

T6.24

67/14

c

T6.24

THE SEATTLE JACL AND ITS ROLE IN EVACUATION

Brief History of the Seattle JACL

Due to the inaccessibility at the moment of source data referring to the early history of the Seattle chapter of the Japanese American Citizen's League, only the most general statements of this background can be offered in this paper. (Refer to James Sakamoto, Mr. Okuda, the Seattle JACL Files, the Japanese-American Courier, Tura Nakamura, and others for the early history.) The following account of the early developments of the Seattle JACL, therefore, must be regarded as a sketch that may be filled in at some opportune occasion.

According to Mr. Okuda, the oldest and most venerated living pioneer among Seattle Issei who took a most active part in the political history of the Seattle Japanese, the initial organization of the Seattle Nisei into a political body was not under the banner of the present National JACL, but rather into a local citizen's organization for a local purpose. The name of this organization cannot for the moment be recalled, but it is generally regarded as the forerunner of the national JACL. Thus, it is the proud boast of the Seattle people, or at least of those who have identified themselves with the JACL, that the national organization had its origins in Seattle.

During the years between 1910 and 1920, an effort was made by a certain Mr. Ozawa, a Seattle resident, to gain citizenship for aliens of Japanese ancestry through the normal process of naturalization. The case was taken from the local courts, where the

appeal was denied, through the Circuit Court of Appeals, to the Supreme Court. In this ultimate court of justice a decision against K. Ozawa was handed down which virtually closed the path of naturalization to alien Japanese, and, in a sense, this adverse decision laid the ground for the various anti-Japanese legislations that sought to restrict the rise of the immigrant Japanese minority in this country. The legislation most disasterously felt by the Issei (alien Japanese) was the so-called Anti-Japanese Land Laws which were passed in all the areas where the Japanese had located in numbers, and this affected not only the farmers among Japanese who found themselves excluded from purchasing farms that they might develop, but also placed limitations upon the Japanese city population who desired to buy landed property and expand their businesses. Moreover, certain licenses, such as the ^{state} fishing and hunting license to mention a rather insignificant instance, could be held only by citizens.

As these limitations of opportunity were placed before the Issei in Seattle and the surrounding region, the Japanese Association of Seattle, and particularly Mr. Okuda and Mr. Chiusaburo Ito, who had prominently backed Mr. K. Ozawa's effort to gain the privilege of naturalization, saw the necessity of seeking proxy methods of gaining access to or using citizenship. Without this legal privilege, there was a definite peril of constant insecurity through attacks against the immigrant Japanese on the grounds of their non-citizenship, and of choking of the economy of their communities. It was in this circumstance that the leaders of the Japanese Association sought the creation of an organization among American-born

Japanese---that is, the element of the Japanese population in the United States that possesses citizenship by the natural right of birth on this soil---of voting age into an organized group that could serve the purpose of giving the Issei "citizenship by proxy." It is at the moment impossible to say how many Nisei of voting age were in the Seattle community at the time this proposal was made, in 1921 or 1922, but it is doubtful that they numbered more than a half-a-dozen or dozen persons. Few as their numbers were, however, the older Nisei like Tura Nakamura, George Ozawa, and others were called together and formed into a citizen's organization that called itself _____.

It is said that George Ozawa subsequently signed a great number of contracts and leases, of the type that ~~could not~~ excluded non-citizens from entering into the bargain, in behalf of Issei who desired the use of landed property. In one instance, the organization of pool hall proprietors for whose service there was a great demand in the "frontier" period of the Japanese community, found themselves unable to get licenses because of their lack of citizenship. Tura Nakamura was enlisted, because of his citizenship, and through his representation the pool hall association was able to gain license for operation. It seems clear that the citizens organization was primarily organized and used for the service of Issei who found themselves restricted due to their non-citizenship status. Whatever the usage may be called, subterfuge or otherwise, the organization constituted a significant limb of the community along which the whole Japanese community could flourish and grow.

For the following seven or eight years, no marked change took place in the nature of this Nisei organization. As the number of Nisei of voting age increased, the size of the organization increased. Besides the original function of the group, of serving as the citizen's agent of the community, there was rapidly added a number of social functions. It should be added, however, that even these social functions were controlled in these years to a large extent by the Issei parents, for in the latter's regard the American form of mixed sex recreation such as social dancing was considered only once removed from a form of vice. If the older Nisei, the element that came to constitute the "old-line" JACL, are radically different from the younger groups that have recently invaded and to some extent displaced the former, these indications of the strict Issei influence over this Nisei organization points to the kind of socio-cultural atmosphere within which the older generation of Nisei ~~group~~ achieved their maturity. The nature of the claims which the Issei established over the Nisei should also be noted, for while it is true that the Nisei aided the Issei in their economic life through their possession of citizenship, nevertheless, the latter undoubtedly acutely felt the superior economic position of the Issei and the Nisei's consequent obligation to the Issei.

Nisei groups of a similar nature were organized up and down the Pacific Coast, in Los Angeles and San Francisco as well as in the lesser Japanese communities; and about 1931 it was decided that some national organization of Nisei for the purpose of mobilizing their citizenship for the protection of Japanese minority rights

was thought necessary. Consequently the Japanese-American Citizens' League was organized in that year (1930 or 1931) and the first of the national conferences was held (as I recall it) in Seattle. The development of the JACL constitutes a history of its own, but it may be said that JACL chapters were in function and purpose quite alike wherever they cropped up.

*Skip this
para-
graph.
Continue
at top
p. 6.*

The name of James Sakamoto looms large in any account of the Seattle chapter of the JACL, and he perhaps more than any other individual has shaped the characteristics of this chapter. (See Appendix A for a very brief life History of James Sakamoto). About 1929, Sakamoto suddenly made his appearance in Seattle after years of wandering in the East where he had attended school (allegedly at Princeton for a year), married and divorced a Caucasian girl, attained some fame in Madison Garden's as a lightweight prizefighter, and, in general, lived a rather colorful un-Nisei life. At this time it was apparent that he was rapidly losing his eyesight as a consequence of the battering he had received in the fighting ring, and it was not long before he was completely blind. This crisis determined the entire organization of his future career, for he was forced to seek some work in which his blindness would be the least handicap and he undoubtedly had to seek psychological compensations in making his shift from a highly mobile to an extremely sedentary life. By good fortune he was able to marry an extremely intelligent and capable Kibei woman, and with her aid he established the first all-English newspaper to appear in the Seattle Japanese community. This weekly, known as the Japanese-American Courier, was as a matter the only English section among the Seattle Nisei for several years

*Insert
this para-
graph on
p. 8.*

for it was not until much later that the other two Japanese papers in the community instituted the practice of carrying an English section. Special attention is brought upon the Courier for the reason that, with Jimmy Sakamoto, this paper became in a sense the symbol of the JACL in Seattle.

We need not enter into the purposes and policies of the Seattle JACL for they differed little from those of other chapters, but we may review briefly the kinds of activities they promoted. The high points of the organizations activities were the national and sectional conferences, the annual New Year's dance under their sponsorship, and the "Japan Day" at a local recreation park. Among other activities of prominence were the outings during the summers, their annual dinners, and the occasional gatherings to hear some speaker. Their monthly meetings were drab affairs at which a monotonous round of old and new business would be gone over, the major portion of which seemed concerned with the various conferences, or the preparation for some social event. For the majority of Nisei who participated in the functions of the group, it fulfilled a social purpose and meant little else. To be sure, the JACL constantly tried to stimulate political interest among the Nisei, and they often invited prominent candidates for elections to speak at their meetings. They urged Nisei to vote and attempted to enlighten the Nisei on political issues through the columns of the Courier, but while the organization was allegedly non-partisan, there was no question of its Republican bias through the years of the 1930's. The organization kept itself informed on legislations that might affect the Japanese, and on infrequent occasions, sent delegations to the state capital or to persons able

to influence legislation. There was this shadow play with politics that the Seattle JACL was always involved in, but the impressive part of the organization's history is undoubtedly in the social functions that it promoted in the local community for the Nisei.

It was an organization of Philistines, or of Philistine leadership, and to illustrate the point, I mention one of their annual dinners which typically shows the activities it promoted. At this dinner-dance, held at one of the better downtown hotels, the program began with the flag procession of a few Boy Scouts who marched to the center of the banquet hall to plant their flowing American flags while the audience, in long gowns among women and dark suits among men, stood at attention. As the flag was set in its place, Clarence Arai, the oldest Nisei Seattle lawyer who was nicknamed "Mayor of Main Street" (Mayor of the Seattle Japanese district), gave the command for everyone to pledge his allegiance to the flag and sing a stanza of "My Country Tis of Thee" before the beginning of the dinner. The after dinner speaker was the head of a local post of the American Legion, a man of some prominence among the Legionnaires of that region who ~~had~~ was frequently called upon to participate in JACL functions. And the person who introduced the main speaker was, as was often the case, ^{James Sakamoto} the blind editor of the Courier who gave one of his fighting introductions in his hard, rasping/^{voiced} mistreatments of the English language. Although I recall nothing of the content of the speech, the Major who spoke generally treated themes of a typically Legionnaire character turned to suit the Nisei audience. The dinner was followed by a dance, the most congenial and unaffected portion of the program. The language used here to describe this affair may be somewhat subjective, yet ~~this was the attitude of the~~

yet most of the members themselves spoke of JACL activities in much the same tone. The significant fact is that despite the dissatisfaction among the membership with the Seattle JACL, there was little understanding of how to change the organization for the better and almost no effort in that direction.

(Insert paragraph on pp. 5-6 describing James Sakamoto at this point.)

Nothing represents better the weakness of the Nisei position in the political life of the community than the stand which Sakamoto and his Courier took on the Sino-Japanese wars of the 1930's. It will be recalled that the foreign policy of the United States with respect to Japan's invasion of the continent was one of open disapproval from the outset and of uncompromising hostility towards Japan in later years. However, the Courier became an out and out apologist organ for the activities of the Japanese Government in the Far East, and the amazing contradiction in it all was that ~~in~~ on the same pages with the rationalization of Japan's foreign policy would appear stirring accounts of the JACL's Americanism. The impossible position which the Courier and the Seattle JACL ~~was~~ was attempting to pursue is indicated in the remarks of a Caucasian who had long been a friend to James Sakamoto and had been a staunch defender of the Nisei. He declared, about the year 1937:

"I've come to the point where I can no longer subscribe to the Japanese-American Courier. Why, the paper's become nothing more than a propaganda sheet for the Japanese Government. And I know that a lot of influential people in Seattle who have been supporting Jimmy until now and have subscribed to his paper feel just as I do."

