

A SEMINAR DISCUSSION OF
CHAPTER I. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE TULE LAKE COMMUNITY

Frank Miyamoto
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The Problem

- A. Definition of: To describe the structure of social organization in the Tule Lake community. Social structure defined as the major classifications of people in Tule Lake that provides the framework of social relationships.
- B. Assumptions:
1. A social structure may be defined in Tule Lake.
 2. Parts of a structure are functionally related to the whole.
 3. Structure in human society is essentially psychological and not biological. Depeds on how people conceive each other and therefore act toward each other. Also depends on the adaptability of the structure to other life conditions.

The Method

- A. Preamble: The problem was not defined prior to beginning the collection of data. Hence, no distinctive method was used, but the data was studied for pertinent facts.
- B. The problem of isolating the important groupings in the social structure. The relation of conceptualization to observed facts.
1. One possibility is to gather all available data on social relationships, then after careful study, to induce the ones which cut across all other relationships. However, at some point conceptualization must enter.
 2. What features of social relationships are pertinent to the problem of social structure? Sociometrics considers the vectors of human relationships, but seems inadequate. Social structure seems to arise out of the mental classifications which persons make of each other.
 3. How take account of individual variations of such mental concepts? Under some conditions of society, it seems individual variations are small, as in a stable society. But even in changing society, individuals tend to take over social stereotype. What's significance of variant individuals?
- C. The actual procedure of classification used.
1. The impossibility of arriving at my classification through a study of all my data. The inadequacy of the present journal, and the interviews, records, and other documents gathered. The problems of recording everything, and the fallibility of memory.
 2. The influence of sociological training on the classification selected. The place of rationalization in conceptualizing.
 3. The importance of a broad personal experience within the social group under investigation. The problem of checking on insights derived through personal experience.

4. The use of common-sense terms (like keto) for determining a classification. Warner's study of Newburyport. Other methods of classification.
5. The Problems of sampling. Representativeness and reliability of the data. How determine the validity of my interpretation against any others?

D. Sources and techniques used:

1. Participant-observation
 - a. The danger of getting a biased sample.
 - b. The problem of remaining objective in a disturbed community.
 - c. Limitations upon the participant observer in actual participation.
 - d. Others's conception of the participant observer. Informer.
 - e. The problem of distinguishing between participation and observation.
2. Personal journal.
 - a. Its inadequacies in observation of social relationships.
 - b. The confusion between data about others and about oneself.
 - c. Its advantages.
3. Casual interviews.
4. Formal interviews.
5. Other personal documents.
6. Formal documents, WRA files, etc.
7. Statistical information.

The Findings

1. Caucasian-Japanese Relations.
2. Social Stratification.
3. Rural-Urban Relations.
4. Sectional Differences.
5. Generational Structure: Issei - Kibei - Nisei.
6. Bi-Sexual Division.
7. Total Organization.

Gaps and Plans for Filling

- A. Inadequate observation of interpersonal relationships among all the structural groups.
- B. The need to understand more about personal conceptions in terms of others. How do the Issei, Kibei, and Nisei conceive of themselves in ~~terms of~~ relation to Caucasians? Etc.
- C. The place of the eta in Tule Lake, and their problems.
- D. What is the behavior of Issei and Nisei towards each other in various circumstances? How are the Issei able to maintain authority over the Nisei?
- E. What methods of class differentiation are developing in a community in which external symbols have only limited use?

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COMMENTS ON MIYAMOTO'S "SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY".

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: This chapter is excellent. The ideas presented here, in tentative form, can be developed into an important monograph. Particularly significant is the "semi-cast" concept, and the analysis of the relationship between the Japanese and the "three major Caucasian groups" which affect their lives. Of these three groups, however, the treatment ^{American} is necessarily indirect and relatively weak, in re the Caucasian public. We can -- and will -- get further documentation on this aspect, from the viewpoint of "outside the camp". For one thing, we will have access to all the records of the Student Relocation Committee. For another, we should attempt to collect, systematically, letters and records for those who were on furloughs. We are also attempting a sample "press analysis" and analysis of other surveys of public opinion. Finally, we shall have to follow those who are being "permanently" relocated.

The treatment of the "keeto stereotype" is good (pp 12 ff), particularly in respect to the inability of the evacuee to differentiate clearly between the Army and the WRA, but, to the extent that differentiation is made, to favor the Army. However, pp 13-19, point out one of the most difficult methodological problems of the whole study; i.e. the essential discriminatory nature of the evacuation orders produces a dichotomy: evacuees and non-evacuees, or as you point out, lower caste and upper caste. But each of these dichotomous groups can be subclassified in various ways. To bring out this subclassification, without being tedious is not an easy matter. To neglect it, however, results in oversimplification and, at times, distortion. This is apparent in your treatment of the evacuee attitude towards the Army. You start out (second paragraph) on p. 13, by defining the place of the Army "in the minds of the Issei" but by the third paragraph you are talking about "the eyes of the evacuees" and by this time the evacuees are being treated as a unit, which they certainly

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are not. Many Nisei -- and unquestionably some Issei -- prefer the "social gain" policy of the WRA -- however indefinite and vacillating this policy may be -- to the strong-arm tactics of the Army. You imply this differentiation, of course, on p. 15, when the Councilman is rebuked by the of his colleagues, but you do not bring it into sufficiently clear focus. The solution may be an extension of the introduction, in which you draw in the main points you make in your later analysis; i.e. your main classification is Evacuees -- Caucasians. Evacuees are sub-classified by generation or background or both (Issei -- Kibei -- Nisei); by occupation or type of residence (urban -- rural) (professional -- business -- farmer, etc.); by section or region; by education; etc. etc. Caucasians are also subclassified in various terms. In treating any subclassification of the one (as you do the Caucasians), some attempt should be made to indicate that the other is not an undifferentiated whole -- even if you merely point out that the treatment of various types of evacuees and their various types of reactions is postponed to a later section.

SPECIFIC POINTS

P. 19. Re the WRA "democratic policy", should it not be pointed out here (to be developed, of course, in another section) that the WRA has had considerable trouble in defining "democracy". The evacuees, as a whole, have been relegated (through no fault of WRA) to "second-class citizenship" but WRA has relegated the aliens among them to a considerably lower degree of citizenship.

Pp. 21-26. The whole question of greater professional competence of evacuees than of Caucasian personnel is important and should be more completely documented.

P. 28. Here, as in various other reports of various observers, references are made to the "series of broken promises" by the administration.

We must have a carefully documented account of these points.

P. 29. Billigmeier is in a position to give us further documentation of the "in-group" feeling among the Caucasians.

Pp. 32-33. Did not the class distinctions in pre-evacuation days play rather an important role in, e.g., marriage arrangements?

P. 36 (2 pages are numbered 36!) Here is a place where we ought to be able to get some statistical evidence. Who is elected to what offices (classification by urban-rural, previous occupations, sections, etc.). Who gets what sorts of jobs? This, again, is probably a job for Billigmeier.

P. 38. These pre-evacuation resistences to unionization need further investigation. This is a job for one of the Berkeley staff.

P. 39. Job for Sakoda: analyze the background of those who favored and opposed the Coop movement.

P. 45. What, actually, was the number of jobs available on the farm compared to the number available in construction? Construction work is not a "profession". Analysis should be made of previous occupations of those on farms by former occupations.

Is it true that many "could not qualify for any other work",

P. 46. Analysis of previous occupations and relative success of various groups sent to beet fields should be made.

Pp. 46-47. Statistical data badly needed.

Pp. 58-59. This whole Issei-Nisei split seems to me to be complicated by a further division, i.e. Issei who are parents of Nisei vs. "lone" Issei (i.e. unattached) males).

Pp. 61-62 Another point (and a very important one) for Billigmeier to check statistically: Age and background groupings by occupations.

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Pp. 63-64. The Farm and the Theatre Project will, of course, be treated as separate sections.

P. 65. In the political section (a) the campaign speeches will be documented (b) the background of candidates analyzed in detail.

Pp. 67-73. Excellent -- but needs further documentation

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PART IV. COLLECTIVE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE RELOCATION CENTER

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Social
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CHAPTER I. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY

Introduction. The effort of this section is to describe some of the outstanding features of the social structure in the local community. Presumably, the analysis of structures attempts to define the major differentiated parts of a total framework and to note the relationship which each part bears to the rest. All that is indicated in this section is the skeletal framework of relationships in the community within which are drawn the detailed designs for living of individual persons and groups.

The task of defining the structure of a relocation center community is, unfortunately, not as simple as is the task for an anthropologist studying a pre-literate culture, or even of a sociologist studying a long established New England town; for the Tule Lake community is today only a few months old, and one might almost say that the community is as undifferentiated as a newborn infant and as equally lacking in organization. But the analogy exaggerates the fact; there is a considerable residue of old habits of social relationship which have been transplanted or translated for application to the life here. What we do observe is that the new environmental conditions of the relocation center tend to break down the order and direction of established relationships among various groups and cause a process of reshuffling to start by which these groups seek a more stable position than now exists. Furthermore, under these unusual conditions of life, it is not inconceivable that new conceptions of grouprelationship, non-existent or at least insignificant in other communities, may come to play an important part in this society. All this serves as a warning against accepting social structures in a relocation center too literally, and points to the greater need of attention to the condition of flux which is pre-eminently the characteristic of this community.

In the process that is taking place, of establishing a new social structure,

there appear to be two main factors which are, in a sense, operating as dialectical forces. On the one hand are those influences which are seemingly "objective" to the individuals of the community, such as the requirements of the new geographic environment, the available physical facilities, the WRA and governmental policies, and the military restrictions, to all of which the people must adjust; on the other hand are those influences which may be called "subjective" and are deeply ingrained parts of the individuals, such as their habits of action established in former experience. The critical problem of the evacuees is that they must telescope into an extremely brief space of time the adjustment of their "subjective" tendencies to the "objective" requirements. Thus, the "objective" pre-conditions of life in a relocation center set limits to the social structure that may be developed, and they play a significant part in the adjustment of evacuees, for immediate and conscious account of them must be taken. Unlike the normal community, opportunities for individual selection of the environment or of gradual adaptation to external conditions are extremely restricted. It is this which causes the relocation program to be a crisis in the lives of evacuees.

The Caucasian-Japanese Relation: A Semi-Caste Structure If the "untouchables" of India, the Eta of Japan, and the Negroes of the South are typical examples of outcaste groups, the Japanese in the United States¹ have not hitherto been a part of a caste structure. Indeed, under favorable circumstances there has been such free intercourse in social relationship between members of the two races that not even the faintest semblance of a caste relation could be noted in these instances. However, one may say that certain basic characteristics of a caste system, such as the hereditary distinction made between the two groups, were latently present, and it only required the evacuation to bring them more prominently to the foreground.

The one fact, above all others, which sets the Japanese off in a lower caste-like group is that persons of Japanese ancestry, and they alone, have been

¹For the sake of brevity, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, are referred to as "Japanese" unless otherwise indicated.

subject to evacuation. At the Hearings of the Tolson Committee, the view was abundantly expressed that most Issei and Nisei were probably loyal to the United States, but it was the inability to tell the loyal from the disloyal which was a major factor contributing to the "military necessity" of evacuation. To cite but one illustration of this view, Governor Olson of California declared at the Hearings:

. . . . First, let me say, the distinction between the Japanese and the Italian and German is the difficulty of telling who is who among the Japanese. I think they realize that. I don't believe that difficulty exists among the Germans and Italians.²

It was on the ground that, "We cannot doubt, and everyone is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country. But the innocent ten in this time of war will perforce suffer for the guilty one,"³ that the evacuation was justified by the Tolson Committee. On the other hand, the same committee recommended that, "They (a hearing board) should examine all cases of German and Italian aliens on an individual basis."⁴ There is no appeal for the Japanese; the fact of their national-racial characteristics condemn them to the evacuation centers. When the realization awakens among the Japanese that their hereditary traits are alone sufficient to determine their destiny, the psychology that arises is not different from that of out-caste groups anywhere. And it seems fair to assume that the majority of the American populace who have concerned themselves with the minority Japanese problem do not question the justice of removing certain privileges from the Japanese, a typical upper-caste attitude. To be sure, the tradition of a caste relation between these two groups of people is absent, but the psychology involved is similar in many respects.

The line of division between the two groups is well defined by the derogatory terms, "Jap", and "keto" (the hairy one), which each uses against the other to describe his feeling about the other. It is needless to mention what

²Tolson Committee Hearings, Fourth Interim Report, p. 141.

³Tolson Committee Hearings, Preliminary Report and Recommendations, p. 15.

