, came to regard me as an ally of some value. He revealed helpful information on the past and current activities of the Resegregationists, and since he was a politician of no mean experience, we had many enjoyable discussions in which we analyzed the general and specific political and sociological ^{phenomena} of Tule Lake.

It was not, however, until March of 1945 that I felt my rapport secure enough to risk an outright question on a matter about which I had desired information for six months. This was Kuratomi's side of the story of how he, Kai, and Tada had fallen out with the Resegregationists after their release from the stockade.¹ I had hinted at this subject a number of times but Kuratomi had always discreetly ignored the hints. At this March visit I had to good fortune to find Mr. Tada visiting Kuratomi. After a half hour spend in discussing current affairs, I asked the two men for their opinion on a certain detail of my analysis of the development of the Resegregation Group. Data indicated that the Resegregationists had been following a plan which they had ~~formed~~, at least roughly, in the spring of 1944.² Oishi agreed with me on this point, but I wished to get as full data as possible. Kuratomi and Tada also agreed and gave additional data which enabled me to put my case even more strongly.

1. See pp. 56-8, 116-8.

2. Dr. Marvin Opler, the Community Analyst at Tule Lake held that the Resegregationists had changed their plans radically in September 1944. Since my data pointed to a different conclusion, I desired to check it as thoroughly as possible.

While this animated discussion was going on, Kuratomi produced a large bottle labelled "vinigar" but containing distilled sake. He refused to drink any but sat by quietly while Mr. Tada and I consumed large water tumblers full. By this time we were beginning to appreciate each others personalities to a marked degree, for the effect of distilled sake is roughly comparable to that of straight brandy. I thereupon remarked that for many months I had been concerned over the fact that I had only Mrs. Tsuchikawa's and Mr. Yamashita's accounts of the schism which had occurred in September, when the Resegregationist leaders had refused to sign a letter to the American Civil Liberties Union because Tada was also a signer. "Well," said Tada, "what did they say about me?" I then broke my rule of not repeating the statements of one factional leader to another and recounted the long series of accusations which the Resegregationists had made against Tada and Kuratomi. As the tale progressed, these gentlemen broke into chuckles and finally into roars of laughter. When the story was finished, they consulted each other by glances and Kuratomi decided to give his version of the matter. He did this in great detail. Mr. Tada was particularly irritated by the fact that the Resegregationists had told me that he and Kuratomi had attempted to borrow money from them. "Why, I put up most of that money myself," said he.

By this time a second glass of distilled sake had vanished. Tada by now was feeling very happy indeed and began to relate the story of his personal difficulties with the Resegregationists, data which I also had desired for a long time. He ended with the astute observation: "The Resegregation group kicks about discrimination and exclusion they had in America. But they (the Resegregationists) are doing the same thing here in this camp."¹

1. Field Notes, March 6, 1945, pp. 3-7.

It was now late in the afternoon. Mindful of the administration's disapproval of Caucasians remaining in the Japanese section too late in the day, I ended the visit. I had not, however, reckoned on the effect of a generous pint of hard liquor coupled with freezing weather. It took great self control to walk the half mile to the sentry gate in a straight line. It took more to risk the possibility that the sentry would stop me and ask to see my pass. Had I been observed leaving the Center reeking with bootleg sake, the Study would have been brought to an abrupt close. Nevertheless, I held my breath, assumed a dour and virtuous expression, and stalked by the sentry without challenge. When I reached my room, I collapsed, crawling out of bed several hours later with the valuable notes still in hand.

For the remaining period of study, I had little difficulty in making new contacts and was able to get data on almost any matter. Kuratomi furnished additional documents, carefully edited and explained the minutes of the Farm Strike representative body (thereby giving me two edited editions, the other having been done by Kato). He recommended the names of informants on those activities in which he had had no personal part and if these individuals were reluctant to talk to me, Kuratomi took my list of questions and interviewed them himself.

Developing Rapport with Leaders

The above account of field experiences indicates that making the acquaintance of the leading agitators was not difficult. Indeed, they were the easiest persons to contact in the Center and the easiest with which to gain rapport. A powerful leader who had a strong following did not need to concern himself over the fact that a visit from a Caucasian might give him the reputation of inu.¹ Since he was a leader,

1. Tada was an exception. Though he had a loyal following, his "boys" were considered gamblers and ne're-do-wells by the general residents and he himself had a poor reputation because of his alleged dealings in vice.

it was taken for granted that Caucasians might call on him to discuss matters of community interest. When, in fact, I apologized for calling rather frequently, the Yamashitas and the Tsuchikawas were voluble in their assurances that I might call as often as I chose. "We fear no one," they would say, "Our door is always unlocked."¹

To some extent, visits from a Caucasian increased the prestige of the leaders, for one of the earmarks of a powerful and influential man was that he might remain at home and people would call upon him.

Just as it was relatively easy to contact leaders, it was also easy to develop rapport with them and to obtain specific information from them. They expected to be questioned about their public-spirited activities. Kira had obviously prepared for his first interview by outlining the subjects he wished to discuss and explain. After these subjects had been exhausted, it was not difficult to find additional questions which concerned matters which reflected credit upon the leader or gave him the opportunity to explain (to his advantage) matters which had been misinterpreted by the administration or by Japanese rivals. Once such men had been lured into spending several interviews explaining what able and unselfish politicians they were, little additional effort was needed to build rapport.

Moreover, these men were unusually *self-centered* egotistical individuals. Almost all of them considered themselves more influential and powerful than they actually were. Few, however, felt any genuine security. Though they might have a considerable following, they constantly had to contend with the disapproval of the administration and the attacks of opposing factions. Furthermore, their primary ambition and probably their chief conscious

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1. These courageous words were not always true. During periods of extreme inter-factional hostility, the apartments of prominent leaders were guarded night and day by loyal followers. But to admit fear before me would have meant loss of face, since it implied lack of power.

motivation was the hope that their pro-Japanese activities in Tule Lake would result in their being welcomed and honored on their arrival in Japan as persons of status rather than as penniless repatriates and expatriates, disliked and mistrusted by the genuine Japanese by reason of their long residence in the United States. Consequently, they welcomed any kind of favorable publicity. The distinctly idealized version of their activities which they presented to me, published under the name of a great research organization, might serve (so they perhaps thought) to establish the rightness of their behavior and the correctness of their procedures.¹

There was, however, a more practical reason for my rapport with the agitators: they believed they could use me as an informant on the policies, attitudes, and activities of the Administration. This turning of the tables was, of course, attempted occasionally by most informants, but some of the leaders grilled me with a persistence which would have been annoying had I not appreciated the irony of being given a taste of my own medicine. Needless to say, a good deal of perspicacity was needed to keep from revealing information which I had received in confidence from staff members. Here the devices used by evacuees when they did not wish to give information were very useful, e. g., pretending not to understand the question and answering at length but beside the point; answering those questions which could be answered with painstaking thoroughness and honesty so that the informan-questioner got something for his trouble; reminding

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1. The leaders, like other informants, were told that their names would not be used in publications. This appeared to make little difference to them, for several remarked that it did not matter whether I used their names or not. "We have nothing to hide," said they. In truth, all they required was the assurance that their activities would not be betrayed to the administration.

informants that I was not in the confidence of the higher ranking members of the administrative staff (which was true) and consequently would not be given important information. On one occasion Mrs. Tsuchikawa asked me to throw a message into the stockade. I refused. Though the message purportedly contained only some advice as to how to proceed with the negotiations with the American Civil Liberties Union regarding a suit contemplated against the WRA for detention without trial, the chance of being shot by the sentries and abruptly ending field work was too great.

The Role of Geisha

Ever since my friendship with the powerful Issei leader of the Gila Center, who frankly discussed Center politics while discreetly sharing his stock of black home brew with me,¹ I had unconsciously been playing a role with certain male informants which was extremely effective because it fitted squarely into Japanese culture. I learned of this role by accident. Having left Tule Lake for a brief period, I met and had a long discussion with an Issei friend. This man, who had himself been an agitator in another Center, had read my reports. He was enthusiastic and most complimentary. After a long discussion of Center politics, he said, "You know, of course, why you get this fine information?" I mentioned a few of the techniques which have been explained in this paper. The Issei laughed. "Excuse me for saying this," he said, "but you're all wrong. You don't know it, but you're a geisha." I had sufficient knowledge of Japanese culture to understand that being called a geisha was by no means the same as being called a prostitute. Nevertheless, I suffered a severe blow to my academic

1. See pp. 35-7.

pride. Perceiving that he had hurt my feelings, the Issei elucidated. He explained that in Japan a man with any pretensions to status attempts to get himself a geisha. He must do this, "because Japanese men never tell their wives anything. They can't afford to because the wives will brag to the neighbors about what their husbands are doing and all the secrets will come out." The Issei explained that a man cannot boast before other men either. It is not good form. The chief function of a geisha, therefore, is to listen to a man's achievements and his plans. The more adept she is at listening with subtle flattery, the better geisha she is. The agitators at Tule Lake, said the Issei, were under tremendous tension. By talking to a woman who would listen, admire, and because of her intimate acquaintance with Center politics was able to comment intelligently, they could release some of this tension and re-inflate their egos. He then became more serious and stated that if I desired to continue to function capably as a gatherer of data I should not weaken and succumb to any of the enamored agitators. "Then they'll think you belong to them and if you look at another man, there'll be fights. And, whatever you do, don't fall in love with any of them yourself. Paint your finger nails, wear your best clothes, keep flattering them, and you'll keep getting the information."

How correct the Issei was in his analysis of this peculiar role cannot be determined objectively. I am inclined to the opinion that with certain informants at least, the analysis was most astute.

Recommendations for study in a factional situation

Some general recommendations for the study of factionalism may be presented on the basis of these experiences. It should be emphasized, however, that these recommendations are offered only as suggestions which a student may follow insofar as other factional

situations resemble that described above.

It should be pointed out that the investigational situation at Tule Lake was unusual in that it was characterized by the combination of a community terrorized by a faction and so great a degree of social isolation that I was able to become intimately acquainted with the terrorists and yet conceal this association from the general residents.¹ In short, I was able to keep fairly well informed on the plans of the feared group and simultaneously obtain remarkably frank attitudes from the general residents concerning their reactions to these plans. This procedure would have been impossible had my informants suspected my friendly relationship with the agitators. I would then myself have become the object of fear.²

The student cannot hope to encounter this combination of circumstances frequently and must be prepared to work in a situation where it will not be possible to visit leaders inconspicuously. If these leaders are terrorists, the student will probably do well to compromise. In the early period of his study it may be wise to avoid the leaders and concentrate on gaining rapport with the general residents. Especially he should attempt to develop casual friendships with individuals who are not taking an active part in politics but have been leaders of sorts in the past. Such persons appear to have an insatiable interest in current politics even though they may not be participating actively. If their biases are taken into account, they make excellent informants.

After the field worker has established some solid friendships and obtained considerable data he may, for the latter period of his study, concentrate on the leaders, risking the possibility that he may lose

1. See pp. 83-4.

2. See the interview with Fujii, pp. 96-9.

some of his more timid informants. By this time the leaders may have lost some of their fearsome qualities, as did certain of the Farm Strike leaders after their release from the stockade. The leaders, he may be sure, will be relatively easy to contact for reasons which have already been explained in detail. This policy, however, has one serious drawback -- the leaders, if they are terrorists, may be arrested by the authorities and placed far beyond the reach of the field worker. It is also obviously inferior to the simultaneous collection of attitudes and actions of the leaders and the reactions of the community.

