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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

M2.40

"COLONISTS
in
WYOMING"

What about the Japanese-Americans?
Here's a first-hand account of
people from Palo Alto, San Jose,
Southern California and Yakima
Valley, now "relocated" in Wyoming.

As the first light breaks the darkness, the roosters of a concentration camp suddenly come to life. First one, then another, then a chorus of dishpans rattle and clatter the call to breakfast. It is partly clouded, and the deep pink in the Eastern sky suddenly gives way as the whole heavens blaze. The eyes are pulled up and up, above the drab barracks and the drab countryside, to this spectacle of the Great Plains. The color dies as quickly as it had lived. For a moment the whole world is gray, and then the sun catches the snow on the mountains to the southeast.

Inside the black barracks the people stir. Some groan and roll over. Others push back the covers and slip quickly into their clothes. Grabbing towel and toothbrush, they go outdoors where the bits of snow and ice crunch under their feet. "Cold", they say to one another, and hurry towards the warmth of the latrines. Soon they are lining up to get breakfast: grapefruit, cold cereal, French toast, coffee.

As the sunlight reaches the camp, a bell on one of the barracks starts ringing and the kids come down to school. Lacking a schoolhouse, they sit in barracks all day, many on benches without backs, sharing textbooks because there aren't enough to go around. The teachers try to get along under the primitive conditions, finding their classes noisy because the partitions separating the rooms are flimsy--don't go up to the roof.

Over in the Administration Building the block administrators get together for their daily meeting. Appointed by the W.R.A., this group is all Nisei. It carries out the minor functions of government, takes the complaints of the people to the Administration. Like any governing body that doesn't have much power, its members sit and smoke and joke and appoint committees. The Isseis, who are not eligible to be block administrators, serve on a block council. And the people laugh, and call the block administrators stooges and the block council blockheads, for they know who really runs the government.

Out in a corridor two Caucasian members of the Administration talk with each other about the colonists. Unlike the Army which ordered the evacuation, most of the W.R.A. staff want to see the Japanese really relocated. One of these men is from Washington and tells how well former colonists who have gone out under student relocated have fared. He hopes the W.R.A. will work on public opinion so that more and more colonists can get out. And the administrators are tall, clean-cut Caucasians who are rather embarrassed when they are asked why the camps are called "partnership enterprises", because they know as well as anyone the difference between voluntary partnership and coercion.

And two of the people overhear a snatch of their conversation as they pass, and one mutters: "Colonists! Jesus Christ! I wonder if they call tigers pussy cats?"

As the morning goes on, the sun becomes warmer and now it falls full on the ground which forms the streets and the spaces between the barracks. And the puddles of water which had been frozen hard all night long begin to melt. When a boot lands on them they crack and break, and muddy water spurts up over the toe of the boot. Then the millions of little frozen water particles in the earth that had been holding the ground firm and hard, these too begin to melt, and the ground softens. As the sun continues to shine on it, and the people to walk over it, it becomes muddy. The people's feet get wet and dirty whenever they step outside a building.

Two Nisei girls walking across the camp jump and slide in the mud, and try to keep in the shade of the barracks where the ground is still firm. They are social workers. Social workers in a place like this? What does a social worker do to prevent juvenile delinquency when kids are suddenly jerked from normal life to this? Recreation? When there's no item in the budget for recreational material and the recreation halls are even used as offices? Education? When they promise that the college kids can get out and then let only a few go? Worthwhile work? When the majority of the jobs they give us! are so meaningless that most of the kids act as if they were doing time?

How can you teach democracy in a concentration camp? Or praise American labor standards where people get \$4 for a 44-hour week and nothing for overtime? Or talk about racial equality when the Caucasians on the W.R.A. staff are setting up a whole Jim Crow system of their own?

Lookit these little boys. They used to worship football players. Remember when you were a little kid, how every little boy has a hero? Now they follow the toughest gang leaders, and the gangs get tougher and fight one another and steal lumber. New gangs are formed, and they look at the girls more often.....Lookit that girl, most gregarious damn person I ever saw. But even she needs to be off alone sometimes-----but she never can here. We're not individuals here, but cogs that eat and sleep and work and live all alike.....Lookit that mother-----she used to be the core of her family, providing the meals, training her children, those little things that build a family unity. Now other people throw food at us, the kids no longer eat with the parents, but learn their manners from the roughnecks, run wild most of the time. What kind of people will we be if our families break up?.....

I read in a paper how a minister said we oughta be satisfied because we were being well fed and housed and given a chance to work. Is that all living means to that guy?

Is life just getting your belly filled and a hoe in your hand? Betcha that same fellow talks a lot about liberty and spiritual values when he's thinking about Hitler!....

And the social workers walk on across the camp. People change slowly, but being social workers, they can see the change. And the sun cuts into the shade of the barracks, and more and more of the ground becomes muddy and soft.

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Down by the mess halls, the people line up for lunch. One of the girls tells a story she had read in a paper about a barber named Vic. Vic liked to show people his draft registration card, because on it he was checked as a member of the white race. The color of his skin was black, but he was a Cuban. Often when he went into restaurants or bars, the proprietor would shout: "Scram! We don't soive niggers here!" Then Vic would produce the little piece of paper which was his passport to equality, and invariably the proprietor would feel like a dolt. And the proprietor should feel like a dolt. Does a colored man have to be a foreigner to get equality in this democracy? What is the race line? Obviously it isn't the color line--Vic's case proves that. So does the familiar fact that a Negro who wears a turban can ride in the same street-car with Southern white folks. Is it a hat prejudice? Is it a draft card prejudice?

And the people laugh at the story, because they have learned to laugh at the things that hurt them most. Whenever anyone mentions that they may stay here permanently, "like Indians on a reservation", everyone always laughs. But they do not think the subject of Indian reservation is funny.

What is the race line. The people would like to know. They tell about the time the Elks had a party for the teachers---but only the Caucasians were invited. The next day, one of the women teachers (Caucasian) was telling another of the women teachers (Nisei) what a wonderful party they had had. The Nisei girl smiled and laughed, but later she went home and cried.

And they tell about the two washrooms at the Pomona Center. Over the big washroom was a sign which read: "Caucasian Administrative Staff Only," and over the little washroom "Japanese Administrative Staff Only."

Then there's the story about the Caucasian history teacher who told her class: "Today we will study the Constitution." And the class laughed and tittered so that they never did.

And the people who have been hurt make cracks about the number of Jews on the W.R.A. staff, and they say to one another: "Did you see the two new Hebes who are here?" And they make disparaging remarks about Negroes, and point out the economic degradation of the Mexicans.

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In the afternoon many persons crowd into the "Courthouse" for a public forum. The Niseis who run it have hopefully hung a sign which proclaims Voltaire' famous statement about free speech. First, a visitor speaks, and then there is to be an open discussion. Toward the end of the speech, a Caucasian walks in, and one woman whispers to another: "Here comes an administrative stooge. Now we can't say what we want." But the other, sizing the newcomer up, disagrees: "Naw. He's only a kid highschool teacher."

The discussion begins, and the chairman is nervous. He wants it to be frank enough to satisfy the people, but is scared of future censorship if it gets out of hand. A tall, lean fellow with a black goatee rises again and again. "Are you going to participate in this Camp government? Do you still think you're citizens of this country? Do you have the rights of citizens? Isn't the government just going to coddle you and make you into another bunch of people on an Indian Reservation? Or will they ship you all back to Japan? What sort of jobs could you get if you could go outside? What are you, citizens or Japs? Or are you donkeys?"

The fears that lurk in the people have been touched, and they stir nervously. The chairman raps for order. A block administrator jumps up: "I read in a novel once where Kathleen Norris or someone said a man and his wife with some chickens could live on the prairie as happily as in New York City. We've got plenty of prairie here. All we need is the chickens!"

The crowd roars. The chairman relaxes a little. The talk goes on, and Niseis ask each other about Nisei problems and discuss "Japanese-American Salvation," as if the Japanese-American problem was the only problem in an otherwise unimportant world.

