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QUARTERLY REPORT

Activities of Community Analysis Section
April through June, 1943

During this quarter, the Community Analysis Section was chiefly concerned with two problems: (1) the analysis and utilization of the experience of registration, and (2) the organizing of Community Analysis at the projects.

A detailed analysis of the conditions surrounding registration and the effects of the registration program on the people of the centers was made by the Washington staff. A summary of this study was issued as a confidential document on June 25. Many of the findings in this report had been previously presented in various committee discussions of registration during March and April. An example of this use of the material is a memorandum of April 26 from the Section to Mr. Provinse which discussed the results of registration.

Community Analysis sections had been established at all but one project by the end of the quarter. Analysts were appointed with the approval of the project directors for the following centers:

Gila River	James Barnett	April 5
Jerome	Edgar McVoy	April 13
Heart Mountain	Forrest LaViolette	May 3
Central Utah	Weston LaBarre	May 12
Granada	John Rademaker	May 13
Tule Lake	Marvin Opler	May 24

James Barnett resigned on May 11 due to illness but was replaced by Gordon Brown on June 18. Thus by the end of June, there were analysts at nine projects (including Poston), Minidoka and Manzanar having been provided with analysts during the preceding quarter.

During the quarter the general purpose of Community Analysis came to be pretty well understood at most of the projects; the registration results indicated once again the need for first-hand, up-to-date analysis as a guide to project administration. The men selected as field analysts had anthropological or sociological training, and most had a year or more of field experience. With one exception, they all succeeded in adapting themselves to their jobs, producing in a fairly short time results of use both to the local project administrators and to the Analysis Section in Washington. The latter was able to synthesize the material which came to it for the benefit of the Washington staff.

Two general reports were issued during this quarter:

No. 4	<u>Notes on Japanese Holidays</u>	April 2, 1943
No. 5	<u>Evacuee Resistances to Relocation</u>	June, 1943

This last report was based on material presented by John Embree to the May

Project Directors' meeting in Washington.

In April a new series of reports based on materials from the various projects was established. This series was designed for distribution to Community Management chiefs, Project Directors and others interested as a means of informing them concerning social developments and problems at other centers. Two early reports on registration at Topaz and Granada were listed as Nos. 1 and 2, and a third report on the same subject from Manzanar became report No. 3 in this Project Analysis Series. Others issued were:

- No. 4 The Fence at Minidoka, April, 1943
- No. 5 Preliminary Evaluation of the Resettlement Program at Jerome Relocation Center, May 1943
- No. 6 Report on an Unorganized Relocation Center (Government at Minidoka), June, 1943
- No. 7 Notes on Some Religious Cults at Topaz, June 15, 1943
- No. 8 Factors Influencing Low Enrollment in Certain Adult Education Courses, June 16, 1943
- No. 9 Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement at the Tule Lake Relocation Center, June 23, 1943

The Section also carried out some research on Japanese social organization in order to assist the Director in his dealings with the Dies Committee, and work was begun on compiling the available data on conditions at the assembly centers.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1943

I. The Work of the Section.

Prior to July, 1943, foundations had been laid at all projects except Rohwer for the carrying out of Community Analysis. The Department of Interior had sponsored social analysis at Poston since June, 1942. At the other eight projects, the WRA, beginning in March, 1943, had established analysts. However, during the ensuing six months some analysts left and replacements were made with difficulty. Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain, Poston, and Topaz had analysts in residence during only portions of the period. Thus only five projects -- Manzanar, Minidoka, Tule Lake, Granada, and Gila -- functioned ^{Throughout} ~~adequately~~ insofar as Community Analysis was concerned.

Segregation. The analysts were put to work immediately on the major new program of the period -- segregation of the non-loyal. They were asked to estimate the "Probable Effects of Segregation", and five careful studies were prepared. The burden of these was that evacuees had long expected the move and were already psychologically prepared for it, that it would affect relatively small proportions of people in each center, and that it would occasion no serious trouble or unrest in the relocation centers. The influence of family ties, of bitterness over evacuation, and of desires not to have to move again during the war were, however, pointed out as factors which could be expected to affect many people in such a way that the ostensible purpose of segregation -- separation of loyal and disloyal -- would not be achieved.

These predictions were given currency among the Washington staff and at the pre-segregation conference in Denver. The fact that analysts agreed on the probable peacefulness of the process was pointed to hopefully, although probably not fully believed in by the administrators. The Washington Analysis staff worked closely with other Washington staff in the formulating and writing of the Segregation Manual setting forth the procedures for carrying out the program.

During the process of segregation the analysts were enlisted to make weekly reports of the developments on their projects -- chiefly in regard to evacuee reactions to the procedures. Five of the analysts reported regularly in this fashion and helped to keep the Washington staff abreast of the program -- which moved forward with uniform smoothness. Only one significant development not fully foreseen in the Segregation Manual was isolated by an analyst in his weekly reports. That was the problem of integrating the Tuleans smoothly as they came to other projects. The need for attention to this was pointed out by de Young at Minidoka, and his recommendations (although little heeded at first at his project) became the basis for later advices from the Washington office to the projects. The weekly reports of the analysts formed the basis for a general Community Analysis report on the segregation procedures issued in October. This report emphasized the importance of evacuee participation as a factor in smooth execution of the program.