⁴Ibid., p. 23.

"Jap" means to most Americans today. The term "keto", like the term "Jap", is a non-discriminating reference to a whole group, and while it is applied generally to the whole Caucasian race, the referenece in the Tule Lake Project is specifically to the white Americans. The term is primarily one of disdain, but also of hate, and reflects accurately the hostile attitude toward Caucasians which tends to prevail among the Issei and Kibei. Their view is that if the Japanese are subordinated beneath the keto, it is merely because of the stupidity and ignorance of the latter and the unjustified feeling of superiority which run through their strain. Among the Nisei the term keto is much less frequently used, but there is generally a distinction made between the White-Americans (hakujin) and the Japanese-Americans, the former being a group that is more the object of resentment than of disdain or hate. The difference in the attitude toward Caucasians between the Issei and Nisei is evident in many ways. It is evident in such an instance as when a group of Nisei brought some of their visiting Caucasian friends to the messhall for supper. One person there who knew the attitude of the chef in that messhall commented, "Better not bring too many white persons here. The chef (an Issei) doesn't like the keto. He's likely to (he'd want to) poison them." The general Nisei attitude, on the other hand, is one of friendliness to those Caucasians who will befriend them.

Three major Caucasian groups affect the lives of the Japanese evacuees most directly: the American public, the Army, and the WRA. Because American public opinion, especially of the Pacific Coast, influences the policies of the WRA and controls the future of the Japanese in the United States, the American public has a distant but nevertheless sure hand in the determination of activities within the community. The strongest influence of the American public upon the lives of evacuees comes through the fear of the WRA that any series of disturbing incidents in the project might arouse strong adverse opinion against the WRA administration of the projects and dislocate its whole program.

For instance, the chief objection which the administration had against the farm strike of August 16 was the dangerous effect it might have on American public opinion concerning the operation of WRA projects. Speaking before the City Council two days after the strike, Joe Hayes, assistant project director, declared:

Suppose the militia had come out and fired a few rounds of shots to disperse the people; some persons would have been killed and many others would have been wounded. There would have been hell to pay. The thing would have gotten into the news just as the trouble down at Santa Anita did, and the one down at Manzanar. And the newspapers would have magnified the thing beyond reasonable proportions. Do you know what I heard on one of my recent visits up to Klamath? One woman came up to me and asked if it were true that the reason beer is scarcer now in Klamath Falls than before is that a lot of it is being shipped into the project. We have to be careful what we do here, for people on the outside are willing to believe any story that gets around.¹

Similarly, when Mr. Newhall of the San Francisco Chronicle was scheduled to appear at Tule Lake to gather material for a feature article on this project, Mr. Sharrill's chief concern was that the construction crew strike was impending and that other disturbances were all too evident in the community.² Now that the WRA has defined its policy of relocation and is attempting to establish work opportunities outside the centers for the Japanese, it is especially desirable that a favorable view of evacuees be created among the American public. During his last visit to this project, Dillon Myer spoke before a special meeting of the City Council to clarify the new policies of the WRA most of which had to do with relocation, and the burden of his discussion concerned the need of cooperation between the people and the WRA to create favorable public opinion so that the relocation program might be facilitated.³

Nor is the American public far from the gate of this project; they are in the hinterland of the community watching it closely for any misstep that might be called to account. Quite recently, three members of the farm crew went beyond the zone of permitted travel to get beer at a tavern in Tule Lake. The constable of the town picked them up and confined them up and confined them in jail until they were released to officials of the Tule Lake Project. One of the three offenders repeated

¹Miyamoto Document, City Council Meeting, Aug. 18, 1942, p.5.

²Miyamoto Journal, September 4, 1942.

³Special Council Meeting, Dillon Myer on New Policies, Oct. 12, 1942

the offense only a week or two after the first incident, and was caught by an army officer in Stronghold Inn a mile or two from the center. Others have been caught as far away as Medicine Lake seeking pine trees for the Labor Day floats. In consequence, the Army and the WRA have changed the project area so that army guards are now stationed at distant points on the highway to prevent further vagrancy. The need for such restrictions were not directly conceived by the Army or the WRA, but rather developed as a result of pressure from people in the surrounding area.

The hostility of the local population, especially around the little town of Tule Lake, seems to have arisen from the fact that the WRA took over land, from the U. S. Reclamation Service, which was meant for the veterans of the first World War of whom there are a great number in this region. Since some thirty or forty thousand acres of extremely fertile land would have been given to these people had the reclamation program developed as it was originally planned, their feeling of resentment at seeing this land used for "Japs" is perhaps understandable. No incidents of open hostility have yet been evidenced by the local population against the evacuees---the presence of army corps, and the fact that the WRA is a governmental agency, have been deterrents against such action---, but they have taken every opportunity to discredit the WRA and the evacuee population here. Mr. Sherrill has been receiving letters from Washington which originated in Tule Lake and were addressed to the President of the United States charging that the present administration of the Tule Lake Project is incompetent and should be replaced by stricter authority. Complaints have been issued that the "Japs" are driving farm trucks at extremely high speed burning up precious rubber and purposely trying to wear down governmental property, that "Japs" are "yoo-hooing" white girls walking along the highway, that they are destroying game fowl illegally, and that they are openly practicing military training with long staves in preparation for sabotage.¹ Some of these accusations have been found true, but most of them are malicious rumors without a shred of truth. Since a few incidents that are true give basis to

¹Issei Meeting, Nov. 5, 1942, p. 1.

a thousand lies, the administration has shown considerable vigilance in attempting to curb any forms of behavior in the community that might find poor reflection in American public opinion. While the administration is acutely conscious of the unfavorable view of the project current in the surrounding populace, the people of the community who have little or no contact with that small segment of the American public are no more conscious of them than they are of the rest of the "keto".

The more significant American public as far as the evacuees are concerned are the groups with which they are likely to come into contact under the relocation program. Almost every student who has gone out on the Student Relocation program seems to be concerned with the Caucasian attitude he is likely to encounter on the outside and especially at the place where he enters school. One young graduate medical student who wishes to return to the University of Chicago Medical School where he spent several years of study declares:

Prior to evacuation, I wrote to some of my friends at the school asking about the general attitude towards Japanese in Chicago since the outbreak of war. They didn't encourage me to return, not that they were afraid I wouldn't get along on the campus where everyone knows me, but they didn't want to be responsible for anything that might happen to me on the street. After all, there are a lot of irresponsible people around who wouldn't think anything of beating up a fellow. I'm going to write to Dr. Tashiro and find out what he thinks of the situation there now.¹

If a person who has spent seven years in a city is concerned about the attitude of the people toward Japanese since the outbreak of war, one may understand the misapprehensions felt by those who are entering a strange city for the first time. The same question of the majority group attitude toward Japanese prevails among those who go out to the sugar beet fields and other outside employment in the adjacent states. Letters written to friends and relatives in the project by those who have gone out to the fields on the outside are a favorite weathervane to gauge public sentiment. The favorable tales of social relations between Japanese farm workers and Caucasians have encouraged the tendency toward relocation, but it is generally agreed that certain places, like Montana, Payette County in Idaho, and others, are undesirable places to go to.

¹Miyamoto Journal, Nov. 7, 1942, p. 2.

Personal contacts with the American public is necessarily quite restricted within the project, but it does continue to take place, especially on the economic and religious levels. It is said that some of the business enterprisers of the surrounding area, particularly of Klamath Falls, have profited considerably by the location of the Tule Lake Project in this locality, and there is a substantiation of the point in the willingness of laundry men, local agents of mail-order houses, grocery retailers, and others, to make the thirty-seven miles trip to this center. Contacts of this kind, however, produce little of lasting effect and is extremely casual to say the least. The personal relationships arising out of Christian church activity, however, is much more extensive and intimate. In the early stage of project development when no ministers from Tule Lake and Klamath Falls volunteered their service. At frequent intervals throughout the summer months, Christian young people's groups visited the project to hold joint services with the young people's fellowships in this community. On these occasions, the visitors would be invited into the homes of evacuees and entertained.

In the effort to improve public relations with the Caucasian population in the surrounding area, the WRA sometimes invites outside groups, such as the Kiwanis and Rotarians, to visit the center and mix formally with the Japanese. On these occasions the role of the Japanese is chiefly that of entertainers, for they are called upon to sing, dance, serve sukiyaki, act as guides on tours, and, in general, participate as public relations hosts to the Caucasians. The visitors are required to pay for their dinners. While the relations under these circumstances are quite cordial, very little interpersonal contact takes place, and the community at large is relatively unaffected by them except in the attitude they may develop upon observing white strangers driving around in large automobiles. The most permanent and intimate contact with Caucasians is that carried on with friends known in former communities who come to visit at the project, but these visits are so infrequent and affect such a limited portion of the evacuee population that their influence is probably of minor importance.

The American public is thus a group which evacuees must seriously take account of since its opinions directly affect the lives of Japanese in America, but because of the restricted inter-personal contact with it, it has little concreteness in the thought of evacuees about it. One notes the hostility of Issei and Kibei, and even of many Nisei, against this ephemeral public which apparently was a potent factor contributing to the evacuation, but there is difficulty in directing one's feeling against a populace that stretches the breadth of a continent. One way in which the Issei are able to handle so large a unit in their thought is to oppose it with another equally large unit, the people of Japan, and one suspects that the feeling of identity with Japan which has been strengthened among a large portion of the Issei since their arrival here is at least in part explainable by their need to vent their resentment through some group large enough to cope with the American people as a whole. Another method of giving expression to their hostility is through action against that portion of the American people with whom the evacuees have contact, such as the administrative personnel of projects. Among Nisei, who feel little or no identity with Japan, the task of concretizing the object of their resentment has been much more difficult and many give up the effort and take on a fatalistic attitude about their situation, but others enter the hunt for the group or groups in the American public to blame for their present humiliating and unjustified position.

Out of the need to think of the American people in some way or another, several types of attitude have developed and prevail among the evacuees in Tule Lake. First, there are those who hold a belligerent attitude toward the keto and would wreak vengeance upon them, so they say, if ever they are given the opportunity. Second there are those who would prefer to avoid contact with the keto, at least to the extent that no inter-personal claims may be developed, for they hold in the back of their minds the possibility that Japan and the Axis may win the war and they should prefer to side with the winning nation. Most of the first two classes are Issei or Kibei, though Nisei are not absent from the latter category. Third there are the Nisei in particular,

and some Issei and Kibei, who have in their past experience developed many friends among the Caucasians, but have felt the injustices wrought by the American people upon them; and their inclination is to divide the American public between those who are their friends and those who are the ignorant masses who persecute the Japanese in America. The latter are the object of resentment; or more specifically, it is the vested interest groups, the leaders of the masses in the anti-Japanese agitation, as well as the followers who are the object of resentment. Among this class of Nisei are those who seek to enlist the aid of friendly whites in their effort to neutralize and overcome the anti-Japanese movement. Finally, there is a limited number who, because of maladjustment or an unusual degree of Americanization, find themselves out of place among Japanese and therefore disdain the group of their parental heritage and seek to identify themselves rather with the White-Americans.

The Army, of course, is a part of the Caucasian group and ⁱⁿ the minds of the Issei are categorically classed as keto. But the relationship of the Japanese evacuees to the Army, and as well to the WRA, has been much more concretely defined through recent experience than to the American society as a whole, and structurally their relationship has been canalized differently than in the latter case.

In the eyes of evacuees, the Army is the ultimate ruler of their destiny, the power behind all power which directs the puppet lives of Japanese evacuees. The Army is spoken of as a single unified command, yet it is sometimes difficult to conceive it as a unit, for there is the army that ordered and carried out the evacuation, there is the army that stands guard over the project, there is the army that threatens to induct the American-born Japanese, and there is the army that is fighting the soldiers of Japan. In general, the contact of the evacuees with the Army has been indirect and impersonal, and their conception of the Army has been influenced by their experience.

The most direct contact with the Army was had during the period of evacuation and in the assembly centers supervised by the WCCA under the direct control of the Army. Those who found the WRA relocation center a considerable improvement over the

assembly center were inclined to speak of their experience with the Army with redoubled bitterness. It was not uncommon in the earlier period of life at Tule Lake to hear criticisms of General De Witt or General "Nit Wit" (as some outspoken persons were inclined to call him) and his policies. The fresh memory then of frequent baggage inspections, of occasional restrictions newly imposed on the evacuees, and of being herded about like cattle by military guards all contributed to an unfavorable view of the Army. But even in the period of the evacuation and of the assembly center, direct contact with the Army was relatively infrequent for it was generally represented by some civilian agency which did all the "dirty work", and the Army was rather cast in a favorable light by the quick action it could take whenever problems were presented directly to its officers.