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It is Halloween, and across the camp are many parties. In one mess hall, gay streamers enliven the walls, and the people crowd together as the orchestra comes in. Ten Nisei boys, each wearing a red-and-black-checked flannel shirt, and a girl at the piano, start to play remarkably good music. But no one dances. Finally a boy says to a girl, "Hell! Let's dance!" The ice is broken, and the floor is suddenly jammed with couples dancing or watching a hot jitterbug exhibition. People laugh and joke, and a boy says to the girl he is dancing with: "I almost forget where I am." "I never do," the girl replies, as the smile goes from her face.

Sitting on a bench in one corner watching are Caucasian members of the Administrative personnel. Everyone else is standing, for there are no other seats. Every so often one woman in a fur coat stands on a bench to get a better view and, waving her corsage, shrills gayly at her Caucasian companions below. Several of their faces are flushed, their breaths heavy with the aroma of wine. Liquor is strictly contraband within the camp, and the people turn and look and turn away again.

What will these camps produce? Out of them come leaders and prophets, men and women of great faith and great patience, blazing new paths in overcoming racial prejudice. Will the hardship burn and temper their faith and make it strong? Will there be men like Phillippe Vernier, whose love and strength came out of four years of solitary?

The people do not know. In one of the barracks, a late bull session is going on around the warm stove. "It's too easy," said one boy. "We get food, there's no rent to pay, the routine is deadening. Everything leads to a degenerative life instead of an invigorative one. Everyone is grabbing for himself. We grab the coal, grab bits of wood lying around, grab for clothing allotments, grab our food. No wonder the little kids are getting so they do it too, and think only of themselves. No wonder we're apathetic and ingrown."

The people walk quickly home through the sharp cold of the night. The ground is hard under their feet along the brightly lighted streets and alleys. From a thousand chimneys the harsh coal smoke tries to rise, curls under the weight of the cold air, and settles like a blanket close to the ground. A train whistle sounds in the darkness. Music comes from a guard tower where a bored soldier listens to the radio. From the floodlights a path of light surrounds the camp.

FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION
2151 Vine Street
Berkeley, California

November 6, 1942

HEART MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY

I. Moving in. August, 1942, to January, 1943.

1. The Camp was built. The first comers, August 12, found only a few blocks sufficiently finished by the contractor to be habitable. Major building continued till near the end of September, hardly keeping ahead of subsequent trainloads of people.

The residents themselves kept on building:

- (1) Winterizing the barracks with interior walls and ceilings of celotex, piling earth around the base of the outside.
- (2) Installing stoves.
- (3) Making furniture. Authorized for messhalls and schools. Much of it unauthorized--scraps and "stolen" lumber for evacuee apartments. There was a "big steal" of lumber over Halloween from a pile for use in constructing the high school. At least one councilman told his block people to go help themselves, aided in commandeering a truck to haul lumber to apartments. The whole pile was carried away. Staff property men were aghast. Even some evacuees thought the job was a little extreme in its thoroughness. There was a good deal of resistance among evacuees to the celotex project. Objected to building the camp; that was the Government's job. Hard facts of coming winter was important in resolving resistance. Stoves were a problem in that the

rules called for proper installation and inspection to prevent fire hazard. A lot were installed, inspected later.

Need for heat urgent.

2. Basic Services were established.

(1) Coal. Not much data on this first fall except that there was difficulty in getting coal crew. Coal was an important anxiety at first. Californians terrified at prospect of Wyoming winters. Hatchi observed a man gazing at recreation hall, spoke to him. Responded the man, "If the coal fails, we should start on that." (pointing to the recreation hall). After a while coal problem was too well settled, i.e., coal was over-abundant, much wasted through burning only lumps.

(2) Hospital. Almost no data, except a hectic time for awhile.

(3) Schools. Pretty crude make-shifts, but operating in October. Had involved moving some people out of apartments to which they were first assigned.

(4) Housing. Much over-crowding in initial period, instances or more than one family per apartment, etc. Some shifting for schools, to get relatives together, and to relieve hardship cases. By November, most of this re-adjustment shifting was over.

(5) Food. This and coal had been perhaps the basic anxieties at first. Late September or early October a mess steward was discharged for incompetence. Real shortage threatened.

procurement set-up revised. By November supplies were flowing much better. Food difficulties became more petty--the kind of things that continued on and on in many messhalls. (6) Law and order. Police force established and judicial commission set up. Crisis in police in late October and early November. Strike of evacuee force induced by discharge of Rosie Matsui and 3 others by I.S. head. Temporary Council took over. Striking police worked under Council. Impasse settled by resignation of Internal Security head; resignation encouraged if not actually asked for by Project Director. Law and order still not effective in one area. Gangs of boys and young men were troublesome. Santa Anita gangs arrived already organized. Pomonans and Portlanders organized in self defense. Matters were growing worse through September and October. Not until November and December that adequate measures really got under way through a vigorous community activities program. It took a little time to work this out but by January the worst of the difficulty was licked. Leadership: 4 or 5 older Nisei (one a young Issei), Barber.

3. Staff and evacuees took important steps toward learning to live and work together; basic mechanisms for cooperation operating.

(1) Council of Block Chairmen.

For some reason Barber seems to have had the idea from first that Issei were dominant, leadership to be found among

them. Sam Nagata arrived from Pomona with a letter from Pomona Director commending him as one who knew the Japanese and who would cooperate. As blocks filled up he recommended Issei leaders to serve as block chairmen. Barber interviewed the men. Not clear if more than one per block were interviewed. Anyway, appointment was fast. Began meeting with him immediately. Late August or early September, before all people arrived and before corps was complete Barber suggested that chairmen should ask block residents if approved them or desired an election. It is likely that chairmen thought it would be good idea. Some of them may have originated the idea. Anyway, all called block meetings, explained their positions, asked what people wanted to do. Probably all met some questioning and antagonism. Some residents wanted to know why the Administration had happened to select them, stooge insinuations. In all but one case men of probity arose to argue that chairman should be left and given support. If another choice was wanted, it could come later. That is, Barber's choices were sustained. Just one block, 14, voted to have an election. Champion of the proposal was elected chairman in place of the man Barber had appointed. (Incidentally, he was never re-elected until near the end of the center when Council material was becoming scanty.)

All of these chairmen were Issei.

I think all but two were over 50.

Most had been pretty well known in their pre-evacuation communities, though only one or two were former topdrawer leaders.

The % of Christians was higher than in later Councils. Sam N.'s influence.

Everybody agrees that this Council worked hard. Met daily for weeks. Until 3:00 A.M. once during police strike; until war midnight many times. Saw much of top staff, especially Barber.

At first, it was expected that Chairmen would be very temporary. November 3 temporary Council was asked by Administration to continue in office until permanent government was set up. Elections of some sort held.

Organizing Commission or Charter Commission established at same time to accomplish that end.

(2) Block Managers. (Called Block Administrative Officers until December.)

These were older Nisei, one or two young Issei with generally Nisei viewpoint.

How this came about not known. Certain Nisei protested all Issei chairmen immediately; protestors were generally well-thought-of Nisei in the evacuee community. Talked the language, literally and figuratively, of Administration too. Most staff, except for Barber, preferred to do business with them rather than the Chairmen. Perhaps there was an outright administrative decision that they should be Nisei Council and other Nisei agreed with the idea. Though the Nisei should be recognized and that this was a good way. The representatives of the people would be themselves, Issei. Nisei managers would work with and for the administration in connection with more mechanical aspects of center operations.

Managers rapidly became an active political body. In a sense there were two councils. Managers fought the administration for concessions to the community of all sorts. Spoke for the community, often differing with the position and especially with the tactics of the Council. Administration considered them a tough bunch, able and aggressive; harder to handle in some ways than the Council. Yet somehow more dealable with.

In december their name was changed to Managers and they were officially declared not to be a political body. The official declaration had little effect. They ceased to be an important political body only during 1943 as a result of relocation. The material for this kind of corps of managers seems not to have been abundant. When the first batch left, there was no one to replace them.

