

Wax, Rosalie (Hankay)

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March 14, 1944

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Tule Lake Fieldnotes

Rosalie Hankey Wax

MARCH 14, 1944

I arrived at Klamath Falls at 7:40 a.m. Mrs. Johnson, Dr. Robertson's secretary, who had come in to meet her mother, offered to drive me to the project. The mother was nervous over the prospect of taking up residence in a Japanese camp. She said she had been having nightmares for several nights - everywhere she looked in her dreams there were treacherous Japanese. Mrs. Johnson attempted to reassure and instruct her mother; by the time we reached camp the elderly lady was saying "Japanese" occasionally instead of "Jap". However, each time she hesitated over the longer word. Mrs. Johnson told me that I would still need an escort when I went into the "colony" - although this is no longer required for WRA personnel, male or female.

After getting my passes (this time no special pass was required to enter the colony) I waited some time to see Mr. Robertson. Best has been at Washington for some time and is expected back Saturday, the 18th. Meanwhile, Robertson was acting Project Director. Robertson was courteous, but explained that an escort for non-WRA persons was still required by the Army. Opler came into Robertson's office and again wanted to accompany me to see my informants. I refused. Opler told me that he and Spicer(1) - at Spicer's last visit - had entered the colony at night, unescorted, to pay calls. Suddenly jeeps converged upon them from all directions. According to Opler, the Army did not approve of such close "identification." This incident, Opler hinted, was at the bottom of his proposed transfer to Jerome. He now has an office "in the colony" in block 7, which, however, is not very far from the administrative quarters. Since the Army appears to disapprove strongly of Caucasians visiting the colony at night, I decided not to risk an "incident" and possible expulsion and confined my visits to the daylight hours.

When Opler left, Robertson gave me a paper which Kurihara had written for the study and had allowed him to read. He asked me to ask Kurihara if he might have a copy.

I asked Robertson what progress had been made in evacuee-Administrative relations. Not very much said he. Over 120 people are still in the stockade, which he thinks is 120 too many.

I inquired as to just what his conception of the status quo was. He said that he thought it was a gradual outgrowth of the passive resistance which began after the farm incident. He asked me if our study would let anyone see their material. I said no. He then asked if I would do one thing for him - try to find out what could possibly be done to improve relations, to mitigate the present hatred and suspicion. I promised to do what I could and added that in return, I would ask some questions of my own.

I checked with the Housing Division - there was no room for me. They told me that another temporary visitor like myself was going to Klamath Falls every night. Even some members of WRA personnel are still housed at Klamath Falls. This caused me some concern, since, anticipating that I might not be given a room, I had tried unsuccessfully to get hotel accommodations in Klamath Falls that morning. Luck favored me, however, for at lunch I sat at the same table with a woman who asked me if I were new. I told my story and she offered to let me stay in her room providing a cot were moved in. She is leaving the project Saturday because she doesn't get along and she is lonely. The reasons for her solitary state are apparent to anyone who stays with the lady - but anything can be endured for four days. Only the evenings are really painful for I must listen to long tales of assaults on her virtue by males of the administrative personnel.

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[1. Edward H. Spicer was community analyst at the Poston, Arizona, Relocation Center and later headed the Community Analysis Section of WRA in Washington.]



TALK WITH MRS. ODA [KURUSU]

I called on the Odas first to take them some Otsukemono (pickled vegetables) from the Kato's.(1) Mr. Oda was attending a block manager's meeting, but his wife, a much better informant than he, gave me all the help she could. I planned to call Friday afternoon when he will be home and no other visitors are expected. Mrs. Oda explained that what she could tell me was only "what she had heard," and she did not hear very much because they live away at the end of camp.

Coordinating Committee

There has been no change in the peoples' attitude toward the Coordinating Committee. To me they all think in the same way. But they don't do anything about it. I believe they're going to give them (the Coordinating Committee) a fair chance.

The curfew came and people went back to work very quietly. To tell the truth I believe they've changed somewhat; but they don't say anything aloud. So many have gone back to work anyhow.

There are still people in the stockade. Some fellows were taken from our block and haven't come back yet.

I don't know much about center happenings. When the block managers have a meeting, no member of the administrative staff ever comes. If a happy solution is to come, both sides have to come together. In Manzanar they tell me every week the project director or a staff member comes to speak to the block managers.

I believe the block managers are in a neutral position and they should be able to bring up block problems to the administrative staff.

Mrs. Oda now asked if she could ask me a question. She wanted to know why they have cut off one part of the camp with double fences. I explained that I had heard that this had been done so that if trouble threatened again the "good" might be separated from the "bad".

Daihyo Sha Kai

They came from the farm incident. They may have been started already before that. After the accident and before the funeral we were told to get a representative from each block. I don't know who was behind it. We voted for these representatives.

At that time the people wanted to get together and speak to the Project Director. I heard the Negotiating Committee was chosen from these representatives.

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[1. Mrs. Oda and Mrs. Kato were sisters. The Katos, who lived in the Gila Center, were my friends.]



Second Negotiating Committee (Mrs. Oda perhaps means Coordination Committee)

No one knows about them. That's altogether unknown. There really was no second negotiating committee. All the people said that their representatives were already chosen and were in the stockade. We had no election like that in our block.

I heard the boys were already working in the warehouse.

Manzanar People

There hasn't been any effect from the Manzanar people coming in. It seems the Administration are afraid of them. They had a riot over there, you know. They've gotten very good consideration if you ask me. I think Gila had the raw deal. We were the last in here and when it came to work, Gila didn't have any. Manzanar already got work before they came in. Gila is too quiet [submissive]. I understand there are quite a number of people still in Manzanar who are coming here.

The Manzanar people are really crowded. They get three beams(1) and two or three people are supposed to get in that. For a few months or so you can be crowded. But when you don't know when you're leaving, it's very hard. I think the Manzanar people are trying to get better rooms. They say more people are coming from Gila or Manzanar than from every other center. They can't crowd all those people into three blocks.

The camp is so big now that if they make it bigger we're going to have to have trolley cars, so we can get from place to place.

Everybody says Mr. Robertson is the only good one here.

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I now attempted to call on my friend Jim Takeuchi and my block manager's brother, Bill Nishino,(2) but found neither at home. Being near the address of one of the high school students whom some of the Gila teachers had asked me to visit, I decided to call on her. This young lady proved to be working in the office of the Coordinating Committee.

I went there; the same strained silence(3) on the part of the ten boys in the outer office greeted my appearance. I asked for the young lady and one of the boys went to get her. When she appeared we chatted for a few minutes, she regarding me meanwhile with a steady, amazed, awe-stricken stare. The young men in the room talked only in Japanese. I then asked the girl if she would ask May Iwohara to come out to see me. May came out immediately. She said Mr. Akitsuki would be very glad to see me and would like to talk to me, suggesting that she call me tomorrow at the administration building and let me know what time would be convenient.

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- [1. The size of "apartments" was measured by the number of crossbeams on the ceiling.]  
[2. At Gila I had been living in the "evacuee section". My block manager had asked me to call on his brother, Bill.]  
[3. As at my previous visit.]



The ten boys, sitting, standing and lounging in the outer office looked at me suspiciously. They said nothing, but were not rude. All conversation was in Japanese. (I had an interesting talk with some of these boys two days later.)

I called next on Mr. Iwata whose brother had sent him a message (and some money) from Gila. He was rather ill at ease, but made the following remark:

I don't know personally. There is lots of personal feeling among the Japanese. As far as the management of the Tule Lake Camp - all right. But a few among these people; they don't understand each other. They don't try to understand the other persons' point of view. If all the people concerned try to give in a little, I don't know; but I think things would be better.

I next called on another relative of a Gilan friend, Komura. The gentleman was not at home, but his family, a wife and several female relatives received me most cordially. Being women, they said, they keep out of politics; but they were very curious as to what was going on in Gila. Wherever I have visited so far I observe great glee over the transfer of Pedicord. Sleath's good name has preceded him. One of Komura's aunts rushed out and bought a dozen shell ornaments.<sup>(1)</sup> These were intended for people in Gila. I was given first choice and then the names of recipients were carefully written down. The ornaments were wrapped carefully in kleenex and placed in the sections of an egg box.

While we sat chatting a messenger came to the door with a telegram from Crystal City, telling of the death of a male member of the family. The older women received the news calmly; one did not understand. When Komura's wife translated the telegram. The older woman turned to the messenger, bowed and said, "Arigato gozaimasu," (thank you). I offered my services and was asked to find where they would have to go to telegram. I did this.

#### TALK WITH JIM TAKEUCHI'S BROTHER

When I called at the Takeuchis' quarters, his wife told me that he was working at the mess, "as he has always wanted to do." The family suggested I return in the evening or on Saturday or Sunday. I decided on Saturday. I met Jim's younger brother for the first time. He is just as fluent a talker as Jim. While we discussed developments in Gila the following statements were made by Jim's brother:

#### Dr. Pedicord

Even the way he talks, curls his lips, I don't like. It's like he was snarling at you. He's sure going to get his bald head sunburnt in Gila.

I shifted the subject to what possible hope there was for bettering the conditions at Tule.

I don't see a single thing that could be done. The peoples' confidence is gone. You get one guy like that in WRA. It doesn't make people hate just him; it's a reflection on all WRA. (Referring to Best) The guys from Leuppe liked

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[1. Many of the unemployed and unoccupied residents of the Tule Lake Center made beautiful shell ornaments from tiny shells picked out of the earth, tiny safety pins, and glue.]



(The following is verbatim.)

Best. They said he was understanding and would make a good Project Director. They said he was Best, the best. Now they say, "Best, my foot!"

### Daihyo Sha Kai

At first there was a group that went up to see Mr. Best. They were refused; the Army told them they weren't representatives.

### Public Funeral

That was the Kibei and the Hawaiian boys. I don't think that was the Representative Committee. They didn't go just to ask to be allowed to use the auditorium. They just demanded and rubbed Best the wrong way.

### Representatives

The representatives were elected for the block at the beginning of the year. They met together and talked things over. They went up to try to negotiate with the Army. But the Army wouldn't recognize them as block representatives. So the representatives made up a petition and had all of the people in the blocks, all 18 of them, to state that he was a real block representative. This was done after November 1.

Then they took the petition with all the names signed. Then they went to talk to Austin.(1) But they didn't get any place. Some guys went and hollered louder. They got picked up. The loudest ones just got yanked, that's all.

After November 4 - that's when all the people started hollering about the Daihyo Sha and block representatives, etc. The funny part of it is, in January, right after New Year, they're going to elect new representatives. They had about six or seven nominees. Finally one was elected; he absolutely refused to be a representative in this block. He's really a stubborn man. Here it is March and he hasn't represented anything yet.

### The Coordinating Committee

That bunch is a bunch of inus, and Akituski is the biggest inu of them all. He'll probably get his brains beat out one of these days. That Coordinating Committee - I don't know who elected them or not. Akitsuki - people around here know about him. He used to head the Coop during the trouble. WRA took rice here - prior to the search Akitsuki and the big shots got together and sold the WRA rice in the canteen to the people. They did this with rice and oranges. The money they got from that they divided among themselves.

They send out pamphlets. It's just a lot of bolony.

I know of a group that has been trying to get a lawyer or a bookkeeper to audit the Co-op books and investigate into it. We know graft like that is going on. Akitsuki probably got word of it. It was getting hot under the seat, so he quit the Co-op now.

[1. Lieutenant Colonel Austin, Commanding Officer of the Army unit at Tule Lake.]



Possible Effect Of Another Election:

I don't think an election would do any good anyhow. What do we want representatives for? They don't do any good. Let us roam around here and feed us three times a day. We'll wait until the war lasts. Nobody likes trouble. If they'll treat us like human beings and not like dogs, nobody starts kicking.

If they had had enough brains to kick aside the unreasonable requests and settle the reasonable ones, everybody would have been satisfied.

Manzanar

(Gives me paper by Akitsuki)

That's about Manzanar. That's the kind of thing an inu would write. That's really soft-soaping the people.

Jim's Wife: When Manzanar came in, gee, they were treated good.

Jim's brother's wife: They got everything!

Jim's wife: My sister tells me, 'Gosh, they got treated so good they thought something was fishy.'

Jim's brother: That paper ought to be signed, "Inu Akitsuki."(1)

WELCOME MANZANITES!!

You have come here by your own choice to join us. We welcome you as one of our own. We are indeed grateful and happy to receive you. We fully realize that you have gone through many a heart-breaking tails since evacuation of three years ago.

Man is a curious animal, isn't he? He seems to give forth his finest product only when crushed. He loathes poverty, fights diseases, and avoids wounds, tyranny, and oppression. Yet somehow only when these come, do the rarest flowers appear on the human bush.

This world we live in is formed in a laying-up plan. All of us lay up something. It is a great idea to ask oneself, considering any act we are about to perform, not only what will be the immediate pleasure in it, but what sort of product we are laying up for ourselves by it. We are always coming into our inheritance from the past deeds, in making up our minds it is well to take into consideration what happiness dividend that transaction is going to bring us 10 years -20 years from now.

In order to make success of this Center life we have to keep in mind two things namely: precedent and future - because success implies not only sound reasoning, but also variable factor of how a thing will work, which is found out only by trying it. Hence the surest road

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[1. See Fieldnotes for March 1, 1945, in which I am told that Jim's brother had renounced his citizenship.]



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to success is to use mixture of precedent and initiative. Just how much of each you will require is matter for your judgment. To go entirely by precedent you become moss-back. Each succeeding generation acts the same way. There is a level of efficiency but no progress. Precedent, however, tends to carry forward the ignorance and injustice of the past. Precedent is the root, independent thinking is the branch of the human tree. Our decision must conform to the sum of human experience. Yet, there must be also the fresh green leaf of present intelligence. In other words our reverence for the past must be continually qualified for the reverence for the future.

None of us know how long will our stay in Tule Lake be. All Tuleans have been trying to make it a better place to live under the circumstance. Yet they have no other desire than to live in peace and happiness for the duration. Our ideal is Utopia. Ideal of Utopia may not be attained, however, we must strive to attain that goal as much as we can for ideal is like a North Star. Sailor never reaches North Star, yet without North Star he cannot come to the port.