Any criticisms that may have dwelt in the minds of evacuees during the first phase of evacuation, however, has tended to disappear with each month's stay at the relocation center, for the faults of the Army seem to have been eclipsed by the faults of the WRA. Especially has this been true recently when the difficulties experienced by the WRA in procuring goods for the project has led to considerable dissatisfaction and disorganization within the community, and in this frame of mind the people have tended to turn to the Army as their "Savior" from the disturbing situation. At the height of disorganization in the community in late August, people were heard to say, "Let the Army come in; perhaps it will be just as well."¹ Even on the floor of the council, a councilman who had shown himself a leader in past meetings and a person of responsibility in his actions recently declared, "Maybe it would be better if the army were to take over," and then, after a friendly rebuke from one of his colleagues for such an extreme statement, corrected himself by adding, "I meant to say that rather than take orders from civilians, I'd rather get ordered about by the Army."²

The favorable light in which the Army appears by contrast with the WRA on questions of procurement and organization of an evacuated population is perhaps

¹Farm Labor Strike, Aug. 16, 1942, p. 2.

²City Council Meeting, Taketa's statement, Sept. 22, 1942.

natural, for a civilian agency established during wartime and which attempts to compete with war industries in the procurement of goods and for national administrative attention to their problems is at a considerable disadvantage. Mr. Shirrell has repeatedly pointed out to the people the difficulties of procurement in wartimes, and he declared at his first public address on the problems of the project,

"One of the most difficult problems we have been confronted with is that of procuring goods for all your needs. ...because of the war, there are many things that are not available today which in normal times would have been available; and the means of transporting those goods which we procure is limited. The paramount concern of the United States today is to win this war, and war industries must take precedence over anything else in matters of transportation or of supplies."¹

Dillon Myer stressed the problem of getting priorities for the WRA in one of public statements here², and the apology of the WRA for inadequate supplies frequently includes the statement that this agency has no better than an A-9 priority rating at best. While these difficulties of procurement are being dinmed into the ears of the evacuees, however, they are in a position to observe the miraculous power of the Army in procuring goods which are ostensibly off the market. The large cast iron stoves, for example, which are a distinct improvement over the flimsy wood stoves originally found in the apartments, were accessible only through the Army, a fact which is freely admitted by the WRA. It is common knowledge that much of the food sent us here is procured through the Army quartermaster. Thus, the people are led to the conclusion that the Army is an abundant provider by contrast with the WRA, and they feel themselves willing to forsake the freedom offered by the WRA for the promise of adequate necessities from the omnipotent Army.

Yet in another sense, the Army is recognized as the final arbiter of the evacuee's future. Under the immobilized condition within the relocation center, the people are acutely conscious of the idea of movement. A persisting wish which dominates the thought of evacuees, especially of the Nisei, is the desire to be freed from the restrictions of the project area. For the realization of this desire, however, there is always the need to gain permission from the San Francisco office

¹Miyamoto Journal, Aug. 29, 1942, p. 2-3

²Special Council Meeting, Dillon Myer on New Policies, Oct. 12, 1942, p. 1.

of the Western Defense Command, and there is, furthermore, the need to take account of zones which are prohibited to evacuee residence by military restrictions. The people who desire to relocate thus find their movement circumscribed by all manner of military restrictions, but much of it seems to be accepted with an air of helplessness as if it were the inevitable lot of evacuees. On the other hand, there are these evacuees, especially the Issei, who once having been temporarily relocated to this center are loathe to relocate again. There is a current rumor in Tule Lake, one which has persisted since the beginning of settlement here, that the people of this community will have to relocate again to some more inland point at a safe distance from the Pacific Coast. Mr. Shirrell has repeatedly denied the rumor and presented reasons to show its extreme improbability, but no amount of argument is adequate to displace the anxiety from the people's minds. To Mr. Shirrell's reasoning the people's reply is that even the project director cannot know the decision of the Army, and they present circumstantial evidence to prove that the Army has other thoughts in mind than to permit the Tule Lake Japanese to remain here. There seems to exist a feeling, which is not without its justification, that if the evacuees could place themselves in closer contact with the real source of authority, that much of the complications in their lives would be removed. And the higher authority is not the WRA, but rather the Army.

As far as relationship with the small unit of the local militia goes, contact between the evacuees and this body is so limited that the life in the community proceeds almost as if the local army post were non-existent. The soldiers are prohibited from entering the community except on special duty, and the evacuees are prohibited from entering the fenced-off area of the army encampment. Captain Patterson, head of the local militia who apparently has little love for the Japanese, seems to have issued strict orders to the soldiers that no social intercourse is to be carried on between them and the evacuees. One soldier expressed regret that he could not even exchange greetings with a Japanese girl whom he had known previously, but had to snub her in the presence of the Captain. A few soldiers who are on duty

at the post office inspecting postal deliveries or freight and others who work with Japanese wardens as sentinels at project boundaries probably develop some acquaintance with the evacuees, but no other legitimate opportunities of social exchange exist. The conception of the military police in the community is that these "tough Texans" hate the "Japs" whom they have to guard and that they are an extremely ignorant lot since many of them can neither read nor write, but these feelings of hostility are intermingled with feelings of pity and sympathy at the boring life they must lead in this out-of-the-way camp. The Issei attitude toward the American soldier, which has never been characterized by a very high regard for them, especially ^{by} contrast to their superior opinion about the Japanese soldier, is perhaps typified in the following observation of an Issei:

"These American soldiers are probably glad that the Japanese are here. It would be embarrassing for them to be out on the field of battle retreating all the time. Darashi-ga-nai na. (How sloppy they are.) But I guess it's a part of their duty to do this, although they don't like it. They'd probably rather be at home, but it's their duty to be here."¹

Although the Army contributes to the material well being of the community, its influence upon the social environment is entirely restrictive. Moreover, the flow of influence between the Army and the evacuees is strictly unilateral, from the Army to the evacuees. But the people recognize the authority of the Army and accept it, at least for the present---certainly, the attitude of the people toward the Army is much less critical than toward the WRA. This point of view is clearly reflected in the oft-repeated view of a certain influential element among the Nisei, that the only reason for accepting evacuation is because of the "military necessity" requiring it.

The main relationship between the evacuees in the Tule Lake Project and the Caucasian Americans is, of course, with the administrative personnel of the WRA located here. From the point of view of the Issei, the WRA personnel is indistinguishable from the rest of the keto, and if the Caucasian Americans of the Pacific Coast are the keto who usurped the hard-earned possessions of the Japanese,

¹Najima Notes, July 17, 1942.

the WRA Caucasians are keto who are profiting by administering a dispossessed people.

Much has already been said of the WRA; here we need only indicate the structural relation of the WRA to the evacuees. From the beginning the WRA has emphasized the policy of conducting the projects in a democratic way, of giving to the evacuees all the responsibilities they are capable of assuming. The evacuees were to have full self government in the establishment and management of governmental services; they were to assume those positions in the WRA work corps for which they were best fitted. But despite the WRA's declared sympathy for democratic control and operation of the project by the people, the fact is that the people are so dependent upon the administration for most of their basic needs and the supervision of all departments that very little actual self government exists. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the WRA administers the work corps and therefore determines work opportunities, and the maximum wages achievable, that it is the commissariat of food and clothing supplies, that it directs the extent and condition of available housing facilities, that, in short, the WRA administers directly over a wide and important portion of the evacuees' lives. The WRA unquestionably has put forth effort toward administering the project as democratically as possible, but the actual nature of the relationship between the administration and the people which is necessarily the outcome of the relocation situation is a direct contradiction of the democratic ideal. Out of this relationship has evolved the conception in the community that the WRA is the "provider" and the evacuees the "recipient" of goods. A dominant philosophy that has characterized the community from the beginning of resettlement is that the people should try to get everything they can from the WRA, an attitude which is comparable to that found among ~~the~~ labor unions in their relation to employers. The administrators of the project have been bitterly disappointed and disillusioned by the "people's unwillingness to assume more personal responsibility," but as long as the administration retains control of the purse strings of the community, it appears unlikely that any increased awareness of personal responsibilities can be created among the people.

The superordinate-subordinate relationship between the Caucasians and Japanese is most acutely felt by the evacuees in their relation to the WRA personnel, for the relationship involves direct personal contact. Every Japanese, even the best trained and most experienced, is under the administrative control of one Caucasian or another, and the unfortunate aspect of the situation is that in many instances the subordinate Japanese are more capable than their superiors. Particularly is this the case on the farm where any number of men experienced in the management of large farms or were successful operators of their own small farms are under the supervision of the Caucasian farm supervisor, A. R. Kallam, who has shown no evidence of being more capable than the Japanese farm workers under him. Many farmers from Northern California claim to have known him when he was farming around the Delta Region, and they speak with disdain of his lack of success in operating his ~~own~~ own farm enterprises. Other comments about Kallam indicate the general attitude which prevails even today but was particularly dominant at first.

Comments were being made that water is needed in this patch or that. These farmers knew where water was needed. "These keto wait to irrigate all the fields at once instead of doing one field at a time. These keto do the culverts and ditch gates without testing for elevation. The ditch gates might be at a point lower than the rest of the field where it's ineffective."¹

"Kallam goes ahead planting without getting the irrigation prepared. The cabbages and onions are practically all burnt because they didn't have the water ready at the time of planting. Those shoots should have come right up if they'd been watered right after planting, but Kallam doesn't plan for those things.

"Kallam did not come out to the field today. He is very unpopular among the farmers nowadays. They wish he were out of here. Most of the foremen agree that Kallam is the downfall of the whole farm, and that he doesn't know how to farm anything but sugar beets and barley. Someone put up a turnip shaped like a nude and wrote a tag on it saying "This is Kallam" and nailed it on the wall. Remained there all day."²

Farmers blame Kallam for not being prepared beforehand to harvest the crops. He should have been prepared with shock nails, sacks, trucks, etc. They say that everything is left until the last minute."³

¹Najima Notes, July 17, 1942

²Hisatomi Notes, September 2, 1942

³Hisatomi Notes, September 3, 1942

Since the position of the evacuee farmers does not permit them to compete with Kallam for the same managerial office, there is no violent feeling of jealousy about his superior position. In fact, most of the farmers are inclined to ^{the} view ~~that~~ that the project farm is not their farm, and that they shouldn't work too hard or assume much responsibility when they get only \$16 per month wages. On the other hand, they take a certain pride in their knowledge and experience at farming and they dislike working under ineffective conditions. Perhaps nothing would raise the morale of farm workers more than to have their opinion consulted in the conduct of the farm, but no effort has been made to organize the farm workers on a democratic basis. The criticism of farm supervision, of course, is not limited to Kallam alone, but is also directed against Hudson, the marketing head, and Eastmann, chief of the agriculture and industry divisions.

In the medical field where there is an acute consciousness of professional status, it is perhaps to be expected that friction will arise between the evacuee doctors and the Caucasian administrator, and the only condition under which disagreements could be avoided is through the choice of a Caucasian supervisor who is unquestionably the superior of other doctors on the project. One doctor (Japanese) who had been connected with a well-known hospital until recently replied when he was asked his opinion ~~ix~~ of Dr. A. B. Carson, Chief of Medical Service in Tule Lake,

"He's all right. But the trouble is, so many of the Japanese doctors are superior to him in medical knowledge. Some of them have had more training and more experience. It's hard for a man in his position to command the respect of doctors under him."¹

It was following the difficulties of the Iki-Harada case and the proposal of the WRA to transfer some of the Japanese doctors to equalize the medical service in the various projects, that the most pointed criticisms of the Caucasian administration of medical service in this project developed. For some time, since the first establishment of the base hospital, the Japanese doctors had been repeatedly requesting, or demanding, certain equipment which they felt was absolutely necessary for the offering of adequate medical service to the evacuees. When Dr. Carson left the project for three weeks, accompanied by his secretary and Dr. Iki, to set up the

¹ ~~Miyamoto~~ Notes, June 23, 1942

base hospital at the Hart Mountain Project, Dr. Harada was appointed temporary head of the hospital. His first move was to requisition all the material which the Japanese doctors had been demanding for some time, but which Dr. Carson, for his own reasons, had not submitted for procurement. For the requisitions to be accepted by the project administration, however, they required the signature of Miss Graham, the head nurse, perhaps an arrangement made to check just such requisitions as were submitted by Dr. Harada. The attitude of the Japanese doctors to this arrangement was:

"It's an insult to have a nurse placed over a doctor. I've never heard of doctors taking orders from nurses; it's just not done. How can the nurse know what doctors need? Miss Graham was in no position to judge whether or not a certain requisition ought to go through or not."¹

Although almost all the doctors on the staff here are Nisei and understand Caucasians perfectly well, such incidents as these have split the relation between the Caucasians and Japanese on the medical staff perhaps as widely as in any department on the project. One doctor characterized Dr. Ueyama, who is said to be one of the best doctors among Japanese from the Bay Region, as "allergic to Caucasians." Another doctor further enlarged on this point:

"Dr. Ueyama is one of the bluntest fellows I've ever met. He's absolutely tactless, and says whatever he thinks..... He's pretty rude to the Caucasian staff these days. He won't even speak civilly to Miss Graham, the head nurse. Not that the Dr. is impolite, but rather that one can see his dislike of Caucasians in his behavior."²

One final illustration may be drawn from the problems that have developed in the post office where some dozen Nisei are employed under the supervision of Mrs. Wallace, the attractive young wife of an army corporal stationed here. Considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed in the community as well as among the workers about the lack of adequate organization in the office. Work assignments have not been properly made, the Nisei workers are too young and do not sufficiently recognize the responsibility of their position, packages have been lost and even stolen, and yet

¹Miyamoto Notes

²Iki-Harada Case, Sept. 17, 1942. p.3 and p. 5.