Something else I don't know is how the early managers were selected. There is a reference in the P.A. report of March 11, 1943, to the effect that the block submitted a panel of names from which the Operations Chief appointed a man. Who in the block took the trouble to get up the panel? (Later on) (1944) Councilman had much to do with naming Manager.) First managers probably offered themselves.

Each Manager had an assistant, called secretary or block clerks. She was a Nisei girl. Worked in manager's block office. Took care of routine business in the block. Managers had a central office altogether in Administration area, next to the assembly room which they shared with the Council for meetings.

Chairmen had no block offices. Would ask block clerks to do little jobs for them. Chairman's block "office" was at home.

Managers on WRA payroll.

Block clerks on WRA payroll.

Chairmen not on WRA payroll as chairmen. In early period could have jobs elsewhere if wished; not held to duties of such jobs. Just marked present full time and sent checks. Most chairmen received \$19 per month and clothing allowance in this way. A few not on payroll at all. At least one was paid \$20 per month out of block contributions. Barber requested set-up of chairman as paid job; turned down. This was in October, I think.

(3) Charter Commission for working out permanent form of government set up in early November. Two delegates from each block, one Issei, one Nisei. Met and selected executive committee of 12, half Issei, half Nisei. Chairman Nisei.

It is said that organization of this Commission caused Issei-Nisei conflict to abate. Nisei presumed that permanent government would guarantee them more power. Most Nisei wanted some modification of instruction 34, however, which would allow limited Issei participation.

Charter Commission didn't get far in this first period. Instruction 34 chief reason.

Temporary set-up continued to function.

(4) Key employees. My information is not very good, but I think these were Nisei predominantly. Aggressive persons who offered themselves and were accepted by this and that administration.

(5) The role of personalities in the staff evacuee adjustment process.

Staff: It appears that the first P.D. turned over dealing with the community to Barber. Barber was determined to bring the staff and evacuees together, to develop real cooperation between them. He was willing to make as many concessions as possible and to give evacuees as much responsibility as the rules allowed. He went out of his way to try to prove to evacuees that he sincerely cared about their welfare. A.P.'s (in Community Services only probably) participated in Halloween and Christmas parties in the blocks under Barber's orders. (Some of them were not too willing and somewhat clumsy in this participation. Occasions, especially the first, said not to have been very well organized.)

Many evacuees liked and trusted Barber. The rapid development of Community government was largely due to him. It is reported that he got on much better with Issei than Nisei, especially with the kind of Issei who made up the Council as contrasted with the kind of Nisei who were Managers. I saw something somewhere that dealing with Managers was transferred to Todd because "Barber couldn't handle them."

Virgil Payne shared Barber's views, worked closely with him, re-enforced his good relations with the community by her own good relations.

The P.D., it is said by many staff members, allowed the evacuees to "push him around." Robertson once commented that Rachford got along with the evacuees easily by letting them have everything they wanted. Myer considered him lacking in firmness.

The two most important A.P.'s in community relations, then, were both conciliatory. Barber's attitude was more than conciliatory. It was active seeking for common ground with evacuees.

Many A.P.'s were opposed to the Barber-Rachford policy; some were violently opposed.

Two quotes on Barber. Staff member: "The man who did the most damage to Heart Mountain of any man who has ever been here--Japanese or Caucasian--was Philip Barber."

Evacuee: "A lot of staff members have come to and gone from Heart Mountain. The departure of only one of them caused sorrow in the community or was even noticed much. He was Philip Barber. Oh no, there were two. I should include Miss Payne."

Certain other A.P.'s were establishing relations with certain evacuees in connection with their line of work. Loomis (Engineering) has a very large force in this beginning period. Reputed to have been easy-going, let evacuees run things.

Robertson and Todd started Community Enterprise. Chose evacuees of a sort that they could work with. They were young Issei and older Nisei mostly. Perhaps one reason for the protracted difficulties regarding C.E. was that when steps were taken looking toward organizing a co-op as a permanent form of business organization, the administration addressed the community, i.e., the representatives of the community, i.e., the Council of Block Chairman. In a sense, these were Barber's men. Some chairmen were important men in Co-op-Study Group. Soon clashed with the C.E. men. Differed just as Robertson differed from Barber. The factions continued until the end of the center. I wouldn't want to press the point too much, but maybe the staff personalities involved was a factor.

In December Rachford left, Robertson came in. Robertson had disagreed with easy going policies of his predecessor, had different conception of status and duties of a P.D. Had also disagreed with Barber's viewpoint and practices. In January at P.D.'s meeting, Robertson asked Barber's removal. More on the meaning and consequences of this change later.

Evacuees: Sam Nagata's role in selecting Council has been mentioned. His job was assistant to Barber. Had a desk just outside Barber's office. Conferred with him much as long as he was there. Very likely that Barber did not rely on him as much later on as at first. Nagata figures he was always a potent influence. Many evacuees didn't like him. Considered him inu. Moved from block 17 under pressure.

Hayashida was chairman of the temporary Council. A smooth politician, a compromiser. Issei in late fifties. As Issei go, quite Americanized. Wife an English woman. He was real-estate operator. Most of his contacts were with Japanese pre-evacuation, but had not been active in Japanese organizations and had many social contacts with non-Japanese. Many evacuees didn't like him though in a different way and for different reasons than in the case of Nagata. Not inu, just too aggressive and too smooth, or slick.

Fumimoto, Issei in 50's. Yakima. In Yakima block, 15, he was the leader. Became pal of Hayashida, worked with him in Council though remained independent. Not smooth as Hayashida was, punched hard in dealing with Administration. I suspect he played a role in defining

function of Council as representing evacuees as against Administration. I doubt that he was thought of as administration stooge. Many Nisei and young Issei didn't like him. Considered him an old, stubborn, hide-bound Issei. Question how much mark he made.

Riki Tomo. Chairman of the Managers. A tough Hawaiian Nisei in his forties. Economically successful pre-evacuation. Caucasian wife. Electric refrigerator in apartment. Good "cellar" entertained top staff. Really sore about evacuation. Kept careful records of losses so he could sue the Government. All records in triplicate. Meantime, until he could sue, he wanted to get as much from WRA as possible. Especially resented any assumption that staff ran the project and evacuees were supposed to take what they got and like it. Tough, direct bargainer. Probably he did much to give the first Managers the character they had.

Block 29 chairman, Koide. The one young member of Council of Chairmen. Issei about 40. Nisei liked him, i.e., more up-and-coming Nisei did. Many Issei did too, though some suspicion he was "pink". He got on well with more intelligent A.P.'s. Educated, restrained, diplomatic; but spoke plainly when necessary. Important as Issei-Nisei, Council-Managers link. Also Robertson-Council & Manager link. Robertson relied on him a good deal.

C.E. Managers. Mostly older Nisei and young Issei. Selected by Robertson and Todd. Got along well with them, better with them in some ways than with older Issei of the sort who made up Council. One

C.E. man, Sashihara, Issei in late forties, was a Chairman. Served as link.

Young Issei and older Nisei organized C.A. program. Carried through. Got on well with staff and community generally. C.A. never a "problem" from the first.

There were others who helped staff and evacuees learn to live together who did not necessarily have important positions in the organization of the community. Tom Tsunoda and Robertson were real friends. Both successful businessmen. Talked the same language. Tsunoda's income \$25000 a year in camp. He was an Americanized Issei. Taught Robertson a good deal; failed to teach him in some ways. Referred to other Issei as "they". Robertson relied on him for information and interpretation of the community.

Bill Hosokawa was Mechau's right hand man, very popular with the staff generally. Very Americanized Nisei. Said (and thought) things that pleased the staff mightily about evacuation and how evacuees should feel about it. He founded what some Issei (and Nisei) called "the Sentinel gang." Considered pro-Administration.

