

May 12, 1943

*Registration*  
B. BILLIGMEIER'S REPORTS *Part II.*

Grodzins: The point in question is the activity carried on by the administration between January 30, when registration was first announced, and February 10, when registration actually began. Billigmeier, in his report, makes note of statements made by Coverley and Hayes on February 3 and 4, but the report indicates that the first real information given to the community was on February 9 when the Army team first arrived. This was just one day before registration was scheduled to begin.

Billigmeier: On January 31, the day after the announcement of the registration program, in the Tulean Dispatch, Don Elberson made some very illuminating comments. In the first place, he expressed the hope that the Project Director would carefully consider methods that should be used in presenting the registration program to the people. One of the most important things he felt was that full information should be provided the people in the beginning and that this information should be presented carefully because the evacuees, many of whom are deeply suspicious of the WRA, would react negatively to any WRA program pushed on to them. That is, if the program was pushed by the Project Director, blatantly announced in the project newspaper, then the evacuees would feel they were being pushed into something they considered they would not want to be in.

Grodzins: In other words, Bob records Elberson's points on January 31 as: (1) full information should be given to the people by the administration, and (2) this information should be transmitted



carefully and with circumspection. In the main, Elberson was concerned with not creating a situation which would result in the "negative reaction" of the evacuees to any blatantly announced WRA program.

Billigmeier: Through Elberson's experience with the evacuees in building the cooperative he knew when a policy or an issue was announced without due preparation, the people are against it without considering the issues involved.

Spencer: How well was Elberson and the rest of the administration informed about the matter? I heard that Hayes was the representative of the Tule Lake Project at Washington when the matter of registration was brought out, its <sup>aims and</sup> purposes outlined and the procedure described. I heard from people who attended these meetings at Washington, notably John Landward, that Hayes was in attendance at the meetings in a very sporadic manner (in other words, he got drunk and stayed away).

Billigmeier: That checks with what I have heard. According to the testimony of Sergeant Tsukuhara, Hayes was not in frequent attendance at these meetings in Washington. Coverly relied upon Hayes to bring back information about the program. He informed community leaders, such as Father Dai, Harry Mayeda and others that Hayes would bring back the details of the registration program, but Hayes returned without them. Then Coverley realized that he would have to wait until the Army team arrived to receive those details, but the Army team itself did not know the answer to many of the questions that



arose, and the people, like Mayeda and Father Dai and Mr. Ikeda, attached great importance to the lack of information on the part of the administration during the days between the announcement of the registration program and the actual inception of the registration itself. They made many efforts to contact the administration, in the hope that they might secure information and relay it to the people of the community, so that the community reactions would be favorable, because they realized that the program was a delicate one and that the way in which it was presented was tremendously important.

Grodzins: The point now is to describe the steps by which the three-fold character of registration were differentiated for the evacuees. In the Tulean Dispatch of February 4, the first announcement of general leave registration was made, and on February 9 the Tulean Dispatch carried the announcement that the Army officers who were to register the citizens for military service would also have charge of the leave clearance registration.

Billigmeier: The first mention of the difference between the various registrations came after the registration program had begun. When it appeared that the first generation wanted to have Question 28 clarified before answering it, they asked Lt. Carroll if registration couldn't be postponed three days pending clarification. Lt. Carroll answered that the alien registration could be postponed, but the registration of male citizens was the Selective Service registration and had to be done immediately.

Grodzins: Then no actual attempt was made to distinguish between the registrations until actually after the registration began.



Subsequently, however, the Tulean Dispatch frequently made explanations of the differences but, according to Bob, "it is hard to understand how poor a propaganda medium the Tulean Dispatch is, for the Issei especially."

Billigmeier: "That's right."

Grodzins: Then my final conclusion would be, (1) the administration allowed the registration to become confused in the minds of the evacuees and (2) the administration took inadequate steps to clarify the confusion once it was made.

Billigmeier: Added to that is the fact that the WRA officials in Washington anticipated no negative reactions to the registration of aliens or citizens. This was definitely stated by Dillon Myer to the Caucasian staff at Tule Lake when he visited them. They neither anticipated any reluctance on the part of Issei to answer Question 28, nor did they anticipate any difficulty that would arise from holding the registrations simultaneously. Holland is said to be largely responsible for planning the registrations to be held at the same time. According to people working in the WRA office in Washington, many of the individuals there are resentful towards Holland for not having requested their participation in considering the program. They wanted to take part in evolving the whole registration program and felt ~~they~~ had they been consulted, much of the trouble would have been avoided. Leaving aside for the moment the opposition to Questions 27 and 28, it is difficult to assess how much of the opposition to registration arose because of the community confusion. However, it can be said that certain community leaders, such as influential Father Dai, Mr. Ikeda and Harry Mayeda, were penalized by not having sufficient information concerning the



program. Had these community leaders been fully informed, their effectiveness as leaders would have been greatly strengthened.

Grodzins: In summation: (1) the Administration at Tule Lake did not have sufficient facts about the registration, (2) as a consequence the administration was unable to give information to the community leaders, (3) furthermore, the administration was unwilling to discuss plans and procedures with the community leaders, and (4) the community was informed by neither its own leaders nor by the administration, and when information was passed to the community, the community leaders were in a position of selling something that they knew very little about.

Billigmeier: With regard to point 3 above: Coverley is a man who has deep convictions about administrative hierarchy and administrative procedure, and he conceives the WRA to be another government agency to be administered without consultation with those directly affected. It was his policy neither to consult with evacuees or evacuee leaders who might aid him in evolving means of presenting the program to the people, nor did he consult with people in the administration who could best anticipate reactions to any program.