Mrs. Wallace fails to impose strict regulations within the office so that such mishaps would not recur. Recognizing that there is a lack of trained personnel among the Nisei to operate the post office efficiently, the situation is not improved by placing in the supervisory capacity a girl who is so young that she herself does not fully realize the responsibility of her position. According to an older woman who spent several months working in the post office as ex officio head of the Nisei workers, Mrs. Wallace still likes to have a good time herself and hence is not strict when the young Nisei workers get out of hand at the post office, she is an expert jitter-bugger and frequently is absent on Monday mornings after over-exertion the night before, and has only gradually come to an awareness of how extremely responsible the task of handling other people's mail and packages is. The disorganization in the post office appears to become more and more acute, and the expectation is that the Christmas rush will snow under the delivery department of the post office. A few of the older girls working there now look with despair upon the situation, and declare among themselves that one capable Nisei with organizational ability could do much to improve the circumstances. Recently, when the City Council asked Mrs. Wallace to appear at their meeting to answer questions about the condition of the post office, Mr. Shirrell informed her that she need not appear since he had not been informed of the council's action, and instead raised her pay which is said to have been about \$12 5 a month. Some of the Nisei workers who have been exerting themselves to keep some order within the confusion are a little upset to think that Mrs. Wallace has had her pay increased despite her inability to organize the post office efficiently.

The difference in class level between the administrators and the evacuees is especially emphasized by the difference in wages. One bookkeeper in the finance accounting section was constantly demoralized by the fact that in the books she kept, young Caucasian truck drivers getting \$80 per week would be listed beside Japanese workers getting only \$12, \$16 or \$19 a month. ~~Professional Japanese workers~~

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~~getting only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month.~~ Professional Japanese workers who were accustomed to getting hundreds of dollars a month on the outside consider the \$19 a month (plus, of course, their basic subsistence) laughable, though, to be sure, none of them refuse to accept their monthly penance. Their resentment becomes most apparent in those circumstances when criticism is directed against them from their supervisors for their lack of industry at their work. Said one young stenographer of her "employer":

"Mr. C. makes me mad. He kept me working until 5:30 yesterday evening just because he changed his mind about a letter he was writing. I copied the thing five times. Then he complains that we're not willing to work hard enough and says all the Caucasian staff are working even on weekends to keep the project going. What does he expect from us when we only get \$16 a month?"¹

Frequently, there is a feeling among the Japanese workers that they are doing more and showing greater efficiency in their work than is true of the Caucasians who are so much better paid.

Such discrepancies in the ability shown and the compensation paid are, however, forgotten during the routine work day while the workers pursue their tasks side by side with their supervisors. Rather do these discrepancies offer another basis of the general resentment against the situation in which the evacuees find themselves, which get overt expressions of hostility only

1. Miyamoto Notes, Aug. 7, 1942.

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when a critical situation arises in the relationship of workers and the management. But when the resentments and hostilities of the evacuees come to the surface, the awareness of all the discrepancies in position between the two groups becomes acute. The Caucasian administrators are then persons who live in one part of the project separate from the evacuees, their houses are favored with porches (for which the Japanese have been crying in their own barracks), they have adequate rooms and furnishings in the eyes of evacuees, and they are served by Japanese labor that is hardly adequately compensated for the work they do.

Because of the inability to communicate in the same language with the administrators, and the difference of their experiential background, which sets them off in another world from Americans, it is the Issei group which is most sensitive to the semi-caste relationship that now exists between them and the administration. If this social distance exists between these two groups, it is less the fault of the system than of the difference of language and experience. But the Issei do not define this situation as one in which the differences are to be lessened and better understanding developed through closer inter-personal contact with the Caucasian staff. Rather, they assume an air of belligerent resentment against the keto who have caused the degradation of their status¹, and their immediate reaction to almost everyone of the Caucasian administrators is one of mistrust. The typical attitude is:

"Kendall Smith? He's smart, too smart. But he can't

1. The common phrases "the inferiority feelings in the Japanese" and "saving their face" hint at a truth about the Japanese, but actually tell nothing because of their superficiality. A thorough analysis of Japanese sensitivity to status is wanted.

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put anything over on us. We're just as smart as they are.¹

Since Mr. Smith is a sharp business man, and admits it, he is perhaps to be distrusted; but the mistrust extends even to Mr. Shirrell, the project director, who has given abundant evidence of his sincerity in working for the evacuees. For instance, a Messhall Committee investigated the shortage of food in the warehouse and ostensibly discovered graft on the part of Mr. Pilcher, assistant project steward. The findings were then taken to Mr. Shirrell, and because he became angry at this meeting (which was perhaps an explosion on Mr. Shirrell's part following persistent and somewhat unreasonable demands about the messhall situation) the conclusion was drawn that Mr. Shirrell, too, must have been a part of the graft. The Issei's distrust of the Caucasian staff is so deep-seated that any proposition suggested from the administration is looked upon with skepticism. If the proposition is favorable to the evacuees, it is thought of as the natural privilege of the Japanese, or as just another promise which probably will not be fulfilled. If the proposition is unfavorable to the Japanese, it is because of the malicious intent of the administration which desires to keep the Japanese down. Almost any statement from the administration is thus likely to be viewed in the worst way, and the motivation

1. Miyamoto Notes, Oct. 19, 1942

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of the Caucasians is generally thought to be ulterior and detrimental to the Japanese. To be sure, the ground for this distrust was laid in large part by the series of promises made by the WRA which were ultimately broken.

With increased pressure from the Japanese population, there has tended to develop among the administrative staff a stronger in-group feeling. Even some of the most liberal minded /and understanding members of the administration are sensitive to attack upon their own group and are quick to reply in defence. Although it was quite clear that the community was violently opposed to Mr. Pilcher, the Asst. Project Steward, Mr. Shirrell was loathe to terminate him or to accept his resignation because of his fear that the Japanese could follow this single precedent and demand other resignations. The increasing dominance of the view in the administration that they are necessarily a group set off from the evacuees has tended to strengthen the position of those who entered the project with rather conservative ideas of racial differences, but who had been forced to subordinate such ideas because of the strong liberal democratic point of view that characterized the administration policy at the outset. An extreme example of the conservative caste tendency which exists among some of the Caucasian staff may be cited:

"B. mentioned a clash he had with P. today. The B's. had invited the Watanabe's to dine at the personnel messhall last night. There were five in their party and no tables

were open to take that many. Miss Smith and her father, who were sitting at an otherwise vacant table, offered to move, but B. consulted the head waitress first to see if other arrangements could be made. The head waitress herself asked the Smiths if it would be all right to change tables, and the latter complied willingly. P., who was seated at the next table with a group of teachers kept glaring at B. all through this discussion. Later, when B. went to P's table to speak to one of the teachers, P. burst forth with some very rude comments about B's rude exhibition in forcing the Smiths to move to accommodate evacuees. B. kept his temper and pointed out that the Smiths themselves had offered to move, and that he otherwise saw nothing wrong about bringing evacuees to dine there since there was no other room available to entertain in the project. P. went on to indicate that he himself had come of a poor family, that he had always felt thankful when others did things for him and showed his gratitude, but that the evacuees were the most ungrateful lot of people imaginable. B. interpreted all this to mean that P. "saw red whenever he saw 'Japs' coming into the messhall," to eat on the same level with the Caucasian staff. In P's mind the Japanese were apparently all right as long as they kept their place.¹

Many Japanese in the community feel rather bitterly about the condescending attitude of the Caucasian personnel toward the Japanese², and particularly is this the case among those who have been trained to think highly of their personal self-respect and whose equal status with any other racial group has been emphasized. It is difficult to know how extensive the attitude of superiority is among the Caucasians, but there is no question of its existence among some of them. A girl relates an incident that occurred at the beauty shop when a Caucasian woman tried to get her hair dressed after the closing hour.

¹ Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 17, 1942

² Sakoda Journal, See pp. 191, 204, 210.

"While I was sitting under the hair dryer, a Caucasian woman walked into the shop this evening and, in an overbearing manner, asked that she have her hair done. The girls pointed out that it was almost closing time and that it would be impossible to start the work at that late hour. (The shop closes at 8,00 p.m.) The Caucasian thereupon demanded that a special case be made in her instance since she had to leave for Washington, D. C. the next day, and she wouldn't have time to have her hair fixed at any other time. (It was assumed that she was the wife of one of the administrative staff.) I think the girls would have done it for her if she had made her request in a civil manner, but it was the way she demanded that the work be done which got their 'goat.' The girls absolutely refused to do anything that evening, and they even gave her a rather awkward hour the next day just out of spite. The other woman was red in the face, and you could see she was quite angry, but she couldn't do anything about it so she went out with the appointment she'd had to accept. I'm surprised they did it for her at all. The girls were mad. They said she had no business trying to get her hair done there anyhow at the reduced rate the shop offers for the sake of the evacuees. Why didn't she go to Tulelake, or Klamath Falls?"¹

The differential between the Caucasian administrators and the evacuees is likely to be further emphasized by the construction of a barbed-wire fence around the evacuee housing area separating it off from the warehouses, lumber yards, personnel buildings and quarters, an Army order presumably to safeguard against theft. When the fence is constructed, the evacuees will not be permitted passage to the administration building area except by a special pass.

Under the circumstance, there is a feeling among a large part of the Issei that anyone who associates too closely with the Caucasians is suspect in the same degree that the Caucasians are mistrusted. Such persons are known as "keto no ketsu wo neburu mono," (Those who lick the rear of the keto). By virtue

¹ Miyamoto Journal, Nov. 10, 1942

of their daily contacts in the administration building with the administrative personnel, white-collar workers in the office are generally spoken of in this way. Anyone who takes the view of the administration, or agrees with anything they say, is likely to be labelled in this manner. For this reason, many who have friendly relations with members of the personnel are even likely to avoid the administration building and contact with Caucasians to escape condemnation from their own group. The motivation implied to persons who associate closely with the Caucasians is that they are trying to simulate the Caucasians to make themselves appear superior to the Japanese, that they are trying to gain individual advantages, and that they are trying to break into Caucasian circles since they think the Japanese are not good enough for them.

Social Stratification Among Evacuees¹

By social classes we mean those groupings of people which are determined by attitudes of superordination and subordination-- that is, attitudes of superiority or inferiority in relation toward others-- and it is assumed that social classes exist only where vertical mobility is possible. Furthermore, there is clearly no value in class analysis unless it is assumed that the class position of a group of people is a significant factor in determining their behavior. In this section, what we are seeking is a definition

¹ Note: Material on this section is very inadequate and a much more careful study of the subject is required.

of those groupings in the Tule Lake community that are associated with attitudes of superiority or inferiority among people, and are "social forces" that shape the life of the community.