The choice between America or Japan was clearly indicated to the Nisei even as early as this period, and many "intellectually" minded

took a genuine stand for America at the time, even at the cost of antagonizing their Issei parents and friends. For the bulk of Nisei, however, there was nothing to do but to rationalize Japan's position to the American world, and to assume as far as possible a neutral position on the international issues between the nations. Sakamoto's position, in particular, is understandable though perhaps not commendable. His paper depended for its advertizing support upon the Issei, and not on the Nisei, and as blind and helpless as he was, he did not have the strength to antagonize the Japanese Consulate. Moreover, because of his personal handicaps, his newspaper was constantly on the verge of bankruptcy and his family was pitifully close to destitution.

Such, in brief, is the confused, insecure course that the Seattle JACL and its leaders followed in the years prior to the outbreak of war. If the JACL was an opportunistic, unstable organization, the fault lay not merely with its leadership, but the bulk of the Nisei population in Seattle were confused concerning their national and social identity and they extended these characteristics into their major organization. One might say that almost all the characteristics of the JACL, good or bad, derived more or less directly from the characteristic mental state of the Nisei.

On December 7, 1941, the Seattle JACL was apparently totally unprepared for the turn of events that was to affect it so profoundly. The immediate consequences of the outbreak of war to the Japanese community in Seattle was to curtail in considerable degree the freedom of the Issei generation. All their community organizations were closed without ceremony, their businesses suffered serious setbacks

due to the freezing of funds and revoking of licenses, and most of the important Issei leaders of the community were immediately apprehended by the F.B.I. or were placed in a position of impotency because of their fear of apprehension. It required no profound analysis to realize that the relative positions of the Issei and Nisei had been suddenly reversed, and the JACL was not slow to capitalize on the role of leadership that was cast upon the Nisei. An Emergency Defense Council was created within the JACL, its purpose being to cooperate closely with the Seattle Civilian Defense Control offices. Through the Courier and the English sections of the Japanese papers, calls were sent out to the Nisei for participation in the JACL's CDC activities. Nisei teams of the CDC were recruited, and the activities of these teams were given publicity in the Seattle papers. An important branch of the Emergency Council was its "intelligence corp" that was to operate directly under the supervision of the F.B.I., and it was an openly stated fact that Clarence Arai was the chief of this bureau. At the head of all this activity was James Sakamoto, and overnight Sakamoto's position shifted from that of the "leader of the Seattle Nisei" to the "leader of the Japanese community."

One of the first events sponsored by the JACL in its effort to meet its new responsibilities of leadership was a large mass meeting of all Japanese in the community called in the latter part of December ~~for~~ at the Japanese Buddhist Church. The function of the meeting was to re-affirm the loyalty of Japanese in Seattle to the United States demonstrating this fact to the ^{rest of the} people of Seattle, and an elaborate program was undertaken for this purpose.

Important political figures in the city like Mayor Milliken and Judge _____ were called to attend the meeting and speak to the Japanese, representatives of Seattle papers were asked to be present to note the conduct of loyal Japanese, and several speakers from the community, both Issei and Nisei, spoke earnestly attempting to convince a skeptical public of the good intention of Japanese in America. It was the most elaborate affair of its kind ever prepared by the Seattle JACL for the purpose of creating a favorable public relations; a PA system was set up for the speakers, the invariably present Boy Scouts flag bearers were ^{again} present to start the ceremony with the presentation of colors, and the whole meeting was carried out in a solemn atmosphere of serious patriotism such that any outsider who might be in attendance could hardly question the loyalty of those whom this meeting represented. Despite the uncertainties induced by the restrictions of movement and action placed on Japanese by the Government, or perhaps more correctly because of these uncertainties, a large audience of Issei and Nisei turned out to pack the auditorium to overflowing. The Mayor of the city gave fine words of his faith in the Japanese people and of his effort to do all possible for them, the judge spoke of his previous friendship with many Japanese and reaffirmed his trust in the people, an Issei representative read off in stumbling fashion, but with great sincerity, the desire of the alien Japanese to cooperate with the Government in their war effort, and the Nisei speakers pointed out the American heritage that the Nisei have adopted and what "we" must do to preserve that heritage. All of this was recorded by the reporters from the Press and presented to the Seattle public on the

following day in the columns of the two leading Seattle newspapers.

One of the important occupations carried on by the JACL through these days was the creation of a favorable public opinion towards the Japanese in Seattle, and there was a need for such work in the light of questioning letters and articles that were coming out about the Japanese. The Seattle JACL seemed in a particularly favorable position to promote this work, for James Sakamoto, through his position as editor of an English language newspaper, had good connections with reporters for the Seattle papers. On more than one occasion, a large section of the Seattle papers was devoted to an account of the work being carried on in the JACL office under its Emergency Defense Council program. In January a correspondence was carried on between the secretary of the local JACL and Fisher, the author of Joe Palooka, asking for the introduction of a Nisei soldier into this influential comic strip to show the part the Nisei were playing in the American war effort. Although nothing ultimately came of this correspondence, due to Mr. Fisher's contention that the strip was planned months ahead and there was no room for the introduction of a Nisei into the story at the time, Fisher nevertheless wrote and drew up a cartoon for a single cut to express his encouragement for the Nisei, and this too was published in the Seattle papers. What might be said of this frantic effort on the part of the JACL to promote good will, however, is that it came too late to alter the underlying skepticism that was apparent in the expressions of the public.

Perhaps the need was that the JACL and the people of Japanese ancestry in Seattle be one step ahead of the rest of the city, but

the activities of the JACL were geared to synchronize one step behind the rest of the people. As Civilian Defense teams were organized in the city to control the city under blackouts, the JACL promoted formations of teams of their own, and urged the participation of Nisei in these activities. As the Red Cross work of the larger community raised its tempo to meet the demands of a wartime America, the Red Cross work of the JACL which had been functioning in a desultory manner likewise increased its activity. When First Aid classes were formed throughout the city following the outbreak of war, the JACL organized classes and requested demonstrators to teach First Aid to the Japanese in the community. There was no question of the increased activity of the JACL, the buzzing busyness of its office, but the pathetic fact about all this business was that although the activity may have loomed large within the narrow limits of the Japanese community, it was lost within the forest of activity of like kind being carried on in the city as a whole.

Finally, there was the important function of the JACL to aid the Issei in interpreting and filling out the innumerable Government forms that were required of them at this time, or of communicating ~~and~~ the various regulations and information that were designed to regulate the lives of Nisei as well as Issei. In many respects this was the most important work being carried on in the JACL office for the months following the outbreak of war was one of considerable confusion and restriction in the Japanese community, and some central source of information was needed to clarify the communication from the Government. Alien Japanese, for instance, found their funds frozen such that many had scarcely enough to maintain their personal

subsistence. Others discovered that they were unable to renew their business licenses after the end of the year 1941, and they found themselves confronted by the possibility of economic strangulation. To be sure, there were Nisei lawyers in the community working long into the nights doing a flourishing trade of helping the people solve their problems, but it was the JACL office that became the clearing house of much miscellaneous information for the people. In effect, the JACL office took over the function in the community which was formerly performed largely by the office of the Japanese Association, and the stream of Issei inquirers who previously flowed to the Association was suddenly shunted overnight to the JACL office. (The Japanese Association, of course, became defunct immediately after the outbreak of war.)

Among these Issei who sought information and advice from the JACL office, there was much dissatisfaction expressed about the operation of that office. In the first place, the JACL office which had formerly operated with a limited staff for limited purposes, suddenly found itself inundated with a tremendous amount of work and responsibility. It was immediately necessary to increase both the function and personnel of the office, and the organization of the new operations could not be carried out rapidly enough to keep up with the demands upon the office. A new personnel was introduced into the office, and it is of interest that much of the time given to this work was from those JACL members, some of whom had become inactive in the years before the war, who found themselves without employment due to the closing down of their businesses. Particularly did this form of unemployment occur

among the Nisei who had been employed by companies incorporated in Japan, such as the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and the Sumitomo Bank. "Tosh" Hoshide, who had been employed by the Mitsubishi Company, is perhaps the best example of the new personnel in the JACL office. He had formerly been a president of the local chapter but had more recently drifted away from JACL work. However, at the outbreak of war, after being apprehended by the F.B.I. for alleged participation in a pro-Japanese organization, a connection he had made for business reasons, he renewed his activities in the JACL following his release from the FBI custody and became a vigorous worker in its office. He gave much of his time to the JACL asking no compensation for what he did, and during the JACL campaign to raise funds for their work, he contributed both his energy towards campaigning as well as an amount greater than might have been expected of him considering his rather difficult financial status. (Hoshide's wife had suffered two or three miscarriages and they were long known to be troubled by economic problems.) One suspects that Hoshide was thoroughly frightened and humiliated by the accusations of disloyalty, and his work in the JACL may have been to clarify his loyalty to the United States.

Others who became important functionaries in the office arose out of similar circumstances though they were neither associated with Japanese corporations nor apprehended by the FBI. Bill Hosokawa was elected to the important post of the secretary of the local JACL, a position which ^{placed} ~~made~~ him immediately under Sakamoto. Bill had been employed by the local Japanese Consulate after completing his studies in journalism at the University of Washington, had been

transferred to the Singapore office of the Japanese Consulate and later made the editor of a Singapore English newspaper which was declared to be subsidized by the Japanese Government, and had returned to the United States in October 1941 when the threat of war in the Orient became ominous. Here again one may question whether the desire to rid himself of the taint of association with the Japanese Government was a motive for joining vigorously the most "Pro-American" group among the Nisei after the outbreak of war. In any case, Bill had been unemployed during the period before the outbreak of war, and was in a position to give much time to the JACL when this office found itself short-handed. In the case of George Ishihara, who with Hosokawa and Sakamoto held the most important positions in the Emergency Council, his unemployment at the time of the outbreak of war was due to the seasonal character of his work. His chief occupation was that of ^abuyer for produce houses and generally during the winter months he had little to do except to occupy himself with miscellaneous work. Whether it was a matter of chance or of real determination, it was a characteristic of all these men as well as many others who entered into JACL work about this time that they were unemployed during the month of December, and, moreover, were men who had long suffered economic hardships for one cause or another.

To anyone inclined toward a cynical view of the JACL, there is nothing more striking than the remarkable shift in political position which the organization underwent in the week following ~~the~~ December 7, 1941. As I have previously indicated, the dominant characteristic of the JACL in Seattle through the 1930's was its

neutral stand on the question of opposition in the Japanese and United States foreign policies in the Far East. In fact, Sakamoto and the Courier as well as many leaders of the JACL, were acting as apologists for the Japanese Government following their invasion of Manchuria and of China proper. By contrast, their stand after December 7 was marked by an outspoken denunciation of Japan's action in starting the war, and although this reversal of position was made easy by the element of surprise in Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor, the fundamental conflict in the policies of the two nations was clearly evident in the years prior to the outbreak of war, and the reversal of the JACL and Nisei political views was necessitated only by the ^{ir}wishful blindness to the actual condition of Pacific relations. However, even these ambiguities in the JACL political views are understandable if one recognizes the fear of the organization of cutting itself loose from the moral support of the Japanese Government especially in the light of the weak minority position of Japanese on the West Coast.

