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Dillon S. Myer, Director

9/10/43

Thomas W. Holland, Chief, Employment Division  
/s/ Thomas Holland

Enclosed is a long memorandum which I have prepared during the summer dealing with the development and growth of our relocation program during 1942. I had intended to revise this draft and have it retyped but it looks to be substantially okay in its present form so I am sending it along in first draft just as I prepared it originally.

Attachment



Memorandum

August 5, 1943

To: Dillon S. Myer, Director

From: Thomas W. Holland, Chief, Employment Division  
/s/ Thomas W. Holland

Hardly a day goes by now without some reference being made to the earlier part of our experience in developing policy and procedures for relocation outside the centers. I thought that it might be useful to put down on paper, as I remember them, some of the more important considerations that helped shape our relocation program during the summer of 1942.

1. I came over to the WRA about May first of 1942 and for the first two weeks here was on detail from the Department of Labor. During that time I had a number of talks with Mr. Eisenhower about the employment policies of WRA and the functions of the Employment Division. At this time Mr. Eisenhower had not been back from the Salt Lake City conference very many days. His thinking about the problem of outside employment was very much affected by the discussions that took place at the Salt Lake meeting which was held on April 7.

In our discussions on employment during these first few days of my service with WRA very little, if anything, was said about the possibility of evacuees leaving the centers permanently for private employment; the thinking that was done was mainly in terms of seasonal agricultural employment built around the Work Corps and there didn't seem to be very much prospect for this sort of work. Most of the discussions I had with Mr. Eisenhower early in May were on the question of wages to be paid the evacuees at the projects and related subjects. I recall meeting Colonel Bendetsen for the first time at a conference on the subject of wage payments in assembly centers at the War Department building here early in May.

On May 4 Mr. Eisenhower wrote me a rather comprehensive memorandum entitled "Responsibilities of the Reemployment Division." Reference was made to the difficulty of seasonal employment while the people were undergoing the evacuation. If male members of a family would leave the projects for given periods the CCC camps might possibly be used for temporary housing. If seasonal employment were permitted outside the projects it would be carried on after voluntary recruitment by the U.S.E.S., prevailing wages would be paid to enlistees, the employer would pay for the transportation and would provide housing and medical services, the States and local communities would give absolute assurance of their ability to



maintain law and order. Almost the same conditions had been proposed by General DeWitt a few weeks earlier and Colonel Bendetsen had presented them to the western Governors at the Salt Lake conference. Although the conditions for employment outside the centers on temporary work had been laid down, Eisenhower was not at all hopeful that any evacuees would be able to get into this work. On April 28 he wrote in a letter to the chairman of a USDA War Board "I wish conditions were such that they could all engage in private employment. At present the military situation, public attitude, and the general inability to guarantee safety, all mitigate against private employment. I hope very much that fundamental conditions will rapidly change."

The tentative policy statement of WRA issued on May 29 gives the best survey of the official views of the organization during this period. The Work Corps was still being viewed as the foundation upon which employment, both inside and outside the projects, rested. An evacuee could be given a furlough for a month from the Work Corps in order to take outside employment; extensions were provided for a month at a time. The policy statement sets forth the conditions which would be required to be observed for recruiting seasonal labor and these are about the same as the conditions earlier laid down by General DeWitt and, in general, were very similar to the conditions actually being required, as stated in my memorandum of May 23. A reference is made in the policy statement to private employment of individuals or families, as distinguished from the seasonal work group employment: "Each such private employment opportunity will for the time being be considered by the Regional Director on its merits."

At about the same time that the policy statement was issued, on June 5, the Solicitor submitted for consideration a draft of a document entitled "Furlough From Relocation Areas." The lawyers felt that it was necessary to have some specific procedure for allowing qualified evacuees to depart from relocation centers in order to strengthen the legal basis of the whole WRA program. The regulations as proposed made provision for a furlough to be issued by a Project Director for a short term departure, for an individual to work outside the center, for a group to work outside, to go to school, and finally an indefinite furlough for indefinite residence outside the relocation area. The Project Director would make whatever investigation of the applicant he deemed to be necessary and in case the applicant wanted an indefinite furlough the Project Director was instructed to give attention to the applicant's past record of loyalty and cooperation, the destination of the applicant, taking into account public opinion toward the residence of an evacuee, and finally to examine the arrangements made for permanent residence and livelihood. Furloughs were to expire at any time that an evacuee, to whom one had been issued, violated any of the



conditions applicable to his furlough or if the Director of WRA notified the evacuee that the public interest required his return to a place under the jurisdiction of the WRA.

Along with the furlough regulations a companion regulation was also drafted by the lawyers in order to provide some means of enforcing the regulations. An evacuee out on a furlough was to "remain in the constructive military custody of the Western Defense Command and the Fourth Army of the United States," and it was proposed that a violation on the part of the evacuee of the furlough regulations of WRA would subject him to the penalties in the Act of Congress passed March 21, 1942, (Public No. 505, 77th Congress).

There is no doubt that from a very early date in our brief history the problem of releasing people for work, education, and residence outside the centers was being discussed by WRA officials here in Washington and the lawyers were beginning to work out a procedure. It was around the first of June, too, that Commander Ringle had a strong influence on the views of the WRA officials. However, despite the discussions of the loyalty of the evacuees that were going on and the efforts of the lawyers to provide a means of departure from the centers, there was, as I said above, very little discussion, or even hope, for a substantial amount of relocation beyond the confines of the centers. The prevailing idea was that almost all the evacuees would remain in the centers during the war and that only a few would be able to settle outside on a permanent basis. Also, as I said above, even seasonal work in agriculture on a temporary leave from the projects did not seem to have very bright prospects after the Salt Lake City conference and until about the middle of May.

2. When the break came in the sugar beet labor situation it came quickly. There was great need for labor in the inter-mountain States in the spring of 1942 and the sugar beet companies were instrumental in bringing the State and local officials around to an acceptance of the evacuees as temporary laborers in the sugar beet fields. May 13, 1942, can be put down as the date when WRA made its first real step in the direction of a program of outside employment for the evacuees. Frase and I were called into conference on the afternoon of the 13th with Eisenhower, the other Division Chiefs, and the Solicitor. I don't know just what the line of pressure was that broke the stalemate but I believe that the Amalgamated Sugar Company had succeeded in interesting a Senator from Oregon in their problem and also the Governor of that State. The Utah Idaho Company was also successful at about the same time in interesting the Governor of Idaho.

Eisenhower earlier in the day had been in communication with Bendetsen and they had jointly agreed on a series of conditions which were very similar to those already laid down by General DeWitt



a few days earlier. At our conference in Eisenhower's office there was a general appreciation that an important step was being taken and I remember well the rather electric atmosphere that prevailed while Eisenhower made the commitments for WRA over the tactical line to San Francisco. Eisenhower summed up the conditions for recruiting labor in a teletype to Fryer.

This teletype message, dated May 15, starts with the sentence: "Bendetsen and I have agreed to the following" and there follows then the statement that approval or disapproval of private employment while the evacuees are in assembly centers would rest exclusively with the Army. WRA was to secure necessary agreements and commitments and make a recommendation about each recruiting proposition to the Army and also WRA was to handle the follow-through administration. The conditions laid down for recruitment were that the evacuees were to be enlisted in the Work Corps, from which they would be eligible for furlough. WRA was to have in writing from the Governor of the State and from the local law enforcement officials assurances with respect to law and order. The employer had to give assurance that he would provide transportation to and from the centers and payment of prevailing wages was required. The U. S. Employment Service was to handle recruitment at the assembly centers on a strictly voluntary basis. The U. S. E. S. also was to have examined living accommodations, medical care, and health facilities provided at the place of employment and to give WRA written assurance that such facilities were satisfactory. The Employment Service was required to assure WRA that local labor would not be displaced and that the wages offered were, in fact, the prevailing wages. The Employment Service was also requested to make a weekly report to WRA on general conditions in the area of employment.

Mr. Eisenhower asked me to leave for California to work on the recruitment of sugar beet labor and I started from here on May 16.

3. By the time I arrived in San Francisco on May 19 several requests for permission to recruit sugar beet labor had been filed in the regional office. Recruiting had already begun at the Portland assembly center by the Amalgamated Sugar Company. At first it looked as if the results were going to be quite good but the first group that left Portland for Nyssa, Oregon, on May 21 was very small, only 15 people. Mr. Fryer assigned Rex Lee to help me in San Francisco and Mr. Eisenhower had also come out from Washington. We went over the pending requests from sugar beet companies for permission to recruit and made some changes in the original statement of conditions which had been dictated by Mr. Eisenhower on May 13. The conditions under which the recruiting during the spring and summer of 1942 took place were set forth in a memorandum which I wrote to the Director and the Regional Director on May 23. This memorandum was mimeographed and since it



is still readily available in our files, I won't attempt to summarize its contents. Substantially, it incorporated the conditions laid down in Eisenhower's teletype of May 15 with some changes that experience during the ensuing days indicated to be desirable.

One important development should be recorded and that is the disappearance of the Work Corps as a vital part of the recruitment policy. Immediately after the decision was made by Mr. Eisenhower to take a part of the responsibility for the recruitment of the evacuees for sugar beet work, Fryer sent Lee, Walk, Gilbert and Dean from the San Francisco regional office to the Portland assembly center to institute the Work Corps. As I said above, any discussion of outside employment for the evacuees has, up to this time, centered around the institution of a Work Corps. The evacuees would enlist in the Work Corps and then would be given a furlough to go out on the seasonal job.

The men from the San Francisco office arrived at the Portland assembly center on May 16 or 17. They immediately went into conference with a group of leading evacuees at the Portland center. They met with a stone wall. These evacuees didn't like the Work Corps. They asked questions which couldn't be answered by the WRA men and they weren't persuaded by the presentation given. Lee has given me a play-by-play account of this trip and its failure, I am sure, is not due to him or his colleagues. The trouble was with the Work Corps itself. After this trip the condition that had been laid down that the evacuee had to be a member of the Work Corps was forgotten insofar as sugar beet labor recruiting was concerned. We just quietly put the requirement on ice and the recruiting proceeded without the necessity for enlistment in the Work Corps. My memorandum of May 23 makes no reference to the Work Corps.