With one exception, there was a notable lack in the analysts' predictions concerning the effects of segregation. They viewed the

process in terms of its effects on the centers in which they were working, exclusively. The analyst at Tule Lake alone made an effort to envisage the problems which the segregation center itself would present. This was natural, in view of the fact that Tule Lake was to be the segregation center. He predicted "riots, passive resistance," and a general tendency of Tuleans to declare themselves disloyal on paper in order to remain in what evacuees generally regarded as one of the best centers. The analyst recommended that some other center be chosen for segregation. Neither the Tule Lake analyst or any other attempted to foresee in detail the problems which the new social aggregation of segregees would present. It is true that studies were suggested from Washington and carried out by four analysts of the nature of certain groups of segregees. Rather full descriptions of family compositions and attitudes of repatriates were presented in these studies. But no attempts were made to envisage the fitting together of the repatriates, expatriates, "No" answerers etc., in the new community. This lack reflected some serious deficiencies in the analysts' approaches: (1) a preoccupation with the norms in the communities in which they were working, (2) a lack of acquaintance with the extremist types of persons to be concentrated in the segregation center, and (3) insufficient knowledge of the history of social organization and disorganization in the assembly and relocation centers.

Morris Opler at Manzanar pursued the study of various groups of segregees in exhaustive detail. He produced statistical and attitudinal analyses of repatriates, Nisei without foreign travel, Kibei, etc., which for the first time began to provide a satisfactory picture of the relative importance of various sentiment systems among the evacuee population. Although little attention was paid to these reports on the

project, they were utilized increasingly in the Washington office as a basis for determining policy for the segregation center. What they did chiefly was to point out the minor importance of concepts of "loyalty" to any country in the decisions of the segregates to go to Tule Lake, and to emphasize the much greater importance of family considerations and economic opportunities in the future.

The analyst at Tule Lake was utilized extensively by the new project director during the process of segregation. He prepared speeches for the director to the evacuees, advised on methods of conveying segregation information to the evacuees and means of circumventing the crystallization of any general evacuee opposition to the movement, and just prior to the incident prepared at the project director's request a series of studies of Issei, Kibei, and Nisei remaining from the old Tule Lake population. At the same time he reported regularly on the signs of unrest which began to develop in the center as the newcomers arrived. His recommendation that the evacuee committee which formed just before the incident be formally recognized and dealt with was not accepted as feasible.

Immediately after the incident the Washington analyst went to Tule Lake and, working with the Tule analyst and the Reports Division, documented the events. The background and other material thus gathered during the month of November was immediately relayed to Washington where it was utilized by the Reports Division in preparing data for the use of the Director in his appearances before the Dies Committee in December, 1943. The analysis of the incident was not completed and issued as a Community Analysis report until March, 1944. The Tule Lake

analyst instituted a series of news letters to Washington in which he recorded in detail the political and social developments there under Army occupation. These were utilized by Washington staff as well as project staff in keeping abreast of the rapidly shifting scene at Tule Lake. The Tule Lake analyst in addition took a prominent part in the formulation of plans for community government in the segregation center.

Relocation. Prior to July, the analysts at Tule Lake, Jerome, Minidoka, and Manzanar had been asked to make surveys of evacuee attitudes toward relocation. The results of their studies were incorporated into a general report on the subject in June. They were asked to continue their observations on this subject during the next six months. Two reports probing somewhat deeper than the preliminary ones were prepared during the period by the Granada and Topaz analysts. Both of these stressed the solidity of the Issei determination not to relocate, recommended the importance of devising methods of group relocation, and pointed out the need for eliminating anything that could be considered "forced" relocation. Both reports were given extensive study by the Relocation Division and the Granada report was given wide circulation on the projects and among relocation officers. In addition, some brief analyses of the effects of specific events inside and outside the centers on relocation were carried out by most analysts at the suggestion of the Washington office. These did little more than to make clear that the major influences on numbers relocating each month were, first and most important, the seasons of the year and, second, outbursts of anti-Japanese feeling which caused minor recessions probably in the numbers

relocating. Analysts' predictions that segregation would temporarily slow down rather than speed up relocation in the main held true.

At the time the Relocation Division was set up in the fall, the Washington analyst participated in the general policy meetings which guided the Division's later activities. Plans were laid at this time for the cooperation of the project analysts with the family counsellors in the provision of background material and also the interpretation of the data yielded by the counselling interviews.

A new line of activity was begun in October, when John de Young was detailed from Minidoka to make a study of resettler adjustment in Denver and vicinity. A month's study resulted in a sketch of the problems of social integration of the evacuees in the area both in connection with the previous Japanese population and the majority group. This study, conducted too hurriedly, yielded little of value. It suggested that there might be real need of an analyst attached permanently to a relocation office, where like a project analyst, he would be in closer touch with the current problems of the WRA administrator. With this in mind the possibilities of utilizing the research materials on resettlement of the University of California staff in Chicago were explored. The California research workers agreed to make their findings available and to prepare a report with the advice of the Chicago Relocation Office for the use of WRA. In December the Washington staff began a study of relocation in the Washington area.

The Relocation Centers. A number of special studies were carried out at the suggestion of the Washington office which were aimed directly at aiding in the formulation of policies of center management. There

were four of these on which most of the analysts responded: (1) private enterprises, (2) the integration of Tuleans, (3) out-groups, and (4) Issei leadership. The first of these on the nature of, extent of, and attitudes toward private enterprises led to a memorandum prepared in the Washington office which contained the recommendations that private enterprises be re-defined in the administrative instruction to exclude private instruction and that the councils be empowered to license. This study was utilized in writing policy on private enterprises. The studies of integration of Tuleans were not completed until the next period, as was also true of the studies of Issei leadership. The studies of out-groups which it was supposed would contribute to an understanding of factionalism and dissensions on the projects, met with little response from the analysts, and the reports which did come in revealed nothing of value.