We appeal to you, MANZANITES!! Now you are in the same boat with us. Let's make the best of it and lay up for the future happiness.

Byron Akitsuki, Executive  
Secretary of Co-ordinating  
Committee

ENCOUNTERS WITH STAFF MEMBERS

Late in the evening, while I listened to a detailed description of the moral and intellectual failings of the male members of the appointed staff, my room mate confessed that she too, had always wished to go to University "and make something of herself." She would have liked very much to go in and look around the colony, but "that was not considered the thing to do here."

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At breakfast, I sat with some friendly teachers who were discussing their classes. I remarked to one young teacher of American History that I did not envy her job. She said it was not so bad. She just let the kids talk and say what they please. She made no attempt to justify what the kids had been put through.

How could I justify evacuation?, said she.

A debate on the draft was scheduled. She invited me to attend.

Walking back to our barracks, the conversation turned to the search which the Army had made in November. Another teacher remarked that only certain teachers "who were known for their attitude" were asked to come to the meeting.

They picked them well. Mr. Harkness (the principal?) took the attitude that you couldn't go against the Army. There was much discussion among the teachers, but no one put it to the test.(1)

During my three day stay I have found at least a half dozen staff members who are surreptitiously sympathetic to the evacuees. My neighbor, the laboratory technician, is secretive about her sympathetic attitude. Says she,

If they find out how you feel, they'll start the war of nerves and torture you till you quit.

She is a Jewess.

Made my first morning call on Bill Nishino, my block manager's brother. He was in a most informative mood and talked unceasingly while stuffing me with cake and cookies.

STATEMENT OF BILL NISHINO [HIGASHI]

When a man marries into a family where there are all daughters, and marries the eldest daughter, there is an understanding. I'm being adopted. I'm responsible for my sisters-in-law as if I were their brother. This is usually done where there is a mutual understanding between folks. You see, my mother and my mother-in-law are cousins. (They are parrallel cousins, daughters of two sisters.)

This might happen too where a family get to be good friends. They may not be related, but one family has all girls and the other all boys. Here I'm Nishino. But in Japan, in the statistics, my name will go down as her name.

Events of Last Month

Since you left, quite a few people have been willing to go back to work. As far as work is concerned, status quo is

[1. Evidently some of the teachers did assist the Army in searching for the hiding leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai.]



(The following is verbatim.)

cracking. But some minority groups are much stronger.

Those fellows in the stockade -everybody signed their names after November 4, saying these people are the true representatives. As more and more say in here, we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it isn't right to give in. The minority group for status quo says, "If you let people out of the stockade, everything will be all right."

In our block we had a meeting for mutual understanding among the block people not to say anything for or against the status quo. I told them, 'It's no use talking about status quo and bring disharmony.' We had an inspiring talk by Reverend Inouye. We all realize the fact there's no sense bearing a grudge against each other. But there are a few agitators still existing. But they won't talk out in public.

The majority of the people are against status quo but in their heart they don't like to see people in the stockade.

They haven't gained much confidence in Akitsuki. They don't thank them (the Coordinating Committee) for anything. I'd still like to know how they got in there. I went back to the paper which said, "The Army and WRA will recognize the Coordinating Committee."

The Negotiating Committee did not print much. There were meetings between the Negotiating Committee and the Block Managers. The Block Representatives would come back to the block and state that the young fellows -those in their teens and twenties too - were too hot tempered and they would like them to be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back to the block (ours is still in the stockade) and said for the young people not to take matters into their own hands. This was right after the farm accident in October.

This was what I've heard. After the Negotiating Committee - a certain man, let's call him X, (1) wrote out a petition in English, stating that these nine people were not legally elected. He sent this to blocks 16 and 17 and said to please sign this paper. He was turned down very harshly. The the Planning Board (the body of representatives) posted a bulletin saying, Mr. X is an inu. If you work for the project here, you'd find he's the key man. He's standing pretty high now, and has the confidence of the Administration now.

X did this because he is jealous. They didn't recognize him. He's a graduate of a political school in Japan. He wanted to be a member of the nine.

If these nine came out (out of stockade) I think all this status quo will just vanish into the air. If all the 125 come out the status quo will forget everything.

Yamatani is the buyer of the fish market for the Co-op. Way back when I was a kid in Terminal Island we had a Japanese Cooperative Fish Cannery. He was a member of this cannery, a share holder. He broke it up into bankruptcy. Then he came back to Santa Maria Valley - he and Miyake and Kono. They had a farm together and filed bankruptcy again. A guy like that shouldn't be a buyer for a fish market or anything.

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[1. Later, someone told me this was Mr. Takahashi.]



(The following is verbatim.)

The Daihyo-Sha Kai were all elected after the segregees came in. They were elected after the farm accident. The Daihyo Sha, the same group, but temporary, went to ask for the funeral. The nine were elected later. November 1, Myer states, providing you people will get a committee to talk things over with the administration, we are willing to negotiate with you. Then they elected the nine.

The Negotiating Committee stating that all the Administrative Staff withdraw - that's fantastic in my personal opinion. If I was running one of the Japanese camps and the prisoner of war tell me to resign, I don't think the Japanese government would stand for it.

#### Manzanar

They're all glad they're here - but we don't like the things the Administration do for them. We've been here six months. We haven't received broom, mops, or soap. Manzanar came February; all received a new mop, broom, a cake of soap each person. What's the difference between these fellows and us?

Regardless of that they're (Manzanar) still griping out there now. Jobs are scarce; very few people are working. They say food in this center is worse than it was in Manzanar. They say the Project Director in Manzanar was considered one of the top. There is no comparison with Best.

The way they (the Administration) handles you, it makes you do it. Now these closets - if you give me a closet I wouldn't want to go around stealing. But I need one, so I have to steal. The Manzanar people, they had closets, so they don't have to steal. They (the Administration) gave them wood and didn't give us any! I got a sled and tore over, and I had to work fast to get this amount. (Here Mr. Nishino pointed to a pile of wood in the corner, about two feet high, five feet long and three, wide.)

#### Keadle (a staff member at Gila)

You know when Keadle used to get letters from Washington, we'd come in there and find him reading them with a dictionary.

When I came in here I got a job. I didn't feel bad at all. People who didn't get jobs felt awfully bad.

#### Second Negotiating Committee

Some of the fellows put in the stockade received rough treatment. So they said, 'We're going on a hunger strike.' That was January 1 or December 31. That leaked out. So the fellows still standing for status quo came around to each block in the morning and said, we are going on a hunger strike. But at that time most of the block representatives had not been pulled in. They had a meeting and came back to each block and said, 'None of this is official.' So the hunger strike did not go into practice in the colony.



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(The following is verbatim.)

### Spanish Consul

The Spanish Consul said, I can't do anything except to report to the Japanese Government how things stand. He said, 'I'm here for the benefit of the Issei, the natives of Japan.' He was here in November -late November. The representative from the State Department who was here at that time, advised putting up the Issei representatives.

There has been no attempt to get new representatives for the people. That shows quite a majority of people are backing the status quo.

### Seinen Kai

At that time there was no Seinen Kai as there is at present. At that time there were two or three seinen here - youth clubs.

They have a 650 membership at present. At Gila the Seinen Kai was appealed to at registration. At present, the Seinen Kai had a grand opening last Sunday on the open stage. Things which we like to do for the center people is to keep peace and harmony and give entertainment. They are entirely different from the Negotiating Committee.

As long as they give us proper food and decent living, I won't squawk. Why don't we get fresh vegetables? If the canteen can sell fresh vegetables why can't the Army or WRA get them for us? Here is the mess hall you look at the menu and it says chicken. They give us salt pork or corned beef. The system of the mess operations isn't too good. When they have certain things on the menu, they should at least send a correction memorandum to each mess saying they will send something in exchange. Now they say they're having roast pork, and macaroni will come in. In 54 we have a wonderful cook. We do have roast beef today (on the menu). That's wasting beef. He'll use a little for us and save the rest for hash. Otherwise we might have just potatoes, macaroni and starch that day, but he'll give us hash. All praise him.

We never get fresh vegetables. A week and a half ago they started coming in, but they didn't have any for 1 1/2 or 2 months. All we had was potatoes or beets. We're getting some lettuce now. Why couldn't we get it when the canteen was selling it?

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KURIHARA

I found Kurihara cordial and courteous as before. I had read his article and was able to comment intelligently upon it. He said he had sent his first article (which we have) to the Saturday Evening Post and to Collier's, but they had refused to publish it. He said he could understand their feelings, since this is a time of war. He expressed himself as willing to answer any questions I asked.

I asked if the inu he had remarked upon in his paper were as serious a danger as his statements implied:

The Administration absolutely ought to refuse to listen to them. Any person accused by any so-called inu, if a trial is held and inu presents the case before them all and shows the person was guilty, then I think it would help to discourage the inu. I believe the inu are working here with the Administration to a great extent.

It is known throughout the camp that the inu gave away the Negotiating Committee (of the Daihyo Sha Kai). They sell their soul for a few pennies. They make my blood boil.

The majority of the inu are now considered persons of low character. On the other hand, we have a lot of loyal people here. Probably they are here for the Administration to make use of them. The Administration didn't have a place to send them till there was room in the other camps. At present there are 400 old Tulean loyal families here. That probably means about 16 hundred people.(1)

In every case the Negotiating Committee who were elected even by a few hundred people must be considered the legitimate representatives of the people. When I acted as one of the members of the Negotiating Committee in the Manzanar incident, we were selected by the kitchen workers. They recognized us as their representatives. There were quite a number of block leaders attending the meeting. They also agreed to recognize us as the Negotiating Committee. We negotiated with Mr. Merritt. He agreed. But when things went wrong and the shooting occurred, they (the Administration) said the first Negotiating Committee was not the representatives of the people. If we weren't, why did they negotiate with us?

The Coordinating Committee

Among those seven are several people whose record is so black that I even flatly refuse to talk to them. My profession is a public accountant. I nearly sent him (Yamatani) to jail for defrauding the company of \$40,000. They have to use force if they want to stay in their positions. There are others too.

[1. (Later, the Relocation Planning Division of WRA estimated the number of "loyal" Tuleans at 1,100. See Thomas and Nishimoto (1946:104, 104n.))]



(The following is verbatim.)

The Administration doesn't know their past. If they find out, they should be dismissed.

The Administration is making use of the people in the Co-op. They are very much hand in hand with the Administration now.

Right now the Co-op is in a sad spot in this camp. The Co-op is charging an exceedingly high price. It isn't necessary for them to charge such high prices. Prices in some cases are so high it seems ridiculous. They have a mop - worth 15 cents, even today it could not be worth more than 25 cents at Woolworths. They are charging 55 cents. For an aluminum teapot which used to cost 25 cents and is probably worth 50 cents now, they are charging \$1.25.

Fish - the market price at that time (pre-evacuation) was 19 cents a pound; they are selling it at 65 cents a pound. They are simply robbing the Japanese here. The prices of things are so high and the cost of operations is so cheap; rent is cheap, they have such quantity, they pay such little salaries; there is no reason prices should be so high.

Before the war, shoyu (soy sauce) imported from Japan used to cost \$1.75 cents a gallon. Here for ordinary shoyu they charge \$2.15 o \$2.85 cents a gallon.

#### Arrival of People From Leupp

We arrived here December 6. We were to be transferred in October. They had trouble here and they kept us in Leupp till further notice. We left there December 2 and got here December 6. We were put in the stockade and released the 9th. The trouble was here way before.

They connected me with the start of the trouble (strike of October and November 1943) here while I was in Leupp. It was in the San Francisco Chronicle. I wanted to know the facts. Best, Robertson, Colonel Meek and Austin were there. I said if I were the instigator of the trouble here while I was in Leupp, I should be a general.

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(At this point one of Kurihara's room-mates came in. I explained my presence and he joined the conversation. Evidently the fact that Kurihara trusted me was sufficient for him.)(1)

#### Kurihara's Friend

At Moab, before we went to Leupp, Best never talked to us for a week. When he did see us he always had a soldier with a Tommy gun at his side.

#### Public Meetings

There are no public meetings allowed here now. But in Manzanar it was forbidden to hold public meetings in Japanese. When Mr. Best was in Leupp I suggested that if he permit the Japanese to hold an open forum and give them a chance to express their thoughts it would help. He said, 'I'm going to do everything they want.' But he changed his mind.

#### Theft of Rice

If we Japanese see a man commit a crime, we like to see him punished. These people who stole the rice deserve to get the full penalty.

(Kurihara agreed that public sentiment would have supported severe punishment of the boys who attacked Dr. Pedicord. Other evacuees have concurred in this opinion.)

#### Mr. Best

The first fault with Mr. Best is that he yesses too quick. I found that out in all my conversations with him. Before I complete my conversation, he says 'Yes, I know; Yes, I know.' I'd like to know what he knows because I haven't completed the sentence.

And a man thinks he has made a promise. Two weeks will pass and he doesn't do anything. Two weeks later you go back and he Yesses you again. Unless people have eyes to see and observe him properly, they will always take it for granted that he made the promises. I noticed that in Moab and in Leupp.

Kurihara added that he had written a page on Mr. Best which he intended to insert in the paper he had written for us. But he had thought better of it and had removed it. I did not think it wise to urge him to give it to me at this time.

[1. (I was surprised because usually, when I was talking with Japanese Americans I knew, an unexpected visitor would either leave or would say little or nothing.)]



TALK WITH GEORGE YAMASHINO

I called next on Mr. Yamashino, who I had already been told had been elected president of the Tule Lake combined Seinen Kai (Youth Organization). He was not at home when I called but his wife received me most cordially. She offered to get him if I had time to wait. I told her I would be glad to wait. When he appeared I asked him about the Seinen Kai.

I came to this camp December 10. This organization intended to organize around November. There were about 52 delegates from every center - two to five from each. They tried to organize but the November 1 incident made it impossible. The Seinen Kai couldn't be born at that time: (1) because of this incident and (2) because of the people in the Negotiating Committee wanted the backing of the Seinen Kai.

