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Untruths About Japanese-Americans

By Galen M. Fisher

A FULL year has passed since completion of the second large-scale racial evacuation in American history, that of the Japanese-Americans (that of the Indians was the first). As to the necessity of moving many of the Japanese from critical coastal areas, the government and public opinion were agreed. As to removing all Japanese residents, and only Japanese, without hearings for any of them, except those interned as subversive, there was a strong body of dissenting opinion. Experience has shown that the dissenters were right. The evacuation may be termed a military success, a social failure, an international tactical blunder.

After what happened at Pearl Harbor, everybody on the exposed west coast, including Japanese residents, agreed that drastic defense measures were justified. But the record shows that for over a month after Pearl Harbor, no military or civilian spokesman suggested the complete and summary evacuation of all persons of Japanese race. During that period there was a marked absence of animus against the Japanese-American residents. The FBI, with the cooperation of the other intelligence services, arrested several thousand Japanese, Germans and Italians, mostly aliens, and set up civilian hearing boards to ascertain whether or not they should be interned. All the military forces were placed at once on a war footing. It was generally assumed that these measures had forestalled any possible danger of fifth column activity and sabotage, and the public was comparatively calm and restrained.

Then, as if a hidden hand had given the signal, a barrage of verbal attacks on the resident Japanese was begun and demands for their total evacuation were made. What brought about this sudden barrage and won for it widespread popular support? Many forces were at work, some honorable, some utterly vicious. False rumors and fallacious arguments played an important part. Among them were the following untruths:

Untruth 1. That sabotage was committed by Japanese at Pearl Harbor. The readiness with which ordinarily critical minds swallowed the fantastic rumors about how Japanese and Japanese-Americans aided the attacking forces on December 7 should suffice to humble many a professedly propaganda-proof American. Even the members of the Tolan congressional committee belong in that category, for during their hearings in California one of them silenced protests against wholesale condemnation of the Japanese by saying: "There are authenticated pictures during the attack [on Pearl Harbor] showing hundreds of Japanese old automobiles cluttered on the streets of Honolulu so the army could not get to the ships." It is to the credit of the Tolan committee that in its printed report it made the *amende honorable* by presenting ten pages of official denials of such statements. Their falsity was early exposed in my article, "Our Japanese Refugees," in the April 1, 1942, issue of *The Christian Century*. J. Edgar

Hoover told a House committee that the civilian population of Hawaii had committed neither sabotage nor espionage, and the attorney general of California told the Tolan committee that there had been no sabotage and no fifth column activity in the state since the war began. In face of all these denials, one would expect the rumors to die. To the contrary, they are still being repeated and believed by respectable people. Finally, in order to scotch them for good, I secured statements from the two men best qualified to know the truth. Here they are:

Colonel Kendall Fielder, chief of military intelligence for Hawaii since June 1941, wrote on May 17, 1943: "There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage or fifth column activity committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941." Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson wrote May 12, 1943:

The statement that Japanese trucks in Honolulu deliberately put out of commission several American airplanes is an absolute lie. No American machine gunners cleared Honolulu streets of any Japanese before, on or after December 7. The statement that all over Honolulu were signs which read, "Here a Japanese traitor was killed," is another absolute lie. . . . There was no dynamite planted by any Japanese or anyone else in or about Honolulu in December; and no civilian ever used a truck to pick up any dynamite.

Nelson Pringle, CBS broadcaster, after checking these rumors made these comments on October 5, 1942:

Where were the Japanese on that Sunday [December 7], if they were not sabotaging? Hundreds of them were actively helping defend the territory, as members of the Oahu Citizens Defense Committee. Volunteer truck drivers, they rushed to their assembly points, stripped their delivery trucks of their contents, inserted frames prepared to hold four stretchers, and went tearing out to Pearl Harbor to take the wounded to hospitals. Some of these Japanese got there so promptly that their trucks were hit by flying shrapnel or machine-gun bullets from road-strafting Jap planes. The presence of the Japanese drivers and of their scarred and pock-marked trucks undoubtedly gave rise to the rumor that guns had to be employed to clear the highway of Japs who were blocking the road to Pearl Harbor.

An equally emphatic denial was broadcast over NBC on August 1, 1943, by Will Tyree, just returned from Hawaii and the south Pacific front.

I have dwelt on these rumors because their gullible acceptance on the west coast was a major link in an evil chain. They made possible the change from popular calm and tolerance toward resident Japanese to hysterical distrust, the anti-Japanese crusade in the press and over the radio playing upon weak and excitable minds, the exaggerated reports of assaults upon and homicides of Japanese, the mutterings of mob violence against Japanese by gangs and even by respectable citizens. These all culminated in the decision of the military authorities to resort to total evacuation, partly for the protection of the Japanese residents themselves. This un-American principle of

"protective custody" of an entire racial group may not have been the dominant factor leading to total evacuation, but careful observers agree that it was one of the weightiest.

Untruth 2. That the nisei gave no information to intelligence officers. It has been loosely charged, even by a staff officer of the Western Defense Command, that the nisei have not aided the authorities in discovering dangerous Japanese residents. The falsity of these allegations has been proved by intelligence officers both in Hawaii and on the mainland, as well as by informed civilians. It is true that the great majority of nisei did not give such aid, and the same could presumably be said of German-Americans. The chief reason is that most of them had no information to give, any more than most white citizens. Some who did have information feared dire consequences if they told it. Still others would not inform on relatives. But enough of them did give aid to disprove the sweeping charges to the contrary. Let some of the intelligence officers speak for themselves. On August 10, 1942, one wrote me:

I personally know at least fifteen intelligence officers who have received continual aid from the group of loyal and patriotic nisei attached to each, and have in consequence been of great service to the United States in obtaining information regarding disloyal or suspicious Japanese. There are innumerable cases I could give you.

An anonymous intelligence officer who "has more complete knowledge of the activities of loyal nisei than any other individual on the Pacific coast" wrote in *Harper's Magazine* for October 1942:

Many of the nisei voluntarily contributed valuable anti-subversive information to this [the naval intelligence] and other governmental agencies. The Japanese consular staff, the Central Japanese Association, and others known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause did not themselves trust the nisei.

Joseph Driscoll, in the course of a series of articles on "The Japanese in America," wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* of January 31, 1943:

These slant-eyed young Americans [of Japanese extraction] have thrown the fear of God and the Federal Bureau of Investigation into their elders and made it plain that treason would not be tolerated and would be reported to the authorities. Common gossip out here was that not one Japanese had informed on another. On the highest authority I was assured the contrary was true, and that many patriotic Japanese have turned in suspects of their own race and even of their own families.

Untruth 3. That evacuees have been coddled in the centers. Congressmen, journalists and letter-writers to the papers have emitted a deluge of charges that the evacuees were living on the fat of the land, while the rest of us were being severely rationed. The facts as stated by the war department and the War Relocation Authority jointly on July 18, 1943, are that "all rationing restrictions applicable to the civilian population are strictly followed and two meatless days are observed each week. In general, the food is nourishing but definitely below army standards. The cost of feeding at the centers over the past several months has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person per day. . . . Some perishable commodities are purchased locally, and practically all other food is bought through the quartermaster depots of the army."

Untruth 4. That dual citizenship is peculiar to the Jap-

anese. In the *American Legion Magazine* for June 1943 Frederick G. Murray writes what many other people have said before him: "All dual citizens—the Japanese are the only nation to establish a dual citizenship." This betrays inexcusable ignorance. France, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and many other European and Latin American nations claim far more jurisdiction over children born of their nationals in America than does Japan. In fact, Japan in 1924 enacted a law by which American-born children of Japanese subjects would have only American citizenship unless their parents registered them at a Japanese consulate before they were fourteen days old—a provision expressly intended to remove the issue from American-Japanese relations. In 1930, Professor E. K. Strong estimated that only 40 per cent of the Japanese-Americans in California over seven years of age had dual citizenship, and close estimates place the present number of such dual citizens in the United States at not more than 20 per cent, or about 16,000. A considerable number of these would renounce Japanese nationality if doing so were not often difficult and expensive.

Untruth 5. That Japanese-Americans and Japan's warlords are brothers at heart. It would be as logical to bracket all German-Americans with the nazis as to brand all Japanese-Americans with the same mark of Cain as Japan's military gangsters. Mr. Grew rebuked such careless libeling of an honorable group of fellow citizens when he said in his address at Union College on April 26, 1943:

We Americans, of all races and creeds, fight the evils of despotic and selfish militarism. There can be no compromise between ourselves and the arrogant exclusiveness of self-styled men-gods of Japan—no more than between ourselves and the self-styled Aryans of Germany. In our war against caste and privilege, wherever they may exist or occur, the contribution of Americans who are of Japanese descent is of real value: first, because they are living proof of our non-racial free unity; second, because they make a valuable contribution to the sum total of our American civilization.

A few months ago two men at opposite ends of the country sang the same song of hatred of all persons of Japanese race. The one was Senator Stewart of Tennessee, who proposed to the Senate that the execution of American flyers by the Japanese warlords be matched by stripping of citizenship and confining in concentration camps all Japanese-Americans. The other was the new president of the Native Sons of the Golden West, who sounded this keynote: "We're going to Washington to bar the Japs forever from again participating in the privileges and freedom of the country they so ruthlessly and treacherously attacked." Both of these gentlemen obviously identified a group of their fellow Americans with Tojo and his gang. They merited the stinging rebuke administered by the *Baltimore Sun* to the senator on April 26: "What Senator Stewart urges would . . . represent acceptance of the Axis technique of visiting vengeance upon the innocent by the deeds of others. It would be nothing less than an example of the Axis brand of racial bigotry."

Untruth 6. That confinement of evacuees is both lawful and necessary. The responsible federal authorities hold that the evacuation was legal, but that detention is legal only until resettlement of the evacuees in unrestricted areas can be effected. This distinction goes to the heart of

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American civil rights. Apparently this conclusion of the War Relocation Authority is unknown to the western congressmen and governors and county supervisors who have been telling the world that all evacuees should be strictly confined for the duration; or possibly they set themselves up as superior judges of law and policy.

The legal question hinges on the interpretation of two presidential executive orders. That of February 19, 1942, authorized the war department to "prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded." That of March 18, 1942, created the WRA to provide for the needs of the evacuees, to supervise their activities and to provide for their relocation and their employment.

It is the basic contention of the federal authorities that the evacuees must be treated not as prisoners of war or as criminals, but as persons innocent until proved guilty or dangerous to national security, and therefore entitled to honorable treatment while in detention, and to the earliest possible restoration to freedom within unrestricted areas. The alleged danger of subversive activity by the evacuees if they are released does not carry conviction in face of the statement of the director of the WRA that as of June 1, 1943, not a single act of sabotage or other subversive conduct had been charged against the 14,000 evacuees who had been released from the centers to resettle or to take short-term jobs. He properly added that all evacuees found, after proper procedure, to be disloyal or dangerous would continue to be confined.

Untruth 7. That the evacuees are unchanging, imper-

sonal units. It is always hard to personalize people who are far away and markedly different from ourselves. It would therefore not be strange if Americans east of the Rockies thought of the evacuees as though they were robots. But it is decidedly strange that many Californians who knew individual Japanese before the evacuation now seem to think of all the evacuees as a static mass, as unaffected as a sleeping Buddha by the drastic changes in their lives or by the prevalent defamation and proposed disfranchisement or deportation of all "Japs."

In reality, the evacuees have been undergoing changes in attitudes and ideas equaled in intensity by few, if any, groups in our entire population. How could it be otherwise? Family life disrupted; business and professions gone; savings and security lost; a host of youth unable to realize plans for careers; life for the refined reduced to mediocrity; children contaminated by weakened parental control and abnormal social life; citizens registered for the draft and then denied service in the armed forces, except in a segregated racial unit; the future for most of them a dark enigma. Anyone with a modicum of imagination must see that the evacuees are an exceedingly dynamic as well as tragic group. The practical import of this fact is that the tragedy is heightened by every added week of life in the centers. To advocate continued confinement of loyal and disloyal, citizen and alien, old and young alike, is to conspire to turn one of our most productive, orderly and ambitious groups into a host of shiftless, cynical problem cases.

Our Two Japanese-American Policies

By Galen M. Fisher

THE POLICY adopted toward the Japanese population on the west coast was a compromise between sound Americanism and compliance with hectic popular pressure. Now that the situation has cooled off, it is both possible and profitable to examine it critically and to contrast it with the course that was followed in Hawaii.

When the Pearl Harbor disaster left the west coast exposed, both the government and the public rightly demanded protection against invasion. This protection was held to be solely a military problem. But it is now clear that it was not exclusively a problem in physical military defense. If it had been, then the summary mass evacuation of residents of one race, the Japanese, might have been justifiable. But the situation was shot through with delicate social and international factors, almost as vital to winning the war *and* the peace beyond as the physical military factors. The war department is not supposed to be qualified to handle social and international factors. The national administration should therefore have conditioned the power given to the military so as to make sure that those factors were properly handled. If that had been done, the unfortunate repercussions of the evacuation among our allies in Asia would have been averted. More important, constitutional rights would have been more fully maintained, and the evacuees would have been honored, if not compensated, for the sacrifices they made in the national interest.

Where the President Failed

Whose duty was it to check the hysterical popular pressure for indiscriminate and precipitate evacuation of the Japanese? That duty rested on many persons, public and private, but in the national emergency only the administration could adequately cope with it. Sobered by danger, the people as a whole would have heeded a stern appeal to refrain from lawlessness and to honor the Bill of Rights, if it had been issued by the President and backed up by the secretaries of war and the navy and the Western Defense Command. Failure to make this appeal was a lamentable oversight. Attorney General Biddle and Governor Olson of California did issue such appeals, but they alone did not carry sufficient weight to check the anti-Japanese campaign that began suddenly five weeks after Pearl Harbor.

There is much to commend in the execution of the evacuation by the Western Defense Command, but much to condemn in its rejection of selective evacuation. That a selection could and should be made, where the Japanese lived, by hearings or other legal processes, was from the outset the conviction of many representative citizens. But thistles were sown, and thistles have been and will long be reaped. It has proved impossible for the War Relocation Authority and all the voluntary religious and

social agencies working for the evacuees to do more than reduce the number of thorns.

For some weeks it was taken for granted by nearly everyone of standing on the coast that the military would move only a fraction of the Japanese residents, since the FBI had promptly arrested all suspected and dangerous persons. What led to total evacuation? Many factors. Among them were the false rumors from Hawaii, the sinister campaign already referred to, the danger of invasion and fifth column aid and fear of mob violence to Japanese residents.

One Man's Prejudice

But one other factor, which was probably of considerable importance, has come to light: the apparent anti-Japanese bias of the then commander of the Western Defense Command. This bias was suspected at the time by some observers, but not until fourteen months later was the suspicion apparently confirmed. For on April 13, 1943, General DeWitt was quoted by the Associated Press as having said at a hearing of the House naval affairs subcommittee on housing: "It makes no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving him a scrap of paper won't change him. I don't care what they do with the Japs so long as they don't send them back here. A Jap is a Jap." Although no denial of this statement has ever appeared, it still seems incredible that the highest representative of the army on the coast could have gratuitously insulted an unfortunate body of citizens and cast aspersions on citizenship in general.

What happened on the west coast might then be summarized as follows: Confusion as to policy but public restraint toward all enemy aliens and Japanese-Americans for weeks after Pearl Harbor; then sudden agitation for total evacuation of Japanese, countered by demands for selective evacuation; then threats of violence against resident Japanese; finally, the decision by the military to evacuate some 70,000 citizens and 40,000 aliens of Japanese race without hearings or evidence of misconduct. The evacuation was executed without harshness. Its hardships were tempered by the services of church and other groups and by kindly individuals. The evacuees were confined in assembly centers, then in relocation centers located mostly in desert areas where accommodations are primitive. Now efforts are being made by politicians and "patriotic" organizations to disfranchise, exclude from the coast, or deport evacuees. The WRA policy in the centers has been and is democratic and humane. The war department has authorized formation of a nisei combat unit, but registration for the unit has been bungled. Inland resettlement of approved evacuees is being pushed by WRA, with the aid of civic and religious groups. Resettlement is being slowed up by the reluctance of the

evacuees, especially the aliens, to go out in face of uncertain prospects and public antipathy.

We turn now to Hawaii. There, martial law was declared soon after Pearl Harbor and General Emmons became military governor. About 37 per cent of the islands' population is of Japanese ancestry. One might therefore have expected a more drastic treatment of the Japanese than prevailed on the mainland. The contrary was the fact. General Emmons as well as civil officials and leaders of public opinion did all in their power to preserve the self-respect of the Japanese residents. Only 390 persons of Japanese extraction were interned, and half of those were consular and other officials of Japan. A few hundred others were evacuated to mainland relocation centers. The remaining 159,000 Japanese were treated like all other inhabitants, although the intelligence services and the large body of unquestionably loyal Japanese remained alert to discover signs of disloyalty anywhere. Lieutenant Commander Coggins, in the June 1943 issue of *Harper's Magazine*, says: "By their actions an overwhelming majority of Japanese-Americans have shown hatred of the enemy and have made brilliant records in all of the war effort in which they have been allowed to participate." General Emmons and other officials have repeatedly acknowledged the indispensable part played by the Japanese population in rebuilding Pearl Harbor defenses, in donating blood, in buying bonds and producing food. To be accurate, there have been many instances of minor friction, especially between lower military officers or newcomer Caucasians and the Japanese, but these have not seriously marred the general harmony. An interracial committee in the morale section of the military government has been effective in averting trouble.

The Varsity Victory Volunteers

A dramatic illustration of the happy results of trusting and respecting the Japanese population is the story of the "Varsity Victory Volunteers." Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, sections of the army and of the public felt uneasy over the fact that nisei members of the Territorial Guard or militia were protecting vital installations. Tactfully, the guard commander discussed the situation with the nisei members. They agreed, though not without deep chagrin, that they should be inactivated. But 155 of them resolved to find a way to evidence their patriotism. So they wrote a petition to General Emmons which ended with these words: "Hawaii is our home; the United States our country. We know but one loyalty and that is to the Stars and Stripes. We wish to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever service you may see fit to use us." The general was pleased and made them a labor corps with the engineers. For more than a year these V.V.V.'s rendered most efficient service. The press filled columns with their pictures and accounts of their doings. President Gregg Sinclair of the University of Hawaii termed V.V.V. "the most honored initials in Hawaii." When the lists for the combat unit were opened in February of this year many of the V.'s rushed to volunteer.

The litmus-test of the two policies—trust and respect in Hawaii, and mass evacuation and expressed or implied distrust and disrespect on the mainland—was the com-

parative response to the chance to volunteer for the combat unit. In the ten relocation centers, only 1,300-odd volunteered; in Hawaii, 9,600. The 50 per cent larger Japanese population of Hawaii does not alone account for the difference. The basic reason was the difference in government policy and public attitude there from what obtained on the coast. More specifically: (1) In the centers, there was confusion because a registration for release was held simultaneously with that for the combat unit. There was also general resentment because Question 28 of the registration questionnaire required the alien evacuees to renounce allegiance to Japan, thus leaving them men without a country, since America debars them from naturalization. Only after a week was this question withdrawn. In Hawaii there was no confusion or bad feeling, because the registration was solely for the combat unit. (2) On the mainland, the nisei had been depressed by public abuse and opposition to their settling inland and, later, to their return to the coast. (3) The nisei volunteers in Hawaii, unlike those in the centers, had no reason to worry about the future of their families.

Coastal Policy Costly

Economically, also, the contrast is marked. The policy pursued in Hawaii enabled the Japanese to continue producing 90 per cent of the food raised in the islands and to play a leading part in defense work and other occupations. On the mainland, confinement of the evacuees withdrew not less than 45,000 working adults from normal production, at a loss, for the first year, of approximately \$70,000,000. Another \$70,000,000 was sliced from the federal treasury to maintain the centers. The loss would have been still greater had not some 14,000 evacuees been allowed to go out to work on farms, nearly 10,000 of them to help save the sugar beet crop, thereby supplying a year's ration of sugar for 10,000,000 people.

The cynic may hold that the Hawaiian policy was due not to liberality but to necessity. He may claim that it would have been impossible to get ships to evacuate 160,000 Japanese, and that the economy of the islands was utterly dependent on them. This is true. Yet the fact remains that the tradition of racial fair play and the social wisdom of the authorities lifted the policy from negative necessity to positive statesmanship. In support of this interpretation, note these words of the chief of military intelligence, Colonel Fielder, in an address given last March:

Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the Axis crowd would give one of enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? Yet that's what was done in Hawaii, and so far it has proved militarily sound. That the situation is working out well is a tribute not only to wise administration, but to tolerance on the part of the rest of our good Americans here. . . . It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were put on the spot have proved their love for America and have helped solve an otherwise ticklish military problem here. For the information of all who might be misled, there is none among us who has been led into this policy out of a mawkish sentimentality or gullibility. . . . Americans of Japanese blood . . . are Americans, and until they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving) traitorous, they should be treated as Americans.

On the west coast, sincere defenders of the evacuation policy contend that it was inevitable because of the twin

dangers of fifth column activity in aid of the expected Japanese naval invasion, and violence against residents of Japanese race by Filipinos and Americans enraged over Nipponese army atrocities. Both these dangers were felt by nearly everyone to be real. Yet the Hawaiian military command, confronted by the same dangers in greater degree, refused to apply the weak-kneed device of "protective custody" or to shut up any Japanese residents except the 390 known or suspected subversive persons. Constructively, the military government formed a morale section, expressly to forestall interracial disunity and mob violence. Then the military and civil authorities applied their full force and prestige to check hysteria and violence against the Japanese residents. This policy won the grateful and ardent cooperation of practically the entire Japanese population. There is abundant reason to ask whether a similar policy could not have been applied to advantage on the mainland.

Two Japanese-Americans

Thus far we have dealt so largely in generalities that the reader may have failed to see between the lines the sensitive brown faces of the thousands whose lives in Hawaii or on the mainland are being blessed or cursed by these contrasting policies. Two stories may serve to make more vivid what happened to a vast number of individuals.

A Japanese-American pastor on the island of Kauai, T.H., rendered invaluable aid to the authorities during the trying year after Pearl Harbor. As soon as the formation of the nisei combat unit was announced, he made strenuous and finally successful efforts to be appointed a chaplain to the unit. He was much impressed by the anxiety of his young parishioners and friends as they awaited the outcome of the physical examination on which hinged their admission to or rejection from the unit. He wrote: "When a 'reject' was called, his facial expression changed, his eyes were ready for tears, and he

said: 'Why am I rejected?' . . . The quota was filled, and 20 who were able-bodied had to return home. Their feet were heavy. They shouted their protests. A white soldier in camp told me: 'My God! I never saw a crazy bunch like this before.' The white cook exclaimed: 'I would really like to cook for these fellows. They certainly cooperate.'" Some weeks later, the same pastor wrote: "My mother and I sat anxiously thinking about the prospect of my youngest brother's induction into the unit. The next day he was called. That evening I met my mother and she had happy tears in her eyes. She said: 'With six sons, one at least should be in the army besides you. As a mother who has received so much from America, I can now walk the streets with head erect. I am mother of a son in active service.' She spoke as if God had whispered, 'Well done.'"

Contrast that with this and draw your own conclusion: In southern California lived a nisei, a veteran of the United States army in World War I. He had been decorated for bravery and was head of an American Legion post. He was evacuated, but he kept his chin up and rallied all the nisei veterans in the relocation center to form a Legion post. They sent in their application for a charter and were heartsick when it was denied. About the same time, the charters of several all-nisei posts were canceled by the Legion authorities. These incredible rebuffs, added to the dismal life in the center, the blind-alley prospect for the future and the widespread "hate-campaign" against all "Japs," ultimately soured his spirit. He still loathed militarist Japan as much as ever, but he began to lose faith in the America for which he had repeatedly risked his life. He became a leader in stirring up trouble in the center, a carrier of disaffection, one of the many frustrated and disillusioned spirits.

This is the second in a series of four articles on the situation of Japanese-Americans by Mr. Fisher. The next article will appear in an early issue.

Sponges on Spearpoints

By E. Stanley Jones

THERE was one humane spot in the dark cloud of cruelty that hung over the scene at Golgotha. It was the sponge. The sponge with its deadening drug would soothe the tortured nerves of the crucified. It was a token that there was a spark of compassion left in human breasts.

But Jesus would not take the sponge. He refused it, say two of the Gospel writers. He would match his courage against the tragedy of that hour. They had denied him justice in the judgment hall. Now they would be kind to him on the cross. He refused the kindness, for charity without justice is an insult.

But there was something else involved in his refusal. The sponge was given to him on a spearpoint: "So they put a sponge . . . on a spear." Back of their charity was the spearpoint of domination.

We wonder why labor is not content with its wages and demands more and more. "They are never satisfied, no matter how much we give them," complains the puzzled industrialist. Why is labor dissatisfied with its wages, however high they may be? For the simple reason that labor senses the fact that back of the sponge of wages is the spearpoint of domination. Capital has the right to hire and to fire labor. Labor is a commodity to be bought or dropped at the will of capital. Capital owns the tools of industry, and labor can use those tools only at the will of the owner. As long as that condition exists, there will be discontent and revolt. The only way out is to put labor on the same level with capital on a cooperative basis. When capital and labor cooperate in production, in management, in profits and losses, then and then only will we have peace and progress in industry. For

then the spearpoint of domination will be gone and there will be equal justice.

In our treatment of the Negro we are willing to be kind, but we are unwilling to be just. Many white people, lacking sympathetic imagination, are completely unconscious of the spearpoints that pierce the soul of the man of color in our civilization. They attribute the unrest among colored people to "agitators." But the agitators are the unconquerable instincts of mankind which refuse subordination and slavery and revolt against the daily reminders of that subordination. Withdraw the spearpoint of domination, as the New Zealander did with the Maori, and relationships will be natural, cordial and unstrained.

Good Government or Self-Rule?

In the areas of the world where white imperialism has been in operation, many beneficent sponges are being offered to subject peoples—education, roads, railways, telegraphs, postal systems, in fact all the apparatus of modern civilization. "Why aren't they content with these things? Look at what we are doing for them," stutters the puzzled imperialist. He puts their discontent down to "agitators," to "base ingratitude," to a spirit of "biting the hand that feeds them," to "never knowing when they are well off." All of which may have some truth in it, but it overlooks one thing: back of all these sponges of benefit offered to subject peoples is the spearpoint of domination whose prick they constantly feel. You have to put yourself in their place and feel as they feel before you can understand. Only then will you know what they mean when they say, "Good government is no substitute for self-government."

When Mahatma Gandhi was about to launch his first civil disobedience movement, I wrote to him begging him not to do it. I felt that there were too many dangers involved. He wrote in reply: "May I assure you that I will not launch this movement without a great deal of prayer and searching of heart. You perhaps have no notion of the wrong that this government has done, and is still doing, to the vital part of our being. But I must not argue. I invite you to pray with and for me." Note the words: "the wrongs . . . done . . . to the vital part of our being." His sensitive soul was writhing on the spearpoint of domination. No amount of good things offered on sponges could take away that central and fundamental fact.

Where Some Missionaries Fail

The onlooker does not see that fact unless he can put himself into the other's place. Even missionaries, who by the very nature of their calling are supposed to have sympathetic imagination, often fail in this respect. One reason is that they have been used to dominating converts in mission compounds—for the converts' own good, of course. They wonder why the converts are not more grateful. They carry that same spirit over into national affairs and wonder why Indians are not more grateful for the Pax Britannica. They lack the sympathetic imagination to feel the pressure of the spearpoint.

Intelligent and outstanding Western Christians have been puzzled and resentful at India's failure to accept the

Cripps proposal. They say that self-government was offered India and India would not take it. Now, they assert, the problem is not to induce Britain to give self-government, but to induce India to take it. But what was Britain's offer? To grant dominion status while reserving defense. In essence, Britain said: "You can govern yourself but you cannot defend yourself." India could not take self-government on a spearpoint of domination.

Suppose Britain had said, "We will give you self-government, including defense." India would have turned around and answered: "Yes, we're grateful, but we will have to have your help in defense. You have had to defend us so long that you cannot suddenly turn the task over to us in time of war with the enemy at our gates. We are unprepared, for you have kept us unprepared. Let Wavell stay and we will appoint a defense minister who will coordinate our resources with those of the Allies." In that case, India would have been behind the Allies to the last man (except, of course, for convinced Gandhians, who do not believe in military methods). The spearpoint was not withdrawn, and India refused the offer. Every responsible body in India—the Moslem League, the Congress, the Mahasabha and others—rejected the British proposal.