Besides these special studies which analysts were requested to carry out for the purpose of providing comparative data, there were numerous studies of specific problems on particular centers. Some of the most important of these may be selected as follows:

Heart Mountain:

1. Analysis of the hospital walk-out
2. The split in the Buddhist Church
3. The work of the Charter Commission

Minidoka:

1. Studies of Community Government
2. Attitudes towards the hospital
3. The first boilermen's dispute

Topaz:

1. Analysis of employment practices
2. Role of the Community Council

Tule Lake:

1. Reactions to opening of Council to Issei
2. The Kibel problem

Jerome:

1. Studies of wood crew difficulties

Rohwer:

1. The communication of information

The attention of analysts was directed during the period to two major sets of problems: (a) project employment, and (b) community organization. The most extended studies bearing directly on current problems were generally on these subjects.

Background Studies. All the analysts carried on to some extent brief study of the cultural background of the evacuees. The most notable contributions in this respect came, however, from just two centers -- Manzanar and Minidoka. John de Young produced a steady stream of short reports on details of life in the Minidoka Center -- social dances, funerals, theatricals, meetings of various kinds, slang and language, children's play, etc. His reports constitute the most extensive record we have of the minutiae of daily life in the relocation centers. Together with McVoy's psychological study of the "Effects of Center Life" from Jerome, they provide a picture of considerable value for the social historian of Evacuation and Resettlement.

Morris Opler of Manzanar worked on the background of evacuees in a different manner. He reported very little of current happenings. He worked more like an old-fashioned ethnologist, obtaining great masses of material on the pre-evacuation life of the Japanese. He also gathered

numerous accounts of the evacuation itself. His richest material probably consists of life stories and autobiographies which he collected also in considerable numbers. This material is fundamental for an understanding of the various attitudes which crystallized during evacuation, registration, and segregation. In the Washington office some contribution was also made to this type of background analysis through Anne Freed's study of the assembly centers, carried out during this period.

II. Problems of the Section.

Aside from the somewhat mechanical problems of keeping and securing personnel, the major problems of Community Analysis might be discussed under the general heads of (1) working relationships, (2) communication, (3) utilization of materials, and (4) reliability of data. These problems are of course pretty much merely different facets of a few basic problems involved in the application of social science to any administrative program.

Working Relationships. A major problem throughout the period under discussion proved to be the delineation of function of the project analysts. The administrators with whom they were working had not had previous experience with social science advisers on their staffs. The analysts themselves were, with one exception, without experience in the direct application of social analysis to a current administrative program. A formal working relationship between analysts and administrators had been roughly defined during the previous three months when the Community Analysis Section was being established in the WRA. In the absence of experience on both sides, however, it could not be expected

that this would be sufficient to establish the framework within which each analyst would actually work. Both the analysts and the administrators found it necessary to feel their way to a satisfactory adjustment.

Thus at Gila, Gordon Brown was almost completely immobilized so far as Community Analysis was concerned from July through October. This arose out of several conditions: (a) the inadequacy of personnel (felt on all projects) for carrying out the emergency program of segregation, (b) a lack of conviction on the part of the project director and other administrators that Community Analysis as such had anything to contribute, and (c) the feeling of the analyst that he must conform to the administrators' conception of his role in order to lay the foundation for real Community Analysis work. The result at Gila was the establishment of good personal relations between analyst and administrators, the acquisition of a working knowledge of operations problems by the analyst, and a complete failure to record or analyze community reactions to the process of segregation. Brown's acceptance of operations duties demonstrated ^{very conclusively} the disadvantage of trying to combine operations and Community Analysis ~~very conclusively~~.

About the same time another type of misinterpretation of the analyst's function became apparent at Granada. Here the analyst was assigned by the project director to make an investigation of a dispute between individual evacuees. The investigation involved collecting information concerning particular persons for the purpose of assigning blame in the case. This was obviously the province of Internal Security and perhaps of Social Welfare. It was the sort of assignment which

if persisted in would affect the analyst adversely in two ways. It would consume his time in investigations of sort which other sections were designed to carry out and it would injure his relations with evacuees insofar as he would be regarded as a criminal investigator.

The developments at these two projects indicated the most usual misconceptions in regard to Community Analysis on the part of administrators: (a) that it constituted a type of work not really necessary or at least wholly subordinate to all other kinds of work, and (b) that the analyst's training fitted him for individual investigatory work which was recognized as a necessary part of Community Management. Accordingly, an emergency instruction was issued from the Washington office defining anew the analyst's function, emphasizing the need for freedom from operations duties of any kind, and especially of those connected with individual investigation. This was later incorporated into the administrative handbook. It probably had some immediate effect, most notably at Gila, where the analyst reported shortly afterward that he had been "left severely alone" for several weeks after the receipt of the letter.

However, it became evident that such an instruction was of minor importance in establishing working relationships. At Gila and Granada the analysts continued to engage in operations duties, working closely with certain staff members and producing very little in the way of written reports. At both projects there continued to be little response to suggestions from Washington and generally poor communication between the projects and Washington. Nevertheless, it was clear that the analysts were valued members of the staffs at both projects and that through oral communication and intimate participation were injecting

their points of view as social scientists into project policies. They were having, despite their "unproductiveness" from the Washington point of view, as much effect on their projects as any of the analysts. It has not been thought necessary to try to enforce conformity in these cases, but to recognize this as one type of working relationship which may be expected to develop and which has its value.