II. BEING SORTED

1. A look backward:

- (1) A new project director --- Dec. 16, 1942. He had a different conception of status and role of P.D. than predecessor. Different ideas on Com. Management than Barber. Asked for Barber's removal in Jan., 1943. In important ways new P.D. wanted to be his own Com. Management head. He conceded less, sought to build up his authority. ("It seems to me he always said no, especially at first." Chairman of Temp. Council at the --- in conversation in L.A.
- (2) Issei temporary Council had had much experience working with adm. and community.
- (3) Block managers, older Nisei, competing with Council in same ways. Vigorous and outspoken in dealing with adm.
- (4) Organization of permanent government going slowly. Instruction 34 one of main obstacles. Charter completed, approved by Org. Commission Jan., 16. Provided for Nisei Councilman and Issei adviser from each block. Some Nisei charged that Issei favored proposals that would insure rejection of Charter by WRA; preferred temporary set up. Nisei went along because they wanted to see how much self govt. would be allowed.
- (5) By early 1943 some signs of growing restiveness due partly to the "tougher" adm. and, perhaps more, to the fact that most of the urgent problems of existence had been solved. There was time and energy to work for smaller concessions, to feel around, to express and dwell on dissatisfactions.

PA report of 1/9/43 refers to rumors of strikes. Cooks said to be pressing for \$19 instead of \$16.

In Feb. a threatened hospital strike.

2. Registration.

- (1) Existing tensions blossomed into action. Many meetings and fervid speeches. Center-wide Nisei Congress elected. Petitions for delay, requests for information from other centers, confusion. Delegates from some blocks explicitly instructed to vote for nothing without consulting block again.
- (2) Administration countered with announcements that registration was sedition, penalties cited.
- (3) Council decided registration was necessary, that resistance would lead to trouble. One way and another, deviously and directly, worked for it.
- (4) Managers, some at last, seem to have agreed with resisters.
- (5) Results.

Practically everybody registered.

Few volunteered. Those who did, together with their families, faced much criticism and ridicule.

The administration was shocked. Many staff members earlier friendly with and sympathetic toward evacuees were disillusioned. (The honeymoon had been fading earlier.) The less sympathetic A.P.'s felt pretty good. The P.D. wrote a letter in early March to the Council and Managers, calling attention to the few volunteers and criticizing their leadership in the program. The Council was a little annoyed; the Managers were worse. The P.D. recognized that the Council had helped him

through the situation, but their help had not been forthright enough. The PA wrote that 90% of the trouble was caused by the Nisei, a view the P.D. probably shared. I suspect that the P.D. began to view the Issei in a somewhat different light than he had earlier. They could be depended on in a pinch in a way the Nisei couldn't be.

The Community had had an emotional binge that brought some release of accumulated tensions. But the release was impaired by the feeling that the administration had defeated the community. The great majority had not wanted to register; they had brought pressure to have the matter dropped or to have it postponed, and they had failed. Hopes were abandoned that the evacuees might control their existence in fairly important ways. The Adm. was boss. The P.D. had a firm reputation as a tough man. The hakujin couldn't ever understand.

The Council felt its limitations in dealing both with the Adm. and the community more fully than before. Many in the community had resisted urging, had criticized councilmen. Councilmen figured that they had helped the Adm. a lot. The P.D. apparently didn't appreciate their efforts. Ideas that they had developed as to how much they could sway adm. were revised. At an election on Mar. 1, several of the original chairmen withdrew.

A cleavage developed between the "loyal" minority, the kind of persons who volunteered and who never seriously questioned registration, and the rest of the community. There had been individual brushes with the numbers of the minority before,

but life before registration had failed to show who was who. Statements and acts during registration labelled the "loyal"; they became a category. The disaffected and "disloyal" became a category too. Many of the "loyal" relocated during 1943. The pressure under which they lived in the center after registration contributed to their decision to go.

New relations between A.P. and evacuees already touched on but few more points: Both groups withdrew. Evacuees tried less to explain themselves, to be understood. Invitations to kabukai, etc. ceased. Staff members concluded not many evacuees could be saved. It may be the group-wise, both A.P.'s and evacuees felt better. On both sides they had sort of made up their minds; the situation was more clearly defined; they could relax more.

3. The aftermath of registration: March--June.

- (1) Defeat not taken gracefully by many in community. Strong undertone of antagonism. Anti-Adm. acts and statements had much of the nature of potshots, something like an underground movement in an occupied country.
- (2) Administration campaign for full-time work was initiated in March while wounds of registration were still pretty raw. I don't know if there was any consideration of "timing" or if the matter had just been got around to. Our popular staff member, head of engineering and construction, was let out because he did not support the campaign vigorously enough. There were orders, terminations, written and oral admonitions. Evacuees resisted; feeling was bad. Several exchanges of

uncomplimentary remarks between A.P.'s and evacuees. Among evacuees, talk was pungent.

- (3) The Motor Pool strike. On April 26, a fight between an evacuee Agriculture foreman and A.P. Motor Pool foreman over servicing of farm tractors. Tractors had been running out of gas, water, etc., bespeaking lousy co-ordination between the two departments. Much pressure on agric. Fight occurred in Motor Pool office with three hakujin and no evacuee onlookers, except through windows. Door closed. Wild rumors or ganging up on evacuee. Strike underway by afternoon, complete by next day. Hot meetings by Motor Pool workers. wide community support; evidence of state of feeling generally Motor Pool workers reported hostile and uncompromising. P.A. reports suggest staff with a few important exceptions were also hostile and uncompromising.

Agric. workers also met but decided they had no grievance provided (a) protagonists "made up", which they did by shaking hands publicly and

- (b) the adm. would take steps to see that tractors were serviced adequately.

P.D. met with Council and Managers. Also met with Motor Pool workers. On April 29, these workers rejected Council mediation. Meaning: AP reports that majority of strike leaders were "no-no" boys. At that date didn't want strike settled; certainly wanted satisfaction of exacting concessions from Adm. May also have been element of distrust wider than "no-no" boys of what Council would do, resulting from Council role in registration.

Special staff meeting warning of April 29. While in session what Adm. called "demands" came from Motor Pool workers.

They were: (a) Apology from Robertson for harsh attitude the day before, especially, statement that if they wouldn't drive trucks, he would find someone else, outsiders if necessary, who would.

(b) Lane (head of Transp. and Supply) resign or at least give up Motor Pool supervision. (I do not know why antagonism fixed on him. A.P. foreman in fight exonerated by Motor Pool workers; they liked him. Felt the fight occurred because of adm. bungling which happened to produce a personal clash between an evacuee and an A.P., blame attached to neither. Lane probably "efficient." Also, a member of the A.P. high command. The strikers wanted to do something important; to hit where it hurt.)

(c) Todd refrain from going to Canal project and giving orders directly to Canal workers; should operate through supervisors and foremen. (The apparent irrelevance of this demand is significant. Relations in general were such that discontent of most any group might have been voiced by Motor Pool workers while they were presenting their own case.)

While the "demands" were under consideration by staff, some councilman came asking for document. Suggested that Motor

Pool workers might be prevailed on to modify "demands". Councilmen never contacted Motor Pool workers, simply edited document, putting it in more diplomatic language. Returned toned-down version $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours later.

Staff reply prepared. P.D. took leading role, vetoing many suggestions of the more "vigorous" members of his staff. P.D. then showed reply to Council. They urged that it not be sent till next morning because Motor Pool men were still too hot. P.D. was persuaded.

That night Council worked. Waiting for P.D. next morning When he arrived urged him not to send letter; predicted general strike if it were sent. Suggested that a committee from Motor Pool would be willing to meet with P.A.

Meeting held that morning, April 30. Agreement arrived at to submit matter to "outside" committee (1 regional, 1 Washington WRA man, 1 Army officer.) Committee to report not later than May 17. Trucks running within $\frac{1}{2}$ hour. Some AP's sore at P.D.'s weakness.

Two days later, May 2, evacuee foremen of canal workers reported that men would not go to work unless paid for time lost due to Motor Pool strike. Meeting submitted to same committee. Work proceeded. (PA report.)

May 5 evacuee warehouse foreman called A.P. foreman a bad name. Nothing more, but the situation there not good. (PA report)

Slow down in agric. reported by PA through May. Talk of strikes. Most evacuees refused to work on 5 a.m. shift which

had he instituted; A.P.'s took over shift (Opposition by some A.P.'s -- "Let 'em starve.")