Keep Control of Purse

There is another consideration. To reserve "defense" meant that about 75 per cent of the revenues of India would be in British hands—for approximately that amount goes for the military. Thus about 25 per cent would be left the Indians with which to begin self-government. How could India begin self-government with only 25 per cent of its revenues under its control? Is that an offer of self-government? Let Japan offer the whites the return of Malaya on those terms, and see what they would say! And yet responsible men continue to declare that self-government was offered India and India would not take it.

Besides, whoever controls the military has the final power. Would the military be handed over to India at the end of the war, or would some reason be found for withholding it? India was not sure. This shows suspiciousness? Yes, it does. Subject peoples have found that imperialism will give anything, literally anything, short of withdrawing the spearpoint of domination.

A good deal is made of the fact that the viceroy's council now consists of Indians. But the viceroy's powers remain intact. He is not responsible to the Indian legislature. When a British high court justice ruled that the imprisonment of the national leaders was illegal (thousands of India's leaders have been imprisoned) the government was not in the least upset. The viceroy could make it "right" by "certification." The viceroy's word makes an illegal act "right."

Anything except the withdrawal of that spearpoint will be granted. Ask for its withdrawal, and the sponges will fall away and the point will pierce your side. Just a week ago a letter came telling me that Chand Pundit, niece of Jawaharlal Nehru, former minister of the local self-government of the United Provinces, was shot down as she headed a procession for the cause of freedom. This nineteen-year-old college girl, a student of the Isabella

Are the Evacuees Being Coddled?

By Galen M. Fisher

DOUBTS as to the legality of detaining the evacuated Japanese in the relocation centers constitute one of the cogent reasons why the War Relocation Authority is speeding the release of all approved evacuees. The fact that only a few of the evacuees themselves have filed suits to test the legality of restraints on their freedom is noteworthy evidence of their tolerance in the national emergency. Not one of the Germans or Italians evacuated from the west coast has been further detained except after due process of law. If they had been, doubtless a host of citizens would have raised a rumpus—and justifiably. The Constitution declares that no citizen may be deprived of his liberty or of his property without due process of law. But the Constitution makes no exception on account of race. Do the citizens who clamor for the continued confinement of the Japanese evacuees desire to amend the Constitution to legalize detention solely on the basis of race? How is that different from the Nazi race laws? Or do they desire that citizens be detained without benefit of law? What happens then to government of laws, not of men?

Be the law what it may, the fact is that some 107,000 evacuees were placed in ten relocation centers last year, and the bulk of them are still there. Some day the job done by the WRA in creating those centers will be recognized as a marvel of social engineering. There was no close precedent to follow. The nearest was the dubious Indian reservation system. The staff responsible for solving the problem had been trained largely in various branches of the federal government. Until this situation was precipitated by forces which took advantage of the war, few Americans realized what a reservoir of social engineering talent has been developed in such departments as those of agriculture and the interior.

WRA Headed by Experts

It was to the department of agriculture that the President turned for the two able administrators who have successively served as directors of the WRA, Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the general, and Dillon S. Myer. Around them was assembled a staff of 1,800 Caucasians. Critics who have sneered at this staff as "welfare workers," "theorists" and "sob-sisters" may not have known that all candidates were sifted by the Civil Service Commission, not picked at random by "reformers."

Have the relocation centers been a success? Yes and no. The odds were stacked against success. The patient, so to speak, had been inoculated with a malignant germ before the doctor (WRA) took the case. Since then, both doctor and patient have worked hard to give the latter's healthful energies free play. The regimen might be called naturopathic; self-service, self-government, and a blend of work and such play as could be devised were its elements.

To drop the figure, in each of the ten bare relocation centers, a city community had to be evolved from scratch. Nearly all the abilities needed to make any city go round were to be found among the evacuees. They were put to work, with the Caucasians generally acting as supervisors. Self-government with freedom of expression and initiative were encouraged. This liberal policy has evoked loud protests from critics who persist in thinking of the evacuees as somehow criminals who ought to be "treated rough." But the WRA has stood its ground. To be sure, some of the Caucasian staff have been paternalistic, others have given too little authority to able evacuees or have pigeonholed good suggestions, and still others have let red tape clog the wheels; but as a rule, they have striven to live up to democratic American standards. Incidentally, it is not the fault of the WRA but that of the niggardly budget adopted by Congress that the wages paid to most evacuees are far below market level.

Only Two Major Disturbances

As to disorders in the centers, there have been major disturbances in only two of them, and only once did a center manager deem it necessary to summon the soldiers stationed outside for emergencies. The disturbances were fomented by small groups of agitators. The wonder is that there has been so little disorder and protest. Conditions in the centers inevitably generate friction, pessimism and frustration. Nerves are frayed; tempers are on edge; rumors and gossip spread like wildfire. It is the perfect setting for the trouble-maker. Any like number of white Americans, with their low boiling point on personal rights, would have staged an uprising within a week.

The issues underlying the disturbances were always complex and generally confused. The root factor was not loyalty or disloyalty to America, but resentment, especially over the indiscriminate character of the evacuation itself and against the abuse heaped upon the evacuees by press and public. It seems clear that some of the most active trouble-makers might well have been removed more promptly after last winter's disturbances. How salutary such a step would have been is shown by the fact that at Manzanar Center all trouble ceased after thirteen ring-leaders had been sent to the isolation center set up by the WRA at Leupp, Arizona. Similar effects have followed removals from other centers, although all told only 170 men have been isolated, of whom 100 were aliens and 70, citizens. Most of the citizens were those *kibei* ("returned to America" youth) who were sent to Japan for schooling in childhood and became Japanized. *Kibei* who go to the mother country later in life generally return hostile to Japanese imperialism. Several hundred of the latter and of *nisei* who have never been to Japan are now serving in the intelligence services of our armed forces.

is the greatest obstacle to collaboration between the two nations and the largest single factor contributing to American isolationism. Let Britain open the prisons of India, recognizing as she does so that restoration of freedom of speech, press and assembly might and probably would lead to Indian independence. In doing so she would bind America to her as she could bind her by no conceivable volume of propaganda and by no possible refinement of balance-of-power politics.

After Four Years of War

THE WAR enters its fifth year this week. The First World War lasted only three months into its fifth year, but there is little prospect that the present conflict will terminate in an equal space of time. Nevertheless the past twelve months have undoubtedly witnessed the turning point in the struggle. Opinions may differ whether Germany will collapse before 1943 ends, as the most optimistic believe, or can continue on into 1944. But there is now little difference of opinion concerning the certainty of that collapse. In each of the major theaters the tide of war turned during the past year. It is now flowing as strongly toward an Allied military victory as it was ebbing in the direction of their defeat a year ago.

Contrast the situation as it exists today with that which obtained at this time in 1942. Then Marshal Rommel was standing well inside Egypt. Speculation concerned itself with whether he would push on immediately or would wait for help before taking Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. Hitler's armies had pushed through to the Volga and were generally expected to mop up the last resistance in Stalingrad within a few days. The Japanese were threatening alternately to move into India or into Australia. In the north Pacific they had shelled Dutch Harbor and were in possession of the outer Aleutians. On every front the Allies were fighting defensively, unable to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy.

The decisive turning points can now be seen clearly. In Egypt the battle of El Alamein, which Wendell Willkie described then as the crisis of the war, was certainly the crucial moment in the battle for North Africa. After that debacle Field Marshal Rommel's Africa Korps was never allowed to stop its retreat until its last remnants surrendered on Cape Bon, fifteen hundred miles to the west, to a British-American-French force. The incredible resistance of the Soviet army at Stalingrad held that pulverized outpost until fresh forces arrived and captured the besieging German army. A slashing winter campaign was followed by the powerful summer offensive which broke the Nazi system of defenses at Orel and led to a general retreat. In the Pacific the decisive naval-air battles of Midway and the Coral Sea were followed by the capture of Guadalcanal and Munda and the gradual penetration of the outer perimeter of Japanese defenses in the south. The recent recapture of Attu and Kiska turns the war in the north Pacific from the defensive to the offensive.

The decisive factor was Allied superiority in the mechanized equipment of modern war. This became apparent

first in the air, where the Axis everywhere lost the advantage of both numbers and quality during the year. Now the Anglo-American bombers have shown in the destruction of Hamburg that even great cities can be wiped out. This spring the defeat of the U-boat and the naval encounters in the south Pacific revealed that at sea also the productivity of American factories and shipyards was proving of decisive significance. The American expeditionary force which landed in North Africa demonstrated that it needed battle experience to be equal to its desert-hardened allies, but Sicily showed that American troops are not slow to learn.

Military success makes all the more tragic the political failure of Allied leadership during the fourth year of the war. Across every major achievement of arms has fallen the shadow cast by the inability of the United Nations to state their war aims. The first clear evidence of this was the cynical deal with Darlan in North Africa. In the case of Italy, it now seems certain that this indecision will cost tens of thousands of lives which might have been saved had the Allies been prepared to speak clearly and decisively for democracy when Mussolini fell. Refusal to discuss the future of Germany or of eastern Europe has played directly into the hands of Russia, which now appears to be in process of defining its own terms for those areas. Our continued silence concerning the future of the colonies, coupled with the severity of the measures by which the Indian bid for independence was suppressed, has handed the political initiative in Asia to Japan. Our Pacific foe has made territorial arrangements and given promises of freedom right and left, forcing the implied Allied defense of the imperialist status quo into the worst possible light.

The future is not in doubt so far as the military outcome is concerned, if the Russians continue to fight. But the signs that Stalin has other purposes in mind than those held by his western allies are ominously disquieting. At the Quebec conference, Stalin was present only as a specter. This lone wolf who has consistently declined to sit in with the heads of the other anti-Axis belligerents obviously has plans of his own for the postwar future. Those plans concern both Germany and Japan, which are his nearest powerful neighbors, one on each side. What is in Stalin's mind? No one knows.

We adhere to the conjecture which appeared in these pages before it was elsewhere expressed, that Stalin will make terms with Germany before the Allies bring Germany to her knees. Both Russia and Germany have everything to gain by such a course as compared with the crushing defeat which the British-American leaders promise. Stalin can handle a de-Hitlerized Germany without benefit of Anglo-American cooperation (or complication) to the relative advantage of Germany and the enormous aggrandizement of the Soviet Union. What then? Do we fight Russia and Germany together? Now? Ten years from now? And what will this combination mean for our war in the Pacific? Will Stalin let us crush Japan? Will the United States wish to crush Japan in view of a Russo-German control of the land mass of Eurasia? No doubt our leaders thought of all this before they made the United States a partner in the European war!

So case-hardened had the evacuees become by May 1943 that the Dies committee hearings on the relocation centers raised their temperature but slightly. With characteristic fanfare, the committee announced in advance that a subcommittee, to be headed by Congressman Costello, would submit a report that "will oppose release of any Japanese whatsoever" and "will insist that 'known subversives,' estimated to number more than 25,000 in the centers, be taken from their 'comfortable environment' and placed in rigidly guarded department of justice camps for enemy aliens." This announcement was made before any member of the committee had visited a single center. It provoked Director Dillon Myer to make this comment when he appeared before the committee: "If the committee has evidence that there are more than 25,000 'known subversives' in relocation centers, we earnestly hope that it will be turned over to the authorized investigative agencies of the government and to this agency [WRA] with all possible promptness. As this is written [a month after the announcement] the committee has submitted to the War Relocation Authority no evidence whatever in support of this charge." According to reliable reports, the 25,000 "known subversives" suffered such a shrinking that the committee ultimately gave the WRA the names of only 600 "suspects." Careful investigation of intelligence and WRA records showed that *not one* of the 600 had an unfavorable record.

Such a travesty of justice were the Costello subcommittee proceedings that Chester Rowell, dean of west coast journalists, wrote that its Los Angeles meeting accepted "testimony of which, so far, not one word would even be admitted or heard by any judicial or quasi-judicial body in existence." The committee declined Director Myer's repeated offers to supply data or to appear in person or by deputy. Mr. Myer finally felt forced to give to the press "some fifty comments on statements reported in the press, allegedly made by witnesses before the Dies committee." I quote one of his comments:

The *San Francisco Examiner*, in a story from Washington dated May 25, attributed the following statements to Representative Thomas in the form of a direct quotation: "The Dies committee investigators and I found conditions very bad in the war relocation centers. At one camp the Japanese objected to a fence which confined them. They tore it down. It stayed down and the Japs are still roaming around there at will. . . . Camp newspapers are virulently critical of anyone who opposes Japanese interests."

Representative Thomas had never visited a relocation center at the time this story appeared. . . . It is true that a section of the fence surrounding the Minidoka Center has recently been removed and has not yet been replaced. . . . It was removed by evacuee labor crews working under orders of the War Relocation Authority and with the full knowledge and consent of the military authorities. The statement that evacuees are permitted to "roam around at will" is wholly inaccurate. . . . No evacuee is permitted to leave the relocation project area without a permit at any time. . . . If the "Japanese interests" referred to are those of imperial Japan, this statement is wholly without foundation. The War Relocation Authority has reviewed relocation center newspapers since they were first established and has never seen one line of criticism directed against any person because of his opposition to the interests of imperial Japan. If, on the other hand, the statement refers to the interests of the Japanese-Americans, criticism seems wholly in accord with the American principles of free speech.

When at length, on July 6, the Costello subcommittee allowed Mr. Myer to appear before it, he carried the attack deep into the enemy's lines by reading into the record the following devastating statement:

The manner in which the War Relocation Authority conducts its program is of concern to all the people in the United States, and it has a significance which goes far beyond the geographic boundaries of this country. Undoubtedly, the WRA program is being watched in Japan, where thousands of American soldiers and civilians are held as prisoners or internees; in China, India, Thailand, Burma and many other countries whose collaboration we need if we are to defeat our enemies with a minimum loss of life. The program of the War Relocation Authority has been under investigation for the past eight weeks in such a manner as to achieve maximum publicity of sensational statements based on half-truths, exaggerations and falsehoods; statements of witnesses have been released to the public without verification of their accuracy, thus giving nation-wide currency to many distortions and downright untruths.

This practice has fostered a public feeling of mistrust, suspicion, and hatred that has had the effect of (1) providing the enemy with material which can be used to convince the peoples of the Orient that the United States is undemocratic and is fighting a racial war; (2) undermining the unity of the American people; (3) betraying the democratic objectives which this nation and its allies are fighting to preserve; (4) it may lead to further maltreatment of our citizens who are prisoners or who are interned.

The resettlement of the evacuees is decidedly unfinished business. A maximum of 107,000 evacuees have been under the care of WRA. Of that number only 17,000 had been released as of August 1, 1943. Of those, about 6,000 were on short-term leave to meet the farm labor shortage. During May the number of releases rose to 1,000 a week, but at that rate it would take over a year and a half to empty the centers. What are the obstacles?

Until this summer, the bottleneck was the lack of jobs and of communities ready to receive the evacuees. Now, however, the WRA declares that the bottleneck is the reluctance of the older generation of evacuees to risk the plunge into a reputedly hostile world, where they might find it impossible to support a family. Many of them have young children. Two measures must be combined to break that bottleneck. First, it will be necessary to convince the reluctant evacuees that a democratic welcome awaits them in hundreds of communities east of the Rockies. Second, plans must be worked out whereby groups of ten to thirty families can be settled in rural and small-town communities all over the north central and middle west states—not bunched in little colonies, but scattered within courting distance.

Suspects to be Segregated

The numbers to be resettled will be reduced by not less than 15,000 when the process of segregating the eligible from the ineligible has been completed. The uninformed have been impatiently demanding that the WRA quit stalling and forthwith separate the sheep from the goats. But it is not so simple. If it were, the army would have done the separating during the months when the evacuees were in its custody. Although the evacuees were then near their homes, where information about them was readily accessible, the army gathered almost nothing except elementary identification data. For months now the

WRA and FBI have had hundreds of clerks sifting records and tabulating data gathered in the centers, by means of both the February army questionnaire and the conduct record for each evacuee.

The upshot of all this is that about 8,000 adults and 8,000 minors will be concentrated at the Tulalake center for the duration. Among the adults are all those who want to go back to Japan. Not a few of these have no sympathy with militarist Japan but feel they will be pushed to the wall if they stay in America. The group includes also, of course, all those suspected of disloyalty, including some hundreds of Japanese *kibei*. The plight of the children is tragic, for they are American citizens, totally ig-

norant of Japan and its ways and already mentally set by American ideals. It is to be hoped that many of these children as well as their parents may even yet be restored to American life. For the success or failure of resettlement is not primarily a matter of humanity toward 100,000 people made homeless through no fault of their own. It is essentially a trial by ordeal of the validity of American ideals, even under the stress of war and the passions engendered by war.

This is the third in a series of four articles on the situation of the Japanese-Americans by Mr. Fisher. The final article will appear in an early issue.

On Choosing a President

By Oswald Garrison Villard

WHO can deny that the present aspect of the impending campaign to select a President clearly reveals the weaknesses of our system of choosing Presidents? On the one hand we have the incumbent in the White House. Popular with large sections of labor and many liberals, he is unpopular with farmers, the middle class and the very prosperous. He is able to dictate his nomination for the fourth term by his control of the undemocratic, one-party south and of the entire party machinery. There is plainly not the slightest need for the Democrats to hold a party convention unless the President decides that the chances are against him and refuses to run (I should as soon expect the sun to refuse to set!). On the other hand, we have the Republican party, with the stupidest conceivable leadership in Washington, concerning itself only with the names of four or five men who are mentioned solely because they happen to be holding high offices or to have held such offices recently. The one openly avowed candidate, Mr. Willkie, has not been an officeholder, but claims the right to head the party because he led it to defeat in 1940.

A Governorship is Not Enough

But Bricker, Stassen, Dewey, and Warren of California are "mentioned" simply and solely because they are in public life. No one would think of singling them out if they had not been able to write the magic word "governor" after their names. What peculiar fitness has any one of them to represent the United States in 1944, given the existing world situation and the near-chaos to which Mr. Roosevelt has reduced the governmental machinery in Washington? Obviously none. They don't know Europe; they have never lived there; they have never thought deeply about international problems (Governor Dewey least of all) or played any role that brought them into touch with international events. Only Mr. Stassen has distinguished himself in this regard, by some intelligent speeches as to the postwar world given before he joined the navy. Why must the Republican choice be restricted to these politicians?

I have been putting this question to a number of prominent Republicans in urging them to look elsewhere for a candidate, and I am informed that the suggestion is idle, that the politicians will consider only men in public life who already have their publicity machines or have made themselves known. I pointed out that what the nation needs today is a great organizer and executive, that if such a man can be found the war effort needs him more than can be well stated without using what would seem to be extravagant language. I was told that such men can be found, but that a knowledge of international relations is even more important for the presidential candidate. My reply has been that the Republican party is fortunate in having at hand Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. He knows the Japanese situation as well as if not better than any other living American; he has spent his life in the diplomatic service; he has courage, ability and vigor of utterance—all of which would seem to indicate that he would make an admirable secretary of state to reinforce a President who might be chosen wholly for his experience with large business affairs. I have pointed out that some college presidents, like Conant of Harvard and Seymour of Yale, have shown themselves able executives and have revealed a far wider understanding of European affairs than Governor Bricker or Governor Warren or even ex-Governor Stassen, to say nothing of Governor Dewey. I even believe that there are great business men who might be considered without in the least insuring the handing over of the United States to the big business influences which I personally have fought for so many years.

In the light of the tremendous crisis in which the country finds itself, is it not inexplicable that the Republicans do not form a large group, chosen from the party as a whole and not merely from the national committeemen and committeewomen, to survey the field in search of a candidate? Such a committee could immediately inquire whether there was any chance of Wendell Willkie's overcoming the deep dislike with which the Republican masses in the middle and far west regard him because he changed his position as to the war after the 1940 cam-

What Race-Baiting Costs America

By Galen M. Fisher

THE EVACUATION of 107,000 Japanese-Americans from the Pacific coast states and their incarceration in relocation centers has raised profound questions concerning the meaning of "the American way of life." Does that way still connote liberty under law as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the dignity and essential equality of all men, regardless of race, creed or status, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and the sovereignty of the people under God? In an attempt to answer this question, this article will weigh assets against liabilities as contained in our policy toward Japanese-Americans.

The chief liability to the American way involved in the evacuation is that it has impaired the value of citizenship in the United States. It is to be hoped that this impairment is temporary, but it must be faced for what it is. The suspension of full constitutional rights for law-abiding citizens and aliens of one race jeopardizes those rights for people of all races. Denial on the unconstitutional grounds of race of the rights which citizenship in the United States confers establishes a precedent for further denials on this and other irrelevant grounds. The fact that this denial was brought about through the pressure tactics of race-baiting newspapers, organizations and politicians that call themselves "patriotic" but depend upon incitement to race hatred and the threat of mob violence to realize their ends, shows how gravely menaced and how precariously held are the rights of all citizens.

The Un-American Legion

The chief assets have been the partial vindication of the Bill of Rights for an unpopular racial minority, even in wartime, by decisions of the federal courts; the gradual restoration of equal status to Japanese-Americans by the war department; and the staunch support of the genuine American way by influential journals, by students, and by a host of religious, social and labor organizations. Some of the evidence for these general assertions as to liabilities and assets will now be reviewed.

Certain "patriotic" organizations that pose as chief defenders of the American way have piously mouthed the phrase while flagrantly violating its spirit. This is especially true of the California American Legion, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the Eagles, and the Americanism Educational League. Just before the evacuation, representatives of the Native Sons and the legion filed suits to disfranchise Japanese-Americans. In pleading one of the suits, former state's Attorney General Webb went so far as to call the fourteenth amendment a mistake. The Native Sons suit was dismissed by a federal judge, and the dismissal was sustained by both the circuit court and the U. S. Supreme Court. The legion withdrew its suit. Chastened by these rebuffs, the Native Sons this year adopted a resolution calling for denial of citizenship only to chil-

dren born in this country of *alien* Japanese parents. The California legion, however, at its convention last month, adopted resolutions demanding the discharge of enlisted Japanese-Americans from the United States army and the continued detention of all the evacuees under army, instead of civilian, control.

Cemetery Despoiled

The self-appointed role of many legion posts as arbiters of other people's Americanism was illustrated recently at Portland, Oregon. The local Fellowship of Reconciliation assembled a group representing various communions and colors to trim the grass and shrubbery of the Japanese Buddhist cemetery, as "a gesture of good will and fellowship." Vandals had previously overturned many gravestones and done much damage, and since all Japanese-Americans had been evacuated there was nobody to repair the wreckage. The United Press reported the commander of Portland Legion Post No. 1 as saying: "The legion is not going to stand for this. It's a bunch of monkey business." One legionnaire laid hands on the leader of the fellowship at the cemetery gate, but others restrained him. The sheriff then closed the cemetery for the duration. Interference by the legion was a violation of civil liberty, which was sustained by the officer whose duty it was to enforce the law.

A rebuke was administered to the intolerance of both the legion and the public by Colonel Scobey of the army general staff, in the course of his testimony before the Senate military affairs committee's subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation centers: "I can give you the names of Japanese who served in the army or in the navy in World War I, who are members of the American Legion. These men in these [relocation] centers have contributed to the extent of their ability to assist in Americanization. They have tried to combat this sinister activity in the centers. They have been terribly hurt. They have been mistreated. They have had their membership in the American Legion posts canceled, and they have been condemned by people."

Postwar Race-Baiting

It is a pleasure to add that some legion posts in the middle west have gone out of their way to befriend evacuees settling in their communities and to champion the constitutional rights of all evacuees. One such post is in Madison, Wisconsin. Another is Post No. 84 in Northfield, Minnesota, which condemned an article in the June 1943 *American Legion Magazine*, urging the relocation of citizens of Japanese descent on islands in the Pacific ocean, as being "in direct violation of our constitutional guarantees," and vigorously protested "against our national magazine being used to foster race hatred in violation of our own constitution and the Constitution of the

United States." An almost identical resolution was adopted later by the Minnesota legion convention.

In California itself, many legionnaires writhe under the legion's un-American policies, but while some of them keep on fighting they have found that a tight, politically minded hierarchy rules the organization. One of the hopeful omens is the bold criticism of legion leadership by the University of California *Daily Californian*, organ of the largest student body in the country. Referring to the rantings of National Commander Roane Waring and other officers, the editor says:

This purportedly 100 per cent American organization contains the seeds of fascism. The group in control has laid down a policy which is rampantly nationalistic; intolerant of other nations and other people; intolerant of minorities within the United States; lacking in regard for the rights of citizens and strongly emotional in its approach to social and political problems. . . . Would-be critics are frightened off by the legion's loudly proclaimed patriotism.

Closely allied with the California legion and Native Sons combination is the Americanism Educational League, headed by John R. Lechner, who has long been a professional patriot. He has been chairman of a local legion Americanism commission. For months past he has been agitating for permanent exclusion of the evacuees from California. As I write, word has come from Rt. Rev. Joseph McGucken, Catholic bishop of Los Angeles, that as a protest against its policies touching the evacuees he has directed Dr. Lechner to drop his name from the list of sponsors of the Americanism League.

Courageous Congressmen

Most west coast politicians have trimmed their sails to the anti-Japanese wind and dodged the question of constitutional rights. Notable exceptions are Representatives Jerry Voorhis, George Outland, Will Rogers, Jr., and Chester Holifield. Senator Sheridan Downey is to be commended for having called forth, in July, the White House statement which for the first time showed that all departments of the government were supporting the WRA program. Representative John Tolan deserves credit for his fair conduct of the inquiries of the House committee, which gathered valuable data and made constructive recommendations as to the evacuation, but fell short of high statesmanship. Gov. Earl Warren's toadying to the "patriotic" organizations has disappointed many.

The final recommendations of the Dies Committee publicity on the relocation centers and the WRA have just been announced by Representative Costello, chairman of the responsible subcommittee. One of the three recommendations reads: "It is to be hoped that the War Relocation Authority will undertake a thorough program of Americanization in each of the relocation centers." I am puzzled to decide whether this is an instance of naiveté or effrontery. A committee that has done all in its power to destroy the faith of the evacuees in American democracy and constitutional rights might better preach to itself.

The Senate committee on military affairs, through a subcommittee headed by Senator Chandler, also investigated the relocation centers, and its report contains valuable documentary material. Its first and best recommendation is that "the draft law be made to apply to all

Japanese in the same manner as to all other citizens and residents." As to this, Colonel Rasmussen, a naturalized Dane in our army, who knows the Japanese language, told the committee: "Their record for loyalty, in my opinion, is unquestionable. . . . I have found it necessary to separate from my command approximately 4 or 5 per cent, who were definitely disloyal. Their loyalty to the commanding officer . . . is probably the most complete of that of any group in the United States. Once they have been under influence in the camps, it is different." As to the influence of the centers, Senator Chandler himself added, "They are breeding hatred, enmity, and trouble for the country in the future." The poor quality of the committee's report may be inferred from the devastating comments made on it by Representative H. P. Eberharter, the dissenting member of the three-man committee. The *United Press* quotes him as saying: "The War Relocation Authority is doing a good job on a difficult problem. The findings [of his fellow committee members] are wind and fury, climaxed by feeble and meaningless recommendations."

Press Undermines Freedom

Safe behind the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, newspapers like those of the Hearst chain and the *Denver Post* prostitute their privilege by undermining the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights and degrading the American way. They have been foremost in arousing hatred of the evacuees and in denying them their constitutional rights.

By no means all the disloyal agencies that are undermining the American way have been discussed, but enough have been mentioned to indicate how formidable they are. Yet arrayed against them, both on the west coast and the country over, are a multitude of loyal agencies, sufficient to warrant confidence that "they that be for us are more than they that be against us." Let a few of them pass in review. State and national conferences of leading churches and of the Y.M. and Y.W.C.A.'s have declared themselves uncompromisingly in favor of democracy and justice for the evacuees. Through the Protestant Church Commission for Japanese Service, they have supported religious work in the centers, and they have further backed up their resolutions by facilitating resettlement and by contributing most of the scholarship funds for students admitted to eastern colleges. They influence millions of voters. Any California politician who has national aspirations will reckon without his host if he assumes that the rest of the country will blindly follow the race-baiters of the west coast. One of the striking Christian pronouncements was the resolution adopted by Chinese-Americans at Lake Tahoe in July:

Whereas such propaganda as "No Japs in California" . . . is against all principles of fair play and harmful to a true democracy; therefore, be it resolved that we, in consonance with the sentiment of Madame Chiang Kai-shek as expressed in her speech, "No Hatred toward the Japanese People," condemn such activities as un-American, undemocratic and unchristian.