A second type of problem in connection with working relationships on the project consisted in too little involvement in project administration. This situation developed most prominently at Manzanar, where the analyst was described as "a mole" and came to be regarded as of little or no value by the project director. The analyst at Manzanar busied himself with the most elaborate of any written analyses. He produced large quantities of material and combined a statistical with an ethnological approach. His reports were uniformly the most deep-going and as well the most effectively presented of any. His attention to written reports, however, removed him from contact with the staff and as he lost contact (a phenomenon which was no doubt contributed to by the rather tight and exclusive character of the circle of the top administration), lost the confidence of the top staff. The possibility of making more effort to bring the analyst into current planning and discussion of problems by the top staff was taken up with the project director by the Washington Community Analysis office. The effects of this move did not become apparent, however, until the following quarter.

It is significant that throughout the period assignments undertaken by the analysts were chiefly either on his own initiative or came from the Washington office. There was, especially during the first

three months, little effort on the part of project staff to make use of the analysts' particular training and skills, except as the analyst himself took the initiative and worked out assignments in conjunction with other staff members. There was a tendency, fostered by the Washington office at first, on the part of the analysts to think of themselves as working more closely with the Washington office than with the local project. This was a reflection of the initial attitudes of the project administrators, who as has been indicated did not immediately accept the analyst as being of any value. Steadily, however, during the period this attitude changed and by the end most analysts were receiving assignments from the project directors and chiefs of community management or other staff members, or if not actually getting assignments, at least discussing their work programs with other staff members. The most definite action in this direction appeared first at Tule Lake and at Topaz. The Tule Lake analyst was given a series of assignments on the background of attitudes of the Tule Lake population. This assignment was not prompted by Washington and indicated a very clear idea of the community analyst's sphere. There developed a similar understanding at Topaz. But at the other centers the trend was not yet so definite.

Communication. Communication between analysts and project staff followed many different patterns. It can be said that in all cases it was highly imperfect during the period and was in addition limited to a few staff members. At Minidoka the analyst gradually worked out perhaps the most effective system of any analyst for acquainting the staff with Community Analysis findings. He established close contacts with the project director and the reports officer. Through intimate personal relations

with them he transmitted orally the view of social relations and attitudes which he was gaining through his study of the center. The closeness of relation with the project director resulted in the analyst's view exerting considerable influence on the general policy of the center. In addition, the Minidoka analyst maintained close relations with the school principals and gave frequent talks to the teachers, especially the new ones. He also, apparently alone among the analysts, carried out a systematic routing of Community Analysis material from the Washington and his own office to the project staff. At the other projects contacts through which Community Analysis findings were transmitted remained more limited and seem to have been for the most part confined to the Community Management Division, and usually only sections of that. All the analysts relied more heavily on oral communication within their own projects than on memoranda and written reports. The Washington office, after September, made a definite effort to encourage analysts to devise methods for wider and more effective circulation on their projects of their reports and findings.

Adequate communication between Washington and the project analysts remained a problem throughout the period. The formal report through channels was utilized by all analysts except Gordon Brown at Gila and Rademaker at Granada and constituted the bulk of all material that came to Washington. A system of writing personal letters to the Washington head of the section had previously been instituted as a means of passing on information too unripe or too nebulous for the regular channels. It also became a vehicle for passing on information which analysts for one reason or another did not like to submit to their project directors.

This aspect constituted a definite problem, in that personal letters could not be made a basis for action. The system did give the Washington analyst a specially rich insight into project relations and incipient trends at the projects, but the feature of going around the local staff (and thus the likelihood of incurring their distrust) as well as the weakness of the personal letter as a basis for any sort of action led to a decision to change the system. Suggestions were made from Washington to formalize the miscellaneous reporting in the manner of the monthly letters of the project attorneys to the Washington office. Granada made no response whatever to the suggestion, but continued to report in the personal letter fashion. Gila tried a letter or two through channels and then came back to personal letters and formal reports. At the other projects the personal letter became what it should be, namely, merely a means of communicating purely personal feelings and observations as an aid in maintaining rapport with the Washington Community Analysis staff. The continuing difficulty at Gila and Granada was evidently tied up with the analysts' personal aversions there to preparing formal reports and also with a lack of rapport between the analysts and the project directors.

Two efforts were made in Washington to meet the problem of maintaining informative and stimulating contacts between Washington and the analysts and among the various analysts. The Community Analyst letter inaugurated previously was continued and was established as a regular monthly newsletter concerning Community Analysis personnel and presenting ideas and data from both the project analysts and the Washington staff. In addition, a circulating letter containing examples of techniques employed by the various analysts as well as some of their most significant

findings was attempted. This, however, bogged down somewhere on the projects. The reports sent out disappeared, and it was not tried again.

Utilization of Materials. Closely connected with the problems of communication but nevertheless presenting additional features was the matter of effective utilization of the materials gathered by the analysts. In general, the core of the problem here was the selection of what to turn the analysts loose on. The basic approach of Community Analysis was established at the beginning as not one of merely recording the life of the evacuees, but of contributing through analysis of social structure and attitudes to the successful execution of the WRA program. None of the analysts was really experienced in this sort of work. Their backgrounds were largely academic and their general tendency was to begin either by focusing attention on unusual aspects of evacuee culture or to attempt a generalized descriptive approach aimed at the solution of no problem in particular. These tendencies were, however, quickly dissipated in each case as the analysts were thrown into immediate contact with obviously urgent problems, the need for solving which they evidently felt as keenly as did the administrators who had the responsibility for solving them.