May 13, 1943

Spencer: In my own analysis of the registration program at Gila, I had at the time of writing that just completed an analysis of what I called "Pressure Groups in the Community," aiming at a study somewhat similar to Miyamoto's concepts of <sup>collective</sup> adjustment, so that when the registration program came about, I was concerned with its relationship with these various groups in the community, and attempted to delineate to some extent the reactions and reflections of the proposed program in these various groups.

Morton is concerning himself in this analysis with the administrative side of the announcement and facilitation of the program <sup>by</sup> of the administration officials. I am particularly interested in the reaction in the community from the point of view of its effect upon various groups, and that is the point of view that I ~~could~~ choose to take. The thing that is of considerable interest to me is the fact that at Gila you have the development of groups of various kinds which follow definite formalistic Japanese patterns of behavior in that they are definitely organized. I brought out in my own analysis of registration the fact that you have a strong Issei pressure group calling itself the Vigilante Committee, a United Kibei Club and similar organizations in both camps at Gila. These organizations banded together to a considerable extent with the result that they were able to present a united front against registration, against the whole program. You can pretty well pick out the leadership, and you can see in the relationship of these groups, one to the other, the growing tendency against registration, against enlistment, and against any other so-called pro-American measures. The administration, being aware of the leadership, arranged with



the FBI for the apprehension of the leaders. That was done, and suddenly the whole system, the whole front against registration, this demonstration of group solidarity as you find it among Issei and Kibei, collapsed entirely, and from then on you find a good deal of agreement in the community to measures proposed by the administration. Now, the x point that amuses me, is that nowhere else, apparently, in the other Relocation Centers, do you get a similar development. Taking Poston, Manzanar and Tule Lake - even though you do get the apprehension of some individuals accused of being agitators, pro-Japanese and the like, nonetheless the resistance to the program doesn't back down as it did at Gila with these arrests. I am interested in finding out why such a development as this should have taken place at Gila and not specifically at Tule Lake, and how these groups at Tule Lake may be defined and what the effect of registration on them was.

Throughout Bob's report on registration, and in Miyamoto's report as well, hints are given from time to time as to reactions within definite groups. Mention is made of Nisei, of Kibei and of Issei reactions. The first question that I would ask is: lacking a specific organization, how may this reaction in a given social group be determined? In other words, I understand that you have Kibei at Tule Lake, who present, as do the Kibei at Gila, pretty much of a united front. You make mention in your paper of the fact that, as the result of registration, Kibei unity is tending to be broken, that there are groups developing among the Kibei themselves.

Billigmeier: Not exactly that. Kibei unity was born in opposition to the registration program. For a while the Kibei were unified in their stand against registration, or a substantial part of them.



As the program progressed, as more and more Nisei complied with the registration regulations, the Kibei group split. Some of them split over the matter of violence; this resorting to violence on the part of some Kibei resulted in dissension in the ranks of the Kibei. The Kibei opposition to registration created unity only in that one particular question. It is closely related to a similar outlook they have on various other things: their allegiance to this country, their attitudes to this country, their attitudes towards Japan. Actually, there was no strong organization existing, there was no Kibei leaders who had exerted a long-time influence as at Gila.

Spencer: Would such concerted antagonism toward the registration program give rise to any leadership in the Kibei?

Billigmeier: It is hard to say just how much of the whole Kibei opposition was a spontaneous phenomena and how much was directed by Kibei leaders. It is hard for an outsider to say. There were leaders it is true, but how effective a role they played it is hard to say. It is very probable that the Kibei leaders were quiet leaders who were untouched by the arrests made by the FBI and Internal Security. There were no individuals who said this person is a Kibei leader, or the Kibei organization stands for this, therefore we will apprehend him.

Spencer: Nevertheless, there were assaults on various individuals, the stimulus for which must have been provided by leaders of some kind.

Billigmeier: Though there was no organization, there still was a willingness to cooperate. So that actually one of the beatings was



organized by Issei who approached a Kibei, and this Issei and Kibei planned the beating of Nomura, though neither one of them before had been close friends, yet the Kibei was actually willing to cooperate because they felt strongly against a suspected inu, though there was no organization.

Spencer: The Kibei at Tule Lake from the point of common purpose and common ideology and background, got a certain amount of Issei support. That seems to be the general pattern followed out in the whole registration program. In the same way, the Nisei seemed to be completely divided among themselves. Unable to make decisions of their own, being at variance with one another, completely lost in not knowing which way to turn.

Billigmeier: That is brought out in some of the interviews that were held during registration. An interviewer would talk to an Issei or a Kibei and ask them to decide where their loyalty lay, with the United States or Japan, and in many cases the person was unable to answer, they were afraid of discrimination after the war, and afraid of the unknown. Japan, to some Nisei and Issei, was an unknown quantity. They did not know where their allegiance lay, and some did not think it contradictory to have allegiance to both the United States and Japan.

Spencer: Miyamoto mentions the JACL affiliations with reference to the pre-evacuation past. However, in spite of the fact that you get JACL members at Tule Lake, nevertheless, there has been no formal organization of the JACL.

Billigmeier: They are not chartered.

Spencer: How did the resistance of these JACL assert itself against the recalcitrant groups?



Billigmeier: I don't know how the evacuees would answer, but I have a feeling that to the best of my knowledge JACL leaders and members backed out of the picture when they realized that this whole issue was going to be a serious one. Many of the leaders had so encouraged the enmity of the community that they could not make any effective resistance to the groups opposing registration, that is, they could not take a constructive stand in registration that would lead to effective results. I suppose without a doubt Tsukamoto is the leading JACL leader in the camp, but he had gathered so much antagonism toward him that he had to step out of the picture and leave the colony. So with his passing the JACL people made no attempt to play an effective role.

Spencer: They made no attempt at <sup>Tule Lake</sup> ~~Gila~~ to make people change their answers?