As the outcry in the American public for the evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry swelled, the JACL busied itself with issuing counter publicity to establish the fact of Japanese loyalty. We have already mentioned the favorable newspaper support that the JACL sought and gained. Moreover, the organization spent its time writing letters to the President of the United States, Mrs. Roosevelt, and a few ^{Caucasian} friends within the region who might use their influence to contest the evacuation movement. But the public relations work of the organization was characteristically limited by the lack of contacts that could be leaned upon for aid in this critical period.

One wonders if the leaders of the organization must not have felt the same feeling of helplessness in the face of powerful forces operating to oust them from their homes which was being felt by the large majority of Nisei during these times. Most Nisei spent their time drifting with the course of events only hoping that nothing disastrous would happen to them; and all the JACL could do was to take the minimal action towards deterring the approaching disaster.

When it became known that the Tolan Hearings would be held in Seattle in the latter part of February, the Seattle JACL was invited to submit a report to the Tolan Committee and to be represented at the Hearings. The JACL immediately outlined an elaborate report of the contributions of the Japanese to the economy and social life of the Northwest, and despite the brevity of time remaining to compile the data and put it together, a fairly comprehensive discussion of these points was written up.¹ As Bill Hosokawa, the secretary of the JACL and the editor of the report, declared, "We worked three days and night practically without sleep to put the thing together as well as to gather the data that's included. It's not entirely accurate, but I feel we did a pretty good job considering the limited time we had." The main emphasis of the report was upon the integral part played by Japanese in the Northwest in the local economy and the need for their manpower, especially in wartimes, for the maintenance of this economy.

It may be that the JACL performed a much more important part in the counteraction of the evacuation movement than has been credited to them in this report, and, unfortunately, it is at the moment

impossible to sufficiently document this report to give any proof of either the present or the opposite view. Yet, from a casual acquaintance with the activities of the JACL prior to evacuation, it seems apparent that the organization was only a little ahead of the unorganized mass of Nisei in its effort to counteract the trend of events that were developing in those months. The striking fact is that the JACL was far more efficient, as it seems to us, in administering the process of evacuation than it was in organizing against it. One is inclined to the view that the Seattle JACL was organized to function as a minor satellite of the larger community, but that it was not organized to oppose it.

The Seattle JACL and the Evacuation

As soon as the decision of the Western Defense Command to evacuate all Japanese, both Issei and Nisei, from the military areas of the Pacific Coast became known, the function of the JACL was immediately turned to minimizing the confusion in the community concerning the procedure of evacuation, and of creating the greatest efficiency possible in effecting the evacuation. As I have said, in this function the JACL seemed to perform much better than in its previous effort to oppose evacuation.

The immediate concern of the people of Seattle was regarding the disposition of their property, and various offices were established by the Government for the performance of this task. Most of these offices were centralized under the WCCA, located at 808-2nd Avenue in Seattle, but for various reasons the matter of custody of property could not be cleared up without information from other sources such as the District Attorney's office and the F.B.I.

For the people of the community, the JAOL became the office for the coordination of information, and most of the problems concerning the disposal of property, filling in of various forms required by the Government, and procedures of evacuation, were taken to that office. The kind of work done by the JAOL in this connection is indicated in the following examples of correspondence:

Route 4, Box 104
Chehalis, Wash.
March 26, 1942

Dear Mr. Hosokawa:

Since the Army has actually started evacuating the Japanese from the Pacific Coast they will probably work very fast. Therefore I have a few questions to ask.

Upon your suggestion in your letter of March 11, I went to the U.S. Employment office in Chehalis and asked them various questions in regard to this matter. But they were not very sure about the evacuation and have asked us to wait about another week or until the Farm Security Administration Office can be transferred from Raymond to Chehalis so that definite arrangements can be made on the farms.

The Japanese papers said in today's issue that if people are moved by the Army, then, they would not be able to take all their household belongings and others with them. Does this apply to bicycles and automobiles? How are the Seattle group doing? Are majority of them selling or keeping them for transportation? If we are not allowed to take our auto with us we would much rather sell it.

We have no radio and the newspapers are always a day late so that some of the news we miss unless we pick it up thru another place.

We have also about three sacks of rice and number of sacks of flour. Will they permit us to ship these to where we go?

I am asking you these things because people in the U.S. Employment office seem to know very little about these things, and I hate to listen to people who tell us this and that because then we wouldn't know what to think.

Also in regard to auto insurance. In November we took out an insurance covering public liability and property damage, with an agent in Centralia of the Maryland Casualty Company. However, after the outbreak of war it was cancelled a month afterwards. Various insurance agents in Chehalis have told us after we showed them the papers, they would return the premium due us. But they haven't yet, and it's been a good three months since its cancellation. We think we have a perfect right to have it returned to us, but what opinion do you form in regard to this matter?

Yours very truly,
M. Nakamura

Dear Mr. H., We have the ashes of my brother in our house. Of course, it is illegal to keep them, but we had planned to take it back to Japan when the opportunity came. What do you think is the best solution to this? We have been quite concerned over this because of this evacuation.

Very truly yours,
M. Nakamura

March 30, 1942

Miss M. Nakamura,
Route 4, Box 104,
Chehalis, Washington.

Dear Miss Nakamura:

Even at this late date, almost everything concerning evacuation is still indefinite. The first group to be evacuated to Owens Valley, California, will go by train and leave practically all their personal possessions behind. How later groups will be handled, I am not sure.

In the case of your parents where your father is quite ill, perhaps it might be better to sell your car as soon as you can get a reasonable price for it.

In California, persons going to the reception camps are fed by the government and therefore do not need to take along food.

You have every right to get your money back on the insurance policy. I suggest that you see your agent immediately or write to the head office of the insurance company and request a return of that money. As for your brother's ashes, it would be a good idea to deposit them at some local or nearby columbarium. I also understand the Buddhist Church in Seattle ~~see~~ accepts urns.

May I also remind you that it is very essential to make arrangements for care of your farm property before you leave. As I remember, I suggested in my last letter that you get your neighbor to look after your land or make some other similar arrangement.

Very truly yours,
William Hosokawa

Longview, Washington,
P.O. Box 180,
March 25, 1942

J.A.C.L.,
517 Main St.,
Seattle, Wash.

Dear Sir:

I wrote to you about two weeks ago asking you for some advice what we should do with our monthly payments. We are all waiting for that answer but two weeks has passed without a word from your office.

I also enclosed a stamp, because we wanted an answer as soon as possible. If you do not mind will you please give us an answer to that letter as soon

as possible. Thank you.

Mrs. K. Kayano

(There follows her first letter which had gone unanswered.)

March 12, 1942

Dear Sir:

I am writing to you again for some information many of us here are so puzzled of what to do.

I own a refrigerator which I purchased about five months ago, I am almost half finished with the payment. What do you think I should do? The ladies here are all debating too. Whether to return it or still keep payment on it. Is it worth it? I sure hate to lose it, because I've paid so much on it already. Please let me know?

About cars too. They would like to know if it is worth keeping up on this payment or returning it.

Would like an immediate answer if possible.

Thank you. Sorry I had to bother you again.

Sincerely,
Mrs. K. Kayano

Shiro Ogasawara,
Bacon Island #10 $\frac{1}{2}$,
Stockton, California
March 14, 1942

J.A.C.L.,
517 Main Street,
Seattle, Washington.

Gentlemen:

As I do not have a passport (lost), I am having difficulty cashing my checks and will appreciate it if, through this office, you may be able to procure for me a signed statement, attested by Notary Public, to show that I entered the United States at Seattle, June 30, 1922 on the Osaka Shosen Kaisha liner, Africa Maru, on passport #190176. I left the Immigration office on July 1.

I shall pay for Notary Public fee and other fees attached toward procuring the statement.

I shall appreciate very much if you will handle this as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,
Shiro Ogasawara

March 30, 1942

Mr. Shiro Ogasawara,
Bacon Island, #10 $\frac{1}{2}$,
Stockton, California

Dear Mr. Ogasawara:

Upon careful inquiry regarding your letter of March 14, we have discovered that any affidavit attesting to your entry into the United States must be signed by you and witnessed by two American citizens. We are unable to procure such statement from the United States Immigration Office here.

We are enclosing a form which has been approved for use in Seattle. We suggest that you have copies of this made and sworn and attested to by your friends in Stockton.

We trust that this will be satisfactory in California, as this has been accepted by the authorities here.

Very truly yours,
William Hosokawa

~~Note: See letters on pp. 20-23~~

^{It is} Apparently ^{that} from these letters, the inquiries concerned not only ~~with~~ the disposition of ~~the~~ property but ^{also} with such questions as how to get a legal clearance for missing passports, what to do with urns of the dead, ^{and} ~~and~~ what property to take to Assembly Centers. The fact of ^{the} confusion that existed in the minds of the Japanese people in that area cannot be minimized. This too should be evident from a review of these letters, ~~that~~ The advantage which the JACL possessed in giving advice on these inquiries was that it had more direct contacts than the people in general with governmental and other agencies dealing with the problem of evacuation.

Not only was the JACL concerned with advising prospective evacuees, but they were also concerned with the problem of trying to maintain a community that was already in the process of disintegration. Many of the Japanese had become unemployed since December 7, and even at this late date some of them were seeking employment to maintain themselves until the date of evacuation.

Note: See letter on p. 24

March 30, 1942

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Joe Kozo Uenishi, a Japanese national residing at 171-C 16th Avenue, Seattle, Washington, has applied to this office for assistance in finding employment and has been registered at this place since early in January 1942. Although he has expressed his willingness to take any sort of work and has checked here at frequent intervals, we have not been able to place him to date.

Very truly yours,
Wm. Hosokawa

Note: William Hosokawa reports that the above form was used with success by persons seeking a position through the U.S. Employment Service.

The JACL office operated as an intermediary between the Japanese and U.S.E.S. although it in itself was probably unsuccessful in getting employment for these people. In many instances, however, ^{there} were cases in which the breadwinner of the family had become unemployed as a consequence of agitation against the Japanese or where issei parents had been apprehended by the F.B.I., and among these cases were some in which families were reduced to a tragic state of impoverishment. The JACL likewise intervened in these cases and sent out sacks of rice, canned goods and other foods in order to aid these families through the period prior to evacuation. It may be noted that the JACL was ^{thus} ~~in~~ ~~this case~~ fulfilling functions which had hitherto been performed by the Japanese Association of Seattle; but since the latter organization was now defunct, the JACL was performing services that had been previously taken care of by older issei organizations. As has been traditionally the case among the Japanese, very few families were willing to voluntarily request relief. But the JACL would learn of those cases of need through friends who reported cases or through Caucasian welfare agencies. This work was largely financed through funds of the JACL, much of which was the residue from a financial drive of the JACL in earlier years, but no little portion ^{of it} ~~which~~ was directly contributed at that time by the people of the community who were themselves in a better situation. Contributions to the

JACL were frequently being made through this period both by Issei as well as Nisei and some of the contributions were earmarked for this relief work.