Nevertheless the approaches of the analysts remained extremely varied. They ranged from elaborate analysis of social institutions as such on the project (La Violette, Heart Mountain) through reporting of current miscellaneous happenings (de Young, Minidoka) to retrospective probing of attitudes involved in the fundamental issues facing the evacuees (Opler, Manzanar). In the absence of much direction from the local staff, the analysts went pretty much their own ways, except when

given specific assignments from Washington. The Washington assignments consisted primarily of (a) requests for the analysts' views on what might be expected to result from the application of a given policy at the projects, (b) requests to describe attitudes already existing toward institutions or procedures which it appeared in Washington needed improvement or change, and (c) suggestions for analytical studies of social structure which might assist in putting into operation some of the programs of the Authority. The direction from Washington ordinarily left to the analysts the choice of methods for securing and presenting the data. The result was an uneven quality of material from center to center and often data that was not strictly comparable. The development of uniformity in techniques remains a problem and is one on which little was done during the period under discussion. It may be said, however, that selection of problems from the Washington level became a recognized procedure during the period. Responses to Washington suggestions and requests constituted the chief source of material which was put to immediate and effective use in the formulation of over-all policies and procedures.

The problem of systematic prediction was not solved. No analyst worked out any system of isolating and reporting regularly on trends in evacuee thinking or crystallization of social structure. Community Analysis reports were mostly analyses of faits accomplis, and the projection of situations into the future was largely left to the administrators to whom such analyses were presented. The full utilization of Community Analysis depends on the development of means for isolating and following systematically trends which are significant in connection with

the objectives of the WRA. The use of such trend analysis, it may also be pointed out, depends on consultation with analysts before contemplated policies are put into effect. Some important policies were instituted, such as the curtailed employment program, without any effort to utilize the analysts' information before so doing.

Reliability of Data. The other major problem in connection with research data was to what extent it could be relied on. The objective of Community Analysis had been set up as the discovery of evacuee viewpoints and reactions. The basic problems involved in such an approach were finding out (a) what kinds of evacuees believed what, and (b) how much importance for administrative programs did each of the viewpoints of various evacuee groups have. Fundamental for the reliability of analysts' findings was the question of the nature of the analysts' contacts.

A basic problem of method was posed here. Were the analysts to be opinion pollers of one sort or another? Or were they to be anthropologists with a broad knowledge of the various facets of the community who might advise in a general way as to the currents of evacuee reaction? Actually, the analysts worked in both ways. At Jerome, Poston, and Granada, systematic opinion polls were carried out -- but each in a different way. At Poston, inspired by the National Opinion Research Center, a poll on attitudes to relocation was taken by means of the Gallup type of sampling. At Granada a poll on the same subject was taken which relied on large numbers for its reliability rather than on analytic sampling of the population base. At Jerome a random sampling of every fifth person on the census rolls was employed. These polls obtained substantially the same results -- and it may be said which

results which have proved fairly reliable. They were results which should have provided a basis for a long term planning of the relocation program. They were used, however, only in part. What the polls did do was to provide knowledge of the extent of attitudes toward specific objectives of the WRA program. What they did not do was to provide an understanding of the fundamental motivations and sentiment patterns of the evacuee groups.

From other analysts came the data on the underlying motivations and patterns of sentiment. Opler, at Manzanar, in particular pursued the slow and painful method of the anthropologist — picking up by chance here and there an attitude toward Japan largely hidden from the administrator ^a ~~or~~ nuance of thought in regard to the evacuation. He explored deeply through life histories and wide-ranging personal interviews, and steadily built up the picture of the few basic idea constellations and attitude sets. He probed into the past as well as the present, an approach which the opinion poll cannot utilize. This was not a procedure which was calculated to give quickly and with finality all the evacuee viewpoints, but it seems demonstrated that it has provided a sound base for the development of more rapid polls and surveys. The total range of attitude factors which must be taken into consideration for trend analysis and prediction are known chiefly through Opler's work. He has now begun to integrate his surveys of attitudes with numerical analysis of the population, so that their relative importance may be estimated.

The lack in the Manzanar approach was the analysis of minor administrative programs and procedures on the project in terms of the

basic sentiment patterns. It was as though Opler were unable to pay attention to the daily life of the centers and could think only in terms of the broadest issues which evacuation, relocation, and segregation had posed. His work was not geared to the minutiae of administrative practice. This lack was to some extent filled by the analyst at Tule Lake. Here the procedure was a never-ending polling of selected evacuees supposed by the analyst to be representative of the most important segments of the population. All current administrative problems were analyzed in the context of the thinking of various evacuee leaders -- staff-evacuee relations, hospital management, community government, etc. This was a polling which sometimes went wrong because it depended so entirely on the personality of the analyst, but in the main it gave the best running picture of the complex of evacuee attitudes toward the current administrative setup and procedures.