It is doubtful whether social classes, taken in this meaning, can be identified within the Tule Lake community; they cannot be identified even in very general categories. There is no elite to whom a society page might be devoted in the TULEAN DISPATCH; there is not even a clearly defined group of the poverty-stricken. Even in the Japanese communities of pre-evacuation day, it was difficult to define class lines though vague distinctions of people did exist. In the cities, to be sure, there were the treaty merchants (kaisha people) and the consular group who formed an élite among Japanese in America, but these people were frequently entirely distinct from the immigrant community. Among the immigrants themselves, there were so few who were wealthy or had any tradition of upper-class status that it was impossible for them to form groups entirely apart from others. In the large cities where the kaisha group were, the self-styled élite of the immigrant communities sometimes vied for favors from the kaisha people, and this constituted the main form of social climbing. There were also conceptions of "uptown" Japanese and "downtown" Japanese, but in the closely knit Japanese communities social relationships tended to cut across this line of division. There were also those families which claimed samurai ancestry, awareness of which made a difference in family ideals

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that were emphasized, but there was no grouping of such families into a special class in the immigrant communities, and it is certain that no important organization of such people existed. The one group set off from all others is, of course, the eta, but since their position, sociologically viewed, is more like that of a caste than of a class, the discussion of the eta is reserved for the latter part of this section. Whatever distinctions of wealth, manner, tradition, and sentiment, which existed in the immigrant communities have hitherto been relatively indefinite, and there were only hints of the beginning of a class society.

The conditions in the relocation centers have been entirely unfavorable to the development of class differences. The material culture of the wealthy, the "conspicuous consumption" of Veblen's leisure class, which is the external symbol of upper-class status, cannot get expression under the uniformity of housing, meals, wages, privileges, and purchaseable artifacts, such as, cars, furnitures, and even clothing, that has been imposed by the life conditions of the centers. There is no choice of residences superior to others, and even if there were, the better homes are not to be had by one's privileged status in the community. There are no special shops or places of entertainment the patronage of which gives "class" to one's name. The uniformity of wages imposes a considerable restriction upon the development of class differences, but more important still is the fact that everyone in the relocation centers is an "employee" of the WRA and cannot

hope to become an "employer." The result is ^atendency toward the levelling or standardizing of all evacuee social status, and of bringing to the evacuees' consciousness the contrast of class position with those outside the relocation centers rather than among themselves.

We observe, however, that the class aspirations and class definitions formed in the past have some carry-over value in the Tule Lake community. The bulk of people in this center came from the assembly centers at Walerga (Sacramento people), Pinedale (Pacific Northwest people), and Arboga (Marysville section people). People from these assembly centers seem to know a great deal about others from their respective group, and out of this knowledge frequently speak of the relative merits of different families. "That family puts on airs here, but, really, they were nothing back home," is the kind of attitude frequently expressed. In regard to the recognition of superior station, one gets remarks like the following:

"See that well-dressed woman standing with a child? She's from the 'afternoon tea group' in San Francisco, but was sent here after she evacuated to the 'white zone'."¹

Group associations formed in the past among people of similar class interest seem to persist here. Walter Tsukamoto, lawyer, Dr. George Iki, physician and surgeon, and Sumio Miyamoto, accountant, are a few persons who apparently formed the upper crust of Nisei society in Sacramento and continue their

¹ Miyamoto Notes, Oct. 31, 1942.

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associations here. One of their chief interests is in small gambling over contract bridge games, and they frequently get together in lieu of golf, clubbing, and other activities of the upper class which are restricted in this project.

It is difficult to know, however, what it is that determines class status among these people, for a variety of factors apparently enter into its determination. Families are frequently pointed out as probably having a large amount of wealth, and there is unquestionably envy in the minds of those who are not equally well off, but there is as often a tone of disdain in the discussions about families especially when they have nothing beside their wealth to indicate status. Particularly is this true in the view of city people toward farmers' families, for while mention is made that this family or another from the farm has amassed a fortune through the tilling of the soil, there is also an attitude of pity toward them because they have never learned anything other than to work and save.

Yet, in this community where there is a large degree of anonymity among people from different sections of the Pacific Coast, there is an effort to impress others with the kind of background from which one came; and in this contest of "impressing others," the description of artifacts which were once possessed plays an important rôle. One hears such gossip as:

"Mieko was mad when she heard that S. had been going around speaking of her father's large dairy farm. Mieko said, 'If S. calls two cows, a dog, and two cats a large dairy farm,

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I don't know what to call the farms of most Japanese.''
Mieko's a very sincere girl, and I'd never seen her mad
before." ¹

Persons well trained in manners and conventions, especially among the Issei, sometimes speak critically of those who are more poorly bred in these matters, but the community as a whole does not single out those who are "to the manner born" and contrast them to those who are not so. Those who have had considerable contact with Caucasians in the past and know how to get along among them will sometimes be heard to say, "I don't know how to get along with Japanese because I've always associated with Caucasians," and it is said with an air of one who wishes to point out his difference and superiority. At least among the Nisei, one senses that, much as they may deny the superiority of the whites, there is a desire to be accepted by the better class of whites and to know how to get along among them. Education, previous occupational status, and social recognition of any kind received in the past are other factors contributing to one's status in the Tule Lake community. But there is little fundamental agreement about the criteria of high social status in the community or of who belong to the higher classes.

If any class differential exists in the community, the most definite of all the vague factors contributing to social

¹ Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 7, 1942

distinction seems to be urbanization. It is perhaps natural that in modern society where city ways are considered more favorably than country ways, one should find even the Japanese evacuees in relocation centers holding to these ideals. Where there is a mixture of city people among country people in a given block, there is some awareness among city people that the habits of the country people are cruder. In one block, it has been observed that the leadership at meetings arises much more frequently among the city people than among the country people, and every important elected or appointed office among the Issei has gone to persons of urban background. In fact, at one election when a country person was nominated for an office, his reason for declining the nomination was;

"I and others of us are mostly from the farm and are inexperienced in matters of this kind. I think it would be better to elect persons from the city who have had experience in organizational work." ¹

The superior offices in the community's organization are likewise generally held by those of urban background although there is probably a larger percentage of rural than of urban people in the Tule Lake Project. Since the ideals of upper class status, such as, ability to express oneself, personal appearance, and manners, have not altered since the time of evacuation, and wealth plays a relatively smaller part than these other factors in determining status in the relocation center, persons of rural background show some reticence in

¹ Miyamoto Journal, August 21, 1942

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entering the competition for status. But they are perhaps critical of the extravagant mode of life which is somewhat more characteristic of the city people. One gets a hint of this in the remarks made by a girl from the country to a city girl who was washing some of her dishes in the washroom:

"Those are awfully pretty dishes. I suppose they were quite expensive. We use tin plates in our family, but we feel that in a place like this, there's no use keeping nice things around."¹

There is also some feeling that there are sectional differences in the attitudes of superiority and inferiority, that the people of the Pacific Northwest are inclined to think themselves better than those from California. However, such feelings of superiority, if they exist, are based on vague feelings of difference, and does not offer solid ground for class differentiation.

Despite the vagueness of class structure in the Tule Lake community, even these hazy differences have some significance in the political life of the community. During the recent controversy over the question of building a theater with the profits of the community enterprises, some difference in ideology of those who have wealth and those who have not seemed to appear. After more than two weeks of discussion in the City Council concerning the desirability of building a theater with the people's money, and clarification of the proposal had been

¹ Miyamoto Notes, August 7, 1942

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offered by Mr. Kendall Smith who had initiated the project, Walter Tsukamoto moved that the council recommend the building of the theater, and in so moving, also declared:

"I want to give my youngsters a chance to see a few movies, and possibly see one myself now and then. Mr. Smith tells us that the total cost of the theater won't be more than 58¢ per person. I don't think that's too much to ask of people for what they're getting in return.¹

People who had not been pinched in their economic circumstances by the evacuation seemed more inclined to view the problem in the same way as Tsukamoto, but there were loud reverberations against the Council's action, especially among those who count every penny earned on this project. There seems to exist a haunting fear among those without much savings that they will not have enough to sustain themselves and their families in the period of readjustment after the war, and they count their money in terms of its smallest fraction. Unfortunately, because of the complexity of reasons offered by the Issei for rejecting the theater, it is impossible to demonstrate the extent to which family savings influenced the final referendum vote; but one senses that some ideological differences based on the amount of wealth exist in the community on issues of this kind. People of wealth cannot understand the "pinch-penny" attitude of a great many in this community, and they will not understand it until they are confronted with the same problem of economic security for the future.

¹ Miyamoto Notes, City Council Meeting, Oct. 6, 1942

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From a broader point of view, the class system of Tule Lake must be seen from the standpoint of its relation to the class structure of the United States. On the whole, the Japanese in the United States have been profoundly middle class in their economic interests and social and political aims. The occupational census of Japanese in 1940 indicates the great extent to which they were involved in proprietorship or managership of their own shops and farms, in clerical services, and in personal services.¹ Most of the private enterprises were family-operated, and there was little room for a widespread development of the distinction between employers and employees. Hence, unlike the people of the United States as a whole, very little growth of a working-class consciousness has taken place among the Japanese, and the primary economic impulse seems to have been the development of private enterprises. The tendency of their ideology is clearly indicated in the fact that, up and down the Pacific Coast among Japanese, there seems to have existed a general opposition to labor unions, and when they were forced to accept the fact of unionization, they found greater acceptability in the A. F. of L. than in the C. I. O. Few were wealthy enough to have intellectual convictions about class divisions.

¹ Tolson Committee Hearings, Fourth Interim Report, pp. 105-107.

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No fundamental change of ideology seems to have taken place among the Japanese because of their new conditions in the relocation center. The hope of most Issei is that, after the war, they may return to their former position in the economy as farm operators or as small entrepreneurs in the city. The Nisei, although less sure of their future, mainly picture their future in terms of professions or the operation of farms and shops following their parents. Among an immigrant group who have always asked only that they be left alone to pursue their economic ends, and even now think that is all they ask of the Government, it is not surprising to find that their deepest political convictions are aligned with those of the dying middle class. One of the justifications offered in the "Fascist" propaganda from Japan for the rising power of the military clique was that theirs was a resurgence of the small people of Japan against the dominance of the capitalist class, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi. There is no indication that the immigrants in this country have ever objected to or rejected this view, and it may be that their agreeableness to the new organization resulted from their un-
verbalized feeling of identity with the "oppressed" farmers and entrepreneurs in Japan who constituted a large part of the population.

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The middle class attitudes of the people have been a significant factor contributing to the difficulties of the WRA in administering the project. Some of the leaders of the opposition to the establishment of a co-op came from those who had been prosperous enterprisers in pre-evacuation days¹, and there has even been the suggestion that their opposition was based on their fear that the acceptance of the cooperative idea by the Japanese would spell the doom of individual enterprise among them in the future. Again, since the Japanese have never experienced the tradition of labor organization among themselves, the formal organization of the project which requires that every Japanese be an employee of the Government is unfamiliar and ill-suited to them. On the whole, the evacuees seem unwilling to accept wholly the status of employees, and there exists a tendency in the work corps for each member to desire to handle his job in his own way. Because of their inability to work independently under the circumstances, the resulting attitude^{on the part of the worker} is one of indifference to his job and to do only enough to prevent himself from being terminated. If there is distrust of the WRA and the Caucasians, there is also distrust of workers in their own group that arises from the interpretation that every other person is out for his individual gain. One minister declares:

¹ Miyamoto Journal, July 21, 1942, p. 8.

"Don't you think there are a lot of people here who have atomistic interests? They can't see themselves as a part of a community. Each individual wants to go his own way without regard for the other fellow. This society seems very atomistic to me. There's no cohesion." ¹

Of course, the hypothesis that these individualistic tendencies of the evacuees result from their middle-class background is difficult to prove. It is not unlikely that a community of working class Japanese might respond in the same way, if not in an even more individualistic manner. But it seems certain that the tradition of workers' organization is lacking, and one may offer proof of this in the difficulty which Mr. Shirrell has had in getting the Japanese to submit their complaints about their work through definite procedures, if they are to complain. In the strikes and slow-downs that have taken place among the work corps of this project, few if any of them were organized. Rather were they more like mass responses to the suggestions of a few leaders, and strikes would follow without any clear definition of demands, and without the establishment first of a negotiating committee. The meetings of strikers were characterized by an ignorance of organizational procedure; there seemed only the desire to give vent to basic dissatisfactions without any common understanding of how to establish the machinery for the removal of the dissatisfactions. One might say of Mr. Shirrell's exasperation

¹ Miyamoto Journal, July 21, 1942, p. 8.

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at the strikes, that he complained less of the fact of the strike than of his inability to cope with them because of their lack of organization. Of course, organized strikes would have been much more difficult to combat, but the bargaining between parties would have been much more rational.