The community of Tule Lake was exceptional in another respect. The nature of the issues did not allow any member of the community to assume an open middle-of-the-fence position. In fact, to be an avowed fence-sitter was almost as bad as being an inu. Consequently, a person who was not an outsider would have found it almost impossible to study the factional developments.¹ He would have been forced either to join some faction or to keep out of politics altogether. Had he approached the leaders as anything but a supporter, he would have been branded as an inu. Had he persisted, he might have paid for his curiosity with his life. I, on the other hand, could not be expected to be a "true Japanese" and could not formally have joined any of the organizations even if I desired to do so. It is doubtful if many factional situations will present such marked advantages to an outsider and such marked disadvantages to a student who belongs to the in-group.

Turning to general recommendations pertinent to the study of factionalism, the following suggestions may be made. If the student's problem requires that he obtain information from the leaders themselves, and the situation does not render such contacts

1. Evacuee students of social science who have studied the reports of the writer have frequently expressed this opinion.

unwise, the sooner the field worker establishes rapport with the leaders the better. If the field worker can establish amicable relationships with the leaders before a factional conflict reaches a crisis, his situation will be ideal. He will be in the very fortunate position of having gained their confidence before active hostilities begin. He will also increase his chances of being in their presence when they are in a state of tension or strongly moved by emotion which will often induce them to make rash confidences.¹

The alert student who is mixing with ordinary residents in the community will have no difficulty in obtaining hints as to the identity of the leaders. If he does have difficulty, the writer recommends that he make a concentrated effort to win the trust of individuals who have been leaders in the past. Such persons, he may be sure, will either assume leadership as a crisis develops or, if they are forced to take a back seat, they will be inclined to resent the successful leaders and will become valuable sources of information.²

If, however, the field worker begins his investigation after a period of marked crisis, he will face a more difficult task. Almost every informant who participated in the crisis situation will give him misleading information. The successful leaders will soft-pedal their

1. See interviews with Yamashita and Oishi, pp. 120-1, 123.

2. My field experiences, though they cover only two communities, yield much data in support of a thesis that once an individual has tasted the power and excitement of leadership, he will almost always continue to maintain a strong interest in current politics. Excluding the Resegregationist leaders and Kuratomi (all of whom had been or had attempted to become leaders before they came to Tule Lake), my regular and most reliable sources of information on Resegregationist activities were four ex-leaders. Though these individuals repeatedly told me that they "were staying out of politics," they were apparently fascinated by the factional developments and enjoyed discussing them. In contrast, non-leader informants discussed the factions only when events brought them to their attention.

less creditable activities. The defeated leaders, if they can be contacted, will be anything but objective in their statements. Ordinary citizens who supported the defeated side will conveniently forget this fact. Much patience and persistence will be needed to obtain a reliable picture of the past activities and attitudes of individuals and groups.¹

The leaders in power will not be difficult to contact. For example, during my first visit to Tule Lake I found it relatively easy to make appointments with the chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee and the young woman who served as secretary to the body. However, as the power of the Co-ordinating Committee rapidly waned under rising public disapproval and diminishing support from the authorities, its members became increasingly wary of any contact which would increase their reputation as inu. The best I could do was make infrequent and cautious visits to the secretary. Consequently, satisfactory data on the attitudes of this group was never obtained.

If the defeated faction has gone underground these leaders may at first be hard to contact. The student, however, has powerful psychological forces as his allies. Politicians cannot remain underground indefinitely. They are bound to make their presence known, even though they may do so by organizing benevolent societies. As soon as the underground leaders take some action which can conceivably be viewed as public-spirited, the field worker is given an

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1. After my first visit to Tule Lake I entertained the hypothesis that support of the Farm Strike uprising had been much stronger than the administration and most of my Japanese informants would admit. Getting data to support this hypothesis took a long time. It was procured by discussing the events of the Farm Strike repeatedly with the same informants. As the months passed, it was interesting to observe how informants who at first had posed as non-combatants, began to tell of how they had thought the strike was a good idea, how they had attended the demonstration with high hopes and enthusiasm, and how they had laughed at the soldiers.

automatic entree. He can visit the leaders, let them convince him of the justice of their cause, let them conceive of the notion of employing him as a tool, and allay their anxieties by his respectful attention.

The final important problem of the field worker is very general, and will appear in any factional situation. This involves the technique of maintaining amicable relations with two or more groups of leaders who are hostile to each other. I am inclined to think that the difficulties of this task are prone to be exaggerated by students who have not experienced it. So long as the field worker does not openly play one faction against another and does not attempt to curry favor by repeating the statements of one leader to another (which may cause even the most naive leader to wonder whether the too garrulous field worker may not be discussing him with equal freedom with his rivals), he should meet with no extraordinary difficulties. His chances of success, however, will be augmented if he is an outsider and cannot reasonably be expected to participate openly in the conflict and if he possesses even a modicum of status and power which the factional leaders think they can employ to their advantage.

My experiences give considerable evidence of the probability of these contentions. The Yamashitas and the Tsuchikawas knew that I visited Kuratomi. Kuratomi knew that for many months I had been on excellent terms with his rivals. Oishi knew that I visited the Re-segregation Group leaders and had himself recommended that I obtain rapport with Kira. I did not find myself noticeably handicapped by this. So long as I did not give the impression that I was becoming converted to the views of the opposition, the leaders accepted my explanation that my duty as a student lay in recording as many opinions as possible. Their job, as they saw it, was to keep me on their side. In fact, I had little need to play faction against faction or to

introduce the name of a rival leader into the conversation. With the exception of the initial reserve shown by Kuratomi, the leaders usually made haste to inform me of the alleged errors and misdeeds of their opponents. Even the wily Kira occasionally told me how his public spirited plans were being misunderstood and attacked by "certain people".

In certain situations the field worker may find that overtly playing one faction against another may bring quick results in the accumulation of data. But if he intends to make an extended study and follow the dynamics of a factional development, it is probable that such a policy will be injurious. Leaders may be fanatical and egotistical, but they are not ^{seldom} a ways fools. They will not be slow to perceive that they are being played with.

On two occasions I broke the precept which I am vigorously proposing here. The first occasion was when I pledged myself to help Oishi fight the Resegregationists and gave him the information I derived from the leaders. It should be remembered, however, that I had been on excellent terms with Oishi for eight months and with Itabashi for three months before this involvement arose. Both of these men had had ample opportunity to see that my disapproval of Kira was sincere and that I was not assuming a false attitude in order to pry additional information from them. Moreover, I continued this espionage for only six weeks. Had not the Resegregationist leaders been interned so opportunely, I might have found myself in grave difficulties. On the second occasion, when I told Kuratomi and Tada the specific accusations which the Resegregationist leaders had made against them, I did this only after I had been visiting Kuratomi for six months, during which time I had seldom mentioned any prominent Resegregationist by name. Nevertheless, I do not think that these actions are to be recommended. In adopting them I pushed my luck almost to the limit of its endurance.

The advisability of patience and waiting for the opportune time to concentrate attention on certain leaders have been emphasized so strongly above that they require only brief/mention here. It might be remarked, however, that a field worker can judge such matters capably only if he has acquired a "feeling for the situation." He will acquire this "feeling" only as his knowledge of the attitudes of the community becomes precise and penetrating.

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CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE DATA ON FIELD WORK EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
EMPLOYED BY WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The Japanese Centers were intensively studied by a number of anthropologists and sociologists hired by governmental agencies. In June of 1942 the Office of Indian Affairs, which was responsible for the administration of the Poston Center, secured the services of Alexander Leighton to head a sociological research project. The aims and purposes of the Poston research project were as follows:

1. To aid the administration by analyzing the attitudes of the evacuees with particular reference to their responses to administrative acts and to draw practical conclusions as to what worked well, and what did not work so well and why.
2. To gather data of a general character that might be of value to the administration of dislocated communities in occupied areas.
3. To train field workers of Japanese ancestry in social analysis so that they could be helpful in occupied areas of the Pacific, during or after the war.¹

From January of 1943 until the closing of the Centers in December of 1945 the War Relocation Authority maintained a staff of social scientists. These men were called Community Analysts and one of them worked in each of the Centers. Their chief task was to prepare analytical and descriptive reports on the attitudes of the Japanese residents and to aid in solving the problems of the administration.²

Since these social scientists and the writer were engaged in a

1. Leighton, op. cit., p. 373.

2. Spicer, E. H., "The Use of Social Scientists by the War Relocation Authority," Applied Anthropology, Spring 1946, 5:2, pp. 16-40.

similar task, a comparison of the field work techniques mentioned in their reports with those described in this paper should be instructive. This comparison, however, cannot be thorough. None of the writer's colleagues described their experiences in detail comparable to this paper. Though the writer was able to observe some of the activities of the Analysts in the Gila and Tule Lake Centers, these observations yield only fragmentary data concerning two individuals. Therefore, the comparison in techniques will be limited to a discussion of the acquisition of informants, the techniques of alleviating suspicion, certain additional minor techniques, the informal interview, and personal contacts with informants.

The Acquisition of Informants

The Community Analysts and Dr. Leighton, in contrast to the writer, hired a staff of Japanese research assistants and clerical workers.¹ They remark, however, that they also gained considerable assistance from unpaid volunteers. This paid staff varied in number in the different Centers from about four to twelve employees.

Most of the Analysts stress the fact that recruiting the paid staff was very difficult. Moreover, individuals with proper training were not available or they preferred other positions which brought them less social stigma. Mr. Hoffman of the Central Utah or Topaz Center states that evacuees felt his work "was a sort of F. B. I." Mr. French of Poston reports that he was never able to obtain a capable personnel and tells of an early mishap -- hiring two evacuees who were already regarded as inu by the residents. Mr. Hansen of Minidoka states that "an adequate method of (staff) recruitment was never developed" and that capable people "would not accept jobs because it meant frequent

1. Leighton was also assisted by two Caucasian anthropologists, Spicer and Colton.

explanations to their suspicious neighbors."¹

Obtaining a Community Analysis staff in the post-segregation Tule Lake Center was probably most difficult of all. When, in late September and early October of 1943, almost 9,000 segregees were brought to the Tule Lake Center, Dr. Marvin Opler was presented with what was virtually a new community to study. Two weeks after the arrival of the segregees the farm accident occurred and the farmers refused to work. Acquiring informants during this period, when the community was in the initial throes of an uprising, was extremely difficult. Some three weeks later the Army took over the jurisdiction of the Center and Dr. Opler was not allowed to go to his office in the Japanese section without an impressive military escort.² Not until mid-December was he able to resume contact with the Japanese and this contact was not entirely fortunate since it was with the anti-strike group which formed the nucleus of the Co-ordinating Committee. Despite these difficulties Dr. Opler succeeded in obtaining some research assistants and typists by the early spring of 1944. All of them were promptly regarded as inu by the residents. The following statement is only one of many made by the writer's informants:

"They have an inu office in 701 (the office of the Community Analyst). It's run by a fellow named Opler. He's a good guy but the fellows working for him are inu. Opler asked me to work for him but I wouldn't do it for anything. Not with those guys anyway."³

In their reports the Analysts seldom give specific details of the

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1. Hoffman, O., M. S., "Closing Report on Community Analysis Section, Central Utah Project," p. 5; French, D. H., M. S., "Final Report on Poston," pp. 1, 2, 4; Hansen, A. T., "Community Analysis at Heart Mountain Relocation Center," Applied Anthropology, Summer 1946, 5:3, pp. 15-20; Sweetser, F., M. S., "Report on Manzanar, May 29 through May 31, p. 4.
 2. Field Notes, Mar. 1944, p. 60.
 3. Ibid., June 8, 1944, p. 1.

techniques they employed to mitigate this suspicion and obtain paid assistants. They could, of course, point to the fact that according to the policies of the WRA their sources of information were to remain confidential and they were not to be asked to investigate anything on a personal basis.¹ The research project headed by Dr. Leighton adopted similar policies:

"All confidential material must be safely guarded and prevented from falling into hands of persons who might misuse it for personal gain or to harm others.