Another important work of the JACL was to act as a clearing house for evacuation sales. Japanese who had property to sell such as refrigerators, sewing machines and other furniture used the JACL office as kind of an advertising agency for the sale of these goods. As this function of the JACL became generally known prospective Caucasian customers called the office and inquired about goods in which they were interested. The sales on the whole were quite satisfactory due to the shortage under war time conditions of such commodities as refrigerators and farm equipment. The extent of the work of the JACL in this connection ^{is} roughly indicated by the fact that one full-time officer gave all of his time to these evacuation sales.

The most important work of the JACL in this period, however, was that function ~~of~~ communicating information concerning evacuation from governmental agencies to the people in the community. ^{The} Confusion, ^{as} I have previously ~~indicated~~ indicated, that existed in the community ~~throughout the period~~ gave rise to endless rumors that had no basis in accurate information. The fault in this regard probably lay in the fact that governmental agencies were outlining general policies for evacuation procedures and were not stating detailed programs of handling evacuation. For example, at the time ~~of~~ ^{the} restriction of voluntary evacuation was announced in the newspapers sometime late in March, there was immediately much confusion as to whom this restriction applied to. It raised a question ~~as to~~ whether the restriction was directed only at aliens or whether it also applied to citizen Japanese. In attempting to interpret the meaning of this announcement, ^{it was learned that} ~~found~~ the Seattle office of the WCCA was as much confused as anyone else in its interpretation. It was only after much conversation with the San Francisco office that clarification of the announcement was gained. Rumors such as these regarding the interpretation of ~~the~~ announcements, of how prospective evacuees should plan movements according to these announcement, of what they

might do or might not do, cropped up ~~in connection~~ with ^{such} alarming frequency that it was necessary ~~that~~ ^{for} some office with more direct channels of communication with the San Francisco WCCA ~~should be in a position~~ to clarify these informations. Bill Hosokawa, who was then acting as secretary of the JAOL, makes the proud claim that the Seattle WCCA office declared of the JAOL office that it was often a step ahead of its own office in getting this type of information. To be sure, it was impossible for the JAOL or any other organization to intelligently ride ^{the} public atmosphere of ^{the} confusion we have described. But the JAOL office undoubtedly performed an important role in minimizing that confusion. Especially was this ^{true} ~~time~~ ^{the} for ^{the} Elder Issei who like ^{the} Nisei had access to the WCCA office but who because of language handicaps feared to approach that office for simple information that they required. It was the JAOL office that publicized through the Japanese press and mass meetings the necessary information to the Issei.

I have previously mentioned ~~the fact~~ ^{as} that, ^{it} seemed to me, ~~that~~ the JAOL ^{was} far more efficient in administering the process of evacuation than ⁱⁿ organizing against it. Illustrations of ^{the} ~~which~~ work the JAOL did ~~among this period~~ seem to suggest the ~~same~~ view that the JAOL fulfilled an important role in the community in administering evacuation. The weakness of the JAOL in organizing ~~gain~~ against evacuation, however, may have had its basis in the general political stand which it took from December 7 on. ~~Note~~ ^F For instance, ~~that~~ in the ~~the~~ mass meeting of the Seattle JAOL following shortly after the ^{out} break of war, ~~was~~ ^{Nisei} the speakers on that occasion spent much of ^{their} ~~his~~ time in condemning the treachery of Pearl Harbor and disclaiming any relation with the nation that had perpetrated that incident. At the mass meeting of the JAOL held March 19, 1942, James Sakamoto was heard to say, "Direct your hatred against Japan, the nation which caused it all." Finally we have the attitude of cooperation with the Army on matters of evacuation. In a report submitted to the Tolson Committee, the Seattle JAOL declares, "Japanese

do not want evacuation. They desire to stay in their home city and districts away, of course, from vital defense areas and in this way they believe they can serve the United States best, but, we repeat, the Japanese will abide faithfully by any decision that the government reached." (P. 32 in Report Submitted to Tolson Congressional Committee on National Defense Migration) If the JAOL was weak in organizing against evacuation it seems that this weakness arose from the stand the organization took. But in a sense the very nature of this political stand derives directly from ^{the} confusion that existed in Nisei minds concerning international relations of Japan and the United States and Japan and China during the decade before. The position of most Nisei and the JAOL on this issue may be characterized as one of neutrality between ^{the} pressures of Issei opinion and American public sentiment. Given this position of neutrality the Nisei were not in a position to condemn Japan, and American, in ^{the} manner of one who had foreseen ~~it~~ ^{war, or} the historic course of events that seem inevitably to lead to war between Japan and the United States. The Nisei were not in a position to condemn powerful governments ~~with~~ in ^{their} ~~its~~ action against weaker minorities. Out of this paradox it seems, grew the attitude of cooperation with the Army that prevailed among the JAOL leaders in Seattle throughout this period.

Having stated their willingness to evacuate if "military necessity" required, the alternative which the JAOL saw was that of proposing ^{methods} ~~cooperation~~ of adjustment, following evacuation, that would be most satisfactory to the Japanese. One such proposal was ^{that of} the establishment of a model city. This idea ^{was most fully} ~~originated~~ ^{developed} ~~in~~ ^{by} Seattle ~~with~~ James Sakamoto and his group, although there were others like the American Friends Society that had similar plans in mind. Sakamoto's plan is included in the report submitted to the Tolson Committee, and it proposed the establishment of an all-Japanese city somewhere in the interior of the country able to sustain itself as a self-sufficient unit. The city would be governed by American citizens who would elect a mayor and council just as other American

cities, and the hope was that the community would develop so as to gain a permanent place for itself in this country. It is evident by the latter part of March however, that Sakamoto was discouraged by the non-committalness of government agencies to his proposal. Another plan that Sakamoto ~~was developed~~ about this time was that of a Japanese community somewhere in Missouri, the community to be established under the sponsorship of the Maryknoll Church, a Catholic organization of which group Sakamoto himself had become a devout member. Father Tibesar, priest of the church, evidently worked strenuously on the plan, and at one time, just on the eve of evacuation, there were high hopes among many members that the plan might ~~also~~ be carried out successfully. On the other hand there were those in the community who resented the fact that Sakamoto, who had assumed leadership in the community was using the agency of the JACL to ~~serve his~~ ^{feather his} own ~~interests~~ ^{nest}. Whatever justification there may have been for ~~criticisms~~ ^{the} directed against Sakamoto and the JACL on various scores, the significant fact is that ~~the~~ ^{at the} criticisms ~~were~~ ^{were} already brewing in the community in pre-evacuation days.

Despite the developments in the community against the JACL there was ^{also} a tendency among the people to rally behind the organization. In ~~a~~ large part increased support of the JACL grew out of ^{the view} in most instances, that there was no alternative to this support; and it can hardly be said that the following which developed arose out of ^{any} a deep-seated conviction ~~that~~ about the rightness of the JACL policy. In the latter part of March the JACL held a membership drive, the purpose of which was to gain solid Nisei backing of the JACL in this critical period. The basis ~~for the~~ ^{of} publicity ~~in the~~ ^{in the} this drive was the plan to write out ~~a~~ certificates of membership and identification for all members, new and old, and it was declared that this certificate would be of aid to resettling Nisei ^{by} indicating ~~their~~ ^{their} allegiance to this country. The office where ^{the} certification was carried on on March 22, was an interesting scene in itself. On ~~one~~ one side of the room, where prospective members filed in, ^{were} ~~over~~ long desks at which fees were paid ~~that were~~

~~required~~ ^{to gain} for membership. In the rear of the room snapshots were being taken by ^a hired Caucasian photographers that were to serve as identification on ^{the} certificates. The final ritual before the individual was ~~being~~ ^{duly} elected into ~~the~~ membership was that of standing before Clarence Arai (otherwise known as the 'Mayor of Main Street') in ^{The} presence of a Caucasian notary public ^{and of} ~~to~~ swear ^{ing} allegiance to the country. In one sense there was a quixotic ^{humor} ~~comedy~~ about the situation for this elaborate by-play ~~went~~ on in the midst of ^a considerable turmoil within the community. For several days it seemed that the major subject of conversation in the JACL office was the question of the form of the seal, of getting the proper notary, etc. There were many in the community who ~~intentionally~~ ^{witfully} rejected this opportunity of becoming members of the JACL, but there were many others who had never previously given ~~any~~ sign of interest in the organization who were present to become members on that day. Perhaps ~~this~~ ^{the latter} is not surprising considering the general feeling of insecurity which was profoundly ~~a~~ part of that community, and ^{among} ~~for~~ many ~~instances~~ any step that ~~went~~ ^{served} to safeguard their position was ~~to be~~ taken irregardless of their convictions.

By early April it was definitely known in Seattle's community that the Japanese of that area were to be removed to Puyallup Assembly Center. The question of procedure of evacuation, however, was not definitely outlined until the middle of the month and in the intervening period there developed a struggle among contending groups to gain position of leadership when evacuation came. In these last weeks before the Japanese community of Seattle was to be abolished the minds of many Nisei turned to the question of relative status in the new community that was to be formed in Puyallup. Whatever was the personal motivation in the struggle for status or not, it was generally felt that in the expressed sentiment that leadership and organization of a high type be required in the new community. In this situation there were those who felt themselves better fitted than others to perform the required function of leadership.

One such group looking ahead to organizing in the Assembly Center was that which arose around the group in the University YMCA and YWCA. Leadership in this community was probably two-fold (1) from Caucasian staff members of these organizations and (2) certain Nisei, alumni and active members of these organizations. The nisei most interested in creating the organization was probably Mrs. Paul Suzuki and at her suggestion two or three meetings were called in which problems of organization was discussed among a select group that she gathered. Membership of this group was largely drawn from university students and graduates; those who were, generally speaking, non-JACL members the periphery of its activities. There was, at first, some tendency for Nisei to flock to this group but they never gained authority to organize in Puyallup Center and as a consequence it was the JACL which shortly took the rein of control. The fact that the JACL gained control was due largely to its close relationship with the Army, which when the time of evacuation approached went directly to James Sakamoto and the JACL to carry out evacuation. One may well understand the feeling which developed among the defeated group or groups against the JACL when it was learned that the latter organization had gained its authority through cooperation with the Army. Once the organizing work of the JACL started there was a general debacle in other groups and many of the minor leaders of these groups went over to the JACL to assume certain positions within that organization. The general feeling expressed by one person who declared, "There's no use belonging to any other group than the JACL; now they carry the whip hand and we might as well follow along."