I talked to Robertson and Best. They told me to do something about it. I tried to form it. I called it around early February. I put a note in the newspaper and tried to get people to Mess 46. About 76 seinen (young men) got together and we discussed. At the same time the Gila Young Peoples Association combined with the Tule Lake Young Peoples Association. The Gila Young Peoples Association and the Seinen Kai are the same. Seinen Kai means youth organization. Four or five other organizations combined at the same time. Then we made a Constitution and had a membership drive at the same time.

Now the cabinet of this organization, if they consider me as a Leupp representative - it's more like a combined seven center Young People's Association. Minidoka and Granada have not combined yet. They are a very small group in this center.

We are a pure non-political organization. We'd like to cooperate with the Administration and have a better community here.

I don't think the people in the stockade will ever be released.

This Seinen Kai, if we do good to the WRA, people will think we're inu; if we don't we get stuck in the stockade.

Nothing could be done to help this condition. My idea would be to form the Community Council here - but we have no power. If a general election were held in this camp, who's going to be a candidate? I won't. We wouldn't have any power.

I think if they give a few things to the people; 'If you pet them, they come to you. If you hit them they despise you.'

I was working in CAS (Community Activities Section) up to February 15. I suggested that they let the people know how WRA thinks. I say, 'What's the use?' I'm fighting for the people; but no use. I resign.



The Block Managers were appointed by the Project Director. A general election in six months would be a good idea. The supervisors and the block managers get together and keep food. By election would only get six months.(1) If they don't do it right, they could not be elected again.

Some Block Managers think the status quo is necessary. They pull people their way, so the election goes their way.

I know the Coordinating Committee works hard. I respect them. But I think status quo against anti-status quo will be a big trouble in the future too.

If the Seinen Kai organizes, the CAS will be dead. Maybe WRA doesn't like it. If they had a better head, I'd work for the CAS.

All the wiser people stay back. If, as supervisor of the CAS, if something happened, I'm going to be the first one to get a two-by-four.

[The Community Activities Section was responsible for promoting the camp's recreational activities. Had Mr. Yamashino worked in the section he could have been very helpful. But he and Mr. Huycke, the head of CAS could not get along. Mr. Yamashino was extremely competent and accomplished a great deal. It is noteworthy that at the end of his statement he hints that even in this period of "normalcy" any Japanese American working for the administration could be called an inu and "get a two-by-four" on the head.]

While driving back from the colony I noticed some evacuees building barracks near the stockade. They appeared to be guarded by armed soldiers. I asked my Internal Security escort if they were stockade men. He said no, they were ordinary workers, but they were watched by the armed guard so that they could not communicate with the men inside the stockade.

Late that evening I joined three staff members in conversation. The subject turned to the account in the San Francisco Chronicle dealing with the sentencing of a Tule Lake evacuee (or evacuees?) for operating a still to make sake. One of the women, employed in the warehouse, said that she thought it was a shame. In her opinion, the still operator had been encouraged by Caucasians to make and sell the liquor. She had seen the staff members in the warehouse with jugs of sake which they had obtained from evacuees.

[1. I think Mr. Yamashino meant that the persons elected should have only six months in office.]



MARCH 16, 1944DISCUSSION WITH OFFICERS OF THE CO-OP, MR. YOSHIMURA, IKEMOTO AND IWAMOTO

I asked Mr. Yoshimura if there were any written record of the demands the Negotiating Committee had made of the Co-op [on December 6, 1943]. Said he:

(The following is verbatim.)

They did not present it written. It was all oral. I can't still see why they tried to destroy everything like that. To me, what they did was not constructive, just destructive.

The Stockade

I can only tell you my personal opinion. I suppose some of the fellows in the stockade should be left out. A good many didn't mean anything -not knowing what the consequence was to be. The real agitators -the leaders were nothing but agitators. They should be kept there their whole life as far as I'm concerned. They will only object to anything again. They just want to start trouble.

Ikemoto: (Another Co-op official, a young Nisei) They're chronic agitators.

Yoshimura: They (the Administration) tried to do everything for Manzanar. When we came in here we were treated like criminals. We were treated dirty. When Manzanar came in they were treated as prince. Even their stoves were started already. They had showers and everything.

Iwamoto: But don't you think WRA can't do anything if they want to do it!

Yoshimura: When the representative committee came in to talk about the demands (there were 5 of them) it was more of their attitude than their demands that made us feel bad. Right then I think I'm sympathizing with the Administration. Their attitude was not at all conciliatory. I think they were inexperienced in negotiating. They were running away from their objective; demanding and making it impossible to grant.

When the people came November 1, they came with threats. The people came en masse.

Iwamoto: There is one interesting fact: that time once or twice the Co-op went to the Headquarters of the Negotiating Committee and asked permission to open a store. So you could guess how the situation was at that time.

Yoshimura: We didn't want to have any friction to this.

Iwamoto: They gave us a written order that time.

Yoshimura: They didn't have any right to order. They were supported by everybody. Really, I don't think they were working for improvement in the center.

There is a lot of underground work being done by the supporters of the Negotiating Committee. We found a pamphlet distributed among the newcomers from Manzanar telling them the Negotiating Committee were the real fellows and the others (Coordinating Committee) were just ambitious fellows trying to do something for themselves.



(The following is verbatim.)

WRA tried to help the Coordinating Committee; but they're slow. When the Army works it works fast.

An important fault of the Japanese people here - they don't pay too much attention whom they elect to certain offices. When you have a meeting, somebody that has not a speck of brains comes out and talk, talk, talk - he get's it (the position). In one of the Co-op offices - I don't see why that man was elected.

I find out that the more responsibility a person has, the less he can talk interestingly to the crowd. You can watch crowd psychology when you have no responsibility. In this center when you talk before a big crowd, intelligence has nothing to do with it. If you make a sensible speech, everybody calls you inu.

Iwamoto: The mixture of No-Nos and Loyals in here is one of the main causes for trouble. This policy of the WRA has trouble from the beginning. The loyal people are troublesome. Their mistake is not being set. They look both ways.

Ikemoto: I think they just think they are not one of us.

Iwamoto: We don't speak the same language.

Yoshimura: There are quite a few of the original Tuleans that are still here - six or seven thousands. We call them weather-watchers.

I think the present Tule Lake trouble was caused by bad advice taken by WRA. You can blame the status quo party people.

Iwamoto: Don't you think WRA would like to have more loyal people than disloyal?

Yoshimura: Here is one thing I wish you would try to find out for me: Why did the Spanish Consul say the Nisei need not serve. It seems to me that a man in the diplomatic office ought not say such a thing unless it were true. Will you find out for me?

Iwamoto: When I speak of this loyal group I hesitate to express my free opinion. Don't you think the policy of WRA wants people to say Yes-Yes so they can fill the fighting until then they can put them all in the front line and wipe all the Nisei out of America. What do you think?

(I said that I did not believe the Army and WRA's intention was quite so fiendish as that.)

Some people say Yes-Yes and then asked for repatriation. If I was in that division (WRA) I should say, he must say No-No before he can repatriate.

In Gila, Captain Thomas put a statement in the paper that if you didn't answer 'Yes', you could get 17 years in jail and a \$10,000.00 fine. I went to Mr. Terry. I represented ten people. I talked to Mr. Terry and said, 'Will we really go to jail for 17 years?' He said, 'If you think that Japan will win the war, you can place your loyalty to Japan and No-No.' He said, 'If you say No-No you don't have to go to jail.' He said it very clearly: 'You sign No - you will be segregated in six months according to Senate legislation. According to the federal law, regulation of justice, there is no law saying you will be fined 10,000 dollars or sent 20 years in jail.'



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Rosalie Hankey Wax

I told my friends. They decided right way. When segregation start as Mr. Terry predicted, I am really surprised. I really respect him for being frank with me like that.

TALK WITH BYRON AKITSUKI AND MAY IWOHARA

I went to this interview with Mr. Akitsuki with a great many questions. Since, however, he and May talked to me in his office with several other people within easy hearing distance, I did not feel free to ask most of them. I therefore settled for a conversation on general developments or the lack of developments and a few pertinent questions. Perhaps I am becoming altogether too suspicious and Japanesey, but I felt very ill at ease. The tension in the office is great.

Mr. Akitsuki

Some of the leaders have been released. They released 200 up to the 16 of March. There are still about 130 inside. Some of those released have given us their backing.

I asked whether the interviews with detained stockade internees had been held in Japanese and if any Caucasian had been present. Akitsuki said they had been held in Japanese and that no Caucasian had been present. Only the soldier who had brought the men over, and he had stayed outside.

I brought up the subject of the apparent disharmony between the Advisory Committee (of the WRA) and the Coordinating Committee. I said that I had the feeling that Mr. Huycke's (Head of CAS) actions were not altogether above board. Akitsuki smiled meaningfully and looked at May. He said,

Perhaps I better not say anything.

Then, from a drawer he took a copy of notes kept by the Coordinating Committee. Here under February 18, I read that the Coordinating Committee resented the statement that the Advisory Council had reached the limit of its patience. The English was not clear. The exact quotation was: "Committee resented 'Limit of patience on the part of the Advisory Council' This was hinted by Huycke in an analogous statement."

Akitsuki then said that the Advisory Council had implied that the Coordinating Committee was bothering them too much over trifling matters. Huycke had said to Akitsuki, "If I should come home late and my wife accused me of being disloyal to her -if she keeps on doing that -I will truly do something to decieve her. Think that over!"

I asked what he felt the Coordinating Committee had accomplished in the last month. Said he,

Nothing whatsoever.

I asked him if he and the committee had any idea how greatly the general camp population resented the courtesies and privileges that had been granted to the Manzanar arrivals. He said that this had not been brought to their attention. (This, I believe, is very significant, for it is scarcely conceivable that the Coordinating Committee could be in close touch with the evacuee population, even those not particularly in support of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and not be aware of this almost universal resentment.) When I remarked upon its importance, he said to May,



How many times did I bring up brooms and water pails at meetings? They (the Administration admit they have everything ready in the warehouse.(1) But they say the brooms we have are not old enough. In as dirty a place as this, a broom is all worn out in six months.

I next brought up the subject of the presence of the "Loyal" people. Akitsuki agreed they were a disturbing factor.

The people who are undecided are the ones with families and a number of children.

On the subject of the prohibition of public meetings Akitsuki said,

Public meetings are not prohibited now. They are allowed; only one has to have a permit for the use of the mess hall. They were forbidden through November and December up to the 15 of January.

On the hunger strike in the stockade:

The search in the stockade was December 30 and 31. They refused to go out for roll-call.

(This reason for the search was corroborated by several soldiers with whom I talked.)

Why Daihyo Sha Kai members' names were crossed off the list:

What I understand, they were considered most dangerous by the Army; even we were not sure. The internees did not feel free to speak because the dangerous men were present. The soldier stayed outside.

Here Akitsuki turned to May and remarked with a smile,

You remember how the first (stockade) internees acted when they came in (to the Administration Building), like cornered animals. They wouldn't even sit down.

The Negotiating Committee:

The Negotiating Committee had seventeen members. Out of these seventeen there was only one Old Tulean.(2) You can't altogether blame the Administration for not recognizing them. An informer told the Administration they were self-appointed. Nearly 50% of the population was Old Tuleans and there was only one Old Tulean on the committee.

Akitsuki said that as far as he knew, no effort had been made to apprehend the boys who beat Dr. Pedicord.

Promises made by the Administration:

The Negotiating Committee had nothing in writing. All they received were verbal promises. Another fault, they were not well organized. Even Shimizu, when we talked to him, didn't know anything.

[1. Robertson told me brooms were not available.]

[2. The Negotiating Committee had 7 members and two were Old Tuleans. I may have misheard Mr. Akitsuki, but I suspect that this is what he told me.]



My police escort had had some errands to do in the colony and had told me he would call for me at 3:30. Since I did not feel entirely free to question Akitsuki in his office, the interview ended by 3:00. I waited in the outer office. Here the young boys lounging about began to put on an act. The first cue was given when a boy of about 17 came in sadly and remarked that he had only 11 cents. He had been to the Co-op but saw nothing for 11 cents. Well, said he, he had been working for only six weeks without being paid, so he guessed that wasn't so bad. I sympathized. The conversation turned to the inadequate food. The chief complaint was the rice shortage. One boy remarked that at least three days a week they get no rice at all. Another brought up the gripes of the boys who work on the night crew at the hospital. They had been accustomed to getting one meal at the hospital (I gather that hospital food is considered better than food at the colony messes). But now this had been cut down to a cup of coffee.

Our conversation was interrupted by the entrance of a young Japanese in a state of great excitement. He went to the young man in charge of the reception desk and began a long, excited tale in Japanese. All I caught was the term Housing Department and the obvious fact that he was very angry. Some of his remarks caused laughter among the boys in the room. Finally a rapid "son-of-a-bitch" appeared in his monologue, sandwiched in the Japanese. Everyone looked at me. I couldn't help laughing and remarked, "That's not Japanese."

When this boys had left, the conversation was resumed on a more friendly basis. The draft in the other centers was discussed and considerable scorn expressed for those who had said No and then changed to Yes. I was asked if I thought the No-Nos would be drafted. I said I did not know, but that I thought it would be very foolish if the attempt were made. All agreed that they'd go to jail before they'd go in the Army.

Before I left a good looking well-mannered boy sidled up to the table at which I was seated and took the chair across from me. He asked me bashfully if I had not had Evelyn Hatanaka working for me (at Gila). I said Yes. He then asked me to take her his regards. I said I would.

The boys in this room impressed me as being definitely American in their reactions - but they all were able to speak Japanese and they may have had education in Japan. But they acted like Nisei. The presence of this "Nisei" contingent in the outer office of the Coordinating Committee is significant.

#### CONVERSATION WITH OPLER

On first appearance of the Negotiating Committee:

The Administration was aware of a group, the representatives of it would come to talk to Best. They didn't feel it was necessary to tell the Administration how they had come to exist and who they were. They were pretty much organized from the inside. Best challenged the committee with the fact that there were no Tuleans on the committee.(1)

#### Internal Security Spies

Internal Security has two men who do investigation. I'm worried. It's put me (as Community Analyst) on the spot. They're pretty bad. They're going to people and trying to force them to talk.

[1. In point of fact, there were two Old Tuleans on the committee.]