The joint committee on Japanese-American relocation set up by the Federal Council and the Home Missions Council has stimulated many religious and civic groups to welcome and employ released evacuees. A score of

returned missionaries have ministered to the evacuees. The American Friends Service Committee has served all evacuees, but especially the youth. Under its management the Student Relocation Council has aided hundreds of young nisei to continue their education. The American Civil Liberties Union has helped greatly to win the favorable decisions in the courts. The C.I.O. has stood solidly for selective evacuation and for equal rights for law-abiding evacuees. In the A. F. of L., courageous leaders like Senator John Shelley and John Wagner dissuaded the California state convention from backing the disfranchisement proposal. The Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, which includes many eminent citizens of the region, has issued pronouncements which carry great weight and has done other things to stop race-baiting.

The war department has become an increasingly outspoken defender of the constitutional prerogatives of the Japanese-Americans. Secretary Stimson wired Mr. McNaughton, a banker of Portland, Oregon: "Any proposition to deport all Japanese-Americans irrespective of citizenship or loyalty would not only be inappropriate, but contrary to our experience and tradition as a nation." Assistant Secretary McCloy wrote the San Francisco Down Town Association: "It seems entirely unnecessary and unjust to retain loyal citizens and others in restrictive custody when they could do their part toward the war effort." Colonel Scobey, executive officer to Mr. McCloy, wrote the San Diego county supervisors: "The war department feels that retention of 100,000 people in relocation centers at the expense of the government in time of war is not only unjust to those who can establish their

loyalty, but it is an unnecessary expense. . . . To condemn the Japanese in this country as a whole for the actions of the Japanese militarists does not seem to be just or appropriate."

These, briefly, are the liabilities and assets that have accrued to the American way from the evacuation. It remains to press home the question: What effects are the activities of the agencies disloyal to the American way having upon the war effort? At home, they have hounded numbers of heretofore heartily loyal Japanese-American citizens into skepticism or even disaffection. At a moment when Negro-white conflict has occurred on the coast for the first time, they have thrown into the witch's cauldron an aggravated Oriental race problem. They have libeled 80,000 fellow Americans by persistently bracketing them with the Nipponese militarists. They have robbed the nation of millions of work days by making efficient manpower idle, despite the desire of the War Manpower Commission and the army to put it to work. They have undermined the very way for whose preservation the nation is fighting. Abroad, they have given the Chinese and other Asiatic allies good cause to think that Americans are no better than nazis in their contempt for the colored races. They have thereby made plausible the propaganda of the Nipponese warlords that they are the saviors of Asia from arrogant white oppressors.

If this indictment is true, then the men responsible for thus undercutting the American way must be branded as arch subversives.

This is the last in a series of four articles on the situation of the Japanese-Americans by Mr. Fisher.

Organized Labor and Philanthropy

By Kermit Eby

ORGANIZED LABOR is giving \$30,000,000 to war relief this year. That fact is symbolic of a revolution in American philanthropy. Instead of depending solely on Lord and Lady Bountiful of Upper-Crust-on-the-Hudson, it now finds substantial reason for taking into account Joe and Mary Smith of, say, Packinghouse Workers' Local No. 284. If organized labor succeeds in giving next year the \$100,000,000 which its leaders believe it may give, the effects of this sacrificial effort will be felt in every community in America and to the ends of the earth. For this huge sum will buy an incalculable amount of goods and services. But what really counts, what indeed is revolutionary, is the spirit created by such cooperative endeavor in the ranks of labor, in the attitude of the community toward its working people, and in the world.

Labor has always contributed its share to the fund-raising drives of the various relief and social work agencies. Formerly however the gifts of the workers were lumped together with the contribution of the firm and credited merely to the XYZ Corporation. The workers'

share was part of the total, and not specifically credited. Credit in itself is not important. But when millions of men and women pledge an hour's pay each month to war relief, it is important that the beneficiaries know who their friends are. Chinese patriots, English orphans, Indian seamen, Russian soldiers are a few of the far-flung groups benefited by funds given by the C.I.O. These people of our Allies in combat zones have come to think of our labor movement as being behind them not only on the production front, which has supplied such tremendous amounts of war machines, but also on the human front. There suffering is being relieved as often and in as many ways as American ingenuity plus dollars can make possible.

I

At the beginning of industrial development, those who toiled in the factories and sweatshops of the world were themselves objects of charity. The child workers of London, the shirtwaist makers of New York city, the silk weavers of France were exploited and overworked. Philanthropy supplemented their inadequate wages to keep them

alive. Charles Dickens, Charles Norris and other writers and social reformers concentrated on calling public attention to their miserable plight. It was then that working people began to organize for the purpose of collectively gaining the decencies of life.

Their struggle has never ceased, but out of it socially significant by-products have already come. Working people have learned techniques of organization and cooperation which have heightened their social usefulness. One instance is the almost unnoticed emergence of the labor movement as the largest single source of revenue for philanthropy in this country or in the world.

This fact is important for many reasons. It represents a shift in emphasis on labor's part. Pure self-interest—as evidenced in a concentration on wages and hours—gives place to a sense of identification with workers everywhere, regardless of race, color or creed. That brotherhood promises well for the future. This attitude of interdependence is a long way better than the old idea of charity. The conception of charity as the distribution, in the grand manner, of largess or bounty by those willing to share their disproportionate good fortune with those they considered their inferiors has been the bane of philanthropy, religious or secular.

Behind labor's giving is the consciousness that there, starving and homeless in China, India and Europe, but for the grace of God go they. That millions now recognize the deep truth of this judgment is an encouraging sign of human progress. Besides, the laws of mathematics are on the side of labor's giving. The tremendous number of small gifts from little people snowballs into a sum which no millionaire can match, and supplies to the victims of war or other sicknesses of society a feeling of kinship and moral support which large donations from a few wealthy individuals can never impart.

Labor, of course, must take enormous strides in the postwar world before it will cease to need relief in its own ranks. Until more enlightened labor legislation is passed and a more inclusive social security program is got under way, workers and their families here will not be safe from poverty and the effects of ill health. Meanwhile, union members in the United States, out of an average wage of \$41.50 per week, before payroll deductions reduce it to \$27.50 (for a family of four), are willingly contributing their share to relieve the hardships of war.

II

The huge war relief program launched by our trade unions has opened up channels of understanding and good will hitherto uncharted. It has diminished the friction between labor factions and between the worker and the rest of the public by encouraging their working in unison with war chest and Red Cross organizations. The C.I.O. and the A. F. of L. characteristically work in complete harmony in community philanthropic efforts. It has also strengthened the ties between union members and the communities in which they work and live. By contributing to local welfare, the workers earn the respect of their non-union fellow townsmen and gain the right to have their views considered on questions of organizational policy.

This program has also strengthened ties between donors and those who administer the contributions of labor. A

new complexion has often been given to the directorial boards of welfare agencies. This is of advantage all around. Red Cross officials, for example, have a chance to see at first hand at board meetings that union officials are not what they might have imagined they were. Welfare workers discover that they have some able collaborators among the workers and workers learn that welfare workers also are human beings.

To give an idea of the progress made by this revolution, consider some things that happened in 1942: In Detroit, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee and many other cities, the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. together contributed 20 per cent of the community chest totals. A single C.I.O. local in Detroit gave \$400,000. In Madison, Wisconsin, the war chest gained 311 per cent over the previous year when labor had not participated as a unit. Eleven hundred workers gave the equivalent of \$36 each.

Some of the activities on which these large sums are now being spent are: (1) Recreational facilities in army camps, including hundreds of musical instruments for bands and thousands of books. (2) The establishment of orphanages and rehabilitation hospitals in Russia. (3) The establishment of merchant seamen's hostels and workers' rest homes in England. (4) Checks and cash gifts to men leaving for the armed services, and also for loans to destitute dependents of men in the services, under circumstances of unusual hard luck. (5) The underground railway which smuggles skilled workers into Free China where they are needed to help their soldiers back up our soldiers in the Orient. (6) The preparation and distribution of 250,000 copies of a *Serviceman's Manual* containing useful information for the men and their families.

III

The moral of this tale seems clear. Organized labor has outgrown the purely pressure-group stage. It has graduated into the realm of service. It is interested in giving as well as in receiving. It has developed a real social sense which makes it the ally of the churches in every good work. It realizes that its own hard-won capacity for cooperation and unity must be extended from the local union outward through the whole of society. A better life for labor can be won only as a better life is won for all.

By making their influence felt through their philanthropic dollars, the workers of the United States are winning for themselves their rightful place in community and national councils. They are helping build brotherhood in the world. Matters of postwar rehabilitation cannot be decided without the voice of a group which pays for much of the reconstruction. Social agencies realize that they must make a place for labor on their boards. When the time comes to push housing, education in nutrition and child care, peacetime agricultural programs and other measures for the benefit of large numbers, labor will have earned the right to have its opinions taken into account. Labor should be allowed to help write the peace.

This is all to the good. This is democracy. This is Christianity in the broad sense. And there is one point buried in these facts for the churches of America to consider: a gospel, if it is to attract the workers, must take into consideration their problems, their points of view, their way of life.

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by

GALEN M. FISHER
COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND FAIR PLAY

A few days ago a leading citizen of San Diego asked me to comment on an editorial appearing in the San Diego Union entitled "They Cannot be Ignored", which appeared on March 31, 1943.

The first sentence of the editorial is an error of fact; for Judge Denman, of the Ninth Federal Circuit Court, in his Dissenting Opinion of March 28, did not declare General DeWitt's order barring 70,000 American-born Japanese citizens from this Coast to be unconstitutional. He simply protested the referring of the Hirabayashi Case to the U. S. Supreme Court, and in so doing, the failure of his colleagues to state many relevant facts.

That is a minor point. The main emphasis of the editorial is on the question of loyalty. This astounding statement is made: "It is only fair to concede that there is an occasional person of Japanese ancestry who doubtless is loyal to the United States....it is not likely that the Japs in this country are 100 percent disloyal. But the burden of proof is, or should be, upon the individual Jap." "How, then, can the Government of this country set a standard by which to judge loyalty on the part of the Japanese?" No evidence to support these assumptions is given. I venture to offer other facts and competent testimony in rebuttal.

1. After Pearl Harbor, the F.B.I. and Intelligence services seized about 4,000 Japanese residents on the Mainland, mostly on this Coast. Only a handful of them were nisei, that is, citizens. The Government set up a Hearing Boards to sift them. As a result, about 2500 were interned, as being potentially dangerous. Those Boards were composed of eminent lawyers and other citizens. They examined German and Italian, as well as Japanese suspects, and they found it but little more difficult to pass on the Japanese, than the German and Italian cases. The same rules of those Boards have said that it would have been perfectly possible to pass upon the loyalty of all the Japanese and Japanese-Americans during the months before evacuation, or at latest, while they were in the temporary Assembly Centrs, within easy reach of the relevant evidence. They believe it would have been comparatively simple in the case of the American-born, educated in our public schools and colleges, and known well by many school-mates, teachers, and neighbors.

2. In March, 1943, a registration was held in the ten Relocation Centers, and all evacuees were asked if they wished to leave America and live in Japan after the war. Although there was unfortunate confusion in the minds of the evacuees as to the meaning and purpose of this and other questions, only 20 percent, or 22,000 of the entire 110,000 expressed a desire to leave America, and this, in spite of the fact that 40,000, or 36 percent, were aliens. This does not prove that the 80 percent are loyal to this country, but it does suggest that the number who are pro-Japan is far smaller than is popularly assumed. The successive heads of the War Relocation authority, Milton Eisenhower, and Dillon Myer, have both testified to the remarkably loyal and cooperative spirit of the great majority of the evacuees. The former said to a Senate Committee that he thought from 80 to 85 percent of the nisei were loyal. The

distrubances in the Centers have been due to a small number of malcontents, almost exclusively older aliens ambitious to retain political control, and certain disloyal Kibei, that is, nisei who went to Japan for their early schooling. Such Kibei are a small minority of the nisei.

3. The record in Hawaii presents striking evidence of the general trustworthiness and loyalty of the Japanese residents. The chief Military Intelligence officers have repeatedly borne testimony to this effect. Out of 160,000 residents of Japanese stock they have interned only about 400, and have evacuated only a few hundreds. They have appealed to the loyalty of the entire Japanese population, and their confidence has been fully justified. Not only has there been absolutely no sabotage, either before or after Pearl Harbor, but there has been marvelously hearty cooperation with the authorities. When the War Department announced on January 28 that a volunteer Combat Unit of Nisei would be formed, it said that 1500 would be received from Hawaii. But when some 9400 volunteered and clamored for admission, the Department gradually increased the number accepted to 2875. This result was due in part to the fact that in Hawaii both the Government and the public have long given fair and equal treatment to the Japanese and the other Orientals, and in part to the high reputation of the separate regiment of nisei who have been training at Camp McCoy, as well as of the other 5000 nisei who are members of various units of the armed forces. Conditions on this Coast are different from those in Hawaii, but both Army officers and civilians who know both areas have said that most of the tragedy and disaffection caused among the Japanese evacuees on the Mainland could have been avoided if a similar policy had prevailed here. The confinement in barb-wire centers, the denial to the nisei of any chance to be heard as to their loyalty, and the threats of disenfranchisement and other disabilities, have naturally created doubts as to the reality of Constitutional rights and democratic principles, and all this is reflected in the fact that only about 1400 nisei volunteered for the Combat Unit in all the Mainland Relocation Centers.

4. Competent testimony as to the loyalty and Americanization of the nisei has been given by some of California's best known citizens, among whom are educators like Robert Milliken, Monroe Deutsch, Tully Knoles, Ray Lyman Wilbur, and Aurelia Reinhardt; businessmen like Frederick J. Koster and Henry F. Grady; and religious leaders like Bishops Bertrand Stevens and James C. Baker. Typical of these statements is the following by Frank S. Bayley, leading attorney of Seattle and ex President of the National Council of the Y. M. C. A. "I have personally known quite a number of alien and native born Japanese, both in ^{and} ^{at} ^{found} Seattle and on Bainbridge Island. All that I have so known, I have found to be reliable, and I believe to be free from subversive conduct or attitude.. The nisei group I consider as loyal, almost without exception. They have shown a very fine spirit in voluntarily obeying the removal order, as a means of demonstrating their patriotism. I am quite sure many of us would have claimed constitutional rights and gone to the courts about it."

The editorial assumption that our fellow-citizens of Japanese stock are nearly all disloyal, resulting from the author's proper abhorrence of ideology and acts of the military caste now dominating Japan, is on a par with branding all Americans of Russian stock as necessarily antagonistic to American ideals because Russia is a communistic country. President Roosevelt rang true to our best traditions when he wrote to Secretary Stimson on February 1: "Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry."

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aid from the group of loyal and patriotic nisei attached to each, and have in consequence been of great service to the United States in obtaining information regarding disloyal or suspicious Japanese." This statement referred only to Southern California. I know of similar aid given to the F.B.I. and Intelligence Service in other sections of this Coast. Intelligence Officers in Hawaii have borne similar testimony.

To cap this evidence let me quote from the article by a high Intelligence Officer in the October, 1942 Harper's magazine: "I consider that at least seventy-five per cent of them (Nisei) are loyal to the United States." (p.490). . . "Many of the author's) and other governmental agencies. The Japanese Consular staff, the Nisei voluntarily contributed valuable anti-subversive information to this Central Japanese Association, and others known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause did not themselves trust the Nisei. A great many of the Nisei had taken legal steps through the Japanese Consulate and the Government of Japan to divest themselves officially of Japanese citizenship (dual citizenship) even though by so doing they became legally dead in the eyes of the Japanese law and were no longer eligible to inherit any property which they or their families might have held in Japan." (p.491). . . "Of the Japanese-born alien residents (the Issei), the large majority are at least passively loyal to the United States.

"There are among the Japanese, both aliens and United States citizens, certain individuals, either deliberately placed by the Japanese government or actuated by a fanatical loyalty to that country, who would act as saboteurs or enemy agents. This number is estimated to be less than three per cent of the total, or about 3,500 in the entire United States." (p. 491)

REPLY TO EDITORIAL APPEARING IN THE SAN DIEGO UNION, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,
MARCH 31, 1943

by

H. Kingman

GALEN M. FISHER
COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND FAIR PLAY

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Japanese Evacuation from the Pacific Coast

By GALEN M. FISHER

THE total evacuation of the Japanese from our Pacific Coast is an unprecedented event in our national history. So momentous is it that it merits careful and continuing examination both as a war measure and in its implications for post-war policies.

A statistical description of the evacuation would read: Approximately 109,000 persons of Japanese stock lived in Military Area No. 1, the broad 150-mile strip along the Pacific coast, at the time the United States entered the war. Of this number, about 9,000 moved out of that area before March 29, 1942, when further voluntary evacuation was prohibited, so that about 100,000 were evacuated by the Army. Not quite half of the evacuees were agriculturalists; in California they raised 42% of all truck crops grown in the state in 1941. Aliens numbered 40%, and citizens by birth in the United States, 60%; but with the older generation rapidly dying off, the percentage of citizens thus moved will soon be 80%.

Forces Impelling Evacuation

The military historian will record that evacuation was caused by our involvement in a two-ocean war, the west coast thereby being left in danger of a Japanese invasion in which fifth columnists might play a disastrous part. The social historian would add that complex forces were at work: the treachery of the Japanese Government; the unpreparedness of the American forces at Pearl Harbor; the tradition of vigilantism in the west; certain economic and political interests eager to profit by expulsion of the Japanese; anti-Oriental prejudice, the present outburst being only the latest of the racial eruptions that began seventy years ago; and the general acceptance by the public of the rumors of sabotage by Japanese residents in Hawaii.

The grounds for the total evacuation announced by the government were summed up in the blanket phrase "military necessity." When the President, by his order of February 19, 1942, gave the Secretary of War authority to exclude any persons from prescribed areas, he based it on the necessity of "protection against espionage and sabotage." In the exercise of this authority, General DeWitt's staff has indicated that his orders for indiscriminate evacuation of all Japanese were due to fear of Japanese fifth-column sabotage and to fear of mob violence against Japanese residents in case of further military reverses or of an attack by the enemy on the west coast.

It is impossible, of course, to prove that national security did or did not require this evacuation; that could only have been demonstrated by trying a less drastic solution and waiting to see what happened. The stakes were high, and the Army apparently con-

cluded it could not take responsibility for less-than-complete precautions.

As for mob violence, no one who was on the spot in December and January would dispute that General DeWitt had grounds for fear. Public hysteria was due, in large measure, to reports that resident Japanese had rammed planes at Pearl Harbor with trucks and had blocked highways leading to the Harbor. Not until three months after the Pearl Harbor attack were these reports denied by Hawaiian and Federal authorities, belatedly helping to allay hysteria and reducing the danger of violence. The official Roberts Report stressed Japanese espionage in Hawaii, but neither affirmed nor denied that there had been sabotage.

Japanese in Hawaii

The Executive Order of February 19 embraced Hawaii as well as all parts of the mainland, but no Japanese evacuations from Hawaii have been announced, although persons of Japanese ancestry number more than one-third of the total population. The Secretary of War has made no public explanation of this striking difference in policy from that pursued on the Pacific Coast. Ships would be necessary to evacuate any large number from Hawaii, and the shipping shortage may be one factor. Moreover, Hawaii needs all available labor, including Japanese, in defense work and on the plantations.

Informed Caucasian residents in Hawaii have expressed the opinion that loyalty to the United States is high, even among the aliens, and is nearly unanimous among the American-born. They attribute this in good part to the long-continued and general practice of fair and friendly interracial relations throughout the islands. That confidence in the loyalty of the resident Japanese is shared by the Army is evidenced by repeated declarations by the Commanding General during the last year. After the Pearl Harbor attack, it was deemed desirable, for army morale, to remove Japanese-American soldiers from front lines on Oahu. By a happy inspiration, 155 such soldiers, all former students at the University of Hawaii, were formed into the Varsity Victory Volunteers and assigned to work behind the lines. The newspapers published their picture and treated the assignment as an honor.

Selective Evacuation from West Coast

Practically every witness who appeared before the Tolan Committee approved the removal of large numbers of Japanese from the coast. The fundamental cleavage of opinion arose as to the possibility and desirability of selective versus indiscriminate evacuation. A weighty minority stood stoutly for selective, or individualized, processes. For example, the Committee on National Security and Fair Play advocated selectivity for all Japanese, until it became apparent

that this had been ruled out for Japanese *aliens* by General DeWitt. Thereafter, the committee advocated selectivity for *citizens* of Japanese parentage. In this position it was joined by the religious and social work leaders of the coast, as well as by influential representatives of the bar. In a studied opinion dated March 6, 1942, and submitted to State Attorney General Warren, Mr. Gerald H. Hager, former president of the California State Bar Association, contended that "the loyal Japanese-Americans should be given some reasonable opportunity to prove that it is unnecessary for them to remain outside of a specified area," and he suggested that "some board or other tribunal could be set up" for that purpose.

The above-mentioned committee, in a memorandum presented to General DeWitt on March 9, argued thus:

Let all *nisei* be given the opportunity of being examined as to their loyalty or disloyalty by hearing boards in the communities where they now reside. The Appeal Boards of the Selective Service appear to be made to order for this purpose. . . . The process could be completed in six weeks at the outside. . . . The proposed evacuation of the entire group of *nisei*, but of no other group of citizens, apparently on the basis of race, is already embittering some of them and making them turn a ready ear to communist and other subversive ideas. It is also causing acute distress to many white citizens like ourselves who are concerned over every violation of the democratic principles for which we are fighting. . . . Furthermore, the indiscriminate evacuation of *nisei* citizens will, in our judgment, weaken rather than strengthen the civic morale which is an essential element in national security during the war and of national unity after the war.

The constitutional validity of evacuating *aliens* of any nationality without a hearing or other "due process of law" was generally accepted by both sides of this controversy. Evacuation of *citizens*, short of martial law, was held by some witnesses before the Tolan Committee, by members of Congress, and by the Tolan Committee itself, to be constitutionally dubious.¹ The Executive Order of February 19 is based on the assumption that the Constitution permits such exceptional measures when they are necessary to national security.

The Evacuation Process

The population of the Pacific Coast breathed a sigh of relief when the President's order laid the problem in the lap of the Army. That relief was replaced by distress on the part of the minority already referred to, when it turned out that the Army would reject selective evacuation. Even the minority, however, felt confident that the Army would do its duty well.

From the point of view of organization, the evacuation was handled with precision. It was not flexible enough, however, to allow for the manifold human factors involved. The Army is naturally geared to handle young men like machines, not to consider the needs of a hundred thousand women, children and men, complicated by the thousand details of property, businesses, physical handicaps, and hindering emotional ties.

That the Army finished its assignment within some 68 days of the first actual removal, and did it without any serious breakdown, merits admiration. That it made some blunders is not to be wondered at. From the outset the Army had the advantage of a surpris-

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ingly docile and cooperative spirit on the part of the Japanese affected. It also wisely enlisted the aid of federal civil agencies, among them the Farm Security Administration, the Social Security Board, the Federal Reserve Bank, the U. S. Employment Service, and the Works Progress Administration.

On the credit side, these points should be mentioned: unflinching courtesy of both Army and civil officials; patience in hearing countless requests and complaints; ingenuity in utilizing race tracks and fair grounds for Assembly Centers; the attempt to conserve and utilize the natural groups and organizations of Japanese communities, such as the churches, the family life, and the association of the American-born, the Japanese American Citizens League.

On the other side, certain unfortunate effects can hardly be overlooked. Confusion and distress and financial loss followed, partly because of the announcement of evacuation before preparations or even plans had been formulated. Overlappings and indefiniteness of function were noted among the agencies of evacuation. No attempt was made to set up hearing boards or other methods of establishing loyalty, thus making possible selective evacuation. The limitation of evacuation to persons of Japanese ancestry, including citizens, gave the movement the appearance of race discrimination, as well as of a violation of constitutional rights. To the extent that rules were applied with apparent disregard of human factors, thus creating disaffection among the Japanese evacuees, the difficulties were aggravated of reincorporating these evacuees into the body politic after the war.

A long interval elapsed between the first intimation of a general evacuation and the definite orders announcing when and whither each local group was to be evacuated. This was only a prelude to the basic hardships of being exiled from home, becoming wards of the government, being looked upon as criminals by a large section of the public, and being given no opportunity to prove their loyalty, even though they might be citizens or long-resident aliens, hostile to Japan and all its warlike works.

The interval of suspense was greatly relieved by the friendly ministrations of religious and social service agencies. In several cities, churches offered their plants to the Army as stations for registration and embarking of the evacuees. Groups of women were on hand to provide a creche for the children of mothers while they registered, to taxi registrants from home to station, to talk with those who were waiting, and to serve refreshments.

Evacuation from Military Area No. 1 having been completed, General DeWitt on June 4 issued Proclamation No. 6, calling for evacuation of all Japanese residing in the eastern California section of Military Area No. 2. This order followed months of agitation by local interests who stressed the danger of sabotage by resident Japanese against forests, reservoirs, power lines and grazing areas. Both the permanent Japanese residents in Area No. 2 and those who had removed to it from Area No. 1 before March 29 had assumed that they would be immune to evacuation. This unexpected extension of the area of evacuation led to fresh demands by certain Congressmen and others for either limiting or revoking the powers given to the Army by the Executive Order of February 19.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO JAPANESE EVACUATION

DECEMBER 7, 1941: Pearl Harbor attack.

DECEMBER 8: Declaration of War by the United States.

FEBRUARY 13, 1942: Letter of Pacific Coast Congressional Delegation to the President, recommending "the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States, from all strategic areas."

FEBRUARY 19: Executive Order of the President, authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas from which he and the military commanders whom he may designate may exclude any or all persons.

FEBRUARY 21: The Select Committee investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives (The Tolan Committee), began its hearings on the Pacific Coast, at San Francisco. Similar hearings were held within the next ten days at Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle. The reports of the Committee form the most comprehensive source on the Japanese Evacuation. It is felt by some students of the subject that the Committee's conclusions show a bias against the Japanese, especially in that it recommended hearing boards for German and Italian aliens, but not for Japanese, either aliens or citizens.

FEBRUARY 23: Telegram sent by Tolan Committee to Secretary of the Treasury recommending establishment of a regional alien-property custodian office for the Pacific Coast. On March 9 the Treasury announced that the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco had been directed to work out a comprehensive plan.

MARCH 2: Lieut. General John L. DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 1 defining Military Area No. 1, from which any or all persons may be excluded. Official press release made clear that all Japanese were liable to be evacuated.

MARCH 15: Wartime Civilian Control Administration created by General DeWitt.

MARCH 16: General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 2, extending the alien control program to include Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah.

MARCH 17: Act of Congress providing penalties for violation of restrictions on persons imposed under authority of Executive Order of February 19.

MARCH 18: Presidential Executive Order establishing the War Relocation Authority.

MARCH 19: Inquiry by Tolan Committee addressed to Governors of 15 Western States as to attitude of respective States on receiving Japanese evacuees, the replies being unfavorable except in case of Colorado.

MARCH 24: Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 issued by General DeWitt, affecting "all persons of Japanese ancestry" in Bainbridge Island, Washington.

MARCH 29: Further voluntary evacuation by Japanese from Military Area No. 1 prohibited by General DeWitt.

JUNE 1: Evacuation of all Japanese from Military Area No. 1 to Assembly Centers or Relocation Areas practically completed.

JUNE 2: General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 6, imposing an 8:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m. curfew and 10-mile-travel restrictions on all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 2, in California. This is the Eastern Section.

Assembly Centers

It was a tremendous job for the Army to prepare even temporary living quarters for 100,000 people within less than three months. The labor shortage and priorities on supplies would have made it impossible for private contractors.

Seventeen Assembly Centers have been set up, most of them in race tracks or fair grounds, and all but three of them in California. Accommodations are simple to the point of crudity. If the Army had realized from the first that the evacuee children and delicate mothers would have to be detained in these Centers for several months, it would doubtless have provided more adequate facilities. Observers who have visited several of the Centers say that the managerial Caucasian staff on the whole is kindly and well-intentioned. However, good intentions have not always been matched by competence. Red tape and the priorities bottleneck can be blamed for some of the failures.