The situation petered out into peace. The report of the Committee, which gave few concessions, no important ones, produced almost no response. Many A.P.'s and Mason Furiobiki surprised at this. In a sense evacuees were beaten again. By June 3, PA reported less talk of strikes among evacuees, but added that the situation was not really good. Analyst who came May 14, recorded great decline in public excitement between his arrival and early June.

(4) Views of segregation.

Administration was yearning deeply for segregation; impatient of delay. Anticipated that it would solve or ease most of their troubles. They would get rid of

- (a) disloyals
- (b) anti-adm. persons
- (c) agitation generally.

Confusion-- An agitator or spokesman for dissatisfied laborers was suspected of being disloyal and visa versa.

The "loyal" category mentioned above was equally anxious for segregation. It would take the heat of them, they thought.

A very few prospective segregees wanted segregation as soon as possible in order either to get to Japan or to get away from the namby-pamby fence-sitters at Ht. Mt.

Most people were not in a great hurry, but, since it was going to happen, it would be better to get it over with.

(5) The general nature of things. It was another unpleasant period for everybody. Slowly subsiding hostility. Sharper cleavages between Adm. and community and between certain segments within the community. Less sharp probably as feeling became less intense. Gradual acceptance of defeat by evacuees with an occasional stand; more retreating potshots. Another point should be added: The staff was sort of defeated too. May 6 (the date is not altogether certain) the PA wrote a potent and feeling letter, abysmal in its pessimism, expressing his conviction that it was impossible to operate the project under the conditions laid down by WRA. Only ray of hope he saw was that segregation and a place to which trouble-makers could be removed might make it possible to scrape along.

4. Life goes on--June--September, 1943.

(1) More aftermath--the hospital strike. Things quieted during May. As stated, the report of the Committee on the Motor Pool strike produced little response. Peace, maybe indifference, continued through June. Then, on June 24, the hospital workers walked out.

Staff-evacuee relations had never been very good. The chief nurse especially had always been under fire. Three had quit under pressure. In May there was considerable agitation among hospital workers, but it didn't go beyond words and petitions. The actual walk out seems to have been organized rapidly.

The Council Hospital Committee offered its services, even urged that its services be used, but the administration declined

Finally met anyway with a group of hospital workers in one of the block messhalls; report of committed labors sent to Washington.

Meanwhile the adm. handled strike in its own way. Strikers were discharged. Hearings held. Two men sent to Leupp. It was announced that strikers would be re-hired after interviews. Began to come back.

Community support of the strike seems to have been less wide than in the Motor Pool strike. This is curious in view of the fact that more people were involved in the hospital and the hospital loomed larger in the thinking of evacuees generally. Suggested interpretation: In April registration was nearer; public more excited and suggestible; state of feeling appropriate for any conflict incident to catch on. By June the situation was quieter; the sentiment in favor of peace and order stronger. Evacuees were settling down, having pretty much accepted their status with reference to the administration. They wanted no trouble. I suspect that the two who were sent to Leupp and some others who supported them had misjudged the popular temper. They may have thought the aftermath conditions of March and April were still present. In any case, the community didn't go along. It may be noted that the charter was in its final stages for submission to the people while the strike was in progress and that it was voted on and adopted very soon after.

(2) Organization proceeds--the charter.

In February Kimball came to Ht. Mt. with the Charter that

had been approved and sent in in January. He was prepared to point out in detail the quite numerous ways in which it was unacceptable. Before he saw anyone, he was instructed from Washington to soft pedal controversial issues and not push Charter because of effect it might have on registration. Met with Charter Commission prepared to carry out instruction. The evacuees jumped down his throat; brought up every angle of so-called self government; worked him and the subject over. Their general position was that they had drawn up a Charter; there was no self government if WRA could tell them how the Charter had to be.

Put on shelf until May. Instruction 34 revised. Soon Charter revision began, but not until some members of the Commission had resigned. Those that carried on argued over this point and that, but generally took the position: "Ok, WRA, tell us what kind of charter you will let us write and we'll write it."

May 13. Revised charter approved by Commission.

June 16. Charter returned from Washington approved. Slight changes of languages had been recommended by WRA and accepted by Commission.

June 25. Meeting to plan vote. Publicity material issued in succeeding days. Vote set for July 7.

July 3. Teletype from Director deleting one article except last sentence. This was Saturday. Advocates of charter were ready to sabotage it on this proof of its apparent meaninglessness. Cooled over Sunday. Went to work again to promote adoption of revised revised Charter.

Publicity angle: True Charter could be changed at will

of WRA; not really provide for self government. Better that way. WRA would have all the responsibility. But still a good idea to have a document which would set forth how things should be done under WRA.

July 14. Charter approved by voters.

New, official Council elected 2 weeks later. Care was the old temporary chairman, but quite a few changes. Two went out on seasonal; others stepped out because work of council less exciting than earlier or were pushed out as new men gained recognition in block and interest in politics. Also, of note, 5 out of the 20 councilmen were Nisei whereas all of the temporary councilmen had been Issei. Maybe by now things had quieted down, most of the bigger problems were settled; what community government could do had been reduced to such narrow limits so that Issei could trust Nisei.

(3) Readjustments and re-sorting. Theoretically, registration was to have sorted people into those who wanted to be moved out, with Japan as their ultimate destination, and those who wanted to remain, with relocation out into America as their destination. There were many changes of mind as the excitement of registration cooled, as the center settled down, as segregation was contemplated, and as WRA announced its plans and established procedures for re-shuffling. Two strong rumors affected decisions June-September: Selective service would be re-opened to unsegregated Nisei and after segregation the relocation centers would be forcibly closed.

(a) Relocation was one aspect of sorting. Nisei for the most part whose answers at registration permitted them to do so, were leaving. The community was

losing the following kinds of persons:

Nisei who had never accepted the center, had wanted to get out all along.

Nisei who had been "loyal" and co-operative during registration. Their behavior during registration called attention to them. Under pressure from those who had responded more negatively to evacuation and registration and those who were more "Japanese."

Nisei whose first reaction was that they would "rat it out" in the center for the duration who had calmed down.

Nisei who didn't like the drift of things after registration -- settling down under Issei dominance and acceptance of adm. control.

As the more-anxious-to-leave left, others somewhat like them grew restless. There was less of the "right kind" of company in the centers. Assimilated Nisei who had had a pretty good time earlier began to be bored. The center lost many of those who could communicate most easily with the hakujin and who earlier complained about things "Japanesy." The term was heard less; the remaining population proceeded with its growing Japanesy-ness with decreasing protest from within the community.

- (b) Leave Clearance hearings, and requests for repatriation during June and July great interest developed in procedures for changing the status acquired at registration. Some wanted to relocate or be free to do so later on; others wanted to go out on seasonal to earn so that life

would be more comfortable and secure for themselves or their families. Many manifested a sense of urgency to get out which became dissipated while they awaited hearing results.

In contrast, others sought segregation status by requesting repatriation. The chief motives were fear of the draft and forced relocation. Requests mounted all during July, even though it had been announced that such late requests would not be in the first segregation movement. Cancellations were also numerous as people changed their minds.

In reshuffling both ways, unity of the family was an important motive.

5. Segregation:

- (1) The decline of urgency. As indicated, during the spring the staff wanted segregation--and quickly. The "disloyal" they thought, were the cause of most of their troubles of all kinds. When they were out, maybe it would be possible to run the center. The very "loyal" minority felt about the same way. The people who stressed "order" anticipated that segregation would bring more peace, though it is doubtful they itched for it as the above groups did. Such people had some sound and quiet friends among the prospective segregees. A fair percentage of the prospective segregees were also anxious to be segregated because they wanted to be in line to go to Japan or because they desired to carry through the protest they had expressed in registration. When the P.D. returned

from Washington early in June with no plan for segregation, there was a community-wide sense of having been "let down".