Billigmeier: I talked to Nakamura during the crisis and he is a former JACL leader from Marysville. He knew nothing about what was occurring in the camp but was taking no active part in trying to further the registration program. He was trying to be <sup>as</sup> inconspicuous, as it was possible for him to be. I think that because Tsukamoto had played such a prominent part when he left the picture it left such a hole in its strength and leadership that it couldn't function to fill the void.

Spencer: Would you consider the JACL <sup>was</sup> ~~wise~~ at the time of registration indicative of the concerted Issei feeling of pro-Americanism, pro-administration, and so on.



Did the JACL provide an impetus for affirmative answers to questions 27 and 28?

Billigmeier: I think that what opposition to those who were against the registration program came not from the JACL but from certain individuals, like Harry Mayeda, who was interested in building a strong Nisei organization. Chester Ogi would be another individual. These people would be interested in forming a Nisei group who are interested in affirming their loyalty. There were people who favored this organization, who wanted to make it identical with the JACL, but this was impossible.

Spencer: In view of community opposition to the JACL ...

Billigmeier: There were a great many Nisei who are still extremely loyal and are opposed to the JACL for political reasons.

Spencer: How far did this Nisei group get?

Billigmeier: It was gaining strength during the last days of the registration.

Spencer: Had it been conceived before?

Billigmeier: There had been people anxious to organize the Nisei into strong groups but there had never been enough support among the Nisei for it to materialize. The opposition on the part of Nisei and Kibei encouraged many of the more patriotic Nisei to feel the need for an organization against Issei and Kibei, and since the registration many of the ~~more~~<sup>more</sup> capable of Nisei leaders have left the project. The whole program for organizing the Nisei has fallen into abeyance.

Spencer: I am working on the assumption here that in the main the Nisei if left alone would have acceded to registration without much difficulty and that opposition centers itself in the Kibei



group generally, and in certain Issei. It is suggested now that certain Nisei leaders, like Harry Mayeda, Tsukamoto, Ogi, do exist, but it's difficult to name the leaders of the opposition. I have seen enough of these communities to know that this Japanese love of formalism, especially among those of exclusively Japanese background, requires some kind of acknowledgement of leadership, and I think that the WRA administration and the FBI in apprehending certain individuals did so in order to carry out the idea that certain leaders do exist, that by removing the leaders, the structure of the resistance would be broken.

Billigmeier: That was the idea of the Director at Tule Lake. He had a feeling that if you ~~took~~ picked up Kibei and Issei, the opposition to the program would immediately collapse. The Project Director made a list of people to be apprehended on the basis of notes he received from evacuees. It seems that some members of the community acted as anonymous informants, naming various individuals as key people in the opposition, by writing letters. There were also some who were willing to speak with Coverley, also he got information from individuals who themselves were suspected of being opposed to the registration program. Several of them were willing to implicate others, one such fellow implicated 10 leaders.

Spencer: Were all apprehended, and the informants sent to other projects? How justified did you think this list compiled by Coverley <sup>was?</sup>

Billigmeier: Most of the people who were on the list were definitely in opposition to the registration, but it is also certain that a great many not on the list were opposed to the registration and equally as influential as those appearing there, so actually Coverley didn't get the heart of the opposition by apprehending those individuals. The



apprehension itself might be justified, but it wasn't the cure-all it was supposed to be, as it was at Gila.

Spencer: At Gila, the apprehension of 28 individuals who were recognized leaders of organized groups caused the opposition to collapse. The result was that ever since, and during the remainder of the registration program, there was no concerted opposition, there was the rise of no leadership which has proved itself to be anti-administration or against any other measure which has been subsequently noticed.

Billigmeier: Doesn't it appear that by apprehending these people at Gila you got those individuals who were willing to be leaders in opposition to the administration. In case other questions arise between the people and the administration there might be others willing to assume leadership, ~~but you haven't~~ By apprehending those leaders you only temporarily stymied the opposition.

Spencer: That was my thought at first. That the mass apprehension only grabbed the front men and those individuals are still there in the community who were the leaders capable of rousing the community. Another kind of opposition as arisen - relocation and resettlement.

Billigmeier: It may be that your opposition may take a new form. It may be a more passive resistance but still be as strong an opposition as there existed during registration.

Spencer: That is, of course, true and something I am looking out for, but I am convinced that the apprehension by the FBI got nearly all of those who were sources of trouble. I don't think there was any backing behind them.

Billigmeier: What relation was there between the Issei and the Kibei?

Spencer: Simply this: that you have a strong Issei group making



a bid for recognition. The president of the Kibei perfectly willing to grant that recognition and sponsor it and urging these Issei to come to the fore in order to bring suit for their recognized organization by the administration. It is true not only in the case of that one individual but there were other leader Kibei who would fit in with the Issei; a close connection in the sumo club and the dramatic society, gambling groups. In other words, you get this peculiar manifestation of solidarity of purpose among a number of organizations. The only opposition which could arise could only arise through the JACL. It had a Chapter at the Butte camp at Gila, and there again your emphasis on former development absent at other centers. The situation at Poston very closely analogous to that at Tule Lake. It makes your problem of definition very difficult. Can't put your finger on any specific point of leadership or manifestations of group development. I am trying if possible, for my own interest, to see if I can get as close to what might approximate organization for Tule Lake. To summarize what we have said briefly: Comparative view - you have a situation at Gila which can be tabulated, and at Tule Lake you have more of a random development which presents difficulty in analysis. Where do these Hawaiians stand in relation to the Kibei and Nisei. You mention that the Hawaiians took a very favorable stand to registration though they had been previously suspect by the administration.