In one of the better Centers there are inadequate medical and dental facilities, even for minor cases. Major cases are sent to the county hospital. In some Centers there are flush toilets, but in others scarcity of plumbing supplies has led to the building of old-style latrines. None of the toilets provides privacy, and there is an absence of hand-washing water in some "lavatories" and of sinks for washing the tableware which the evacuees carry to the mess halls. With no sports equipment, except what friends outside may have contributed, with no adult education classes and work for only a small minority, time hangs heavy. The appointment of Advisory Councils of evacuees has braced morale, especially where their recommendations have been accepted instead of being pigeonholed.

It should be said that in five of the Centers visited by the writer there has of late been gratifying improvement in many respects. Supplies of medicines have arrived, and activities, including regular school classes from kindergarten through high school, have been expanded.

As many of the evacuees as possible are put to work in the kitchens and other service features of the Centers. The compensation paid, in addition to food and shelter, is \$8.00 a month for unskilled workers, \$12.00 for skilled, and \$16.00 for technical workers. The original proposal to pay evacuees wages comparable to the pay given in the Army appears to have been dropped.

Among the 100,000 evacuees in the Centers are some 15,000 Protestant church members, and about 1,500 Roman Catholics. Of the younger generation, it is estimated that more than one-third are Christians. Hence it is not surprising that religious services in the Centers are being attended by a large proportion of the evacuees.

Responsibility for organizing such services has been assumed jointly by pastors and lay church officers inside, and by Christian leaders outside who have long been associated in work with the Japanese. The central agency created to supervise and coordinate this outside cooperation is called "Western Area Protestant Church Commission for Wartime Japanese Service." This commission is the accredited agent of the Federal and Home Missions Councils and of the Foreign Mission Boards. Representatives of twelve bodies compose it. Government authorities recognize this com-

mission as the sole outside Protestant agency for supplying the preachers and other workers whom the Japanese within may desire. Similar privileges are given to the Roman Catholic and Seventh Day Adventist representatives.

The Relocation Areas

Great credit is due to both the Army and the various civil federal agencies for the resourcefulness they have shown in devising solutions for the baffling problems set them by the whole evacuation business. Among all the schemes adopted, the Relocation Areas is perhaps the most satisfactory. On March 18 the President created the War Relocation Authority to take over full responsibility for the evacuees after they had been evacuated by the Army. Among the essential features of the plans adopted by the Authority are these:

1. Eight large tracts of government land east of Military Area No. 1 have already been selected, and more are in process of being selected, capable of providing homes for the duration for all of the evacuees. Each area will have a Relocation Center.

2. Efforts will be made to give productive work to every able-bodied person above 16 years of age: mainly agricultural, but also manufacturing of things that require much hand labor. Teaching, engineering, and the other professional skills will also be utilized as far as possible.

3. Evacuees will be allowed to leave the areas only for specific and properly guarded work projects. Like the Assembly Centers, the Relocation Areas will be surrounded by barbed wire and under guard, not only to keep the evacuees inside, but to prevent outsiders from intruding and possibly making trouble. Inside, however, largely self-sustaining, autonomous communities will be created, and life will be made as normal and satisfying as practicable.

4. Elementary schools and high schools will be maintained, in cooperation with the respective states and the U. S. Office of Education. Arrangements for higher education also are likely to be made, either by releasing students to attend outside institutions, or by inviting the establishment of extension courses by colleges.

5. As in the Assembly Centers, religious worship and related activities will be freely permitted.

At the request of the War Relocation Authority, the American Friends Service Committee on May 7 accepted responsibility for coordinating efforts to resettle west coast college students of Japanese ancestry. Already many such students had been allowed by General DeWitt to enter inland colleges on two conditions: evidence that the college was ready to receive them, and that they had financial resources sufficient for a year. Seventy-two colleges east of the Sierras have offered to admit students; Grinnell will accept the largest number, 50.

The quality of the directing staffs now being assembled is so excellent that there is good ground to hope that this program will be executed in accordance with the best American standards. If so, it should be possible to restore to a large extent the evacuees' self-respect which has in many cases been sorely wounded. Opportunities could be developed for intercourse between residents of the centers and the people of the neighborhood. Individuals and groups might be invited

to give literary, musical and dramatic programs, or to engage in athletic and debating competitions. Farmers, engineers and public officials might be asked to inspect the methods used in the various public works and in the factories and schools. The best preachers of the state might be enlisted to speak to the people.

Reincorporating the Evacuees into American Life

With the coming of victory and peace, not the least crucial problem facing the American Government and people will be how to treat the evacuees. The answer will have been predetermined in good measure by their treatment during the war.

There are two main alternative policies. One would be to treat these Japanese like "second-class citizens," to "let them stay in the United States but away from the coast, and strip the Japanese-Americans of the franchise," or to "ship them all back to Japan." The other would be to recognize, even during the war, that two-thirds of them are fellow citizens, that they are victims of circumstances beyond their control, of Japanese Government policies which many of them abhor. In this case, everything possible would be done to strengthen their faith in democracy and justice, and to narrow the gap opened by the war between them and the rest of the American people so that, after the war, they would again enjoy freedom of travel, residence and occupation, and be able to resume their place in normal life, more fully Americanized than they were before.

There are many people who favor the first alternative in one form or another. Representatives of the American Legion and of the Native Sons of the Golden West have filed a suit to compel the registrars in San Francisco and Alameda Counties to strike the names of Japanese-Americans from the voting rolls. People who have never known a Japanese are advocating that they all be kept in concentration camps and in no case be allowed to settle, even temporarily, in their communities. Evidence of this attitude has appeared not only in the press but also in the signed statements of all but one of the fifteen western governors to the Tolan Congressional Committee. The exception was Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado.

Segregation or Distribution?

This question of segregation or distribution of the evacuees is the basic issue to be faced. The Army had to abandon distribution because public opposition made it unsafe to expose the evacuees to the danger of mob violence. Until March 29 the Army was encouraging the Japanese to evacuate voluntarily, with the result that many of them rushed eastward, before preparations had been made either by themselves or by government authorities. Some were insulted and warned to leave; others had to be put in jail to be protected from enraged citizens, east of Military Area 1. Only students, as already indicated, are now being allowed to leave Assembly and Relocation Centers to continue their studies.

The situation the nation now faces has been summed up thus by the Committee on National Security and Fair Play:

The bottleneck in resettlement is opposition in certain localities to the coming of even a few Japanese to settle in their midst. Until the mass of Americans is convinced that such opposition is an impediment to

winning the war and a violation of American ideals, the policy of wide dispersal must remain in suspense, being replaced by concentration in settlements under military guard. That this is economically wasteful and socially unsound is evident from the following contrasts.

Economically: In the settlements, on wild land, they must be fed for many months before crops can be harvested, at a cost of \$60,000 a day, and the devising of work for the more than half who are not farmers will be difficult. If scattered in normal communities, they would help meet the labor shortage, would at once be self-supporting, would increase war production, and the non-farmers could find city jobs.

Socially: In the settlement, they will be insulated from normal life, their American character diluted by segregation, a danger especially dreaded by the younger generation, citizens born. The stigma of suspicion will cling to all of them. In normal communities they would enjoy free association with other Americans, their faith in democratic fair play would be confirmed, and their self-respect would be restored.

It is thus evident that the economic and social losses imposed on the nation by segregation are serious.

As soon as such opposition abates, so that it is safe for Japanese to be abroad, the War Relocation Authority can release them from the guarded settlements and resume the policy of scattering them in hundreds of inland communities. Care would presumably be taken by the Authority to release only persons against whom the Authority and the F.B.I. have no grounds of suspicion, and to give preference to American-born citizens educated in our schools and colleges. Naturally, the Authority would send evacuees into territory where proper protection and working conditions for the evacuees are provided.

The sweeping evacuation was made because of military necessity during a national emergency. We are convinced that good Americans upon mature deliberation would not object to a redistribution whereby evacuees in small numbers are redistributed within their vicinity so as to make possible their reabsorption into American life.

That local attitudes are not all hostile to dispersed settlement, and that hostility can be mellowed into tolerance and friendliness, have been shown in several instances. For instance, a promising settlement at Keetley, near Salt Lake City, is the result of collaboration between a white American rancher, George A. Fisher, and Fred I. Wada, citizen, for years a prosperous produce dealer in Oakland. That settlement of 140 persons of varying skills is now operating on a cooperative basis, and has already been asked to furnish workers of various types to nearby farmers and communities.

Wada's purpose in leasing the property and establishing the settlement is told in his own words: "I am ready to spend some thousands of my capital to do my bit in this way for my country. I don't care if I never make a cent of profit from it. My great hope, as a patriot and a Christian, is to make the enterprise contribute food for freedom, and give some hundreds of my fellow settlers a chance to be self-supporting, instead of being dependent on the government."

Given a careful selection of settlers, many communities, both urban and rural, might successfully absorb from two to twenty families of citizens of Japanese ancestry. Millions of Americans, including many who supported the emergency evacuation as a war measure, will feel that no other solution is consistent with America's basic war aims as stated by the President in the Four Freedoms—"for all men, everywhere."

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Japanese Evacuation from the Pacific Coast

By GALEN M. FISHER

THE total evacuation of the Japanese from our Pacific Coast is an unprecedented event in our national history. So momentous is it that it merits careful and continuing examination both as a war measure and in its implications for post-war policies.

A statistical description of the evacuation would read: Approximately 109,000 persons of Japanese stock lived in Military Area No. 1, the broad 150-mile strip along the Pacific coast, at the time the United States entered the war. Of this number, about 9,000 moved out of that area before March 29, 1942, when further voluntary evacuation was prohibited, so that about 100,000 were evacuated by the Army. Not quite half of the evacuees were agriculturalists; in California they raised 42% of all truck crops grown in the state in 1941. Aliens numbered 40%, and citizens by birth in the United States, 60%; but with the older generation rapidly dying off, the percentage of citizens thus moved will soon be 80%.

Forces Impelling Evacuation

The military historian will record that evacuation was caused by our involvement in a two-ocean war, the west coast thereby being left in danger of a Japanese invasion in which fifth columnists might play a disastrous part. The social historian would add that complex forces were at work: the treachery of the Japanese Government; the unpreparedness of the American forces at Pearl Harbor; the tradition of vigilantism in the west; certain economic and political interests eager to profit by expulsion of the Japanese; anti-Oriental prejudice, the present outburst being only the latest of the racial eruptions that began seventy years ago; and the general acceptance by the public of the rumors of sabotage by Japanese residents in Hawaii.

The grounds for the total evacuation announced by the government were summed up in the blanket phrase "military necessity." When the President, by his order of February 19, 1942, gave the Secretary of War authority to exclude any persons from prescribed areas, he based it on the necessity of "protection against espionage and sabotage." In the exercise of this authority, General DeWitt's staff has indicated that his orders for indiscriminate evacuation of all Japanese were due to fear of Japanese fifth-column sabotage and to fear of mob violence against Japanese residents in case of further military reverses or of an attack by the enemy on the west coast.

It is impossible, of course, to prove that national security did or did not require this evacuation; that could only have been demonstrated by trying a less drastic solution and waiting to see what happened. The stakes were high, and the Army apparently con-

cluded it could not take responsibility for less-than-complete precautions.

As for mob violence, no one who was on the spot in December and January would dispute that General DeWitt had grounds for fear. Public hysteria was due, in large measure, to reports that resident Japanese had rammed planes at Pearl Harbor with trucks and had blocked highways leading to the Harbor. Not until three months after the Pearl Harbor attack were these reports denied by Hawaiian and Federal authorities, belatedly helping to allay hysteria and reducing the danger of violence. The official Roberts Report stressed Japanese espionage in Hawaii, but neither affirmed nor denied that there had been sabotage.

Japanese in Hawaii

The Executive Order of February 19 embraced Hawaii as well as all parts of the mainland, but no Japanese evacuations from Hawaii have been announced, although persons of Japanese ancestry number more than one-third of the total population. The Secretary of War has made no public explanation of this striking difference in policy from that pursued on the Pacific Coast. Ships would be necessary to evacuate any large number from Hawaii, and the shipping shortage may be one factor. Moreover, Hawaii needs all available labor, including Japanese, in defense work and on the plantations.

Informed Caucasian residents in Hawaii have expressed the opinion that loyalty to the United States is high, even among the aliens, and is nearly unanimous among the American-born. They attribute this in good part to the long-continued and general practice of fair and friendly interracial relations throughout the islands. That confidence in the loyalty of the resident Japanese is shared by the Army is evidenced by repeated declarations by the Commanding General during the last year. After the Pearl Harbor attack, it was deemed desirable, for army morale, to remove Japanese-American soldiers from front lines on Oahu. By a happy inspiration, 155 such soldiers, all former students at the University of Hawaii, were formed into the Varsity Victory Volunteers and assigned to work behind the lines. The newspapers published their picture and treated the assignment as an honor.

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The Relocation Areas

Great credit is due to both the Army and the various civil federal agencies for the resourcefulness they have shown in devising solutions for the baffling problems set them by the whole evacuation business. Among all the schemes adopted, the Relocation Areas is perhaps the most satisfactory. On March 18 the President created the War Relocation Authority to take over full responsibility for the evacuees after they had been evacuated by the Army. Among the essential features of the plans adopted by the Authority are these:

1. Eight large tracts of government land east of Military Area No. 1 have already been selected, and more are in process of being selected, capable of providing homes for the duration for all of the evacuees. Each area will have a Relocation Center.

2. Efforts will be made to give productive work to every able-bodied person above 16 years of age: mainly agricultural, but also manufacturing of things that require much hand labor. Teaching, engineering, and the other professional skills will also be utilized as far as possible.

3. Evacuees will be allowed to leave the areas only for specific and properly guarded work projects. Like the Assembly Centers, the Relocation Areas will be surrounded by barbed wire and under guard, not only to keep the evacuees inside, but to prevent outsiders from intruding and possibly making trouble. Inside, however, largely self-sustaining, autonomous communities will be created, and life will be made as normal and satisfying as practicable.

4. Elementary schools and high schools will be maintained, in cooperation with the respective states and the U. S. Office of Education. Arrangements for higher education also are likely to be made, either by releasing students to attend outside institutions, or by inviting the establishment of extension courses by colleges.

5. As in the Assembly Centers, religious worship and related activities will be freely permitted.

At the request of the War Relocation Authority, the American Friends Service Committee on May 7 accepted responsibility for coordinating efforts to resettle west coast college students of Japanese ancestry. Already many such students had been allowed by General DeWitt to enter inland colleges on two conditions: evidence that the college was ready to receive them, and that they had financial resources sufficient for a year. Seventy-two colleges east of the Sierras have offered to admit students; Grinnell will accept the largest number, 50.

The quality of the directing staffs now being assembled is so excellent that there is good ground to hope that this program will be executed in accordance with the best American standards. If so, it should be possible to restore to a large extent the evacuees' self-respect which has in many cases been sorely wounded. Opportunities could be developed for intercourse between residents of the centers and the people of the neighborhood. Individuals and groups might be invited

to give literary, musical and dramatic programs, or to engage in athletic and debating competitions. Farmers, engineers and public officials might be asked to inspect the methods used in the various public works and in the factories and schools. The best preachers of the state might be enlisted to speak to the people.

Reincorporating the Evacuees into American Life

With the coming of victory and peace, not the least crucial problem facing the American Government and people will be how to treat the evacuees. The answer will have been predetermined in good measure by their treatment during the war.

There are two main alternative policies. One would be to treat these Japanese like "second-class citizens," to "let them stay in the United States but away from the coast, and strip the Japanese-Americans of the franchise," or to "ship them all back to Japan." The other would be to recognize, even during the war, that two-thirds of them are fellow citizens, that they are victims of circumstances beyond their control, of Japanese Government policies which many of them abhor. In this case, everything possible would be done to strengthen their faith in democracy and justice, and to narrow the gap opened by the war between them and the rest of the American people so that, after the war, they would again enjoy freedom of travel, residence and occupation, and be able to resume their place in normal life, more fully Americanized than they were before.

There are many people who favor the first alternative in one form or another. Representatives of the American Legion and of the Native Sons of the Golden West have filed a suit to compel the registrars in San Francisco and Alameda Counties to strike the names of Japanese-Americans from the voting rolls. People who have never known a Japanese are advocating that they all be kept in concentration camps and in no case be allowed to settle, even temporarily, in their communities. Evidence of this attitude has appeared not only in the press but also in the signed statements of all but one of the fifteen western governors to the Tolan Congressional Committee. The exception was Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado.

Segregation or Distribution?

This question of segregation or distribution of the evacuees is the basic issue to be faced. The Army had to abandon distribution because public opposition made it unsafe to expose the evacuees to the danger of mob violence. Until March 29 the Army was encouraging the Japanese to evacuate voluntarily, with the result that many of them rushed eastward, before preparations had been made either by themselves or by government authorities. Some were insulted and warned to leave; others had to be put in jail to be protected from enraged citizens, east of Military Area 1. Only students, as already indicated, are now being allowed to leave Assembly and Relocation Centers to continue their studies.

The situation the nation now faces has been summed up thus by the Committee on National Security and Fair Play:

The bottleneck in resettlement is opposition in certain localities to the coming of even a few Japanese to settle in their midst. Until the mass of Americans is convinced that such opposition is an impediment to

winning the war and a violation of American ideals, the policy of wide dispersal must remain in suspense, being replaced by concentration in settlements under military guard. That this is economically wasteful and socially unsound is evident from the following contrasts.

Economically: In the settlements, on wild land, they must be fed for many months before crops can be harvested, at a cost of \$60,000 a day, and the devising of work for the more than half who are not farmers will be difficult. If scattered in normal communities, they would help meet the labor shortage, would at once be self-supporting, would increase war production, and the non-farmers could find city jobs.

Socially: In the settlement, they will be insulated from normal life, their American character diluted by segregation, a danger especially dreaded by the younger generation, citizens born. The stigma of suspicion will cling to all of them. In normal communities they would enjoy free association with other Americans, their faith in democratic fair play would be confirmed, and their self-respect would be restored.

It is thus evident that the economic and social losses imposed on the nation by segregation are serious.

As soon as such opposition abates, so that it is safe for Japanese to be abroad, the War Relocation Authority can release them from the guarded settlements and resume the policy of scattering them in hundreds of inland communities. Care would presumably be taken by the Authority to release only persons against whom the Authority and the F.B.I. have no grounds of suspicion, and to give preference to American-born citizens educated in our schools and colleges. Naturally, the Authority would send evacuees into territory where proper protection and working conditions for the evacuees are provided.

The sweeping evacuation was made because of military necessity during a national emergency. We are convinced that good Americans upon mature deliberation would not object to a redistribution whereby evacuees in small numbers are redistributed within their vicinity so as to make possible their reabsorption into American life.

That local attitudes are not all hostile to dispersed settlement, and that hostility can be mellowed into tolerance and friendliness, have been shown in several instances. For instance, a promising settlement at Keetley, near Salt Lake City, is the result of collaboration between a white American rancher, George A. Fisher, and Fred I. Wada, citizen, for years a prosperous produce dealer in Oakland. That settlement of 140 persons of varying skills is now operating on a cooperative basis, and has already been asked to furnish workers of various types to nearby farmers and communities.

Wada's purpose in leasing the property and establishing the settlement is told in his own words: "I am ready to spend some thousands of my capital to do my bit in this way for my country. I don't care if I never make a cent of profit from it. My great hope, as a patriot and a Christian, is to make the enterprise contribute food for freedom, and give some hundreds of my fellow settlers a chance to be self-supporting, instead of being dependent on the government."

Given a careful selection of settlers, many communities, both urban and rural, might successfully absorb from two to twenty families of citizens of Japanese ancestry. Millions of Americans, including many who supported the emergency evacuation as a war measure, will feel that no other solution is consistent with America's basic war aims as stated by the President in the Four Freedoms—"for all men, everywhere."

THE BOTTLE-NECK IN JAPANESE RESETTLEMENT
(Sent as a letter to N. Y. TIMES, by Galen Fisher, on April 22, 1942)

never published - see Release of 5/18/42

The evacuation of 110,000 persons of Japanese race from the West Coast will soon be history. The basic policy undeniably involved an infringement of constitutional rights, and the sudden uprooting itself inflicted bitter losses and hardships on persons, two-thirds of them citizens, against whom no legal offense had been even charged. But the execution of the policy, by both military and civil officials, has been marked by exemplary kindness and consideration. Criticism of the evacuation policy should not be hushed, but at the moment, the question is, How can resettlement be carried out effectively, that is, so as to make the utmost contribution to winning the war, and at the same time do a minimum of violence to our democratic ideals?

"Effective resettlement" thus defined involves attaining at least five objectives, namely:

1. Enabling the evacuees to make the largest possible contribution to national production and strength during the war.
2. Restoring their self-respect and the respect for them of the general public.
3. Promoting the Americanization of the evacuees, especially of the citizens.
4. Facilitating their reincorporation into American life after the war, and intensifying racial friction.
5. Exemplifying democratic procedure in the resettlement process, so as to foster patriotism among the citizen Japanese-Americans and respect for American principles among the alien Japanese.

It is the conviction of the War Relocation Authority, as it is of the writer, that the master policy for attaining all these five objectives is this: Distribute the bulk of the evacuees widely over the interior states in many normal communities, provided that the inhabitants will extend to them the right hand of fellowship. The "bulk of the evacuees" refers primarily to the two-thirds who are citizens, and are already considerably assimilated to American life. This policy was in force until late in March, when widespread opposition to the "invasion" of Japanese evacuees compelled the Army to stop the "voluntary evacuation" which it had been encouraging, lest the evacuees suffer mob violence.

The bottle-neck in resettlement, therefore, is popular opposition to the policy of dispersal. Until the mass of Americans, as well as the leaders of opinion, are convinced that such opposition is an unpatriotic impeding of the war effort and a violation of American ideals, that policy must remain in suspense, being replaced by the artificial, and wasteful, and unamerican policy of segregation and concentration in colonies under military guard. That this would be artificial, wasteful, and unamerican, is evident from the following considerations stated with the utmost brevity.

1. The labor shortage in many communities, caused by the draft and the rush to munitions industries, would be partially met if thirty or forty thousand adult evacuees were made available.

2. In normal communities, production by the evacuees could begin at once, whereas in settlements on unsubjected, arid land, agricultural crops could not be harvested for many months. Furthermore, more than half of the evacuees are not farmers and it will be difficult to find productive non-agricultural work for all of them in the settlements.

3. Dispersed in normal communities, most of the evacuees would be self-maintaining from the first, whereas in the settlements, a Relocation Authority official told me it would cost \$60,000 a day, plus the cost of military protection, and to offset this, there would be a belated and uncertain income from the agricultural and manufacturing labor of the evacuees.

4. Segregation from normal contacts with white Americans will retard the Americanization of the evacuees, in fact, will tend to de-Americanize them - a fate which many of the young Japanese-Americans dread - whereas distribution of the evacuees in some such ratio as one to 500 of the general population would greatly accelerate Americanization.

5. Distribution and incorporation into normal American life would go far to restore self-respect, and also to remove the stigma of disloyalty and inferiority which is attached to the evacuees by many thoughtless or race-prejudiced white Americans. If forced to live herded in settlements, under guard, for the duration, it would be hard to regain self-respect or get free of the stigma.

6. Dispersal and opportunity for free enterprise and uninhibited participation in the effort to win the war would give play to the undoubted patriotism of most of the citizen evacuees, whose faith in the American dream has been rudely shaken by their evacuation.

7. Isolation and segregation will hinder reincorporation into normal life after the war, for it will tend to intensify the racial tension which has been gradually decreasing on the West Coast, and will prevent the maintenance of association with white friends and cooperation with them in educational, social, and civic activities.

That this is a formidable indictment of the policy of segregation and a strong argument for the policy of dispersal, would no doubt be agreed by most of those who read these words. But they are not the Opposition, whose animus or thoughtlessness is blocking what, from all considerations of national advantage and democratic principle, appears to be the sound and patriotic policy. The problem, therefore, is to convert that opposition into convinced support. To do this in time to make a contribution to the war effort will obviously be a stupendous task. But even if that should prove to be impossible, the long-range importance of adopting the dispersal policy at the earliest possible date is so great that the task of popular reeducation and conversion should be persistently undertaken. This will call for the vigorous effort of thousands of individual citizens and hundreds of public-spirited organizations. Since the policy of dispersal is supported by the War Relocation Authority and by the Government as a whole, and since it will conduce to winning the war, it ought to be possible to press the patriotic nerve hard enough to move even the most unregenerate heart.

A TOUCHSTONE OF DEMOCRACY

The Japanese In America

COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL ACTION
of the
CONGREGATIONAL CHRISTIAN CHURCHES
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A TOUCHSTONE OF DEMOCRACY

The Japanese in America

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THE Congregational Christian Committee for War Victims and Services and the Council for Social Action present this pamphlet as one part of a total effort to alleviate the human misery at home and abroad which is the dreadful toll of war. One copy is being sent free of charge to every minister in our fellowship. We hope that it will be purchased and read by thousands of church people in the United States.

It is our belief that immediate measures of relief are essential, but that we must do more. The final resettlement of Japanese-Americans in normal community life is a charge upon the conscience of all Christians and of all lovers of democracy.

To that final goal, *A Touchstone of Democracy* is dedicated.

—ELIZABETH G. WHITING

June, 1942

THE END AT SANTA MARIA*

BY CLARENCE S. GILLET

April 30th was the end. For weeks, even months it had been known that the blow would fall. On that date all the fourteen hundred Japanese-Americans and their parents had to be out of the Santa Maria valley. Fertile farms and, for some, the homes of forty years must be given up. Tears and regrets might be held back in public and nonchalantly the whole exodus passed off up to the very end.

But once loaded on the huge Greyhound buses that would sweep them away from their homes, from the work of years, and from "the tie that binds," there came to brave Japanese the welcome relief of tears.

On Thursday evening before Easter—early so as to comply with the military 8 o'clock curfew regulations—nearly sixty members of the Japanese Union Church joined in the Fellowship Supper and Communion, remembering Jesus in the upper room before he and his disciples went out to the Mount of Olives.

Other Sundays and more waiting followed. Household goods were sorted and packed; a bare minimum of bedding and clothes could be taken. Sunday and dress-up things were not needed; in assembly and reception centers the dust and heat would be too severe. The final Sunday, April 26th, came.

Should any Sunday service be held—would any have the time and the heart to come? Yes, they would try. Thus, after their separate group meetings, came the final twenty-minute joint service in the simple but beautiful Japanese Union Church sanctuary. It was their chapel—with the sacrifice and savings of thirteen years they had created it—and now they were saying farewell. Above the lighted cross on the altar in the chancel,

*Santa Maria is 75 miles north of Santa Barbara.



Second and third generation Americans.

was the small round stained glass window of Jesus with a lamb in his arms, still radiant in the spring twilight.

Their pastor, who thirteen years before had helped to start the church, was away awaiting his own hearing. But he had not forgotten. "I send my sincere greetings at your last service in our own church. God bless you and protect you wherever you go," his telegram said.

The leader of the service did not stand in the chancel; the pastor was there in spirit and it was not fitting that anyone should take his place. The eighty or more young people and mothers sang a hymn, "How Firm a Foundation," and prayed, "Dear Lord and Father of mankind, forgive our feverish ways." A few words by the leader—half looking up at that radiant window—about seeing Jesus only, as the disciples had on the Mount of Transfiguration, reminded them, as they left their

church, that it was most fitting they should lift their eyes and see Jesus only. Then a few words entrusting their church and records to the pastor of the Nazarene congregation which is to use their beloved church while they are away and his simple heartfelt response. One stanza of the hymn, "Blest be the tie that binds our hearts in Christian love," and then, "Lead on O King Eternal, the day of march has come," and the benediction: "Now may the Love and Peace of God which passeth all understanding and which the world cannot give and which the world cannot take away, possess your hearts and minds now and always."

But that was not the end. With damp eyes and choked throats they silently slipped out. Then one old mother asked that the lights be dimmed and that she be allowed to return alone to kneel in farewell—beneath that window and before the lighted cross. Probably she would never see it again.

Eight o'clock—curfew—and on Thursday four days later all were gone!

Clarence S. Gillett has served for 20 years as an American Board missionary in Japan. He is a graduate of Union Seminary and received his doctorate in education from Columbia University. Mr. Gillett has been loaned by the American Board to serve as Executive Secretary of the Congregational Christian Committee for work with Japanese evacuees. This Committee will be financed by the Committee for War Victims and Services and will be administered by the Council for Social Action.