4. While the Amalgamated Sugar Company was recruiting at Portland I went up there and accompanied the second group of evacuees to go out to the sugar beet fields. This was on May 27, 1942. The second group consisted of 44 people and Nyssa, Oregon, was the destination. On returning from Nyssa I spent a part of my time at Tanforan, Santa Anita, and at Manzanar keeping in close touch with the recruiting. One Sunday Lee, Gilbert and I went out to Walnut Grove, California, and had an opportunity to observe the operation of a central station which was the first step in the evacuation process.

In connection with recruiting for sugar beet work, nothing was said about investigating or screening the evacuees who were hired to go out in the fields. Anybody could go. I do not recall any discussion whatever on our part or any conferences with the military officials in which the problem was raised about the type of individual who would be allowed to depart from a center for this agricultural work. Of course, the evacuees who went out were under a restrictive order which confined them to a definite area, escorts were required to accompany the groups of



evacuees departing, and it was expected that the evacuees going out on this work would come back to the centers. It may well be that the question of the type of person to be allowed out did not become a topic of discussion because the safeguards of the recruiting system were tacitly regarded as adequate.

I don't know the exact number of evacuees who went out for work in sugar beet fields in the spring and early summer of 1942. The estimate we give is between 1,600 and 1,700 people. This number was disappointing to us but in view of the tenseness of the feeling on the West Coast last spring and the expressed hostility in the areas in which the job opportunities were, it was probably a pretty good showing.

Insofar as the development of a program by WRA for outside employment was concerned this first experience with outside work was a very important influence in that direction. There were no complaints that evacuees had engaged in un-American activity; there was little or no violence and remarkably few tense situations developed. The evacuees did good work and made a real contribution to saving the crops in the northwest. They built up good will for themselves. Based on the experience we had with the recruitment of labor at this period, I think that it was only natural for those of us who were closely in touch with the situation to begin to look ahead to the possibility of a larger utilization of these people in employment outside the projects.

5. At this period the principal activity of the Employment Division was on the West Coast. The Division was composed of Davis McEntire, Robert Frase, Rex Lee, and myself. Lee had been transferred in May to work with me, and McEntire joined the staff in the latter part of the month. Early in June, Frase came out from Washington. We were swamped with the recruiting of sugar beet labor but I recall that we had numerous talks about the desirability and possibility of relocating the evacuees throughout the country instead of confining them closely to the camps. As the days passed it became apparent that the seasonal type of work outside the camps was feasible. The evacuees were profiting because it gave them a chance to earn their own living under conditions which, if not normal, were at least more normal than camp life. The country profited through the addition of the evacuees to the gainfully employed at a time when it was vital that no source of labor be overlooked. By the middle of June it was pretty clear that WRA could count on having a program for seasonal work outside the camps in western agriculture. But this did not seem to us to be enough. The camp continued to be the base for the evacuee and for the majority there was no encouragement or opportunity to settle permanently for those who wanted to get away from camp life. In our discussions we felt that it was essential



to the country and to the evacuees that there be such encouragement and opportunity; and also for the moral of the centers where most of the people would probably have to abide for the duration of the war. As we saw the problem, a program which would permit permanent relocation was equally important as the maintenance of the camps.

The resettlement of evacuees throughout the country would contribute useful manpower to the country, would salvage the evacuees as Americans, would bolster the morale of the relocation centers, and beyond these immediate advantages of relocation it was hoped that this sort of approach might even go a long way toward solving the problem of the Japanese minority in the United States through an elimination of the pressure that had been generated by excessive concentration on the West Coast.

These views were not exactly theoretical. All four of us were out in the assembly centers a good deal of the time in connection with sugar beet recruitment. McEntire went down to Poston and came back to San Francisco deeply concerned with the problems he had seen taking shape. My first view of the realities of the evacuation was at the Portland assembly center and I don't believe that I will ever forget the sharp impact of this brief visit. Here were thousands of working people out of work at a time when their contribution would mean so much to the country; young and old, good and bad, Japanese and American, were thrown closely together under one roof; and most of the people behind the barbed wire and the guns were American citizens. It seemed to me if military necessity had made this drastic confinement of Americans necessary that at the earliest possible moment after these people were out of the sensitive military area they should be encouraged and assisted to get back into the normal ways of American life just as rapidly as possible.

6. I do not think that it is possible to separate out of the factors and influences that were shaping the relocation program during the spring of 1942 any one that was of paramount influence. As usual in this sort of situation, there was a complex of factors and influences. Principally on the negative side was the fear that adverse public sentiment would not permit such a program. This fear was pretty firmly held at this time within WRA. Also on the negative side was the almost complete preoccupation of WRA with plans for relocation centers and life in these centers.

Moving in the direction of a relocation program, as I have indicated above, was the experience with the sugar beet labor, the growing feeling among some of the WRA staff that a vigorous program of relocation outside the centers was essential from several points of view, and the work of the lawyers on a formalized procedure for release from the centers. There were others, too, who were concerned with the possibility that WRA might not provide anything more than camp life. The evacuees themselves were interested.



There was considerable talk among groups of them of the possibility of individual and group resettlement outside the evacuated area. Some of the evacuees had friends or relatives who offered them hospitality or jobs. In May and June the file of correspondence from evacuees and their friends and relatives grew steadily in the San Francisco office. Just before I left San Francisco to return to Washington I went over approximately 150 requests to leave Manzanar and Poston. I understand that the WCCA received many requests of this kind for release from the assembly centers. The specific requests for permission to depart from the centers gave us something concrete to start working on.

The contribution of the church people toward a relocation program should not be overlooked. A group of clergymen on the west coast were encouraging resettlement. Galen Fisher comes to mind as an active member of this group. Representatives of the Federal Council of Churches were interested. John Thomas of the Baptist Home Mission organization was giving especially close attention to the problem. The YWCA was active. The Friends Service Committee was also deeply concerned and had begun to function in a small way in the middle west and east in securing employment. I can recall a very fruitful conference with Homer Morris early in June.

College and university people both on the West Coast and elsewhere in the United States exerted a strong and initial encouragement to relocation outside the projects. There was a general concern with the likelihood that many of the nisei in West Coast schools would end up for the duration in camps. These nisei found champions in many of their teachers. The Director of WRA, Mr. Eisenhower, felt a special concern for these young people. The upshot of the matter was that a Student Relocation Council was organized late in May, 1942. This Council got into action immediately and gave an impetus to the developing idea that there might possibly be a chance for many of the evacuees to find a new life outside the centers.

Another factor that was an influence in this general direction was the release from the assembly centers of a number of evacuees. The WCCA, I think, let three or four hundred evacuees go after investigating each applicant and receiving assurances about the community sentiment in the place the evacuee wanted to go. This assurance had to be secured by the evacuee from the mayor or chief of police before he would be given a release. I don't know how many evacuees were allowed to leave by WRA during May and June but some were allowed to depart from the few centers we were operating at that time. The number was very small and I think that they went out to join their family.



7. I left San Francisco for Washington on June 17 and on that day wrote a memorandum to Mr. Fryer. In the memorandum I said that I was anxious to get back to Washington "to talk with Mr. Eisenhower about the possibility of outside employment for smaller groups or individuals. I see by a memorandum from Colonel Bendetsen that the army is willing to release people from the assembly centers for outside employment provided it is beyond the limits of the Western Defense Command. Also, the army is willing to allow permits for university students to go out of the assembly centers. It seems to me that we should be equally as liberal. To my mind, the most important thing that can be done to benefit our relocation centers would be to allow those Japanese who have propositions for outside employment to take advantage of them freely. I am convinced that the great majority of the people will want to stay in the relocation centers for the duration of the war. There is a percentage of the more active ones who are just dying to get out of the western area and to take advantage of jobs that they already have lined up. If we discourage such outside employment, it means that we have penned up against their will probably the most vocal and disillusioned of the Japanese. I am confident that allowing this minority group of people to take jobs elsewhere freely will have an excellent psychological reaction on those who choose to stay. It turns the relocation center into a genuine free refuge. If the people are free to go outside and take jobs and we do not take advantage of their freedom, then we can probably get them to work more freely in our centers. \*\*\* I will see Mr. Eisenhower the end of this week and hope to be able to persuade him, if he needs any persuading, as to the desirability of a liberal policy on departures for outside jobs."

It was my view that the camps should be places of refuge and not detention camps. One advantage of relocation outside was that it would give those who wanted to get out an opportunity to do so and those who remained behind could settle down to making the best of camp life for the duration. I did not think that very many people would be resettled outside. At this time I thought that we would be getting pretty good results if those who had job offers through friends, religious bodies, and others were enabled to leave the centers to take the offers. We would encourage this sort of relocation but the total number relocated would probably be limited to those who had some sort of sponsorship. As I look back after having had the advantage of 13 months of experience, this appears to be a limited view. The truth is that the relocation program has gradually unfolded and the process is still going on today. In June of 1942 we knew practically nothing about the possibility of acceptance for the evacuees in the middle west and the east; we didn't know whether jobs would be abundant or scarce or what kind of jobs would open up for the evacuees. About all we had to go on definitely was that some of



the evacuees had job opportunities in other parts of the country. During June of 1942 we cut our cloth to fit this pattern. At about this time I wrote to an interested clergyman that we were trying "to take the first step in the direction of relocating the evacuees outside the relocation centers. At each of the relocation centers we have on file the applications of several Japanese people who have specific jobs waiting for them in the middle west or the east. Taking these people as a starter, it is my hope that before very long we will begin to have a small steady movement of evacuees into private employment. As our experience grows and perhaps as we begin to beat the Japanese nation more definitely this small trickle will develop into a larger stream."