Billigmeier: Well, the Hawaiian group supported the Nisei in their attempts to organize. One of the devices that the Niseis used to organize was the University of California Club. A meeting of this club was called during the crisis but had to be postponed because of Kibei opposition. But a few days later the club did meet. The



Hawaiians though not students of the U.C. attended in force. They were armed with lead pipes and sticks and were disappointed when the need for violence did not manifest itself. They were ready for a showdown with the Kibei. Hawaiians volunteered for the army, others left the camp to join the merchant Marine in the Great Lakes. It is interesting that one of the sergeants had cautioned the Hawaiians to be circumspect in their behavior because he thought they were too anxious for violence and should be more cautious and not incite the Kibei. Took a strong position throughout and the most outspoken of any Nisei in favor of registration because there was no group of Kibei who could pressure them into silence.

Spencer: Are there any figures among the Hawaiians who emerge as leaders?

Billigmeier: That is a point I don't know. To my knowledge there are no individuals who stand out. Actually there may be leaders known to the group itself, but as far as I know there are no individuals who stand out. The Hawaiians in Gila were largely in the police force. What was their role in the crisis?

Spencer: Not many of them.

Billigmeier: Are they strongly pro-American?

Spencer: Don't emerge as a group.

Billigmeier: Despite the fact that they work as a unit?

Spencer: They might constitute a caste instead of a group. Definitely despised.

Billigmeier: Was there any attempt to use the wardens or to use them against those who opposed registration?

Spencer: No. <sup>Williamson</sup> ~~Wilson~~ got hysterical. He said he couldn't trust any of his men. Wouldn't consent to their being used for that.



Wardens have always been looked down on by the community at large and got no support.

Grodzins: Spencer, in his Gila report, has suggested that tremendous family conflicts affected the answers of the Nisei in the registration. On page 14 of Billigmeier's report there is reference to the fact that several Issei "dragged" their children away from the place of registration.

Billigmeier: The incident such as you mention happened particularly in the first period of registration, during the time when registration itself was held in the block managers' offices. Nisei would frequently come to the block manager's office with the intent of registering. Parents would see their children making this move and would try to prevent the children from complying with the registration program. Such incidents occurred in a number of blocks during the first week. Subsequently, however, registration was removed from the blocks and transferred to the administrative area. Such family displays of disunity were no longer manifest in such a dramatic fashion. There were, of course, indications of family splits. Nisei frequently told the teachers who registered them their parents had objections to their registering, and that a family crisis had ensued. That was also apparent in the matter of registration for repatriation. But the actual evidence of family disunity was not as apparent as when registration was held in the block managers' offices.

Grodzins: In the report, the attitude of those who refused to register is very well described in the interviews that were recorded. At one place, it is noted that sergeant Tsukahara was successful in getting five Kibei to change their minds about registering, and this



is the only point where any outstanding success is noted.

Billigmeier: In the first place, Tsukahara was very quiet in his manner, very slow talking, very sincere and considerate of the person he was interviewing. There was no emphasis or disregard of the problems faced and he made a sincere attempt to understand them and he had the background to do it. He was willing to ~~xxx~~ admit certain of the arguments which the registrants brought forward, but he would emphasize other factors dealing with the registration which the person being interviewed hadn't considered. In the second place, there is this factor: Tsukahara was an Issei, he was racially Japanese if such a thing can be said of a person, ~~mf~~ and the Japanese were willing to trust him more than they would a Caucasian. In many of the people's minds, Caucasian represented the WRA, and neither could be trusted very far, and I think it is true most of the evacuees trusted Tsukahara.

Grodzins: The ~~xxxx~~ success of Sergeant Tsukahara in convincing non-registrants to register again seems to be an indication that factors other than deep-seated loyalty or disloyalty were important in shaping the action of the evacuees. It would seem profitable, therefore, to summarize here all the reasons that were known which contributed to the troubles during the registration period.

Spencer suggests that there is some significant difference between (1) answering "no" to questions 27 and 28, and (2) not registering at all. However, both (1) and (2) represent a form of protest and a response to confusion and fears. Before attempting to analyze the significance of the difference between not registering at all



and answering "no," we will list the reasons that lay behind both types of protest, because we are agreed that the same reasons impelled both types of protest. Spencer further points out the

interesting fact that at Gila the protest took the <sup>one</sup> alternate form ~~(negative responses) while at Tule Lake it took largely the other (complete non-registration and or negative responses)~~. After <sup>neg. standing</sup>

making our list, we will try to analyze both the differences in the nature of the protest and the reasons that resulted in the different protest.



GRODZINS  
BILLIGMEIER  
AND SPENCER

1. We've registered already, why should we register again?
2. An honest confusion with regard to where one's loyalty lay, with Japan or the United States, and an absolute unwillingness to commit oneself to the United States on short notice.
3. Among the Issei, as Miyamoto has noted (this is to relate to point 2 above) an indisposition to either forswear allegiance to Japan, which would make them stateless persons, or to forswear allegiance to the United States, which would make them disloyal persons.
4. No trouble was expected in the registration by the Administration officials, nor in fact was the registration form built in any way to conflict with ideals and beliefs of the evacuees in the Relocation Centers. It was only on presentation of the form itself, the perusal of the form by evacuees, that aroused a resentment at its presentation. In short, the very way in which the form itself was drawn up brought about a feeling of indignation.
5. There was a confusion in the minds of the Nisei with regard to registration and to induction in the minds of many evacuees the two were identical. They raised the issue, therefore, that compliance with registration would necessitate their leaving the project. In other words, registration is tantamount to enlistment, and by enlisting their parents would be without care.
6. Many Nissei felt that they could not register until their civil rights which had been taken from them were restored. They frequently offered as an excuse for registration that they were not being ~~are~~ treated like citizens of the United States and, therefore, could not be required to assume the obligations of the citizens. Their non-registration was a protest against their current treatment.
7. Many people were subject to strong pressure. There was pressure from family groups, and actual threats of physical intimidation from Kibei gangs. As an illustration of the strong family pressure, Billigmeier tells a story of the person who refused to register at Tule Lake because of parental objection, but requested that he be transferred to another Center so that he might enlist and enter the army immediately.
8. Many Issei regarded completion of the leave registration as meaning that they would <sup>be</sup> move from the camp whether they wanted to go or not. At Tule Lake all the newspaper publicity given to correcting this apprehension was unsuccessful.