A TOUCHSTONE OF DEMOCRACY

BY JOHN C. BENNETT

The fate of the Japanese who have been evacuated from the West Coast will be a major test of the integrity of the Christian churches and of the reality of American democracy. In these days we are in the habit of thinking of scores of millions of victims of the war who have experienced the worst in cruelty and deprivation that our minds can imagine, and so it may seem that we should not become too much concerned about a hundred thousand people whose physical safety and economic security are guaranteed by the United States government. But these people, unlike the Poles and Chinese and others who have suffered most acutely, are in a direct way *our* war victims. They suffer from what *we* have done to them. Most of them are American citizens who believed until a few months ago that they had all of the civil rights that any American citizen takes for granted. The discrimination against them is based upon a different motive from that underlying the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis and it is certainly not attended by acts of deliberate cruelty. But externally there are some painful resemblances between this American way of dealing with a racial minority and the hated policies against which we believe that we are fighting. Whether or not America is really guilty of adding to its long-standing sin against the Negro because of race, another equally flagrant sin against the Japanese because of race depends upon what happens to the Japanese Americans during the next twelve months. The Congregational Christian Churches which have so fine a record in dealing with the Negro problem once again have a chance to aid and protect a racial minority.

It is easy to start an argument concerning the necessity of the evacuation of all Japanese, aliens and citizens alike. The benefit of the doubt should certainly be given to the motives of the army in ordering the evacuation. Because of the long record



At the Santa Maria Japanese Union Church—On guard.

of doing everything too late that has had such tragic results for the democracies, the civilian has little right to criticize the army for acting on the basis of the worst possible contingencies. Moreover, there is a case in favor of evacuation as the only sure means of protecting the Japanese themselves from mob violence if there should be raids upon our coast. We must distinguish between the issue raised by the evacuation from coastal areas and the question of future policy. Even if this evacuation was necessary, it is still a very evil thing to deprive American citizens of all of their liberties by administrative fiat, without due process of law. Whatever is to be said about the government which has adopted this policy with obvious reluctance, there is no doubt that a large part of the public deserves condemnation for accepting it with complacency and sometimes for advocating it for selfish motives. Those who have emphasized the military necessity of evacuation as a means of disposing of a minority whose property they coveted or whose competition they sought to remove are themselves the real enemies of America, not the

Japanese against whom not one proved case of sabotage has been reported here or in Hawaii. Those who say that the Japanese Americans are not American citizens because Japan still claims them as citizens threaten the citizenship of millions of Americans of European ancestry as well. Those who say that there is no reason to be disturbed about what is happening to the Japanese because our own soldiers have no better conditions in the camps than the Japanese have in the Assembly Centers seem to forget that our soldiers do not have to watch their families, perhaps their sick children, undergo unaccustomed hardships.

A few days ago I visited one of the Assembly Centers where there are several Japanese students from the Pacific School of Religion. In that Center there are over eight thousand people. They are kept as prisoners, however much that fact may be disguised—prisoners who have committed no offence. The external conditions could be much worse than they are. Food and sanitary arrangements—the worst features of some other Centers—are fairly good. There is no heat for the cool mornings and evenings. What is really bad is the psychological situation. This evacuation policy has falsely suggested to the public that its hysterical suspicion of the Japanese Americans is true. This has been a blow to their morale as Americans. The government owes it to them to clear them of suspicion by setting up boards that will pass on any doubtful cases. There is nothing for most of the people in the Center, especially the older people, to do. Everything is drab except the distant view. And there is no hope. These people have left their homes with no prospect that they can see now of having homes again in a normal community. Their next destination—a government settlement, perhaps in Idaho—four or six months from now may prove to be better but it too will be artificial and it will offer little to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the younger generation. It is not the least humiliation that this Center is a race track where many of the Japanese are lodged in horse stalls. Accommodations have been hastily improvised but there is general testimony to

the effect that in the various Centers they have been improved. Even those who are most critical of all things military are impressed by the fine spirit shown by the army in its relations with the Japanese. *The Federal government has been far ahead of the public in its sensitivity to this human problem involved in the evacuation.*

Galen Fisher in his article will explain the plans of the government and the next steps which the public should make possible by its cooperation. The government has no desire to keep the Japanese prisoners for the duration of the war. The fact that they allow students, even alien students, to go East as free men, even paying their Pullman fares, indicates that wherever any responsible group or institution can guarantee the safety of the Japanese the government is glad to have them go. The only alternative to what I have called imprisonment or to what at best would be a kind of protective segregation is the acceptance of Japanese Americans by normal American communities. This pamphlet will make many suggestions on that point. If the government fears that the Japanese will be made the victims of war hysteria or race prejudice in communities in the Middle West, there will be no choice but to keep them together where they can be guarded by the army. If the evacuation of the Japanese from the coastal areas was a military necessity it would seem to be the duty of patriotic citizens to cooperate with the government by receiving Japanese in their midst, particularly the younger generation which can be easily assimilated. If the evacuation was not a military necessity, it is even more the duty of Americans to atone in whatever way they can for what must be regarded as an outrageous act of injustice. Those of us who know many of the younger generation of Japanese Americans can assure all who have not had that privilege that if these young people are given half a chance they will soon win the confidence and friendship of those with whom they live and work. The Colleges and Universities on the West Coast which know Japanese students because they have had thousands of them have shown by their efforts on their behalf that they be-

lieve in them. This speaks well both for the institutions and for the students.

This problem of the evacuation of the Japanese was primarily the concern of the states on the West Coast. But it is now primarily the concern of the states east of the Sierras. It is a national problem with which our churches must deal on a national scale. We still have a chance to prevent this evacuation from inflicting lasting wounds upon many thousands of young Americans. We still have a chance to prove that American citizenship means the possession of civil rights by all minorities. We still have a chance to show by our actions that we do not intend as a nation to increase the burden that the sin of racial prejudice has imposed upon men.

THE DRAMA OF JAPANESE EVACUATION

BY GALEN FISHER

PROLOGUE

Calling the Evacuation a "drama" is by no means a figure of speech. It even falls naturally into five acts. The stage is vast—a score of states. The cast of actors is immense: the hundred thousand evacuees, the Army, the Relocation Authority, the anti-Japanese agitators, the champions of constitutional rights, the democrats and Christians who, with Bobby Burns and Jesus, hold that, regardless of race or color, a "man's a man for a' that," and the millions of citizens who seem to be mere spectators, but whose attitudes may determine whether the drama shall be tragedy or melodrama.

Some day a Victor Hugo, a Tolstoi, or a Steinbeck may weave a notable historical novel out of it all. Longfellow's "Evangeline" depicted the removal of 6,000 French Acadians; perchance another poet will make the removal of 100,000 Japanese into an equally moving tale.

ACT I. DRIVING FORCES

The impersonal fact is that during the winter and spring of 1942 some powerful social forces playing upon the Pacific States of America resulted in the summary eviction of some 100,000 residents of Japanese lineage from the broad coastal region known as Military Area No. 1. The military historian might say that this unprecedented event in American history was caused primarily by the fact of a two-ocean war, the West Coast being thereby left in danger of a Japanese invasion, in which fifth columnists might play a disastrous part.

The social historian might say that the evacuation was the resultant of a complex of forces,—the vigilantism of the West, the treachery of the Japanese Government, the unpreparedness

of the American forces at Pearl Harbor and anti-Oriental race prejudice, the present outburst being only the latest of the eruptions that began seventy years ago.

A more systematic analysis might conclude that there were five chief contributing factors:

1. *The Pearl Harbor attack.* Caught off guard by a combination of the trickery of Japanese militarists and the unpreparedness of our complacent military forces, the whole American public, and especially those living on the exposed West Coast, was seized with anger, chagrin and humiliation, which it tended to vent against the resident Japanese, as scapegoats.

2. *False charges of sabotage in Hawaii.* Circumstantial charges were made that Japanese-American citizens, some of them in the armed forces, drove trucks into parked airplanes and blocked the highways so that American officers could not reach their posts after the attack. The Roberts Report mentions espionage by Japanese agents, and there is no reason to doubt that it had been carried on extensively for years by them, as by other nations, but it does not mention sabotage, the detailed rumors of which did much to inflame public indignation. Even the chairman of the Congressional Committee Investigating Defense Migration, Mr. Tolan, said during the Hearing at San Francisco, on February 23, 1942: ". . . they had probably the greatest, the most perfect system of espionage and sabotage ever in the history of war, native-born Japanese. On the only roadway to the shipping harbor there were hundreds and hundreds of automobiles clogging the street. . . ." It was not until March that these wild rumors were officially spiked. Then letters and sworn statements denying any sabotage whatever in Hawaii were addressed to the Tolan Committee, by police and justice officials in Hawaii, and by Secretaries Knox and Stimson and an assistant to Attorney General Biddle. It was these rumors circulating and expanding for three months that fanned the flames of suspicion and hatred of Japanese on the Coast.

3. *The fear of fifth column activity.* Since the Japanese fleet and air force had obviously long planned the attack on Pearl Harbor, might they not have organized a formidable fifth column corps along the West Coast in order to make possible a similarly successful attack on its vulnerable industries and utilities? (In fact, no sabotage or evidence of organized fifth column activity has been discovered on the Coast.)

4. *The danger of mob violence against Japanese residents.* This danger was real. Lawlessness is a national habit. Lynch law has not been confined to the South. Many Westerners are proud of the vigilantism which some story-tellers have tended to glorify. If Pearl Harbor had been followed up by a Japanese attack in force on the Coast, the Army had good cause to fear that mobs of excited pseudo-patriots would do violence to the first Japanese they ran upon. It still believes that if the Japanese continue to capture American prisoners and if they should make an assault on the Coast during the foggy summer season, any Japanese at large would be in peril. Although the reasonableness of the Army position is evident, there is room, at the same time, to reproach the military authorities and, even more, the civil authorities, both federal and state, for yielding to popular clamor, without making a vigorous effort to calm public hysteria and to expose the sinister character of some of the loudest shouters for total evacuation of the Japanese.

5. *The Anti-Japanese cabal.* It would be quite false to charge that all advocates of evacuation were self-seeking or race-biased, but it is true that among them were the professional anti-Orientalists, such as the Hearst press, and certain politicians, merchants, farmers and realtors who itched for a chance to turn the anti-Japanese agitation to their own profit.

Such were some of the major forces that drove the nation, as by fateful necessity, to adopt the drastic policy of indiscriminate evacuation of citizens and non-citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.



Santa Maria, April 30, 1942—Heading for Tulare Assembly Center.

ACT II. THE EVACUATION

The President, on February 19, 1942, issued an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War and such military commanders as he may designate, to prescribe areas "from which any or all persons may be excluded." "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary."

This Order closely paralleled the recommendations made to the President on February 13 by the Pacific Coast delegation in Congress, and ended a long period of debate and uncertainty. Secretary Stimson designated Lieut. General John L. DeWitt to execute the Order and he, by successive proclamations, on March 12, 16 and 24, set the stage for the evacuation from Military Area No. 1 of every person of Japanese ancestry, including the progeny of mixed Japanese and Caucasian mar-

riages. It was a huge and difficult undertaking, but as someone has said, "When there's a tough job to be done that everyone balks at, call on the Army." No Government agency had blazed the trail into this unknown territory. Besides, the Army trains its officers to handle machines and men like machines, not a conglomeration of men, women and children complicated by the thousand details of property, businesses, physical handicaps and hindering emotional ties. That the Army finished its assignment within some sixty-eight days of the first actual removal, and did so without any serious breakdown, entitles it to our admiration. That it made some blunders is not to be wondered at. From the outset, the Army had the advantage of a surprisingly docile and cooperative spirit on the part of the Japanese affected. It also wisely enlisted the aid of federal civil agencies experienced in handling the human problems involved in the evacuation, among which were the Farm Security Administration, the Social Security Board, the Federal Reserve Bank, the U.S. Employment Service and the Works Progress Administration.

On the credit side one should mention these points: the unflinching courtesy of both Army and civil officials; their patience in hearing requests and complaints from both the Japanese and numberless citizen groups; the ingenuity in utilizing race tracks and fair grounds for Assembly Centers; the attempt to conserve and utilize the natural groups and organizations of the Japanese communities, such as the churches, family groups and the Japanese American Citizens League, whose members are American-born.

On the debit side must be mentioned: the confusion and distress and financial loss caused in part by the announcement of evacuation before preparations or even plans had been formulated; the overlappings and indefiniteness of function among the agencies of evacuation; the refusal to set up Hearing Boards or any other method of establishing loyalty and thus making possible selective evacuation; the limitation of evacua-

tion to Japanese, but including citizens, thus giving it the appearance, at once, of race discrimination and violation of constitutional rights; the iron-clad application of rules with apparent disregard of human factors and of such unfortunate results as the creation of disaffection among citizen Japanese and aggravation of the difficulty of reincorporating the evacuees into our body politic after the War.

Space permits the discussion of only one of these debit points, the Hearing Boards. Eminent groups of citizens, such as the Committee on National Security and Fair Play, headed by General David Barrows, Henry F. Grady, Presidents Sproul and Wilbur and Dr. Robert A. Millikan, urged General DeWitt to set up such Boards. They and many others familiar with the Japanese residents held that it would be but little harder to distinguish the dangerous from the loyal Japanese than in the case of persons of most other races, and that, by utilizing the Appeal Boards of the Draft, the hearings could be completed within five weeks. Even though a large number should be found disloyal or doubtful, and therefore refused exemption from evacuation, the mere fact of having been given a hearing would have a deep influence on morale, and would vindicate for all citizens the cherished guarantee of the Constitution, of "due process of law."

General DeWitt finally declined to allow hearings. His representatives argued that they would cause delay when speed was urgent, and that it would be practically impossible to establish the loyalty of anyone of Japanese race. One must honor the singlemindedness of the Army: it could take no chances.

The drama moved forward. The anti-Japanese agitators went offstage, leaving it to the overburdened officials, the religious and social service agencies and the dismayed Japanese. It was not strange that the Japanese were dismayed and bewildered: suddenly to be evicted from home and all the privileges of normal life, made wards of the government, looked upon as criminals by a large section of the public, and to be denied op-

portunity, even though citizens, to prove their loyalty. They could not learn when they would be evacuated, where they were to be sent, nor what to do with their homes and businesses.

Notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the Army to bring order out of the welter, and the friendly mediation of many religious and social service leaders, the situation remained confused until March 2. On that day General DeWitt proclaimed that complete evacuation of all persons of Japanese stock, whether aliens or citizens, would be begun shortly and completed within sixty days.

Church people were to the fore in multifarious forms of service to the evacuees. Local committees arranged to store belongings for the duration; they formed in Los Angeles a corporation to administer properties; in Berkeley, they ran a sale of art works by a Japanese professor, the proceeds to be given to establish a scholarship in the University of California for worthy students who had suffered from the war; they set up a clinic staffed by Japanese doctors and nurses to give anti-typhoid inoculations lest mothers with children be prostrated if they had to undergo two other injections upon arrival at a Center. These friendly efforts came to a climax during the last days of registration and departure. Beginning with the First Congregational Church of Berkeley, church plants were offered to the Army as evacuation stations. Groups of church women were on hand to provide a creche for the children of mothers while they registered, to taxi registrants from home to station, to talk with those who were waiting, and to serve tea and sandwiches, or even a tasty breakfast the day they left.

When the big buses or the long trains filled with outwardly smiling faces rolled off for the Assembly Centers, they were bidden au revoir by loyal friends from the churches and schools, or by fellow students, as at Pomona College. It was such cups of cold water that helped more than all else to heal the sting of parting and to lessen the resentment felt by some at what seemed to them an injustice and a disgrace. Fortunately, not a



Santa Maria, April 30th evacuation of Japanese-Americans and their parents.

few of them, particularly the citizens, managed to construe the eviction as "Part of our sacrifice in the interest of national security and winning the war." Wrenched loose from all their moorings, they are resolved to show that they, too, like earlier American pioneers, can defy the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. For the older generation, the evacuation is pathetic to the point of tragedy.

nearly All of them have been in America for at least eighteen years—for they came in before the exclusion bar of 1924 was erected—and many of them came thirty or forty years ago. The Japan in which they were reared was far different from the Japan of today, and it is safe to say that many of them—practically all of those who are Christians—have no sympathy with her present policies.

ACT III. THE ASSEMBLY CENTERS

It was a tremendous job for the Army to prepare even temporary living quarters for 100,000 people within less than three months. The labor shortage and the priorities on supplies would have made it impossible for private contractors.

Eighteen Assembly Centers have been set up, practically all of them in race tracks or fair grounds, and all but three of them in California. The accommodations are simple to the point of crudity. If the Army had realized from the first that the evacuees, children and delicate mothers would have to be detained in these rude Centers for several months, it would doubtless have provided more adequate facilities. Observers who have visited several of the Centers say that the managerial Caucasian staff on the whole is kindly and well-intentioned. But good intentions are not always matched by competence, and in some cases they have lamentably failed to butter the parsnips. Governmental red tape and the priorities bottleneck can be blamed for some of the failures, but not for all. To be specific, in one of the better Centers there are practically no medicines or medical and dental equipment, even after a month of pleading by evacuee doctors and excuses by the management. In justification of these deficiencies, it should be said that all serious medical cases are supposed to be treated at the regular county hospitals, which have been most cooperative. Scarcity of plumbing supplies has led to the building of old style latrines with no partitions, and to absence of handwashing water in the "lavatories," and of sinks for washing the table ware which the evacuees carry to the messhalls. Such deficiencies inevitably undermine morale and they can not be counterbalanced by the appointment of Advisory Councils of evacuees, who too often find their recommendations are pigeonholed.

One of the best features of the Centers is the policy of using as many as possible of the evacuees in the various service departments. Those who get such a job count themselves lucky, for

the rest suffer acutely from nothing to occupy hand or mind during their unwanted leisure.

The compensation paid to evacuees working in the Assembly Centers, in addition to food and shelter, is \$8.00 a month for unskilled workers, \$10.00 for skilled, and \$12.00 for technical workers. The original proposal to pay evacuees approximately what privates and non-coms receive in the Army appears to have been dropped. That might have made the evacuees feel they were a sort of civilian army, and thereby have nurtured their self-respect.

Extracts from two of the many letters written to me or my friends by evacuees will give a clearer picture of the good and bad points of the Centers than pages of description. The first letter is from a cultivated woman, born and bred in California, who feels keenly the deprivations and the humiliation of her exile. She is in one of the better Centers. The English is her own. The stables she speaks of are the race horse stalls, whitewashed and enlarged by the addition of a small sittingroom in front.

"Our camp is getting better in every way. At first it was hard, harder than we ever imagined, but when I think of those ill-smelling, windowless stables, I think I could stand most anything. I'd die if I had to live there. So many of our friends are housed in those awful stables, and I can't help crying every time I pass there. You have no idea how awful.

"I spent three days nailing papers on floor cracks to keep the cold out. Some cracks were so wide I could put my finger through. We froze from cold drafts the first few days. It's a little warmer now.

"We Japanese love privacy, so our greatest ordeal is taking showers and going to the rest rooms. The lavatories are just wide enough to pass; two seats to a section, and no doors. Showers are single, but also doorless. Volunteer women clean the place every day, so it's kept very clean,—but one feels awful. So I take my shower at 5:30 a.m., but others get the same idea, so it is embarrassing.

"I find so many things I brought are useless, and what I need most, I haven't. So will you ask your friends to send me old clothes . . . especially sportswear,—sunhats, for standing in line in scorching sun for a long time at mealtime is an ordeal. . . . I never

12
\$19.00

dreamt a time would come when I'd have to ask for old clothes. I've got no pride left, for these are necessities. Please send some old shower curtains. I could put nails up and hook them across when I take a shower. Also old garment bags. Dust here is terrific. The walls are so thin that when I put a screw in, it went through. So when it gets hot, it's like an oven, and during the nights, it's like an ice-box.

"We've all lost weight noticeably. But food is better. . . . Pregnant women and mothers with small children, old people and invalids are pitiful. Mothers and old people walking, groping in the dark to the rest rooms are a sight. Gosh! War is hell, even behind the lines. I think it's worse.

"Did you ever feel an indescribable longing for something you've loved? That is the way I felt when I left dear old — —, the only city I knew and loved. Part of my life went out when I left it. My childhood, girlhood and womanhood, with all its accompanying sorrows and joys, all were left behind. I can't express the yearning for the place I called my home, and all my dear friends. My only wish is that God will let us return once more to all I hold dear.

"Our Sunday services are very simple and impressive. We feel nearer to God here. The very simplicity and earnestness of our hearts make the whole service more touching. In contrast, the young people are a great problem."

As the last sentence implies, the demoralizing effects of the unregulated, promiscuous life in the Centers upon the thousands of idle young people are an acute anxiety to the fathers and mothers. *Markshaft* No school, little work or sports equipment, no privacy, family life and parental control broken down by mass living—there is cause for worry. Gradually, equipment for play, study, and other recreative activity is being supplied by private contributions. It seems as though the Army had planned the Centers with only husky men in mind. They can take it with a grin, but for infants, elders and refined women, it is hard on both body and spirit.

The other letter was written by a pastor, trained at Pacific School of Religion, in Berkeley. He writes thus of himself and his "church-in-exile":

"The trip to the Center on the train was to many of the children, their first railway ride. The country in early summer is beautiful. Our hearts cried, 'This is America we live in. This is our country,

and we must defend it. God bless America.' The train was guarded by military boys who are courteous to us internees. Yes, they are American youth, intelligent and companionable. We, too, have our sons in the American Army. They are pals to each other.

"The first sight of our new quarters was a dismay to our women folks—the look of the inside of a stable, whitewashed a long time ago. But with characteristic fortitude and quietness, they took it. 'It could be worse. Thankful this much is provided,' they all say.

"I suddenly found myself a shepherd of 5,000 souls. There are church groups from other cities, but their pastors are not with them. So it looks as though I'm to be a busy pastor. Here I have the freedom of living an utterly self-forgetting, self-giving life. Saturday evening last, our church Board met, and we are planning to carry on all regular activities."

Among the 100,000 evacuees in the Centers are some 16,000 Protestant Church members, and about 1500 Roman Catholics. Of the younger generation, it is estimated that more than one-third are Christians or pro-Christian. Hence it is not surprising that the religious services in the Centers are being attended by a large proportion of the evacuees.

Responsibility for organizing the services of worship and the Bible study has been assumed jointly by the pastors and lay church officers inside, and by Christian leaders outside who have long been associated in work with the Japanese. The central agency created to supervise and coordinate this outside cooperation is titled: "Western Area Protestant Church Commission for Wartime Japanese Service." This Commission is the accredited agent of the Federal and Home Missions Councils and of the Foreign Missions Boards. Representatives of twelve bodies compose it. The Government authorities recognize this Commission as the sole outside Protestant agency for supplying the preachers and other workers whom the Japanese within may desire.*

Between the lines, in the letters reproduced above, one can

*This Commission will be glad to answer inquiries concerning matters traversed in this article. Address communications to the Secretary, Rev. Gordon K. Chapman, 2729 Elmwood Avenue, Berkeley, California.

infer what a blow the evacuation has inflicted on the self-respect of the more sensitive spirits. When bystanders cynically say: "Why should they complain? They are safe and well-fed, and that's more than our boys at the front are enjoying," I wonder if they reflect that the boys at the front know they are heroes to a hundred and thirty millions of their countrymen. No matter what they suffer, they are buoyed up by a consciousness of nationwide admiration, and a knowledge that they are rendering a priceless service to their country.

The evacuees, on the contrary, are the objects of suspicion, if not of contempt, to many of the hundred and thirty millions. Considering that two-thirds of the evacuees are full-fledged American citizens, and that the rest of them have been charged with no crime, is it not plain justice and sound social policy to go out of our way to enable them all to maintain their self-respect? From that viewpoint, it would have been a wise investment to spend twice as much money on the Assembly Centers, and to send off the evacuees with the band playing and the flag flying.

Fortunately, the Relocation Authority seems to have adopted this viewpoint, and it is a pleasure to turn now to describe the Relocation program. The change from the Assembly Centers to the Relocation ~~Centers~~ *Projects* may make many an evacuee feel like the ancient Israelites when they advanced from the wilderness to the Promised Land.

ACT IV. THE RELOCATION AREAS

Great credit is due both the Army and the various civil federal departments for the resourcefulness they have shown in devising solutions for the baffling problems set them by the whole evacuation business. And among all the schemes adopted, that of the Relocation Areas is perhaps the most satisfactory; at least, it will be if the paper plans are carried out.

It was on March 18 that the President created the War Re-

location Authority, to take over full responsibility for the evacuees after they had been evacuated by the Army. Among the essential features of the plans adopted by the Authority are these:

1. Five large tracts of government land east of Military Area No. 1 have already been selected, and as many more are in process of being found, capable of providing homes for the duration for all of the 100,000 evacuees. Each Area will have a Relocation Center, *called a "Project."*
2. Efforts will be made to give productive work to every able-bodied person above sixteen years of age: mainly agricultural, but also manufacturing of things that require hand labor. Teaching, engineering, and the other professional skills will also be utilized as far as possible.
3. Evacuees will be allowed to leave the Areas only for specific and properly guarded work projects. Like the Assembly Centers, the Relocation Areas will be surrounded by barbed wire and under guard, not only to keep the evacuees inside, but to prevent outsiders from intruding and possibly making trouble. Inside, however, largely self-sustaining, autonomous communities will be created, and life will be made as normal and satisfying as practicable.
4. Elementary schools and high schools will be maintained, in cooperation with the respective states and the U.S. Office of Education. Arrangements for higher education also are likely to be made, either by releasing students to attend outside institutions, or by inviting the establishment of extension courses by colleges.
5. As in the Assembly Centers, religious worship and related activities will be freely permitted.

The quality of the staffs now being assembled is so excellent that there is good ground to hope that this program will be executed in accordance with the best American standards. If so, it should go far toward restoring to the evacuees the self-respect which has been so sorely wounded. One thing which might well be done to that end is to arrange for the gradual multiplication of opportunities for intercourse between residents of the Centers and the people of the neighborhood. Individuals and groups might be invited in to give literary, musical and dramatic programs; athletic and debating teams might come in for competitions. Farmers and public officials might be asked to inspect the

methods used in the various public works and in the factories and schools. The best preachers of the state should be enlisted to speak to the people.

Yet when all these methods have been used, the stubborn fact will remain that life within the Centers will not be normal. It will be insulated from the free tides of America's coursing life. Sad experience with isolated Indian reservations should suffice to prove that only by merging any group into the general body of society can it either absorb the best things America has to give, or make its distinctive contribution to the common weal. This brings us naturally into the next and last Act of the drama—one in which all true lovers of democracy must play a role.

ACT V. REINCORPORATING THE EVACUEES INTO AMERICAN LIFE

With the coming of victory and peace, not the least crucial problem facing the American government and people will be how to treat the evacuees. Our answer to that question then will have been predetermined in good measure by what we do to them during the War.

There are two main alternative policies:

(1) Treat them as though they were criminals and "second-class citizens," "yellow-belly tools of their fatherland;" ship them all back to Japan; let them stay in the United States, but away from the Coast, and strip the Japanese-Americans of the franchise.

(2) During the War, recognize that two-thirds of them are fellow-citizens, and that all of them are guiltless before the law, the victims of circumstances beyond their control of Japanese government policies which many, if not most, of them abhor. Therefore, do our utmost to strengthen their faith in American democracy and justice and to narrow the gap erected by the war between them and the rest of us. Then, after the war, restore to them freedom of travel, residence and occupation, so

all

During the War, release a considerable number of them for productive work in inland states.

that they will resume their place in normal life more fully Americanized than they were before the war.

It may seem impossible for any sane supporter of a war for "the four freedoms" even secretly to entertain the first alternative. But along the West Coast there are many voices chanting such a chorus; and in the states beyond the Sierras many who have never known a Japanese are urging that they all should be kept in concentration camps and in no case be allowed to settle, even temporarily, in their communities. Evidence of this is at hand, not only in the press, but also in the signed statements made by all but one of the fifteen Western Governors to the Tolan Congressional Committee.

The only sound American basis for settling the issue is to ask: Which policy will help most to win the war, and will accord with the democratic principles for which we profess to be fighting? Or, in other words, which is better, segregation or distribution of the evacuees? The Army and the War Relocation Authority favor distribution, but have had to abandon it because public opposition would expose the evacuees to danger of mob violence:

Consider these facts: Until March 29, the Army was encouraging the Japanese to evacuate voluntarily, with the result that many of them rushed Eastward, before any preparations had been made either by themselves or by the government authorities. Some of them were insulted and warned to leave, and others had to be put in jail to protect them from enraged citizens.