To be sure, the universal employee status of the evacuees is giving rise to a workers' ideology, even among those who formerly were the most outspoken opponents of labor organizations. During the farm strike of mid-August, a farmer was heard to say that friends of his were trying to organize a CIO union in the community, and the listeners nodded their heads in approval. Considering the general opposition to unionization which has characterized Japanese farmers in the past, it is ironical to hear them speak approvingly of labor unions. Moreover, the point of view of the evacuee workers toward the WRA is so characteristically like that of workers on the outside toward their employers that it amuses one to recall the diametrically opposite position held by the Japanese on the outside. But it seems doubtful that this newly gained perspective is very deeply seated among these people, for the persisting idea is that all the evacuees demand is to be allowed individual freedom in pursuing his economic ends. Unless the war is of long duration, and unless the Japanese are more or less entirely dispossessed of their present holdings, it seems unlikely that there will be a fundamental revolution of ideology from their present middle class tendencies.

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Rural-Urban Structure of Relationship

In the previous section, it was mentioned that the urban population tends to hold higher status in the community than does the rural population. The basis of the difference, however, is not easily determined for although people speak of these differences frequently in reference to each other, there are no clearly defined characteristics that distinguish one group from the other. An observer wandering about the project can frequently tell from a person's appearance whether he comes from the country or the city, but there are perhaps an equal number of cases in which he could not make the distinction. Even in the personal association of people in a block, relationships cut across rural-urban divisions and, externally, it is difficult to know who is who among them.

The main distinctions seem to arise from preconceptions which each has of the other, and the implications which people read into people's behavior on the basis of what they learn of their background. Roughly speaking, the attitude of the city people toward those from the country is that the latter are less socialized, less able to express themselves and join in social conversation, inexperienced in the city ways of the project, more conservative, and generally inferior to the city people. On the other hand, the country people seem to think

of the city people as unduly extravagant, "keeping up appearances" without the need or the means to do so, "weak sisters" ill prepared for life under difficult circumstances, and "snooty" without having reason for being so. The distinctions are drawn upon relatively intangible factors which are determined by feelings of difference that arise in social contacts; and it seems that there is greater awareness of difference among women than among men.

During the first few weeks in a certain block when the women's toilet was more than once clogged and plumbers had to be called, one heard accusations among the city people that the "ignorant" country women had committed the unforgivable sin. There is a current belief among city people that the table manners of those from the country are unrefined, and one also hears the observation that conservative countrified people are not interested in eating at the messhalls in family units, but tend to scatter family members at several tables. Considering the critical observations of messhall workers about the diners' table conduct, which falls indiscriminately upon city and country people, it may be questioned whether the actual fact of difference in this regard exists. There are hints, however, that those from the country, especially those who are self-conscious about social status, are sensitive to these current beliefs about the differences in socialization between the two

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groups. The S. family comes from an isolated farming area in the Northwest where they had little contact with Japanese. All indications are that they have never been wealthy and that they owned only a small farm, but they seem to be very keenly conscious of social status. Sakoda remarks of them in his journal:

"Kiyo was telling Mike about a snooty family that she came across in her interviewing. All of the children except one seemed to be brilliant. She raved especially about the eldest daughter who was a Phi Beta...."¹

At a block party where everyone had to introduce himself and tell his place of residence prior to evacuation, the S. sisters evaded the question of place of residence except for the youngest sister who, in her simple honesty, named a large city some distance from her father's farming community. A girl who knew the family in its previous locale complains that the eldest daughter goes about claiming her father's farm to have been much larger than it was.² One suspects that this is an extreme case of a general tendency which may be found in milder form among a large part of the rural people who are thrown closely in contact with the urban population.

It might have been hypothetically assumed that in relocation centers where farming is the major industry, the population with a farming background would gain the highest occupational status and therefore achieve the highest social status in the community.

¹ Sakoda Journal, August 3, 1942, p. 133.

²

Omitting
footnote on p. 45
(ms.) to be
added

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The basis of this assumption would be that the farmers, being the most productive group would get the highest wages in the community, and would also be recognized publicly as the most important unit of the work corps. As matters have turned out, the construction division has drawn the most workers (almost twice the number on the farm) although the farm was unquestionably recognized as the most productively significant department in the whole project. Wages have been no more for farmers than for anyone else; and under the circumstance, the preferred positions have been those in the offices and in the professions where not only are the wages frequently better, but one has the superiority of a white-collar position. Work on the farm has largely been taken by those who could get managerial positions there and hence get the highest wage rate, those who enjoy farm work and prefer it despite the hard labor involved, and those who could not qualify for any other work. The characteristic resentment of the practical farmer against those holding the cityfied "soft jobs" in the offices is prevalent among the farmers in Tule Lake, as witness the attitude of farmers toward the agricultural technical staff which is regarded as sitting around the office drawing high pay while the farmers do all the work for them.

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Nor have women from farming areas gained any preferential status (over city women) by their greater capacity for work. In the first place, the policy of the WRA has been to use men rather than women on the farms, and women of farming experience find themselves ill-adapted to the idle social life of cityfied people. Those who preferred to work took positions as dishwashers, laundresses, and packing-shed workers, but none of these have added to the social prestige of the workers.

The only condition under which the farm workers would come to have superiority over city-trained people would be in the situation where their farm training would give the rural people economic advantages over others, but the wage policy of the WRA has prevented such a situation from arising within the centers. But in the relocation policy of sending out evacuees to outside employment in the sugar beet fields and the fruit orchards, farm-trained people have shown a considerable advantage by their greater endurance, ability to work faster, and the consequent ability to earn much more than the "greenhorns" from the city. If this policy continues, and farm work is made the chief outlet to outside employment, there may result a turnabout in the relative status of farm and city people.

In the division of labor in the Tule Lake Project, one finds that the city-trained people have tended to occupy administrative and professional positions, while the farm-trained population has tended to drift toward industrial employment, as on the farm and in

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the construction crew. Social and political leadership in the community is clearly more in the hands of city people than the farm, and while no general hostility has been evoked from the rural population because of their relatively subordinate status, vague feelings of resentment may be noted among some of the people. If scales of social attitudes are drawn, such as:

inferior social status	---	superior social status
traditionalism	---	liberalism
Japanism	---	Americanism

the hypothesis may be offered that rural people would probably appear more frequently to the left of urban people on the same scale. Such a generalization, however, is subject to the qualification that considerable sectional differences appear, and that it will hold only where large Japanese communities of farm and city people existed in adjacent areas.

Sectional Differences and Relationships

The Tule Lake Project is unique among the relocation centers in having large numbers of people from each of the three Pacific Coast States. Of the total 15,000 people (in round numbers) evacuated to Tule Lake, about 1,200 are from Oregon, about 4,200 from Washington, and the remaining 9,600 from California (latter figures estimated). Most of the Oregon and Washington people are from the rural areas in the outlying regions from Portland and Seattle. The California people are primarily from the city

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of Sacramento and its surrounding rural area, and the rural and semi-rural areas around Marysville and Lincoln.

The sectional groupings of evacuees have been preserved by the allotment of housing according to the time at which the evacuees arrived, and an ecological distribution map might be drawn to show the segregation of people roughly according to their place of origin. Dividing the population according to wards, the distribution would be:

- Ward 1 Washington and Oregon mixed with Clarksburg and Sacramento, California.
- Ward 2 Sacramento and rural hinterland
- Ward 3 Sacramento and rural hinterland
- Ward 4 Sacramento and rural hinterland
- Ward 5 Marysville
- Ward 6 White River Valley, Washington, and Tacoma, Washington
- Ward 7 White River Valley, Wash., and Tacoma, Wash., plus Hood River and Salem, Oregon.

Although social relationships are not determined strictly or even principally by sectional groupings, since occupational and other special interest associations cause the relationships to cut across sectional lines, the fact that a large part of the population lives in blocks that are relatively unmixed sectional groups (except in Ward 1) tends to preserve the structure of social relationships developed in former communities.

The distinction between sectional groups was, of course, most commonly noted in the early history of the community, but these distinctions have tended to disappear with time. In the

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early period when there was considerable anonymity among people, efforts at identification frequently selected out overt characteristics of people to determine their place of origin. Skin color was thought to be a rough criterion, for there was a general assumption that northern people were lighter than those from California. Sacramento youngsters frequently called each other "kurombo" (Negro) because of the deep sunburnt complexion of many of them. The mother of a family from California living in the same block with several families from Washington and Oregon inquired of a Washington girl how girls from the north kept their complexions light and clear, and expressed anxieties about her daughter's appearance. Certain language differences were identified, such as the frequent use among California youths of exclamations like "getcha down" and "waste time." Such differences have tended to disappear during the months that all groups have lived under the same climatic conditions and in constant communication with each other.

Intangible factors of sentiment, attitudes, and modes of thought that distinguish one sectional group from another, however, seem much more persistent, though they offer no insuperable barriers to social relationships. Evacuees from the Portland and Puyallup assembly centers who came here as an advance crew and were the first to settle here, came with the understanding (so

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they say) that the others in these centers would follow. Throughout June and July, they watched with misgivings the continuous flow of Californians into Tule Lake, and no little resentment was felt among them when it was finally announced that Puyallup and Portland would not be relocated to this center. Even now one occasionally hears disgruntlement among these people because they had been separated from others of their group on the basis of a false promise. Several petitions were received by the social welfare office for relocation of some of these families to Minidoka, where the others of the Puyallup and Portland evacuees went. Nor is the case different for people from any other region of the Pacific Coast, for when they are separated from the bulk of those who had been their friends in pre-evacuation days, there are frequent expressions of desire to join their friends in other relocation centers.

No doubt these nostalgic tendencies are in large part due to the difficulties of establishing new congenial associations and of gaining recognition among strangers. Football and baseball teams are frequently organized by sectional groups, and one finds such names among them as: "Sacramento Miks," "White River Bruins," "Tacoma Busseis," "Marysville," "Sacramento Christians," "Hood River," "Bellevue," "Florin," "Auburn" "Riverside," and "Isleton." Clubs are sometimes organized according to the section from which people come,¹ and dances are

¹ Sakoda Journal, September 11, 1942, p. 208.

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frequently held among those from a certain locale. Likewise, among the Issei, social relationships are principally along sectional lines, though it is less apparent than in the case of Nisei because of the absence of formal organizations, but with the Issei it is more frequently due to the fact that their friends have been located as neighbors.

The relationships based on sectional feelings are not un-mixed with those arising from more recent associations formed since arrival at this center, but sectionalism is a significant form of relationship in that it is an easy channel for people to fall into. A patient whose long-time family doctor is in this center feels justified in asking for this doctor instead of any other at the clinic, and in making greater claims upon him than ordinarily might be the case. When any favor is to be asked of someone in a responsible position, intimate acquaintanceship in the past with such an individual simplifies the approach to him. But obligations incurred in the past must likewise be repaid even though the situation has been changed by evacuation, and in the gift exchanges at births, weddings, and funerals, community feelings formed in past associations frequently gain expression. In these situations, where interpersonal relationships developed in previous association must necessarily play an important part, the community recognizes the naturalness of the relationship and condones the sectional

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feelings that appear. But where community-wide activities are involved, as in the functions of the recreation department or the city council, conscious effort is made to minimize sectional feelings and to promote unified action in the whole community.

The Generational Structure; Issei - Kibei - Nisei.

No aspect of the social structure of Tule Lake is more definite than the division of the population along generational lines.

Something should be said of the traditional Japanese conception of generational differences, for it plays a significant part in the differences that have appeared between the Issei and Nisei. Age has a much greater importance in the determination of social roles in Japanese society than is the case in American society. One of the primary ideals inculcated in children is respect for elders, and in obedience to their wishes and views; but this respect for elders does not end with childhood or even adolescence; it presumably carries over to manhood. To be sure, men over sixty rapidly enter into the group known as the "inkyo" (leisure class), and they forego responsibilities of family, business, and other major decisions to a large extent, turning over these responsibilities to younger and newer heads of families. But even the inkyo-san must be respected, and when he decides in moments of family crisis to add his view to the discussion, his argument must be given considerable weight. If we assume each generation to cover about thirty years, it will be seen that

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about the time the parental head passes into the inkyō class, the young new family head should be about thirty years of age. The intimacy to the family system of this age system of relationships and responsibilities must be noted, for the system apparently arose under the condition in which the tradition of primogeniture required that the chosen member of the younger generation be initiated by the parental generation into family responsibilities so as to perpetuate the family name. The passing of responsibilities to the younger generation is best facilitated in a stable situation, for the younger generation is presumably trained throughout his youth to assume the responsibilities and should be capable of doing so without external aid unless unpredicted events upset the routine.