During July and August segregation became viewed more and more calmly. Staff members realized they would lose good workers as well as trouble-makers. Maybe, too, the establishment of Luepp where troublemakers could be sent provided release for some of staff frustration. They continued to think segregation would be a good thing, but it wouldn't make as much difference as they had anticipated earlier.

The very "loyal" evacuees shared staff attitudes; perhaps desired segregation a bit more than staff did. They realized that large numbers of "disloyals" would remain and this partially spoiled the satisfaction they had hoped for. But still, even with its clumsiness and incompleteness, segregation would be a proper gesture. It would remove some of the people who had ridiculed and mocked the "loyals" since registration and would afford some release to the "loyals" aggressive impulses.

In the Buddhist Church there was split that segregation promised to resolve. Hence, it was awaited with considerable interest by some Buddhists.

In a few blocks, factions led by prospective segregees had opposed the councilman and his supporters and disturbed the tranquillity of the block. Here, too, segregation would do something the majority of the residents of such blocks would approve.

Throughout the community many individuals who were staying knew certain individuals they would be glad to see go. But it wasn't clear cut. Other annoying persons would be staying and some "good" people were going.

By July and August, memories of registration had faded. Life was becoming more orderly and more comfortable more secure--except for fears of the draft and forced relocation. There was no significant opposition to segregation; much indifference; some sentiment, rarely strong, in favor of it. To most people, the best "reason" for segregation was that some people wanted to go and should be allowed to. Besides the Gov't was going to do it.

(2) Preparations.

WRA tried to apply the lessons on registration. Much care with information and instructions. Evacuees brought in on the operation.

Evacuees responded well. Managers and council worked hard on details.

The community prepared in another way by the reshuffling mentioned above.

Many individual and block farewells. Some figuratively nose-thumbing from both sides.

- (3) The movement. There was considerable excitement, occasional confusion. Nothing beyond what most any movement of this magnitude would have engendered. Community-wide send-offs for each train. Staff a little shocked that departings "disloyals" should evoke so much parting sadness and so many sincere expressions of bon voyage

6. The incoming Tuleans.

(1) The exchange. Departing for segregation, 845; transfers from Tule, 1339. Gain in population, 496.

(2) Preparations.

Housing the main practical problem. Early overcrowding had been partly adjusted by relocation and redistribution. Now, it would be as bad as before or worse. More resistance to making room for Tuleans than to preparing for departure of segregationees. Resistance primarily individual and family -- not went to give up improved apartments or space. Some community protest through Managers and Council. Arrangements had to be pushed through by adm. with only occasional help from evacuee officials in persuading an obstinate person or family to move.

Integration of the newcomers into the community also recognized as problem by staff and community. In this, community participated wholeheartedly. CA, Managers, and Council planned reception -- Community-wide and by blocks.

(3) Arrival and settling.

The S. out band was out. Big WELCOME sign. Programs and parties.

In other aspects, reception not so well carried out. An effort to make proper preparation of good jobs available. But there was fudging. Tuleans had to take more than their share of less attractive work. Coal crew was short -- As always in Sept. and Oct. Tuleans filled it up.

but in general reception and integration ok. Soon settled with little differentiation

7. Summary:

Registration came when tensions were accumulating from several sources. Response was community-wide, deep, highly emotional, very vocal. Kept at the vocal level and registration was accomplished because the community already had a fair degree of organization and because the mechanisms of staff-evacuee communication and cooperation were sufficiently well established to function through the crisis.

The administration was shocked. Staff-evacuee cleavage widened. Each group understood and misunderstood the other better than before. (Maybe this doesn't make sense, but something like this happened.) Divisions within the community were sharper.

There followed a period of strain -- slowly dissipating.

Organization continued to develop, seemingly on a firmer basis. Evacuees knew and were accepting their status. Staff, key staff anyway, recognized its limitations more clearly.

These organizational developments were in the hands of a moderate majority that laid great emphasis on order within in the community and in relations with staff. The sorting process removed from Heart Mt. a part of the people who were not disposed to go along with this moderate majority. Segregation, along with a lot of ordinary persons, took out some who were not willing to cooperate with the adm. under the conditions the center set-up imposed. Non-cooperators and unusually assimilated persons relocated.

When segregation was over, the settling down process could go on more smoothly and completely -- disturbed only by the re-institution of Selective Service and by the insidious pull of relocation.

Mr. Embree (for your file)

COMPARISON REPORT ON MANZANAR AND HEART MT. DURING WEEK OF MARCH 18-25

Compiled by
Ray Hayashida

Project Rept. # 86 - May 12, 1943

The following report between Manzanar and Heart Mountain during the week of March 18th to the 28th is an approximate comparison of activities in the two camps.

	MANZANAR	HEART MT.
POPULATION	9,525	10,557
LEAVES ISSUED		
1. Short term leaves	5	13
2. Group employment	6	0
3. Indefinite leaves	25	60
4. Transfer to other centers	0	9
VITAL STATISTICS		
1. Deaths	2	0
2. Births	7	3
3. Marriages	5	0
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION		
1. Addition to personnel:		
1. Anderson, Jesse M.	Laborer	1. Gilmore, Claud Leave off.
2. Armstrong, Fred V.	Carpenter	2. Milhollin, William Sr. Clrk.
3. Carney, Lucille C.	Grad. Nurse	3. Saunders, Fred O. Sr. Store.
4. Evans, Jeanette	School teacher	
5. Goodman, Howard W.	Laborer	
6. Hines, Marie	School teacher	
7. Miller, Henry G.	Carpenter	
8. Thompson, Elmer A.	Carpenter	
9. Williams, Lillian	School teacher	
10. William, Moritzki	Carpenter	
11. Woods, Velma	School teacher	
2. Terminations		
1. Archuleta, Bennie	Laborer	
2. Hunault, Fred	Laborer	
3. Nicholson, Mandeline	Evacuee Escort	
4. Woods, Velma	Education Department	

MANZANAR

HEART MT.

3. Business conducted during week:

- a. Vouchers scheduled for payments
- b. Cash payments
- c. Purchases Orders issued
- d. Shoe Rationing tickets issued
- e. Carloads received at warehouses

- 1. 101 vouchers totaling \$32,699.65
- 2. 1,275 totaling \$33,561.50 (this includes clothing allowances)
- 3. 86 purchases orders totaling \$12,400.00
- 4. 706 tickets issued
- 5. Foodstuff 6 carloads
Supplies 15 carloads
Shipments 97 (tally ins)

- 1. 162 vouchers totaling \$151,435.00
- 2. 1,926 totaling \$15,423.80
- 3. 53 totaling \$33,001.78
- 4. 500 tickets issued
- 5. Foodstuff 2 carloads
Coal 12 carloads
Other supplies 5 carloads
Transport trucks 53
Shipments 200 (tally ins)

PROJECT ATTORNEY

- 1. Assisting Evacuees file their unemployment claims (865)
- 2. Prepared a letter to State Board of Equalization for refund of a penalty paid by the Manzanar Co-op because of the delinquent sales tax returns for 1942.

- 1. Action to initiate proceeding to clear up small estates left by residents who have died while in camp.
- 2. Procedure for procurement of cameras, radios, etc. for evacuees worked out in collaboration with Evacuee Property Office

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

1. Statistical resume:

- 1. Public meetings attendance in Manzanar for the period March 20 - 26 was 11,715. The affairs held were the School Pageant, Block Meetings, Outdoor Movies, and Church gatherings. Various socials and entertainments were given during the week.

- 1. A total of 86 activities was conducted by 211 assigned and 16,351 as spectators. 31 affairs were serviced by the maintenance dept. and 27 were serviced by the technical staff.

2. Judicial Commission

- 1. Two cases reported

- 1. Two cases.

MANZANAR

HEART MT.

3. Education

a. Educational activity

1. Educational Week was held in Manzanar from March 18 - 23

1. Vocational agriculture classes opened under registration for Rural Defense Training Classes.
2. An alternate plan for grade schools was completed and submitted to Mr. Gibson to be presented for consideration in Washington D. C.