The situation we now face has been pithily summed up by the Committee on National Security and Fair Play in these six paragraphs:

"The bottleneck in resettlement, therefore, is opposition in certain localities to the coming of even a few Japanese to settle in their midst. Until the mass of Americans is convinced that such opposition is an impediment to winning the war and a violation of American ideals, the policy of wide dispersal must remain in suspense, being replaced by concentration in Settlements under mil-

itary guard. That this is economically wasteful and socially unsound is evident from the following contrasts.

"Economically: In the Settlements, on wild land, they must be fed for many months before crops can be sown, at a cost of \$60,000 a day, and the devising of work for the more than half who are not farmers will be difficult. If scattered in normal communities, they would help meet the labor shortage, would at once be self-supporting, would increase war production, and the non-farmers could find city jobs.

"Socially: In the Settlements, they will be insulated from normal life, their American character diluted by segregation, a danger especially dreaded by the younger generation, citizens born. The stigma of suspicion will cling to all of them. In normal communities, they would enjoy free association with other Americans, their faith in democratic fair play would be confirmed, and their self-respect would be restored, so that after the war they could fit smoothly into American life.

"It is thus evident that the economic and social losses imposed on the nation by segregation are serious. Yet presumably patriotic citizens, through thoughtlessness or prejudice, are causing these losses by their unwillingness to allow Japanese, even though citizens, to settle near them.

"As soon as such opposition abates, so that it is safe for Japanese to be abroad, the War Relocation Authority can release them from the guarded Settlements, and resume the policy of scattering them in hundreds of inland communities. Precautions should, of course, be taken by the Authority to release only persons against whom the Authority and the F.B.I. have no grounds of suspicion, and preference should be given to American-born citizens, educated in our schools and colleges. The Authority should also require state and local officials and private agencies to give satisfactory guarantees as to protection, working conditions, and wages for the evacuees to be sent to their area.

"The sweeping evacuation was ordered on the grounds of military necessity, during the national emergency. It ill becomes any of those who excused that order to protest when the same national emergency dictates the settling of a few evacuees in their vicinity."

That local attitudes are not all hostile to dispersed settlement and that hostility can be mellowed into tolerance and friendliness is shown by three instances that have just come to my knowledge.

The first is reported in a letter from a University man in Wisconsin. It says that a band of eleven Japanese arrived from California, of whom two are citizen youth set to enter the University, and two are farmers. "I think they will be able to fit in, but they have been finding it hard. The Presbyterians and Congregationalists in particular are doing what they can to overcome prejudice and help them get a start." If this group had consisted entirely of citizens, its assimilation might have been much easier.

A professor in Denver University writes of a second instance: "I have just returned from giving some commencement addresses in northeastern Colorado and western Nebraska, in the beet sugar areas to which many of the Japanese have migrated from California. It was a relief and delight to learn that, so far, there is no evidence of friction, and indeed, the leading white citizens evidence a determination to see that no trouble shall arise. In most instances the new arrivals have been taken into the homes or the farms of the Japanese families that have long been Colorado or Nebraska residents."

The third instance reads like fiction. The two heroes of the tale are an influential and broad-minded white American rancher named George A. Fisher, and Fred I. Wada, citizen, for years a prosperous produce dealer in Oakland. In February, while the Army was encouraging voluntary evacuation, Wada went to Utah to search for a place to develop a settlement. He found an ideal combination: 4000 acres of irrigable land at Keetley, 39 miles southeast of Salt Lake City, on which stood fifteen dwellings, a large apartment house, and a \$25,000 schoolhouse, erected for the workers of a now defunct mine. ~~All the buildings were empty but in good condition.~~ Wada paid Fisher \$500 on the spot to clinch a lease on the property.

On returning to Oakland, Wada got the blessing of the Farm Security Administration, and then he spent a long evening with the writer, discussing how to create a Christian cooperative community, for he is an earnest Christian. "I am ready," he said, "to spend some thousands of my capital to do my bit in this way

shoveled down

for my country. I don't care if I never make a cent of profit from it. My great hope, as a patriot, is to make the enterprise contribute 'food for freedom,' and give some hundreds of my fellow-settlers a chance to be self-supporting, instead of being dependent on the government."

Wada soon assembled 140 people, nearly all Christians, possessing a variety of skills, so as to form a balanced community. Vowing to follow this modern Joseph Smith—minus the Book of Mormon—and to pool their possessions and abilities, they trekked to the ranch, taking along a large assortment of trucks and farm implements, and enough food to last them a year. As soon as the winter broke, they plowed and sowed their crops. The neighbors at first eyed them suspiciously, but their cash purchases soon dissolved distrust, and farmers from far and near, seeing their industry and skill, began to beg Wada to let them have some laborers. One landowner offered him a big tract for a branch colony, and so he sent 39 of his party off to settle there. Two trained housekeepers and a nurse were desired by leading residents of Salt Lake and a nearby town, so Wada filled the places with three competent women.

Fearing that the settlers might be attacked by lawless whites, a State Patrolman was at first assigned to the settlement, but he was soon withdrawn as being superfluous. Whatever peace duties are to be done are looked after by ~~Mr. Fisher's son and the storekeeper, who have been made deputy sheriffs.~~

The colony operates on a thoroughgoing cooperative basis: all earnings and expenses are pooled. Wada is general manager and chief, but he receives no more than any other member. Regular church services and a Sunday School have been established, the sermons being preached by a neighboring white minister. The schoolhouse will soon echo to the singing and recitations, in English, of a flock of children. At the entrance to the village they have erected a large V, bearing the words, "Food for Freedom."

The children go to a neighboring village school, so it is hoped to convert the Keetley schoolhouse into a factory, to turn out camouflage nets or other things for the Government.

EPILOGUE

Not every inland state can match just the combination of favoring factors that have made this Keetley experiment so promising. But, given a sizable group of determined and patriotic citizens, and a careful selection of settlers, there appears to be no good reason why many other communities, both urban and rural, could not successfully absorb from two to twenty families of Christian citizen settlers of Japanese ancestry.

The villain of the piece, Public Hostility, is temporarily in the ascendant and, at the moment, the drama seems destined to end in black tragedy. But if the villain is converted, it can be turned into a radiant melodrama. The villain being in reality the myriad-headed populace of our nation and our churches, the process of conversion calls for a nationwide crusade, persistent and pervasive, by men and women who realize that to repeat the slogan, "the four freedoms for all men, everywhere," is hypocrisy unless they are ready to extend those freedoms also to the Japanese evacuees.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN SITUATION IN OUR EASTERN STATES

BY CHARLES IGLEHART

The Japanese on the Eastern seaboard are much better off than their brethren in the West. They are few in number—only two or three thousand in all—mostly with inconspicuous work in restaurants, homes and offices, and scattered widely. They are more nearly assimilated to American ways of life and are more nearly received by the Caucasian community. They are farther from the dangerous Pacific; in the East they have to fear no organized movement of expulsion from community life. They

have not been evacuated nor have they suffered the "protective custody" of their cousins on the West Coast.

Yet the difference is more apparent than real. They are under the same disabilities as are all others of Japanese race in this country. The fate of the Japanese in the West stares in the face of every Japanese in the East. They know that the President's executive order put the whole country under the emergency control of the Army. The East has been zoned for defense exactly as has the West. There "total evacuation" was ordered on short notice and without adequate preparation to receive the uprooted people. And the evacuation was not total at all but highly selective, no Germans nor Italians being taken but instead Japanese only and *all* Japanese. Furthermore, the precedent has been set for a complete disregard of any difference between the alien immigrant Japanese and their American-born sons and daughters who by our constitution are Americans.

Notwithstanding kindness on the part of most of the officials, the grim fact remains that 100,000 of these Japanese and Americans are now herded into temporary barrack shacks behind barbed wire under armed guards. They are over-crowded, without privacy and for the most part are being demoralized by idleness and shame. Nothing like this has ever happened before in American history. And it may happen in the East on a moment's notice. Certain army leaders in recent interviews have promised that for the present this is not contemplated. But the sword of Damocles hangs by a slender thread, and it paralyzes all normal processes of living. It doesn't help morale for the Japanese to know that the bottleneck in relocation is caused by the resistance of every American community to their settlement.

Added to their fear for the future is the present problem of getting a living. With many heads of families interned, with Japanese firms liquidated, with considerable local prejudice and with many government restrictions, subsistence is now for many a major problem. About 5 per cent are on relief and another 20 per cent must soon be taken on. Many more see the end of their

financial resources in sight, as they are unable to get jobs. We cannot speak in high enough praise of the concern the New York City Welfare officials have shown for the needy Japanese, nor of the unselfish efforts of private agencies such as the Community Service Society of New York and the Church Committee for Japanese Work. But this problem lies deeper than mere alleviation of economic distress through relief.

Behind the unprecedented policy of evacuation and wholesale internment we come upon a factor far deeper and more disturbing than military necessity. It is the matter of the attitude of us all toward racial minorities—in this case the Japanese. This has taken concrete form in the discriminatory practices and legislation of the Western States. But they have been upheld by the Supreme Court and assented to by Americans at large. We of the Eastern States cannot cast the first stone until we are certain that if we had been presented with this problem we would have solved it in any better way than has been done in the West. Actually we have not tackled the Oriental problem at all as yet. Along our Eastern seaboard in many cities one finds a single Japanese person or one family accepted in the local church, but that is about as far as our Christian powers of assimilation seem to go. In this crisis we know of more than one church which has made it known that it does not wish even one Japanese to cross its threshold. Until we correct our own attitudes we can scarcely have much of a contribution to make to the solution of this larger issue of the assimilation of new elements into our American life.

Our next task is to press for a change in our laws so that the un-American principle of exclusion and of civil disability on account of race shall be forever erased from our statute books. Our present laws offer no hope whatsoever for any constructive adjustment of our nation to the developing Asia of the years just ahead. And unless we can adjust we cannot live in the modern world with these neighbor millions across the Pacific.

The next duty laid upon us by this crisis is that of obtaining

exemption for all the second-generation Americans from the operation of this indiscriminate measure of detention. We dare not remain complacent while our fellow-Americans are suffering this injustice. We can render specific aid by welcoming in our neighborhoods any students or other selected persons whom the authorities may be willing to release upon the guarantee of reception and support in some Eastern campus or community.

A constructive way to help the Japanese in the Eastern States so that they may help themselves and their Japanese friends is by providing employment. Self-respect gained by remunerative work is worth more than any amount of relief aid in maintaining character and morale.

And finally, since all plans for free re-settlement are bogged down in the morass of a resisting public opinion throughout America, our heaviest pull must be in the promotion of an improved and an informed public sentiment toward our fellows of Japanese ancestry.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN STUDENTS

BY JOSEPH CONARD

For hundreds of young Japanese students who have lived and studied on the Pacific Coast, the evacuation from campus to Assembly Centre has cut off their education in mid-stream and threatened their potential contribution to democratic society.

What is the calibre of these students?

This spring, when the University of California announced the highest scholastic honor awarded to a graduating senior, the winner could not receive the proffered medal. For Harvey Itano, a straight A student and loved by all who know him, is an American with Japanese ancestors.

After twenty-five years of experience with Japanese and

Japanese-American students, Dr. Aurelia Henry Reinhardt, President of Mills College, writes, "Throughout these years there has been no single case of personality problem or ethical question arising among Japanese students. Perhaps three-fourths of these Japanese women have been Christians, but in sense of responsibility and in the high standard of personal conduct, our Japanese young women have been one in their standard of quiet, industrious and courteous behavior. They have won the affection and respect of their fellow students of all racial groups."

In Southern California, the Theodore Roosevelt High School has announced that 26 per cent of its Japanese seniors were in the upper 10 per cent of their class.

When the University of Washington selected five organizations out of forty-eight to receive awards for outstanding scholarship this year, one of these five was the Japanese Students Club.

The Colleges of the Pacific Coast know well their Japanese-American students and, from Canada to Mexico, these institutions have united in vigorous efforts to provide an opportunity of continued study for their evacuated youth. From hundreds of Caucasians, the Student Relocation Committee has received letters like this, each about a different student: "I cannot speak about others, but *this* student I know, and he *must* be allowed to go on with his college work. He has outstanding possibilities as a student and he is completely dedicated to American traditions."

Importance of Relocation

For several reasons, the resettlement of Japanese-American students in Eastern Colleges is a crucial problem. Fortunately, new homes are more easily found for them than for other evacuees. This is true partly because students do not compete economically with Caucasians. Thus, the fears and hatreds which have been largely responsible for race prejudice against

the Japanese in California are obviated. Furthermore, college communities tend to be more liberal than others, and the college campus itself is particularly likely to offer an understanding new home. This last fact is verified by reports from across the country. In many resettlement questionnaires, "community response" has been forecast as being "uncertain," and in some cases even negative, whereas most reports from college campuses have been "favorable." Another factor which makes college relocation relatively easy is the existence of suitable housing facilities.

Aside from the fact that negative arguments and fears of community response are eased by the consideration just given, there are many positive arguments for continued college study. To force these students to abandon their work would be a tremendous waste of the time and energy already invested in the student's education. Dr. Monroe Deutsch, Vice-President of the University of California, states that it would be equivalent to the "destruction of an important part of our national resources." Added to this fact is the recognition that the attitudes of the entire Japanese-American group of tomorrow will be shaped largely by their future leaders, the men and women now going to or preparing for college.

The serious danger that present evacuation may introduce a new case of racial peonage will be increased if Japanese-American leaders are not given an opportunity for higher education. The entire group may, in such an event, be forced to a position of economic and cultural inferiority, and no policy could more seriously threaten the long-term future of the Japanese group in this country.

Finally, if the college students are given an opportunity to complete their studies, the morale of the entire Japanese-American group will be enhanced. An older evacuee, in a letter just received, describes some of the hardships of his present life and concludes that the really pressing problem is the education of the young people.

Number of Students Involved

In the college year 1941-42 there were 673 Japanese-American students in colleges of the evacuated zones in the state of Washington and 131 in Oregon. In California last year, there were 1684, of whom all but 29 were attending colleges in zones being evacuated. This means that about 2500 students should be relocated. These students are largely concentrated in a fairly small number of West Coast Colleges. The University of Washington included 458 before evacuation, the University of California about 430, Sacramento Junior College 216. About one-third of the students are women. Of the entire 2500 students on the west coast, there are probably less than 100 who are not citizens of the United States, and some of these came to this country in infancy.

A very large number of Japanese-American students are working in highly specialized fields. In a sample of 323 made in Northern California, 56 were studying medicine and 17 more were taking similar scientific courses; 61 were students of engineering or allied studies. Thus 134, or 40 per cent of the group, were studying in these two fields.

An extremely high percentage of students wish to continue their college work despite the maladjustments brought to them and their families by evacuation. A sample of about 750 students showed over 80 per cent wishing permits to transfer. Only 15 per cent of these, however, had sufficient funds to continue study without scholarship aid. Seventy per cent could pay part of their costs and another 15 per cent could pay nothing at all. There are two reasons for financial difficulty. 1. Families have suffered the loss of business and income through evacuation. 2. The overwhelming majority of students have attended State Colleges or Junior Colleges in West Coast States, where their fathers' taxes covered costs of tuition. Now there will be the necessity of paying out-of-state fees.

Plans for the Future

On May 29, Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, at the request of the War Relocation Authority, convened a meeting of educators and other interested groups in Chicago to set up machinery for the relocation of students in colleges outside the prohibited areas. A National Student Relocation Council has been set up, and President Robbins W. Barstow, of the Hartford Seminary Foundation is serving as Executive Secretary. Members of the Council will represent college and university administrations, churches and student organizations. Federal officials will serve the Council as consultants and the entire program is proceeding at the request of the Federal Government, which plans to issue permits for the transfer of students after adequate investigation and after assurances covering financial needs, college admission and favorable community reception have been given.

All questions concerning the responsibility of colleges receiving students and all requests for general information should be addressed to the Eastern Office of the National Japanese-American Student Relocation Council, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Inquiries concerning the students, themselves, may be addressed to the Western Office, Union Street at Allston Way, Berkeley, California.

The National Student Relocation Council will place as many Japanese-American students as possible. Already more than 100 colleges have agreed to accept these students, and many more will do so. The major problems to be faced are public opinion in receiving communities, and financial need. All who read this article can help at both points. Overhead costs of the Council are already guaranteed. *Your* contribution will be applied directly to student aid.



THE BOTTLE-NECK IN JAPANESE RESETTLEMENT
(Sent as a letter to N. Y. TIMES, by Galen Fisher, on April 22, 1942)

(not published)

The evacuation of 110,000 persons of Japanese race from the West Coast will soon be history. The basic policy undeniably involved an infringement of constitutional rights, and the sudden uprooting itself inflicted bitter losses and hardships on persons, two-thirds of them citizens, against whom no legal offense had been even charged. But the execution of the policy, by both military and civil officials, has been marked by exemplary kindness and consideration. Criticism of the evacuation policy should not be hushed, but at the moment, the question is, How can resettlement be carried out effectively, that is, so as to make the utmost contribution to winning the war, and at the same time do a minimum of violence to our democratic ideals?

"Effective resettlement" thus defined involves attaining at least five objectives, namely:

1. Enabling the evacuees to make the largest possible contribution to national production and strength during the war.
2. Restoring their self-respect and the respect for them of the general public.
3. Promoting the Americanization of the evacuees, especially of the citizens.
4. Facilitating their reincorporation into American life after the war, and not intensifying racial friction.
5. Exemplifying democratic procedure in the resettlement process, so as to foster patriotism among the citizen Japanese-Americans and respect for American principles among the alien Japanese.

It is the conviction of the War Relocation Authority, as it is of the writer, that the master policy for attaining all these five objectives is this: Distribute the bulk of the evacuees widely over the interior states in many normal communities, provided that the inhabitants will extend to them the right hand of fellowship. The "bulk of the evacuees" refers primarily to the two-thirds who are citizens, and are already considerably assimilated to American life. This policy was in force until late in March, when widespread opposition to the "invasion" of Japanese evacuees compelled the Army to stop the "voluntary evacuation" which it had been encouraging, lest the evacuees suffer mob violence.

The bottle-neck in resettlement, therefore, is popular opposition to the policy of dispersal. Until the mass of Americans, as well as the leaders of opinion, are convinced that such opposition is an unpatriotic impeding of the war effort and a violation of American ideals, that policy must remain in suspense, being replaced by the artificial, and wasteful, and unamerican policy of segregation and concentration in colonies under military guard. That this would be artificial, wasteful, and unamerican, is evident from the following considerations stated with the utmost brevity.

1. The labor shortage in many communities, caused by the draft and the rush to munitions industries, would be partially met if thirty or forty thousand adult evacuees were made available.

2. In normal communities, production by the evacuees could begin at once, whereas in settlements on unsubjugated, arid land, agricultural crops could not be harvested for many months. Furthermore, more than half of the evacuees are not farmers and it will be difficult to find productive non-agricultural work for all of them in the settlements.

3. Dispersed in normal communities, most of the evacuees would be self-maintaining from the first, whereas in the settlements, a Relocation Authority official told me it would cost \$60,000 a day, plus the cost of military protection, and to offset this, there would be a belated and uncertain income from the agricultural and manufacturing labor of the evacuees.

4. Segregation from normal contacts with white Americans will retard the Americanization of the evacuees, in fact, will tend to de-Americanize them - a fact which many of the young Japanese-Americans dread - whereas distribution of the evacuees in some such ratio as one to 500 of the general population would greatly accelerate Americanization.

5. Distribution and incorporation into normal American life would go far to restore self-respect, and also to remove the stigma of disloyalty and inferiority which is attached to the evacuees by many thoughtless or race-prejudiced white Americans. If forced to live herded in settlements, under guard, for the duration, it would be hard to regain self-respect or get free of the stigma.

6. Dispersal and opportunity for free enterprise and uninhibited participation in the effort to win the war would give play to the undoubted patriotism of most of the citizen evacuees, whose faith in the American dream has been rudely shaken by their evacuation.

7. Isolation and segregation will hinder reincorporation into normal life after the war, for it will tend to intensify the racial tension which has been gradually decreasing on the West Coast, and will prevent the maintenance of association with white friends and cooperation with them in educational, social, and civic activities.

That this is a formidable indictment of the policy of segregation and a strong argument for the policy of dispersal, would no doubt be agreed by most of those who read these words. But they are not the Opposition, whose animus or thoughtlessness is blocking what, from all considerations of national advantage and democratic principle, appears to be the sound and patriotic policy. The problem, therefore, is to convert that opposition into convinced support. To do this in time to make a contribution to the war effort will obviously be a stupendous task. But even if that should prove to be impossible, the long-range importance of adopting the dispersal policy at the earliest possible date is so great that the task of popular reeducation and conversion should be persistently undertaken. This will call for the vigorous effort of thousands of individual citizens and hundreds of public-spirited organizations. Since the policy of dispersal is supported by the War Relocation Authority and by the Government as a whole, and since it will conduce to winning the war, it ought to be possible to press the patriotic nerve hard enough to move even the most unregenerate heart.

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Our Japanese Refugees

By GALEN M. FISHER

Constitution

The uprooting of 60,000 Americans of Japanese parentage from our western seaboard is for them an ordeal of personal suffering. It is also a test of their ability to rise above resentment and to maintain faith in their America and ours. For white Americans, it is a testing by fire of devotion to the letter and spirit of the above antipathy toward persons of Japanese race. For white Christians, it is a challenge to demonstrate that Christian brotherhood transcends blood and skin color.

The presidential proclamation of February 20, 1942, authorized the secretary of war and the military commanders designated by him to "prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded." Martial Law was not invoked, but presumably the Supreme Court would validate the proclamation on the ground that it was within the powers of the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in time of war and national emergency. However, the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution specifically provide that neither the nation nor the states shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The presidential proclamation could have been executed without violating this provision. There have been no hearings nor other "due process of law" for the Japanese evacuees.

One must sympathize with the army, especially after the grievous losses at Pearl Harbor. Their task of the defense of the Pacific coast is huge and difficult. But the army had no right in law to order the compulsory evacuation of 60,000 American citizens, on the basis of their racial character, without any pretense of judicial hearings. Its action smacks of branding a racial group as "second-class citizens" and sets a dangerous precedent. Someone will at once ask: "Did not the proof of fifth column activity by Japanese-American citizens in Hawaii on December 7 give the army ample warrant for taking drastic steps? Must it not protect the country against a possible body-blow even at the cost of suspending normal constitutional rights?"

No Sabotage in Honolulu

The irony of this argument was thrown into glaring relief on

March 20, when the mainland press carried this startling cablegram, sent on March 14 by Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson to the Tolan Congressional Defense Migration Committee: "Pursuant request Delegate King, advise you there were no acts of sabotage in city and county of Honolulu December 7, nor have there been any reported to police department since that date. Police department had charge of traffic on Pearl Harbor road from Pearl Harbor to Honolulu shortly after bombing started with several officers on duty there. There was no deliberate blocking of traffic during December 7 or following that date by unauthorized persons."

The president of the Honolulu chamber of commerce and the chairman of the Honolulu Citizens Council wired jointly to delegate King this additional information, in refutation of an equally false rumor: "Upon consultation with chief of police and heads of army and navy informed that to date there has been no single instance of Japanese truckdrivers or other truckdrivers running machines into U. S. planes on the ground, of Japanese or others disabling automobiles of army and navy officers, or of Japanese or others throwing furniture into the streets to blockade army and navy officers."

Uncomfortable Questions

These telegrams raise uncomfortable questions: Why did not Roberts report include such a declaration? Why did the secretary of war and the commander of the Fourth Army, who ordered the evacuation, allow the universally accepted rumors of Japanese fifth column activity at Pearl Harbor to go without denial, unless they likewise were in the dark, which seems incredible? Did the censorship at Honolulu prevent the truth refuting this damaging charge from getting to the mainland public by either wire or post? And finally, why did not more of us supposedly propaganda-proof citizens take the rumors with many grains of salt and insist on impartial proof?

If the Truth Had Been Known

The pity of it all is that the whole situation as to evacuation might have been radically changed if the truth had been generally known. One of the main arguments given by the army for removing all persons of Japanese

the

race from the coast was to protect them from the grave danger of mob violence. That danger was real. It arose in part from well-founded reports that Japanese official espionage had been going on in both Hawaii and the mainland. But it arose even more from popular swallowing of the now discredited rumors of sabotage by civilian Japanese at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. In defense of the army, it may properly be said that it is not their business to deny false rumors or to guide public opinion. But if the army is thus absolved from blame, then all the greater blame attaches to those federal civilian authorities who, if they knew the truth about the alleged sabotage, did not promptly make it known and thus allay the anti-Japanese hysteria which swept over the Pacific coast and went far to give the army a plausible justification for indiscriminate evacuation.

But the chain of evil causation goes much farther back. It includes the long record of anti-Oriental discrimination, especially in California. We and our fathers have sown dragon's teeth for sixty years. I am not denying that Chinese and Japanese immigration should have been controlled, but it should have been done equitably, as by the application of the quota to them as to all other peoples. As has been said in the *New Republic*: "After the passage of the immigration act of 1924 a statesman-like policy would have made it possible for all resident Japanese to become citizens (and the same observation also applies to the Chinese and Filipinos). Having permitted those people to enter the country, we should have made the best of the situation by making it possible for those who were then residing here to become American citizens if they so desired."

As in a Greek tragedy, the sad denouement which has now come upon us is the nemesis of a chain of evil deeds.

High officials in Washington have recently complained that the limited number of protests against indiscriminate evacuation that had reached them from California had been drowned out by the raucous chorus in favor of it. Consequently they say they were forced to yield against their own better judgment. Unfortunately, there is truth in this complaint. To be sure, vigorous appeals for "selective evacuation," at least for citizen Japanese, were made by groups of eminent white citizens, notably by the Committee on National Security and Fair Play, headed by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry

F. Grady, General David P. Barrows and prominent representatives of education, labor, religion, industry, and law. Chester Rowell, California's most noted columnist, repeatedly argued for selective evacuation of both aliens and citizen Japanese.

Why Protests Were No Louder

But it is also true that the mass of intelligent people in the churches and outside kept still, not because they favored indiscriminate evacuation, but apparently because they could hardly conceive that the authorities would adopt it. In support of their confidence in a temperate policy they had the precedent of Hawaii where, despite all the then accepted rumors of fifth columnists and the preponderance of the Japanese population, neither the army nor white civilians had made any move toward placing all Japanese in concentration camps, and only a fraction of one per cent had been interned. Furthermore, pronouncements appealing for fair play and democratic treatment of all Japanese residents had been made by the President, Attorney General Biddle, Governor Olsen and other high officials. What wonder that hosts of liberty-loving citizens hardly dreamed that the army would actually yield to the clamor of the extremists!

Alas! they guessed wrong. The extremists, led by Japanese-baiters like Hearst, by irresponsible radio commentators and by politicians bent on catering to mass prejudices, were joined by business interests eager to crowd out Japanese rivals, as well as by honest patriots who believed every Japanese was a fifth columnist. The demand for unconditional and immediate evacuation was no doubt congenial to the military mind, which must reduce risks and wants to wash its hands of civilian problems. It is accustomed to handle men as mechanical units, rather than as bundles of democratic self-determination. So on the very day — March 3—that the Committee on National Security and Fair Play issued its release warning that "the indiscriminate removal of citizens of alien parentage might convert predominantly loyal or harmless citizens into desperate fifth columnists," General De Witt issued his "Proclamation No. 1, and the supplementary orders for sweeping evacuation.

The die was cast. Yet even then, influential groups persisted in urging General De Witt to appoint hearing boards as a means of differentiating between loyal and

disloyal or suspicious citizen Japanese. They argued that expulsion of any citizen bloc on the basis of racial origin would violate the principles for which America professes to be fighting, would drive loyal American citizens of Japanese descent to desperation and disloyalty and would play into the hands of Japan by giving her authentic support for her claims to be the protector of all colored races against the persecuting and arrogant white nations.

What of the effect of the total evacuation order on the Japanese? The older generation, for the most part, have suffered in stoical silence. Although all of them have lived in America for from twenty to fifty years, and many have longed to become citizens, our naturalization laws have denied them that privilege and mean-minded Americans have strewn their path with thorns. That there were potential fifth columnists among them is hardly open to doubt, as the arrest of over 2,000 by the FBI attests, although no widespread plot has been uncovered. It would not be strange if most of the Japan-born still felt a strong attachment to their fatherland. Yet theirs seems to be a divided loyalty, for thousands have been proud to see their American sons enter our armed forces.