Just before I left San Francisco Frase and I worked out a procedure for releasing the evacuees who had job offers. Frase picked out several of the pending applications and had Fryer instruct the Project Directors in the centers where these people were located to investigate the evacuees and to report back to the San Francisco office. The Project Director was instructed to make whatever investigation of the character and background of the individuals as was possible at the project. The plan was for the San Francisco office to submit the name of the individual to the FBI and the ONI on the West Coast. The whole file was then to be submitted to the Washington office where final action would be taken by the Director. The Washington office was to make all contacts between the WRA and the employer, local authorities and sponsoring groups at the place of employment. On my way through Chicago between trains I interviewed two of the prospective employers. It should be said in concluding the summary of this first practical step toward a procedure for releasing evacuees for permanent resettlement outside the centers that no one ever got out as a result of it. It was absorbed and superseded by the developments of the next few weeks.

8. I got back to Washington from San Francisco on June 20, 1942. The new Director, to whom I reported on the afternoon of June 20, requested me to make a fuller report at the staff conference which was to be held Wednesday night, June 24. I urged at this meeting that two major steps be taken: (1) That the Work Corps be dispensed with and (2), and more important, that we regard the projects as refuges for unfortunate people who could not go anywhere else and that we permit evacuees to depart from the centers for permanent relocation outside.

I do not have notes on this conference but I have before me a copy of a letter, dated June 25, from the Solicitor to his regional attorney in San Francisco summing up the discussion which took place that evening.



"1. Tom Holland reported on the Work Corps. He indicated that the institution is lapsing into innocuous desuetude. He recalled the unfortunate experience that accompanied the attempt to enlist at the Portland Assembly Centers and subsequently in some of the other Assembly Centers. He emphasized the "blank check" aspects of the enlistment form, both as originally printed and as revised. He indicated the meaninglessness of the method of enlistment used at least in the past at the Colorado River project. He emphasized the unwillingness of evacuees to enlist when W.R.A. is unable to give assurances as to the type of work to which the enlistee will be assigned, the precise wages he will be paid, the conditions under which he may be asked to move to another Center, and other employment conditions. He stressed the reluctance of enlistees to enlist "for the duration" because of the uncertainty as to the effect of such enlistment on their subsequent freedom of movement. Lucy Adams supplied a brief supplement in which she agreed in general with Tom Holland's position on the Work Corps.

"I traced some of the history of the Work Corps idea and indicated that while I was still not certain that the Work Corps idea would not have worked well if we had been able to launch it properly after filling in the blanks in the check, yet I was now convinced that events since the organization of W.R.A. have made it important that we set aside the Work Corps, at least for the time being. I pointed out this would not necessitate an amendment of Executive Order No. 9102 or repeal of the regulations governing enlistment, nor even announcement of any policy in this regard. It would be sufficient to cease all efforts to enlist evacuees in the Corps and to let the institution remain dormant. The employment and the furlough regulations could be revised so that enlistment in the Work Corps would not be a significant element in any of the decisions or procedures. Subsequently, when conditions are proper, we can formulate an appropriate method for renewing the idea and reviving the Work Corps.

"Elmer Rowalt pointed out the possibility of limiting the Work Corps more or less as it was early conceived into an institution for enlisting and organizing those of the evacuees who will be working on public works projects, either directly for W.R.A. or for other governmental agencies, Federal, State, or local.

"Dillon Myer took the entire subject under advisement and will probably make no decision until after he has discussed the problem with Si Fryer and others on the West Coast. He and Elmer Rowalt are leaving for San Francisco early next week. I shall not accompany them.



"My guess is that either of two decisions will be made shortly after Dillon has gone to the West Coast -- (1) to forget the Work Corps idea entirely for the time being, or (2) to use the Work Corps for public works employment along the lines of Elmer Rowalt's suggestion.

"2. We discussed, also, the question of leave from Relocation Centers (with the accompanying furlough from the Work Corps for those evacuees who are given such leave and are enlisted in the Corps). Tom Holland and others indicated the desirability of permitting free movement out of the Centers, subject to necessary administrative procedural controls -- but the latter were not too clearly defined. I pointed out the desirability that leave, when granted, should be expressly conditioned on the right of W.R.A. to require return to the Relocation Center if circumstances make that necessary. This is in order to strengthen our theory of constructive custody and our constitutional rights to require such return if need be. It was emphasized by several people, and Dillon agreed, that we could not risk numerous leaves from Relocation Centers until we had some evidence that general American public opinion was prepared to permit the evacuees to move about in this way. My guess here is that the leave regulations would soon be approved, including provision for indefinite discharge under carefully guarded circumstances."

9. The staff conference on the evening of June 24 is an important event in this brief history because it opened up the problem and started general discussion in WRA of the possibilities of a relocation program that would allow for settlement over the country. The conference also aroused interest in the procedure that would have to be established for releasing evacuees from the centers for relocation outside. There was some reference to procedures at the staff conference but the Solicitor was quite right when he observed that the administrative procedural controls were not too clearly defined in connection with the objectives stated that evening. Up to this time Frase and I had spent a short time discussing possible procedures while we were out in San Francisco. We had just barely got our teeth into the problem. The lawyers were also at work at this time drafting proposed furlough regulations. After the meeting on the 24th I had conferred with the lawyers and found myself in disagreement with the proposed furlough regulations in some respects.

It was not until July 20 that the first Administrative Instruction was issued by the Director covering departure from the centers for relocation. The issuance of this instruction was preceded by four or five weeks of discussions with the lawyers and other members of the staff, arguments, preliminary drafts, and conferences within WRA and with representatives of other agencies.



The type of evacuee to be let out was discussed along with the extent to which there was to be a sifting or checking of those who wanted to go. Acceptance in the middle west and other parts of the United States was discussed with numerous people. The problem of support after leaving the project was explored. There were discussions and arguments over the status of an evacuee who had left a project and how WRA could get him back if his return was desired. These problems were gone into at some length between the meeting of June 24 and July 20 when the Administrative Instruction was issued. It should be observed, however, that the first Administrative Instruction on leave was not the end of our consideration of the subject. Indeed, it was only the beginning. Not until October 1, 1942, when the basic leave regulations were adopted did WRA crystallize the procedure which in main outline is being followed today. Even this has not proven to be the final answer. The scene has shifted constantly and rapidly. Some problems have been solved but more have made their appearance fresh on the scene. It has been necessary to adjust our thinking and our rules to the ever-changing pattern.

10. I want, now, to give some attention to the ideas that were being developed on relocation during the latter part of June and through July. The same day that the staff conference was held, June 24, I had drafted a procedure to get the outside relocation program started along the limited lines that were being thought of at that time. It was proposed in this draft to have the FBI "investigate and report to us on those evacuees who want to leave in order to secure employment outside the relocation centers. If the investigators raised doubts about the evacuee's loyalty he would not be allowed to go. If he came through the investigation satisfactorily he would be given a card or some kind of a certificate from the Director of the WRA showing that there was no black mark against his record. Aliens who pass the hurdle of the investigation would be allowed to leave as well as American citizens."

At the time I prepared the memorandum I did not know just what the FBI could or would do for WRA in the matter of investigating or checking the people who wanted to leave the centers. On the same day I went over to the FBI office in the Justice Building and had a talk with Mr. Strickland. It was his opinion that the FBI could not, in view of the heavy load it was carrying throughout the country, undertake to investigate the evacuees prior to their departure from a center. In a report of this conversation I wrote: "Yesterday I talked with Mr. Strickland of the FBI about it and he said the size of the task made it very unlikely that his organization could be of much help to us." Strickland said that the FBI would be able to assist us by a name check of any of the evacuees against the records kept by the FBI. After this we looked to the FBI only for a record check and did not press the matter of making investigations of evacuees who wanted to relocate outside the camps.



It is interesting to observe in looking back to last summer when the first steps toward an outside relocation procedure were being taken that in every draft made there was provision for screening the evacuees who applied for permission to depart. The Solicitor observes in his report on the June 24th staff conference that free movement of evacuees out of the centers was being proposed but he goes on to say that this movement would be subject to necessary administrative procedural controls. I do not recall that anyone ever proposed that the gates should be let down at the centers to permit anyone who wanted to do so to depart at will. From the very beginning, while I was still out on the West Coast, we talked about having the applicants checked or investigated or both by one or more of the intelligence agencies and by our own organization. Frase was trying to make arrangements on the West Coast with the intelligence agencies. He was going ahead out there at the same time that we were studying the question here. On July 6 he wrote to Mr. Fryer "I have been attempting to make arrangements today with Military and Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation for checking the names of applicants for individuals outside employment against the files of these organizations," and he goes on to say that Naval Intelligence would assist us, that Captain Astrup would submit the names of evacuees to Military Intelligence, and that the San Francisco office of the FBI would not make arrangements without instructions from Washington.

For a time during the summer of 1942 the ONI on the West Coast checked on names submitted by the WRA San Francisco office. In the first drafts of the procedure and in the Administrative Instruction of July 20, 1942, provision was made for checking with the FBI on the West Coast. However, Mr. Hoover advised us in the latter part of July that requests for record checking should be sent to the Washington office of the FBI. This fact, along with the decision by WRA later in the summer to centralize all leave clearance work in Washington, led to the final decision on our part to make our intelligence agency contact the FBI record check in Washington. It is apparent from looking back over last year's memoranda that the decision to check only through the FBI in Washington was made only after various possibilities were considered. We arrived at the conclusion that the most administratively feasible intelligence contact to be required in all cases was the FBI record check which could be secured only in Washington. Another factor which led us to focus around the FBI check was that we were told at one point that the FBI files included material from the service intelligence agencies. I don't recall where we got this information but I see that there is a letter in the files from you to Fryer, dated August 1, 1942, in which you say that we were advised by the War Department that the FBI had all the relevant records from both Army and Navy Intelligence.



In view of all the discussion that has gone on about the propriety of releasing the evacuees from the centers and about the adequacy of the leave procedure we have adopted, I have tried to dig out the reasons that were prompting us a year ago to set up a system of sifting and checking evacuees who wished to depart. The best statement I can find is in a memorandum written by Frase to Fryer on July 3. Frase says that there are at least three reasons for checking up on the evacuees before permitting them to depart.

"A. All evacuees are now under suspicion in the public mind because of the evacuation program, regardless of the official reasons which are given for the program. We cannot expect many private employment opportunities to develop except under extreme pressure of labor shortage unless we take some official action to separate what goats there may be from the sheep and only allow the sheep to go out into private employment.