Release of Internees

Releases have been pretty slow. But there was no start till lately because of WRA and Army maneuverings. There were releases almost from the first. The Army states now that they want to release individuals. I've heard some (Army) say that some individuals will never get out.

The Army would go for one man and pick up four or five roommates.

Best

Best's mistake was not working with the Negotiating Committee and calling in the Army. I think he sees that now.

Failure of Coordinating Committee

That is partly the fault of not organizing the center. When we first contacted individuals some of whom later became members of the Coordinating Committee, I had a lot to do with that. The staff in the Co-op had fought the Daihyo Sha Kai earlier. When they were first contacted the idea was to talk over center problems with them. You could talk with people who would talk with you. The discussions were on how to organize the center. Alternate types of organizations were discussed, wide participation, spread controls. We were meeting with them back in December.

Organization Now

But there's a bottleneck on organization now, both in Washington and in the center. When Best went to Washington at New Years he came back with a plan for segregating the tough guys from the others and a lot of threat procedures.

Daihyo Sha Kai

It was the nucleus that was free. Sugimoto was the one found when they searched. Kimura was mainly a messenger or bodyguard for Kai. Both Kai and Kuratomi were free. Best had some wild ideas at the time. He thought they might not even be on the project.

One of my men said a very smart thing the other day: 'People from each center are still flying their local colors.'

Best says of the people here: 'They're not real people here. At Minidoka - there were people there.'

Instead of recognizing the Negotiating Committee as I said he should, he always made a fanfare of the word representative. He'd argue with the committee about the meaning of the word representative.

Opler stated definitely that he was not going to Jerome, that he was disgusted with Best's tying himself up with the force and strictness policy of which Schmidt and his vastly increased police force and F.B.I. tactics are an example, and that his friendliness and mixing



with the evacuees was responsible for the rumor of his proposed transfer to Jerome.(1)

He was enthusiastic about the way his staff is increasing - he has orders to hire twenty people (to increase employment) and has one boy working hard on Japanese art, and another on frustration in center life.

MARCH 17, 1944

This morning I attended the 11th grade high school class to which I had been invited. I decided to test whether I could get into the camp without an escort. (Internal Security thought I should be able to get in alone, since I was going only to the school.) I approached the sentry and told my story. He took me to his corporal. The corporal said that Internal Security didn't have anything to say about it, but he saw no reason why I couldn't go in.

I arrived at the class about 15 minutes late. I had not been introduced and quietly took a seat. A debate between eight or ten Nisei was in progress, subject: Should the loyal Nisei serve or refuse to serve in the Army. Some of the remarks and arguments were so fascinating that I could not resist making notes. This was soon noticed by one of the students, who asked the teacher who that lady was and what she was writing down. I made a short speech explaining the aims of the study, struggling with the handicap of mild laryngitis. The speech seemed to go over. The class took a vote as to whether I might stay which was carried unanimously. Later the students asked me questions. Some of them were pretty tough. What did I think was going to be done to the people left in the Relocation Centers? What did I think about the draft? What did I think about the fact that the Nisei were being drafted and purposely being sent to the front lines to be killed? I shall not record my answers here. After class was dismissed, two of the boys stayed behind and we chatted; one was from Gila. He apologized for the class' initial attitude toward me. He said he had wanted to go to the University of California too.

Attitudes Expressed in the Debate

The people say they're loyal; they ought to fight.

But the people who want to relocate and want to establish homes, they didn't feel like getting drafted. If they thought they were going to be drafted, they would have stayed in camp.

If they do go to the Army, they will be the first to go to the front and they'll just be made fools of. They send the Negroes and the Japanese to the front first. (Applause)

They say they're fighting for America and for equal rights; but they (Caucasian people in U.S.) are violating these rights.

The U.S. should let them (Japanese Americans) work in factories.

If they go out from here shouldn't they fight for their families?

[1. As Community Analyst, he was employed specifically to talk to and mix with the evacuees. Evidently, some high ranking members of the Administration disapproved of this.]



If they're dead, what do they have? If they go out and die, all right. But they put them in the front lines and they come home maimed and handicapped and descriminated against. What then?

If the Nisei are drafted in this way and come back crippled, I'm considering that people on the outside will give them another chance, like a dog with a bone. If they believe that much in this country, they should fight for it.

Sure, they'll fight, if they have equal rights!

They are not allowed in the Navy.

Why did they relocate under those circumstances?

Most of the Nisei who went out were money crazy.

If the boys really knew they'd have to go out to the Army, they wouldn't have gone out.

If they took the chance of going out, why did they take the chance? I heard a couple of fellows saying, 'We'll have to take the chance.'

Is there any proof of segregation in the Army? I know many Japanese boys who went into the Army and were treated well by their fellow soldiers.

And I know (Japanese) soldiers - instead of officers putting stripes on them, they take them off (laughter).

When the white man does something good they put stripes on him, but on the Nisei they take it off.

My friend went into the Army and passed the examination to take officer's training. They wouldn't let him (go up for training).

Since we've been talking about it, you tell me what good thing has happened to the Nisei. Nothing!

They went outside. . . . .

Is that a good thing?

They profited. You can't help descrimiantion. That's only natural.

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This afternoon Opler confided to me that both the Emperors were on the project. "Myer?" I asked. "Yes," said Opler, "only it's supposed to be secret." An hour later my pleasant Internal Security Escort gave me the same information, in confidence. He said he had heard that although the matter was confidential, the Japanese knew about it this morning. (Later I heard the Coordinating Committee - although they were not supposed to be told of Myer's presence -- had asked to meet with him on Saturday morning.)



DILLON MYER SPEAKS TO STAFF

Black, Best and Dillon Myer arrived on the project this morning. This news was supposed to be kept most confidential, but I heard that it had leaked out to the evacuees in a few hours. At the lunch table, it caused a considerable flurry. Several people voiced the hope that the incident that accompanied the Director's last visit would not be repeated. I heard through the grapevine that Myer was to speak in the Caucasian Dining Hall at 7:30. I cajoled my roommate into going so that I might slip in innocently as her guest. However, I doubt that anyone would have objected to my presence. The attitude of the Tule Lake staff toward me and toward the study is infinitely more gracious and cooperative than at Gila.

Best opened the proceedings by complimenting the staff on the success of the war bond drive and saying that he was sorry he had missed the staff party of Saturday. After various other compliments he introduced Myer.

Myer's first remark was to ask if the loud speaker was the same one he had used on November 1. He said he had repeatedly been asked by the Dies committee about the ownership of the public address system he had used on that day. But these investigations, said he, had been mostly good-natured rough and tumble, and did a lot of good. Dies hearings had to be expected anyway, about twice a year.

He continued:

the most significant event in WRA, since the Tule Lake trouble has been the Selective Service for Nisei. This was a major turning point in the WRA program. Since November the situation had been growing much calmer on the Pacific Coast. The Selective Service action was chiefly responsible for this change. Up to date the results had been pretty good. In all centers 862 boys had received notifications, two from Tule Lake. There had been ten volunteers and 19 hold outs. Seven boys had been arrested, some had relented. Twelve hold outs at Heart Mountain had not yet been taken in by the U.S. Marshall. This Selective Service is a most important event in the lives of those evacuees not at Tule Lake, and in the lives of some of those in Tule Lake. I've been working for it since July, 1942.

The Washington office knows what you people in Tule Lake have gone through. It is appreciated. We have heard a lot about the thoughtful things done for the Manzanar people. This was the extra needed touch. We congratulate you.

Of course, our major object now is relocation. With the new year, it has been stepping up. There were 350 the week I left Washington. I think by the 1st of April we will hit 500 a week, the figure we hit last April. The program is running about as we had anticipated. More than half of the young people have relocated. The big job now is to move the families. We have had some success. When the bees and the birds come back and the pull of the soil begins, it will pick up. I think WRA has passed its worst crisis, assuming we don't have another blow up. I feel more confident about Tule Lake than ever before. Things are on the beam now. Everything's going to be all right. Once I decide I have the right people in the right place, I'll support them.



## Tule Lake Fieldnotes

Mr. Best now called for questions. When there was no immediate response, he said,

Don't be afraid; speak right up.

The first question was asked by O'Day, the Veblen reading, radical statistician.

O'Day: How significant has the drift back to camp been?

Myer: There has been very little of it. A while back - for several months - there has been a total of 800. This is very small in proportion. There are 90,000 people in camps and 20 to 21,000 on seasonal or indefinite leaves.

Question: What is the prospect of more exchanges?

Myer: I don't know. I think there is a possibility ultimately. The Tule Lake incident of November 1 got people in this country and in Congress to understand that we were dealing with a delicate international question. As it stands now the civilian camps in Japan are still handled by people who have been in the Consular service in this country. This is better than if they were handled by the Military.

Question: How many people are still to come into Tule Lake, and why are many still coming when segregation is supposed to be over?

Myer: I don't know and probably never will know how many will be segregated. I don't know whether all of them will be moved to Tule Lake. Our best estimate of those to be segregated now is 3,500 to 3,600 people. Here there is room for only 1,800. The chances are that the actual movement will be in April or May before we close the Jerome center. Tentatively, we are planning to send Jerome, Heart Mountain, Granada and some other centers to Tule Lake. The chances are that will be the only movement for some time to come, until we get some of the people out of Tule Lake who are eligible to leave.

Question: Can't you stop us getting any more people from Jerome?

Myer: (Laughed and stated that the people coming from Jerome will not be so bad.)

Question: What is the chance of the expatriation bill passing?(1)

Myer: There is a good chance.

Question: What is the reaction in the central states to sending the Japs there?

Myer: It is generally very good. (He gave many details which I did not write down.)

O'Day: What economic status do the relocating evacuees get?

Myer: On the whole they are not getting the best jobs. But they are getting normal wage rates. In most places they are going into the unions.

Myer added that the next budget for July, in which 44 million dollars had been asked, had been cut to only 40 million one hundred thousand dollars. The 44 million had been based on a

[1. The questioner probably meant the Denationalization Bill, which was passed by Congress in July, 1944.]



90,000 population as of February 1, 1944, while the 40 million was on the basis of an anticipated 85,000 population.

There were no more questions. Best thanked Myer and said that at the last occasion when director Myer was present, he (Best) had felt - well, he did not want to say how he had felt - well, humiliated. The meeting was adjourned.

CONVERSATION WITH MR. ODA (Block manager. Old Gila friend)

The Spanish Consul said he had no power to take part in this dispute.

The Representatives (of Daihyo Sha Kai)

In this block I think they held a meeting and appointed a man for block representatives. They thought he was capable. But some blocks elected them. There were 63 representatives in the organization. The Council elected and appointed nine representatives.

I think if the people were released from the stockade, the people (general population) would like it. In our block there are still four people to come back.

Position of Block Manager

My job is much easier every day. It gets easier and easier. I'd like to know more different information that will help the residents. When we go to the central meetings, there are nothing but complaints, asking us to take things to the WRA.

I keep every word of the central meetings minutes.

But most of the suggestions we send up, we send to Civic Organization, 1808 B - right next to the Coordinating Committee office.

The Central Meetings (now) consist of the seven ward chairmen. Since Manzanar came in there have been eight wards; each ward has nine or ten blocks. Each ward elects a ward chairman and secretary. These ward chairmen go to the central meeting. Ward meetings are held every Thursday, and central meetings twice a month. We have had the same system since camp started. I don't know the inside.

(Mr. Oda showed me a diagram, but did not give me a copy.)

This chart is just for the block managers. Each block has a block manager and a block council of five or six members. These members assist the block manager. There is good cooperation. I heard that other blocks here have trouble but there's not any in our block.



The residents here don't know about the Civic Organization. I don't know. Merely we received notices from the Civic Organization and we send regular weekly reports to them. But I don't know.

[I had become curious about the composition and function of the body called "Civic Organization", but found that Mr. Oda, a block manager, knew no more about them than did I.]

#### Lack of Information

The big trouble in the center is lack of information. I'd like to ask the Administration to give good definite information which will satisfy the residents. If the block manager gets good information it's easy to handle the block affairs.

I'm sure they (the people) had a good experience in the last three months and don't want any more trouble.

#### Loyal People

I'm sure the removal of the Yes-Yes people would be a good thing.

#### Boys in Stockade

They took a person and his three roommates here. Only the roommate was there the night of the incident. But his three roommates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade.



MARCH 18, 1944

I talked to an unidentified evacuee in the outer hall of the Administration building. He was an Internal Security Warden, I believe. We talked for some time on the state of camp. He said that the Daihyo Sha Kai had existed before, but first made itself public after the farm incident.

(Before I left Gila for this trip, Reverend Yamasaki had asked me to visit two young girls who had lived in his block before being segregated to Tule Lake. He had told me that they were excellent students and that he hoped they might be induced to relocate and to attend a university. Miss Butterfield, a teacher at Gila, had asked me to try to visit a blind boy to see how he was getting along. But she had also told me that his brothers, with whom he was living, were "dreadful".)

At the home of the first girl, Emiko Adachi, I found only her father at home. He asked me curtly and suspiciously why I wanted to see her. When I explained, his attitude changed immediately and he ran off to school to fetch her. When she came, she and her mother and I gossiped about Gila, rejoiced over the coming of Dr. Sleath and sympathized with the Gilans for having to take Dr. Pedicord. Like all the 'colonists' to whom I have spoken, Emiko asked how the Gilans were taking the draft. She expressed the almost universal Tule Lake attitude that it served them right. They had said Yes-Yes, said they were loyal, and now they had to take the consequences. Emiko was very happy over her present work as assistant teacher to the first grade Japanese school. She didn't know whether she knew enough to teach,, but she got a great deal of pleasure out of it. It gave her something to do. She thanked me for Reverend Yamasaki's message, but said that she did not intend to leave Tule, even if she could.

At Kozuko Kawakami's home I was received just as courteously. Her father and mother were present and the same attitudes over the draft and over Dr. Pedicord's leaving were expressed: Here I was given a lovely shell ornament for myself and one for Miss Sheldon, of Gila.

#### TALK WITH JOE SAKAMOTO

With some trepidation I next called on the Sakamotos. Miss Butterfield had appeared very anxious over their bitterness and had wanted me to call just to see how little blind Kengo, in whom she had taken a special interest, was getting along. None of her letters had been answered. I knocked on the door and was told to come in. I opened it and asked permission to enter. Then I found that the only occupant was a blind man, Kengo's older brother. Later he told me he had lost his sight wrestling.