"The files are our own and no other division or branch has authority over them.

"No data relevant to subversive activities will be kept in our files."²

The mere assurance that sources of information would not be revealed was not very effective ammunition against the suspicion with which evacuees regarded members of the administration. It placed the informant in the status of a stool-pigeon whose only safeguard was the honor of the field worker. Nevertheless, in a Center where tension was not extreme, this assurance of anonymity added to the explanation that a part of the Analyst's duties consisted of aiding the evacuees by providing a channel through which their opinions and desires might reach the local and Washington administrations was of some help in gaining evacuee assistants. Dr. Brown working in the quiet Gila Center convinced an Issei that he was sincere in these assertions. The Issei became his assistant and then set himself to convince his fellow evacuees, particularly the Center leaders, that they need not feel reluctant to express their

1. Smith, E. E., M. S. "Community Analysis Section at Minidoka, Its history, aims, methodology and problems," p. 2.

2. Leighton, op. cit., p. 393.

opinions to him or to Dr. Brown.¹ Naturally, neither Brown nor the Issei were always believed. In time, however, many of the residents came to respect Dr. Brown, who thoroughly understood the technique of not appearing to pry into delicate matters. Few people called the Issei assistant an inu. At worst, the residents regarded him as a harmless and somewhat childlike individual.

In the crisis ridden Tule Lake Center Dr. Marvin Opler was obliged to employ more devious techniques. After the Army had returned the control of the Center to the WPA, Opler was able to resume work in his office. He did not call his work "Community Analysis" but instead stressed the fact that he was engaged in anthropological research. Having acquired several informants² he encouraged them to spend a considerable part of their time in collecting anthropological data which had little or no relation to the situation within the Center. In this manner, he was gradually able to build up rapport with a few persons and, in time, gain some information on current activities and attitudes. This device did not appear to have any effect on the attitudes of the general residents. Nevertheless, it was a recommendable technique. It permitted the assistant to maintain his personal integrity. If he had the courage to ignore public opinion and work for the Community Analyst, he could at least face his own conscience. Collecting Japanese poetry did not make him an inu.

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1. Brown, G. G., "War Relocation Authority Gila River Project, Rivers, Arizona Community Analysis Section May 12, 1943 to July 7, 1945, Final Report," Applied Anthropology, Fall, 1945, 4:4, p. 6.
 2. The ingenious Resegregation Group leaders attempted to use Dr. Opler as an informant just as they attempted to use the writer. They had a member of the young men's group working on his staff "to spy on the administration".

This brief presentation of the methods of acquiring informants will be closed with a quotation by Hansen -- an excellent description of the tribulations which an Analyst working in a relatively serene Center encountered:

"The Analyst had to get along simply by working with anyone who was willing or semi-willing to work with him. Over and over he explained what he was trying to do. A person here and another there responded favorably. The number of such individuals gradually increased . . ." Hansen remarks further that he began to work with a few well-assimilated (to the United States) and well-educated Nisei, but that "acquaintance with them did not lead far on into the community. In a sense, they too were outsiders." It was not, in fact, until six months after beginning work that Hansen felt that he had adequate Issei informants.¹

Techniques of Alleviating Suspicion

A number of the Analysts' techniques of alleviating suspicion have been mentioned in the previous section, since they are closely related to the acquisition of informants. They employed others in addition. Some, like the writer, attempted to disassociate themselves from the administration, at least to some extent. They were unable, of course to pretend that they were not members of the administration for, as Dr. Brown sensibly remarks, "If (the Analyst) adopts (such a subterfuge) he is apt to be discredited as a fool for thinking he can get away with it, or a liar, or both."²

Hansen describes his attempt to achieve disassociation as follows;

1. Hansen, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

2. Brown, Ibid.

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Hansen describes his efforts to correlate observations as follows:

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"When the Analyst first arrived, he was of the opinion that it would really be better to have his office out in the community away from the rest of the administration. He had an idea that eventually he could partially disassociate himself from the administration in peoples' thinking and that they would feel freer dropping into an apartment than in coming to an office in a regular office building. He was wrong. . . . The residents of block 15 were quite upset when he moved in. . . . Whenever anybody visited the Analyst, the fact was obvious to the neighbors."¹

Smith, the Analyst at Minidoka, remarks that he lived in and participated in the life of the community.² He does not describe how well this worked out.

Brown makes a negative point by stressing that he considers it an error that he was assigned to specific administrative tasks, such as interviewing applicants for repatriation, and could spend only part of his time functioning as a Community Analyst. This, he says, tended to slow down the development of contacts with individual evacuees and put the Analyst in the position of making decisions which might be considered oppressive by the evacuees.³

Though none of them mention it, the writer is certain that the Analysts and Dr. Leighton employed the obvious device of avoiding questioning informants on delicate topics. They also do not mention that they employed the device which the writer found most effective; to imply by their conversation and their manner that as far as good taste and ethics allowed they sympathized with and understood the attitudes of the residents and did not hold with those administrative policies which appeared oppressive to the evacuees. The writer knows that at least two of the Analysts followed this policy and suspects that most of them did. Naturally, their status forbade that they react to an uncomplimentary story about a high ranking administrator

1. Hansen, op. cit., pp. 16-20.

2. Smith, op. cit., p. 7.

3. Brown, Ibid.

with the enthusiasm which her non-administrative position allowed the writer. Nevertheless, much could be expressed with an appreciative and understanding smile. Moreover, merely listening to a grievance with sympathy and attempting to explain the situation as a human being rather than in the mechanical words of a bureaucrat addressing a "native," set the Analysts off sharply from those administrative employees whom Leighton has aptly described as "Stereotype Minded."

Another means of improving relationships with evacuees was to co-operate with the Community Council, the elected evacuee governing body. Here the Analysts were offered their most obvious opportunity to assume a role in the community, i. e., to stand as mediator and interpreter of attitudes, events and policies between the people and the administration. None of the Analysts, however, state that their attempts to work with the Community Council markedly improved their rapport. This was not the fault of the Analysts. The Community Council was not generally respected by the people. Its members were commonly considered spineless stooges of the administration.¹ Moreover, if an important issue arose in the Council it often concerned a conflict between the administration and some group of evacuees. The Analyst was not likely to increase his rapport unless he sided strongly with the evacuee group.

Hansen states that in the early summer and fall of 1944 he was able to collaborate with the Council on a matter with which it was vitally concerned. After that, it looked for a time as if the whole body might be his firm friends. In October, however, the Council sponsored a policy which caused the residents to criticize it for playing the Government's game. Its members pulled away from Hansen,

1. Conversations with evacuees from other Centers indicate that the Gile Center was not at all exceptional in this attitude.

though he retained the friendship of several.¹ Spicer also assisted the Community Council, but he does not state that this improved his rapport with the community.²

The Analysts who mention the more formal field techniques recognized by the modern social scientist state that they employed Observation, Case or Personality Studies, Records, Statistics, and Interviews. Brown adds that polls and questionnaires were used only to a limited extent because they were not practical. Sufficient staff members were not available; besides, evacuees were prone to put down only what they wished the administration to believe.³

Those who discuss the relative importance of these techniques place emphasis on the interview and on informality of approach. Brown states that the interview was his basic device. "As many people as time permitted were interviewed, and the interview was used to determine current attitudes, individual case histories, case studies, or descriptions of social groupings."⁴ Smith states that "formal questions and answers were found to be unsuccessful," that it was difficult to apply "tried and true techniques," and that bull sessions yielded much helpful material.⁵ Leighton and Spicer remark that they "developed a circle of evacuee friends who liked to come and talk about community affairs, feeling apparently that we had some influence with the administration, but that at the same time we were safe confidants. It was an opportunity for such persons to pour out their feelings to interested listeners without fear of consequences, and we thus played a role somewhat

1. Hansen, op. cit., p. 19.

2. Leighton, op. cit., p. 382.

3. Ibid., op. cit., pp. 388-390; Smith, op. cit., p. 7; Brown, op. cit., p. 5.

4. Op. cit., p. 5.

5. Op. cit., p. 6.

analogous to the 'counselors' in the Western Electric Company,"¹

Hansen, who gives most detail, remarks:

"About the only technique the Analyst employed was interviewing, except insofar as he used materials from the Statistics Section. The interviews were very informal. Usually the Analyst had in mind several points he wanted the person to touch on, but often his objective was simply to learn what would be mentioned if no guidance at all were given. Even when he desired some information on a very definite topic, if there was time, he allowed the conversation ample latitude."

He adds, however, that he could question his good informants more directly:

"They understood and trusted him. One Issei woman over a long period, gave very informative answers each week to one inquiry. The Analyst would simply ask, 'Well, how are things in the laundry room?' A detailed account of the prevailing gossip among the women of the block would come out."²

The Importance of Personal Contacts

While the statements cited above indicate that many of the social scientists hired by the Government considered an informal personal relationship with an informant greatly superior to a professional relationship, several of them go even farther and hold that the establishment of friendships with evacuees was a matter of utmost importance. Leighton and Spicer, in concluding their discussion of the position of their research unit in the community, state:

"The mainstay of our existence in the community was the nature of the personal relationships which the different (staff) members had or established. When we were accepted as persons who were 'all right,' the nature of our work was presumed to be all right. . . . It was manifestly impossible for us to know everybody in the community on a personal basis, and it was therefore necessary to make sure that among those who did know and accept us there was an adequate selection of leaders from all the different parts of the community's social organization. Through this, support for us spread in many different quarters and we avoided the weakness of having all our friends in one or a few areas in the society and consequently of being open to attack from other quarters."³

1. Leighton, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

2. Op. cit., p. 22.

3. Leighton, op. cit., p. 382.

Dr. Brown states:

"The process of adjustment to evacuees consists simply in developing acquaintances and friendships with a sufficient number of people. As and when opportunity offers, or is created, these acquaintances become larger in number and mutual confidence comes into being. The technique here is simple; to treat the evacuee group with precisely the same sincere respect that would be accorded to any other individual or group. Consequently, both attitudes and ~~manner~~s are essential. If the attitude contains any prejudice or feeling of superiority it will eventually be detected, and the Analyst's usefulness diminished. At the same time, if the manners are at fault, analysis will equally suffer."¹

Comments

It is apparent that the social scientists employed by the Government encountered problems similar to those of the writer and that they employed similar techniques in an attempt to solve these problems. The differences are minor~~and~~ are largely variations in emphasis on the same techniques. Most of these variations can be traced to the fact that the Analysts and Dr. Leighton were employees of a disliked administration while the writer was virtually independent. Moreover, much of the data the Analysts and Leighton desired was intended to serve as an aid to the solution of current or anticipated administrative problems and this meant that they could not afford to wait for six months or a year -- as the writer sometimes did -- to acquire needed information.² Besides, they were supposed to maintain rapport with their superiors and their fellow staff members. In contrast, the writer was instructed by her superior to avoid the Administration, tell its members nothing, and merely see that she was not dismissed from the Center.