"B. We cannot expect State and local authorities to refrain from imposing widespread restrictions on the movement and activities of evacuees in group private employment unless we make an individual investigation and give these persons the stamp of our approval. There are curfews, deputy sheriffs, and restrictions on going into town and visiting in every area where evacuees are working that I have inspected. We are now in no position to ask for the relaxation of these restrictions.

"C. The War Relocation Authority will be held responsible for any disloyal act which might be committed by evacuees permitted to go out into private employment. For our own protection alone, it is desirable to review each individual who is given a work furlough."

11. In my memorandum of June 24, which was my first outline for a relocation program, I wrote:

"It is conceivable that an evacuee with a clear record might be given a pass to leave without any more ado. However, at this stage of things it is desirable that the evacuees be given assistance in their relocation endeavors. It is also desirable and probably essential that the War Relocation Authority be kept constantly informed of the location and status of evacuees who leave the centers."

I did not believe that it would be possible for the WRA to check on the job offers and community sentiment all over the country and I said that "what we need is some reliable established and respected agency to help us out. Church organizations will best serve the purpose." Several church organizations had approached WRA and had



volunteered to assist in relocating the evacuees. It was my idea that ministers all over the country would be willing to check on community sentiment and job offers. The minister would report to us on the arrival and location of the evacuee and would keep in touch with the evacuee. We would also ask the employer and the evacuee to report to us at intervals.

It should be remembered that at this time we were not thinking in terms of large numbers of evacuees. It was expected that all those who were qualified to get out and had places to go would leave during the summer. We contemplated that job offers might come in to the projects slowly. As we saw the size of the job then it did not seem to be too big to have handled in the communities by clergymen who were interested in assisting the evacuees.

On July 1, 1942, I wrote to a prospective employer as follows:

"We are now trying to work out, with the cooperation of interested religious bodies, some kind of local sponsorship for evacuees who come East to take positions in private industry. We do want these people to be paid prevailing wages for the type of work for which they are hired, but we do not anticipate specifying the detailed conditions which have been used for employing large numbers of evacuees in the northwest in agriculture. The particular situation in that territory made it necessary to specify several conditions. We do want to be assured, however, that if an evacuee comes into a community, there would be no danger to him from any kind of civil disturbance."

12. On June 25 I sent the Director the names of four people then at Manzanar who had applied for permission to leave the project in order to take jobs that they had secured for themselves. I selected these people more or less at random in order to get things started and to give us some concrete basis for working out a procedure. A procedure was proposed along the following line: The Project Director would inquire into the past histories of the applicants "going just as far as possible at the projects;" the Regional Director would check applicants with the FBI in San Francisco; the Regional Director would have a member of the WRA staff "investigate" these people at their former homes. (This may not be necessary in all cases in the future but we should do it now since we are beginning a new phase of our program.)" When the investigation was completed the report would be sent to the Director in Washington. In the meantime, the Washington Employment Division was to verify the job offer with the prospective employer and ask him to "secure an indication from the local law authorities



that the Japanese would not be in danger of vigilante action if he came to the community." Also, sponsors would be found for the people among clergymen in the community to which they went. After all this was done, and if the case merited it, the Director would authorize that a pass be issued. In addition to the above, I mention the necessity for a follow-up on the evacuees at the place of employment and in case of a change of jobs.

The Director was leaving for a trip to the west at the end of the week and since I was anxious to get going with an outside relocation program, I talked with him on Thursday and Friday about the proposals I was making. The Director made some changes in the proposals developed during the week and on Saturday, June 27, just prior to his departure, gave an approval to go ahead with a memorandum to the Regional Directors which incorporated his suggestions. This draft was entitled "Temporary procedure." It stated that:

"we intend to proceed slowly and carefully with this phase of our program. We are taking only a first step at this time and other phases of the program will be dealt with later after this first phase has been taken care of satisfactorily."

It also stated that WRA was now ready to issue "passes" to evacuees to leave relocation centers in order to accept jobs "outside the limits of the Western Defense Command." This was a new development as was the following provision:

"The Project Director, for the present, will consider only those applications from evacuees who are American citizens and have not been educated in Japan."

The other provisions in this memorandum to the Regional Directors were substantially the same as those referred to above. The employer and local sponsor were to be asked to report on the evacuee from time to time. The evacuee was to receive his pass if he agreed to return to the center upon a request from the Director of WRA to do so and he was also asked to agree to notify WRA of any change of address or change of employer.

13. In my memorandum of June 25 I expressed a concern over the possibility that the military authorities might not approve of the idea of the relocation eastward and that there might be a request "to clear with them, town by town, the places where the evacuees had the jobs prior to their departure to take the jobs. After all the checking up and chaperoning that we would do on an evacuee who wants to go East to take a job I should think the assumption would be that WRA wasn't launching a set of dangerous saboteurs across the face of the land. Moreover, if the people from our relocation centers aren't allowed to



move eastward into places where Japanese aliens who weren't in the evacuation are allowed to go, we find developing a restriction that doesn't make sense. \*\*\* To my mind the Army attitude is a most important factor in the success of any program of outside employment. If the same attitude is followed on employment as has been taken on educational institutions I have no hope for this part of our employment work. Would it be possible for you and Colonel Cress to get the policy cleared up by Mr. McCloy before you go out to California?"

The operations of the Student Relocation Committee were being seriously circumscribed by the requirement of the Army and Navy that colleges be approved in advance for enrollment. Almost all of the first rate schools were not approved. In order to avoid a pre-clearance of localities for employment purposes, I thought that we should talk with the military authorities at the outset about our plans for relocation of evacuees outside the projects. This we did on June 27. The Director, John Provinse and I spent about an hour with Mr. McCloy at the Pentagon Building. In a memorandum for the files, the Director wrote:

"I presented briefly the proposal for developing private employment outside of relocation centers for Japanese citizens who were interested in obtaining such employment by people who were willing to provide employment. We indicated that of course the people sent out would be carefully investigated both by WRA and checking with FBI, if possible. We stated further that we would try to work out a plan to develop local sponsorship in the area of their employment. Secretary McCloy said he thought this approach sound and suggested we go ahead with our program. We promised to send him a copy of our proposals as soon as they were more carefully worked out."

14. The memorandum of June 27 to the Regional Directors was not sent out. The Director left for the West and on Monday, June 29, Colonel Cress called me in for a conference with the Solicitor who had raised an objection to the clause in the memorandum which read:

"Upon instructions to do so the Project Director will issue a pass to the applicant. This pass is issued subject to applicant's agreement to return to a relocation center if there is a request to do so by the Director of WRA. This pass is issued also subject to the requirement that applicant will notify WRA of any change of address and of any change of employer."

After our discussion Colonel Cress wrote to the Director that:



"Mr. Glick has raised the point that the procedure included in paragraph 12 of the draft does not contain all the possible safeguards which the War Relocation Authority can impose. Mr. Glick points out that return to a relocation center is placed upon a contractual basis rather than a conditional permission with the penalties of a misdemeanor available to enforce compliance. Mr. Glick, therefore, suggests the following substitution for paragraph 12. \*\*\* This pass will be issued subject to the right of the Director of War Relocation Authority to require the applicant to return to a relocation center if the Director should find it necessary to make such a request. The pass will be issued subject to the further requirement that the applicant will notify the War Relocation Authority of any change of address and of any change of employer. \*\*\* I personally agree with Mr. Glick and prefer a constructive custody theory."

Even at this early stage in developing our relocation theory and practice, I had arrived at one conclusion which has stood the test of experience pretty well. It seemed to me, then as now, that the evacuees should be absorbed into the normal channels of American economic life as rapidly as possible. For the benefit of the country and the evacuees it was desirable to break off the wardship of the Government as quickly as possible. If the evacuee qualified for a pass to leave the relocation center it was my view that we should try to make this a permanent departure. He had been an evacuee and for a time he was the ward of the Government. Now he was a free man and it was expected that he would build up a new life for himself in America. It was inconsistent with this view to keep the evacuated people tied back into the projects. However, at this time, the Director agreed with Colonel Cress and Mr. Glick and during the summer this was the official view of the War Relocation Authority.

15. Upon the return of the Director from the West Coast discussions about the proposed procedure were resumed. A draft of an Administrative Instruction was prepared by the lawyers. Administrative Instruction No. 22 was signed by the Director on July 20, 1942. It was entitled "Temporary Procedure for issuance of permits to individuals or single families to leave relocation centers for employment outside such centers and the Western Defense Command." The statement was made that the program of outside employment would be further developed as we accumulated experience.

The following summary gives the principal provisions of the instruction:

- (a) Any American citizen of Japanese ancestry in a center "who has never at any time resided or been educated in Japan" would be eligible to apply for a permit to leave."



- (b) The applicant had to show that he had a specific job opportunity. "Preference will be given by the Director to applications for leave to accept employment within the middle west."
- (c) The Project Director would investigate "as thoroughly as practicable" each applicant through interviews and by other suitable means. The application would then be sent to the Regional Director together with all the papers and a recommendation.
- (d) The Regional Director was to "obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information or record it can supply regarding the applicant or his family, and will make such further investigation in connection with the application as may be necessary."
- (e) The application would go to the Director in Washington with all the papers and a recommendation by the Regional Director. The Director would make any necessary arrangements with the employer, local governmental authorities, and such sponsors as might be designated for the applicant.
- (f) When advised of approval of an application, the Project Director would issue a permit. The permit was to state that the evacuee would be required to notify the Director of any change of employer or address. The permit was to state that it was issued under the authority of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander and failure to observe the conditions applicable to it would subject the holder to penalties provided in the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, (Pub. No. 503, 77th Cong.)
- (g) "Every applicant issued a permit pursuant to this Instruction, and his accompanying dependents, will remain in the constructive custody of the military commander in whose jurisdiction lies the relocation center in which the applicant resides at the time the permit is issued. Any such permit may be revoked at any time upon the order of the Director, and the applicant and any dependents accompanying him may be required to return to the relocation center or such other place as the Director specifies, if the Director shall find such revocation to be necessary in the public interest."