He asked me to sit down. I explained my errand. He said Miss Butterfield was a nice lady. Joe Sakamoto has studied abroad and in Japan. I explained the origin and aims of our study. From this we passed to a discussion of world affairs, the stupidities of Caucasians, in general, and the mighty spirit of Japan. I remarked that I was of German descent,(1) and that I could make no sense of the fact that American citizens of Japanese descent were picked up and put into camps, whereas citizens of German and Italian descent were not. Joe then said that he had once crossed the ocean on a boat where a group of Germans had been fellow passengers. He admired the German people and their spirit. These passengers had marched round and round the deck singing the German National Anthem. He thought the Germans were a fine people. We discussed Oswald Spengler and his theories. At this point another brother came in. He explained that none of the boys would feel the way they do if it were not for evacuation. They would have been glad to fight, if they had been considered equal. Now they

[1. This was not accurate, for I am a third-generation American of German, Polish, and Scandinavian ancestry. I did, however, speak German before I spoke English and I had found in Gila that my German ancestry impressed people favorably. Some people assumed that I was a "German Nisei."]



were changed. Joe interrupted, saying he was not going to Japan because he was bitter, but because he had no money here and had no chance. Neither of the brothers had any sympathy with the Nisei who were being drafted. They, said Joe, are like a fellow who chases two girls - he'll get neither. He added the Japanese proverb:

Nito wo oou mono itto wo mo ezu. He who chases two rabbits, loses both.

As the conversation continued, Joe, as occasionally happens with repatriates(1) whom I interview, threw out a few subtle insults, insinuating that I was probably an inu or an F.B.I. investigator.

If I get picked up now, he said, I'll send them after you with a hatchet.

I laughed, and gave him my address, so that he would know where to send the avengers if he were picked up. (Here's hoping he isn't picked up.) [I did, however, feel angry and insulted and in a spirit of reckless retaliation I added, "Mit Gewehren, Bomben, und Granaten, wird das Ungeziefer ausgebrannt!" This line from one of the songs of the International Brigade of the Spanish Civil War caused Mr. Sakamoto to look at me with a kind of awe.

German is a wonderful, warlike language, he said.

(I did not give him the translation: "With guns, bombs, and grenades we will burn out the (Fascist) vermin.")]

The other brother remarked that after the war, people like me might be pretty well off, since we (as allies of Japan) might be able to indulge in profitable trade. I disavowed such aims, and said that my job was to write a true historical account of what happened at Tule Lake. If I did not tell the truth, losing my self-respect would be sufficient punishment. Joe then apologized for his remark about inu and four legs, saying that he was just kidding.

Before I left I thanked him for inviting me in, stating that many Americans, who had suffered nothing from the Japanese, would not have shown him similar courtesy. He invited me to come back whenever I chose. He asked me to bring him a good cigar when I came back, because he can't get them in camp.

[I did not visit the Sakamotos again. I did not want to push my luck too far.]

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#### TALK WITH JIM TAKEUCHI

##### Akitsuki

He's more or less the guiding hand in the Coordinating Committee business. William Mayeda is head of Civic Organization; he lives in 32 block and there's Frank Kawaii here, of Housing. They're all placed in strategic positions here. They've always been here. All these fellows are not on the Coordinating Committee. But I'm absolutely positive they

[1. I am struck by the fact that Joe Sakamoto was the first Japanese American whom I describe as a repatriate in my field notes. Repatriation procedures had been initiated by the State Department on June 1, 1942 and it is possible that people like the Yamashiros and Odas had also applied. But Mr. Sakamoto was the first person I talked to at Tule Lake who sounded as if he had irrevocably made up his mind to go to Japan.]



(The following is verbatim.)

belong to that group. Joe Nakao, the one who is supposed to be the Senior Steward of the camp; Sej Mooroka, a sullen type of man - he seems to be Hawaiian born.

#### State of Mess Division

I got nosy the other day and went through the files. The people in here are supposed to be allowed 45 cents a day for food. We're getting 20 cents a day now - .2033 if I remember right.

Another very interesting fact was (WRA) personnel mess here had their figures set at .1190 per meal. But I think it's falsified. When certain foods are delivered to the personnel mess, they seem to be so high and mighty, why nobody condescends to sign for the darn things. And without the signature you can't prove delivery. It seems to me they are getting WRA good, and getting it at cost zero.

My younger brother works at the (WRA) personnel mess. He gets supper there. Since he started to work there in one month they've served turkey three times. They had swiss steak too, and sliced pineapple and cottage cheese salad. You can't tell me you can get all that stuff on that amount of money.

It's pretty disgusting to sit in that damn office and hear them talk about chicken and turkey and we walk back to work ten blocks and sit down to corned beef and salt pork.

They have two types of corned beef in the butcher shop. One they call dry pack and the other wet pack. The dry pack costs 15¢ a pound and the wet pack 18¢ a pound. Ever since the day I started to work, the personnel mess has never used the dry pack; they're always breaking open barrels to get the wet pack.

Mr. Atsinger, one of the Assistant Project Stewards, he says: 'Use the dry pack first because the wet pack will keep indefinitely.'

Mr. Hayward (Jim's boss) is all right.

Personally I think if Best was kicked out and Robertson got it, it would be the best thing.

If they tear down the fence, not a person would wander away. This is home, such as it is. It's all we've known since evacuation.

Feeling toward the Administration hasn't changed at all. The only thing that has changed is that people in the center have more or less realized that to try to go against the Administration would be hurting themselves. They're getting smarter.

#### More on Mess Division

It's just to a point here - you take the mess division. Joe Bellow seems to be quite a decent sort. As far as changing the food, I don't think he'd do much about it. But at least he seems to be quite cooperative and sympathetic. While Archie Foss and Atsinger and Kirkman and Charlie Hoover - all of them are connected with the mess. With the exception of Bellow and Hayward, all the rest of them have very definite anti-Japanese feelings. With a group like that controlling any division



## Tule Lake Fieldnotes

(The following is verbatim.)

you can't do anything for the Japanese. They got the attitude here; we just hand out food because we can't starve 'em.

The Work Situation

They're talking about opening up the farm and that would increase work. It's not that they're not trying. They're going to have people work or else!

Joe Bellow has just come to the point where he can't stand the company of the others anymore. He's applied for a transfer. 'Confidentially,' he says; he wanted to go to Gila to work with Keadle. He asked what I thought of Keadle. Far be it from me to hand out bouquets. I told him exactly what I thought of Keadle. So Bellow says, 'I'll have to remember that when I go down there.' I said, 'It seems sad that a person like that should be at the head of a Division.' Bellow said, 'You'll find that true of all the centers.'

Bellow said, 'It's all politics. Take for instance, Mr. Hoover here. Well, Mr. Hoover seems a very able man and all that and also he is a commissioned steward in the maritime service. But after associating with him, he definitely got the impression that he had never gotten any farther than the 4th grade. It impressed me that a fellow (they are both Assistant Project Stewards) should talk like that about a fellow worker.'

The "Loyal" People

100% of the inu are of the loyal bunch. I wouldn't be surprised if Akitsuki and that bunch are all loyal. There is a girl who works at my office. She acts like an inu. This is how I suspect. I told her, "you know, there are a lot of inu in camp". And she said, 'Is that so, but it's better not to say anything.' That's how I know. Now the natural reaction would be, 'Who are they?'

Manzanar Treatment Compared With Other Segregants

The facilities in the new area, they have everything. Porcelain and mirrors over every porcelain fixture. In this area the men's latrine is nothing but a trough; they leak on the floor and the stench is terrific. The sinks are leaking. The plumbing is so bad they're always plugged up.

Daihyo Sha Kai

What you call the block representatives always existed even previous to the trouble. Out of those that were representatives, a lot relocated and newcomers were elected to take their place. It's quite possible that at the time of the trouble men were elected. But there were quite a few old ones and that's one of the reasons why the people got so burnt up. The name Daihyo Sha Kai was first heard after the trouble (farm incident).

In the beginning the Daihyo Sha Kai was the literal Japanese translation of the Negotiating Committee which the representatives called themselves. I'm quite sure they took on the name immediately after the farm incident. Under that title they tried to carry on the first negotiations.



(The following is verbatim.)

It was definitely decided by block consent to attend the funeral and make it a regular project-wide affair, by the Negotiating Committee. This was before the nine were elected. They were probably from the newly elected bunch from other centers. They might have been goon-squads but they were representatives.

#### Second Negotiating Committee

They put in their bid after they yanked (arrested) the first representatives after November 4, but before the important four had given themselves up. They were very radical. That same group went to see the Tule Lake Co-op. By December 6, the original Daihyo Sha was just about shot.

#### Draft Notification

I got a notice from my selective service. They wanted to know my address and my present draft board. I filled it in. That's what all of us fellows are going to do. We'll fill in everything we get until they tell us to come for a physical. Then we won't report. I figure on staying here as long as I can. There are a few fellows in our camp (Gila) who were yanked during registration trouble. They were sent here. They actually didn't have time to register for repatriation until after the 20th of January.

#### Dismissal of Night Boiler Man

Here's one thing I want to find out. It gets plenty cold here until the middle of May and June. They have dispensed with the night boiler man. The way I get it from former residents here; They had a boiler man here until May last year. But now they dispense with him in March.

#### Spanish Consul

Anybody was invited to the meeting with the Spanish Consul. It was open to the public But the Army presided over the meeting. The consul always had Captain Hartman sitting beside him. He couldn't say too much. All the answer the Consul gave at that time - there wasn't anything definite said. They were all more or less suppositions or promises.

Ask the block managers if they have any stuff on file as to promises made to the Daihyo Sha Kai.

#### Food

Fresh vegetables started to come in two weeks ago. At the present time exactly 243 cans of string beans #10, and 184 cans of peas are on the shelves. I know because I've looked. That's all there is besides a little canned corn.

If you give a Japanese rice and vegetables, you can just about cut out anything else. Another thing the all-seeing fathers here can't see is: a Japanese prefers pork to beef. It never occurs to them. There are six people against Hayward.



The main reason I'm working where I am is I want to find out exactly what is going on in the food situation, what the Caucasians eat, where it comes from and what's paid for it. I want to compare that with the measly 20 cents the Japanese are getting in here.

Draft

A good ninety percent of the fellows I've talked to here, they say they'll string along with the Selective Service Board until they get their notice for physical examination. Then they won't appear. That's how I feel. If I'm going to get yanked I'm going to string it out as long as I can.

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Sat next to a telephone operator at dinner - a Miss Moreno. She had previously worked at Leupp and greatly admired Mr. Robertson. Hearing that I was from Gila she asked me if I knew Yamasaki. I recalled him as having been sent to Leupp for defacing the segregation poster in the hospital. She said he had been one of the nicest boys at Leupp. Everybody liked him, he ran the canteen there. He was one of the sweetest boys she had ever know. A few days later I had occasion to talk to Mr. Robertson and asked him about Yamasaki. Both Robertson and his wife agreed he was a splendid boy, very idealistic - overly so. Robertson said he would not be surprised if the Gila rumor, that Yamasaki had taken the blame for an action committed by others, were true.

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After dinner my new roommate entertained her soldier boyfriend. The boyfriend and I began a discussion of the Japanese, and their characteristics. He said one thing he couldn't understand. The soldiers would get after one Jap and give him hell for something in the stockade and this one (getting hell) would not bother to warn another some distance away who was doing the same thing. This surprised the soldier. On the other hand, on one occasion (I found out later this was before the hunger strike in the stockade) one of the men in the stockade answered a soldier back, telling him,

You wouldn't be so brave if you didn't have a gun. If you didn't have that gun I'd kill you.

The soldier told the boy to get over into the tent stockade, two tents inside a high fence, where, as the soldier said,

It was colder than blazes. And, added the soldier, any of the rest of you who want to go with him just step forward.

All of the fifty or so Japanese standing about stepped forward. The two tents could not accomodate so many men.

'Get back there you \_\_\_\_\_,' said the soldier.

This incident took place December 30 or 31.



MARCH 19, 1944TALK WITH PAUL ROBERTSON AND DILLON MYER

I had made an appointment with Mr. Robertson for this Sunday afternoon, having promised to do what I could to collect evacuee attitudes on the means by which rapport between the Administration and the evacuees could be improved. About 11:30, while I was going over my notes, Mr. Robertson came to my room and asked me if I would object to Dillon Myer being present at this talk. I said I had no objections, but naturally, would not feel so free to express myself frankly. So Robertson and I went over to the Administration building and talked about a half hour while waiting for Myer to finish a meeting. Robertson admitted that he knew the status of the Coordinating Committee was low. But he was somewhat surprised that they had received no credit at all for the return to work and the lifting of the curfew. He said he thought some of the men on the Coordinating Committee might well be "loyal". Yamatani, he knew, was bad. He was well acquainted with the almost solid evacuee support of the Negotiating Committee. He said that in his opinion, the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai were the accepted representatives of the people and that the Administration's refusal to recognize them as an error.

He asked me if I thought confidence in the Administration could ever be restored and I said, "Frankly, no." He then told me of the situation he had met at Leupp, of the extreme bitterness of the men there, and of how he sincerely felt that most of them now trusted him. I pointed out that the situations were not aparallel. If it were possible that he or people like him could make similar contacts with the 18,000 people in Tule Lake as he had done at Leupp, I would not be so pessimistic.

I remarked that the only evacuees who had had anything to say against him were members of the Coordinating Committee. He said,

Do you know why? It is because I have kept up my contacts with the other group.

He told me that a few days ago, a young woman, named Violet Matsuda, a strong supporter of status quo and the release of persons in the stockade, had asked him to come to see her. She had been refused a pass (by either Army or Internal Security). When he arrived at her quarters he found about twelve Japanese there, many of whom were not known to each other. He heard them introducing themselves. Their object appeared to be to find some better methods of colony representation. This experience led Robertson to believe that an attempt to get legitimate representation and better feeling would not be altogether futile.