I

III. Appendix

A. Personnel Acquisition and Loss

Washington Analysts Lost:

John F. Ambree	August 20
Frank L. Sweetser	September 1

Project Analysts Lost:

Edgar McVoy, Jerome	October 15
Forrest La Violette, Heart Mountain	September 15

Washington Analyst Secured:

Edward H. Spicer, Sr. Analyst	September 5
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Project Analysts Secured:

Charles Wisdom, Rohwer	August 2
Oscar Hoffman, Topaz	September 4
David French, Poston	December 17

B. Mimeographed Reports Produced

Community Analysis Reports:

Nisei Assimilation	July 21
An Analysis of the Segregation Program	October 16

Project Analysis Series:

Japanized English at Minidoka	July 20
Notes on Evacuee Family Patterns	November 24

C. Chronological List of Reports from Projects

II

Central Utah:

October 12	Why Topazeans Prefer Tule Lake
" 28	Resident Attitudes on Work Situation at Topaz
November 2	Probable Explanations of Fluctuations in the Numbers Relocating from Topaz
" 3	Reaction of Pipeline Crew to <u>Topaz Times</u> Article

Colorado River: (None)

Gila River:

September 30	Evacuee Attitudes Toward the WRA
November 24	General Report
No date	Evacuee Reactions to the Shooting Incident at Gila River Project

Granada:

August 20	Report No. 1 (No title)
November 10	Evacuee Attitudes on Relocation, Report No. 2

Heart Mountain:

July 30	Monthly Report
July 31-Aug 4	Notes on Heart Mountain (Embree)
August 6-10	Segregation
" 21	Segregation
September 1	Interviews with School Teachers
" 15	The Work of the Charter Commission at Heart Mountain
" 21	The Heart Mountain Hospital Walkout
" 25	The Buddhist Situation and Bon Odori
No dates	Attitudes Toward Segregation at Heart Mountain
	Report on Segregation
	Analysis of Family Compositions of Individuals Who Intend to/or Have Applied for Repatriation and Who Answered <u>28</u> Unsatisfactorily

Jerome:

July	Oppression Psychology
" 14	Comments on General Staff Meeting
" 20	Characteristics of the Repatriates of the Jerome Relocation Center
" 29	Additional Characteristics of the Repatriates of the Jerome Relocation Center
" 30	Monthly Report
August 5	Evaluation of Work Efficiency at Jerome Relocation Center
" 9	Registration and Segregation
" 13	Evacuee Leaders at Jerome Relocation Center
" 16	Proposal for Agricultural Section of the Employment Division, WRA

III

Jerome (continued):

August 18	Bi-weekly Report
" 18	Evacuee Attitudes on Resettlement
" 23	Denson Survey of Opinion
" 23	Report on Segregation
" 24	Report on Segregation
" 24	Additional Aspects of the Human Ecology of Jerome Relocation Center
" 25	Issei Democratic Procedure
" 30	Monthly Report
September 4	Report on Segregation
" 11	Report on Segregation
" 16	General Attitudes Revealed by the Denson Survey of Opinions
" 17	Effects of Life in the Relocation Center
October 9	Voluntary Wood Crew Report
" 13	Attitudes on Private Enterprise
" 14	Evacuee Reaction to the Accident
" 15	Report on Voluntary Wood Crew for Friday
" 16	Evacuee Reactions to the Relocation Program
" 20	Center Wood Situation
" 23	Reactions to the Circular
" 25	Human Ecology of Jerome Relocation Center After Segregation
" 30	Monthly Report
November 3	Manpower Survey
No date	Significance of the Co-op to the Evacuees

Manzanar:

July 5	Commencement Exercises at Manzanar High School
" 13	Segregation paper by Evacuee Community Analysis Staff Member
" 16	Possible Effects of Segregation at Manzanar
" 26-31	11 Interviews disclosing points of views about Evacuation, Center Life, Relocation, Registration, Segregation, etc.
" 30	The Library of Tuberculosis Patients at Manzanar Hospital
August 3	Comments of a Young Evacuee on Segregation and Related Topics
" 14	The Takahashi Family and Segregation
" 30	From a Repatriate
September 1	Future Japanese Retaliation
" 1	Rumors, Latest Crop
" 11	Autobiography of a 22 Year Old Issei
" 13	Statement of a Nisei (Student)
" 14	Statement of an Airplane Mechanic of Japanese Ancestry
" 14	Segregation paper by Evacuee Community Analysis Staff Member
" 19	Studies of Segregants at Manzanar: I The General Picture.

IV

Manzanar (continued):

October	25	Terminal Island During Evacuation
"	25	An Experience in Sugar Beet Work
"	25	A Nisei Discusses the Mess Halls
"	25	An Interview with an Issei
"	26	A Nisei Mother Looks at Evacuation
"	27	Misconceptions about Tule Lake
"	30	The Florin Evacuations
"	30	Current Misconceptions About Tule Lake
"	30	The Venice Nisei (before evacuation)
"	30	Private Enterprise and Co-operative Enterprise
November	3	Evacuation Preparations During March 1942
"	3	Arbitrary Treatment by FBI
"	3	Tule Lake and Family Reunions
"	8	What a "No" Nisei Told Me
"	9	From a Young Well-Educated Nisei
"	17	Disposal of Articles by Japanese
"	17	How Evacuation Aided Cupid
"	17	Relocation Prospects
"	17	Camouflage and Operation
"	17	Mixup of World War II (Political musings of a Nisei)
"	17	Fund Raising Benefits (Before evacuation)
"	17	A Nisei Comment on Leave Clearance Hearings
"	17	Nisei Organizations in Southern California
"	17	Reflections of a Nisei on Zoot Suits
"	18	The Terminal Islanders at Manzanar
"	19	Broken Promises
"	19	One Evacuee's Version of Events Leading up to the Incident of December 6
December	14	Studies of Segregants at Manzanar: II United States Citizens Only With No Foreign Travel
"	16	The Great January Panic
No dates		Parental Influence During Registration
		Why So Many Kibei Said "No"
		Tokyo Announcements of Russia's Positions
		From a Nisei Who Said "No"