16. Such was the first Administrative Instruction setting forth a method of handling applications for departure. It is a compound of ideas contributed principally by the Director, the Solicitor, and myself. It was regarded by all of us as tentative.



It would serve to get a program started. Obviously, it is a very cautious document. After the Administrative Instruction was signed by the Director, I wrote to McEntire and Lee about it and the following quotation from that letter gives my reactions to the instruction and the relocation problem as it looked at that time. The letter is dated July 21, 1942.

"Now, as to the procedure for private employment -- I had one designed immediately after my return from San Francisco and thought that, long before this, we would be operating under it. However, it has been reviewed and checked a number of times, and only yesterday afternoon it was finally signed by the Director and is now being put into the form of an administrative instruction which you will receive very shortly. Most of the ideas that I had in the start will be in the administrative instruction, and the only thing that I object to seriously about the new order is the restrictions put upon the evacuee as a condition to his going out. These restrictions are by no means in the class of the civilian restrictive orders which apply to the sugar-beet workers, but they do definitely tie the evacuees down to the relocation center, provided the Director wants to call them back, which I don't suppose he will do unless a very grave situation should develop throughout the country. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, approved this procedure yesterday afternoon, and he talked with Colonel Bendetsen on the tactical line, and, as I understand it, Bendetsen is fully aware of what we are about to establish and, as far as I know, approves also.

"We have not been excluded by the Army from any area outside the Western Defense Command. However, they have exhibited some jitters about Japanese going into the Eastern Defense Command, and so I have been agreeable to the clause in the instruction which gives a priority to jobs in that area lying between the Western Defense Command and the Eastern Defense Command. This, of course, is an enormous area, and we should be able to place a good number of people here without trouble. Placement in the East is not absolutely excluded, but, for the present, it should be discouraged and only in the case where the necessity is very apparent should we undertake to place anybody inside the Eastern Defense Command.

"This work of placing people in the middle areas of the country, in my opinion, is about the most important thing the Employment Division can do. This offers the Japanese evacuee some possibility of permanent readjustment of his life, something that the life in the relocation centers -- no matter how good they may become -- will not do. You folks out there will play a most important part in the outside employment program. I assume that the Regional Director will have you people handle



the requests as they come in from the projects, and you should keep on the alert to see that no time is lost and that all acceptable applications are given consideration. For your own part at the Regional Office, don't let the checking process take too long. I am very anxious to see that we don't get bogged down at any point but, rather, move expeditiously in placing the people in jobs.

"You will note that the procedure is written in a temporary manner. The important thing now is to establish a sound, safe manner of getting the evacuees into private employment. As experience dictates the possibility of shortcuts or even tightening up in certain points, we will revise the procedure as necessary. For the time being, I am going to handle the contacts with the employers and with the local sponsors and local authorities. Within the next few days, I am going to get out in the field and be on the job to handle the first cases. Bob Frase will be here in the office, and you can communicate with him about any problems in connection with this procedure on which you may need some help.

"There are pending now several requests to take outside jobs which Bob picked out before he left San Francisco. As I recall, there are six of these, and I believe that letters went out to the project directors instructing them to make the necessary investigations and give the Regional Office a report. Will you see that these requests do not lag? One of them is the request of a doctor down at Parker to take a job in Illinois. I am not too anxious to take, at the start, the applications of medical men where the project director feels that this would disrupt the essential medical service. Bob tells me that, in the case of this particular doctor, the project director supported his request. I would suggest that you give special attention to the handling of this particular request and be sure that there will be no problem arising in the minds of the regional director or the project director about the whittling away of the medical service if this request should be granted.

"It is entirely in order now for the Japanese to look up jobs for themselves or to have their friends and relatives on the outside arrange for jobs for them or to have such organizations as the Friends Service scout around for them.

"I am writing Mr. Morris about the procedure, but you might get in touch with him also and let him know that we are now prepared to go ahead within the limitations laid down by the new administrative instruction. I have been dealing with Mr. Morris' associates with the Friends Service here in the East and with other religious bodies, and we are going to be able to secure from them a great deal of cooperation as local sponsors for the Japanese."



17. Administrative Instruction 22 states that preference will be given to applications for leave to accept employment in the middle west. This seemed to be a big enough area for the evacuees to relocate in. We thought that if we focused our relocation in the middle west it would keep the alarm down to a minimum on the part of those who might get worried if the evacuees took up residence at eastern coastal points.

At a conference with Mr. McCloy about the proposed instruction to permit outside relocation I remember that Mr. McCloy suggested to the Director that the commanding officers in the East and in the area around the Gulf might be disturbed if relocation took place in these areas. The Director verbally agreed to have any applicant who wanted to go into the Eastern Defense Command or to the area adjacent to the Gulf checked specially by the War Department before we would approve of his application to leave the project to go to these places.

The Director wrote me a memorandum after the conference confirming the commitment with Mr. McCloy.

"After reading the proposed memorandum Mr. McCloy raised two or three questions, one of which was whether these people should go into the Eastern Defense Command or the Gulf Coast areas. I indicated we had this in mind when we stated in our memorandum that preference would be given to the Middle West.

"I have verbally committed the WRA to this policy -- namely, that for the time being any releases for private employment under our administrative procedure will be only to the Middle West area outside the Western Defense Command, the Eastern Defense Command and the southern Gulf Coast areas. Further, if any cases should receive consideration as an exception to this policy, they are to be cleared individually with the War Department. This should be made clear to our regional staff members and project directors when we submit the policy statement to the field."

The Administrative Instruction also provided that only applications to go to a location outside the Western Defense Command would be given consideration, for the present anyhow. This does not appear in my earlier drafts, and while I do not recall now precisely who or by whom the limitation was proposed, I am inclined to think that it developed hand in hand with our decision to emphasize the program in the middle west. At this time I did not think that any substantial relocation would be possible in these western States. It looked as if the big possibility for outside work there would be in the sugar beet fields mainly on a seasonal basis. I recall making the statement rather often last summer that the chances for permanent relocation west from Colorado were slim. This has not proved to be a correct statement. I note in the letter to McEntire and Lee, quoted above, that I say that "we have not been excluded by



the Army from any area outside the Western Defense Command." This is a hasty use of the word "excluded." We were not excluded by the Western Defense Command from carrying on a relocation program outside the evacuated areas. In fact, I don't believe that WRA discussed this phase of our program with the Western Defense Command officials. As I recollect, it was a feeling on our part that permanent relocation out there would be too difficult to go forward with if it would be necessary to check specially on the evacuees or the localities, or both, and consequently we didn't raise the question but decided to take the first step in our program outside the Western Defense Command.

18. I ought to note in the record at this point that the new instruction did not result in even a moderate number of relocated evacuees. It was received with reservations at the projects by the evacuees due to its limitations and I doubt whether it was understood by the project staff or aroused their cooperation or interest. There is no denying that the procedure outlined was limited and administratively clumsy. On August 10, Fryer wrote to the Director:

"To date we have initiated actions on about 20 cases but the actions are lagging seriously on the projects. As yet we have received no reports back from the projects on cases which we sent down, although we have sent follow-up inquiries in several instances."

As a matter of fact, it was five or six months before the leave work assumed any volume. Even after the leave regulations were formally adopted on October 1, it was several weeks before they actually took hold in the projects. The earlier Administrative Instruction of July 20 made no dent at all in terms of numbers of people released. A check up made in the Washington leave section on October 3 showed that eleven evacuees had been authorized to receive permits by the Director under the provisions of the July 20 instruction on leave. This doesn't mean that this number was the total of the evacuees who did leave the centers, however. The permits section in the WRA San Francisco office released a number of evacuees to join members of their families outside and also a number of persons of mixed blood were released. Both WRA and the WCCA were releasing people on these terms. Leave for the purpose of taking a job, however, was almost entirely confined to the seasonal work in western agriculture.

Despite the lack of tangible returns, the first provision made for issuing leave was a very important step in the development of the relocation program. Tentative as it was, it served to break the ice. It gave rise to considerable discussion among the evacuees, and it aroused the hope among many individuals in the middle west and east who wanted to help on the evacuation problem to know that a relocation program was an actual possibility.



In working on this relocation program there have always been three interdependent spheres of activity that have claimed the bulk of our thought and activity. Before we could get anybody out we had to have a workable leave procedure, then there had to be some place for the evacuees to go, something for them to do, and an acceptance of them where they went, and finally there had to be a genuine interest in relocation among the evacuees. These three spheres have called for action simultaneously but there had to be a priority of a kind. The development of a leave procedure came first; unless we were willing to allow evacuees to depart there was no use working in the other spheres. The signing of Administrative Instruction No. 22 on July 20th was only the first step and a year later, July 1943, we are still in the thralls of leave clearance procedure. The center of gravity has shifted from our own organization to the Joint Board. In the past year, however, we have not done so badly with this difficult problem. After the months of experimental work in 1942 W.R.A. began to hit its stride in leave clearance and indefinite leave work early in 1943. In the following paragraphs I want to carry the account of our activities through the remainder of 1942.

Within a few days after Instruction No. 22 was signed I left Washington on a field trip to explore briefly the employment possibilities and the reactions to the evacuees that might be expected in the middle west. We had made the first step in the direction of releasing evacuees from the centers and now it was time to make a beginning in the second sphere of activity that I have referred to above. At this time we were not thinking in terms of considerable numbers of relocated evacuees nor in terms of a field staff. At this time Frase, McEntire, Lee and I were the only members of the staff giving detailed attention to the outside relocation program. Employment offices were being created at the projects and they were doing some work in connection with seasonal agricultural recruiting but as yet there was neither interest in an outside unemployment program at the projects nor administrative machinery to handle it. One man was hired during July as a field representative of the San Francisco region employment division. This was Joe Beeson whose station was Boise, Idaho; his work was entirely with the sugar beet labor that had been recruited at the centers. It was not until January 1943 that W.R.A. set up its first relocation office in the middle west. From August 1942, on through the remainder of the year, Frase and I were working constantly with individuals and organizations in the middle west who were interested in taking part in the relocation program. In the paragraphs that follow I want to give a brief view of this activity.