The factors listed above contributed to the fact that the writer, in general, found it easier to acquire able informants,

1. Brown, op. cit., p. 6.

2. The advantage of being able to wait for information have been described on pp. 84-5 and p. 24.

gain rapport, and alleviate suspicion than did her colleagues.

The fact that the Analysts used paid assistants and volunteers while the writer used only volunteers deserves some comment. There is little doubt that the use of paid informants and the establishment of an office had marked disadvantages. Probably not a single Japanese research assistant escaped being called an inu at some time or other during his employment. Moreover, evacuees who would never have considered visiting the office of an Analyst did not object to casual visits by a Caucasian to their apartments. Their neighbors, after all, could not blame them if a Caucasian called on them occasionally. Nor could the neighbors expect them to be so rude as to forbid a Caucasian social scientist engaged in an innocuous study to enter their apartments.

If the use of paid informants and an office was poor policy, the fault did not lie entirely with the Analysts. They were following regulations set up by administrators who probably did not realize the extent of the difficulties which the field workers in the Center would encounter.

Due largely to the lack of comparative data, few significant comparative statements can be made regarding specific techniques of alleviating suspicion and gaining rapport. The Analysts, like the writer, attempted to disassociate themselves partially from the administration. This attempt was greatly inhibited by their status as Government employees. They avoided tabooed topics and one, at least, put his informants to doing Red Herring Studies. They assumed the roles of learner, confidant, and friend. Some of them attempted to gain rapport by establishing their offices in the Japanese section of the Center rather than in the administrative section. It is significant that Hansen states that having his office in the Japanese section did not help him very much. Similarly, the ^v writer

found that actually living in the Japanese section did not in itself increase rapport.¹ Conversely, the fact that she was forced to live in the Caucasian section in Tule Lake did not appear to be a serious handicap.

It is interesting that none of the scientists hired by the Government mention that they were able to assume a functional role in the community. Their legitimate role, that of liaison man between the administration and the residents was largely inhibited by the mistrust of evacuees. The writer, even though disassociated from the administration, was also never able to achieve acceptance by the community as a whole. Evidence points strongly to the conclusion that in an investigational situation where in-group solidarity demands an outward show of disaffection toward the authorities, the field worker will do well to concentrate on the roles he plays with individual informants and remain inconspicuous before the community. This, in fact, was the policy followed successfully by Leighton and Spicer.²

The most salient agreement in techniques is found in the relative emphasis placed on the informal interview and the establishment of personal relationships with informants. The writer believes that if all of the Analysts were asked to commit themselves on the relative importance of this procedure, the majority if not all of them would agree substantially with Brown, Hansen, Leighton, Spicer and herself.

Hansen defends his extensive use of the informal interview, remarking that "this is generally considered to be an inefficient way to conduct interviews." He then explains that the residents were "question shy," "that they had acquired an inner compulsion to give 'right' answers rather than subjectively honest answers," and that

1. See pp. 19-20.

2. Leighton, op. cit., p. 381.

"a few of the things the Analyst wanted to learn about were touchy topics. If he let it be known he wanted to hear about them, they were less likely to be referred to than if he trusted to luck that they would come up in the course of a casual conversation."¹

The writer not only wishes to express her hearty agreement with Hansen's contentions but will add that to anyone at all familiar with the investigational situation within the Japanese Centers this technique needs no defense. If any social scientist employed in the Centers found a better device, he has not mentioned it.

The agreement on the importance of personal relationships with informants merits even more emphasis. The history of the writer's field experiences illustrates repeatedly that her data would have been superficial indeed had she not been able to acquire friends who trusted her. Moreover, whenever tension in the community increased, she was forced to rely increasingly on her closer personal contacts. Supported therefore by the forceful statements of Leighton, Spicer, Hansen, and Brown, the writer offers the conclusion that in the study of a community where the student desires data on the current situation, and where he is handicapped by the suspicion of his potential informants, the keystone of his success will be the extent to which he is able to establish personal relationships with a sufficient number of informed residents of the community.

A criticism of the Community Analysts

In view of this conclusion, the writer will present one criticism of the procedures of those Analysts whose work she was able to observe. If, as Leighton and Spicer contend, personal relationships with

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1. Op. cit., p. 22. Here Hansen comes close to describing what the writer considered her most effective interviewing technique: the Oblique Approach. See. pp. 90-6.

evacuees were the "mainstay of (their) existence in the community," those Analysts observed by the writer did not make sufficiently energetic attempts to establish such relationships. This criticism is tempered by the fact that this policy was not entirely due to the choice of the Analysts. Fraternization of staff members with Japanese was frowned upon and at times forbidden by the Project Directors of both Gila and Tule Lake. Strange as it may seem, the Analysts were expected to conform.

In truth, the writer doubts that her remarks on Dr. Brown ought to be termed "criticism." They are more in the nature of an explanation of the predicament in which a social scientist, hired by a Governmental agency, may find himself. Dr. Brown made consistent attempts to obtain volunteer informants. Gradually he acquired a number of Japanese friends. Occasionally he and his wife were invited to evacuee apartments. These courtesies were difficult to return. The Project Director did not approve of staff members visiting evacuees and he strongly disapproved of evacuees visiting staff members. If Brown had ignored the Director he would probably have received richer data. On the other hand he would have seriously limited his usefulness as a Community Analyst, for his superior would have given his statements and suggestions little attention.

Dr. Opler in the Tule Lake Center also made numerous attempts to contact better informants. But when these individuals refused to work for pay -- as they almost invariably did -- he was too prone to let the matter drop. Not underestimating the severe handicaps under which Dr. Opler worked, the writer believes that had he kept after certain of these men, particularly the leaders who considered themselves authorities on Center politics, he might slowly have won their confidence.

Opler asked Oishi to work for him and was refused. On a few

occasions thereafter he visited Oishi, but gained little rapport.¹ Oishi, however, prided himself on his fearless frankness. He enjoyed airing his views, giving advice, and pointing out the "errors of the administration." Had Opler visited him more frequently and placed himself in the role of a staff member asking for advice, he probably could have won his confidence. The same may be said for a number of the writer's other informants whom Opler also contacted but did not pursue as acquaintances when they refused to work for money.

Dr. Opler also made no thoroughgoing attempt to contact or consult the important leaders of the Resegregation Group even after he had fairly good evidence of who these persons were. Instead, he acquired data on these men and their organizations from his paid informants, who were in no position to give such information. This, sometimes resulted in needless misunderstanding. When, for instance, the Resegregationists' young men's organization changed its name in mid-November of 1944, Opler erroneously reported that the adult group had changed its name. Since, by this time, the Resegregationists had come out into the open and were energetically publicizing their activities, there was no reason why the leaders could not have been approached directly and questioned about such innocuous details. Nor did Dr. Opler make an energetic attempt to improve his relationship with the leaders of the Farm Strike Uprising, after their release from the stockade.

The Project Director of Tule Lake would not have objected to Opler's visiting evacuees in their apartments, though he would not have approved of evacuees' visiting the Opler residence. The Director respected Oishi highly and it is probable that if Opler

1. According to Oishi's statement.

could have become a channel for the occasional advice of men like Oishi and Itabashi, the Director would have been predisposed to give this advice attention. On the other hand, the Director is said to have regarded the Resegregationist and the Farm Strike leaders with an extreme fear and dislike and Opler may have avoided criticism by not contacting them.

The suggestion that the Analysts would have benefited by more diligent attempts to obtain volunteer informants who were intimately acquainted with the political phenomena of the Centers is not based only on the observations of the writer. It was the one criticism levelled against them consistently by the evacuees. Speaking of a social scientist (neither Brown nor Opler) a Gilan informant voiced the opinion that this man would have learned far more about the Center if he had spent more time talking to "ordinary people" in stead of with a small group of Japanese intellectuals and professional people who were distinctly a marginal group. "He lived like a gentleman," said this evacuee with mild disapproval.

Oishi, who was often very blunt, once asked the writer how it was that the administration with its large force of Caucasian and Japanese policemen and the services of Dr. Opler appeared to be finding out so little of what was actually going on in the Center. The writer replied that probably they were not talking to the right people. Oishi, intrigued by the problem, embarked on an investigation of his own. He questioned some of Dr. Opler's informants with whom he was well acquainted. Later he reported that he had discovered that Dr. Opler's assistants "didn't tell him anything" and that Opler spent most of his time in his office. "If he walked through camp all day long and talked to people, I'm sure he'd find out much more," concluded Oishi.

In the preceding discussion it has been pointed out that the

social scientists hired by the Government met great difficulties in carrying on their studies in the Centers. There is no doubt that these difficulties were more extreme than those met by the writer. It may well be asked if it is possible for a governmental employee, studying a crisis situation, to develop rapport comparable to that of an independent student. This question may be answered in the affirmative. A member of the Tule Lake staff accomplished it. He bore the additional handicap of a position of high rank which was not designed to facilitate meeting evacuees on a personal level.

Before coming to Tule Lake this man had served as director of the Isapp detention camp where ^{the} Kibei and Nisei agitators held responsible for the disturbances attending the Military Registration were confined. Despite the fact that these men were extraordinarily bitter and suspicious, Mr. Green (a pseudonym) managed to win the confidence and respect of many. Those of the writer's informants who had been confined in Isapp¹ repeatedly expressed attitudes which revealed that they regarded Mr. Green as a paragon among administrators. Oishi, who was economical in his compliments, remarked, "That is a man I really respect." Another compared Mr. Green's behavior at the detention camp with that of his predecessor. "Mr. X (the predecessor) always used the outer entrance and came inside the stockade as little as possible. Mr. Green always left by the entrance which took him through the camp and asked if he could get the boys something. This showed he had a Christian heart."²

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1. Those of the Isapp detainees who chose to expatriate were sent to Tule Lake early in December of 1943.
 2. Field Notes, Feb. 16; July 8; Mar. 20, 1944. Speaking in complimentary terms of Christianity was rare in the "true Japanese" Tule Lake Center. Mr. Green's piety, however, was not held against him. Instead, he was cited as the rare example of a man who lived up to his religion.

Mr. Green became equally popular in Tule Lake where he was transferred in late December of 1943. He was one of the few staff members who entered the outlying districts of the Japanese section alone -- a practice which the Japanese were quick to notice. When asked to speak at an entertainment at which many adults were present, he opened his talk with a Japanese greeting, badly mispronounced, but enormously appreciated by the Issei. In fact, his reputation for sincerity, courtesy, and fairness spread so rapidly that within a few months after his arrival almost every resident was devoutly hoping that he would replace the unpopular Project Director.

In the opinion of the writer, Mr. Green obtained a knowledge of the situation within the Center to a degree of accuracy which she, an independent student with much more time to expend, was not often able to surpass. She herself came to trust and respect him as thoroughly as his evacuee friends and eventually discussed Center matters with him with complete faith that information revealed would be kept in strictest confidence. The writer was never present when Green interviewed an evacuee friend. She can, therefore, give only her impressions of his extraordinary personality and skill, as they were employed to gain her confidence.

At her first meeting with Mr. Green the writer was impressed with his insight into evacuee attitudes and his sincere but unsentimental sympathy with them. He regarded the evacuees as human beings who had suffered many unjustified hardships and indignities and not as mysterious and dangerous Orientals. While protesting that he knew very little about the situation at Tule Lake because he had just arrived at the Center, his insight into those matters with which he was familiar was so accurate that the writer, much as an evacuee might have done, was impressed with the fact that this man must have great rapport with the Japanese or he would not have learned

so much. At the end of the interview the writer asked for advice about the stove in the apartment she had been given. The temperature was well under freezing and she had been unable to light it. Mr. Green promptly saw to the stove himself, taking considerable trouble to find the necessary fuel oil. He could easily have referred the writer to the maintenance department and she might have gotten some oil the next day.