4. Library

a. The library circulation record for this week shows:

1. Adult circulation 1,641
Juvenile circulation 1,697
Fines collected \$7.89

1. Adult circulation 599
Juvenile circulation 818
Fines collected \$2.28

ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT

Praise was given the athletic Dept. for directing a successful basketball season ending this week.

This department is handicapped by lack of an equipment hauling truck. Plans are being made for center-wide boxing and weight-lifting tournament.

HOSPITAL

1. Patients in hospital	105	
2. Patients discharged	44	
3. Hospitalization outside center	1	
4. Operations		
a. Major	1	
b. Minor	2	
5. Ambulance calls (per day)	7	
6. Clinic Laboratory		
a. This includes work done by the lab. on Urine analyses, Hemoglobin, Wassermans, etc.	557	

123
48
3
7
8
28
102

	MANZANAR	HEART MT.
7. Department of Dentistry	486	686
8. Department of Optometry		
a. This includes recommenda- tion of lenses, repairs, referment to doctors, etc.	42	131
9. Out Patient Department		
a. Total number of patients admitted	737	597
10. Pharmacy Department		
a. Total number of prescrip- tions filled	750	866
11. Sanitation Division Tests		
a. This includes water samples, inspection of Mess Halls, latrines, etc.	1	5

INTERNAL SECURITY

1. Fire Department	Routine duties were performed by the Fire Department Evacuees employed totals 43	No fires reported by the Fire Department Evacuees employed total 79
2. Police Department	No arrests reported by the Police Department Evacuees employed totals 48	Investigation of reports concerning gambling and stolen articles from the warehouses Posting of traffic signals Evacuees employed totals 92

SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT

1. Total grants recom- mended for payments during the week.	1. Grants approved 5 2. Grants rejected 2 3. Special grants paid \$511.87	1. Clothing grant \$8,683.45 2. Public assistance and special grant \$ 540.66
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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Hunt, Idaho

336

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mr. H. L. Stafford, Project Director
FROM: Elmer R. Smith, Community Analyst
SUBJECT: Special Reports Requested of Community Analyst
and Implications for All Staff Members
DATE: April 6, 1945

This memorandum is to inform you and your staff members of the expanded program requested of the Community Analyst to put into operation relative to the over-all picture of Center life. This expanded research program will be carried on for the next 5 or 6 months as part of a complete analysis survey desired by the Washington office.

To date there seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of some personnel members on the project as to the use of both public and so-called confidential material the analyst is called upon to request from the various divisions and sections. In order to have this position cleared up before any really embarrassing situations arise for all concerned, I am taking this opportunity to state the position of the analyst in dealing with records, interview materials, etc.

The WFA Manual (30.8.3; 30.8.4) presents the basic rules and regulations for the analyst and his relations with other staff units, but some explanations in terms of the new program are evidently needed. The analyst must operate, of course, within a system but at the same time he must study

that system, and it is here where misunderstanding seems to be centered. At this stage of the game and to follow out the research program herein suggested, it must not be lost sight of that the WHOLE COMMUNITY, which includes not only the resident community but the appointive staff as well, becomes grist for the mill of the analyst. It was stated at the Community Analyst conference held in Denver in September 1944 that "practically in field work....the social structure of the staff was just as interesting to us and of just as much concern as the social structure of the center." It was also emphasized that the "whole" needed "studying and the community reached all the way to Washington." (September 13, 1944).

The records and materials (as well as sources of information) are treated with the strictest confidence by the analyst, and they are not used for public distribution. They are used only for specific reports and background material for reports for the government office and are held in confidence for both administrative and research purposes. It is not the business of the analyst to make reports of confidential or semi-confidential matter public or even semi-public property. It is also important to realize that the names of persons involved in confidential matters are not used, but instead numbers or letters -- in alphabetical order -- are used, and the sources of information are kept in confidence. That is a basic professional rule found among research workers and analysts.

SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY AND REPORTS
TO BE MADE AT WINIDOKA
IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS

I. An analysis covering at least the following aspects of the information program:

- a. The extent of understanding and misunderstanding of basic policies and procedures;
- b. The origin of any misunderstanding;
- c. The role of block managers, Relocation Commissions, or other official bodies;
- d. Efforts and effectiveness of unofficial evacuee groups in pooling information about conditions outside the centers;
- e. The specific needs on the project in regard to types of information which are not being fulfilled at present.

II. Problems of Community Organization and how they were or were not solved at Winidoka from the start of the Project.


III. The TOTAL reaction to the WHOLE resettlement program.

IV. The sequence in changes of attitudes of evacuees during the life in the center and the factors (causes) of these changes.

V. The development of the community structure in the center and factors involved.

I trust this will clear up some of the misunderstanding some of my colleagues have of the work I am doing and avoid future misunderstanding. I will report to you from time to time on the progress of these studies.

Sincerely yours,


Elmer H. Smith
Community Analyst

Hent nut

John:

Thought you might like
to see how we keep posted
on the news, N
7/2/43.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

Excerpts from a letter from Bill Kosokawa, July 12, 1943

Learned today segregation is to start as of Sept. 1, to be concluded about Oct. 20. Segregation will be on the basis of expatriation and repatriates pluss the no-no boys, the latter to be given benefit of a hearing board. Move-ments such as in the days of transfer from WCCA to WRA centers will be instituted, and one center used as the segregation camp. Myer revealed this before Dies, and asked the press to keep it off the record. I think the legitimate news services did, but not so the Hearst press. Myer wanted to keep it quiet until all details had been worked out.

Unofficial reports: Tule Lake will be the segregation camp. Shirrell is supposed to have told a nisei secretary in his office from Tule to get her folks out quicklike. Also reports Tule had made no contracts after August, that the C. E. there is cutting down its stock, etc. All sounds logical, especially since the greatest number no-nos, and non-registered are supposed to be there, the camp is large enough to take 1700 (repatriates and no-nos total about 14,000) and opportunities for resettlement are scarcer on the coast than anywhere else. Cost estimated at a million dollars, mostly on transportation.

WACS to induct nisei shortly, according to Larry. A directive was to have been issued this week, but got held up on height qualifications. Planned to reduce the height requirement for nisei. There will be no segregation, and nisei will serve everywhere outside the evacuated zone. A maximum quota of 500 in the first group.

Larry also says unofficially the Dies guys found they caught a Tartar in the JACL and WRA, and were glad to drop the whole matter. Both Mike and Myer gave them hell. Larry says Myer investigated the Dies committee in a very fair manner, challenged every one of their wild statements, and kept punching with both fists all the way. Myer said the "the JACL has gained in stature as a result of the hearings."

(2)
Rec'd at A. P. M. - Mr. J. J. July 8th, 1943

Just got back from Topaz. Here is some inside stuff. The day before I got there the FBI picked up 12 kibel and shipped them off to Leep. I understand they were asked if they would engage in sabotage against the U. S. if they got a chance to do so, and apparently they said they would sabotage. The 12 were for the most part not well known, and included such unobtrusive guys as dishwashers. Many people seemed to think the wrong ones had been picked up, and that most of the 12 were harmless. There was some unrest.

One of the amazing things is that there are close to 200 evacuees from Hawaii here, almost all of them Hawaiian kibel, single men. They were shipped over here after anywhere from 3 to 9 months in an internment camp in Hawaii, behind electrified barbed wire. They have not been given a hearing, so I was told. They were about 90 per cent no-no in the registration, my informant said; and are bewildered about the whole thing. Those who were yes-yes on 27-28 are given same leave privileges as others, they told me. They came over in an Army transport under military guard. Some issei were with them, and they were confined to the hold of the ship, and permitted to come up for air about 10 minutes daily. The issei were run off to an internment camp on landing. The kibel came to Topaz. Most of the kibel were said to be quiet, docile and perhaps cowed by the whole thing, but some of the local agitators had gotten to them, kindled a dormant resentment and were opening the way for possible trouble.