The philosophy of education upon which this age structure is based may be expressed in the view, "Children are ignorant and irresponsible; they must be taught." The technique of teaching is generally understood to mean the technique of ordering and forbidding, for by impressing the malleable mind of the child with the right way, as against the wrong, he will learn to act with responsibility and self-discipline. Under such a mode of instruction, there is less opportunity for the development of independence and individual initiative than in the American method of training, but one gets assurance of conformance to family ideals and the perpetuation of a "good" family name. A further safeguard to the system of primogeniture is offered in the obedience to and respect for older children

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In Japan, properly bred children address their older brothers and sisters as "niisan" (older brother) and "nēesan" (older sister) rather than by their Christian names, and these terms are symbolic of obedience and respect to the one to whom the terms are addressed. Ultimately, one of the older children, usually the eldest male, becomes the family head, and his brothers and sisters must accept him as the responsible head of the family.

The transition from the period of irresponsibility in early childhood to responsibility in adulthood seems to come rather suddenly, for about the time of early adolescence, the family begins to impress upon the child that he is now grown up and must assume adult ways. The child at this age is frequently showered with criticisms and invidious comparisons with others, but it is assumed that through this instruction the adolescents will prepare themselves to take their places in men's and women's society, at perhaps the age of twenty-five in the case of males, and about twenty in the case of females.

This system of age structure of social relationships has suffered considerable deterioration in the United States due to the failure of conformance of the offspring generation of immigrants. In the first place, when the family was uprooted from the hereditary soil in Japan and the significance of the

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the family name and of primogeniture disappeared, the meaning of the Japanese age structure of society was lost to the American-born Japanese. Although the inkyō-san is not uncommon in Japan, he is an exception in the United States, and most men continue to work far beyond their sixtieth birthday. Although the terms "nīsan" and "nēsan" are frequently taught the American-born Japanese children, the importance of the terms is not stressed as much as in Japan. Moreover, the American-trained Nisei fail to conform to the ideals of family responsibility held by the Issei, and the independence and individualism of the Nisei has long been a source of concern to the Issei. Because the Nisei accept the traditional family sentiments and responsibilities held by the Issei, there is a tendency for the latter to think that the former have not matured properly and that they retain much of the child-like irresponsibility.

Added to the difference between the Issei and Nisei in interpretation of the age structure of society there is also the whole realm of cultural differences which have split the two apart. Of primary importance is the inability of the two generations to speak a common language, for without adequate means of communication, they are by and large unable to enter into common social events or discuss their differences of opinion. Moreover, because of the different experiential background of the two generations, their interests, sentiments, attitudes, customs, and habits, are quite varied, and these differences contribute barriers to unified action between the two groups.

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In the pre-evacuation Japanese community, some kind of workable structure of relationships between the two generations was developed in each community, though conflicts were not absent within this structure. Because of the economic dependence of the Nisei upon the Issei, the political views of the communities were generally shaped more by the Issei than by the Nisei. In fact, authority in general rested more in the hands of the Issei than the Nisei. But because of the Issei's inability to speak English adequately and their lack of American citizenship, the superiority of the Nisei in any relations with Caucasians was recognized. The area of greatest difficulty in social adjustment was in harmonizing the customs of the two groups, but these difficulties were generally alleviated by accommodation and a series of compromises between the two groups. Accommodation was possible, for the adjustments were usually made within the family unit, and questions of community-wide scope seldom disturbed the relationship between the Issei and Nisei. To be sure, issues such as pro-Japanism vs. pro-Americanism tended to arouse community-wide interest, but they were never acute enough to solidify one group against the other.

The position of the Kibei in this structure of relationship was not exactly between the Issei and Nisei, as might be assumed, but they were a group apart, never wholly identified with the Japanese communities of America. Spencer has described their position

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usually possess American citizenship, and whose contacts with Japan have not fundamentally altered their characteristics. The Kibei (returned to America) are those who were born in the United States, spent several years of childhood or early adolescence in Japan before returning to the United States, and are unable to identify themselves with the Nisei.¹ From the standpoint of identity with a group, most persons belong to one generational group or another, and they ~~from~~ different areas of experience, which must somehow be interrelated.

Following December 7, 1941, Issei freedom was considerably curtailed by the sudden restrictions upon Japanese nationals. Licenses of all kinds were withheld from the Japanese, funds were frozen, and economic activity among the Issei all but came to a standstill. From the outbreak of war, the FBI opened its dragnet upon all suspected Japanese aliens, Issei leaders of the communities were detained, Issei clubs and associations folded up, and political life among the Issei rapidly degenerated. The strong pro-Japanese leaning that had generally characterized Issei political views was hushed, and many Issei expressed loyalty to the United States in

¹ Inability to identify themselves with the Nisei is crucial in defining the Kibei. Those Kibei who do not seek identification with the Nisei naturally remain unassimilated. But in most instances the Kibei seek to make some kind of favorable adjustment to Nisei society, and failing in that, seek out association among themselves. The impulse to seek identification with the Nisei group is strong for the reason that the Kibei has more opportunities for self-realization in the larger group of Nisei than in the small group of Kibei, if he can gain acceptance in the former group. Some individuals are able to identify themselves at one time with the Nisei, and at another with the Kibei.

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open discussions. With this curtailment of Issei activity, the Nisei took over the leadership of the Japanese communities, while the Issei accepted the reversal of authority without too much comment. There were, to be sure, some criticisms of Nisei leadership even from this time, but no general movement to control this leadership appeared among the Issei.

The newly formed Nisei leadership was carried over into the assembly centers after evacuation. There were relatively few jobs open to the Issei, for they could not use English well enough to fit into administrative positions, and were not flexible enough in their occupational habits to fit into the types of jobs offered in the assembly centers. Because of Army regulations, Issei could not enter into the political life of the community, but they accepted the Nisei leadership without much open hostility. Perhaps the chief reasons for Issei docility under this subordinated condition was the recency of their experience with the extreme restrictions placed upon all enemy aliens by the Government following the outbreak of war, and the temporary nature of their stay in the assembly center.

The structure of Issei-Kibei-Nisei relationships in Tule Lake has undergone a series of minute changes since the initial period of community settlement, and it would perhaps be more correct to say that no clear-cut structure of relationships exists. Throughout June and July there was a re-establishment of roughly the same

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structural relation developed in the assembly centers, of economic and political dominance of the Nisei over the Issei, a separation of Issei and Nisei interests in activities, and the Issei acceptance of this relationship. The Kibei were generally regarded as a difficult trouble-making group, and neither the Issei nor the Nisei gave them much support. But by the beginning of August, there were developing signs of unrest among the Issei against the dominance of both the administration and the Nisei, until by September, a showdown struggle between the Issei and Nisei developed for the political control of the community. It was in the political power relationship between the two groups that changes occurred, while in other forms of relationships, as in the family or in recreation, changes took place more slowly or were less noticeable.

Separation of association between the Issei and the Nisei, the Nisei and the Kibei, and even the Issei and Kibei, is clearly apparent in the community. One seldom observes Issei and Nisei associating with one another in social groups or in activity groups. Groups walking home from work, groups talking at leisure on some family porch, and groups attending the various functions of the community, are invariably divided on the generational line between the Issei and Nisei. The Kibei fluctuate in their associations more than do the other two groups, relating themselves at one time to the Issei, at another time to the Nisei, and perhaps most frequently going among themselves. The acute

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consciousness of these differences of association is brought out in such a comment as, "Mr. Tanaka seems to be a pretty good fellow. He seems to have as much fun playing around with the Nisei as he does with the Issei." As if it were strange that anyone should be able to associate with either group with equal facility! The separation of interests is expressed formally in the establishment of an Issei entertainment section under the recreation department, with ~~a~~ separate office from the Nisei. Church services are either in Japanese or in English according to whether the audience is Issei or Nisei. Even in the shower-rooms, where an equal number of Issei and Nisei are present, the generational groups define themselves, though the noise of the showers may make it difficult to talk across the room, and it would be easier to address one's neighboring bather. The difference in age is, of course, an important factor contributing to this split, but even more significant are the barriers of language and cultural differences. The necessity of having a Japanese section in the newspapers, and translators at mass meetings, indicate^s the gravity of the language barrier. Where association and conversation does take place between the Issei and Nisei, there is usually a decided formalism in the interchanges, or a tendency to vulgarity in the unnatural effort at intimacy. In deference to the Issei, such conversations are usually in Japanese, although one sometimes finds rapid shifts from broken

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Japanese to broken English, and back again, in the effort to find some common medium of communication; but these associations are usually rapidly terminated by the limitations of vocabulary and of a common ground of discussion. The pertinent fact about association among the Issei, Kibei, and Nisei, is their separation; and as between the Issei and Nisei there is very little effort to impose one's association upon the other. The Kibei, however, frequently attempt to find a place in Nisei activities, and failing in that, may join the Issei or their own group.

The one activity in which generational lines break down to a considerable extent is in baseball. Issei, Kibei, and Nisei, all join in this activity with equal enthusiasm, and the subject of baseball furnishes one of the few common bases of conversation among the different groups. But even here, the structure is not completely removed, for the Nisei and some Kibei are the active participants while the Issei are without exception audience participants. Among the younger Issei, one sometimes hears complaints that they cannot join in the games with the Nisei.

"Softball is another game the Issei could play, but as things are now, the Nisei monopolize the game and the Issei can't play. At Walerga there were a number of fellows like myself who like baseball and played the game. But here, if the older folks want to play, they can't get into the leagues so they have to play with little children, and play easy and lose so that the children won't be unhappy. Or they have to play among themselves, but that's not interesting. There should be a place in the league for an Issei or Kibei team where these men could play with their equals." ¹

¹ Miyamoto Journal, July 21, 1942, p. 4

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Few Issei are any longer young enough to ^{participate}/actively in such sports, and this individual expression is perhaps the exception, but some of the factors contributing to the separation of generations even where a common enthusiasm exists is indicated. Another point of interest in this remark is the speaker's reference to the opportunity at Walerga of participating in baseball, which he is unable to do here. The separation of the generations was much less formalized in the assembly center because of which everyone had to make concessions to everyone else, but also due to the relatively temporary character of the assembly center community. An important problem in the applied sociology of relocation centers is of finding other areas of community life, like baseball, which afford a common basis of participation for all generations, and of keeping the structure of generational relations fluid enough so that absolute dissociation in community activities does not set in.

The separation of the generations tends to be present even in occupational groups. The Japanese employees in the administration building are almost without exception Nisei, except for the janitors and the maintenance crews who are Issei. Office work in general is done by the Nisei because of their ability to speak English, and their greater adaptability. Other fields where the Nisei predominate are the

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warehouses, transportation, base hospital, post office, recreation, social welfare, fire-fighters, garbage crews, public school and adult education, canteens, newspaper staff, and messhall waiters and waitresses. The Issei are predominantly working as janitors, boilermen, chimney sweeps, messhall cooks and dishwashers, construction crews, and farmers. In the latter two occupational groups, the Issei are intermingled with Nisei and Kibei, but the Issei are unquestionably present in the greatest numbers. In the construction crew, the senior foremen are mostly Kibei or young Issei, but on the farm, the superior positions are almost all in the hands of the older Nisei. The Kibei appear in scattered occupations, such as the construction crew, the farm, and the messhalls, but the one occupation in which they predominate, interestingly enough, is the wardens. By and large, most of the white-collar positions are occupied by Nisei, and they also hold most of the superior positions on the farm, while the Issei, it seems, are delegated to do the "dirty work" of the community. This is perhaps a source of resentment among the Issei, but since they cannot object, due to their lack of qualification for the white-collar positions, their resentment gains expression through the idea that all Nisei are "licking the pants of the whites."

The mounting resentment among the Issei against their subordination expressed itself chiefly through their struggle for political

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recognition. As has been mentioned previously, the Issei were subordinated under the Nisei and Kibei throughout the initial period in their political status, and the Issei acceptance of this situation is indicated by their failure, in this period, to question the right of the WRA to exclude them from election to the city council. In fact, it was not even thought necessary, on the whole, to elect Kibei councilmen who could bridge the gap between the Issei and the administration better than the Nisei could. Crucial as the point is, it is difficult to explain the mentality of the Issei at this time which led them to accept docilely this authority system in which the Issei role was clearly that of subordinates. An outstanding factor was probably their strong consciousness of their status as "enemy aliens" who could not possess the rights and privileges of citizens during wartime. If this were the case, the Issei must have somehow distinguished the Nisei as different, in status due to their possession of citizenship. The only supporting evidence that can be produced on this point was the often heard remark during the period of evacuation that, "We don't mind so much our being evacuated since we're "enemy aliens" and perhaps can't expect more, but it hurts us to think that our children who are citizens are being evacuated."