At a succeeding meeting Mr. Green asked if the writer were free to allow a member of the WRA staff to see her material. She explained that she was not. He then requested that if, in the course of her studies, she came across any suggestions which might improve the grave situation in the Center and might lessen the gap between the residents and the administration that she pass on these suggestions to him. This request and the manner in which it was made caused the writer to think, "Unless this man is a gifted liar, he truly has the welfare of the Japanese at heart. I'll watch him and see if he knows when to keep his mouth shut. If he does, I'll tell him what the people are saying."¹

When the writer found that both Oishi and the Resegregation Group leaders regarded Mr. Green as an honorable man and learned that on a number of occasions he had been given important information which he did not reveal to the administration, she came to place increasing trust in him. She did not give him information intended for her ears alone, but made fairly regular reports on the development of attitudes. In truth, Mr. Green was kept so well informed by his evacuee friends that these conferences were largely comparisons and discussions of similar data from different sources.

It will be remembered that the writer gained her entree into the

1. Field Notes, Mar, 1944, p. 2.

inner clique of the Resegregation Group through the assistance of Mr. Green.¹ He developed his extraordinary rapport with them while they were still underground. They heard of his reputation and attempted to use him as a mediator to obtain the release of the stockade detainees. The plan fell through, but Green was given many confidences by the Resegregation Group leaders and he revealed none of them. His personal relationships with this group, however, brought sharp protests from the Project Director. The Director advised Green to stop his visits and warned him that Mrs. Tsuchikawa was capable of attempting to frame him by accusing him of rape.² Green did not follow this advice and became very unpopular with the Director. Green then appealed to the National Director but was advised to accede to the wishes of his immediate superior. Consequently, although Green had an understanding of the situation in Tule Lake which no other staff member approached, he was able to accomplish very little either in assisting the residents or in bringing about better relationships between them and the administration.

The experiences of Brown, Opler, and Green indicate that a social scientist hired by the authorities to investigate a tense situation may be faced by painful dilemmas involving professional ethics. These dilemmas will be increased in gravity as the crisis situation becomes more acute and as the field worker is able to make the strong personal contacts by which he will gain the information enabling him to penetrate the situation deeply.

The social scientist may be forced to work with an administrator who disapproves of personal relationships between the scientist

1. See p. 108.

2. Field Notes, Mar. 1944, p. 67.

and his informants. Here he will be forced to decide whether he prefers to get more complete data and risk the possibility that his superior will not apply his findings or whether he will stay on the good side of his superior and do the best he can with superficial data. The second dilemma will arise only if in a situation of extreme crisis he obtains informants who are willing to trust him with information which they do not wish passed on to the administration. Here he must decide whether he will keep faith with these informants or with his employers.

Comparison with techniques employed in modern community studies and industrial situations

Several informative discussions of field methodology and interviewing techniques in modern social situations have been made available in the literature of which the Roethlisberger and Dickson discussion of interviewing techniques employed in the Western Electric Company and the comprehensive explanation of the approach used by the members of the Warner-Lunt Yankee City Study are perhaps the best known.¹ In general there appears to be little disagreement between these techniques and those discussed in this paper. Roethlisberger and Dickson's general principles (also cited by Warner and Lunt), e. g., that the interviewer should listen to the informant in a patient, friendly but intelligently critical manner, that he should not display any kind of authority, not give advice or moral admonition, not argue with informants, and should talk or ask questions only under certain circumstances are as broadly applicable to an interview with an employee of the Western Electric Company as to the gangster, Mr. Kira.

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1. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. (1942) Management and the Worker, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 270-291; Warner, W. L., and Lunt, P. S. (1941) The Social Life of a Modern Community, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, Conn., pp. 38-75.

On the other hand there is a marked difference in the overall impression given by the description of interviews with Japanese, for this paper is dominated by an extreme concern with the suspicion and touchiness of informants. The reader may well ask if this concern is not the reflection of the personality of the writer, whether she did not possess a psychological predisposition to view her informants as secretive, semi-hostile beings from whom information could only be wrung by ruse and guile, and consequently, exaggerated the difficulties of the field situation. However, the wealth of corroboratory material furnished by the Community Analysts makes it clear that the suspicion and reluctance of informants were extraordinary. Whether they markedly exceeded the problems met by students of an industrial situation, such as the counselors in the Western Electric Company, is difficult to say. One may assume that they did on the negative evidence that this problem is not stressed by Roethlisberger and Dickson. In fact, it is probably safe to conclude that students of modern communities will rarely encounter suspicion equalling that with which the Community Analysts and the writer had to contend. The writer has frequently discussed these phenomena with persons who have some familiarity with labor crisis and has been assured repeatedly that "things never got as bad as that." A worker suspected of being a stool-pigeon may suffer some social ostracism from his fellows but he seldom, if ever, need fear complete social expulsion from the community in which he lives. The one field of investigation in which a student would meet comparable and probably even more acute difficulties is the underworld.

It may be helpful to discuss certain of the techniques followed successfully in modern society as they relate to the investigational situation in the Japanese Centers. Mr. Warner, like the Community Analysts and the writer lays strong emphasis on the interview as the

fundamental technique. The method which his research assistants employed to begin interviews, while excellent in modern communities, would not have been ideal in Tule Lake. The investigators in the Yankee City Study initiated the development of rapport by collecting general information, e. g., the informant's participation in associations, his income, and occupation. The over-suspicious residents would immediately have interpreted such questions as characteristic of a governmental investigator. Especially any question on membership in an association was absolutely taboo, for active participation in certain Japanese associations was one of the criteria used by the Department of Justice in interning Japanese residents of the Pacific Coast. Any obvious question concerning membership in the various groups formed within the Centers was likewise taboo. Such knowledge had to be gained by implication or from an entirely voluntary admission on the part of an informant. Warner and Lunt also mention that one of their first activities was ^Againing the co-operation of important men in the community. This policy was also significant in the Centers, but on an individual rather than a group basis. Moreover, it could not easily be employed as an initial step in the investigation. Most of the influential Japanese leaders stayed in the background. An inexperienced investigator who asked staff members of casual Japanese acquaintances for the names of "important men" was very likely to be referred to what an evacuee sneeringly called "a so-called man with ability," a person who had no genuine prestige but co-operated with the administration, occupied a prominent position and received the scorn of the residents. In fact, in the matter of gaining the support of influential men, a modern American community and the Japanese Centers are not strictly comparable. In the former situation an investigator sponsored and recommended by a prominent citizen will have his chances of gaining

general rapport and co-operation greatly enhanced. He may be said to take on some of the social prestige of his sponsor. In the Centers, however, no leader enjoyed a status comparable to an influential man in Yankee City. Leaders were either "stooges of the administration" or agitators, and in neither case were they respected by the general residents to a degree whereby a blanket recommendation from them would ensure co-operation from more than a very few individuals. If such ^a man were inclined to be communicative, the student could learn a great deal from ^{him} ~~him~~. If his confidence were gained, he would introduce the student to a few selected friends, instructing the friends to "speak frankly." Beyond this strong personal influence a leader's power did not extend.

Roethlisberger and Dickson's specific suggestions regarding the behavior of the interviewer require no qualifications even in the peculiar Tule Lake situation. Especially the suggestions as to the circumstances under which an interviewer should talk or ask questions are repeatedly exemplified in this paper. The Oblique Approach,¹ for instance, is a technique designed primarily to help the informant talk. Ten or fifteen minutes of informal conversation or gossip in which the interviewer might talk as or more fluently than the informant was, in many cases, the best method of opening an interview. Almost equally effective, however, was the putting of carefully chosen questions by which the informant was led into a fairly long narration of some specific event. In both cases the informant was gradually accustomed to express himself at length and ~~himself~~, warmed up for the topics in which the interviewer was most interested. With nervous, reluctant or suspicious informants the writer sometimes found it necessary to do most of the talking during the first

1. See pp. 90-6.

interviews. Strict adherents to the rule of silence for the interviewer would have been painfully shocked had they been present. It was, however, infinitely better to hold forth freely on innocuous subjects than to sit and stare at the informant in embarrassed silence. Besides, talk appears to be contagious. The Oblique Approach was also found to be the best method of veering the discussion to topics which the informant had omitted or neglected.

A very large proportion of the remarks of the writer were designed as Roethlisberger and Dickson express it, "to relieve the fears and anxieties of the informant." When possible, to be sure, these remarks were masked by indirection. For example, when attempting to impress an informant with the fact that one was not associated with the administration, it was far more effective to agree with some criticism the informant levelled against the administration and perhaps cite additional examples than to take the initiative and make a declaration of non-association.

While the writer did not often "praise an informant for reporting his thoughts and feelings accurately," she attained the same result by thanking the informant for his assistance. In the extremely informal manner in which most of the interviews were conducted, praise for reporting one's feelings would have been out of place, since it might have smacked of authority on the part of the interviewer. Informants, however, were frequently thanked for their frankness, even when they were not being frank. But just as important as praise was an obvious appreciation of a good joke or story or a well turned remark, though the interviewer might do nothing but smile and indicate that he got the point.

The discussion of implicit assumptions underlying the statements of informants was a matter of great delicacy and it was seldom attempted. In any case, the more salient of these assumptions were taboo and to call them into question or even drag them into the light of discussion would have meant

the inevitable impairment of rapport. Almost all of the residents of Tule Lake felt obliged to imply by word and deed that they sincerely desired to go to Japan. The writer knew that the fear of expulsion from the Center or fear of induction into the United States Army underlay many of their fallacious assertions. Nevertheless, it was necessary to accept them as articles of faith which were beyond question. Only once did the writer openly contradict an informant on the "loyalty" question and this, only after she had extraordinary rapport with Oishi. Oishi, as he frequently did, was holding forth on the unswerving loyalty which the residents of Tule Lake felt for Japan. Knowing that he abhorred telling a lie and feeling secure in his friendship, the writer dared to challenge his statements, remarking, "That may be true with regard to affection and respect for the old country. But how many people in this Center are willing to enter the Japanese Army?" Oishi was silent for sometime and appeared to be struggling with himself. He then burst out with, "You're right," and immediately launched into a bitter but truthful tirade:

"The Issei are really on the fence. If it looks as if Japan is going to win -- they jump to Japan. If it looks as if things will go the other way, they will jump the other way. To speak honestly, I was surprised to see how many Japanese can't make up their minds what they are going to do."¹

Listening not only to what an informant wants to say but to what he does not say is a precept of primary importance. Indeed, in the study of the Japanese Centers this technique was applied not only to individuals but to the entire community, for large and very significant areas of conversation were blanketed by in-group solidarity. An individual might have personal reasons for censoring many topics from his conversation but behind these personal reasons loomed the

1. Field Notes, Feb. 28, 1945, pp. 3-4.

Center standards of behavior which conditioned his silence. The task of listening to what people did not say was by no means easy, especially at the beginning of the investigation. The field worker might pounce on some omission which existed only in her own inexperienced guess as to where her informants' interests lay. Moreover, defining the areas of silence was only the first step. Following these discoveries the field worker next had to learn to avoid trespassing on these areas himself and lastly, when sufficient skill and insight had been attained, had to invent and perfect methods of persuading informants to abandon some of their reticence. There were, of course, important areas of silence peculiar to each individual informant. When, for instance, Mr. Kuratomi, after clearly betraying that he had a profound interest in Center politics did not once in a long conversation refer to the Resegregation Group, the field worker immediately became suspicious and soon discovered that this reticence was based on the important fact that he and his friends were beginning a feud with the unmentioned group.¹ Whether this phenomenon is considered from the individual or group level, these areas of silence are often the keys to the analysis of what at first appears to be incomprehensible behavior. Moreover, the problem is general and will be encountered in almost any investigation.