The Nisei, citizen born, have shown diverse reactions. Some have felt humiliated and despondent at having their loyalty impugned. Others have resolved to accept evacuation as their peculiar sacrifice for their country and to emulate the American pioneers who wrested success from adversity.

Atrocities Committed Against Japanese

Since December 7 there have been all too many atrocities committed against innocent Japanese by bullies or misguided pseudo-patriots. The curtains and blinds of Japanese homes are generally drawn. Uncertainty and gloom are the dominant mood. The prospect of evacuation is blighting careers, reducing prosperous families to poverty, forcing abandonment of farms and businesses into which has gone the unstinted toil of decades. For very many of them all this suffering is entirely vicarious, on behalf of a Japan whose policies they condemn. It would be easy to compile a volume of heart-rending stories. It must suffice to tell only one.

Hideo Murata was an alien Japanese who had lived in the town of Pismo Beach, near San Luis Obispo, for twenty years. As a veteran of the A. E. F. in the first World War, he had been given an

"Honorary Citizenship Certificate from Monterey County," signed by the county supervisors. This he kept as his most treasured possession. On the certificate were engraved these words: "Monterey County presents this testimony of heartfelt gratitude . . . her honor and respect for your loyal and splendid service to the country in the Great World War. Our Flag was assailed and you gallantly took up its defense." When Murata heard reports that he was to be evacuated he was incredulous, so he sought light from his old friend the sheriff. To his dismay, the sheriff said that no exceptions were to be allowed. Murata thereupon went to a local hotel, paid for his room in advance, and next morning was found lying dead in his bed. He had taken strychnine. In his pocket they found the certificate, with its official seal.

Few Foresaw Confusion

The crowd demanded evacuation, and got it, but few people foresaw the confusion that the action would produce and no one did anything about it in advance. I would be the first to pay tribute to the conscientiousness and high-mindedness of all army officers and the federal officials whom I have recently been meeting, but this business of tearing 100,000 people from their homes and resettling them is complex and vast. It is not properly a military problem, but one in social engineering and political dynamics. In fact, military training unfits more than it fits men to solve it. It must therefore be a relief to the army, as it is to the rest of us, that the administration of the moving and resettlement of the evacuees has been given to civilian officials from the social security, agriculture and justice departments.

Looking back over the confusion of the last few weeks, I presume the army would agree with the social engineer that the cart got before the horse. It was a case of leap first and then look. Possibly it was unescapable under war conditions. Certainly it caused grief to the Japanese victims and chagrin to many citizens. Some of the Japanese in panic sold their property to sharks for a song. When the army, with the best of intentions, said that it favored voluntary resettlement, some Japanese rushed eastward only to run afoul of exclusion sentiment and threats of bodily harm. If the proclamation of evacuation could have been deferred until the blueprint of the resettlement program, including the custody of property, had been drawn, it would have prevented endless trouble and hardship. Failure to do this has weakened the

confidence of the Japanese in the justice and efficiency of our government.

Voluntary Efforts Fail

With characteristic self-reliance, the Japanese have eagerly supported all sorts of proposals for resettlement "on their own." Several of the Christians have backed a scheme for establishing a cooperative farm colony which has been zealously promoted by a number of Christian Nisei graduates in agriculture, medicine and economics. But despite all their efforts and the encouragement of federal agricultural officials, they have thus far failed to find any large suitable site. Either water has been lacking or vital military plants were near, or the white inhabitants objected to Japanese settlers. Utah seemed to offer the most eligible sites, but even there protests against a "Japanese invasion" arose.

One of the worst fiascos happened in southern California. The Maryknoll Fathers conceived the excellent idea of compiling an occupational census of adult Japanese to be used as an aid to intelligent resettlement. Some 23,000 persons signed up—practically the entire adult population. I understand that the fathers had given no assurance of immediate placement, but quite naturally many of the signers were ready to grasp at any straw and accepted roseate rumors as solid fact. When the truth became known that the fathers had no definite plans for employment or resettlement, the jolt was severe. Hope turned to cynicism. Another factor that has depressed the spirit of the Japanese in southern California is that they now realize how much of the recent furor for total evacuation was worked up by ambitious politicians, notably by one man who wanted to make the anti-Japanese agitation a stepladder to the governorship.

The experience of the past few weeks with schemes for voluntary resettlement makes it evident that government must solve the problem. It is hoped that the spirit of voluntarism will be given as free a play as possible, and the private agencies such as the American Friends Service Committee will be asked to cooperate. But the securing of land and the devising of ways to give useful employment to the hands and heads of so many thousands is something only government can do.

What the Churches Can Do

Far from leaving it all to Uncle Sam, there are two things that the churches in the interior states can

do, and they should lose no time in starting. They can find work for a few Japanese Christians in their own communities and they can assure such Japanese as may come to live awhile among them of fair and friendly treatment. There are perhaps 4,000 Japanese Christian families. Even if only a fourth of them were to find work, that would raise the morale of all the others. The procedure is simple.

A central executive committee has been formed at Berkeley by representatives of all the Protestant churches having work among the Japanese. It offers to act as a clearing house between the Christians who want new homes and work, and the national boards and local white churches to the eastward who are to find openings. This committee is the agent of the Commission on Aliens and Prisoners-of-war created by the Federal and Home Mission councils in New York. Local churches who find openings for Japanese should send information as to nature of work, name and address of employer, wages, living arrangements and sponsoring committee in the church to the chairman of the executive committee, Dr. F. Herron Smith, 2816 Hillegass Avenue, Berkeley, California. Branch regional committees are being formed at Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland, Oregon. Churches that are instrumental in placing a few Japanese in their towns need feel no anxiety lest the newcomers become a burden on the community. The Japanese hold an enviable record for absence of dependency and of juvenile delinquency.

It is planned by the federal resettlement authorities to establish eight reception centers for evacuees in places just east of the prohibited areas. The evacuees will be moved community by community, so that the Japanese churches may continue to function as units under their pastors.

This evacuation is unprecedented in American history in the numbers involved and in the fact that the evacuees are all of one race. It is fraught with two-edged difficulty and significance. It may hinder or help national unity during the war. It may aggravate rather than reduce the problems of interracial assimilation after the war. It therefore behooves private citizens no less than public officials to follow every stage of the resettlement process with a cooperative hand but a critical eye. In it all, the churches may find unexpected opportunities for service.

(Reprint from the Christian Century.)

December 22, 1941

Copy of letter from Dr. Galen M. Fisher, Orinda, California, December 20, 1941:

Dear Dr. Warnshuis:

I've been too busy over Japanese local problems to write to anyone in New York about them. The government authorities have been reasonable, and restrictions on travel, bank funds, and business by Japanese have been relaxed as fast as practicable. There are some injustices and inefficiencies, but less than one might expect, considering the suddenness of the emergency.

Existing agencies and special committees have quickly got into action. In San Francisco the Community Chest agencies dealing with aliens and minorities have taken the lead. In Berkeley, the International House quickly handled the problems of students, and got travel restrictions lifted and funds supplied. Then the Council of Social Agencies appointed a committee, of which I am chairman, (other members, General David Barrows, Chester Powell, Mrs. Wallace Alexander, Dr. Loper, and 4 other well known citizens) to solve various problems. We have cooperated closely with the San Francisco and Oakland groups.

Several Japanese families are stranded because their head has been arrested and his funds were all in Japanese banks. We have loaned money and will probably create a loan fund of some size to care for them. We are attempting to present evidence of innocence respecting a few of the men now interned, among whom are two who have lived here 35 years and have been leaders in Christian work.

General David Barrows, Chairman of the Committee on Fair Play for Japanese Residents, and I, as secretary of same, are sending a statement to the 150 sponsors of the Committee, and are suggesting that members in a dozen other cities, where there are numbers of Japanese, form committees to counsel and aid local Japanese.

The Germans and Italians are being similarly looked after, and have not suffered from race discrimination as the Japanese have. Yet the degree of abuse and discrimination has been less than was to have been expected, in view of public indignation against the Japanese government.

Speakers of the Councils on Home Defense have all been urging fair plan and friendliness toward resident Japanese, and the press has, on the whole, done the same, and of course, the pulpit has.

If you think this would be of interest to Van Kirk and Barnes, Shafer, Iglehart, Jorgensen, Ross, Phelps, or others, please have copies made for them. I have no time now to do it.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) Galen M. Fisher

A BALANCE SHEET ON JAPANESE EVACUATION

Untruths About Japanese-Americans
Our Two Japanese-American Policies
Are the Evacuees being Coddled?
What Race-Baiting Costs America

by Galen M. Fisher

Reprinted from *The Christian Century* of August 18 and 25,
and September 1 and 8, 1943

The Writer

Mr. Fisher's competence to strike A Trial Balance on Japanese Evacuation derives from his long acquaintance with conditions on the Pacific Coast and in Japan, his experience in social investigation, and his knowledge of international affairs. Born in California, he graduated from the University of California, and studied for a year at Harvard. Following twenty-one years in Japan as secretary of the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A.'s, he spent two years in sociological studies at Columbia University, and then served for twelve years as executive of the (Rockefeller) Institute of Social and Religious Research. Among some fifty projects sponsored by this Institute were a number of racial studies, including the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast. In 1930-31, he directed the research staffs of the Layman's Foreign Missions Inquiry in India, China and Japan. He is a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Research Associate in Political Science in the University of California. As a founder and officer of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play and of the Protestant Church Commission for Japanese Service, he has kept in touch with every phase of the evacuation.

Responsibility for the facts and opinions contained in these articles rests solely with the writer. Among the slight changes made in the original text is the substitution of October 1st figures for those of earlier dates.

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UNTRUTHS ABOUT JAPANESE-AMERICANS

A FULL year has passed since completion of the second large-scale racial evacuation in American history, that of the Japanese-Americans (that of the Indians was the first). As to the necessity of moving many of the Japanese from critical coastal areas, the government and public opinion agreed. As to removing all Japanese residents, and only Japanese, without hearings for any of them, except those interned as subversive, there was a strong body of dissenting opinion. Experience has shown that the dissenters were right. The evacuation may be termed a military success, a social failure, an international tactical blunder.

After what happened at Pearl Harbor, everybody on the exposed west coast, including Japanese residents, agreed that drastic defense methods were justified. But the record shows that for over a month after Pearl Harbor, no military or civilian spokesman suggested the complete and summary evacuation of all persons of Japanese race. During that period there was a marked absence of animus against the Japanese-American residents. The FBI, with the cooperation of the other intelligence services, arrested several thousand Japanese, Germans, and Italians, mostly aliens, and set up civilian hearing boards to ascertain whether or not they should be interned. All the military forces were placed at once on a war footing. It was generally assumed that these measures had forestalled any possible danger of fifth column activity and sabotage, and the public was comparatively calm and restrained.

Then, as if a hidden hand had given the signal, a barrage of verbal attacks on the resident Japanese was begun and demands for their total evacuation were made. What brought about this sudden barrage and won for it widespread popular support? Many forces were at work, some honorable, some utterly vicious. False rumors and fallacious arguments played an important part. Among them were the following untruths.

Untruth 1. That sabotage was committed by Japanese at Pearl Harbor. The readiness with which ordinary critical minds swallowed the fantastic rumors about how Japanese and Japanese-Americans aided the attacking forces on December 7 should suffice to humble many a professedly propaganda-proof American. Even the members of the Tolan congressional committee belong in that category, for during their hearings in California one of them silenced protests against wholesale condemnation of the Japanese by saying: "There are authenticated pictures during the attack (on

Pearl Harbor) showing hundreds of Japanese old automobiles cluttered in the streets of Honolulu so the army could not get to the ships." It is to the credit of the Tolan committee that in its printed report it made the **amende honorable** by presenting ten pages of official denials of such statements. Their falsity was early exposed in my article, "Our Japanese Refugees," in the April 1, 1942, issue of *The Christian Century*. J. Edgar Hoover told a House committee that the civilian population of Hawaii had committed neither sabotage nor espionage, and the attorney general of California told the Tolan committee that there had been no sabotage and no fifth column activity in the state since the war began. In face of all these denials, one would expect the rumors to die. To the contrary, they are still being repeated and believed by respectable people. Finally, in order to scotch them for good, I secured statements from the two men best qualified to know the truth. Here they are:

Colonel Kendall Fielder, chief of military intelligence for Hawaii since June, 1941, wrote on May 17, 1943: "There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage or fifth column activity committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941."

Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson wrote May 12, 1943:

The statement that Japanese trucks in Honolulu deliberately put out of commission several American airplanes is an absolute lie. No American machine gunners cleared Honolulu streets of any Japanese before, on or after December 7. The statement that all over Honolulu were signs which read, "Here a Japanese traitor was killed," is another absolute lie. . . . There was no dynamite planted by any Japanese or anyone else in or about Honolulu in December; and no civilian ever used a truck to pick up any dynamite.

Nelson Pringle, CBS broadcaster, after checking these rumors, made these comments on October 5, 1942:

Where were the Japanese on that Sunday (December 7), if they were not sabotaging? Hundreds of them were actively helping defend the territory, as members of the Oahu Citizens Defense Committee. Volunteer truck drivers, they rushed to their assembly points, stripped their delivery trucks of their contents, inserted frames prepared to hold four stretchers, and went tearing out to Pearl Harbor to take the wounded to hospitals. Some of these Japanese got there so promptly that their trucks were hit by flying shrapnel or machine-gun bullets from road-strafting Jap planes. The presence of the Japanese drivers and of their scarred and pock-marked trucks undoubtedly gave rise to the rumor that guns had to be employed to clear the highway of Japs who were blocking the road to Pearl Harbor.

An equally emphatic denial was broadcast over NBC on August 1, 1943, by Will Tyree, just returned from Hawaii and the south Pacific front.

I have dwelt on these rumors because their gullible acceptance on the west coast was a major link in an evil chain.

They made possible the change from popular calm and tolerance toward resident Japanese to hysterical distrust, the anti-Japanese crusade in the press and over the radio playing upon weak and excitable minds, the exaggerated reports of assaults upon and homicides of Japanese, the mutterings of mob violence against Japanese by gangs and even by respectable citizens. These all culminated in the decision of the military authorities to resort to total evacuation, partly for the protection of the Japanese residents themselves. This un-American principle of "protective custody" of an entire racial group may not have been the dominant factor leading to total evacuation, but careful observers agree that it was one of the weightiest.

Untruth 2. That the nisei gave no information to intelligence officers. It has been loosely charged, even by a staff officer of the Western Defense Command, that the nisei have not aided the authorities in discovering dangerous Japanese residents. The falsity of these allegations has been proved by intelligence officers both in Hawaii and on the mainland, as well as by informed civilians. It is true that the great majority of nisei did not give such aid, and the same could presumably be said of German-Americans. The chief reason is that most of them had no information to give, any more than most white citizens. Some who did have information feared dire consequences if they told it. Still others would not inform on relatives. But enough of them did give aid to disprove the sweeping charges to the contrary. Let some of the intelligence officers speak for themselves. On August 10, 1942, one wrote me:

I personally know at least fifteen intelligence officers who have received continual aid from the group of loyal and patriotic nisei attached to each, and have in consequence been of great service to the United States in obtaining information regarding disloyal and suspicious Japanese. There are innumerable cases I could give you.

An anonymous intelligence officer who "has more complete knowledge of the activities of loyal nisei than any other individual on the Pacific coast" wrote in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1942:

Many of the nisei voluntarily contributed valuable anti-subversive information to this (the naval intelligence) and other governmental agencies. The Japanese consular staff, the Central Japanese Association, and others known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause did not themselves trust the nisei.

Joseph Driscoll, in the course of a series of articles on "The Japanese in America," wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* of January 31, 1943:

These slant-eyed young Americans (of Japanese extraction) have thrown the fear of God and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

into their elders and made it plain that treason would not be tolerated and would be reported to the authorities. Common gossip out here was that not one Japanese had informed on another. On the highest authority I was assured the contrary was true, and that many patriotic Japanese have turned in suspects of their own race and even of their own families.

Untruth 3. That evacuees have been coddled in the centers. Congressmen, journalists and letter-writers to the papers have emitted a deluge of charges that the evacuees were living on the fat of the land, while the rest of us were being severely rationed. The facts as stated by the war department and the War Relocation Authority jointly on July 18, 1943, are that "all rationing restrictions applicable to the civilian population are strictly followed and two meatless days are observed each week. In general, the food is nourishing but definitely below army standards. The cost of feeding at the centers over the past several months has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person per day. . . . Some perishable commodities are purchased locally, and practically all other food is bought through the quartermaster depots of the army."

Untruth 4. That dual citizenship is peculiar to the Japanese. In the *American Legion Magazine* for June, 1943, Frederick G. Murray writes what many other people have said before him: "All dual citizens — the Japanese are the only nation to establish a dual citizenship." This betrays inexcusable ignorance. France, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and many other European and Latin American nations claim far more jurisdiction over children born of their nationals in America than does Japan. In fact, Japan in 1924 enacted a law by which American-born children of Japanese subjects would have only American citizenship unless their parents registered them at a Japanese consulate before they were fourteen days old — a provision expressly intended to remove the issue from American-Japanese relations. In 1930, Professor E. K. Strong estimated that only 40 per cent of the Japanese-Americans in California over seven years of age had dual citizenship, and close estimates place the present number of such dual citizens in the United States at not more than 20 per cent. or about 16,000. A considerable number of these would renounce Japanese nationality if doing so were not often difficult and expensive.

Untruth 5. That Japanese-Americans and Japanese warlords are brothers at heart. It would be as logical to bracket all German-Americans with the nazis as to brand all Japanese-Americans with the same mark of Cain as Japan's military gangsters. Mr. Grew rebuked such careless libeling

of an honorable group of fellow citizens when he said in his address at Union College on April 26, 1943:

We Americans, of all races and creeds, fight the evils of despotic and selfish militarism. There can be no compromise between ourselves and the arrogant exclusiveness of self-styled men-gods of Japan — no more than between ourselves and the self-styled Aryans of Germany. In our war against caste and privilege, wherever they may exist or occur, the contribution of Americans who are of Japanese descent is of real value; first, because they are living proof of our non-racial free unity; second, because they make a valuable contribution to the sum total of our American civilization.

A few months ago two men at opposite ends of the country sang the same song of hatred of all persons of the Japanese race. The one was Senator Stewart of Tennessee, who proposed to the Senate that the execution of American flyers by the Japanese warlords be matched by stripping of citizenship and confining in concentration camps all Japanese-Americans. The other was the new president of the Native Sons of the Golden West, who sounded this keynote: "We're going to Washington to bar the Japs forever from again participating in the privileges and freedom of the country they so ruthlessly and treacherously attacked." Both of these gentlemen obviously identified a group of their fellow Americans with Tojo and his gang. They merited the stinging rebuke administered by the *Baltimore Sun* to the senator on April 26: "What Senator Stewart urges would . . . represent acceptance of the Axis technique of visiting vengeance upon the innocent for the deeds of others. It would be nothing less than an example of the Axis brand of racial bigotry."

Untruth 6. That confinement of evacuees is both lawful and necessary. The responsible federal authorities hold that the evacuation was legal, but that detention is legal only until resettlement of the evacuees in unrestricted areas can be effected. This distinction goes to the heart of American civil rights. Apparently this conclusion of the War Relocation Authority is unknown to the western congressmen and governors and county supervisors who have been telling the world that all evacuees should be strictly confined for the duration; or possibly they set themselves up as superior judges of law and policy.

The legal question hinges on the interpretation of two presidential executive orders. That of February 19, 1942 authorized the war department to "prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded." That of March 18, 1943, created the WRA to provide for the needs of the evacuees, to supervise their activities and to provide for their relocation and their employment.

It is the basic contention of the federal authorities that

the evacuees must be treated not as prisoners of war or as criminals, but as persons innocent until proved guilty or dangerous to national security, and therefore entitled to honorable treatment while in detention, and to the earliest possible restoration to freedom within unrestricted areas. The alleged danger of subversive activity by the evacuees if they are released does not carry conviction in face of the statement of the director of the WRA that as of June 1, 1943, not a single act of sabotage or other subversive conduct had been charged against the 14,000 evacuees who had been released from the centers to resettle or to take short-term jobs. He properly added that all evacuees found, after proper procedure, to be disloyal or dangerous would continue to be confined.

Untruth 7. That the evacuees are unchanging, impersonal units. It is always hard to personalize people who are far away and markedly different from ourselves. It would therefore not be strange if Americans east of the Rockies thought of the evacuees as though they were robots. But it is decidedly strange that many Californians who knew individual Japanese before the evacuation now seem to think of all the evacuees as a static mass, as unaffected as a sleeping Buddha by the drastic changes in their lives or by the prevalent defamation and proposed disfranchisement or deportation of all "Japs."

In reality, the evacuees have been undergoing changes in attitudes and ideas equaled in intensity by few, if any, groups in our entire population. How could it be otherwise? Family life disrupted; business and professions gone; savings and security lost; a host of youth unable to realize plans for careers; life for the refined reduced to mediocrity; children contaminated by weakened parental control and abnormal social life; citizens registered for the draft and then denied service in the armed forces, except in a segregated racial unit; the future for most of them a dark enigma. Anyone with a modicum of imagination must see that the evacuees are an exceedingly dynamic as well as a tragic group. The practical import of this fact is that the tragedy is heightened by every added week of life in the centers. To advocate continued confinement of loyal and disloyal, citizen and alien, old and young alike, is to conspire to turn one of our most productive, orderly and ambitious groups into a host of shiftless, cynical problem cases.

OUR TWO JAPANESE-AMERICAN POLICIES

THE POLICY adopted toward the Japanese population on the west coast was a compromise between sound Americanism and compliance with hectic popular pressure. Now that the situation has cooled off, it is both possible and profitable to examine it critically and to contrast it with the course that was followed in Hawaii.

When the Pearl Harbor disaster left the west coast exposed, both the government and the public rightly demanded protection against invasion. This protection was held to be solely a military problem. But it is now clear that it was not exclusively a problem of physical military defense. If it had been, then the summary mass evacuation of residents of one race, the Japanese, might have been justifiable. But the situation was shot through with delicate social and international factors, almost as vital to winning the war and the peace beyond as the physical military factors. The war department is not supposed to be qualified to handle social and international factors. The national administration should therefore have conditioned the power given to the military so as to make sure that those factors were properly handled. If that had been done, the unfortunate repercussions of the evacuation among our allies in Asia would have been averted. More important, constitutional rights would have been more fully maintained, and the evacuees would have been honored, if not compensated, for the sacrifices they made in the national interest.

Where the President Failed

Whose duty was it to check the hysterical popular pressure for indiscriminate and precipitate evacuation of the Japanese? That duty rested on many persons, public and private, but in the national emergency only the administration could adequately cope with it. Sobered by danger, the people as a whole would have heeded a stern appeal to refrain from lawlessness and to honor the Bill of Rights, if it had been issued by the President and backed up by the secretaries of war and the navy and the Western Defense Command. Failure to make this appeal was a lamentable oversight. Attorney General Biddle and Governor Olson of California did issue such appeals, but they alone did not carry sufficient weight to check the anti-Japanese campaign that began suddenly five weeks after Pearl Harbor.

There is much to commend in the execution of the evacuation by the Western Defense Command, but much to condemn in its rejection of selective evacuation. That a selection could and should be made, where the Japanese lived, by hearings or other legal processes, was from the outset the

conviction of many representative citizens. But thistles were sown, and thistles have been and will long be reaped. It has proved impossible for the War Relocation Authority and all the voluntary religious and social agencies working for the evacuees to do more than reduce the number of thorns.

For some weeks it was taken for granted by nearly everyone of standing on the coast that the military would move only a fraction of the Japanese residents, since the FBI had promptly arrested all suspected and dangerous persons. What led to total evacuation? Many factors. Among them were the false rumors from Hawaii, the sinister campaign already referred to, the danger of invasion and fifth column aid and fear of mob violence to Japanese residents.

One Man's Prejudice

But one other factor, which was probably of considerable importance, has come to light; the apparent anti-Japanese bias of the then commander of the Western Defense Command. This bias was suspected at the time by some observers, but not until fourteen months later was the suspicion apparently confirmed. For on April 13, 1943, General DeWitt was quoted by the Associated Press as having said at a hearing of the House naval affairs sub-committee on housing: "It makes no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving him a scrap of paper won't change him. I don't care what they do with the Japs so long as they don't send them back here. A Jap is a Jap." Although no denial of this statement has ever appeared, it still seems incredible that the highest representative of the army on the coast could have gratuitously insulted an unfortunate body of citizens and cast aspersions on citizenship in general.

What happened on the west coast might then be summarized as follows: Confusion as to policy but public restraint toward all enemy aliens and Japanese-Americans for weeks after Pearl Harbor; then sudden agitation for total evacuation of Japanese, countered by demands for selective evacuation; then threats of violence against resident Japanese; finally, the decision by the military to evacuate some 70,000 citizens and 40,000 aliens of Japanese race without hearings or evidence of misconduct. The evacuation was executed without harshness. Its hardships were tempered by the services of church and other groups and by kindly individuals. The evacuees were confined in assembly centers, then in relocation centers mostly located in desert areas where accommodations are primitive. Now efforts are being made by politicians and "patriotic" organizations to disfranchise, exclude from the coast, or deport evacuees. The WRA policy

in the centers has been and is democratic and human. The war department has authorized formation of a nisei combat unit, but registration for the unit has been bungled. Inland resettlement of approved evacuees is being pushed by WRA, with the aid of civic and religious groups. Resettlement is being slowed up by the reluctance of the evacuees, especially the aliens and couples with several minor children, to go out in face of uncertain prospects and public antipathy.

We turn now to Hawaii. There, martial law was declared soon after Pearl Harbor and General Emmons became military governor. About 37 per cent of the islands' population is of Japanese ancestry. One might therefore have expected a more drastic treatment of the Japanese than prevailed on the mainland. The contrary was the fact. General Emmons as well as civil officials and leaders of public opinion did all in their power to preserve the self-respect of the Japanese residents. Only 390 persons of Japanese extraction were interned, and half of those were consular and other officials of Japan. A few hundred others were evacuated to mainland relocation centers. The remaining 159,000 Japanese were treated like all other inhabitants, although the intelligence services and the large body of unquestionably loyal Japanese remained alert to discover signs of disloyalty anywhere. Lieutenant Commander Coggins, in the June, 1943, issue of *Harper's Magazine*, says: "By their actions an overwhelming majority of Japanese-Americans have shown hatred of the enemy and have made brilliant records in all of the war effort in which they have been allowed to participate." General Emmons and other officials have repeatedly acknowledged the indispensable part played by the Japanese population in rebuilding Pearl Harbor defenses, in donating blood, in buying bonds and producing food. To be accurate, there have been many instances of minor friction, especially between lower military officers or newcomer Caucasians and the Japanese, but these have not seriously marred the general harmony. An interracial committee in the morale section of the military government has been effective in averting trouble.

The Varsity Victory Volunteers

A dramatic illustration of the happy results of trusting and respecting the Japanese population is the story of the "Varsity Victory Volunteers." Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, sections of the army and of the public felt uneasy over the fact that nisei members of the Territorial Guard or militia were protecting vital installations. Tactfully, the guard commander discussed the situation with the nisei members. They agreed, though not without deep chagrin,

that they should be inactivated. But 155 of them resolved to find a way to evidence their patriotism. So they wrote a petition to General Emmons which ended with these words: "Hawaii is our home; the United States our country. We know but one loyalty and that is to the Stars and Stripes. We wish to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever service you may see fit to use us." The general was pleased and made them a labor corps with the engineers. For more than a year these V.V.V.'s rendered most efficient service. The press filled columns with their pictures and accounts of their doings. President Gregg Sinclair of the University of Hawaii termed V.V.V. "the most honored initials in Hawaii." When the lists for the combat unit were opened in February of this year many of the V.'s rushed to volunteer.

The litmus-test of the two policies — trust and respect in Hawaii, and mass evacuation and expressed or implied distrust and disrespect on the mainland — was the comparative response to the chance to volunteer for the combat unit. In the ten relocation centers, only 1,300-odd volunteered; in Hawaii, 9,500. The 50 per cent larger Japanese population of Hawaii does not alone account for the difference. The basic reason was the difference in government policy and public attitude there from what obtained on the coast. More specifically: (1) In the centers, there was confusion because a registration for release was held simultaneously with that for the combat unit. There was also general resentment because Question 28 of the registration questionnaire required the alien evacuees to renounce allegiance to Japan, thus leaving them men without a country, since America debar them from naturalization. Only after a week was this question withdrawn. In Hawaii there was no confusion or bad feeling, because the registration was solely for the combat unit. (2) On the mainland, the nisei had been depressed by public abuse and opposition to their settling inland and, later, to their return to the coast. (3) The nisei volunteers in Hawaii, unlike those in the centers, had no reason to worry about the future of their families.