I told him that many of the younger men were restless over the possibility of being drafted. He knew this. He is telling them to fill out any papers they may receive but to write on the back, "I am loyal to Japan and will not serve in the U.S. Army." He thinks that no draft board in the country will draft them if they do this.

At this point Mr. Myer came in. With considerable reservation I discussed the present attitudes in the colony but made no bones about telling him that I thought the attitude he had expressed in his speech of Friday night had been over-optimistic. He admitted that there was some truth in my remarks but felt that the worst hump had been passed when the people went back to work. Externally, I suppose this is so. He said that he was of the opinion that it was futile to attempt to get relations with the colony when the appointed staff were not able to agree among themselves, and that he relied chiefly on Mr. Robertson to accomplish this, believing that this was a more important and more pressing task than the establishment



of personal contacts in the colony.(1) My personal prejudices should be taken into consideration, but I still think he was over-optimistic. I remarked upon the evacuee appreciation of Robertson and Hayward. I listed some of the current gripes: food, the state of the latrines, the Caucasian graft; Myer wrote these down, saying that he thought they were healthy gripes. He added that the release of most of the people in the stockade was being pushed as rapidly as possible. The worst ones were to be taken to Leupp.

On the topic of graft he remarked that Mr. Peck had been dismissed, chiefly for drunkenness, and that the Negotiating Committee had had their figures on graft all twisted up. He also admitted that the Administration's failure to recognize the Daihyo Sha Kai at that time had been an error.

Robertson asked me to repeat my statement on the beating of Dr. Pedicord. I did this, saying that many evacuees felt that the assaulters should have been punished. But as far as I had been able to determine, no attempt had been made to apprehend them. Myer said that attempts had been made, but no one had been able to identify the assailants, not even Dr. Pedicord himself. I asked about the business of taking food out of the warehouse on November 4. Myer said that the trucks had been sent to bring in more harvest workers and not for food. The evacuees had thought it was for food. On the subject of the promises purported to have been made by Myer and Best, Myer referred me to the Dies Committee report.

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#### CONVERSATION WITH LAB TECHNICIAN

My neighbor, the lab technician, said that she admired Myer very much. She had seen him torn apart by the "group of Fascists". She had heard him make the statement, "This is Fascism." She understood why the speech he made Friday was so meek. He had learned his lesson.(2)

#### CONVERSATION WITH TEACHER

Called on a teacher in the evening who had asked to see me. She mentioned the vandalism at the school about which I had heard rumors. I asked her to tell me what she knew.

The six of March when the teachers went back to school they found the elementary school had been broken into. A window was broken in my room. I didn't see any fresh marks but when I went back a teacher told me that the building has been entered. It was a queer thing; nothing valuable had been taken. This indicated that children or young boys had done the vandalism.

The lavatories had writing on the walls; nasty pictures were on the school blackboards. The teachers were told not to disturb anything, because Internal Security might want to take fingerprints. It was mostly sex stuff and the broken window

[1. Perhaps this was an indirect rebuke to Robertson for meeting with the group at Mrs. Matsuda's apartment.

[On the other hand, of the Japanese-Americans with whom I was talking had said or implied that the situation would improve if more members of the Administrative staff "would come inside the fence and talk to people." But as these notes have already indicated, "fraternization" with the colonists was frowned upon by the Administration.]

[2. She was probably referring to a staff meeting held on November 2, 1943 which Myer attended (WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events (manuscript).]



over the hall transom indicated it was younger children.

Last Friday as I went to the school at twelve o'clock to lock my door, I saw a crowd of boys standing around outside. Talking to them were three or four WRA policemen (Caucasians). I stepped to the nearest and asked what was going on. He said it was an investigation. These are the boys who made the entrance. They have confessed.

Four or five of the boys were about 6th grade age. There were two or three older boys, possibly 15.

(This teacher's remarks on obscene pictures and words brings to mind that on the occasions when I have used the women's latrines here in Tule Lake the walls have been covered with such pictures and words. I rarely saw such words or pictures in the latrines at Gila. The teacher believes this has increased since segregation.)

MARCH 20, 1944

Spent the day writing up notes, checking gaps in the narrative, and arranging the list of my informants who I hope to visit in the next three days. Made an appointment with Akitsuki and May Iwohara, suggesting that they come to see me. They thought this an excellent idea but suggested coming at night. I agreed. This necessitated considerable maneuvering since I have no rights on my room, in which my roommate is accustomed to entertaining her soldier boyfriend every night. I doubted that the soldier would feel happy over giving the room to some Japanese for several hours. So I asked the laboratory technician next door if she would mind, explaining the situation. She was most agreeable. I also made an appointment with Dr. Opler who suggested dinner at his apartment on Wednesday. Kept an evening engagement at Robertson's apartment, since I did not wish to be observed closeted with him in his office for too long a time. Moreover, in his office I would not have felt free to take so much time asking questions.

TALK WITH MR. ROBERTSON

Hankey: When was the Advisory Council set up and for what purpose?

Robertson: Between December 6 and 16. The idea sprang from Dr. Opler. He presented it to the Project Director at that time and suggested it. The committee was set up for the purpose of advising the Director; not, primarily to deal with the evacuees. The original intention of the body was to establish a form of community organization.

Hankey: Have there been any other efforts than those made by the peace Committee to call the Administration's attention to the true place of the Coordinating Committee?

Robertson: There have been many unorganized efforts. As a guess, I should say - twelve of fifteen. The Manzanar pamphlet is an example.



(The following is verbatim.)

Hankey: Are public meetings forbidden?

Robertson: They were forbidden during November and December. At present not so far as I know. However, they must get a fire permit for the public meetings.

Hankey: Where can I get data on how many loyal people are still in camp -- how many loyal Tuleans; how many voluntary accompanying persons?

Robertson: That has not yet been determined. They are still having hearings. Any statement would be pure guess.

Hankey: What do you think of the Kibei as prone to acts of violence?

Robertson: From what I saw in Leupp I am inclined to think the boys most inclined to violence are those who have accepted the standards of Western culture.

Hankey: Why did the boys go after Dr. Pedicord?

Robertson: I was told the boys went to get the Japanese in the hospital to make them come to the demonstration.

Hankey: Has anyone any documentation released by the Negotiating Committee?

Robertson: Dr. Opler has what there is. He should be willing to let you see this.(1)

Hankey: What is the process for release of people in the stockade?

Robertson: There is a fact finding body set up composed of members of the Administrative Staff. Whether they have anything to do with release, I don't know. They have to do with incarceration. They don't let anybody go into the stockade who hasn't been investigated first.

Hankey: What was the coal crew trouble of January 1?

Robertson: That was a bunch of kids working on the night coal crew. It was just kids having fun. The night coal crew was released today. Only because of lack of work. There were too many men on.

Hankey: Do you think I may ever be allowed to see the stenographic notes of what was said on November 1 by the Administration and the representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai?

Robertson: Mr. Best would have to say. He might let you see them sometime.

(We discussed this point and decided to wait for a more opportune time.)

Robertson: The things that impressed me (about this meeting) were housing, mops, buckets, interiors of the houses, latrines, etc. They did mention status, but that was not dominant.

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[1. Opler told me there was no documentation.]



MARCH 21, 1944

(The following is verbatim.)

TALK WITH MR. KURIHARA

In most cases negotiating committees are born spontaneously. In Manzanar when I was arrested, we figured there was an injustice done. We held a meeting with no previous arrangement whatever. A person who took the lead was nominated to tell the people.

The Negotiating Committee

Regarding this camp, the Negotiating Committee were those who formerly were considered to be the leaders in various camps. When they took the lead, naturally, they were appointed. The majority of the leaders who were appointed were from Jerome, and they were leaders in their community. When they took interest in this camp, naturally, they were appointed leaders. Whoever is appointed in these cases is a leader in one way or the other.

I was surprised too when I was elected as a member of the Negotiating Committee in the Manzanar incident. That was because I took the lead in destroying the J.A.C.L. (Japanese-American Citizens League). In fact, I was the only one who fought against the J.A.C.L. in Manzanar.

The Coordinating Committee, I think, is the unconscious tool of either the Army or WRA.

When I came in here they took all of my manuscripts, about a half dozen different articles I had written. They went through my luggage. The sergeant told me he was instructed to search my things very carefully. They took these things to F.B.I. headquarters, so Dr. Thomas must not be surprised if the things I have given her are also with the F.B.I. in Washington.

The segeant promised to send them back to me. If he does, I might send them to you or Mr. Spencer. It was about the J.A.C.L. fight. It clearly expresses my opinion on why I was so bitter.

Reasons Why Status Quo Broke

The main reason was not because they didn't want to stick with the Negotiating Committee but - one of the main reasons was lack of finance. Another reason is they didn't want to loaf along doing nothing. Time lags so monotonous.

If we were a bunch of Japanese soldiers quartered here, that is a different thing. But these are women and children and civilians. In Manzanar the F.B.I was making good use of the inu.

Vote on Status Quo

When the vote was taken here - the status quo lost by 400 votes. That shows that the people who are favoring status quo are greater in number. Because many who favored status quo did not vote. They thought it was the way to go to the stockade.



A lot of people thought they might be pulled in. A lot of people feared they might be pulled. They had a soldier by the vote box.

### The Part of the Co-op

The people in the Co-op had a greater interest (in breaking status quo). It was to their interest. The former secretary of the Co-op is chairman of the Coordinating Committee.

I had a friend of mine pulled into the stockade January 10. Best said he saw no charge against him from the request of WRA. He hesitated to release him. I went to Schmidt. The last remark he gave to me was 'It is up to the Coordinating Committee.'

The Japanese are held in the stockade by the Japanese. Akitsuki is probably following the orders of other people.

Here is a rumor: There are four big gambling places run by the Judo fellows who guard the Coordinating Committee. The other small places are raided, but they just stay from those boys. They are not closed.

### VISIT TO VIOLET MATSUDA

Mr. Robertson suggested that if I were interested I might call on Violet Matsuda. She was the woman who stood in such bad repute with the Army and Internal Security and who had asked him to come to see her. When he arrived at her "apartment" he met twelve men who said they would like to bring about a better system of colony representation - pointing out that the Coordinating Committee had failed.

[Violet Matsuda was a Kibei, born in Hawaii in 1914. She was married to an Issei and had three children. One of her brothers was serving in the U.S. Army; another had been arrested on November 4 and was in the stockade. She had come to Tule Lake from Jerome. She renounced her citizenship.]

Mrs. Matsuda invited me in and asked me to sit down. She sat opposite to me holding a three year old sleeping child in her arms. I told her I had heard her name from the Coordinating Committee (this was the truth and I did not wish to implicate Robertson) and my last week's research had convinced me that the Coordinating Committee had no status whatever in the community. I said that I hoped at some future time to write the truth of what had occurred, since I knew I would never get it all from the Coordinating Committee or from the Administration. If she had anything to say, and said it to me now, it would make me lose respect for her. I hoped that she would make inquiries about me and when she had found out what kind of person I was, she might be willing to tell me how she felt about the true state of affairs in the center.

She denied any connection with the Daihyo Sha Kai (as I expected she would do) and said that she was only a high school graduate and that she was merely standing up for her rights. Her brother had been put in the stockade for no cause and her attempts to obtain his release had been referred to the Coordinating Committee. She said she was tired of being grilled by the F.B.I. men and the Internal Security - and was glad that I didn't act that way. Manifestly, she wasn't telling me what she didn't wish to tell me. We had a considerable



discussion on democracy and freedom of speech. I rose to go but she asked me to stay a while. We discussed camp life, the Administration and other topics. After a half hour I left; she invited me to come back anytime I chose.

#### CHAT WITH OPLER

Dropped into Opler's office on my way back to the "administrative section". He now has an office in the colony in block 6. He introduced me to his staff, Mr. Obayashi (James Sakoda's contact, who has transferred from Social Welfare), two typists and a Nisei boy whose name I have forgotten. (He has another Nisei boy, Taketsui, on his staff.)

Opler told me that the Coordinating Committee had told Mr. Myer that it would be a mistake to remove Mr. Best. (This meeting was held Saturday; I was not told about it.)

On the subject of releases, the Army is telling the Coordinating Committee that WRA is holding out. It's a vicious circle.

It's not Schmidt who tells the people with interned relatives to see the Coordinating Committee; it's Captain Hartman.

There are too many cooks with a hand in the broth, the Army, WRA and the Coordinating Committee. The Army is always calling Schmidt in and badgering him.

The logic that the Army and Schmidt go by (in releasing internees) is: you must have records for releasement.

#### MEETING WITH BYRON AKITSUKI AND MAY IWOHARA

I looked forward to this interview with apprehension. The obligation I owed to Akitsuki for the documents he had sent me and my knowledge of the present status of the Coordinating Committee in the community caused me much mental discomfort.

When Akitsuki and May arrived, they were more ill at ease than any other persons I have so far talked to. I invited them to be seated, gave Akitsuki an ashtray, and thanked him for his confidence in the Study. Akitsuki told me that he was working on a translation of some of the Daihyo Sha Kai minutes. These he was afraid to send to us through the mail. I suggested he send them registered mail to Berkeley, or, if the thought best, I would try to come back in a few weeks and pick them up myself. Throughout the evening, both Akitsuki and May were very laconic in their answers.

I asked about the early history of the movement which ended the status quo; who was behind it?

Akitsuki: At that time the responsible men's organization (before the Coordinating Committee). The feeling of the majority present were not in favor of releasing the stockade internees. This was the informal group that preceded the Coordinating Committee.

I asked Akitsuki why the Coordinating Committee had told Dillon Myer that they did not wish the removal of Mr. Best.

Akitsuki: I like Mr. Best.



(He implied that the Coordinating Committee was provoked with the Advisory Council, not with Mr. Best.)

Since the remaining Daihyo Shas were less intelligent, had no leaders, the best thing they could think of was that policy of just stubbornly sticking to the status quo.

#### On Meeting With Stockade Internees

The Committee were invited by the stockade internees at the last meeting. It was the Army that refused permission for the men to come out. The Army called it a blunder because we didn't get anything.

We offended them (the Army). They felt the Committee overrode them on this interview. We expected to get some help from them (the stockade internees). Some statement to keep the colonists from taking rash action.