By the beginning of July, however, gradual changes in the Issei conception of their rights and privileges were already appearing. A note of disgruntlement is noted on the farm on July 7

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objecting to the haphazard practices of the Caucasian supervisor in laying irrigation ditches. In the recreation department, there were disagreements between the Issei and Nisei entertainment chairmen about the Fourth of July program, and the matter came to a head immediately after the program in the form of an Issei demand for a separate department with independent authority. Criticisms were appearing, especially among the Issei, about the high price of goods sold at the canteens, and talk was developing of the need for Japanese control of the canteens. Messhall difficulties, disorganization in the administrative offices, slow payment of wages, and a series of other minor difficulties were creating a condition in Tule Lake of widespread dissatisfaction among all members. A deep sense of insecurity arising out of the people's lack of control over their future was apparent by August. In the discussion of all these problems, leadership came rather from the Issei than the Nisei, and except for a few politically-minded persons among them, the Nisei were not inclined to think seriously about community problems. Hence, in the discussion of the problems, it was the Issei view which crystallized out unopposed, and the conviction seemed to appear among them that the existing authorities didn't know how to operate the project efficiently.

Issei authority in the community was first formally evidenced in the block meetings where, because of the absence of Nisei, they had more or less complete control over the councilmen. This condition

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existed almost from the outset. Also, by the latter part of July, there was a concerted effort to make the cooperative the Issei medium of political, as well as economic, expression, and the success of this movement is evidenced in the pressure by which the city council was brought to divorce itself from the community enterprises. But it was not until the appearance of the issues on the theater project (September 26, 1942) and the overseas broadcast that a showdown struggle between the two generations appeared. The leadership of the Nisei was by then growing impatient with the strongly pro-Japanese expressions that had been appearing in the community, and they rebelled against "acting as messenger boys" in bringing back to the blocks every issue raised at the council meeting, and having to defend the council's action each week against the fury of Issei assault. Although the council voted favorably on both issues, they were voted down by the Issei, and the fact that neither project was undertaken indicates where the authority of the community now lies.

At present the Issei-Nisei relationship is such that the former have essential control over the community, while the latter merely seek escape from the frustrations which they feel when confronted by the immovable force of Issei opinion. The Issei discuss among themselves the eventual victory of the Japanese nation over the United States, but the Nisei who object to these views merely close their ears to the discussion and seldom if ever take issue with

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the Issei. In this way, the Nisei are constantly called upon to compromise their situation in relation to the Issei; but this raises a question as to what happens in the Nisei psychology in consequence of the frustrations which must confront them.

Concomitantly with the increasing distrust of the Issei for the Nisei, and the latter's general decline in political power, the status of the Kibei has been improved. The Kibei are more and more frequently called upon to represent the views of the Issei to the administration, and one notes that in the recent election of councilmen to the permanent council, there was considerable stress placed in all campaign speeches upon the ability of the candidate to speak Japanese and upon a Kibei background. Moreover, the Kibei in general have by now found some stable position in the community's structure of relationship, and there are fewer incidents of difficulties with the Kibei than was the case in the first few months.

The Bi-Sexual Division

The division of functions and roles between the two sexes is characterized by the usual separations found in the American community, added to which are most of the distinctions found in Japan. Among Issei, the women are more definitely in a subordinate role than among the Nisei, and the relationship between the two is less intimate among Issei than among Nisei. When the dinner bell rings,

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Nisei couples are usually seen walking together to the messhall, sometimes arm in arm, but the Issei husbands and wives seldom go together. Among the latter, either each will seek his individual way to the messhall, or the husband will walk several paces ahead of the wife. Issei husbands are never seen helping their wives with the laundering or ironing, but one does find an occasional Nisei who helps his wife with the laundering. There is no clear division of function about getting coal or buckets of water, though men usually seem to perform these functions when they are about the home. Nor is there any clear-cut division in the task of mopping floors, which are constantly getting dusty and dirty. It seems certain, however, that any tasks which were formerly defined as women's work are more or less strictly performed by the women, although in former communities, where the neighbors did not live so close to one's home, there may have been a greater amount of variation according to the division of labor defined in each home. In other words, the intimacy of community life in this project tends to create a greater conformance to the traditional conceptions of division in function between the men and women.

In former communities where the people lived greater distances from each other, the intimacy of Nisei boys and girls was less questioned, but here where the eyes of the community are all about the project, criticism of Nisei intimacy has become much more concentrated. There are occasional murmurings of disapproval among the Issei against Nisei couples walking arm in arm or of their playing

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together too intimately. The criticisms of Nisei dances fall into this category, for among Issei the close body to body contact of American social dances is looked upon with moral misapprehension. In the Issei eyes, such external indications of intimacy or affection reveals too much of the inner qualities of individuals and does injury to one of their most sacred sentiments, that one should not reveal too much of one's inner feelings to others. There are, to be sure, certain sanctioned channels for the revelation of one's affection for another, but these are all presumably subtle ones, as through the indirect means of Japanese poems or the glance of the eyes.

Total Organization and Individual Demands

The relocation projects are unique among city governments in the United States in respect to the extent of centralized control of administration. Perhaps nowhere else can one find a community of 15,000 people in which one central agency controls the distribution and preparation of food, the determination of wages, working hours, and working conditions, the distribution of clothing to the individual, the allocation of housing, the operation of enterprises, and even the expenditure of money. The rationing system under wartime conditions begins to approximate the condition in the relocation projects, but even this form of centralized control leaves relatively much more room for individual

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adjustment than does the social system in the relocation projects. We are here interested in depicting how these extensive formalized controls of the project have channelized the lives of individual evacuees.

The area of the WRA's administrative control is indicated in the policy formulated by the agency at the outset. The WRA, as an agency of the Federal Government, accepts the obligation to:

".... provide the enlistee with a chance to work so that he may earn a living for himself and his family and also contribute to needed national production of agricultural and industrial goods.

The Government also accepts an obligation to see to it that, regardless of the financial success or failure of the project, housing, food, clothing, education, and health service are provided to the enlistee and his family."¹

In other words, the Government had undertaken to provide the "basic needs" of the evacuees in relocation centers, and the people interpreted the policy to mean exactly that. There is no need here to consider how the WRA has administered these various departments, for the discussion is taken up in separate sections. We are here concerned with showing how, once the policy was determined, a social structure crystallized out, and how the people adjusted to the formal structure.

In line with the democratic policy of WRA administration, which was also stated at the outset, there was some talk and enthusiasm in the early stages of the Tule Lake Project about decentralizing the control as rapidly as feasible and of giving

¹ The War Relocation Authority, The War Relocation Work Corps, A Circular of Information for Enlistees and their Families. Washington, D. C., 1942, p. 9.

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the administration over to the evacuees themselves as fast as they could assimilate it. In actual fact, the contrary trend has been the case, of more and more increasing the grip of the administration over the life functions of the evacuees which had been assigned to the WRA.

For example, in the matter of housing, Frank C. Smith, Supervisor of the Employment and Housing Division, spoke enthusiastically of giving each family the size of apartment required for the number involved, of improving the homes with new cast iron stoves and partitions to make small rooms, and of reducing the dust and beautifying the landscape by planting grass and trees.¹ While the conception was noble, it failed to take account of individual demands and individual irresponsibility. One of the first problems encountered was the failure of families to stay in the apartments assigned to them, and much confusion existed because the assignment of presumably empty apartments would frequently reveal some family which had taken independent possession of it. There were frequent expressions of dissatisfaction among the people about the particular apartment or locale in which they were placed, and the administration office was swamped in the initial period with people making demands for changes of apartment. The response of the administration was to establish somewhat more rigid rules about transfers of apartments, especially of independent

¹ Miyamoto Notes, June 16, 1942

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transfers, and there was some checking by block managers to see that small families or groups of persons had not appropriated large apartments, or that they had not appropriated more than their share of blankets, and cots and mattresses. The difficulties of financing and procuring partitions for rooms within the apartments has led to a hue and cry from the evacuees for partitioning-lumber, until the administration now defensively states the exact conditions under which the partitioning lumber will be provided. Where people have taken the matter into their own hands by "stealing" lumber, the administration has responded by increasing the warden/^{guards}about lumber piles and of setting penalties for those who are caught stealing lumber. Through a detailed process of action and reaction between the evacuees and the administration, one finds that the minimal control over housing intended by the administration has led to expanded control over its allocation, as well as over areas only indirectly related to the question of housing as such. (The problem of housing distribution has more recently been alleviated by the departure of many families from the project.)

There was, perhaps, something inevitable about the increasing centralized control, or, more correctly, the increased consciousness of centralized control, which has resulted during the career of the Tule Lake Project. In communities on the outside, the responsibility of feeding, clothing, housing, educating and giving medical care to a family rests upon the family head and other responsible members.

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But in this project, the responsibility or "blame" is constantly pushed upward to the highest point of control, which is, as far as the evacuees are concerned, the local WRA administration. As long as the WRA was held responsible, it had to assume the authority proportionate to the responsibility directed to it.

The total organization of the community has relieved the burden of living among many families. Families which, on the outside, had struggled to make ends meet now find themselves provided for in all their basic needs. Not infrequently, one hears the comment that this family or another had been "saved" from financial disaster by the evacuation, and there are indications that persons who had suffered from personal responsibilities on the outside are glad of the circumstance in which they no longer are responsible. The passing of the onus against public assistance, which was especially strong among Japanese previously, likewise indicates a state of mind in which people no longer feel themselves personally responsible for their state of poverty, and can ask for public assistance grants as if they were the people's natural right. The hypothesis may be offered that the irresponsible and vicious criticisms made against the block managers and councilmen in the blocks, and against the WRA in mass meetings, results from the dropping of personal responsibilities in the relocation project and the malicious pleasure which people feel at seeing others suffer the same discomforts they had felt in the past.

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But concomitant with the dropping of the burden, the total organization also gives rise to conditions in which individual feelings of insecurity are increased. The individual person is no longer able to control his personal destiny as he had on the outside. He must trust to the Government for the provision of food and fuel. He cannot direct the kind of food he wishes to eat, or the time at which it is to be eaten. He cannot seek economic opportunities to provide a larger income if he feels that his present wage is inadequate. He cannot pursue his professional ideals in the way he wishes to as long as he is subject to administrative controls from above. Even the hour he is to arise in the morning and the hour he goes to sleep is regimented by the schedule of the entire project. The presence of these feelings of insecurity is expressed over and over in the rumors that appear in the community. The most persistent rumor concerns the possible transfer of Tule Lake people to a more inland region. Another has to do with potential shortages of food. Still others concern the payment of wages, the issue of clothing, and the relocation of a favorite doctor. In every instance, these rumors touch on basic needs of the people, but about which they are unable to do very much. Because of these feelings of insecurity under a structure of total organization, and the distrust they feel of those who are in the central offices, there has been repeated effort among the evacuees to gain greater control over the departments that affect them most basically.

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There arises a question as to how far the total organization may go in exercising authority over individual lives. One of the blocks recently decided that they wished to hold a raffle among the block members, the proceeds from which would go to the purchase of Christmas toys for the children of the block. The matter, however, has had to be taken up with the administration for clearance since a ruling has been passed that there shall be no private soliciting of funds, and the question was raised as to whether such a raffle would fall under the category of private solicitation. The use of the block recreation halls, likewise, has been a frequent source of irritation, for if youngsters are given the free use of these halls, they frequently make use of them far into the night and disturb the neighborhood. Block managers are inclined to the view that the recreation department should exercise more control over the halls, whereas the recreation department feels that it is a matter^{er} for the wardens to handle. On the other hand, individual members of blocks also object to the strict control of the recreation halls by the recreation department, for frequent conflicts arise over the question of personal use of the halls for social gatherings and the community activities promoted by the recreation department. On each occasion, arbitration is required to form judgments about the individual cases, and it has been hitherto impossible to designate any set ruling upon the problems.

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The consequence of organizing human activities largely on a community-wide basis has been to make people increasingly conscious, not only of their individual and independent interests, but of the effect of individual action upon the total community. Individuals can no longer take a detached view of others' actions for where life is as closely integrated within one system as is the case in Tule Lake, any action on the part of others may rather directly affect one's own life. As one person put it:

"In a community like ours, one can't remain detached from others as one could on the outside. If I didn't think much of the way someone else taught piano on the outside, it didn't affect me personally because everything was competitive and I could merely laugh at others for not teaching their pupils properly. But here, if anyone teaches piano, he's a member of the same organization as other piano teachers. I find that I can't sit back any longer and laugh at others, because if pupils aren't trained properly, it reflects back on the whole group." ¹

¹ Miyamoto Notes, November 31, 1942