Another thing, Caucasian staff quarters were completed recently. Until then the staff had lived in one of the regular blocks. The new quarters include about four units to a building. The buildings are painted, insulated against heat. Each unit consists of two bedrooms, sitting room, kitchen equipped with electric range and refrigerator, running hot and cold water, and bathroom with tub and flush toilet. Evacuee labor was used to help construct the quarters. Considerable resentment developed, especially since these homes were given priority over the high school which has just been started. The new houses have opened a breach between the evacuees and the residents, first because the quarters are more isolated than previous residences, and second the difference in standards of living and privileges are accentuated. I guess it isn't entirely the administration's fault as Delta, 16 miles away and the nearest town, is even smaller than Cody or Powell, and there is no other choice but to build residences on the project. Some of the ad staff I talked to felt very badly about the widening breach.

Also heard the administration is very touchy about the Wakasa case, which is the case about that old fellow being shot and killed by a sentry. The body was five feet inside the barbed wire. He was killed instantly by a single bullet through the heart. The spot where he was found was pointed out to me, and it seemed about 200 yards from the nearest sentry tower. The word is that the sentry was permitted to go scott free, something widely known around the camp but never officially confirmed or denied. The only thing

that was done was to move the sentries out to the border of the project area, and a promise that no soldiers who had seen service in the Pacific theatre would be assigned to guard duty. The sentry claims he shouted a warning, but the old man was partially deaf. Residents were understandably incensed by the incident, but there was no outbreak of trouble.

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This is an effort to provide the view of a man on the outside looking in upon the discussions of the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. It is volunteered solely with the object of clarifying the issues which are apparently involved, and the alternative solutions and their consequences.

John A. Rademaker

ANALYSIS OF THE WORK OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COMMITTEE TO JUNE 1, 1943

The Committee accomplished a great deal of constructive work, which might be summarized as follows: A comprehensive report by Mr. Moore was discussed point by point, differences of interpretation aired, definitions clarified, and certain principles discussed and agreed to. These principles are somewhat as follows:

1. There is a need to synthesize the available approaches and skills into a pattern of action which will deal with problems of juvenile anti-social behavior in the most constructive manner.

2. A Youth Committee, with authority for dealing with all juveniles who present behavior problems, and for dealing with all juveniles who are referred to it by any interested agency, and for establishing a program of prevention of delinquency, is the most promising pattern of action so far suggested. A part of this preventive program is the establishment of a dormitory under the supervision of skilled leadership, and the provision of leadership for the natural groups which have been organized among the juveniles of the Center.

3. The Committee was unable to agree upon the method of setting up such a youth Committee and adjourned for further consideration of the problem. One portion of the committee advised setting up the Youth Committee as a new agency, appointed by the Project Director and composed of appointed personnel to a preponderant degree--the personnel who have in the past disagreed most heartily being that most clearly indicated as necessary parts of a synthesizing program--Welfare, Schools, Health, and Internal Security, plus an evacuee representative from the Recreation Section.

Another substantial portion of the Committee maintained that the Youth Committee should not be set up arbitrarily by the Project Director, but that the existing community agencies for dealing with anti-social behavior be asked to participate in the setting up of the final machinery for dealing with juvenile anti-social behavior. Specifically, this portion of the committee felt that it would have an unnecessary adverse effect on the Judicial Commission to retract from it without its having been consulted certain authority which it was given by the Administrative Instructions 34, 84, and 85, the Charter, and Ordinance No. 1 of the Community Council under the Charter. It was urged that the proper procedure was to submit any recommendations for the Youth Committee or other synthesizing machinery to the Judicial Commission, which could then deligate some of its members or other qualified persons as a sub-committee of itself, to which it might refer juvenile cases, or to which juvenile cases might be referred informally and directly by any interested agency.

This was countered by the argument that such reference of the recommendations of this committee to the Judicial Commission would result in delay, in alteration or obstruction of a good plan, and would provide an opportunity for the Judicial Commission to pass the buck and avoid responsibility and thus break down law enforcement. At this point the session was adjourned.

There seems to be a basic issue involved which is obstructing the progress of the committee until it is understood and determined. The

following is an effort to set this issue out in the open and to state objectively the consequences of the alternatives in terms of the responsibility of the committee and of WRA.

Is our problem

this

To maintain law and order in the Center by fiat and force, creating any necessary machinery by executive order to secure the most efficient synthesis of administrative agencies practicable, to bring to bear all efforts and skills of various divisions and sections on the causes and cases of juvenile delinquency.

If it's this, then

the program set forth and approved, including the Youth Committee, should be issued as a directive by the Project Director.

Thus depriving by executive decree the Judicial Commission of its present authority over juvenile cases will weaken considerably both its status in the community (already none too strong) and its own feeling of responsibility for and interest in the enforcement of law and order in the community.

but

or this?

To maintain law and order in the Center through the understanding cooperation of residents who are trained in and habituated to participation in the democratic American way of life; to deal with problems of social control, especially juvenile delinquency, by retaining for the residents real responsibility while encouraging and enabling them to make use of the best practicable synthesis of all resources by helping them to set up machinery whereby they can call on skilled members of the community, both appointed and evicuee, to deal with problems requiring such skills.

if it's this, then

the present committee is not capable of doing the whole job, because it has not one representative of the community, whereas it should have a majority of such representatives. The recommendations of this committee, can be made a useful groundwork for a truly representative committee, since we have ironed out our most serious administrative difficulties. To keep the committee small enough to operate, some present members should be

replaced on the new committee by some of their skilled evacuee subordinates. The new committee, in which the Judicial Commission and Community Council should have representatives, should then consider this committee's recommendations, and undertake to sell its resulting recommendations to the responsible agencies, the Council and the Judicial Commission.

In consequence:

The regulations adopted will be followed whenever there is enough authority present and watching to make sure that they are obeyed--and seldom otherwise. Informal sit-down strikes by evacuee personnel may be anticipated as a natural part of the process of operation. It will be much more efficient to do away with evacuee representatives entirely. This process will expand, however, until cooperation on the part of any evacuee will be difficult to secure except in face-to-face situations where nominal consent will be given but real cooperation withheld. An excellent program for dealing with juvenile delinquency, such as is before us, can only settle our own tangles in administrative procedures and synthesize the differences in the viewpoint of appointed personnel which contribute to make cooperation difficult, by providing machinery to minimize such difficulties and to bring to bear a more adequate assortment of skills on each problem as it is met. It will do little in the field of prevention and may do much to increase present obstacles to prevention.

We may lose sometime, and have to proceed with a careful educational process involving the members of the Judicial Commission particularly, but will gain much in understanding, cooperation, and ease of operation of the program adopted. A mediocre program backed by public opinion produces much better results than a perfect program which has little public support. Furthermore, our evacuee committee members, and every other evacuee whom we contact in this way will be better able and much more willing to participate in his community's responsibilities once he has resettled. He will have had actual experience in working out a community problem in the democratic manner, with Caucasian as well as Japanese colleagues in the process. The problem of selling persons in authority the idea of the value of using technical skills for social problems is so typical in American communities that experience in this line, and convictions derived from the trial here, are highly valuable to the relocators.

The results are likely to be:

Immediate relief of administrative frictions, better cooperation, more effective use of available skills; growing and intensified "failure to cooperate" on the part of the evacuees; growing disillusionment in WRA's policy of "self-government," and growing unwillingness to get out into outside society, or to accept at face value WRA statements.

Less rapid action, but better training in how to act in the ways of democratic American government; less effective action immediately, but vastly greater possibilities of effective action in the long run; possible synthesis of skills and points of view held by the community as well as those of the administrative agencies; possible increase in effectiveness and decrease in obstructionism on the part of both evacuee and appointed personnel, through continued working together and heightened feeling of mutual reliance, responsibility, and trust.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

*Not for
Government.*

Extract from Tulean Nisei
letter at Heart Mountain
October 22, 1943

.....In comparison to Tule the block managers system is very inadequate and inefficient due to the fact that for every two blocks there is only one block manager. There is no direct contact between the block manager and the block people and we from Tule who had been so dependent upon the block manager for advice and counsel find ourselves quite lost as we do not know from whom to obtain information. Such being the case I went to the Administration and told them of the block managers inadequacy and they agreed with me.