9. Some people in the community were so angered by the method with which registration was presented that they simply would have nothing to do with it.
10. All the above points to the central fact that the administration erred in the presentation of the program. It was an error to combine registration for volunteering with leave clearance.
11. It was an error to rush the registration once it was announced.
12. It was an error not to institute an intensive program of education and propaganda to explain fully the purposes of the registration and the real issues involved.
13. This error in turn rested on the lack of foresight by the planning authorities, who had not contemplated that there would be any opposition to the program.
14. Many people had an intense dislike of the WRA, confusing it with the FBI, Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence and the government in general. All of these people were labeled "disloyal" and definitely anti-American. There is no doubt that a part of them are disloyal and anti-American. On the other hand, a proportion of them were not dealing in ideologies but rather on the basis of their disagreeable relations with WRA personalities and programs, and the evacuation in general.

We have seen that there were two types of protest and that, roughly, the same reasons produced both protests. Now the problem is to analyze the difference in significance, if any, of the protest.

Simple common-sense analysis might hold that complete non-registration demonstrated a less fundamental belief. ~~That~~ <sup>Now</sup> "no" answers <sup>a</sup> ~~a less well established opinion.~~ This might seem a feasible contention because complete non-registration is a negative act.. It simply means lack of activity, and a postponement of responsibility. However, answering "no" to questions 27 and 28 might mean that a positive decision had not been made with regard to matters of loyalty and that a conscious and deliberate decision had not been made to refuse to serve in the armed forces of the United States and to



forswear allegiance to the Japanese Emperor. *9* This is an oversimple dichotomy. Definition must be made between the situation in two camps. In Tule Lake, answering "no" to questions 27 and 28 on the registration form represented *pure* compliance with WRA orders to register. Those who opposed registration were severely critical of anyone, even if they answered questions 27 and 28 in the negative. It is perhaps true that in Tule Lake refusal to register represented a greater distrust and a more fundamental opposition to the WRA than did negative answers on the two questions. To the evacuees, the WRA administration is the United States government, and neither evacuees nor the administrative officials made any distinction between the United States government, as represented by the WRA, and the United States government as a whole. This is an added indication that refusal to obey at all the edict to register represents more fundamental opposition than simply "no" answers. This situation, while true at Tule Lake, did not appear at Gila, even though the same concerted opposition to registration manifested itself through various groups. In the presentation of the registration at Gila the necessity for every individual to register on a compulsory basis was repeatedly emphasized. At the start the matter of registration was presented in such a way as to make the matter appear most necessary that it apparently never occurred to any member of groups of the community to refuse to register. It would appear that at Tule Lake a presentation of this kind, although given and emphasized, did not take the same hold on the community as at Gila. Therefore, a dual situation arises. Refusal to register at Tule Lake, with considerable pressure being leveled against the very act of registration, but at Gila no resistance to registration as such but protest



and a resistance to answering questions 27 and 28 according to the issue of loyalty as specified by WRA officials.

It may be stated in viewing the above remarks that, with this definition of emphasis as it appears in two separate Relocation Centers, Tule Lake offers a far more complex situation. At Gila, with complete registration, the final percentage of negative answers to questions 27 and 28 ran to about 20% of the population. These answers were given oftentimes, as has been mentioned above, in terms of protest. At Tule Lake it has been pointed out that the very act of registration was considered to be an indication of some willingness to cooperate with the administration and was, therefore, anathema. Yet at Tule Lake this situation is evident, <sup>that</sup> ~~with~~ a large percentage of negative answers shows to a certain extent a situation analagous to that of Gila. A situation which is complicated by the refusal of so many to register. A statistical analysis of a number of those at Tule Lake answering in the negative should be given in order more clearly to elicit the differences between failure to register and failure to make favorable expression on the loyalty issue.

We conclude that the common sense evaluation of significance is not a satisfactory one. We further conclude that without further data, especially of a statistical nature, no accurate evaluation of the significance of the different types of protest can be made. Finally, without a very wide case study, it doesn't seem possible to isolate the various causes that resulted in the protest. Above all, it is not possible to say whether the protest was caused by (a) actual disloyalty, or (b) simple disgust with WRA regulations and Center conditions.

Some attention should be paid to the matter of various sources



of resistance to registration which manifest themselves in both of these communities. Some attention has already been paid to this matter at Gila in view of the formalized development there. This information and group analysis is more difficult to elicit at Tule Lake, but it is understood that such information may be forthcoming.

Grodzins: In Billigmeier's registration report he indicates that the evacuee self-government broke down almost completely as a result of the conflicts caused by the registration issue. He shows how the self-governing bodies in the end were distrusted by both the evacuees and the administrative officials. As a political scientist, it would seem to me that the most feasible method in the first place, in selling registration to the evacuees, would be through the permanently established institutions of the evacuees themselves.

Billigmeier: The leaders in the community governing bodies felt this to be true. It was their feeling that they could aid the WRA in presenting the program to the people and they should have been consulted. In effecting the program, however, the Project Director did not ask their advice nor did he use them as an instrument to effect the program until reaction to the registration program had become serious. As a matter of fact, the Project Director refused to accept the advice and cooperation extended by representatives of the civic organizations. When resistance became serious, he asked them to take a strong stand in favor of registration in face of the growing opposition on the part of members of the community. The opposition was so developed by this time that the civic organizations felt that the most definite stand they could take under the circumstances was an individual affair, a matter of individual decision.