The Administration has not publicized the Coordinating Committee releases of internees. The reason - at that time the condition of the center was just beginning to improve. If we made the releases known, pressure groups would have been trying to force us to release them all.

I asked who the sub-Coordinating committee were:

Akitsuki: We have fielders or undercover people. We had to put that word (sub-Coordinating Committee) in the minutes. It was generous of the Administration to grant us that privilege.

(Akitsuki admitted the real function of this group was a guard for the Coordinating Committee.)(1)

The boys went to the hospital to bring Pedicord to the meeting.

I served some cheese, crackers and cookies. We talked about three quarters of an hour about Gila, the evacuation, and how the people had felt coming into Tule Lake; how they had come with high hopes of all working together as Japanese. Akitsuki looked pathetic when he said,

And now they're all divided and fighting against each other.

Then the conversation shifted to entrance to assembly centers. Akitsuki asked May how she had felt when she came into the Assembly Center,

I cried, she said, I didn't want to, but I couldn't help it.

[1. In point of fact, the committee had asked for the appointment of "30 men with WRA remuneration for the purpose of performing intelligence work which is to be used only for the advantage and benefit of the colony." (Minutes of the joint meeting of the Advisory Council and the Coordinating Committee, January 28, 1944.) The Administration approved the suggestion and 30 agents, known as "fielders" were placed on the WRA payroll. (See Thomas and Nishimoto (1946: 205-6). Members of the "pro--status quo" underground learned of this and denounced the hired "dogs" in a pamphlet distributed in late February to incoming segregants from Manzanar (See Thomas and Nishimoto (1946: 208).]



March 22, 1944

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Tule Lake Fieldnotes

Rosalie Hankey Wax

MARCH 22, 1944

Robertson had promised to speak on my behalf to a young man, who had been a member of the Daihyo Sha Kai but had resigned. Today he told me the boy would see me. I went to his home but he was out. I had been unable to get an escort from Internal Security and was given a Mr. Gwinn of the leave office who was rather ungracious about the chore. Therefore, after leaving a message at the Odas' that Mr. Robertson would be glad to attend any block managers' meeting if he felt he were welcome, I had my escort drive me to Opler's office, explaining that Opler would drive me out of the colony.

TALK WITH MR. KURIHARA

Opler was not in so I went over to Mr. Kurihara's, unescorted, and returned the document given me by his friend. I intended to leave immediately, but Mr. Kurihara urged me to sit down and talk with him if I had time. I stayed about half an hour. I told him of the (Evacuation and Resettlement) Study's need for documentation of the activities of the Daihyo Sha Kai, for example, the minutes of meetings, and of our need for such material should another movement take place. He promised to do his best and give us anything he was able to obtain.

Of Akitsuki he said:

There are a couple of men under him. They express themselves better in English than he does, and they go over his head in doing things. If he could wriggle out of the committee, all right. But if he waits longer, some day it's going to be too late. He will be blamed regardless of the consequences that follow.

If he keeps on and sticks at it, even if he's really for the Japanese, he's going to be branded as a spy and working for WRA.

Daihyo Sha Kai

To a great extent the Daihyo Sha Kai has distorted the facts to make the people believe they are working for the good of Japan - when to a great extent they are not.

Mr. Kurihara suggested to me that it might be a good idea to talk to George Yamatani to see what a man like him would say. He could probably tell me a great deal about the Daihyo Sha. I agreed, but shrink for seeking this unpopular gentleman out in his barrack. If I were seen, I explained, it might do me great harm. Here I may be wrong but I can stomach just so much inuing on my own part.

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INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE YAMASHIRO

Tule Lake Seinen Kai

I don't know what may be coming to us in the future; but if our Seinen Kai is to be blamed like in Gila, I can't stand it.



The Seinen is started now and we're knocking down the status quo little by little. But in the future another incident is coming. I don't think all of the people are going to be satisfied over our living conditions here.

I told Mr. Yamashiro what both Mr. Robertson and Dr. Opler had said about the Seinen Kai in Tule Lake. Robertson had said that as far as he was concerned he had rather have a strong Seinen Kai than a weak, mediocre CAS (Community Activities Section). Opler had said that he didn't think the present Seinen Kai could make a go of it, and that while Yamashiro was a smart boy, Opler thought "he was working for George," i.e., himself. He, however, would be very glad to cooperate with George. (Dr. Opler had previously asked George to be on the staff of Community Analysis. George had refused, saying (to me) that that would brand him as inu.)

Mr. Yamashiro: For me, I feel like closing up the Seinen Dan completely right now. Because we're trying to help the WRA and the community. It's running now - so I don't think they need me any more.

Best has told me I didn't do anything wrong.

(When Yamashiro was at Leupp he was told this.)

Why was I taken then?

Before I was here this Seinen Dan here was all separated. Everything was all scattered and they were all seeking for power. Now we have a centralized organization. People don't think that way.

Frankly, since I heard Mr. Huycke is going away, I'd like to get back to that field (CAS) now. Mr. Huycke told me twice to get into CAS. He said, 'I'm a Jap-sympathizer and there are a lot of Jap-haters in camp.' He should say Japanese. I knew right then. An educated man like him knows better if he really means it.

I tried to help Mr. Huycke in building up a reputation for the CAS, but he would break down everything.

My main reason for building up this organization is my feelings toward the Issei is very deep. I tried to establish this - give them something to make life enjoyable after the way they have worked for us. That's all the purpose we had (in Gila).

#### Factionalism In Camp

There's about ten groups in here, status-quo, against status-quo, people who don't like the Coordinating Committee and don't care about status-quo, and the gangster group.

(For this reason, Mr. Yamashiro told me, I ought to come up to camp.)(1)

They are always struggling among themselves. I'd like to go back to Japan in one piece.

[1. That is, leave the Gila Center and take up permanent residence in Tule Lake.]



My idea is to have one decent block, so we could have recreation and have a very fine block together.

Right now the WRA has got to do something before I do anything.


At first the Seinen Kai (the Tule Seinen) gave support to the Daihyo Sha. Some of the Daihyo Sha wanted to use the power of the Seinen Kai and have them back them up. They (seinen) said, 'What the heck, we can't work for you.'

### Loyal People

About 2000 people in this center want to get out. Why don't they let them out? A month and a half ago I heard 400 families are signed up to get out of here.

### Definition of Seinen dan

The Seinen dan is a small branch. The Seinen Kai has one headquarters. Bun dan is branch.




Block 47, 48, etc.

SEINEN DAN

"branches go to heart."

"This is the boss."



SEINEN KAI

The Seinen dan is more democratic. Shibu is the same as Seinen Kai.

Every order the branch gets from the Seinen kai, the shibu has to follow it. Like in Gila, the Camp I branch of the Seinen kai had to listen to the main branch in Camp II.

Mr. Yamashiro and I now discussed the inu at Gila. I mentioned no names. He said he would like to meet Miura some day. Also, when he had returned to Gila in September (August?) to get married he had met Mr. Miyake and had said,



'I want to thank you Miyakesan for all you've done for me. I'm going to bring you a present soon.' Miyake said, 'I didn't say anything George; don't blame me.' Yamashiro said, 'I'm not blaming you about anything. I'm thanking you for getting me out of Leupp to come here. I really want to give you a gift.'

Four days later Yamashiro was sent back to Leupp.

Yamashiro again told me that Dr. Opler has asked him to work in Community Analysis. He has refused. If he works there he will be branded as inu immediately.

There's one thing I'd like to ask you, said Yamashiro to me, Why does Mr. Opler only have Nisei working for him?

You know as well as I do, I replied.

#### CONVERSATION AT DR. OPLER'S

I inquired as to WRA or Army's attempts to get a second negotiating committee after the November incident.

Opler: Austin asked for one Nisei and one Issei from each block. He said, send us a real Negotiating Committee. Cozzens(1) was here then. They sent down the troops to set up a loud speaker. I saw Cozzens's speech beforehand. It read, 'It is a pleasure to talk to so many people.' All of them had prepared speeches.(2)

Then after the P.A. system was set up they sent in the company of the whole guard who lined themselves up in front of the platform. They (the speakers) went out and mounted the platform and nobody came.

I stayed away from the platform. But I saw that the central firebreak was crowded with people. I saw more baby carriages than I've ever seen before. It was a studied indifference, people sweeping their front stoops -- there were about ten football games going on in the firebreak.

I asked for additional information on the earliest development of a Negotiating Committee. Opler insists they were organizing before the farm accident. (So far as I know, there is only the word of the inu for this.)

Opler: There were three groups at that time:

1. The Planning Board, whose delegates didn't cut much ice.
2. A rather amorphous group of block delegates.
3. The Negotiating Committee selected by the Block Delegates.

[1. Field Director in charge of the San Francisco office of the War Relocation Authority.]

[2. Dr. Opler is referring to the abortive mass meeting of November 13, 1943 at which no Japanese Americans appeared.]



(The following is verbatim.)

The latter rode the first two out of the picture. Several blocks did not have representatives from any of the bodies.

None of them came to see Best until after the funeral.

Before the funeral, Kai and Kuratomi wanted to control the funeral and made the first bid in regard to its management. Then a group of three came from another faction. Best was already mixed up with the Kai-Kuratomi faction. They (this second faction) expressed doubt of the Kai group.

Kai and Kuratomi knew of the fringe (radicals) and how they would be affected by their actions. The other faction wanted to keep things under control.

Kuratomi used to come to my office. I'd act dumb and grateful for advice and suggestions.

Kai and Kuratomi would say to Best: 'We are the representatives of the people.' They had petitions signed after the incident.

#### Advisory Council

We set up the Advisory Council just before Robertson came. It was directly after the incident. It was organized to keep Best on the beam, for me to get help in dealing with the Administration.

Mrs. Opler: Mr. Black was in it. I remember you had him and Carter and Albertson. (The latter two men have now left Tule.) They were worried about getting a plan to organize the colony.

Opler: Black appointed a committee including Huycke, Carter, Albertson and myself.

The Advisory Council was first - before the farm incident. We were dickering with Best on colony organization. Then, after the incident we were a group which expanded to include Robertson, Silverthorn, later the reports officer, Markham - Black, then we contacted whatever groups we could in the colony. Also McNeil.

#### Development of Coordinating Committee

After the incident there was a great need to contact the people in the center. We wanted Spicer to see the colony picture, writhing under the Army's heel. Around the time Spicer was here, the deadlock was in progress. Things were tight as a drum. No way of talking above the din of the Army.

At the first it was worse. You had to have a jeep to get into camp. I put off a trip to my office because I had to take the Army with me. Not a little puddle-jumper jeep but one of the big armored cars with a couple of soldiers. You couldn't go to see people; the Army was stern and forbidding.

We made this contact with Spicer. It was the same with the Co-op people. After he left we continued meeting with the whole group. We could meet now with Byron Akitsuki, (Bill) Mayeda and with the intelligent members of the Co-op - on our request. We met with the Board of Directors who were for breaking the deadlock. The Administration wanted the Army out. At that first meeting the Board of Directors of the Co-op were against it.



(The following is verbatim.)

When the Co-op took the vote it was 9 to 1. 55 -44 (Popular vote on Co-op proposition???) Now the present trend is the rise of the martyrdom complex.

We held meetings with the other people on the Co-op who were accessible. We had random meetings with Yamatani and Shimada. We had a series of meetings with Mayeda and Shimada. We had a series of meetings with Mayeda and Furukawa and Namekawa. We talked with them about the temper of the center and what they thought of the majority feeling. They came from three different blocks -three different wards. And lots of others.

Those were the days in which the Army was calling for a back to work in the High School. They sent for the foremen and called them out. They called them late at night. They (foremen) said they'd like to come back to work but you can't do "said." The Advisory Council had meetings with the Daihyo Sha remants after the pickups.

Unfortunately the Army picked so many up -from former Daihyo Sha's notebooks. On one occasion we met with a group. The next week 80% of them had been picked up.

Certain elements of the WRA were trying to reach the Army. How to get the Army out? You would have got venom against the Army (from the colonists) then.

The Division Head's meeting jelled in the center. Byron had not been prominent in this. He had been a figure head. It was the Co-op that led the battle (back to work).

Yamatani was chosen because he moved all over the scene and was in all the confabs. He's a politician type. He doesn't give a damn about his own reputation.

#### Reason For Going After Pedicord

About Pedicord there are different versions. His own version changed every time he was interviewed. But according to the nurses, whose stories are more consistent (eye witnesses), Pedicord wandered around back of the hospital. He ordered the guys out. They beat him up in his office. Best appreciated that that group was out of hand and that the Pedicord incident was unrelated to the demonstration. I think there were four or five boys concerned.

#### Kai and Kuratomi

That group was forming before the October 20'ies, when the farm worker was killed. On some of the meetings with Best, only Kai and Kuratomi would come and say, 'We are the representatives of the people.'

He'd ask them, 'Who do you represent?' They'd parry away in there. Kai's first name is Shizue. On one occasion Kai just stormed out of the room.



Motive for Sending Trucks in on November 4

I employed a dirty trick here, telling Opler that I had heard that the keys of the warehouse were procured, not to get more food from the warehouse but to get trucks to bring in more loyal harvesters. (That is what Dillon Myer had told me three days before.) Opler said this absolutely was not true, they had gone for food.

Where would they go to get what harvesters?, added Mrs. Opler.

Opler went on: Best was taking Zimmer's advice. Zimmer was sitting in the carved chair in Robertson's office then. Zimmer was continually going into Best's office and wasting half the day.

On the Pictures in Life Magazine

I tried to get myself completely out of that picture. I hope nobody recognizes me.

(Opler fears that his appearance with the Advisory Committee and the Coordinating Committee will get him in bad.)

I wonder what Bill Mayeda thinks. He doesn't want to go out. He's changed his mind.



MARCH 23, 1944INTERVIEW WITH LARRY KATAOKA OF THE DAIHYO SHA

When I talked to Robertson on Monday night he said he might be able to put me in touch with a boy who had once been a member of the Daihyo Sha Kai. I asked him to do what he could. On Wednesday morning he told me the boy was willing to talk to me. I was unable to find him at home on Wednesday and made an appointment for Thursday at 10:30. The young man's parents were very courteous, the father tried hard to find his son for me, but it appeared that he had gone to the Co-op store four blocks away.