Another precept: "not to treat everything said as either fact or error," deserves some comment. When the writer began her work she wasted much time in painstaking study of her notes in an attempt to determine which statements of her informants were factually correct. At long last she perceived that the area of factual truth and error and the attitudes of informants were two entirely different things. Weeks of consideration of the voluminous statements informants

1. See pp. 116-7.

made about the inu would have thrown no light on the practical question of how many Japanese were stool pigeons. From the remarks of informants one would conclude that the Center was riddled with spies. In actual fact, certain confidential administrative records provided the best answer to this question, for they revealed that the number of actual informers was very small. This, however, did not detract from the sociological importance of the unreasonable attitudes of the residents and their bearing on the wave of hatred toward the inu which culminated in beatings and murder.

As for the consideration of fact and error during the process of interviewing, the writer followed the general policy of passively accepting almost everything told her as truth while the statement was being made. Particularly the Resegregation Group leaders would not have appreciated being listened to "in an intelligently critical manner." Instead, the writer sometimes stifled her logical processes, allowed herself to become spell-bound and actually believed (temporarily) many of their fabulous statements. Had she preserved the slightest critical alertness she could scarcely have controlled the impulse to a hearty burst of laughter when the bug-eyed Mr. Yamashita, moustaches waving excitedly, held forth on the nobility of his plans. To avert such a mishap she found it best to prepare for an interview by assuring herself that Yamashita was a sincere and honest man (as, in part, he no doubt was), and succeeded in swallowing much of what he told her as the words left his mouth. This preliminary auto-suggestion prevented even a tinge of incredulity from showing on her face, a phenomenon which Yamashita or her alert wife might have observed, to the great detriment of rapport. The writer does not recommend this peculiar habit of temporary self-deception and mentions it

only because it was found so useful in dealing with fanatics. She did not carry her credulity to such lengths when dealing with other informants except in those areas in which community sentiment forbade doubt.

The dangers of adopting the informants' sentiments as one's own have been exemplified repeatedly in this paper.¹ This problem is discussed in the next chapter.²

1. See pp. 99-101.

2. See pp. 126-7.

The student of a tense situation must be prepared to work in a community where he will not be allowed to become a participant observer.

Malinowski and others strongly emphasize the importance of taking up residence with the group under study and participating in the activities of the community in all possible ways.¹ The writer and a number of her colleagues attempted to do this. None of them achieved even indifferent success. Moreover, the procedure was not particularly helpful in gaining rapport.² In such a situation where rapport with the entire community cannot be obtained, the student will be forced to concentrate his efforts on gaining the confidence of a number of individuals. These individuals, of course, should be selected to give as adequate a representation of the group as the study requires. The number of informants will vary according to the difficulties of the situation and the ability and energy of the field worker.

The student working in a tense situation will find that his preliminary attempts to gain rapport with individuals will consist in large part of alleviating their fears and suspicion. In situations where resentment toward the authorities or the superordinate group is marked, he must be prepared to cope with the possibility that his informants will be called stool-pigeons and may pay for their contact with him by ostracism from their own group or even by suffering physical violence. Under such conditions the student will face a double task. He must overcome his informants' fear of him and their fear of their own group.

1.

2. See pp. 19-20.

By far the most effective procedure in coping with the fear and suspicion of informants is to develop a personal relationship with them.

Mutual trust and friendship between informant and field worker will yield advantages which no impersonal technique, no matter how cleverly employed, will offer. An informant who likes a field worker will give him information even if he is afraid. The experiences of the writer repeatedly bear out these statements. She would have faced a task of almost insuperable difficulty, had she initiated the Tule Lake study without the data given by her Gilan segregee friends. Moreover, the data acquired in the Tule Lake Center which was not gained through a personal relationship was for the most part superficial. Contacts with the writer jeopardized the safety of all her informants except the recognized agitators. Nevertheless, they accepted the risk rather than offend a person who had offered them little but respect, sympathy, and the opportunity to express their views.

It is one thing to recommend that a field worker make friends with suspicious and fearful informants and quite another to tell him how to do this. Indeed, it is partly for this reason that the writer described her field experiences in such detail. To present an analysis of how to make friends with informants would have been fruitless and presumptuous. She preferred to make her points by indirection and, in Japanese fashion, allow the reader to perceive for himself the all pervading importance of personal relationships with informants, the intricacy of these relationships, and their dependence on the personality of the individuals concerned. Personality is, in fact, so important that it is no exaggeration to state that an untrained individual whose personality enables him to gain the trust of the subordinate group will get more data in a situation of tension than a brilliant social

scientist who is deficient in this regard. Personality, coupled with the proper attitudes and manners, may even transcend close association with the disliked group in authority, as is shown in the case of Mr. Green.¹

The writer does not intend to derogate training at the expense of personality. The untrained individual may not be able to evaluate his data or pass it on in useful form. Moreover, it is not particularly practical to point out that the personality of a field worker may handicap him in certain investigations. He can rarely do anything about it. Nevertheless, neglecting to emphasize its importance in obtaining the kind of data desired in a study of this type gives a misleading perspective of field work.

Granting that the student possesses a personality which will aid rather than handicap him, he will nevertheless obtain informants more rapidly if he applies certain techniques. First, he must be prepared to assume an occupation (his initial role) which will facilitate informal relationships with potential informants. What this occupation will be depends upon the circumstances of his employment and the situation under study. It should be an activity which appears reasonable to the community^{under} study, for the student cannot make an unexplained entrance and trust that the community will gradually come to tolerate him as queer but harmless. This initial role should be given careful thought, for not only will the student be asked repeatedly what he is doing but he will be expected to live up to his statements. If possible, before entering the community he should discuss the situation thoroughly with someone who knows it well. He should remember, however, that few members of the superordinate group really know what is going on in the subordinate community and unless he can get a first rate

1. See pp. 163-6.

advisor, the information he receives should be viewed with circumspection and used with caution. If he is hired by the authorities, this initial role may already be established and the student may be forced to make the best of it.

Having established his initial role, the field worker will find it necessary to undertake a relatively long campaign to obtain satisfactory and representative informants. If he is responsible to a superior who expects data on subjects about which the subordinate group is reluctant to speak, he will do well to have a preliminary understanding to the effect that at least three months and perhaps more may be needed to lay a foundation which will make the accumulation of accurate data possible.

The general campaign which was effective in the Japanese Centers is probably applicable to many parallel situations. This campaign has three interrelated aspects: 1) The student will apply himself to making numerous contacts with individuals and small groups under conditions which will facilitate the development of rapport; 2) In these preliminary contacts the student will subordinate the acquisition of desired data to an attempt to become intimately acquainted with those attitudes of individuals in the community which bear on the establishment of rapport; 3) He will use this knowledge in selecting and applying the most effective means of breaking down the suspicion of his potential informants and replacing it with trust.

The Alleviation of Suspicion

Although in point of strict chronology, this aspect of gaining rapport is listed last, it merits most emphasis and therefore will be discussed first. It is, in fact, the goal which the field worker seeks when he makes his contacts and attempts to become familiar with the attitudes of the community.

Whether the student is hired by the authorities or by an independent organization, he will be predisposed to success in gaining the trust of informants if he considers personal obligations to his informants more important than obligations to his employer or to the super-ordinate group.

It has been suggested that the personality of the field worker will transcend the devices he employs to obtain rapport. Similarly, the personal ethics of the field worker will outweigh the specific devices employed to alleviate suspicion.

Lacking this fundamental sense of obligation to informants it is difficult to see how an outsider, skillful though he may be, will obtain reliable data over an extended period on topics which in-group sentiment deems unfit for the ears of a member of the super-ordinate group. The field worker guiding himself by this rule will not find it necessary to tell his informants about his mental outlook. They will perceive it for themselves and as they do, the field worker will be taken into their confidence. If this happens, however, the field worker may be plunged into painful dilemmas. When, for instance, the writer was told that Kira was immediately responsible for the terrorism in the Tule Lake Center, she was placed in a most difficult position. The dilemma offered three paths of action, none of which was honorable. If the field worker kept her word to informants and took no action at all, she protected a criminal and left the residents open to additional acts of violence. If she informed to the police, she broke her word to Oishi, who had placed his honor as a member of the in-group in her hands, and to Itabashi, who had risked the safety of his family by telling her the details of his beating. Moreover, had she taken this step she would probably have been forced to give up her work and thereby break her obligation to her employer. If, as she chose to do, she joined Oishi's faction and fought Kira, she

betrayed the trust of the Resegregationist leaders and broke the great academic taboo against subjectivity. There was, in short, no way of meeting the situation with an entirely clear conscience.

A student in the pay of the authorities who, like Mr. Green, achieves excellent rapport in a crisis situation will almost inevitably find himself in even more painful situations. Repeatedly, he may be forced to decide whether he will betray his informants or whether he will withhold crucial information from his employers.

The writer can give no advice on this matter. For the encouragement of those field workers who would do as she and Mr. Green did, she offers a statement by T. E. Lawrence: "When a man serves two masters and has to offend one of these, it is better to offend the more powerful."¹

Turning to a consideration of matters which may more properly be termed techniques, one may suggest that in a tense situation, one of the most effective means of alleviating the suspicion of informants is the ability to avoid showing curiosity about those matters which informants are reluctant to discuss.

This is an ethnographic technique of long standing and it is probably just as important in certain aspects of a relatively serene field situation as in a community in crisis. The most friendly community is not going to look with favor on a student who initiates his study with interrogations about secret ceremonies. This technique has been discussed at such length in this paper that it needs no further explanation here.² It would be well, however, to remark that the student of a tense situation is often under a peculiar disadvantage in practicing it. His employers and he himself will probably desire

1. Liddell Hart, 1934, Colonel Lawrence, Dodd, Mead and Co., N. Y. p. 313.

2. See pp. 21-30, 66-67, 84-5, 90-6, 117, 2

just this kind of information as soon as possible. But if he desires eventual success the field worker must temper his own enthusiasm and perhaps be prepared to resist the pressure of his employers.

Another useful means of alleviating suspicion is to achieve disassociation from the authorities or from the administration.

Several of the Community Analysts state that they attempted to do this. It was one of the writer's main objectives.¹ The devices employed vary in subtlety and the more obvious are probably the least effective. Telling informants that their names will not be attached to their statements or even that the information they give will not be passed on to the authorities will not be very helpful until the informants are convinced that the field worker is not lying. Nor should the field worker place too much reliance on the salutary effects of living in the community and participating in its activities.

A much more effective technique may be employed once the field worker is well acquainted with his informants and with the situation under study. He can then allow his every word and mannerism to imply sympathy with and respect for the group under study in a fashion which indicates a corresponding disassociation from the authorities.

In this more subtle technique the independent student has an obvious advantage. He can afford to be quite overt in showing his dislike for the powers-that-be. A student in the pay of the authorities who attempts to adopt such an attitude will immediately be open to suspicion. Informants will think, "If he thinks so badly of the administration, why does he work for them?" Nevertheless, the alert individual who possesses good taste and tact, will find many opportunities to achieve at least a partial disassociation. A well-timed smile or a shrug may be sufficient with those informants who have come to respect

1. See pp. 21, 25.

the field worker as a person. In general, however, the government employee must be very careful what he says and to whom he says it. If he is not careful he may find himself with excellent rapport but without a job.