As to the third sphere of the relocation program, namely the development of interest among the evacuees themselves, that has had to wait until there was a workable leave procedure and until there



was reasonable assurance of opportunity and acceptance in the middle west. Consequently my story of the development of a relocation program during 1942 will not have much to say on this score. In the earlier stages we were relying primarily on the evacuees themselves to dig up their own jobs. Interest in relocation was intense among those at the projects who had jobs and wanted to get out but, after all, this was not a large group of people. I made a trip to Gila River and to Manzanar in September and interviewed a number of people about relocating outside. Again in December I went to several projects, accompanied by McEntire, and on these visits we met with groups of evacuees and with members of the project staff and explained the leave procedure and the possibilities for relocation in the middle west. Much has been done since then by other people to interest and educate the evacuees and the staff. It is not too much to say that the big part of the task remains to be done. Let me go back now and pick up where I left off with the signing of Instruction No. 22 on July 20, 1942.

19. Instruction No. 22 had hardly been signed when changes began to be made. On August 1 the Director wrote Fryer to send the records into Washington for record checking with the F.B.I. instead of having it done in San Francisco as the Instruction directed. This change was made because J. Edgar Hoover had replied to our request for a record check on July 29 after Instruction No. 22 was signed, and had requested that the requests for such checks be sent to the F.B.I. Washington office.

Mr. Fryer was also notified to check with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

"A similar record check with Naval Intelligence, which Mr. Frase started to arrange for while in San Francisco, was stricken from Administrative Instruction No. 22 because of advice from the War Department that the F.B.I. had all the relevant records from both Army and Navy Intelligence. In a subsequent conference with Naval Intelligence here, we were informed that, although the F.B.I. did have copies of their records, more certain results would be obtained by referring names to District Naval Intelligence Offices as well. Therefore, on receipt of the application dockets from the Project Directors, please submit a copy of the Individual Record Form to the appropriate District Naval Intelligence Office (Seattle, San Francisco, San Diego) at the same time that you forward two copies to this office. By this procedure, the record checks will be carried on simultaneously by Naval Intelligence and F.B.I. and no time will be lost."

Another change was also proposed. A copy of Instruction No. 22 was sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence for comment. On August 3 Commander Wharton replied that

"As an additional precautionary measure it is suggested that a check might be made on the employer as well as the



applicant."

A letter to the F.B.I. inquired whether that agency could make such a check and an affirmative reply was received. The Director wrote to Fryer on August 5 to make arrangements to have the O.N.I. on the West Coast record check through the mid-western O.N.I. offices the names of prospective employers. I learned of this proposal upon my arrival in San Francisco on August 11. It seemed to me that the proposal was unsound from an administrative point of view. An already overly complex procedure would be further complicated with the chances of substantial gain being very slight. Later in the week I discussed the matter with the Director who was also in San Francisco and the proposal was dropped.

20. If we were to screen out the applicants for permission to leave the centers for permanent outside employment and residence it would be necessary to work on some kind of a systematic basis common to all the projects. It would not do to have each project going its own way on this matter. One of the things needed was a uniform set of questions which would indicate whether the applicant was attached primarily to the Japanese culture or, on the contrary, was Americanized. In the latter part of July Frase and I worked out a series of questions. Mike Masaoka gave us an opinion on this matter and made suggestions. Before submitting the set of questions to the Director we had them reviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Two questions, Nos. 27 and 28, were suggested by that office. Question No. 27 asked the applicant whether or not he had brothers in the U.S. Army. Question No. 28 was as follows:

"Have you foresworn any and all allegiance which you may knowingly or unknowingly have held to the Emperor of Japan? Yes \_\_\_\_\_. No \_\_\_\_\_. If not, do you now repudiate such allegiance? Yes \_\_\_\_\_. No \_\_\_\_\_."

On July 28 I wrote to the Director about the steps we were taking to work up a standard project investigation of an applicant.

"I think that an investigation of the evacuees will be regarded as an important step in the procedure we have developed for outside employment. It is important that this investigation be taken seriously at the project and the regional office. I am now working up a standard series of questions which should be asked each applicant. The Objective here is to get sufficient information of a type calculated to reveal the applicant's contacts with both the American and Japanese cultures which he grew up in. From this information we should be able to draw a conclusion as to whether the applicant's background is primarily American or Japanese.



Considerable information will be obtained from our individual record form (WRA-26). In addition, we need to go into such questions as the following -- Does applicant live with his parents and is he economically dependent upon them; does he speak Japanese at home; does he have the same religion as his parents; is he part of a closely or loosely knit family group; have parents influenced retention of Japanese customs at home or is the home Americanized; were his close associates Japanese or Caucasian; has he ever subscribed to Japanese publications or belonged to Japanese organizations; was he ever a dual citizen and, if so, has he denounced dual citizenship.

The above and a number of other questions should be asked of all applicants. In addition, Form WRA-26 on the applicant's parents should be included in the file and interviews should be had with them if they are available. The interviewer should be able to draw some conclusion from talking with the parents as to the degree of Americanization they encouraged among their children.

In addition to the interview with the applicant and the data on Form WRA-26, I suggest that we ask each applicant to give us two references in his home community. The opinion of a former employer, a school teacher, or other Caucasian acquaintance might be revealing."

Early in August the set of questions was revised somewhat by the Director and approved by him. A form was developed, W.R.A. 71, which was used until superseded in November by a revised form of similar nature, W.R.A. 126.

21. I left Washington July 30 on a field trip through Michigan, through Chicago, and then on to San Francisco. This trip lasted several weeks and I was able to spend a few days at both Manzanar and Gila River before returning to Washington. In Detroit I visited the personnel director of the Ford plant and several ministers whose names had come up in one way or another as being interested in helping the evacuees relocate. There was no hostility expressed by the man at Fords but he was pretty chary about the possibility of employment for evacuees by his company. The clergymen were eager to be of assistance but they were uninformed and lacked organization to aid in relocating the evacuees. They were confident that a number of evacuees could be relocated in Detroit, Michigan, however, I also saw the head of the U.S.E.S. in Michigan for the purpose of explaining our program. While he did not disapprove of the idea his attitude was non-committal. I made the same type of visit to Grand Rapids and spent a couple of days in Berrien County which is across Lake Michigan from Chicago. My effort was to find out, if I could,



whether evacuees would have any chance to be employed in this part of the country. I can't say that this trip through Michigan proved much of anything. It did appear, however, that wherever I went there were some people at least who were interested in helping the evacuees and who could be relied on to translate this interest into practical assistance if the opportunity were to arise.

Chicago, by way of contrast to the places visited in Michigan, was ready to go ahead. In fact, there was already in existence a committee to aid evacuees. This committee had been organized at the behest of Morgenroth who is in charge of the Friend's Service Committee for Chicago. Quite an imposing array of people belonged to the Committee from the churches and social agencies. A number of voluntary evacuees had come to Chicago and the assistance given them in getting settled, largely through the Friend's Service, had given interested people in Chicago immediate contact with the evacuation and its consequences. These people sadly lacked information and they were glad to have news about the W.R.A. and our plans for relocation. I had a conference with the U.S.E.S. officials and they were definitely interested and were willing to help out. In a memorandum to the Director written after leaving Chicago, I said

"Chicago is going to be an important place in our program of outside employment. There are numerous opportunities in the area and we will not run up against any adverse reaction if things are handled right."

I was pretty confident that a good number of the evacuees could come into Chicago and find jobs and settle down, especially, after I had talked with several of the voluntary evacuees who were living there and had made a successful adjustment to the community. I was also able to visit and spend some time with two families of Japanese ancestry who had lived in Chicago for some years. These people felt that evacuees could be absorbed in Chicago without difficulty. In my memorandum to the Director I suggested that Frase or I plan to spend a month in Chicago in order to get something started and permission was requested to secure desk space in the O.E.M. office.

This first trip through the Middle West convinced me that a considerable number of evacuees, especially the Nisei, could find new homes in the Middle West. This was not because there was widespread enthusiasm for a relocation program but rather because in the places I went there was someone or some number of people with good standing in the community who would be willing to help out. It appeared to me quite possible that we could locate a small but effective group of people who were deeply interested in the problems growing out of the evacuation and were willing to give their support to doing something practical to solve them. It seemed



fruitless to try to convince the whole population of the rightness and the necessity of a relocation program. It could be conceded that a majority of the people in any community would not understand the problem or sympathize with the way out that we were taking. Large numbers of evacuees were not involved. At the most, all of the relocated people would amount to no more than a few thousands. It appeared to me that the most practicable way to relocate these people was to find the few sympathetic people in the community who were willing to put in their time and energy. In the larger places these people could most likely form a committee to coordinate their activities. As we saw the relocation machinery early in August 1942 it looked as if W.R.A. would do a minimum in the way of field work. We would spend most of our energy on locating interested people, advising on the organization of committees, providing educational material on evacuation and relocation, and supplying local sponsors with information about the occupational background of evacuees who wanted to relocate.

My notes on the field trip through the Middle West express a concern over the ability of the local sponsors and committees to do actual placement work. It was hoped that the U.S.E.S. might be able to do a large share of this. At this time and through the summer and fall the number of evacuees involved in our thinking was not large and I don't think that we faced squarely the problems of just what the place of local sponsors and committees would be because we didn't have to face it at that time. Immediately, these local people were extremely important to the development of a relocation program because they constituted a friendly segment of local opinion and were willing to give a friendly hand to an evacuee who might settle in the community. In part the actual development of the program during the past year has developed along this line. However, W.R.A. itself has taken a much larger part than was anticipated in the summer of 1942.

22. From Chicago I went on to San Francisco to attend a conference called by the sugar beet producers to try to work out with us an improved system for recruiting labor for the sugar beet harvest. I wrote to Frase on August 14 summing up about this conference as follows:

"I arrived in San Francisco Tuesday morning, and went almost immediately to the conference called by Mr. Scalley. It was quite a large conference, and included practically all of the producers of sugar in the West.

Colonel Bendetsen spoke first, and stated that the military authorities out here were sympathetic with the effort to get the evacuees out to help on the harvest, and told Mr. Scalley that if any assistance were needed, he should not hesitate to come to him. Next I spoke for a moment and said that WRA was interested in getting people out to help out, and said we would



do all we could to see that there was a supply of labor for the harvest. Fryer also said a few words along the same line.