Larry is a Nisei, a tall, handsome, sturdy Japanese. He impressed me as a young man of unusual courage and integrity. At one point in our conversation his mother spoke to him in Japanese, warning him against talking to a ketoo(1) like that. He answered (in Japanese) that I was a German Nisei (Doitsu no Nisei desu) and added in English, that he had had many German friends and none had ever double-crossed him. He used an excellent technique, asking me to tell him what I knew of an occurrence and promising to help me where the narrative was incomplete or incorrect. Later he answered some specific questions.

He told me before we began that he had not been in the Daihyo Sha from the beginning and that he had resigned when he saw that things were going on the wrong path. However, he respects the aims of the Daihyo Sha and feels that the men in the stockade are still the real leaders.

I'm conservative. I like to help the majority of the people. I'm not scared of anybody. As long as I'm doing the right thing I do what I please.

Daihyo Sha as Legitimate Representatives

I wouldn't know about all the blocks. I was elected from this block (as a block representative). When I had to resign I had to tell my people. I had to go to two meetings before they let me resign. I resigned because I wasn't feeling the same as the people going through with it.

You try to do right, but they (the Administration) can't see it. I used to work in Social Welfare, but I quit when this new head came in (a woman head whose name I did not catch). She does not understand the Japanese people.

The block representatives were elected after the incident. All were elected after the accident. I came here as a monitor from Jerome.

They figured the people who got hurt (when the truck turned over) represented the whole center. The feeling was very bad, when Best refused to let them use the auditorium. They knew they couldn't all get in, but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral, because he represented all of us.

[1. Ketoo originally meant "Chinese person" in a derogatory sense. Then it came to be used for all foreigners. In the camps I always heard it used in a derogatory sense.]



The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the couble-cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers.

'If Best had told the people frankly that he was bringing in harvesters, would the feeling have been so bad?' I asked.

Not nearly so bad, said Larry. He didn't tell the people a thing.

#### First Requests of the Daihyo Sha

(Mr. Kataoka consulted his parents about this question.)

So far as I know, they made their first requests after the funeral. The funeral didn't come out right. If he'd run it normally, I don't think nothing like this would have happened. The Daihyo Sha on November 1 asked the people to come at 1:30.

#### On Threats Made to Force People to Attend Funeral

There were hoodlums like that. They didn't know any better. So far as I know Daihyo Sha gave out no printed material.

#### Pedicord Incident

He came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and make a stink!

(Larry cleared this up a bit saying that Pedicord had come out the side door of the hospital and cursed the boys, telling them to go away. They then followed him into the hospital and beat him.)

They had so many things they requested for. They (the Administration) might not be able to comply with all of it. But they said they'll do what they can. They (the Administration) said they would not allow people who have bad feelings against the Japanese to work here. They did make promises vocally.

The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?

They made a promise that they were going to cooperate. I didn't hear that they made a promise to stop taking out food.



At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it liveable.

Everything but the essentials stopped working after the hospital incident.

I don't know why they plled out a lot of those Hawaiian boys. There were just a couple of Hawaiian boys in it. Most of them had nothing to do with it.

All the Daihyo Shas were mostly Issei and Kibei.

So far as food is concerned, it was much worse in this center than in the one where I came from (Jerome). After the Army came in it was terrible. Sometimes we didn't get enough to eat and had to buy from the canteen.

When we asked for better facilities: In the beginning of evacuation they said, 'If you're loyal and go into camp they'll provide you with everything, clothing and board. You don't have to worry about anything.' Then you know what happened.

The block representatives (of the Daihyo Sha Kai) were elected by the people. I was voted in. It's a big responsibility and you stick your neck out. I'm acting for the people.

The Administration promised to negotiate and talk things over (after November 4). But the search kind of mixed things up. They thought they could pull them (the leaders) all in and everything would be all clear. Everytime we asked for a chance to talk things over we got picked up.

#### Demands To The Co-op

Larry defended the action in asking the Co-op to discontinue the sale of luxuries. He described conditions under the status quo:

Most of the people not working, getting poor, and insufficient food at mess - doing their best to stick to status-quo. Meanwhile the children of people who had sufficient money to pay the high co-op prices, went around with candy and ice cream cones.

Naturally we thought we should get together with the Co-op and all fight for the same thing. A person with a lot of money can get what he wants from the canteen. It was sometime in December that the demands were made to the Co-op.

#### Coordinating Committee

They just forced themselves in with the help of WRA and the Army. This thing lagged too long. The Army put on the



curfew. We're behind the fence like this and can't act as we please. Naturally, we had the right idea and were doing the right thing. But we began to see it couldn't be. We tried whatever we can. To many of the people it seems as if we tried all we can. The people were suffering.

We try to do all we can. If it doesn't come out, we try to do something also. A representative is for the people and we try to do what we can for them.

### The Army

You can't criticize the Army. In Japan it would be worse. They (the U.S. Army) are lenient. The people do respect the Army more than WRA. In any country the Army is supposed to represent the whole country.

I asked Larry who he thought the WRA represented. He said that he would not like to say.

I give the Coordinating Committee credit for the releases. Some of us have tried too. When we went to see Lieutenant Forbes and May, they were all right. Lieutenant Calling was all right too.

After we find out there's no hope in doing anything, I met Mr. Robertson. I talked to him myself. There was nobody with me. I told him, 'You have the Daihyo Shas in the stockade. You have a new Negotiating Committee (the Coordinating Committee). The first one is petered out and the second one got the peoples' consent without any backing at all. The people didn't approve all the Daihyo Shas did.'

In order to have the camp back to a normal basis, the only way to do is to dispose of the New Coordinating Committee and let the blocks elect at least two representatives from each block and then let them be the peoples' representatives. If the colonists were backing them up, they'd get the backing.

I told him to get in between and let the representatives do this. This would knock all the stuff off. We would have evidence that the people approve of them.

(Here Larry asked me what Robertson had told me. If he had told me about this meeting. I said, he had told me of a meeting but had given me little detail, which was the truth. So Larry said he would not tell me then, but if Robertson wished to, it was quite all right.)

I owe the people that much. Before I do anything, I ask them how they feel. I'm not letting anybody down. Double-crossing people is the last thing I'll do.

The Coordinating Committee did get people out of the stockade and tried to do their share.

If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything.



At the close of this interview (we talked nearly two hours) I thanked Larry Kataoka and told him that I admired his stand. I said that an individual like himself would be a credit to any country. He on his part, thanked me for coming, apologized for taking so much of my time, and invited me to come again.

I hotfooted it for Robertson's office to ask him about the meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL INTERVIEW WITH ROBERTSON

(The following is verbatim.)

When I was in Leupp (during December and part of January), some of these boys started calling me from Block 11. Block 11 was the center of the Daihyo Sha group. When I came back from Leupp there were three memos on my desk that the block manager of 11 wanted to get in touch with me. So about the third day after I came back (I was terribly busy at first) a frantic telephone call came from down there so I immediately went. I went to Block 11 and introduced myself and asked if someone there wanted to see me. They told me a party in Block 6 wanted to see me. I met Larry there and the first thing he said was, 'Mr. Robertson, we're in a quandary as to what to do. We've heard a lot about you and we'd like to know if you'd spend some time with us.'

'Who is we?' I said. 'Members of the Daihyo Sha,' he said. This was January 15.

The next day they had a meeting. There were five or six members of the Daihyo Sha there besides Larry. I knew none of them. All expressed confidence in me and asked me what I thought of the present situation. I told them what I've told you, that there are only two avenues we can take:

1. Have the two groups combine to bring the colony back to normal.
2. Have further segregation.

Their main goal was the release of all the stockade people. That's what they were stirred up about. I advised them that by remaining as they were in the so called status quo it would be almost impossible to get out of the stockade. I suggested that if the Daihyo Sha resign, if a general referendum were promoted, they might be able to elect a group of representatives everyone in the colony would have faith in, and thus bring the two factions together.

The general consensus of opinion at that time was that they would take my advice, but would have to have the approval of the boys in the stockade. They asked me to call men of the stockade group into my office and tell them what we had discussed and ask their approval. They put down their names on a piece of paper. I said, 'You realize that when I talk to these men in the stockade I can tell them what I please?'

They said, 'What you tell them is all right with us.'

So I called the seven men over. We sat here an hour and a half. George Kuratomi was the principal speaker. He said, 'If you'll promise me that we'll eventually get out of the stockade, we'll go for that plan.' I said, 'I'm in no position to make that promise to you. That could be the first step toward your eventual release.'

Kuratomi said: 'If I ask the boys in the stockade to adopt this plan, I'll have to give them my word. If anything goes wrong I'll have to commit harakiri.'



I said: In other words you're laying your life at my feet and that I will not permit. As it stands now I'll go back to your committee and tell them that until you're guaranteed release things will stand as they are.

George said, let one or two of us go out of the stockade and convince the people that this is the thing to do. This group you talked to are not strong enough to lead the people.

I said, I'll approach the Administration on that but I don't hold much hope.

George said: If you'll release two, we'll resign and tell the people to hold an election.

Robertson added that the Administration had taken no action since. Two days after he had talked to the boys one of them was picked up. The message evidently was carried to the boys that they were not to do anything.

Best, said Robertson, had repeatedly warned him against Mrs. Matsuda. 'Some day you'll go to see that woman and she'll run outside and scream 'Rape'.

I promised Robertson that this information would remain absolutely confidential.

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#### INTERNAL SECURITY ATTEMPTS GENTLE THIRD DEGREE ON HANKEY

Transportation to Klamath Falls is now arranged at the Police Office. Here the officers kindly suggested that I ride into town in their car instead of the other. This I did. There were three other administrative personnel workers in the car and I said not a word till we reached Klamath. (I had a headache.) The police officers were interesting specimens. The body and cranial structure of one might have been used by a certain school of physical anthropology to bolster the hypothesis that the blood of Neanderthal runs in our veins today; the other was slender and of the traditional ferret-eyed type. The former looked and acted like a caricature of a tough, dumb detective. His black suit with light pin stripe bulged strangely under his arms, he spoke so deliberately that he appeared to be having difficulty getting out each word. He drove me to the station and suggested that I come back with him and his companion for dinner. I said I had to check my baggage.

I walked back to town and had dinner. While buying a mystery story for the trip, I looked up and saw the big, tough man bearing down on me. 'I thought we had put you on the train, young lady,' said he in police style though intended to be jocular. He engaged me in conversation on my German ancestry, saying that he also was German and that his wife was not even a citizen. His wife really ought to be sent out of the country, if some people had their way. 'Too bad,' said I. Now ferret-eyes appeared from the other direction. A glass of beer was suggested. 'Hell,' thought I, 'Let's see how these babies work.' With the first glass of beer, I was asked what I thought of O'Day, the silly but earnest 'pink' with whom these gentlemen had no doubt seen me conversing (not on my choice). I said I didn't think they had to worry about O'day. A dope like him would only do harm to the Communist party. With the second glass of beer the wheels creaked round to the Japanese. I agreed that my work was interesting. One asked me if the Japanese had organizations similar to the Chinese Tongs. I said I did not know. I had never heard of any. The smaller one said, 'You don't seem to be afraid of them, the way you barge right in.' 'I have nothing to fear in camp,' I said. With the third glass of beer I decided to pour it on and delivered a short lecture on the



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differences in the Japanese and Chinese methods of writing, since the smaller one laid pretensions to some Chinese. 'That's the trouble with me,' said the big one, 'I ain't never had no education.' 'That's no handicap to an intelligent man,' I said, and noting that it was seven o'clock left to catch my train.

The "pinks" in Tule, of which there are a few, are pretty scared of Internal Security. I was warned that I might have my room searched at an moment. But Mr. Schmidt, the head of Internal Security at Tule Lake, knows my brother who is on the force at Berkeley [where the Evacuation and Resettlement Study had its headquarters]. And whereas Schmidt is a big man, my brother Dick is bigger.

[Like my interview with the Sakamoto brothers, this account reflects my biases and the kind of adolescent bravado that I sometimes assumed at Tule Lake.]

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GIVEN TO ME BY MR. AKITSUKIMINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE DIVISIONAL HEADS OF THE TULE  
LAKE CENTER  
January 29, 1944

The regular meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center was held on January 29, 1944, at 1608-A, from 2:00 p.m. Chairman B. Akitsuki presided.

Roll was called and is shown per attached sheet.

Minutes of the regular meeting of the Divisional Heads held on January 22, 1944, were read and approved with an addition of the words underlined, "35 workers are yet to be employed in the high school only," in the section of the reports of the divisional heads.

The Chair then reported on the activities of the Co-ordinating Committee as follows:

1. Approximately 1000 resumed work since January 13, 1944. In spite of the existing frictions between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 750 persons applied for jobs up to date.
2. Up to yesterday, 55 persons were released from the stockade and more will be released in the very near future. The army has definitely stated that release en masse is impossible unless the Center has returned to its normal condition.
3. Through the courtesy of the Japanese Red Cross, imon-him (gifts) have arrived at this Tule Lake Center. Thereupon, all ward chairmen of block managers assembled this morning to discuss the proper ways and means of distribution. It was decided that at least 11 barrels of shoyu (soy-bean sauce) will be allotted to each of the 64 blocks. Inasmuch as leakage of the shoyu must still be accounted for, the allotment is still indefinite. distribution thereon will be left up to the discretion of the block managers and Issei representatives of the respective blocks.
4. As decided at the last divisional meeting, the Co-ordinating Committee presented the suggestion to create new jobs for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities, such as clean-up crew, to the WRA. Project Director has stated definitely that the time is not appropriate to be discussing future plans unless the Center is back to normal and all old activities functioning as usual. Moreover, the Administration must get Washington's approval prior to the execution of any contemplated plans.
5. Relaxation of the curfew hour up until 9:30 p.m. has been recommended but it was felt inappropriate to lift such now; moreover, it was felt that it should be withheld until center completely returns to its normal status.
6. Mr. Lefler of the WRA Washington office, at the previous meeting of the Advisory Council and the Committee explained in details Prisoner-of-war camps in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. His explanation as well as other informations obtained will be published upon permission granted by the WRA.