When Colonel Malone, Army representative from Camp Lewis who was supervisor of evacuation from Seattle, went to James Sakamoto and asked him to organize the Japanese for evacuation, it is said that Sakamoto replied, "Since the Army has come to me with a duty and responsibility of this task I feel that I should assume leadership in this matter." Whatever truth there may be in this rumor, Sakamoto assumed or was appointed to the leadership and he proceeded to organize

for evacuation and the community in the Center by selecting leaders largely from his own group. In the middle of April only a week or so before evacuation Colonel Malone was invited to the JAAC office to present his suggested organization of the task and procedure of evacuation to his "leaders" of the community. The organization he proposed followed strictly according to Army practices. The community was to be commanded or supervised from Camp headquarters. The Chief Supervisor's position corresponded roughly to that of a Commanding Officer of a Division. The Camp headquarters would then organize under the Chief Supervisor in four sections: G1 (personnel), G2 (intelligence), G3 (operations) and G4 (supply).

Note: See Appendix for Organization of Headquarters Camp Harmony.

The organization of the camp was further complicated by the fact that Puyallup Assembly Center was constituted of four different areas on fair grounds and parking lots in which the possibility for communication among the areas was restricted. It was therefore necessary for each area to have its sectional leader and under this leader was a subsidiary organization that paralleled that of Camp Headquarters. It is of interest that Colonel Malone in speaking of this organization praised it as the most effective system known to the Army and one which was inherited from the German practices. Whatever may be said of its efficiency as an Army organization one may question its adaptability to a community of civilian population. Moreover, the system, as in the Army, tended to promote a line of authority in which the command of the supervising officer might not be questioned by those of lower scale. In the nature of Sakamoto's personality however, one may well suspect that he found the organization attractive for he has always been the type to stress obedience to authority and assumption of responsibility where due. But the very nature of this organization was also to have its respect in going about anti-JAAC feeling which developed against the authority given the JAAC at Puyallup Assembly Center.

Since the evacuation of Japanese from Seattle did not proceed en masse but started with the removal from certain areas of the city and moved on to other areas later, the Puyallup Assembly Center was not filled all at one time but was gradually populated first in one area then in the next. The question therefore arose as to Camp headquarters staff, whether they should remain in Seattle for the period of three weeks that would be required for the completion of evacuation or whether it should precede all other evacuees in establishing a community at Puyallup. For reasons of their own, James Sakamoto and his staff decided on the former course of retaining headquarters in Seattle until the last day of evacuation. As a consequence no general community organization existed in Puyallup until the appearance of the headquarters staff in the middle of May and sectional leaders of A, B and C who preceded headquarters staff from the last of April gained, more or less, autonomous control over respective sections or areas. For example, action decided in Seattle that Bill Mimbu, Nisei lawyer, should be section leader of area A. His staff of personnel, intelligence, operation and supply leaders were selected by James Sakamoto and two or three of his lieutenants. This group left Seattle about April 28 and before arriving at Puyallup immediately organized area A so as to minimize discomfort of people who arrived with them. Within the intervening period of four weeks Mimbu and others so established themselves in that area that they had unquestioned leadership over the group and through the process of trial and error worked out an organization which they felt was highly satisfactory for their purpose. Likewise in area B Takeo Nogaki was named section leader and in area C Teruji Umino was so elected and within their respective areas ~~organized~~ ^{organizations} similar to that in area A were developed.

At this point some further mention should be made of the manner in which various staffs were selected. In a large part the headquarters staff was appointed by James Sakamoto in consultation with Bill Hosokawa, George Ishi-

hara, and Dick Setsuda. By nature of selection procedure here selected to the staff were those known to this group, and no elective process was followed. There was considerable feeling among certain Nisei leaders who failed to gain appointment or who received lesser positions than they felt they deserved that Sakamoto and his group had by self-appointment gained control of the Assembly Center. Selection of section staffs were, in most cases, even more haphazard. George Ishihara, Dick Setsuda and Tom Kano would sit down over a list of names and quickly select out those whom they suggested for various positions. Since most of the selecting officers were non-university people, it followed that the staff selected included few college graduates. One of the ~~critic~~ criticism directed against the JAOL and headquarter staff was that Sakamoto, Ishihara, Setsuda and other leaders were illiterate fellows who had never fared well economically to bid the chance of evacuation and willingness to cooperate with the Army had gained position of authority over more intelligent people. In the procedure of selection no doubt that personal animosities had much to do with whether or not many would have a desirable position at the Assembly Center. For example, Takeo Nogaki, who was long an active member of the JAOL who because of independence, attacked the question of policy in the organization, was not well liked by the top officials and in this instance named only to the position of section leader. Likewise Bill Mimbu, regarded by some as one of the more capable Nisei, was not named to headquarter staff but only to the position of section leader. Innumerable other cases of intelligence and other ~~cases of~~ qualifications found themselves without any status in the Assembly Center because they were not known to the JAOL group. It is an apparent question of status which was not important in Seattle community where the individual could seek their independent way become immediately of greatest importance in the Assembly Center where the authority of the community was centralized in the hands of a few and ^{lesser} ~~lower~~ persons were in a sense the tools of the leaders.

Whatever may be said pro and con on the decision of the JACL Headquarters Staff to remain in Seattle until the last day of evacuation, the fact remains that the Staff did remain in Seattle. The decision was to have a definite consequence in the Assembly Center and resentments created between those who went first and those who went last. The function of the JACL office during the last month before the Seattle office was closed had largely to do with detailed procedure of evacuation itself. Evacuation from Seattle began with the removal of Japanese from the harbor areas of the downtown district and certain residential districts of the south end. These people, who were evacuated on April 27 and 28, were asked to gather near an open lot just south of Seattle's Chinatown. All baggages being taken to the Assembly Center were to be brought to this point where they were loaded on trucks and taken to Puyallup. The people themselves boarded public busses which were hired for the purpose of evacuation and this caravan moved through the south end of Seattle ~~preceded~~^{preceded} by Army jeeps that closed the way and proceeded on to Puyallup by way of one of the less used highways. Those who desired to take private cars were informed by the Army that they might do so and were asked to gather at a point somewhat separate from the meeting place of the busses. Information of procedure was, of course, of some concern to evacuees and the JACL office served as an agency through which facts concerning movement could be received. Perhaps the major concern and anxiety of the evacuees, however, was that regarding the amount of baggage that might be taken. The official ruling of the WCCA put down in written form was that the evacuees might take only the amount they personally could carry. The limitation of baggage to this extent, however, was entirely unsatisfactory to evacuees and furthermore was not clear to the people as to what was meant by the phrase "amount a person could carry." The JACL office was frequently flooded in these days with inquiries regarding this point. To a large extent individual families arbitrarily determined ~~its~~ their own interpretation of the statement by going to observe what other eva-

cuees were taking with them but there were others who were inclined to follow the letter of regulation. For example, before the removal of Japanese from the last evacuated area in Seattle a rumor spread to the effect that individual persons were limited to 75 pounds of baggage. This rumor originated with a JAOL leader who misinterpreted a letter to one ~~WA~~ WCCA official. This official statement had to do with the amount of parcel post that might be sent in a single package to the Assembly Center but careless reading of the letter resulted in the JAOL leader to read that it meant the amount of ^{baggage} ~~baggage~~ and individual could carry and as a consequence of this rumor, some families restricted themselves to 75 pounds of baggage per person. When it was subsequently learned that the rumor was only a rumor and families had been "cheated" out of bringing all they wanted, the reaction was, of course, one adverse to the JAOL. Since the JAOL was not in any better position to interpret the very general regulation coming out of the San Francisco office than any other agency in Seattle, errors of interpretation inevitably crept in. But when criticism of the JAOL later appeared, it was those errors of facts that could not be misunderstood which were made by JAOL leaders that were remembered. Apart from the question of the amount of baggage that might be taken, there were constant inquiries from the Japanese remaining in Seattle as to the date of their evacuation. Here again the JAOL was in no better position than any other agency to inform the people of the date of departure but because of the great anticipation of this question innumerable rumors would appear concerning the date of departure and areas of evacuation to be affected. Part of the function of the JAOL was to attempt to minimize inference of these rumors and to the last days of evacuation there was always some popular concern about the question of storing property. Here again the JAOL attempted to alleviate the concern of the people by directing them to particular places of storage.

Seattle JACL in the Puyallup Assembly Center

On August 16, the last day of evacuation from Seattle, Camp Headquarters was moved from its office in Seattle to Puyallup Assembly Center. It had been decided that Camp Headquarters would be located in Area D, largest of the four areas constituting the fair grounds and parking space, which was being used for the Assembly Center and the area last filled with Seattle evacuees. As has been stated, the organization of Camp Headquarters had already been worked out in Seattle and its personnel been determined. The immediate concern of this organization, therefore, was to find an office from which they would operate. The first rooms which it occupied were in the barracks directly opposite the WCCA offices but some resentment among the evacuees to the establishment of an office there arose for many families had been forced to occupy rooms under the grandstand on the fair grounds that were far less suitable for living than the office of Camp Headquarters. The JACL leaders recognized the difficultness of the situation and within a week after their arrival removed the Headquarters office to rooms under the grandstand which were less suitable ~~for~~ from the standpoint of lighting and airiness but which were adequate for ~~the~~ its purpose. In the permanent establishment of these offices, one office was built for general office work and another for a waiting room and a smaller inside office was reserved for James Sakamoto, chief supervisor of Camp Headquarters. It was also necessary to find ~~inside~~ individual rooms for each sections G1, G2, G3, and G4. Due to the extreme shortage of housing facilities in Puyallup Assembly Center, it was difficult to find space for these offices for two or three weeks after the arrival of the Camp Headquarters staff. The inability to establish permanent quarters immediately upon arrival had some effect in retarding the initial organization of Camp Headquarters. In turn disorganized condition of the Camp Headquarters affected the lives of people in the center in more or less degree.

Individual functions and operations of staff members had previously been

determined in a written outline of the Headquarters organization presented to the JACL by Colonel Malone. If Colonel Malone may have understood this outline, however, it was clear that the evacuee staff members had no clear conception of what the duties were. The first two or three days of the conference of the Camp Headquarters was largely devoted to the clarification of the duties of the staff members. (See outline of the Camp Headquarters organization and specific duties of officers.) It must be said that there seemed to exist among most staff members an appalling ignorance of organizational work and it was sometime before the staff members arrived at a conclusion that by nature of the organization outline the authority descended vertically from the Chief Supervisor down through the supervisors of the respective sections. After two days of discussion it was agreed that all orders covering general policies and regulations should derive from the office of Chief Supervisor, James Sakamoto. The duties of the Chief Interpreter, Bill Hosokawa, serving immediately under the Chief Supervisor, was understood to be that of communicating orders from Sakamoto to section leaders. The general work of the various sections may be understood from the outline but the problem confronting the staff was that of defining specific duties of the staff officers so that they would not overlap. Not little time was spent in bickering and defining in their attempt to specify duties of the individual officers.