There were several Government people there; Mulliken of the Dept. of Agriculture, Hunter of the U.S. Employment Service, and a representative of the Farm Security Administration, among others.

There was a general discussion of the need for labor, and I found myself before long, together with Mr. Scalley, doing most of the talking. The larger meeting broke up later in the day, and we Government people had a talk.

On Wednesday we began discussions with a smaller committee of the sugar producers, and have been pretty steadily at it through last evening.

On the whole, the negotiations had been conducted in a dignified and quiet fashion, and we have arrived at a new and different procedure which I think is going to be much better than the old procedure. The basic change is that each sugar beet grower will state in a written offer of employment or contract the conditions of work. He will state how many acres he has of sugar beets, potatoes, etc., and the approximate time that work will begin and end. He will state what wages he proposes to pay for this work, and he will describe the housing available. The evacuee will accept this offer before he leaves the Center. Either party can end the agreement by giving five days' notice. The agreements will be filed first of all with the local United States Employment office which will send them on to us if local labor is not available. Thus we get the guarantee that the evacuee labor is not displacing local labor. I have agreed that WRA will push to the full limit of its ability the recruiting, and that we will do the work. The Employment Service will not recruit at the Centers. We will do the recruiting also at the Assembly Centers. Fryer agrees that this procedure is better than we had before, and says that we should either get behind this recruitment for the harvest season in a big way and make it a success, or that we should pull out entirely and not do anything. I agree with him very whole-heartedly on this, and we both see eye to eye now that the WRA will go ahead full steam in encouraging the evacuees to get out and do the harvest work. Fryer says he doesn't believe the Project Directors will react unfavorably to this, but I am not so optimistic.

There are a number of other details that were brought up which I won't bother writing you about, as these two things are the main developments:

1. The shifting of the recruiting to an individual basis, and



2. The active, favorable recruiting policy of WRA."

The procedure worked out at this conference remained in effect for seasonal work until altered in the spring of 1943. It took a lot of work during the remainder of August and in September 1942 to get out the instructions to the projects on how to handle the harvest recruiting; our small staff in the employment division had to be augmented; and generally speaking the San Francisco employment office was head over heels in work for the next few weeks. By this time the Denver region had set up an employment division and this office was having a vigorous part in the recruitment of sugar beet labor from the Heart Mountain and Granada projects. It should be observed in passing that the existence of another regional employment division complicated the problem of developing relocation policy and procedure. Before the fall season was over the San Francisco and Denver regions had developed several different practices. But fortunately this situation was corrected by the abolition of the regions and the adoption of an organization for W.R.A. which enables one basic set of policies and procedures to prevail.

Recruitment for the harvest work in the West, mostly sugar beets, went beyond our expectations in terms of numbers. Also the whole enterprise was satisfactory on the whole. It did take, however, the individual attention of the small staff that was working on employment problems. Lee spent all and McEntire a good part of his time on the recruiting of seasonal labor. I stayed in the West until mid-September, Frase came out from Washington. For several weeks only my secretary, Miss Thompson, was in the Washington office of the employment division. No doubt the necessity for concentrating on the seasonal harvest labor took away attention from the mid Western relocation program for a time. It was decided to postpone opening an office in Chicago until the harvest recruitment was well under way and Frase and I could get back to the development of plans for the mid West. The push in this direction was resumed around October 1.

23. Another reason for being in San Francisco was to attend the policy conference held in the middle of August. Practically all of the principal staff members of W.R.A. met with the Director at this time. The whole range of policy for W.R.A. was gone over. At the opening meeting the Director stated that an integral and vital part of W.R.A. policy was relocation outside the projects. The statement by the Director at the San Francisco meeting was the first time the policy was laid down definitely as one of the principal objectives of W.R.A. I don't believe that the Director's statement took too strong a hold on the staff at this time. In mid August of 1942 W.R.A. was just in the middle of its efforts to house, feed, and settle the evacuees in the relocation centers; the officials were preoccupied with these problems. Sugar beet recruiting had been rather unpopular with the project staff during the early summer. Little or nothing was known of the possibilities for



relocation in the mid West. The development of the leave procedure was familiar to the lawyers and members of the employment division staff in Washington and San Francisco but not generally in W.R.A. An outside relocation program was generally looked upon as a novel and risky venture in contrast to a safe and sure relocation in the centers. What the Director's statement did do was to put everybody on notice that a relocation program outside the centers was to be taken seriously.

I was chairman of a committee at the San Francisco conference known as the furlough committee. This committee took the current proposals for leaves or furloughs and after examining them made a selective and composite recommendation on the subject to the staff. The committee worked over the procedure laid down in Administrative Instructions No. 22 and the procedure developed to handle the sugar beet recruitment. The activity of the permit section of the San Francisco office was also considered. Procedure was developing in this section for the release of persons to join families and for the release of persons of mixed blood. Finally, there was the revision of the leave and furlough regulations which the lawyers had worked out and which the solicitor wanted to be considered as soon as possible.

The proposed leave and furlough regulations outlined several types of leave for various purposes. Any person departing from a relocation area pursuant to such leave was to remain in the constructive custody of the military commander in whose jurisdiction the center was. The project director was to make such investigation of the applicant for leave as he deemed necessary. For an indefinite leave applicant the project director would consider particularly the applicant's past record, community sentiment and arrangements for employment. The requirements for other types of leave were also stated. The application for indefinite leave with the project report was to be forwarded to the regional director who would make a further investigation if he deemed this to be necessary. The regional director would instruct the project director as to the action to be taken on the application. Provision was made for an appeal to the W.R.A. Director from a denial of an application. An indefinite leave might terminate if the evacuee violated any conditions applicable to the leave or if the W.R.A. Director notified the evacuee that the public interest required his return.

The committee in San Francisco spent a couple of days discussing the various leave proposals that were before it. There was already some practical experience to go on, especially in the field of seasonal employment. There were substantial differences between the proposed leave and furlough regulations and the leave procedure already on the books under the terms of Administrative Instruction No. 22. As is usual in this sort of situation the committee reported back to the Director and the staff a composite plan which



was the outcome of numerous compromises between competing proposals.

The basic leave regulations were worked on for another month after the San Francisco conference. The lawyers did the final drafting and on September 29 the regulations were published in the Federal Register. October 1 was the effective date of the new leave procedure.

The regulations, as they finally emerged out of the mill, make provision for three types of leave, short term, work group, and indefinite. Any evacuee may apply for leave. The project director is instructed to secure such information concerning the applicant as may be available at the center. The application for indefinite leave is to be sent to the Director in Washington together with all related papers and the project director's recommendation. The Director upon receipt of the application secures from the F.B.I. "such information as may be obtainable." The Director is to take such steps as may be necessary to satisfy himself concerning the applicant's means of support, his willingness to make required reports, the conditions and factors affecting his opportunity for employment and residence, the probable effect of the issuance of the leave on the war program and on the public peace and security.

The Director, under the regulations as adopted, issues instructions to the project directors with respect to issuing or denying leave. The evacuee is required to notify the Director of a change of address. Leave may be revoked if an evacuee violates any of the conditions applicable to such leave or when the Director decides that conditions are so changed or when additional information has become available that an original application by the individual would be denied.

Comparison with earlier drafts of leave and furlough regulations and with the administrative instructions in force up to the time the leave regulations went into effect will show the superiority of the latter. By August experience had demonstrated the kind of investigation or screening process that was administratively feasible and necessary. The leave regulations retained certain essential checks but the whole process was simplified. While the Director is able to revoke an indefinite leave for cause the theory of constructive custody of the evacuee by the military authorities was dropped entirely.

Since October 1942 the leave regulations have been altered in a number of respects. Basically, however, these regulations have served as the foundation for the release of evacuees since their adoption.

24. The weeks following the meeting in San Francisco with the sugar beet producers and the formulation of new recruiting



procedures were extremely busy weeks for the members of the employment division. I went down to the Santa Anita Assembly Center and made arrangements for personnel to handle the recruiting there. And I also went on to the Gila River and Manzanar centers to lay plans for the coming recruiting drive. More important than this in the development of the leave procedure was the effort which I made to interest the project officials and the evacuees at these two relocation centers in relocation. Gila River was in the midst of its reception of evacuees from the evacuated area and there was not much opportunity to do anything substantial. Manzanar, however, had been in operation for several months and many people there were anxious to know about the possibilities of departing permanently.

At this time, late in August and early September, the limited procedure laid down in July was the only vehicle for permanent departure except for the activity of the permit section which was handling a few departures to join families outside and those who were only partially of Japanese ancestry. I talked with project officials and a number of evacuees at Manzanar and Gila River. This was the first time the possibility of permanent departure through a systematic W.R.A. procedure was seriously considered at the projects. At Gila River they were not ready at the time for the subject but I talked things over with perhaps fifty evacuees. At Manzanar the interest was much greater. During the week I stayed there early in September people came in to talk with me from early morning until late in the evening. I talked with 250 or 300 people during my stay there. At both projects they were young folks almost entirely. They were people for the most part who were able to comply under the restricted scope of Instruction No. 22. All of the evacuees I talked with were eager to get out. A few of them had jobs but the majority wanted assistance in locating work.

At both projects I kept regular office hours and interviewed people all day long. At Manzanar Mr. Heath was assigned to help and since then he has continued to be the leave officer. Up to this time we had no regularized system for taking the applications for leave. The experience at Gila River and Manzanar was important to us because it gave an opportunity for the first time to put the application process on a formalized basis. One document secured in each case was the WRA-26, the basic individual record sheet. Four copies of this were included in each file. The main interview focused around the new form WRA-71 which I had mimeographed in the San Francisco office and at Manzanar. This was the form we had worked out to give information about the degree of Americanization. It proved to be a pretty good device to center such an inquiry around. Question 28 on loyalty, however, gave rise to a problem. Apparently the question on oath was difficult to understand. These evacuees didn't seem to understand what foreswearing meant. I believe that a good number of the evacuees were confused and in some instances an answer not intended may have been given. At this time Question 28 was not looked upon as



of paramount significance. I felt that a person was to be judged by all the information we had about him; whether or not he was attached to Japan would appear from a consideration of the whole file and not by the answer to any one question. It seemed possible to judge as best we could on the loyalty issue from the other information without necessarily having asked a specific loyalty question. An affirmative of loyalty was important if asked but after the first couple of days experience with question 28 in the new form WRA-71 I felt that it definitely was not getting at the issue. As a result of these considerations I did not continue to use the question in interviewing in most of the cases handled during this trial period. Later, before a new form was developed, when evacuees themselves began to fill out form WRA-71 we found ample grounds to believe that question 28 gave rise to misunderstanding and, as phrased, was not the way to get at the loyalty question.