However, the project administration was not satisfied with this. The Project Director felt that the civic organizations should take a strong stand on the question. He felt that if they did not take this stand, they were failing in their functions. The Project Director contended that the civic organizations were only willing to take a strong stand in favor of the people against the administration and never manifest<sup>ed</sup> any willingness to take a strong stand for the administration against the people. Finally, the Project Director felt that instead of being a useful organization, the civic bodies were real focal points in opposition to registration, so that these bodies became useless. They decided then to resign in the face of opposition from both the people of the community and the administration. It wasn't until later that the administration realized that the civic organizations were not focal points in opposition to registration. Later, too, some members of the administrative staff expressed strong feelings against said civic organizations, against using them as tools of the WRA or devices to effect WRA policy.

Grodzins: Actually, it seems to me that here is another good example of poor administration. First, the Tule Lake officials ignored the natural selling agents for registration, and later the officials tried to use the bodies as if they were set up as administrative organs rather than as independent units.

SPENCER: At Gila, on the other hand, the Temporary Community Council had long ~~xxx~~ failed in influence, so that at the time of registration the Council maintained complete silence. Attempts were made to some extent to make use of the central block managers



office in both camps as a means of propagandizing registration. In Canal this failed because of the lack of power attaching itself to the central block managers office, while at Butte, although block managers were called in by project officials from time to time during the course of registration, they were unwilling to express themselves on this particular issue or to swing block sentiment one way or the other. The block managers at Gila were the only organization ~~of~~ and by the people which might have been used by the administration to aid in the registration program. This failed because the block managers, as a whole, choose to remain neutral. <sup>96 Nov 1945</sup> In summation, any attempt to make use of evacuee legislative bodies by the administration for this measure was completely unsuccessful. The failure of the administration to use community self-government at Tule Lake was a mistake, we said, nevertheless, the comparative success of registration at Gila, without the use of the community self-government, indicates that the failure to use self-government at Tule Lake was only a contributing factor to the total failure there.

On Page 92 of Billigmeier's report, the incident is recorded where Jacoby drives into the community to make an arrest. The victims are saved when fellow-evacuees slash the tires of Jacoby's car, and he retires in defeat. This seems to me to indicate (1) the lack of efficiency in law enforcement procedures, and (2) the low esteem in which law enforcement officers was held by members of the community.

BILL 161 Jacoby was faced with this problem: these people were on the list made out by the Project Director. They had to be apprehended.



Jacoby was faced with the alternative of apprehending these people by force or apprehending them himself without armed assistance. If he took the former course, the same community repercussions could be expected as those which occurred when the 35 boys from block 42 were picked up. This demonstration of armed force added to the difficulty in effecting the registration program. It was Jacoby's ideas that such displays of force should be kept to the minimum. In the incident in which Jacoby went to apprehend several individuals and failed because of block demonstrations, he returned that night and made the arrests which he had failed to do previously, but he did this without show of armed force. This does not indicate any fundamental weakness in law enforcement procedures. Rather, it only indicates that Jacoby wanted, above anything else, to avoid provoking an incident in which he himself might have been attacked and consequently eliminated as the moderate factor among the administrative officials.

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In summary, the picture of the administration of registration is a picture of a succession of blunders.

A. In Washington:

1. The lack of knowledge regarding community life and the failure to anticipate any negative reaction to the three registrations.
2. Combining the registrations.
3. Muddling the matter of sanctions and the entire matter of the registrations relation to the Selective Service system.
4. The lack of adequate instructions to the Projects.
5. The withholding of essential information to the projects.



6. Rushing the entire matter.
7. Not planning an intensive program of education.

B. On the Project:

1. Failure to consult with the leaders of the civic organizations and with these bodies themselves.
2. Failure to consult with those members of the administrative staff who have the widest contact with the evacuees and the best understanding of their psychology, and who are most trusted and respected by the evacuees.
3. The Project Director's ignorance with respect to educational media and propaganda techniques.
4. Failure to allow a sufficient time lag between the announcement and the execution.
5. The failure, again, to anticipate questions and problems, and the subsequent failure to have ready answers.
6. Holding the registration in the blocks which maximized the effectiveness of the opposition pressure.
7. The anger of the officials in charge at opposition, and their refusal to understand the reasons for the opposition in terms other than loyalty.
8. The procrastination of the Project Director in getting additional data from Washington to meet the issues and the consequent "snow-balling" of grievances as this issue dragged.
9. The failure of the administration officials to understand the cumulative character of the grievances which resulted in the failure of the opposing sides to achieve a common ground for negotiation and settlement.
10. The premature use of armed force in apprehending individuals, which aggravated the opposition and caused additional opposition which, itself, merged with the original opposition to the registration, but which was never separated from the original opposition by the administration.
11. The misapprehension that the arrest of a few "sub rosa individuals" would stop the opposition.
12. The general distrust of all evacuees by the administration, which naturally resulted in further resentment and lack of cooperation. This distrust of the Nisei alienated the administration's most active potential supporters.
13. The insistence of the Project Director on the point that the test of one's true loyalty was his willingness to inform upon other evacuees. This test is by no means a fair one, and resulted in further resentment.

*all blocks together*



14. The conception of the Project officials that loyalty was an absolute and almost a biological matter. This primitive view in terms of white and black, entirely overlooked the facts that the issue was clouded by many factors entirely irrelevant to one's loyalty; emotional factors, family considerations, fear of physical reprisals, etc. Even to the evacuees, the stating of loyalty was a confused matter, and one dependent upon many non-intellectual and circumstantial factors.



Billigmeier and Grodzins:

With reference to the trials of those who did not register.

First, they were taken to the CCC camp at Merrill.

Second, they were interviewed individually by the project attorney or by Kent Silverthorn to determine reasons for not registering and also to determine how active the individual's opposition to registration had been. (records kept of this interview but not available.)