The more difficult problem which immediately developed, however, was the question of coordinating the Camp Headquarters organization with the organization in four separate areas. In a conference of the Camp Headquarters it was generally understood that the area leaders should go to section supervisors for any work they desired to have performed. For instance, if the supplies officer in Area A wanted supplies for his group he was to communicate the needs to the area leader who in turn communicated with the supervisor of supply at Camp Headquarters. One may readily see, however, that this vertical line of authority was extremely awkward and time consuming and moreover since there was no established traditions of obedience to authority such as one might find in the Army was practically impossible

to enforce this organization on various staff members. Even more acute than this problem of maintaining a bureaucratic organization, however, was the question of personal feeling of the already established leaders who were now required to subordinate themselves under the Camp Headquarters. Bill Mambu, Area A leader, for example, had in the course of three or four weeks prior to the arrival of the Camp Headquarters staff established a smoothly operating organization in Area A, indeed, this group which considered itself somewhat in the light of pioneers in opening the Puyallup Assembly Center, prided itself in the fact that it had arrived under extremely difficult circumstances and creating a working organization in a place where there had been nothing. It was true that at the time of the arrival of the first group, Puyallup Assembly Center was in an extreme state of unpreparedness. The days of their arrival had been extremely wet and overturned soil ~~had made~~ was like mucky bogs in which no paths could be made. Dishes had not been prepared, food had not been stored in adequate quantities and the problem of feeding a population of 1500 people presented major difficulties. It was out of such circumstances that Area A people had organized itself and it perhaps was not surprising that the members of this organization prided itself on what it had accomplished and on the favorable comments which the WCCA administrative officials had expressed to them. When the Headquarters staff arrived on this scene and attempted to establish authority over Area A organization, it was inevitable that the feeling of resentment developed in the latter group against those who came with less experience than themselves but who tried to supervise their work. The attitude taken by Bill Mambu and others of his group was one of reluctant cooperation and as a compensation to the subordinate position in this form of organization. Camp leaders seemed to react with an air of condescension when the problem arose in the Headquarters staff that had previously been solved in independent areas. The conflict between the Headquarters staff and area leaders was not restricted alone to the case of Area A but because of the high spirit de corp developed in Area A and their resentment of supervision from above was, perhaps, more apparent than in

other areas. In the past because of conflicts between area leaders and Headquarters staff but also because of the nature of the relationship between the WCCA administration and evacuees, the vertical line of authority suggested in the formal outline of the Camp organization was never actually followed. In a large part the individual areas functioned as autonomous units and took orders directly from WCCA officers. In this connection the relationship established between WCCA officers and evacuee officers in various areas prior to the arrival of the Headquarters staff frequently obstructed the fulfillment of the Headquarters organization. Caucasian officers in many cases had established a *contact* with the older evacuees that could not be immediately established with later arrivals and there was an inevitable tendency for WCCA men to go to those whom they best knew. This was, unquestionably, a source of pride and satisfaction to leaders in various areas but at the same time this practice may be said to have sabotaged the functioning of the outlined organization.

An illustration of this point can well be shown in the instance of the education program being instituted under the leadership of the WCCA man named Livingston. In Area A and in other areas established earlier an education program had been created that was functioning well under the circumstances. Plans had been drawn up for the receipt of equipment for teaching a class of youngsters and corresponded with outside groups that would make such equipment available to evacuees had been started. Its tendency, therefore, was to deal directly with the group already established but when it was learned at Camp Headquarters that program were going ahead in various areas with the knowledge and confirmation of the Chief Supervisor, it was immediately requested of the WCCA administration that all orders to evacuees should proceed through the Headquarters office. For the sake of preserving the organization the WCCA complied in general with the Headquarters' request but in actual fact was never possible to follow exactly the procedure of communicating with the evacuees through the Headquarters office. The view ^{was} expressed frequently at Camp Headquarters that the Chief Supervisor "should know

everything going on in Camp." But despite constant emphasis and remphasis of this point WCCA officials frequently dealt directly with evacuees rather than following the procedure which had formerly been agreed upon.

The relations of the Headquarters with the WCCA is further illustrated in the problem of housing which immediately developed at Puyallup as the first major difficulty confronting the Japanese organization. This problem and the manner of its dealing also exemplifies the way which the Headquarters staff functions. In preparing the camp for evacuees contractors for the construction hurriedly built some 200 or more apartments underneath the grandstand of the fair grounds. Barracks on the outside were flimsy and badly constructed for human livelihood, to say the least, but apartments under the grandstand scarcely were suited even for sheltering animals. Conditions there approximated more of that of a dungeon than of a place of human habitat; there was little or no light, hard concrete floors prevented warmth in rooms, apartments were merely four-boarded walls without any roofs, halls were narrow and constituted fire hazards, and in general they were such that were unsuited even as temporary living quarters. These quarters were condemned first by the County health officers, second, by the Chief Medical Officer of the ~~the~~ Camp, and third, by the Camp director himself but despite protests of all these officials against the housing of evacuees in this place, the Army contramanded all these condemnation orders and forced WCCA to place several hundred evacuees in these rooms. Evacuees who were assigned to these apartments immediately protested the situation and made efforts to get apartments on the outside where lighting and ventilation at least were more adequate. The unfortunate part of the apartment assignment procedure was that there were many empty rooms in the barracks on the outside even as people were assigned to undesirable quarters under the grandstand. As this later group eyed these quarters on the outside, it was natural for them to question how it was that they were given bad living quarters when there were many desirable ones on the outside. It happened that the assignment of rooms to more ~~desirable~~ desirable barracks was interrupted to permit the

~~filling~~ filling in of rooms under the grandstand but after the grandstand apartments were occupied assignment to outside rooms was reserved. It therefore resulted that many who came earlier received poorer quarters and it was the source of much resentment among them to see later arrivals provided with better living quarters than themselves. Rumors developed to the effect that it was those who were "in" with the JACL leaders who were getting the choice of rooms. This talk was entirely unjustified but sufficient instances of JACL members who arrived late and given better quarters made these rumors seem correct. The procedure was probably one worked out by the WCCA office but subsequently ~~criticized the pro~~ criticism of the procedure was directed against the Camp Headquarters.

When the Assembly Center was completely filled mostly by Seattle people and also by a scattering of a farming group, the problem confronting the Headquarters was that of reassigning families under the grandstand to better apartments on the outside. Considering the crowded situation throughout the center, the difficulty of emptying some 200 apartments under the grandstand and rehousing of families in them to barracks on the outside presented an enormous problem to the administrative group. The first step required was to have smaller families placed in single apartments so as to make for maximum use of all available space. It was also discovered that in the assignment of apartments certain empty rooms had been overlooked and it was possible to remove families from under the grandstand to such places. However, with the procedure of crowding families and the number of apartments made available on the outside were limited, it was necessary to select families who were to be first to move out. The policy determined was to first rehouse these families in which sickness and other reasons requested that they live under • healthier ~~condition~~ circumstances. Considering the desire of everyone to seek better housing, however, one may imagine the flood of requests that came to the office/ ^{and} despite casual medical inspection given all entering evacuees it was difficult to determine who among the families under the grandstand were in

greatest need of better living quarters. The JAOL Headquarters staff proceeded by listing all empty rooms on the outside and then of selecting from all requests turned in those whom the officers regarded as in the greatest need for better housing. For various reasons this procedure required considerable time and because of the general disorganization within the camp there was much confusion in the efforts of the officers to match needy families to empty rooms on the outside. Furthermore it was necessary to take into consideration the size of the family and apartment available. In some instances families that turned in urgent requests were overlooked at first because the family size could not be matched with the size of the apartment. In the meantime some people who became impatient with the slow procedure of the Headquarters took upon themselves to move into empty apartments and this added to the confusion. When the rehousing officers had straightened out these problems there was a necessity to gain clearance of the WCCA officials but this simple matter often required several days more of waiting.

It was perhaps natural that there should develop among those seeking housing feelings of resentment about the poor condition that had been forced upon them. It was equally natural that this feeling of resentment should sooner or later be directed against those who were thought to be persecuting them. Viewed from the outside it seemed apparent to the people that the main hitch in the rehousing program lay in the inefficiency of the Headquarters officers and in their tendency to show favoritism toward some and not others. Discontent that developed under these circumstances was one of the first important source of criticism against the JAOL.

~~The JAOL~~ Among the JAOL attitude that were developing at Puyallup Assembly Center, however, was the gradual development arising from a series of ~~facts~~ conditions in the center that were keenly felt by the evacuees. Whatever were the expectations of the evacuees regarding the center to which they were removed, it was generally the cases that actual condition which they found were the constant source of ~~dissatisfaction~~ disappointment and resentment. Rumor has it that Puyallup Assembly Center was one of the worst of all temporary establishments put up by the

WCCA. An important factor in creating a feeling of extreme restriction in the center was the division of the total area into four separate small areas. As a consequence the range of mobility within each area is much more limited than would have been the case had all these areas been combined into a single unit, and the limitation of space probably made the people more conscious of the presence of barbed wire fences and Military Police than may have been ~~true~~ true among the evacuees in other centers. For instance, in a class of young children who were asked to draw objects of their surroundings, a large ~~per cent~~ proportion of the drawings submitted presented barbed wire fences prominently in the background. In Area D, one which was located in the main fair grounds and where the grandstand was placed, a sentinel was posted on the roof of the grandstand with the barrel of his ~~gun~~ machine-gun pointed as it seemed downward at the people below. Mess halls, especially in Area D was in an extreme state of disorganization initially where it was inadequately equipped to feed a large population suddenly brought in. At the Area D mess hall, for example, it was necessary to feed 2800 people three times a day with only one kitchen from which to operate and at each meal time a line four abreast and almost two blocks long would form at the doorway of the mess hall. Curfew regulations were imposed such that the people were required to be in their barracks at 9 o'clock and ~~later~~ lights turned out by 10. Later this regulation was altered somewhat to permit the people to remain out until 10 p.m. All these conditions and many others not mentioned created conditions of discontent in a large proportion of the population.

In the confusion among the people of Seattle prior to evacuation opinion as to how to act against conditions of discrimination being directed against them. The impact of indiscriminate mentioned however, and the closeness of evacuation within the center which presented circulation of opinion gradually brought about a crystallization of opinion that was not possible on the outside. In these discussions the dominant view was one of resentment against the injustices of evacuation. Conditions in the Assembly Center tended to bring them out in the open.