Learning the Attitudes of the Community

Familiarity with the attitudes, the behavior patterns, or, to use a more inclusive term, the culture of the group under study will increase the field worker's ability to gain rapport. This truism merits particular attention ⁱⁿ the study of a tense community or a crisis situation. The field worker must be prepared to do more than gain knowledge of the traditional culture of the group. He must also become intimately acquainted with the pressures, fears, and rationalizations which accompany tension or crisis. In the Centers, for instance, an investigator who understood the significance of the in-group solidarity, the ambivalence of the residents, and the great fear of becoming known as an inu, was in an infinitely better position than a scholar who had an extensive knowledge of Japanese culture.

How rapidly the field worker gains this knowledge will vary with the situation and with his own ability and personality. He will accelerate the process by exposing himself to as many informal conversations as possible. Consciously and unconsciously he will learn what to say -- and what is more important -- what not to say. He will learn how to react to many different topics, situations, and events.

The history of the writer's field experiences shows that she carried on this process until she developed a kind of quasi-identification with the evacuees. In certain respects she talked, acted, and even thought like an evacuee. This had certain advantages. It gave insight into matters which a student who did not become identified

might have overlooked. This quasi-identification was also of considerable assistance in maintaining mental health. Had the writer, with her intimate daily contacts with evacuee friends and their painful problems, been forced to identify herself with the tortured and guilt-ridden liberal members of the administration, she could not have endured the strain. Since, however, a few evacuee friends accepted her as an "honorary member" of the in-group and as a person quite removed from the administration, she could blow off steam by ranting with trusted informants against some new injustice or attempting to outdo them in cynical remarks over some generally resented administrative policy.

Identification, however, is not without its disadvantages. If the field worker deceives himself and assumes that he is ever truly regarded as a member of the in-group, this conceit will lead him into difficulties. No informant is ever going to forget that he is an outsider, and the fact must always be remembered in interpreting statements. Out of courtesy or as a joke the field worker may be told that he is an insider. In such an event he will do well to say, "What little I have learned is owing to the kindness of people I have talked to." If he accepts the compliment as truth he will be thought foolish.

In the matter of identification, the field worker hired by the authorities is in a difficult position. If he avoids identification entirely, he will inhibit his insight. On the other hand, if he becomes too closely identified with the group he is studying, he may lose his perspective concerning the problems of his employers and may end by doing little but quarrel with them.

Biases

The dangers of bias and of adopting the informants' sentiments as one's own have been repeatedly exemplified in this paper. The writer

found herself involved in personal prejudice, self-deception and even in intrigue against certain informants. Had Professor Kroeber in giving her parting advice predicted even a fraction of these emotional phenomena she would not have believed him and besides would have felt insulted.

Unfortunately these experiences yield no insight into how these errors may be avoided. In fact, the writer believes that their chief value to herself is the thumping lesson of how unscientific she can be. She agrees heartily with Roethlisberger and Dickson that the field worker makes matters worse by deceiving himself with the notion that he is not being influenced¹ either by the statements of informants or by the events he observes. In truth, avoiding biases appears to be impossible if the nature of the investigation requires a certain amount of identification with informants. Auto-suggestive resolutions to avoid prejudice are not going to be of much help, since one is all too often unconscious of the development of one's² attitudes. The most practical suggestion which can be offered is to send frequent reports on the analysis of data to an intelligent individual who has some knowledge of the scope of the investigation but is removed from the immediate emotional stimuli. Many of the biases will be apparent to a disassociated person and the student, receiving criticism, can then set out to re-check hypotheses and data. When this procedure is not possible, the student may help himself by recording and dating his personal attitudes toward individual informants, group, and events. When he suspects that he is thinking and acting subjectively, he will do well to increase his efforts to obtain verbatim or at least semi-verbatim data, particularly from informants of whom he finds himself disapproving. Later, when time has brought a clearer perspective, he

1. Op. cit., p. 285.

can check these.

Making Initial Contacts

The devices which the writer employed to make initial contacts have been described in detail and do not need reiteration here. They are, in any case, by no means new to ethnographic field work. Red Herring Studies such as the study of technology, the native language, or the notation of genealogies are traditional standbys in building preliminary rapport.¹

The importance of such devices, however, is augmented in the investigation of a tense community. The student may find it practical to pursue these innocuous activities for many months, and may find it necessary to initiate half a dozen such studies simultaneously in order to gain a sufficient number of ^{informants} ~~representatives~~ representative of the different parts of the community's social organization.

It will have been remarked that the writer used additional devices to make initial contacts, freely inventing Red Herring Studies to catch the interest of certain informants. Moreover, she visited leaders and discussed their activities without any beating around the bush. She also had marked success in gaining rapport with potential segregees by approaching them directly. It should be remembered, however, that in these cases she had already spent considerable time learning proper manners and attitudes and, in the case of the segregees, their psychological state worked strongly to her advantage.²

As the field worker makes these first contacts he will find himself received more cordially by some informants than by others. Like many ethnographers before him, he will slip into the role of learner and gradually into the role of friend. In a crisis situation

1. Goldenweiser, A., Op. cit. p. 49; Malinowski, op. cit., p.

2. See pp. 59-60.

the inexperienced student must exercise caution at this point. He may be drawn into too intimate and obvious a relationship with marginal individuals who themselves have little insight into the attitudes of the community and may already have achieved a reputation as stool-pigeons. Several of the social scientists working in the Centers fell into this pitfall. The danger will be lessened if the field worker makes as many contacts as possible in the early period of study, rather than concentrating his attention on the first people who accept him. If most of his informants are reserved, he will do well to beware of the rare individual who offers a too eager friendship, particularly if this individual speaks derogatorily of his own people.

The Role of the Field Worker

The so-called role of the field worker merits some comment. Mr. Redfield in discussing this concept has applied it in the singular. He, for instance, was placed in the role of photographer. Margaret Mead, in a different situation, gained rapport by giving medical assistance. The "role" applied in this sense is roughly comparable to the initial role assumed in the Japanese Centers by the Analysts and the writer when they were obliged to present themselves as social scientists.

The experiences of the writer lead her to suggest that the student of a community in tension may be called upon to play a variety of roles. The student of a relatively large community where heterogeneity is marked will face the same necessity. These roles will vary with informants and a number may be played simultaneously. The writer assumed the role of learner with almost every informant. With many she became a confidant and a close friend. Some of the agitators did their best to push her into the role of informant and most of them desired that she become their ally. Certain leaders regarded her as

a future press-agent and with a number of male informants she assumed the role of geisha. Leighton and Spicer comment briefly on the same phenomena. Leighton, because he acted as psychiatric consultant to the hospital and the Welfare Department, was regarded as a contributor to community welfare. Spicer assisted the Community Council. Both men were regarded as confidants and as friends by a number of informants.¹ While the writer does not recommend that the beginning field worker emulate her in some of her histrionic escapades, one may at least conclude that the student of a crisis situation or a large community will possess an advantage if he is a versatile actor.

Dr. Redfield has also remarked that the role of the ethnographer will frequently be created by his informants. This statement appears to be equally applicable to many of the minor roles which the students of the Japanese Centers assumed. More frequently than not, these roles were a response to the attitudes of the community or particular informants.

Concluding Statement

A student who is a member of the super-ordinate group undertaking an investigation of current developments in a subordinate community where tension or crisis exist, will be forced to expend great energy and ingenuity to get accurate and penetrating data. His major task will be to alleviate the suspicion of his informants. He may bring many devices to bear on this task. These devices, however, will be of only minor assistance unless they lead to the development of personal relationships with informants and eventually to acceptance as a quasi-member of the in-group.

This acceptance will probably never be complete. Nevertheless,

1. Warner and Lunt describe even more variety in the roles of the field worker in the Yankee City Study. Op. cit., p. 43.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS -- COMPARISONS WITH GENERAL ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD TECHNIQUES

When the techniques employed ^{have} by the social scientists who studied the Japanese Centers are compared with the techniques advocated by anthropologists who worked with primitive groups, the differences found do not appear to be very significant. Those differences which are noticeable appear to spring largely from the adaptation of old techniques to a different environment. Some techniques, for instance, were found to be of little use in the Japanese Centers. Others were found peculiarly applicable and were emphasized and elaborated. These alterations in emphasis, it should be noted, do not apply to the study of a sophisticated minority group versus a primitive group so much as to the study of any difficult or tense situation as opposed to one in which the investigator meets little resentment and suspicion.

One of the more important of these differences may be stated as follows:

The student engaged in the investigation of a tense situation must be prepared to spend a proportionately greater amount of his time and energy in establishing rapport.

This expenditure of time and energy will be increased in proportion to the extent to which the student is associated with a group having authority over the people studied.¹ In situations of extreme crisis the student will find that gaining and maintaining rapport will take

1. The advantages of membership in a group other than the superordinate may be great. They have been touched upon in Chapter III, pp. 156-7

precedence over all other activities. Not only will he find it necessary to proceed with intelligence and circumspection when initiating his study, but he will seldom be permitted to relax his efforts to keep what rapport he has established.

The importance of establishing rapport has, of course, been repeatedly stressed by anthropologists.¹ None, however, stresses it as forcefully as the writer is inclined to do. Miss Mead, in fact, states: "Beginning field workers, imbued with the maxim that they must establish rapport usually devote a disproportionate amount of time to doing so, when much less time more carefully spent would have done as well."² Some of these authorities, however, were not working in tense situations. None mention that their informants were threatened by ostracism or violence. Some of the peoples they studied had had very little contact with the superordinate group of which the anthropologist was a member. Some were not yet conscious of their subordination. Others had been so thoroughly defeated by the superordinate group that the attitudes which had accompanied an earlier crisis had been greatly tempered by time and circumstances.

The writer realized that many of these scholars must have encountered considerable difficulty in establishing rapport. She suspects, however, that the difficulties were generally not so extreme as those under which the social scientists in the Japanese Centers were forced to work. If this is so, it may explain the fact that they usually do not emphasize this aspect of field technique.

1. Maminowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific, pp. 6-22; Goldenweiser, A., 1937. Anthropology, F. S. Crofts & Co. N. Y.; Firth, R., We, The Tikopia, American Book Co., N. Y., pp. 8-11;

2. "Native languages as Field-Work Tools," American Anthropologist, 41:2, 1939, p. 108. Italics are Miss Mead's.