Minidoka:

July	9	Congress of Delegates Meeting
"	10	Resident Attitude on Payroll Cut
"	9	Report on "Furo"
"	10	Attitude Toward Cut in Labor
"	10-15	Attitude Towards Movies
"	10-15	Segregation Program Report (MSW)
"	10-15	Segregation Program Report (Kanaya)
"	10-15	Segregation Program Report (KW)
"	11	Attitude Toward Employment Cut
"	12	Attitude on Employment Cut
"	15	Attitude Toward Block Manager Reduction
"	15-17	Farm Field Crew Walkout
"	29	Visit with Evacuee Family

Minidoka (continued):

July 15	Bon Festival Service for 1943
" 30	Employment Reduction Attitude
No dates	Attitudes Toward Housing Adjustment
	Description of a Report Prepared by 2nd Grade Pupils of Huntville School entitled, "Our Community".
August 1	Report on Canteen
" 1	Report on Dress Customs
" 1	Report on Customs
" 1	Report on Punishment of Children (MSW)
" 2	Report on Behavior at Public Gathering
" 3	Report on Punishment of Children (Kanaya)
" 5-12	Attitude Toward Segregation
" 9	Report on Speech and Courtesy Pattern
" 10	Meeting with Representative from the Spanish Embassy
" 12	Report on Community Library
" 19	Mass Meeting of Central Services Division - Project Director - Speaker
" 24	Attitudes Toward Steward, Chefs, and Mess Hall Crews
" 31	Preliminary Notes on Private Enterprises in Minidoka
No dates	Report on Therapeutics Practices by Other Than Licensed M.D.'s in Minidoka Center
	Attitude of Residents Toward Internal Security
September 1	Departure Custom at Minidoka
" 2	Preliminary Report in Social Classes in Minidoka Center
" 6	Current Status of Movies at Minidoka Project
" 6	Report on Engagement and Marriage Customs in Minidoka Center
" 7	Meeting to Discuss WAC Recruitment
" 8	Funeral Services for Yosh Tamura
" 9	Fukiyose Entertainment
" 11	The Incident Which Took Place at Block 14 Canteen
" 11	The Fight Between Mr. X and Mr. Y
" 12	Report of Fireball (Hitodama) Seen in Block 25
" 13	The Funeral of Mr. Kimpei Okano
" 18	Farewell Parties for Persons Going to Tule Lake
" 19	Relocation Movie
" 20	Preliminary Notes on the Effect that Center Life is Having on Residents
" 21	Farewell Dinner for Segregee
" 24	Attitudes on the Segregation Program
" 25	The Arrival of the First 500 People from Tule Lake
" 27	Arrival of the Tuleans
No dates	Preliminary Notes on Effects Center Living Conditions are Having on Family Life
October 1	Welcome Party for Tuleans
" 14	The Funeral Customs: Pre-evacuation Days and in the Minidoka Relocation Center
" 15	Integration of Tuleans into the Block

Minidoka (continued):

October 17	Welcome Party for Tule Lake Newcomers, Block 22
" 18	Shogi Taikai (Japanese Chess Tournament)
No date	Marriage of Issai
November 5	Description of a Buddhist Wake and Funeral, The Wake
" 29	Report on Bootleg Liquor at Minidoka Center
" 20	Report on Janitorial Flareup in Minidoka
" 25	Reports on Thanksgiving Day Dinner in Minidoka Center
No date	Housing Situation in Minidoka
December 16-25	Christmas Activities in Minidoka
" 26	Christmas Program Talent Show
" 30	Evacuee Opinion Regarding Janitorial Situation

Rohwer:

August 20	Visit to Rohwer Relocation Center
" 28	Report on Segregation
September 4	Report on Segregation
" 13	Report on Segregation
" 18	Report on Segregation
" 17	The Informational Organization at Rohwer
October 18	Statistical Report on Segregants at Rohwer

Tule Lake:

July 1	Quarterly Report
" 9	Social Disorganization as Seen in Community Reactions to Administrative Instruction No. 34, Supplement 2, Revised
" 13	Possible Effects of Segregation
" 20	If Tule Lake Remains the "Segregation Center"
August 5	The Beginning of Positive Reactions to Segregation
" 16	Report on a trip by Kitagawa
" 17	The Functioning of Community Analysis in Connection with the Relocation Team
" 21	Report on Segregation
" 26	Out-Groups at Tule Lake
" 28	Segregation Analysis Report
September 16	A Brief History of the Segregation Program at Tule Lake
" 23	Evacuee Attitudes on Segregation Traceable to Registration
" 28	Attitudes of Issai Remaining at Tule Lake
" 29	Initial Report on Housing Problem
October 7	Attitudes of Segregates
" 8	Second Report on the Housing Problem
" 13	The Kibei "Problem" - Past and Present
" 25	Preliminary Report on Private Enterprise
" 26	Problems Connected with Internal Security

Aug. 3, 1945

DATA FOR SECRETARY'S ANNUAL REPORT — COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

The Community Analysis Section, after the inauguration of the post-exclusion program, concentrated its activities on two jobs: (1) the assessment of West Coast attitudes towards the return of evacuees and (2) the systematic analysis and reporting of evacuee reactions in the centers to the lifting of exclusion and the center closure program. Two analysts were employed from January to March making exploratory surveys of community attitudes in California, Oregon, and Washington. The project analysts prepared weekly reports describing the developments in evacuee acceptance of and resistance to the new phase of the program. These were summarized and distributed to staff both in the field offices and the centers. In addition, materials which had been collected during the previous two years concerning the pre-evacuation localities of the evacuees were summarized and prepared for the use of Relocation and Welfare staff.