Third, trials were held at Tule Lake, those people considered most dangerous (on the basis of the interviews and other evidence) being tried first, thus to relieve the pressure on the less dangerous people at the CCC camp. At these trials, they were asked to plead guilty or not guilty to one or both of the charges that were preferred. If they pleaded guilty, they were tried immediately and sentences were immediately imposed. (We have the transcripts of the biggest part of these trials. Others not available.) Those considered the worst offenders were given ninety-day sentences and sent to Moab. Those who received lighter sentences were sent back to the CCC camp to serve out their time. Many (number unknown) who were sent to Moab have since been turned over to the FBI.

Fourth, when an individual pleaded NOT GUILTY, a date for a trial was set two weeks to a month in the future and he was sent back to the CCC camp to await trial. Most of the people when brought back for their second trial pleaded GUILTY. The secretary to the Project Attorney made the statement that, if they had not pleaded guilty at the second trial, they would have had a third trial set ---



again a month in the future. Billigmeier thinks that the Tule Lake administration did not want to hold trials for those pleading guilty. B. thinks that they are not at all sure about their procedure and, in any case, evidence against those pleading Not Guilty would be difficult if not impossible to obtain from the community. B. thinks, furthermore, that the administration is afraid that the Civil Liberties Union might become interested in the cases.

Grodzins thinks the administration has good reason to worry about the ACLU. Nothing more violates American principles of legal and governmental theory than this procedure where the WRA, an administrative body, does its own legislation (orders registration), its own policing (removes recalcitrants to the CCC camp), and stands as its own court --- the said court being presided over by the chief administrator, the only lawyer present being one of those who participated in the policing, and the defendant having neither an attorney of his own nor one appointed by the Court. Billigmeier notes that the only advice given to the defendant was by a translator.

Billigmeier: Since the trials have been held, the WRA is faced now with the next problem, i.e. the imposition of penalties on those individuals in the community who were not apprehended but who (1) have not yet complied with the registration regulations, and (2) those who registered after the time specified. There are an estimated four or five hundred male citizens who have failed to register. There is a much larger number of female citizens and aliens who have not complied with the orders to register.



During the beginning days of the registration, people in the community were told that the registration of male citizens was a Selective Service order, despite the fact that the male citizens had already registered -- most of them before evacuation. The people were informed that the registration was authorized by Selective Service and that hence those individuals who refused to comply would be subject to the long terms of imprisonment and heavy fines imposed by Selective Service authorities as provided by law. In the face of these promised penalties, however, a large number of male citizens were willing to take a firm stand against registering.

The WRA now cannot impose the penalties promised male citizens for not registering. Inasmuch as the Selective Service Authorities failed to issue an order covering the re-registration, that agency cannot impose any penalties. Therefore, the most severe penalties that non-registrants can face are those which the WRA is entitled to mete out. People cannot be tried for anything else but failure to comply with the orders of the Project Director and NOT FOR FAILURE TO FOLLOW SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS. This being so, non-registrants, male, female, alien and citizen, have been guilty of violating the same thing, i.e. the instructions of the Project Director to register. Therefore, it would be hard for the WRA to impose different sentences upon the male citizens who refused to register and the female citizens and aliens who refused to comply. There are some individuals who feel that a heavier penalty be imposed on the former group because they refused to register in the face of the severe penalties which were promised them, while the latter group refused to register only in the face of the instructions of the



project director. The individuals feel that the crime of the former group is more serious and that it represents the intent to oppose the expressed will of the United States Army.

Thus the WRA is faced with the problem of what group or groups should suffer penalty for non-registration and whether differential treatment should be provided for.

The most serious penalties which the WRA can impose are outlined in ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 85. Individuals disobeying the instructions of the Project Director can be arraigned before the Project Director and sentenced to a maximum incarceration of 90 days. The individual may also be deprived of certain WRA payments, e.g. clothing allowance, for a definitely specified time. These singly or in combination are the maximum penalties which can be imposed.

It is impossible, however, to administer the maximum penalties even if the project administration so desired. There is no available place in which the 1,500 or more non-registrants could be kept for three months. The Isolation Camp is being turned into a camp for Conscientious Objectors, and the WRA at Tule Lake has had to rent space in the Klamath jail. This space is obviously inadequate to permit the isolation of such a large number of individuals, or even of the male citizens who refused to register if differential penalties are imposed.

This means that isolation of non-registrants is out of the question. The only alternatives are the application of such measures as depriving individuals of WRA payments, preventing resettlement of these individuals, and terminating their employment.



Mr. Coverley, following the suggestions included in the report submitted to Dillon Myer by Mayeda, Ogi, and Father Dai, called in a group of evacuee leaders to consult on the question of imposing penalties.

Mayeda, Ogi, Dai, Ikeda and others called upon Fleming, Elber-son, Carter and I to discuss this matter with them before these leaders presented suggestions to the Project Director.

It was my point that the contrast was so great between the penalties promised male citizens who failed to register and those penalties which actually could be bestowed that it bordered on the ridiculous. After all, a term of from ten to twenty years in a federal prison and the imposition of a ten thousand dollar fine is substantially more than being deprived of a clothing allowance for three months. It is certain that the WRA has suffered seriously in the crisis, and that trust and confidence in that agency has decreased further. It is likewise certain that the WRA will not be taken seriously when it promises penalties for future infractions of the instructions of the Project Director. The WRA will NOT gain any respect for its orders and regulations by prescribing token penalties which are ridiculous in comparison with those promised. By prescribing such mild penalties further attention will be directed towards the whole situation -- publicize the ineffectuality of the WRA. It is certain that the WRA will lose or has lost in this matter, and that the lesser of several evils must be determined.

Don Elberson lent his support to this position, and after further clarification, it was generally agreed upon. The group of evacuee leaders and Caucasian conferees took a further step, and in this I am not sure I concur.