It should be noted that the first article about the condition of the Assembly Center to appear in any national magazine was written by an evacuee in Puyallup Assembly Center for the New Republic magazine. The content of the article ~~was~~ severely criticized the condition of the center. The fundamental desire of the people at Puyallup then was to rebel in some way against the injustices which they felt were being imposed upon them. The attitude of the Headquarters, however, was inclined to be one of cooperating with the Army and WCCA. Leadership in the Headquarters thus was not following the sentiment of the people but rather going against it and in fact their policy tended to frustrate the feeling among the evacuees that some opposition to discriminatory acts should be made. When it was heard among the people the remark that "we have gotten together and strongly opposed evacuation," the fact remains that no such opposition developed but now that individual sentiments of individual people were being articulated, there was a strong view that some things should be done to regain in a measure their loss of respect. However, it was not so much the ~~failure~~ failure of the JACL to oppose evacuation prior to Assembly Center days but rather their failure to coincide with the ~~we~~ view of the popular majority within the center in opposing the WCCA which was the source of irritation about JACL to evacuees.

As a consequence of disappointment of the people over the failure of their leadership to express resentment and rebellion that was latent among them, the tendency among the people was to view the JACL leaders with considerable distrust. The popular feeling was that the JACL Headquarters staff was a puppet organization of the WCCA who mixed with Caucasian administrators in order to gain special privileges for themselves. It was said that these leaders were able to arrange better housing for themselves while sick people were left to remain in unhealthy living conditions. Likewise in the matter of movement from one ~~area~~ area to another, staff members had special privileges of passes ^{by} which to effect passage from area to area. But this freedom was looked upon with envy by the rest of the evacuees. It was said that because of special privileges granted to staff members

the latter assumed attitude of superiority that they scarcely deserved in the light of their inferior status in the community in Seattle.

Within the first two weeks after the arrival of the Headquarters staff in Puyallup they established mechanisms for infamenting the practice of carrying authority from the top down. On May 17, 1942 members of the administrative personnel indicating means by which business should be transacted in Headquarters offices was published. (See Appendix) This memo points to the WCCA as the apex of authority in camp. The Headquarters staff is declared to be immediately responsible to the WCCA, but members of the staff were largely to communicate with the WCCA office through the Chief Supervisor Sakamoto. The memo declares, "The Chief Supervisor or some^{one} duly delegated to represent him is the only channel to which the administrators of the camp (Japanese staff) may do business with the administrative staff, in turn the Chief Supervisor will communicate with the WCCA staff only through Bob Turner (Chief of WCCA) or someone duly delegated to represent him." As previously mentioned each of the four areas was directed by an area leader with a staff correspondent to that of the Headquarters and each ~~area~~ area was subdivided into sections headed by section leaders. The area leader was made directly responsible to the Chief Supervisor. The memo continues, "the Headquarters staff is the only group that has actual access to the Chief Supervisor. The area director will refer specific problems not capable of being handled within his authority to specific officers on Headquarters staff assigned to that detail."

All communication between staff members were required to be in writing and a copy of every communication had to be sent to the Headquarters office. It will be seen that this practice made for a highly centralized organization was founded on the notion that the whole camp was to be directed from a single officer of the Camp Headquarters. One might compare this organization with the SUPREME COMMAND of the Army organization in which all activity is subordinate under the leadership of a few men. But the paper work required for the fulfillment of such an organization, especially considering the newness of the system among the people, caused

the occasion to be extremely awkward. For matters ^{that} might have been dealt quickly by direct communication with the WCCA, sometimes it required several days of waiting for the Chief Supervisor to take the matter up with the WCCA.

To further facilitate the operation of this centralized organization, daily staff meetings were called at 10 A.M. to discuss in the central committee problems that were ~~wa~~ arising in the center. There was at ~~the~~ first discussion as to whether area leaders should be committed in these meetings but the decision was made that they should be invited. As the matter turned out the area leaders, despite their inferior status, in the organization, frequently had more to contribute to the daily discussion than had other members of the Headquarters staff. At these meetings such problems as the improvement of mess halls, disposition of garbage, control of baseball in areas of residence and control of movement between areas were taken up. Further discussions resulted in a resolution being drawn up to be presented to the WCCA administration, ~~and later~~ as the supreme authority in the camp generally ~~since~~ made the final decision about regulations in the camp. To be sure, there were certain matters that did not require the confirmation of the higher authority and these matters were settled within the meetings of the Headquarters staff.

The personnel of this organization was composed entirely of citizen Japanese and no Issei had even any access to their meetings. Furthermore, of Nisei who held leading positions, all were strong JAOL men and many popular leaders among the Nisei who were now JAOL found themselves on the periphery of the organization. The inner-clique of the Headquarters staff was composed roughly of James Sakamoto, Bill Hosokawa, George Ishihara, Dick Setsuda and Jack Maki. Sakamoto was unquestionably the leader of this group although both Maki and Hosokawa as well as Ishihara in ^a ~~add~~ lesser capacity were able to influence Sakamoto with their advice. This was largely possible due to the fact that Sakamoto was blind and he undoubtedly felt personal limitations in overseeing the camp. The policy followed by this group was one of cooperation with WCCA, roughly speaking, their attitude

may be stated as the view that "we're in no position to fight against the WCCA or the Army but we can better get what we want through cooperation with them."

The position of Clarence Arai in this organization is strikingly interesting. Arai was in Seattle JACL one of the recognized leaders and he invariably held high positions within the organization but at Puyallup he was deposed and placed in the subsidiary office of adjutant general. Arai's personal ambition probably was to act in some capacity that James Sakamoto promised and reasons for his removal to the insignificant position is not entirely clear. Considering his long history of activity as an influential member of the JACL and his long friendship with Sakamoto, Ishihara and other leaders, one could imagine that he ~~could not~~ ^{should} have been given a position of some importance at Puyallup. Arai's reaction was to take an attitude of indifference toward the work of the staff and he fought influence in the community by attempting to use his captaincy in the reserve corps as a means of gaining access to high ~~American~~ Army officials who visiting the camp.

Of the group I have mentioned who held positions of leadership in Seattle and found themselves on the ~~the~~ periphery of the central organization at Puyallup there were such men as Bill Mimbu, Tom Masuda, Kenji Okuda and Kenji Ito. This latter group ~~was~~ ^{was} composed entirely of college graduates who held professional positions in Seattle and they were among the nucleus of the Junior Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The latter organization was composed of Nisei business leaders who had been flourishing in Seattle during recent years in opposition to the JACL. Although there was no actual conflict in the progress of the two organizations, a feeling existed among the JACL leaders that the Junior Chamber of Commerce was attempting to assume leadership among the Nisei formerly held by the JACL. In the Assembly Center men like Mimbu and Okuda found themselves placed in subordinate positions to JACL leaders and they undoubtedly resented in an arbitrary manner in which their lower status was determined.

Due to my departure from Puyallup long before this group was transferred to Minidoka, I am not in position to describe the function of the JACL in Puyallup

during the last two months of operation at the Assembly Center. The story widely ~~circulated~~ current among Minidoka people, however, describing the crisis which led to the eventual downfall of the JAOL leaders may be here mentioned. From the first day of the opening of Puyallup Assembly Center there were occasional inspection of baggages of the evacuees following the bombing of Dutch Harbor. For example, FBI agents, with the assistance of WCCA officers, canvassed the whole camp for liquor and other contraband goods. In a large part the people took such matters passively. Sometime during the summer of their stay at the Assembly Center, however, the WCCA laid down a regulation that no Japanese printed material could remain among the people in the center. Agents of the WCCA therefore went through the entire camp confiscating old books, magazines and other written material that were in Japanese. It was at this point that feeling among the large portion of the evacuees thought the JAOL was not sufficiently standing up for the rights of the Japanese reached its strongest expression. Sakamoto's view was that since the Army had ordered the confiscation of Japanese written material there was nothing for the people to do but to submit to the order. Fellows like Okuda, Mimbu, Masuda and Ito opposed the stand taken by Sakamoto and demanded that some effort be made by the Headquarters staff against the carrying out of this stupid regulation. Despite the popular agitation against Sakamoto and other JAOL leaders the WCCA refused to remand the order. This crisis brought out in the open hostility existing between two factions seeking leadership in the community.

A very short while after the confiscation of Japanese written material, an incident occurred which aroused the anger of the whole evacuee population against Sakamoto and his group. On a short two-hour notice all leaders who had participated in the effort to prevent the confiscation of Japanese material ~~was~~ ^{were} suddenly given orders by WCCA to pack and be prepared for removal to other centers. Families affected by this order were those of Mimbu, Masuda, Okuda, Ito and Hosokawa. Mimbu was sent to Stockton, ~~Masuda~~ Masuda to Poston, Okuda to Granada, Ito to Tule Lake and Hosokawa to Heart Mountain. Considerable sympathy for these unfortunate

people who were given hardly enough time to pack their baggage developed among the evacuees who felt that these Nisei leaders were being sacrificed to the cause of Japanese, consequently a strong opposition developed against Sakamoto and his group for it was felt that it was they who had ^{sold}~~said~~ these fellow Nisei down the river.

Rumor had it that Sakamoto, Arai and possibly one other JAOL leader had arranged with the WCCA and Army for this transfer. From that point on the attitude of the people was which they would submit to the JAOL for the remainder of their stay at the Assembly Center and everything should be done to dispossess them of power at the Relocation Center.

At the Minidoka project it is clearly evident that the JAOL leaders have little or no power in ~~pl~~ the political life of the community. Sakamoto has been forced to the background of community life. Others like Setsuda, Tom Kanno and Ishihara who held important positions immediately under the inner-clique of the JAOL at Puyallup were relegated to insignificant positions at Minidoka. The position of the JAOL at Minidoka requires some analysis but by in large it is probably correct to say that it plays an unimportant life in community life there.

APPENDIX A, BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES SAKAMOTO

James Sakamoto, for thirteen years editor of the Japanese-American Courier (an all English weekly in Seattle), is about forty years of age, of average build, and is married and has two little daughters. The distinguishing characteristic about him is that he is blind and also possesses horribly mangled "calliflower ears", both the consequence of years of prize fighting.