JHP

JH
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION
Semi-Annual Report --- January 1 - July 1, 1945

The Community Analysis Section undertook three new jobs during the period: (1) Exploratory survey of public opinion on the West Coast, (2) Week by week reporting of reactions in the centers to post-exclusion policies, and (3) Preparation of reports on the pre-evacuation communities of evacuees. These activities were carried on in conjunction with the usual advising functions of the analysts both at the centers and in the Washington office.

Personnel. Analysts were in residence at all centers, though briefly at Manzanar, during the period. John de Young transferred from OSS to the WRA in December, 1944, and was assigned to Minidoka during January, February, and part of March in the absence of Elmer Smith on the West Coast. De Young was then transferred to Manzanar for two months, where he was unsuccessful in getting further acceptance of Community Analysis work at that center. In June he was detailed to the New York area office.

Gordon Brown resigned his post at Gila River on May 30.

Joan Ishiyama was promoted from Section Secretary to Assistant Community Analyst in the Washington office.

Anne Freed resigned from the Washington staff in June.

Opinion Surveys on the West Coast. At the Denver Conference of Project Directors in October, 1944, an arrangement was made with Assistant Director Cozzens, in the event of lifting exclusion, for the detail of two analysts to the West Coast.

Katharine Luomala of the Washington office went to San Francisco in December, and Elmer Smith joined her in January. Luomala was assigned to the Central Valley in California and Smith to selected communities in Washington and Oregon. The purpose of their assignments was to survey attitudes toward the return of evacuees and problems connected with their return. Interviews were held in Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, and Yuba Counties in the Sacramento Valley, in San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Merced, Fresno, Tulare and Kern Counties in the San Joaquin Valley, in King County and Bellevue in Washington and the Hood River Valley in Oregon.

The interview material and summaries of each community studied were made available immediately to the San Francisco WRA office and to the Seattle Area Office. Later the surveys were distributed to all the district offices in the northern California, Washington and Oregon areas. Two reports summarizing findings of California surveys were issued for general distribution in the C. A. Reports Series.

At the suggestion of the Reports Division all available materials on attitudes and background of the Hood River community were assembled and analyzed in the Washington office of the section, and a report was prepared for general distribution.

Reporting Center Reactions. A weekly reporting system, worked out at the Denver Conference of Community Analysts in September, 1944, had been adopted by all project Analysts by January 1, 1945. The reports were designed to give a running picture of the

most important developments in evacuee opinion, staff-evacuee relations, and community problems for each center. Immediately after the lifting of the exclusion, the analysts began to follow closely the effects on the center communities of the opening of the Coast and the policy of center closure. The Analysts' reports were summarized in the Washington office, and these summaries were issued weekly throughout the period. They were distributed to WRA staff in the centers, in Washington, and in the relocation offices throughout the country,

Pre-Evacuation Locality Studies. Much material had accumulated in the Section's files describing various aspects of the economic and social life of the Japanese Americans before evacuation. This material was summarized during the first months of 1945 and made available to relocation and welfare staff at the centers and in the field offices, where it was utilized as background information and leads to current problems in the re-integration of evacuees in their former communities. Six such reports were issued and other notes of miscellaneous character were made available.

Other Activities. The section prepared a summary of the "Administrative and Social History of Tule Lake Center" for the use of the Justice Department or any other agency taking over responsibility for Tule Lake when the WRA liquidates.

The section collaborated with the Relocation and Reports Divisions in the preparation of a pamphlet called "Uprooted Americans in Your Community." This was designed to furnish background information, especially to personnel of agencies

assuming responsibility for assistance to resettling evacuees.

The section participated in the planning for a repository for WRA records on the West Coast.

Most of the reporting by project analysts was carried out through their weekly reports. However, a number of special reports on pre-evacuation localities, post-exclusion adjustment on the West Coast, juvenile delinquents in the centers, and relocation trends were completed.

Reports Issued.

Community Analysis Reports:

- No. 11 --- April 4, 1945. Exploratory Survey of California Attitudes Toward the Return of the Japanese.
- No. 12 --- May 14, 1945. Effects of the Housing Shortage on Central Valley, California, Attitudes Toward the Return of the Evacuees.
- No. 13 --- June 6, 1945. Prejudice in Hood River Valley. A Case Study in Race Relations.

Project Analysis Series:

- No. 20 --- February 7, 1945. Relocation at Rohwer Center.
Part III. Background for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers.
- No. 21 --- February 22, 1945. Relocation at Rohwer Center.
Part IV. Prospects for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers.
- No. 22 --- April 17, 1945. A Typical Block at Tule Lake Center.

Community Analysis Notes:

- No. 8 --- March 1, 1945. West Coast Localities: Sacramento County and City.
- No. 9 --- March 9, 1945. West Coast Localities: Placer County.
- No. 10 --- March 13, 1945. Boys' Day.
- No. 11 --- April 2, 1945. West Coast Localities: Fresno County.
- No. 12 --- April 9, 1945. West Coast Localities: Imperial Valley.
- No. 13 --- April 9, 1945. West Coast Localities: San Francisco Bay Area.
- No. 14 --- April 16, 1945. West Coast Localities: San Joaquin County.

Weekly Summaries --- "Reactions to Lifting of Exclusion and Closing of Centers" --- No's 3 - 28.