They felt that the WRA should openly admit the difficulties they faced in the registration program. The Project Director should inform the evacuee public that in the beginning the WRA had believed that the Selective Service authorities had issued orders for re-registration of male citizens, and that promised penalties were made in good faith. The Project Director should, they feel, tell the people that somehow the government failed to issue such a covering order and consequently the penalties for non-compliance with Selective Service regulations are not applicable to non-registrants at Tule Lake.

I do not know to what extent WRA really got mixed up with the Selective Service authorities. It is apparent that Major Marshall, when he arrived at the Project, believed that an order covering re-registration was in existence. According to the Project Attorney, Major Marshall was asked if he was sure the order had been issued. The Major contacted Washington to clarify this point and it was determined that such an order had not been made by the Selective Service authorities. This, of course, plunged the WRA into a number of serious difficulties. They were exceedingly embarrassed having promised several definite penalties for not complying with the registration program and suddenly realized these penalties could not be applied.



Billigmeier: It wasn't until the registration crisis became rather serious that Dr. Jacoby was called to consult with the Project Director. Before that time, the responsibility for planning the registration program rested with Frank Smith as Chief of the Division of Housing and Employment, with Mr. Coverley and with the Assistant Project Director, Joe Hayes. Dr. Jacoby is very cautious in his statements with regard to the role played by the three men mentioned above. He feels that Mr. Smith was not a capable enough person to participate in the planning of such a program. Dr. Jacoby isn't as critical of the Project Director, in his conduct of the registration program, as are some of the other liberal members of the appointed personnel, such as Elberson, Carter and others. He feels at least part of the responsibility for the difficulties encountered are due to the Washington office of the WRA. He also feels that Mr. Coverley lacked experience in dealing with the evacuee people, and that this inexperience was partly responsible for the difficulties he had in solving the problems arising out of the registration.

With regard to Mr. Hayes, Dr. Jacoby again is less critical of him in the role that he played in the registration than are people on the staff like Fleming, Elberson, Carter and so forth. It seems that Hayes, though not an especially competent man, recognized early in the crisis that Dr. Jacoby had a deep understanding of the people in the community. Hayes was willing and anxious that Jacoby be consulted in effecting the registration program and, furthermore, backed him up on several occasions in the positions that Dr. Jacoby took relative to the registration program and the difficulty arising therefrom. I can't give any concrete evidence of this, because Dr. Jacoby is very cautious of



expressing criticisms of other members of the staff, or of revealing information which he considers to be of a confidential nature. The evidence that we have on the statements made above, can be considered reliable, even though they can't be substantiated in concrete form.

Though Coverley insisted on playing the dominant role in conducting the registration, Jacoby's voice was sometimes listened to. It was Jacoby who cautioned in the early days of the registration against the declaration of martial law. It was Jacoby, also, who put the brake on the Project Director in his desire to use informers, to use force in apprehending evacuees who were considered instrumental in opposing registration. It is probable that Jacoby's caution was instrumental in preventing such acts as the use of the military in apprehending the 35 young men from block 42. The strongest opposition to the caution and careful consideration employed by Jacoby came from the Project Attorney, Anthony O'Brien. In back of O'Brien were people like Ralph Peck, the Chief Steward, who, although not directly concerned with the registration, freely expressed opposition to what he thought was leniency and coddling on the part of Jacoby. The registration crisis widened the gap between Jacoby and O'Brien. They had always been more or less antagonistic to each other, but the registration crisis increased the antagonism between these two. To O'Brien, the registration was a good indication of the loyalty of individual evacuees. In addition, he has the feeling that anyone at all sympathetic with Japan, or anyone whose sympathies are not definitely attached to the United States, is subversive, and should be segregated. Dr. Jacoby, on the other hand, did not feel that the registration constituted



a good test of loyalty. He feels that the program wasn't carefully enough presented to the people to constitute such a test. He feels that the manner in which the WRA had effected the program was so faulty that in assuming registration was a test of allegiance, a great number of wrong conclusions would be drawn. Coverley and Hayes represented a position somewhere in between that of Jacoby and that of O'Brien and other extremists.

Dr. Jacoby expressed gratitude for the support that he got from Hayes and Coverley. After the registration program, however, he decided to quit his position as Chief of Internal Security because it had become too much the work of a policeman and he felt he could no longer be true to his principles and remain in that position. Mr. Coverley offered him the position of Chief of the Division of Community Services to succeed Mr. Fleming. The Civil Service Commission would not allow the position to be extended to Jacoby for it represented a jump of two grades in civil service ratings. Jacoby was, therefore, determined to resign and made definite preparations to leave. There was a considerable movement among the community, led by such community leaders as Harry Mayeda, Father Dai, Mr. Ikeda and Dr. Ichishashi. Leaders of various positions started petitions to keep Jacoby. The wardens started the petitions which were circulated to the effect that Dr. Jacoby should be kept at Tule Lake in his present capacity or in another capacity that could be devised for him. In other words, there was a strong community reaction in favor of Jacoby which is a high recommendation of him as Chief of Internal Security. He was forced to assume in the registration a role which was distinctly not to his liking. He had to apprehend, question, and dispose of individuals who would not



comply with the registration program.

Visiting delegations came to Dr. Jacoby on hearing he was planning to leave the community and told him that they appreciated the fact that he was a man of principle and they realized the job of Chief of Internal Security wasn't the kind which he would prefer, and that he should at the same time consider what difficulties might arise if someone less sympathetic than he was put in that position. They also stressed their appreciation of the role he had played in softening the effects of the registration program on the people. Dr. Jacoby finally decided to remain in his position. However, his position now is somewhat altered. In the first place, it is obvious to the Project Director that Jacoby has a strong evacuee backing behind him. Jacoby's position will be much more independent than it has been in the past. He will feel freer to take a strong position against all opposition for he no longer fears losing his job, as he has faced that possibility and has taken a new attitude to his position, an attitude of greater independence. It is still a possibility that some device might be worked out which will enable Jacoby to succeed Fleming when he leaves in mid-June.