25. I came back to Washington around the middle of September bringing with me about 200 applications that I had taken at Manzanar and Gila River for permission leave under the terms of Administrative Instruction No. 22. In Chicago, on the way through, I gave Morgenroth of the Friends Service Committee 30 or 40 copies of the form WRA-26. This was a selection of the education and work history of what looked to me to be the most desirable of the young people who were applying for leave. I explained to Morgenroth that it would be necessary to record check these people with the F.B.I. before we could authorize leave. I figured that it would take about six weeks before we could complete this process and be in a position to take final action of the application. When asked at the projects I had given the answer that it would take six or eight weeks before they would get an answer. A very few did come through during that time but for most of them it took considerably longer. The F.B.I. record check proved at the start to be a real bottle neck.

Our system of handling the leave applications at this time was extremely simple. Miss Thompson, my secretary, for a few weeks did all the clerical work that was necessary. I set up the files myself and did the filing during October. When the file on an application was complete--when the F.B.I. had replied, letters of reference had come in, form WRA-71 was included, there was a job offer, and we had an indication of community sentiment--Frase and I reviewed the file and sent it to the Director with our recommendations. There was a fair amount of work involved in all of this, although as I have said, only a few people were given indefinite leave during the fall of 1942. The actual handling of the details of this work was useful to Frase and myself because it was all new and experimental. New techniques grew out of this experience. It was obvious that a leave section would have to be set up in Washington to handle the growing volume of work. Mrs. Hyman came in during October to take over part of the routine work from Miss Thompson. Ken Nishimoto came in also during October.



He, too, was immersed in the mechanics of the job through the fall.

26. I made three field trips during October. Two were to New York with John Provinse to discuss the whole relocation program of W.R.A. with representatives of national social work agencies and religious organizations. At the latter meeting, sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches, I first met George Rundquist who was appointed shortly after to represent the Federal Council.

On October 27 I went out to Chicago and met with the local committee. From there Miss Watson of the Y.W.C.A., George Rundquist and I went up to Minneapolis and St. Paul and in these places assisted in the organization of committees to assist in the relocation work. Also in these cities I went to see the police officials because we had had correspondence with them about relocation of evacuees in the Twin cities. They had put their foot down. My visit to these officials proved to be fairly successful and it showed the desirability of having someone convenient with W.R.A. policy available for this sort of educational work. From the Twin Cities Miss Watson, Rundquist and I went to Madison, Wisconsin where there was already a committee in existence. I also made a quick trip to Kalamazoo, Michigan.

The trip through the Middle West demonstrated again that there were good possibilities there for relocating evacuees. Interest in the problem seemed to be growing. I was sure that we could find enough friendly people to give local support throughout most of the mid West. It looked as if we should have a representative in that area and I proposed that we locate a W.R.A. representative in Chicago to coordinate the work in the Middle West. At this time we were continuing to plan on ten to twenty thousand evacuees, principally the younger people, leaving the centers permanently. It was thought that the local committees could form the backbone of the local support for the evacuees. We were not planning on more than a minimum skeleton force to supervise field operations in the Middle West. I should mention that in the West we had added six or seven field men to our staff to handle the problems that were arising as the evacuees went out on temporary leave to work in the sugar beet fields. However, there were no local committees in the West and W.R.A. had assumed a definite supervisory function over the seasonal workers.

27. The state of organization for relocation in mid November is summed up in a memorandum I wrote the Director on November 13. Concern is expressed over the rate of return from the F.B.I. "The thing that is necessary is more speed on the large number of applications that are now beginning to come in." The number tied up over at the F.B.I. on which nothing was happening was becoming very alarming. It looked as if this essential element in our clearance procedure might operate with such slowness



that we would be tied up completely in the face of a growing volume of applications for leave.

In this memorandum I also express concern over the necessity for and the time consumed by the special checking with the War Department on evacuees desiring leave to go into the East.

Suggestions were made in the memorandum for expanding the organization to handle the developing leave work.

"The Washington office needs an adequate leave section to handle the volume of indefinite leave applications. We now have two people devoted to this entirely. We need two more, one a supervisor for the section and the other a competent stenographer....My recent trip has convinced me that local committees composed of representatives of responsible local organizations are a key part of our outside relocation process. There are now such committees beginning to operate in Chicago, Madison, Minneapolis, and St. Paul. Other places have manifested an interest and there are many communities in which it can be easily stimulated. I would like to plan on cooperating with local and national groups in getting a good number of such committees functioning within the next three months. I believe that Chicago is the key spot in the Middle West for us to open an office now. I have asked the administrative office to arrange for space in the Office of Emergency Management headquarters in Chicago. We have the application of Miss Ross about whom I talked to you and I hope that we can get her services within the next few weeks. It may be desirable to have one of our employment people from the West with experience in evacuee placement come into Chicago for the time being and I would like to consider the possibility of Rex Lee being stationed there throughout the winter months...

....At each project a competent person with full knowledge of the leave regulations should shortly begin to take charge of the processing of the leave applications. I am now checking each project to see whether a competent person is available for assignment to this work. I do not want to suggest that we hire new people for this work unless it is absolutely essential to do so. Some of these field investigators that we hired this fall may possibly be available now to take over the leave work at the projects if we have projects where no one is available on the spot.

I would like to plan, just as soon as we are able to handle it, to begin to open up the taking of applications for indefinite leave with the view to getting the applications of all those who think they want to get out and take jobs outside. However, I don't want to begin doing this on any scale until we are sure that we can process them rapidly through the Washington office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation."



28. Following the issuance of the leave regulations the lawyers went to work on a comprehensive administrative instruction which would specify in greater detail the procedure to be followed under the regulations. Mr. Frase worked closely with Mr. McLaughlin in the preparation of this document. It was issued on November 6 as Administrative Instruction No. 22 revised. The job of project leave officer was created and was assigned to be handled by the employment officer at the project. The steps to be taken on a leave application were spelled out in detail. It was made possible for an evacuee to start the investigating process prior to the time he wanted to depart. He could ask for "leave clearance." If he secured his leave clearance there was then no extra delay in this score when he filed his application for indefinite leave. Leave clearance and indefinite leave divisions were made in Washington.

The new Instruction No. 22 also carried with it a number of new forms. The application for leave clearance, form WRA-126 was our original form WRA-71 now considerably revised in the light of previous experience in using it. The most significant change in the new form was the omission of any direct question asking an evacuee for an affirmation of his loyalty to the United States and a repudiation of any loyalty to Japan. It was felt that the issue of loyalty could best be gotten at by a consideration of all the evidence in the file and that a direct loyalty question would not contribute greatly to a determination of the issue. We may have been wrong about this but such was the view we took in November as the result of experience and careful consideration.

With the adoption of the new leave regulations and administrative instruction the relocation centers needed attention. The importance of relocation outside the projects was being brought home to the project directors by the Director. Whether they liked it or not it was evident that outside relocation was a vital part of the plans of W.R.A. At a meeting of the project directors in Salt Lake City in the latter part of November the Director had strongly urged the desirability and necessity of relocating as many evacuees as possible outside the centers. From this time on the project directors have taken the relocation as a basic policy. The project directors might be developing an interest in relocation outside but the project staff still was substantially uninformed and uninterested in the program; and those that were interested knew little or nothing about the possibilities for relocation and the leave procedure that had been recently promulgated. Then there was the matter of organization to handle leave at the projects. Provision had been made for leave officers and for the employment officer to handle leave, but in few places were the duties understood or the necessary organization accomplished. I arranged with Mr. McEntire to join with him on an educational trip around the projects and left Washington for Heart Mountain on November 23.

I had been at Heart Mountain only three hours when the Director telephoned me from San Francisco to come right on in



there as he wished to talk with me about the possibility of expediting the whole relocation program. The outcome of our talks in San Francisco on November 27 and 28 was an instruction to accelerate the relocation program as much as possible. We had been planning to handle through Washington around five or six hundred applications a week. The Director's idea was that we should aim to double, or if possible, triple this figure.

It was decided to expand the staff doing relocation work. The regional organization was being abandoned and a number of people were available in the regional offices for new assignments. Some of the men already working in the field in sugar beet labor could be transferred temporarily, at least, to the Middle West for the winter. The result was that beginning about the middle of December a number of new people were added to the relocation staff in Washington. It took a few days longer to get the men into the Middle West. Shortly after January 1, 1943 we had a skeleton staff operating. In addition to the transfer of W.R.A. people to relocation work the Director also approved of several new people hired especially for this work. A meeting was held in the middle of January in Chicago which launched the new field staff. The work in Washington was increasing rapidly and a leave section was organized. I should mention that McEntire and I continued the trip around the projects as planned during December. We talked with members of the staff and evacuees about relocation. Assistance was given the employment officers in organizing the leave sections in the projects. The combination of the Director's urging the projects to take relocation seriously, the new leave procedures, and our educational trip around the projects resulted in a sharp increase beginning around the first of the year in the number of applications for leave clearance and indefinite leave.



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Memorandum

Sep. 21, 1943

To: Thomas W. Holland

From: Dillon S. Myer

I have read with great interest your memorandum outlining the history of relocation up until about January 1. I think it is excellent and have no criticisms or suggestions to make except that it stopped too soon. It would be tremendously helpful if you, perhaps in collaboration with Bob Frase, would write a second chapter starting with the combat team idea, following through the Joint Board, and bringing the history up-to-date as of the middle of September. If you could do this I would appreciate it very much.

/s/ D. S. Myer