"Jimmy", as he is familiarly known, was born in Seattle shortly after the turn of the century, and grew up in the Japanese community among other Nisei youths who all established reputations for athletic prowess and some degree of "toughness". He attended Franklin High School on the south side of the city, and became well known as one of the best quarterbacks to have ever played on that high school's football teams. Sometime in the 1920's, after he had finished high school, he left Seattle for New York, and for several years led a colorful though not entirely respectable career. He quickly established himself as one of the best lightweights fighting at Madison Gardens, and it is said that he often fought men in heavier classes since the fight promoters did not wish to see a Japanese rise to championship and refused Jimmy the opportunity of fighting contenders in his own class. The beating he took during these ring engagements subsequently led to blindness. It was also rumored that Jimmy had attended Princeton, though a counter rumor also existed to say that this was a story that Jimmy had started though there was no truth to it. It was also said that he attended the journalism school of the Columbia University. However, whatever schooling

he may have had in the eastern colleges, educational activity probably played a relatively unimportant part of his life in New York. He married and divorced a Caucasian girl while in the east, but gossip has it that he also played around with a number of other women while out there.

About 1928, Jimmy Sakamoto suddenly turned up again in Seattle with the information that he was losing his eyesight. In the space of a year after his return, he was completely blind, and has never been able to regain his sight despite repeated attention from doctors here as well as in Japan. In the last months before he completely lost the use of his eyes, he started an all-English newspaper for the Nisei of the Northwest, and the Japanese-American Courier as the paper was called became his main support through the years up to the evacuation. Starting his paper as he did just at the onset of the great depression, as well as at a time when the Japanese community of Seattle was on the decline, Jimmy was never able to establish his paper on a sound economic basis; and if he was able to maintain his paper over the years, it was only through the financial aid of the business men in the community (mostly Issei) and the cooperation of Nisei writer friends, ~~that he was able to keep his~~. People sympathized with Jimmy for his courageous effort to support his family despite his handicap. On the other hand, the paper was constantly on the verge of bankruptcy, and the wonder is that it maintained itself as long as it did.

Because of the important part which the Courier played in promoting the JACL in Seattle, and the relatively influential position which the editor of the only all English paper in the community had

upon the Nisei, Sakamoto became the virtual dictator of JACL policies in Seattle from the first days of its organization, and has held this position right through the evacuation. Not only has he been a strong JACL influence in Seattle, however, but he has gained recognition among the JACL leaders of the Pacific Coast and was one of the early presidents of the national body. The combination of his blindness and his fighting background easily made him the symbol of a fighting leader among the Nisei, and this symbolism was most frequently used by Caucasian as well as Japanese leaders who would single him out as the typical leader of the Nisei.

The myth that was created about Jimmy Sakamoto, however, does not entirely correspond with the actual position which he played in the Japanese political life of the Pacific Coast. His political views were strongly biased in favor of the Republicans, he frequently attacked the Communists in his papers though he gave little evidence of understanding the political issues involved, and he was one of the strongest individualists and anti-union men that could be found among the Nisei of the community. To be sure, the Nisei of Seattle were in general a conservative lot politically, and the only difference in Sakamoto was that he vehemently verbalized this conservatism. In the Sino-Japanese War as well as the Manchurian affair, his editorials were characterized by the stand of an apologist for Japan.

I have mentioned elsewhere in this connection that Jimmy was probably influenced in his apologist position of these years by the fact that his paper depended for most of its financial support on

the Issei business men of the community, and he could not afford to present a view disagreeable to them. But there was also an essential strain of individualism and conservatism in him. He prides himself on the fact that his family comes of Samurai background, and his talks have been filled with reference to the ideas ~~in~~ of "pioneering", "duty", "obedience to authority", etc. His political philosophy, it might be said, was shaped in large degree by the notions of self discipline that was popularized in Japanese tradition by the Japanese warriors. It is difficult to determine to what extent his blindness was a factor in making these concepts important to him; perhaps these ideas were means by which he bolstered his own courage in the face of discouraging~~n~~ obstacles to his personal success. There were undoubtedly personal barriers to success as a business man apart from his blindness, for his personality was such that it demanded some active outlets, some degree of free living, of the type that he had indulged in during his life in the East. There was unquestionably a constant personal struggle going on within him between the need of discipline by which to attain goals of economic success despite his blindness, and his impulses to indulge his more primitive^{ly} needs of the flesh. Sakamoto is, on the one hand, an idealist whose mind wanders back to the glories of bygone days, and, on the other hand, a man whose passions have been formed in the tough areas of the Japanese community and among his fighting circle in New York. Perhaps his greatest handicap was a lack of educational background, for this had its effect in limiting his horizon of understanding of the public issues whereof he wrote in his papers.

An outstanding trait in Sakamoto noted by those who know him well is his stubbornness coupled with a narrowness in his understanding of the affairs of life. In a way his thinking goes around in circles as of one who is limited in the possibilities of his thinking, and there is a certain rigidity to his thinking that has been the despair of those who have tried to work with him. Everyone concedes him sincerity of purpose, dogged persistence and courage in attempting to meet the problems placed before him, and a fair fund of knowledge about the Japanese and their problems; but the habits of his youth cut him out for a man of action rather than of thought, and it seems that he has never been able to overcome this initial tendency. In this sense, blindness for Sakamoto was a tragic blow for it required him to completely alter his life and to make of himself the kind of person which he was least equipped to be.

Jimmy married a girl, a Kibei with an exceptionally good business sense, shortly after his return to Seattle, and she probably more than anyone else has made the Courier possible. Family life for Mrs. Sakamoto has been as trying as it might be for anyone, for she has been required to guide a blind man as well as to run his business for him. Jimmy would frequently turn to drinking as a sop to his frustrated impulses, and his wife would plead with him against his abandoned use of the limited family funds. In recent years, with the growth of his two daughters, Jimmy has settled more and has been able to restrain his passions more. He turned to the Catholic Church, probably through the initial contacts established through his children's attendance at the Maryknoll school, and on occasion expresses a devout faith in this religion. But his life

retains to this day the flavor of lives described in 19th Century novels, in which the forces of ~~evil~~ good strive against the forces of evil in an unending internal struggle.

It is the paradox of Sakamoto's life that his blindness brought him to the position where he became the leader of the Nisei in Seattle, and an important figure in JACL activities of the Pacific Coast. Had he not lost his sight, it is doubtful that he would ever have settled to the business of promoting a rather unprofitable newspaper business, and he probably would not have troubled to strive for ~~the~~ leadership in the limited world of the Nisei. His blindness forced him into the position of leadership, but he brought to this office all the naivete of political thought that was characteristic of him as well as his stubbornness and doggedness by which he was able to maintain this position despite his shortcomings. Consequently, the JACL that he helped shape in Seattle was ^{influenced by} his simple and unsophisticated Pro-Americanism. Loyalty in this view meant the patriotism taught in the grammar schools of Seattle in his childhood, of "my country right or wrong". Where this simple political philosophy was found wanting in attempting to understand the trend of the Japanese position in the United States, Sakamoto could only revert to a practical philosophy of meeting the requirements as they arose from time to time.

REPORT OF SUB COMMITTEE ON RELOCATION

A meeting of sub-committee on relocation of farmers group was held on Thursday morning, July 22nd, at the office of Central Block Manager and following members of the committee were present;

Mr. G. Fujishige	Mr. S. Goto	Mr. T. Kinoshita
Mr. S. Hikida	Mr. Y. Minami (Son of Yaemon Minami, well known lettuce king of California)	

Committee discussed upon all matters pertaining to the relocation of farmers group and made following recommendations. It was the unanimous opinion of the members that unless some of the problems facing the resettlement of farming group which are listed below can be solved by the cooperation of the War Relocation Authority and other Governmental agencies, the satisfactory relocation of this group can never be accomplished. This will apply particularly to this project where large percentage of the center population come from rural district. Committee also expressed their belief that once relocation of this group is carried on smoothly and these farmers placed on good starting of their own farms there will come tremendous benefits both to evacuees and to national war industry through increase production of farm products. Therefore, it is sincerely hoped by the members of the committee that the War Relocation Authority and other Governmental agencies consider the problems seriously and bring satisfactory solution of the problems.

I PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD BE SOLVED AND WAY CLEARED FOR RESETTLEMENT OF FARMERS

1. FINANCIAL PROBLEM. In pre-evacuation days, most of our farmers invested their savings in their farms, including houses and implements, and at present they are not available themselves of cash funds to start farming of any scale, large or small. Even those who have little savings in bank do not like to risk their savings as capital in new enterprise in new and strange community under adverse condition. The farming by Japanese in the west coast, in many cases, were in making and by no means they were successful farmers.

* Therefore, it is so recommended that a certain amount of cash grant or cash loan at nominal interest rate payable in long term should be provided them.

2. SECURITY IN LIVING.

One of the main obstacles for resettlement of large families, especially the

farmers group, is a matter of security in living. There are many who would like to resettle at once if they can secure sure means of living. In the minds of many evacuees there is doubt as to their security in living after they relocate outside. So far, there have never been offered opportunity for large farming family to relocate, farm and live in secure.

* It is the recommendation of the committee to have W. R. A. to exert special efforts along this line.

3. FAMILY RELATIONS. Because of the condition under which they lived in California, and because of racial tendency, the family relations of these people were closely tied. This became more evident since the outbreak of war and after the evacuation. In view of such condition, particularly among rural people, there is certain fear of breaking down this family ties by the relocation process, especially, when W. R. A. resettlement policy is based upon dispersed method. Another problem is parents concern over their son's and daughters' matrimonial opportunities if they relocated to the communities where there is no other Japanese. Naturally, they become reluctant to relocate in new and strange community. Further-more, they were accustomed to interdependent type of farming in California, where mutual aids were given in labor and capital.

* Therefore, it is recommended by the committee a certain degree of group resettlement perhaps about fifteen to twenty families in gradual process should be permitted. In the states or localities where public sentiment against Japanese is not present a substantial number of Japanese farmers should be allowed to relocate rather than to disperse them in wider areas. In connection with this matter, the committee thinks that cooperative farming should be established with necessary aids given by government in initial stage until such time that these farmers will be self supporting.

4. PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTIES. Protection of resettling farmers from act of violence in time of emergency by proper authority should be guaranteed. Many evacuees worry so much about their safety in case of emergency.

5. HOUSING AND FARM IMPLEMENTS. According to the informations received by evacuees from those who relocated and now farming, one of the difficulties seem to be the

the matter pertaining to housing and acquisition of necessary farm implements.

* Committee recommend that negotiation should be made to give priority in securing the lumbars and farm implements.

* PROMOTION OF INSPECTION TRIP.

There are several who would like to leave the center for short period in order to observe the farming opportunities in other states. They hshould be given every assistance to obtain such informations.

II. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR EVACUEES FOR RECLOATION.

1. Economic and geograhic course specially on mid-western states be opened.
2. Education on value of resettlement and relocation.
3. Retraining of younger generation in midwestern type of farming.

In comclusion, the committee recommend that two methods of relocation plan should be employed. one is in individual relocation of farmers while other is group relocation. Former can be accomplished through placement of younger member of farming families in jobs offered in small towns where there are farming opportunities near by. Latter can be carried on through cooperative type of farming in the localities where public sentiment is favorable to Japanese farmers.