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The murderer or murderers were not apprehended. The residents were torn by conflicting attitudes. The murder, many thought, was going too far. The inu were despicable, but did not merit slaughter. At first few dared express this sentiment openly, since the murderer was at large in camp and an omnipresent threat. It was safest to state that the murderer was a public benefactor and that henceforth the inu would behave themselves. For three months there were no more beatings.¹ The rumors and gossip about inu dwindled abruptly. After a few weeks expressions of remorse were heard and statements to the effect that nobody knew whether the early rumors had been fact or falsehood. Most of the unfortunates who had fled to "the other side of the fence" returned to the Center, but three of the most unpopular men were transferred to Relocation Centers.

add

The Noma murder was, in fact, a turning point in the development of attitudes among the general population. *and by then 2 men the people was more sure* The people as a whole, at *entirely* first covertly and later overtly, *they* began to express dissatisfaction over the lawlessness, the unending intra-Center disaffection, and, as some termed it, the gangsterism and hoodlumism which prevailed among the Japanese residents. *they were also* The desire *that* peace and order might come to the Center was *the winning then to me he* voiced with increasing frequency. No one, however, dared to *say* *or assist* state that someone ought to inform to the administration. Instead,

"I wish the whole truth were known to the Japanese government. All they would have to do would be to send a message to the people (in Tule Lake) to keep quiet until they're taken back to Japan."¹

The Resegregation Group sponsors a scholarly young men's organization which develops into a militaristic group -- they quarrel with the leaders of the Farm Strike uprising -- the Resegregation Group increases pressure on the community, meets resistance, and resumes terrorization

A The Resegregationist leaders, however, thought otherwise. Since April of 1944, they, as Mr. Yamashita expressed it, "had been working in secret and awaiting the moment."² Their ^{join forces with the street people} desire was to form a formal organization of such strength that the WRA administration in Washington would no longer be able to resist their demands for a separate center ^{or area} of residence from which they might be expatriated or repatriated to Japan with the prestige accruing to a group which had made a courageous and positive stand for the Empire. The formation of this formal organization had been delayed, partly because ^{Yamashita, Kira and the other} the ~~Nisei~~ leaders feared internment or imprisonment, and partly because they ^{in the streets} desired the support of the still incarcerated ^{Officers of the Daikyo Shu Kai} Farm Strike leaders.³ By the beginning of August, 1944, ^{some of the strikers returned here, they kept the families, capped &} their ceaseless agitation for the release of these leaders had brought

^{the} them very close to success. They had obtained the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, ^{and the Union} which was threatening the WRA with a writ of habeas corpus for confining the ^{American citizens} ~~Nisei Farm Strike~~ leaders for eight months without trial. Moreover, the detainees themselves, in a ^{last} last desperate attempt to show the administration that they meant ^{business} business, had gone on a hunger strike, which they pursued so earnestly

1. Ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 5.

2. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, p. 4.

3. By August of 1944 all of the stockade detainees except about 20 of the men considered the most dangerous agitators had been released.

fluent but cautiously worded statements about the November 4th "riot." I thanked him and remarked that some day I hoped to learn the inside story of that fascinating event. At present, however, I suggested that he wait and watch my activities until he was sure that I could be trusted. Tada made no reply. Eight months later, he told me that this statement had impressed him greatly. "When you said that I knew you weren't so dumb."

The situation in the apartment of Mr. Yamashita must have impressed Mr. Tada as ironical indeed. Much later he told me that on that occasion he had come to tell Mr. Yamashita that he could not see his way to joining the Resegregation Group, knowing full well that Yamashita would resent this and that serious trouble might ensue.

~~Before the conversation was well underway,~~ ^{Still} three more men came to call on Mr. Yamashita. It was obvious that he had at least one of the Center qualifications of a leader: "he sat still while the people came to see him." ~~By this time~~ ^{But} the apartment was very crowded and I rose to leave. Yamashita would not hear of this and insisted that I stay and eat Sunday dinner with him in the mess hall. The dinner was unusually ^{a small piece of chicken} good for camp fare, but Yamashita remarked that everything was much better in the internment camps in Japan. I made no comment. At the end of the dinner, Yamashita drew himself up with dignity, urged me to call again and remarked, "Be sure you have the Rockefeller Foundation send me a copy of the book you plan to publish when I am in Japan. They can well afford it."

^{Acquaintance with Mr. Kira} ~~Acquaintance with Mr. Kira~~, the Black Tiger and leader of the dreaded Manzanar gang ~~was made~~, ^{Kira} interestingly enough, because of a recommendation from ~~Mr. Oishi~~ ^{Kira's bitter enemy}. ~~Oishi had told me something of Kira's activities but had not named the man. He gave me no hint as to Kira's real position in the Center, but merely suggested that~~ ^{Kira} ~~he~~ would make an interesting informant. ^{He} warned me that Kira

might insult me, ^{He also} and warned me not to use his (Oishi's) name as a recommendation. ^{if I can} I did not tell Oishi that I had already picked up hints that Kira was the "Black Tiger".

My respectful letter to Kira asking for an interview received a curt reply, telling me that he would see me at his office (he was a block manager) at seven thirty in the evening. This letter placed me in an awkward predicament. ^{for} The administration did not approve of unescorted women entering the Center at night. Moreover, Kira's office was two miles away from the gate, ^{and the sentry} and the sentry. Furthermore, ^{at this time} the Center ^{was almost totally cut off from the outside world} at this period was in the grip of a singular series of rape rumors, which ~~were taken so seriously by the residents that Japanese women seldom left the barracks after sundown.~~

Despite these deterring factors, I was ~~so~~ irritated by the tone of Mr. Kira's letter ^{but} that I kept the appointment. Kira was an appropriately sinister looking character. He was extremely small and delicate, wore a ~~small~~ Van Dyke beard, had his head closely shaved, and wore dark glasses. He sat ^{at his desk} behind his desk ~~with great poise~~ and seated me so that I ~~would be~~ ^{was} forced to look at a large painted Japanese flag which he had fastened to the wall behind him. I smiled ~~innocently and with all the skill at my~~ ^{just to try to impress him} command set out to impress Kira with the fact that I thought him a great and important man. This ~~was~~ ^{proved} very easy, ~~to do~~, because Kira had the same objective.

Kira was far more cautious than Mr. Yamashita and ^{made no} ~~would not make an~~ open admission of interest in the Resegregation Group. ^{out} He betrayed himself, nevertheless, by giving ^{me} an account of an interview he had had with the Project Director in which (if he were to be believed) he had spoken to the Director very arrogantly and had told him what was wrong with the Center. ^{What he said he had told} His quoted statements to the Director ~~were unmistakable~~ ^{was} Resegregationist propaganda and I concluded that Mr. Kira was connected with ~~this pressure~~ ^{the underground} group but was too canny to admit it. I ^{also} decided to see

22 days after I had been waiting for
On the other hand, the Resegregationist feud with Kuratomi, Tada
and Kai presented a truly delicate ~~investigational~~ *was from the middle* situation. For

many months I had been waiting ~~impatiently~~ *for* for the release of the

imprisoned leaders of the Farm Strike Uprising in order that I might

for this was my last about the whole thing why they could believe
~~obtain much needed data on the early period of Center history.~~ The

see more
leading Resegregationists had been waiting with ~~equal~~ *see more* impatience,

since they desired to incorporate the Farm Strike leaders into their

hierarchy of officers and face the administration with a united front.

I had no suspicion that a ~~bitter quarrel was brewing~~ *they are the same as before* and I might have

become involved in serious difficulties had not the Resegregationists

in late September, attempted to keep me on their side by denouncing Kuratomi, Kai, and
Tada and thereby warning me of the existence of the feud.

As it was, my eagerness to obtain data for once became an
advantage. I ~~went after~~ *tried to tell me* the Farm Strike leaders a few days after

they were released. Since the Resegregationists had been ^{openly} voicing their respect and regard for these men for many months, it was both natural and fitting that I ask Mrs. Tsuchikawa to negotiate for interviews with them. ^{Since the Resegregationists were still in a hostile position} The hostilities had not yet begun at this time and Mrs. Tsuchikawa ~~gladly~~ complied, arranging for an interview with Mr. Kuratomi, the chairman of the ^{old N. Y. C. Japanese community} Farm Strike representative body.

Shortly thereafter I called on Mr. Kuratomi but found him out. He was, in fact, busily occupied in preparing to defend himself against the threat of the murder indictment. At his ^{apartment} ~~home~~, however, was another Mr. Yamada, Farm Strike leader, a young man of extremely powerful physique, ~~who~~ ^{Mr. Yamada} suggested that I call on a certain Mr. Kato, who had been secretary to the Farm Strike representative body and was also well acquainted with many matters on which I desired information. I expressed my appreciation and ^{Yamada yes, I later learned in a black belt judo man,} ~~the muscular young man, a judo champion of highest rank,~~ made an appointment with me.

This interview with Kato and Yamada was my first ^{meeting} ~~contact~~ with the notorious "riot leaders". With exemplary propriety, the young men had arranged to have two Issei women present at the interview to serve as chaperones. ~~Almost immediately it was apparent that gaining rapport with these noted agitators was going to be even easier than than getting on good terms with the Resegregationist leaders.~~ I explained

be observed in the company of men who had been accused of threatening to kill the Project Director.

A ~~few~~ ^{weeks} days later I met Mr. Kuratomi, the chairman of the Farm Strike representative body, the man who had been spokesman at the negotiations ^{with} Mr. Dillon Myer. Kuratomi differed ^{markedly} ~~greatly~~ from Kato and Yamada in personality and appearance. ^{He} ~~He was~~ tall, and slender, ^{thin} ~~very~~ and had the regular, rather caucasoid features which caused the young ladies of the Center to think him very handsome. He was, moreover, reserved and dignified, and far less naive than Kato and ^{Yamada} ~~Uchida~~. At ^{his} ~~this~~ first meeting he ^{was} ~~was~~ disturbed ^{over} the indictment threat hanging over his head, and I had no difficulty in expressing my sincere conviction that he had nothing to do with the murder. He ^{seem} ~~appeared~~ to appreciate this, ^{and} ~~and~~ gave me an account of his first impressions of the Center in October of 1943 and recounted the development of ^{his} ~~the~~ attitudes which ~~had~~ led him to take such a prominent part in the uprising. When he had finished his voluntary statements I asked him a number of questions. I particularly desired an explanation of why the Japanese representatives had demanded the resignation of the entire WRA personnel several weeks after their unsuccessful conference with the Project Director and Mr. Myer.

Kuratomi said:

"If there were some clear thinking and decent persons here, we thought that by that time some step would have been taken whereby the situation would have been cleared and the Negotiating Committee vindicated."

After the ^{we had been talking for} ~~interview~~ had gone on for several hours I thought it ^{most} ~~peculiar~~ that Kuratomi had made no mention ^{whatsoever} ~~of~~ the Resegregation. I thereupon referred to them indirectly. Kuratomi, however, was not to be drawn. He smiled and said that he would make a prediction for my private benefit. Before the passage of many

weeks there would be a split in that organization. I responded with the understanding smile which such an obliquity demanded and inwardly wondered what was going on.

I did not have long to wait to find out. A few days later Mrs. Tsuchikawa told me ^{in her dramatic way} that Kuratomi was now an outcast. ^{who I also knew to be a} He had not shown sufficient gratitude to the Resegregationists leaders for their unceasing attempts to get him out of the stockade. ^{down} He had attempted to borrow money from them to assist the evil Mr. Tada fight the threatened indictment. ^{in fact}, the Resegregationists had cut off all relationships with him, with Reverend Kai, and with their wives.

This was very interesting news. It now remained to ascertain how Mr. Kuratomi felt about it. This was not easy for Kuratomi, knowing of my rapport with the Resegregationists, was very cautious and could not be led into a discussion of his rivals. Finally, I gained some information by obliquity. A member of the Caucasian police force told me in confidence that Reverend Kai, Kuratomi's close friend, was the head of the Resegregation Group because the title of the Resegregationists' organization was Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-kai¹ and ended with the name "Kai". This was a ridiculous piece of detective work because "kai" means "organization" or "society" and consequently is the end word in the names of many Japanese groups. At the close of an amicable interview with Kuratomi, I passed on this amusing story. Kuratomi smiled politely, but his wife laughed and said, "Poor Father Kai, I guess we'll have to tell him to change his name."²

The pressing problem now was how to stay on good terms with the leaders of these two hostile factions. ~~This was accomplished by~~

1. Young men's organization for the study of the fatherland.

2. Field Notes, Oct. 19, 1944, p. 4.