Coastal Policy Costly

Economically, also, the contrast is marked. The policy pursued in Hawaii enabled the Japanese to continue producing 90 per cent of the food raised in the islands and to play a leading part in defense work and other occupations. On the mainland, confinement of the evacuees withdrew not less than 45,000 working adults from normal production, at a loss, for the first year, of approximately \$70,000,000. Another \$70,000,000 was sliced from the federal treasury

to maintain the centers. The loss would have been still greater had not some 14,000 evacuees been allowed to go out to work on farms, nearly 10,000 of them to help save the sugar beet crop, thereby supplying a year's ration of sugar for 10,000,000 people.

The cynic may hold that the Hawaiian policy was due not to liberality but to necessity. He may claim that it would have been impossible to get ships to evacuate 160,000 Japanese, and that the economy of the islands was utterly dependent on them. This is true. Yet the fact remains that the tradition of racial fair play and the social wisdom of the authorities lifted the policy from negative necessity to positive statesmanship. In support of this interpretation, note these words of the chief of military intelligence, Colonel Fielder, in an address given last March:

Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the Axis crowd would give one of enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? Yet that's what was done in Hawaii, and so far it has proved militarily sound. That the situation is working out well is a tribute not only to wise administration, but to tolerance on the part of the rest of our good Americans here. . . . It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were put on the spot have proved their love for America and have helped solve an otherwise ticklish military problem here. For the information of all who might be misled, there is none among us who has been led into this policy out of mawkish sentimentality or gullibility. . . . Americans of Japanese blood . . . are Americans, and until they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving) traitorous, they should be treated as Americans.

On the west coast, sincere defenders of the evacuation policy contend that it was inevitable because of the twin dangers of fifth column activity in aid of the expected Japanese naval invasion, and violence against residents of Japanese race by Filipinos and Americans enraged over Nipponese army atrocities. Both these dangers were felt by nearly everyone to be real. Yet the Hawaiian military command, confronted by the same dangers in greater degree, refused to apply the weak-kneed device of "protective custody" or to shut up any Japanese residents except the 390 known or suspected subversive persons. Constructively, the military government formed a morale section, expressly to forestall interracial disunity and mob violence. Then the military and civil authorities applied their full force and prestige to check hysteria and violence against the Japanese residents. This policy won the grateful and ardent cooperation of practically the entire Japanese population. There is abundant reason to ask whether a similar policy could not have been applied to advantage on the mainland.

Two Japanese-Americans

Thus far we have dealt so largely in generalities that the

reader may have failed to see between the lines the sensitive brown faces of the thousands whose lives in Hawaii or on the mainland are being blessed or cursed by these contrasting policies. Two stories may serve to make more vivid what happened to a vast number of individuals.

A Japanese-American pastor on the island of Kauai, T. H., rendered invaluable aid to the authorities during the trying year after Pearl Harbor. As soon as the formation of the nisei combat unit was announced, he made strenuous and finally successful efforts to be appointed a chaplain to the unit. He was much impressed by the anxiety of his young parishioners and friends as they awaited the outcome of the physical examination on which hinged their admission to or rejection from the unit. He wrote: "When a 'reject' was called, his facial expression changed, his eyes were ready for tears, and he said: 'Why am I rejected?' . . . The quota was filled and 20 who were able-bodied had to return home. Their feet were heavy. They shouted their protests. A white soldier in camp told me: 'My God! I never saw a crazy bunch like this before.' The white cook exclaimed: 'I would really like to cook for those fellows. They certainly cooperate.'" Some weeks later, the same pastor wrote: "My mother and I sat anxiously thinking about the prospect of my youngest brother's induction into the unit. The next day he was called. That evening I met my mother and she had happy tears in her eyes. She said: 'With six sons, one at least should be in the army besides you. As a mother who has received so much from America, I can now walk the streets with head erect. I am the mother of a son in active service.' She spoke as if God had whispered, 'Well done.'"

Contrast that with this and draw your own conclusion: In southern California lived a nisei, a veteran of the United States army in World War I. He had been decorated for bravery and was head of an American Legion post. He was evacuated, but he kept his chin up and rallied all the nisei veterans in the relocation center to form a Legion post. They sent in their application for a charter and were heart-sick when it was denied. About the same time, the charters of several all-nisei posts were canceled by the Legion authorities. These incredible rebuffs, added to the dismal life in the center, the blind-alley prospects for the future and the widespread "hate-campaign" against all "Japs," ultimately soured his spirit. He still loathed militarist Japan as much as ever, but he began to lose faith in the America for which he had repeatedly risked his life. He became a leader in stirring up trouble in the center, a carrier of disaffection, one of the many frustrated and disillusioned spirits.

ARE THE EVACUEES BEING CODDLED ?

DOUBTS as to the legality of detaining the evacuated Japanese in the relocation centers constitute one of the cogent reasons why the War Relocation Authority is speeding the release of all approved evacuees. The fact that only a few of the evacuees themselves have filed suits to test the legality of restraints on their freedom is noteworthy evidence of their tolerance in the national emergency. Not one of the Germans or Italians evacuated from the west coast has been further detained except after due process of law. If they had been, doubtless a host of citizens would have raised a rumpus — and justifiably. The Constitution declares that no citizen may be deprived of his liberty or of his property without due process of law. But the Constitution makes no exception on account of race. Do the citizens who clamor for the continued confinement of the Japanese evacuees desire to amend the Constitution to legalize detention solely on the basis of race? How is that different from the nazi race laws? Or do they desire that citizens be detained without benefit of law? What happens then to government of laws, not of men?

Be the law what it may, the fact is that some 107,000 evacuees were placed in ten relocation centers last year, and the bulk of them are still there. Some day the job done by the WRA in creating these centers will be recognized as a marvel of social engineering. There was no close precedent to follow. The nearest was the dubious Indian reservation system. The staff responsible for solving the problem had been trained largely in various branches of the federal government. Until this situation was precipitated by forces which took advantage of the war, few Americans realized what a reservoir of social engineering talent has been developed in such departments as those of agriculture and the interior.

WRA Headed by Experts

It was to the department of agriculture that the President turned for the two able administrators who have successively served as directors of the WRA, Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the general, and Dillon S. Myer. Around them was assembled a staff of 1,800 Caucasians. Critics who have sneered at this staff as "welfare workers," "theorists" and "sob-sisters" may not have known that all the candidates were sifted by the Civil Service Commission, not picked at random by "reformers."

Have the relocation centers been a success? Yes and no. The odds were stacked against success. The patient, so to

speak, had been inoculated with a malignant germ before the doctor (WRA) took the case. Since then, both doctor and patient have worked hard to give the latter's healthful energies free play. The regimen might be called naturopathic; self-service, self-government, and a blend of work and such play as could be devised were its elements. To drop the figure, in each of the ten bare relocation centers, a city community had to be evolved from scratch. Nearly all the abilities needed to make up any city go round were to be found among the evacuees. They were put to work, with the Caucasians generally acting as supervisors. Self-government with freedom of expression and initiative were encouraged. This liberal policy has evoked loud protests from critics who persist in thinking of the evacuees as somehow criminals who ought to be "treated rough." But the WRA has stood its ground. To be sure, some of the Caucasian staff have been paternalistic, others have given too little authority to able evacuees or have pigeonholed good suggestions, and still others have let red tape clog the wheels; but as a rule, they have striven to live up to democratic American standards. Incidentally, it is not the fault of the WRA but that of the niggardly budget adopted by Congress that the wages paid to most evacuees are far below market level.

Only Two Major Disturbances

As to disorders in the centers, there have been major disturbances in only two of them, and only once did a center manager deem it necessary to summon the soldiers stationed outside for emergencies. The disturbances were fomented by small groups of agitators. The wonder is that there has been so little disorder and protest. Conditions in the centers inevitably generate friction, pessimism and frustration. Nerves are frayed; tempers are on edge; rumors and gossip spread like wildfire. It is the perfect setting for the trouble-maker. Any like number of white Americans, with their low boiling point on personal rights, would have staged an uprising within a week.

The issues underlying the disturbances were always complex and generally confused. The root factor was not loyalty or disloyalty to America, but resentment, especially over the indiscriminate character of the evacuation itself and against the abuse heaped upon the evacuees by press and public. It seems clear that some of the most active trouble-makers might well have been removed more promptly after last winter's disturbances. How salutary such a step would have been is shown by the fact that at Manzanar Center all trouble ceased after thirteen ringleaders had been sent to the

isolation center set up by the WRA at Leupp, Arizona. Similar effects have followed removals from other centers, although all told only 170 men have been isolated, of whom 100 were aliens and 70, citizens. Most of the citizens were those kibeis ("returned to America" youth) who were sent to Japan for schooling in childhood and became Japanized. Kibeis who go to the mother country later in life generally return hostile to Japanese imperialism. Several hundred of the latter and of nisei who have never been to Japan are now serving in the intelligence services of our armed forces.

So case-hardened had the evacuees become by May, 1943, that the Dies committee hearings on the relocation centers raised their temperatures but slightly. With characteristic fanfare, the committee announced in advance that a subcommittee, to be headed by Congressman Costello, would submit a report that "will oppose release of any Japanese whatsoever" and "will insist that 'known subversives,' estimated to number more than 25,000 in the centers, be taken from their 'comfortable environment' and placed in rigidly guarded department of justice camps for enemy aliens." This announcement was made before any member of the committee had visited a single center. It provoked Director Dillon Myer to make this comment when he appeared before the committee: "If the committee has evidence that there are more than 25,000 'known subversives' in relocation centers, we earnestly hope that it will be turned over to the authorized investigative agencies of the government and to this agency (WRA) with all promptness. As this is written (a month after the announcement) the committee has submitted to the War Relocation Authority no evidence whatever in support of this charge." According to reliable reports, the 25,000 "known subversives" suffered such a shrinking that the committee ultimately gave the WRA the names of only 600 "suspects." Careful investigation of intelligence and WRA records showed that **not one** of the 600 had an unfavorable record.

Such a travesty of justice were the Costello subcommittee proceedings that Chester Rowell, dean of west coast journalists, wrote that its Los Angeles meeting accepted "testimony of which, so far, not one word would even be admitted or heard by any judicial or quasi-judicial body in existence." The committee declined Director Myer's repeated offers to supply data or to appear in person or by deputy. Mr. Myer finally felt forced to give to the press "some fifty comments on statements reported in the press, allegedly made by witnesses before the Dies committee." I quote one of his comments:

The San Francisco Examiner, in a story from Washington dated May 25, attributed the following statements to Representative Thomas in the form of a direct quotation: "The Dies committee investigators and I found conditions very bad in the war relocation centers. At one camp the Japanese objected to a fence which confined them. They tore it down. It stayed down and the Japs are still roaming around there at will. . . . Camp newspapers are virulently critical of anyone who opposes Japanese interests."

Representative Thomas had never visited a relocation center at the time the story appeared. . . . It is true that a section of the fence surrounding the Minidoka Center has recently been removed and has not yet been replaced. . . . It was removed by evacuee labor crews working under orders of the War Relocation Authority and with the full knowledge and consent of the military authorities. The statement that evacuees are permitted to "roam around at will" is wholly inaccurate. . . . No evacuee is permitted to leave the relocation project area without a permit at any time. . . . If the "Japanese interests" referred to are those of imperial Japan, this statement is wholly without foundation. The War Relocation Authority has reviewed relocation center newspapers since they were first established and has never seen one line of criticism directed against any person because of his opposition to the interests of imperial Japan. If, on the other hand, the statement refers to the interests of the Japanese-Americans, criticism seems wholly in accord with the American principles of free speech.

When at length, on July 6, the Costello subcommittee allowed Mr. Myer to appear before it, he carried the attack deep into the enemy's lines by reading into the record the following devastating statement:

The manner in which the War Relocation Authority conducts its program is of concern to all the people in the United States, and it has significance which goes far beyond the geographic boundaries of this country. Undoubtedly, the WRA program is being watched in Japan, where thousands of American soldiers and civilians are held as prisoners or internees; in China, India, Thailand, Burma and many other countries whose collaboration we need if we are to defeat our enemies with a minimum loss of life. The program of the War Relocation Authority has been under investigation for the past eight weeks in such a manner as to achieve maximum publicity of sensational statements based on half-truths, exaggerations and falsehoods; statements of witnesses have been released to the public without verification of their accuracy, thus giving nation-wide currency to many distortions and downright untruths.

This practice has fostered a public feeling of mistrust, suspicion, and hatred that has had the effect of (1) providing the enemy with material which can be used to convince the peoples of the Orient that the United States is undemocratic and is fighting a racial war; (2) undermining the unity of the American people; (3) betraying the democratic objectives which this nation and its allies are fighting to preserve; (4) it may lead to further maltreatment of our citizens who are prisoners or who are interned.

The resettlement of the evacuees is decidedly unfinished business. A maximum of 107,000 evacuees have been under the care of WRA. Of that number only about 22,000 had been released as of October 1, 1943. Of these, some 8,000

were on short-term leave to meet the farm labor shortage. During May the number of releases rose to 1,000 a week, but at that rate it would take over a year and a half to empty the centers. What are the obstacles?

Until this summer, the bottleneck was the lack of jobs and of communities ready to receive the evacuees. Now, however, the WRA declares that the bottleneck is the reluctance of the older generation of evacuees to risk the plunge into a reputedly hostile world, where they might find it impossible to support a family. Many of them have young children. Two measures must be combined to break that bottleneck. First, it will be necessary to convince the reluctant evacuees that a democratic welcome awaits them in hundreds of communities east of the Rockies. Second, plans must be worked out whereby groups of ten to thirty families can be settled in rural and small-town communities all over the north central and middle west states—not bunched in little colonies, but scattered within courting distance. The right of the loyal evacuees ultimately to return to the west coast is beyond question, but many of them are already planning to live permanently east of the Sierras. Such a dispersal will be socially sound and will mitigate the situation on the coast.

Suspects to be Segregated

The numbers to be resettled will be reduced by not less than 18,000 when the process of segregating the eligible from the ineligible has been completed. The uninformed have been impatiently demanding that the WRA quit stalling and forthwith separate the sheep from the goats. But it is not so simple. If it were, the army would have done the separating during the months when the evacuees were in its custody. Although the evacuees were then near their homes, where information about them was readily accessible, the army gathered almost nothing except elementary identification data. For months the WRA and FBI have had hundreds of clerks sifting records and tabulating data gathered in the centers, by means of both the February army questionnaire and the conduct record for each evacuee.

The upshot of all this is that about 10,000 adults and 8,000 minors will be concentrated at the Tulelake center for the duration. Among the adults are all those who want to go back to Japan. Not a few of these have no sympathy with militarist Japan but feel they will be pushed to the wall if they stay in America. The group includes also, of course, all those suspected of disloyalty, including some hundreds of Japanese **kibei**. The plight of the children is tragic, for they

are American citizens, totally ignorant of Japan and its ways and already mentally set by American ideals. It is to be hoped that many of these children as well as their parents may even yet be restored to American life. For the success or failure of settlement is not primarily a matter of humanity toward 100,000 people made homeless through no fault of their own. It is essentially a trial by ordeal of the validity of American ideals, even under the stress of war and the passions engendered by war.

WHAT RACE-BAITING COSTS AMERICA

THE EVACUATION of 107,000 Japanese-Americans from the Pacific coast states and their incarceration in relocation centers has raised profound questions concerning the meaning of "the American way of life." Does that way still connote liberty under law as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the dignity and essential equality of all men, regardless of race, creed or status, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and the sovereignty of the people under God? In an attempt to answer this question, this article will weigh assets against liabilities as contained in our policy toward Japanese-Americans.

The chief liability to the American way involved in the evacuation is that it has impaired the value of citizenship in the United States. It is to be hoped that this impairment is temporary, but it must be faced for what it is. The suspension of full constitutional rights for law-abiding citizens and aliens of one race jeopardizes those rights for people of all races. Denial on the unconstitutional grounds of race of the rights which citizenship in the United States confers establishes a precedent for further denials on this and other irrelevant grounds. The fact that this denial was brought about through the pressure tactics of race-baiting newspapers, organizations and politicians that call themselves "patriotic" but depend upon incitement to race hatred and the threat of mob violence to realize their ends, shows how gravely menaced and how precariously held are the rights of all citizens.

The chief assets have been the partial vindication of the Bill of Rights for an unpopular racial minority, even in wartime, by decisions of the federal courts; the gradual restoration of equal status to Japanese-Americans by the war department; and the staunch support of the genuine American way by influential journals, by students, and by a host of religious, social and labor organizations. Some of the evidence for these general assertions as to liabilities and assets will now be reviewed.

The Un-American Legion

Certain "patriotic" organizations that pose as chief defenders of the American way have piously mouthed the phrase while flagrantly violating its spirit. This is especially true of the California American Legion, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the Eagles, and the Americanism Educational League. Just before the evacuation, representatives of the Native Sons and the legion filed suits to disfranchise Japanese-Americans. In pleading one of the suits,

former state's Attorney General Webb went so far as to call the fourteenth amendment a mistake. The Native Sons suit was dismissed by a federal judge, and the dismissal was sustained by both the circuit court and the U. S. Supreme Court. The legion withdrew its suit. Chastened by these rebuffs, the Native Sons this year adopted a resolution calling for denial of citizenship only to children born in this country of alien Japanese parents. The California legion, however, at its convention last month, adopted resolutions demanding the discharge of enlisted Japanese-Americans from the United States army and the continued detention of all the evacuees under army, instead of civilian, control.

Cemetery Despoiled

The self-appointed role of many legion posts as arbiters of other people's Americanism was illustrated recently at Portland, Oregon. The local Fellowship of Reconciliation assembled a group representing various communions and colors to trim the grass and shrubbery of the Japanese Buddhist cemetery, as "a gesture of good will and fellowship." Vandals had previously overturned many gravestones and done much damage, and since all Japanese-Americans had been evacuated there was nobody to repair the wreckage. The United Press reported the commander of Portland Legion Post No. 1 as saying: "The legion is not going to stand for this. It's a bunch of monkey business." One legionnaire laid hands on the leader of the fellowship at the cemetery gate, but others restrained him. The sheriff then closed the cemetery for the duration. Interference by the legion was a violation of civil liberty, which was sustained by the officer whose duty it was to enforce the law.

A rebuke was administered to the intolerance of both the legion and the public by Colonel Scobey of the army general staff, in the course of his testimony before the Senate military affairs committee's subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation centers: "I can give you the names of Japanese who served in the army or in the navy in World War I, who are members of the American Legion. These men in these (relocation) centers have contributed to the extent of their ability to assist in Americanization. They have tried to combat this sinister activity in the centers. They have been terribly hurt. They have been mistreated. They have had their membership in the American Legion posts canceled, and they have been condemned by people."

Postwar Race-Baiting

It is a pleasure to add that some legion posts in the middle west have gone out of their way to befriend evacuees settling in their communities and to champion the constitutional rights of all evacuees. One such post is in Madison, Wisconsin. Another is Post No. 84 in Northfield, Minnesota, which condemned an article in the June 1943 *American Legion Magazine*, urging the relocation of citizens of Japanese descent on islands in the Pacific ocean, as being "in direct violation of our constitutional guarantees," and vigorously protested "against our national magazine being used to foster race hatred in violation of our own constitution and the Constitution of the United States." An almost identical resolution was adopted later by the Minnesota legion convention.

In California itself, many legionnaires writhe under the legion's un-American policies, but while some of them keep on fighting they have found that a tight, politically minded hierarchy rules the organization. One of the hopeful omens is the bold criticism of legion leadership by the University of California *Daily Californian*, organ of the largest student body in the country. Referring to the rantings of National Commander Roane Waring and other officers, the editor says:

This purportedly 100 per cent American organization contains the seeds of fascism. The group in control has laid down a policy which is rampantly nationalistic; intolerant of other nations and other people; intolerant of minorities within the United States; lacking in regard for the rights of citizens and strongly emotional in its approach to social and political problems. . . . Would-be critics are frightened off by the legion's loudly proclaimed patriotism.

Closely allied with the California legion and Native Sons combination is the Americanism Educational League, headed by John R. Lechner, who has long been a professional patriot. He has been chairman of a local legion Americanism commission. For months past he has been agitating for permanent exclusion of the evacuees from California. As I write, word has come from Rt. Rev. Joseph McGucken, Catholic bishop of Los Angeles, that as a protest against its policies touching the evacuees he has directed Dr. Lechner to drop his name from the list of sponsors of the Americanism League.

Courageous Congressmen

Most west coast politicians have trimmed their sails to the anti-Japanese wind and dodged the question of constitutional rights. Notable exceptions are Representatives Jerry Voorhis, George Outland, Will Rogers, Jr., and Chester Holifield. Senator Sheridan Downey is to be commended for

having called forth, in July, the White House statement which for the first time showed that all departments of the government were supporting the WRA program. Representative John Tolan deserves credit for his fair conduct of the inquiries of the House committee, which gathered valuable data and made constructive recommendations as to the evacuation, but fell short of high statesmanship. Gov. Earl Warren's toadying to the "patriotic" organizations has disappointed many.

The final recommendations of the Dies Committee publicity on the relocation centers and the WRA have just been announced by Representative Costello, chairman of the responsible subcommittee. One of the three recommendations reads: "It is to be hoped that the War Relocation Authority will undertake a thorough program of Americanization in each of the relocation centers." I am puzzled to decide whether this is an instance of naivete or effrontery. A committee that has done all in its power to destroy the faith of the evacuees in American democracy and constitutional rights might better preach to itself. The poor quality of the committee's report may be inferred from the devastating comments made on it by Representative H. P. Eberharter, the dissenting member of the three-man committee. The United Press quotes him as saying: "The War Relocation Authority is doing a good job on a difficult problem. The findings (of his fellow committee members) are wind and fury, climaxed by feeble and meaningless recommendations."

The Senate committee on military affairs, through a subcommittee headed by Senator Chandler, also investigated the relocation centers, and its report contains valuable documentary material. Its first and best recommendation is that "the draft law be made to apply to all Japanese in the same manner as to all other citizens and residents." As to this, Colonel Rasmussen, a naturalized Dane in our army, who knows the Japanese language, told the committee: "Their record for loyalty, in my opinion, is unquestionable. . . . I have found it necessary to separate from my command approximately 4 or 5 per cent, who were definitely disloyal. Their loyalty to the commanding officer . . . is probably the most complete of that of any group in the United States. Once they have been under influence in the camps, it is different." As to the influence of the centers, Senator Chandler himself added, "They are breeding hatred, enmity, and trouble for the country in the future."

Press Undermines Freedom

Safe behind the constitutional guarantee of freedom of

the press, newspapers like those of the Hearst chain and the **Denver Post** prostitute their privilege by undermining the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights and degrading the American way. They have been foremost in arousing hatred of the evacuees and in denying their constitutional rights.

By no means all the disloyal agencies that are undermining the American way have been discussed, but enough have been mentioned to indicate how formidable they are. Yet arrayed against them, both on the west coast and the country over, are a multitude of loyal agencies, sufficient to warrant confidence that "they that be for us are more than they that be against us." Let a few of them pass in review. State and national conferences of leading churches and of the Y.M. and Y.W.C.A.'s have declared themselves uncompromisingly in favor of democracy and justice for the evacuees. Through the Protestant Church Commission for Japanese Service, they have supported religious work in the centers, and they have further backed up their resolutions by facilitating resettlement and by contributing most of the scholarship funds for students admitted to eastern colleges. They influence millions of voters. Any California politician who has national aspirations will reckon without his host if he assumes that the rest of the country will blindly follow race-baiters of the west coast. One of the striking Christian pronouncements was the resolution adopted by Chinese-Americans at Lake Tahoe in July:

Whereas such propaganda as "No Japs in California" . . . is against all principles of fair play and harmful to true democracy—therefore, be it resolved that we, in consonance with the sentiment of Madame Chiang Kaishek as expressed in her speech, "No Hatred toward the Japanese people," condemn such activities as un-American, undemocratic and unchristian.

The joint committee on Japanese-American relocation set up by the Federal Council and the Home Missions Council has stimulated many religious and civic groups to welcome and employ released evacuees. A score of returned missionaries have ministered to the evacuees. The American Friends Service Committee has served all evacuees, but especially the youth. Under its management the Student Relocation Council has aided nearly 2,000 nisei to continue their education. The American Civil Liberties Union has helped greatly to win the favorable decisions in the courts. The C.I.O. has stood solidly for selective evacuation and for equal rights for law-abiding evacuees. In the A. F. of L., courageous leaders like Senator John Shelley and John Wagner dissuaded the California state convention from backing the disfranchisement proposal. The Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, which includes many

eminent citizens of the region, has issued pronouncements which carry great weight and has done other things to stop race-baiting.

The war department has become an increasingly outspoken defender of the constitutional prerogatives of the Japanese-Americans. Secretary Stimson wired Mr. MacNaughton, a banker of Portland, Oregon: "Any proposition to deport all Japanese-Americans irrespective of citizenship or loyalty would not only be inappropriate, but contrary to our experience and tradition as a nation." Assistant Secretary McCloy wrote the San Francisco Down Town Association: "It seems entirely unnecessary and unjust to retain loyal citizens and others in restrictive custody when they could do their part toward the war effort." Colonel Scobey, executive officer to Mr. McCloy, wrote the San Diego county supervisors: "The war department feels that retention of 100,000 people in relocation centers at the expense of the government in time of war is not only unjust to those who can establish their loyalty, but it is an unnecessary expense. . . . To condemn the Japanese in this country as a whole for the actions of the Japanese militarists does not seem to be just or appropriate."

These, briefly, are the liabilities and assets that have accrued to the American way from the evacuation. It remains to press home the question: What effects are the activities of the agencies disloyal to the American way having upon the war effort? At home, they have hounded numbers of heretofore heartily loyal Japanese-American citizens into skepticism or even disaffection. At a moment when Negro-white conflict has occurred on the coast for the first time, they have thrown into the witch's cauldron an aggravated Oriental race problem. They have libeled 80,000 fellow Americans by persistently bracketing them with Nipponese militarists. They have robbed the nation of millions of work days by making efficient manpower idle, despite the desire of the War Manpower Commission and the Army to put it to work. They have undermined the very way for whose preservation the nation is fighting. Abroad, they have given the Chinese and other Asiatic allies good cause to think that Americans are no better than nazis in their contempt for the colored races. They have thereby made plausible the propaganda of the Nipponese warlords that they are the saviors of Asia from arrogant white oppressors.

If this indictment is true, then the men responsible for thus undercutting the American way must be branded as arch-subversives.

The Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play

Purpose: The fundamental purpose of the Committee is to support the principles enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, and to that end to maintain, unimpaired, the liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, particularly for persons of Oriental ancestry.

The Committee believes: That attacks upon the rights of any minority tend to undermine the rights of the majority; that legislation to deprive Americans of any racial minority of their legal rights would set a precedent for depriving other racial groups of their rights, and would weaken the confidence of our Allies, particularly those in Asia and Latin America, in the sincerity of our professions to be fighting for the rights of all peoples; that it is un-American to penalize persons of Japanese descent in the United States for the crimes of the Government and military caste of Japan.

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Editorial in BALTIMORE SUN, of April 26, 1943:

When Indignation Beclouds Judgment

Indignation at the Japanese execution of some of the flyers who flew with General Doolittle has inspired Senator Stewart to propose that all Americans of Japanese descent be stripped of citizenship and confined in concentration camps. By demonstrating the extreme of intolerance to which blind fury can drive a presumably responsible man, this proposal should give many people a sobering realization of the danger of permitting anger and indignation to overwhelm the firm, disciplined reasoning which the war emergency demands.

On second thought, Senator Stewart himself must realize this. What he urges would violate one of the basic principles of American citizenship. It would represent acceptance of the Axis technique of visiting vengeance upon the innocent for the deeds of others. It would be nothing less than an example of the Axis brand of racial bigotry and hatred.

This war will not be won, in the true sense it can be lost even in the winning, if we descend to the level of our enemies in any way but the relentless efficiency of the fight in field and factory and on the military battlefronts.